Mitch Boyer theory?
Ryan
Steven B. Harris
(Ryan) writes:
>
>
>--WebTV-Mail-19829-282
>Content-Type: Text/Plain; Charset=US-ASCII
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit
>
>Hi, I have a tape called Henry Weibert, 82 Yrs and still on Custers
>Trail. He lives on part of the battlefield and has thousands of
>artifacts. He found the unknown soldier and the crow's nest. Anyway,
>his theory is that Mitch Boyer killed Custer early in the battle and
>then while running to join the Indians a trooper shot him. Mr.
Weibert
>also says that when they were at the Crow's Nest Boyer showed up
wearing
>a new clean jacket when everything else was dirty. When asked where
he
>got it he said he found it on the hill. Mr. Weibert thinks the
Indians
>gave it to him so they would recognize him in the battle and not shoot
>him.
Well, gosh, that sounds like a quite believable conspiracy theory.
You wear this new jacket so that a thousand Indian warriors riding
around in the dust and shooting off their rifles from horseback at your
group, won't accidently shoot YOU. VERRY clever. Hell, you've made a
believer out of *me*.
Doc Credulous
ROGER E WATSON
First I've heard of this theory !! What I've read on Boyer wouldn't indicate
actions like this. Maybe he actually survived the battle and was on the
grassy knoll in Dallas. <G>
Regards....Roger
>>Ryan <Ry...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:6447-3869ACF2->>2...@storefull-262.iap.bryant.webtv.net...
>>Hi, I have a tape called Henry Weibert, 82 Yrs and still on Custers
>>Trail. He lives on part of the battlefield and has thousands of
>>artifacts. He found the unknown soldier and the crow's nest. Anyway,
>>his theory is that Mitch Boyer killed Custer early in the battle and
>>then while running to join the Indians a trooper shot him.
<snip>
>>Ryan
Ryan's Buffalo Page
Ryan
ro...@webtv.net
really killed Tom Custer, cut his heart out, and took a bite of it. He
had said on several ocassions he had done the deeds. However, in this
interview, he said,
"Many lies have been told abut that battle. But in the heat of the
fighting you would not have known your on father or brother."
Recognize and not kill someone because he was in a clean coat????
Hardly sees reasonable or possible
I have felt that maybe, if he knew it was all over, he may have shot
himself, or (he had a wound in the left temple and left breast) maybe
Tom or another of his men did it.
Hoka Hey !
Charlie
Ryan
n8ivtxan
Ryan wrote in message <9602-38...@storefull-265.iap.bryant.webtv.net>...
I'd have to agree, the temple shot kind of leads me to believe that it
wasn't an Indian bullet that killed him. Since you mentioned
Rain-In-The-Face you might want to look at my website, and on the last
page is an actual photo of him that I have in my artifact collection. I
temporarily put it on the page to get it apppraised by someone.
thanks, ryan. thoroughly enjoyed your website. great buffy pix. :)
Eliot Greene
I'd have to agree, the temple shot kind of leads me to believe that it wasn't an Indian bullet that killed him. Since you mentioned Rain-In-The-Face you might want to look at my website, and on the last page is an actual photo of him that I have in my artifact collection. I temporarily put it on the page to get it apppraised by someone.
Ryan
Ryan's Buffalo Page
ROGER E WATSON
You won't get an arguement from me !! <G> I really enjoyed Gray's book. The
time lines established for the different elements of Custer's command were
fascinating.
Since I'm fairly new to the study of GAC and LBH, would you care to
recommend other books that are unbiased (phile or phobe) in the way Gray's
book is. At least, I felt it was unbiased !!
Regards...Roger
Michael Wyman <mwy...@home.com> wrote in message
news:386BFBD8...@home.com...
> all are dead. Theory is also dead, since the publication of the most
> influential book on the battle (arguably) John s. Gray's Custer's Last
> Campaign, which makes boyer out to be a hero.
>
> Left Hand
>
> Ryan wrote:
> >
> > Hi, I have a tape called Henry Weibert, 82 Yrs and still on Custers
> > Trail. He lives on part of the battlefield and has thousands of
> > artifacts. He found the unknown soldier and the crow's nest. Anyway,
> > his theory is that Mitch Boyer killed Custer early in the battle and
> > then while running to join the Indians a trooper shot him. Mr. Weibert
> > also says that when they were at the Crow's Nest Boyer showed up wearing
> > a new clean jacket when everything else was dirty. When asked where he
> > got it he said he found it on the hill. Mr. Weibert thinks the Indians
> > gave it to him so they would recognize him in the battle and not shoot
> > him. Has anybody else heard or read anything like this. This was the
> > first I've ever heard of it. Thanks.
> >
> > Ryan
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Ryan's Buffalo Page
Michael Wyman
Bob Tiernan
> all are dead. Theory is also dead, since the publication of the most
> influential book on the battle (arguably) John s. Gray's Custer's Last
> Campaign, which makes boyer out to be a hero.
Well, not so much a hero (at Little Big Horn), but a
reliable scout/guide who did what he paid to do (and
he admitted he was doing it for the money).
Bob Tiernan
The man who is always worrying whether or not his soul would
be damned generally