[NATO-L] Brigade / Rogov et al / Latvia / Abshire
John Pike
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
1 - RUSSIA * NATO BRIGADE RUSSIA IS READY TO CONSIDER A
PROPOSAL EXPRESSED BY THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO
CREATE A JOINT RUSSIAN-NATO BRIGADE MOSCOW,
FEBRUARY 19. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT
ALEXEI MESHKOV./
2 - NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY
(Executive and Legislative Newsletter No. 7. In full.) 14 Feb 97
3 - * LATVIA * TURKEY * NATO * LATVIA RECKONS ON
TURKEY'S SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION OF NATO RIGA,
FEBRUARY 18. RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT ANATOLY
BARANOVSKY -
4 - A Debate For 16 Parliaments - By David M. Abshire
The Washington Post Wednesday, February 19 1997; Page A21
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
RUSSIA * NATO BRIGADE RUSSIA IS READY TO CONSIDER A
PROPOSAL EXPRESSED BY THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO
CREATE A JOINT RUSSIAN-NATO BRIGADE MOSCOW,
FEBRUARY 19. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT
ALEXEI MESHKOV./
Russia is ready to consider a proposal put forward by Madeleine
Albright, US Secretary of State, on the creation of a joint
Russian-NATO brigade. She expressed this proposal at a meeting
of the North Atlantic Alliance at the level of ministers, which
took place on February 18 at the NATO's headqarters in
Brussels. This was stated today by a top official of the ministry
of defence of Russia. However, according to him, Russia did not
receive any concrete documents in connection with this.
If such a formation is created as "a kind of shield to defend
Europe against nobody knows whom", the ministry spokesman
said, "this is unacceptable". It is another thing if it is used for
fulfilling peace-keeping operations like those carried out by
multi-national forces in Bosnia.
However, the spokesman said, it is not necessary to create a
special Russian-NATO brigade for this purpose. The best thing to
do is to consider a question of including Russian units into the
Eurocorps already existing. -0- /ign/lnv/
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY
(Executive and Legislative Newsletter No. 7. In full.) 14 Feb 97
The prospect of NATO's eastward expansion is worrying not only the
military, politicians and diplomats, but also the Russian public at
large. A
group of authoritative specialists who are immediately involved with
this issue
met for a "roundtable" in the RIA Novosti on February 11. Here are the
summaries of their statements.
Sergei ROGOV,
Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute
of US and Canadian Studies
The Cold War ended five years ago, but one has a feeling now that the
United States regards its results as its full victory over the Soviet
Union and
seeks to ensure the West, especially itself, a leading role in building
a new
world order.
The United States wants to become the only superpower and the efforts to
integrate the Eastern European countries in NATO's military structure
bear
this out.
There is no disputing the fact that this policy runs counter to Russia's
vital
interests. This country is being forced out of Europe and made to take
the
pose of a passive onlooker with regard to the European security issues,
which
will be decided by the NATO leading bodies.
I should note in this context that the West overlooks the fact that in
Russia,
where any issue provokes controversy and debate, there is a surprisingly
persistent consensus on the issue of NATO's enlargement: no one wants
the
North Atlantic Alliance to expand.
In fact, all put the question like this: either we are treated as a
great power
and our legitimate interests are respected or Russia is being pushed to
the
backyard of international life.
What should Russia do in this situation? There is no doubt that we
should not
take NATO's expansion lying down, although we should also realise that
no
one is asking for our consent. In this context one can only wonder at
the
position of the former Russian Foreign Minister who recently published
an
article saying that after some time Russia would somehow adapt herself
to
these changes and that one should not take her current objections too
seriously.
We must not only resist NATO's expansion plans, but also should not let
anyone drive us into a corner. The policy of confrontation with the West
and
reviving the Cold War does not meet our interests. Moreover, the line-up
of
forces has lately changed dramatically not in our favour and we should
realise
that we cannot win in such political or even military confrontation.
In July the NATO leaders are to meet in Madrid where they will make the
decision to invite to NATO at least three Eastern European countries. I
believe that the time left before that decision should be used for
intensive
negotiations with the NATO leadership and also the leaders of the
Eastern
European countries (unfortunately, we talk too little with the latter on
the
issue) in order to try to find solutions that would make it possible to
defend
Russia's security interests and ensure Russia a fitting place at the
table where decisions on the key issues of European security will be
taken.
I believe that deployment of NATO's nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe is
not inevitable. It should be recalled that 10 years ago there were 7,000
American nuclear warheads in Europe; now there are 600 warheads and
within the next few years their number will be reduced to 300. At the
moment NATO has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe.
The problem is that NATO refuses to assume a legally binding obligation
not
to station nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, making that decision
conditional upon Russia's behaviour.
Russia insists that NATO or its new Eastern European members pledge not
to place any nuclear weapons on their territory. Lastly, it may be a
Russian-American or Russian-French treaty, whereby the nuclear powers
will
assume an obligation in relation to the tactical nuclear weapons.
Nikolai AFANASYEVSKY,
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation
Unfortunately, we have not yet seen anything that may suggest NATO's
transformation from a military bloc into an organisation serving the
interests
of security and stability in Europe. One way or the other, NATO is
determined to carry out its expansion plans and the question is whether
we
can do anything to minimise the damage that may be inflicted upon us
without returning to futile confrontational policy.
There are several possibilities. Firstly, we can minimise the military
consequences (non-deployment of nuclear weapons and new types of
conventional armaments and the development of the armed forces of the
new
NATO members in accordance with their declared purposes, that is for
peace-keeping operations). It is also necessary strictly to determine
the aims
and scale of their military activity.
The second aspect is taking into account the political consequences of
the
development of our relations with the western alliance. The West has
repeatedly assured us that it desires to arrange equitable relations
with Russia and take account of her interests as much as possible.
However, it is only a declaration so far. No wonder that in response to
the alliance's proposal we have agreed to hold consultations with the
aim of ascertaining whether NATO is really prepared to meet our concerns
halfway in the military,
political and many other spheres.
The idea is to create a mechanism of co-operation in the military and
other
spheres, a mechanism of consultations and decision-making on the issues
of
immediate concern for Russia. It's hard to say if it's possible to
create such
mechanisms, but we have spelled out our positions, made them known to
the
NATO leadership and are now waiting for the West to reply.
There is a third aspect one should bear in mind. However important, good
relations with NATO are not the only element of European politics. We
believe that the view that the entire structure of security should be
centres on NATO is not projected to the future. There is the OSCE and
other
authoritative organisations that might significantly expand the borders
of
international co-operation in Europe.
We believe that the best way out of the current situation is to focus on
NATO's real transformation. That would be in the interests of the
alliance
itself.
The current aim of our consultations is to determine whether NATO is
prepared to respond to Russia's concerns. We have spelled out our
positions
and made them known to the NATO leadership, so it's now for the NATO to
reply.
Dmitry RYURIKOV,
Presidential Adviser on International Affairs
It is fundamentally important that Russia's rights and interests as the
largest
European states are respected during the expansion of NATO. It can be
said
so far that Russia is denied the main thing, namely involvement in the
solution of European security problems. This is alarming.
In addition, it should be remembered that the world's largest war
machine is
drawing closer to our borders. Nobody in the West can explain explicitly
why
this is being done. However, many Russian analysts qualify this process
from
the viewpoint of international law as a dramatic change of
circumstances.
Indeed, are we witnessing major military-political and strategic changes
in
Europe? If so, this will change dramatically Russia's policy with regard
to the
existing and developing realities.
One of such realities, which we must take into account, is NATO. Russia
should cooperate with it, and on a broader legal basis than provided by
the
Partnership for Peace programme. Russia demands a legal formalisation of
mutual obligations under this agreement, whose text is being coordinated
at
consultations now.
We would not like to see a repetition of the events which took place
after
1990, when changes in the European situation were not sealed in
international treaties. At that time we were given oral promises that
NATO
would not expand, promises which were buried later.
Russia's interests are legitimate, and it has the right, as a state, to
corresponding legal guarantees. From the legal viewpoints the most
important
issue is our status and the problems related to its implementation,
namely
how Russia will take part in ensuring security, how Russia and NATO will
make decisions on European security issues, and to what degree mutual
interests will be respected. In this context, the claims that the West
would
never give Russia the right of veto with regard to situations bearing on
European security appear strange.
Why do other European states, which have smaller interests in a certain
region or a conflict-prone area, enjoy the right of veto simply because
they
are NATO members, while Russia is denied this right? This is not fair.
That
is why Russia will demand respect for its rights in this issue.
The interests of Russia are rejected by those Western quarters which
regard
themselves as the winners in the cold war against the Soviet Union and
fail to
accept the vast changes which took place on the territory of the former
Soviet Union, above all in Russia. These quarters have shifted the
stereotypes of their attitude to the Soviet Union onto Russia. They use
the
old yardstick in assessing it and present time-worn demands to it,
forgetting
that the West and Russia have common values and aims in this new world,
and that they should hence act differently.
Russia has the moral right to demand that its interests are assessed
correspondingly, taken into account and eventually sealed in treaties
and
agreements.
I believe there is still a hope that the question of the NATO expansion
has
not been decided. There is still time to think if the Central European
and
NATO countries really need this expansion, and analyse all pro and
contra
arguments. A serious issue for consideration is the financial burden,
which
will weigh down on the taxpayers in Eastern Europe, NATO countries and
Russia.
Col.-Gen. Leonid IVASHOV,
Head of the Main Directorate of International Military
Cooperation of the Defence Ministry
It looks as if detente, the build-up of trust and Russia's involvement
in
European affairs have frightened some forces in the West into trying to
put a
brake, or even to turn back this process.
The transformation of NATO [into a political organisation] has been
halted.
It is still a military bloc, with none of the ten articles of the
Washington
Treaty changed. No amendments have been made in the Rome strategic
NATO concept, which gives the Soviet Union as the bloc's enemy.
Moreover, the US national security strategy openly says that Russia is
the
potential source of military threat. It appears that a freeze put on
detente
gave birth to the idea of NATO expansion.
Why is Russia so fiercely opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO? We
regard this possibility as damaging to our national security and,
second, as the revival of the cold war elements, which undermines
Russia's trust for the
declared intentions of the Western states.
In practice, the eastward expansion of NATO means the advance of the
bloc's military forces to the borders of the Russian Federation. The
Americans are pulling out 500 aircraft and 1,300 tanks from Europe, but
NATO will get over 700 aircraft and 3,500 tanks by admitting the first
few
new members. In other words, the military capabilities of the bloc will
increase, while the buffer zone will decrease.
Russia is invited to sign a charter which is not even a legally binding
document. The stance of the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and other Russian power structures is that the expansion of NATO
is
not acceptable to Russia, is a source of a new military threat and will
reduce
the security zone of Russia in the West.
The active diplomacy of the NATO countries, above all the USA, is
spearheaded at preventing the creation of a collective security system
of the
CIS states. One of the tasks of the eastward expansion of NATO is to
preclude the military integration of the CIS.
Russia's military weakness was one of the factors inducing NATO to move
eastward. How can Russia make up for this loss of security? First, the
CIS
states should pool their efforts. And second, Russia should pursue a
more
active foreign policy, in particular in the sphere of military
cooperation, with a possible change in the vector of these relations. I
think that Russia has several possible answers - and not all of them
military - to the eastward
expansion of NATO.
Alexei ARBATOV,
Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee
Let us ponder a situation in this country where the matter of NATO's
expansion would never arise or, while projecting its plans into the
future, the
West could not but heed Russia's stance.
For this, we need to achieve an economic upsurge, to rapidly promote
democratic processes, and to successfully integrate with the major CIS
states.
Of course, we need to settle the not insoluble problems with Ukraine,
the
Crimea and the Black Sea fleet division. We need to make the reform in
the
military sphere more efficient and the civilian control thereof better
working.
Importantly, we need to propose a wholesome plan of reorganising the
European security system so as to make NATO's enlargement inappropriate.
I can visualise two ways to postpone, if not check altogether, NATO's
expansion to the east.
One is to intensify the START-2 ratification process in the summer and
fall
of 1997 by way of a political accord between Russia's government and
legislators. The NATO leadership would certainly think twice before
setting
out to materialise plans capable of driving the document's ratification
in
Russia into an impasse again.
The other is to expedite the settlement of outstanding matters with
Ukraine
around the Black Sea fleet and Sevastopol. The joint naval command of
Russia and Ukraine, as proposed by Leonid Kuchma, could provide a quick
decision of the matter, for that would effectively be a voluntary
military
union.
Nothing of the sort is yet taking place, although I do hope that the
Russian
executive authorities will make steps in that direction in whatever time
there
still is.
Many of the economic consequences of NATO's expansion would depend on
Russia's future relations with the West and the Eastern and Central
Europe.
The cold that may set in may freeze many a trade or economic contact.
If Russia were to make steps in the military sphere, like buttressing
its Army
or casting aside the idea of cutbacks on its numerical strength, this
country
would have to spend more money for the military needs at the expense of
health protection, education, environmental protection, social welfare,
etc. In
other words, Russia would feel the heat of even indirect consequences of
NATO's expansion.
I do not think NATO's enlargement to the east would topple democracy in
Russia, but it can well become a democracy with a clearly anti-West
tinge,
not unlike India. The West then would find it harder to deal with that
Russia
than even with the totalitarian, and now defunct, Soviet Union.
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
* LATVIA * TURKEY * NATO * LATVIA RECKONS ON
TURKEY'S SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION OF NATO RIGA,
FEBRUARY 18. RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT ANATOLY
BARANOVSKY -
Today President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia has left for Turkey on
a 4-day state visit. In the course of the visit it is planned to sign
treaties on protection of investments, trade, and economic
cooperation, and also on cooperation in the field of military
training, military science and technology.
Before leaving for Ankara Ulmanis told newsmen that
possibilities of the development of bilateral economic cooperation
and agreement on the stand on extension of the European Union
and NATO will be in the centre of the Latvian delegation's
forthcoming talks. "We will seek ways of NATO's expansion
which would lead to inclusion of the Baltic countries in the
North-Atlantic Alliance", the President of Latvia said. -0-
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
A Debate For 16 Parliaments
By David M. Abshire
The Washington Post
Wednesday, February 19 1997; Page A21
Now that the debate on the enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization is well underway, both sides
seem bent on offering a stark choice between two
unappealing alternatives. On one side, many argue that
NATO should readily admit the countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet republics that seek membership
because it is the only way of ensuring their new-found
independence from Moscow and their democratic stability.
On the other are those who warn that by bringing
U.S.-commanded troops hundreds of miles closer to
Moscow, NATO's enlargement would provoke the most
acute resentment in today's much diminished and humiliated
Russia, strengthening both the ultranationalists and
communists there while weakening democratic reform.
While the enlargers have denounced their opponents as
appeasers, the latter speak of enlargement as endangering
the new spirit of cooperation between Washington and
Moscow. What makes this polarization especially troubling
is that the debate will be conducted in 16 parliaments
simultaneously, including our Congress.
Both sides are overlooking NATO's limitations, as well as
its great strengths. It had barely overcome its 1989-1990
crisis of relevance in the immediate aftermath of the end of
the Cold War when its members were torn by the war in
Yugoslavia. There is bitter irony in the fact that an alliance
that had successfully resisted the full might of the Soviet
Union for more than 40 years was not used to confronting
the tin-pot dictators who proceeded to ravage former
Yugoslavia. NATO was ineffectual for such a long time
because its key members were divided and would not use
its machinery. In other words it lacked the one essential
quality of an alliance: cohesion.
That was the very quality that had been cultivated over the
decades by the most patient diplomacy, and by the detailed
cooperation of countless American and European diplomats
and officers in NATO's commands. But as the Yugoslav
debacle proved, cohesion is not to be taken for granted.
The Treaty of Washington, which established NATO as an
ongoing organization, was not simply an anti-So\viet alliance.
Indeed, the Soviet Union was not even mentioned in the
treaty. NATO represented a meeting of the minds between
Western Europeans, who had finally understood that only a
restoration of Charlemagne's unity could avert further wars
among them, and Americans, who concluded that a
disunited Western Europe would cost them further blood
and treasure at regular intervals. Of course, NATO was
from the first challenged by the Soviet Union, but its
essential and lasting purpose was the strategic cohesion of
Western Europe.
NATO's enlargement should be evaluated accordingly.
Quite aside from any possible Russian reaction, what would
it add to the cohesion of NATO itself? If one country after
another is admitted -- some talk of Russia itself as a possible
member in due course -- it will no longer be today's
functioning and cohesive NATO that the new members will
be joining but rather a diluted entity, a sort of league of
nations.
It is at this point that the stark alternatives now being
debated should be reexamined. True, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary have met many of the requirements to
join the alliance and should not he spurned. But there is no
need to choose between admission and rejection or first-
and second-class status, because all three countries can join
the North Atlantic Council -- the political dimension of
NATO -- without now joining the military commands. That's
how Spain joined NATO as its 16th member. France for
many years has been outside the command structure, and
Norway and Denmark, in effect were not part of the nuclear
side.
In practice, the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles would have
all the benefits of alliance security, including the full
protection of Article 5, which says, "an armed attack against
one or more of them [the parties to the treaty] in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them
all,'" without undermining its internal cohesion.
It can be argued that this solution should have been thought
of earlier. True, but even though expectations are already
raised to include military integration, a major new
consideration argues for revisiting the issue. The question is
cost. How much would it cost new and present members to
achieve military integration? Estimates run to tens of billions
of dollars over the next 15 years. Throughout NATO, that
would further strain defense budgets already under stress,
not to mention the even greater burden it would put on the
budgets of new members. If, however, expectations on
military integration can be scaled back, political expansion
becomes a win-win solution that helps Western ratification
and calms Russian fears.
NATO was conceived as a European alliance and not as a
Eurasian one. That is why it is now urgent to firmly define
the "Partnership for Peace," which is Eurasian, as a broad
security framework in its own right rather than a mere
way-station to NATO membership. With that, it must
become the equally urgent task of American diplomacy to
explain as often and as fully as required that a NATO
expanded more and more would be less and less effective in
ensuring the stability of all of Europe, for members and
non-members alike.
The writer, U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1983 to 1987,
is co-founder and president of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
© Copyright 1997 The Washington Post Company
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
John Pike
Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/
Space Policy Project http://www.fas.org/spp/
Public Eye http://www.fas.org/eye/
Intelligence Reform Project http://www.fas.org/irp/
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.
- Jefferson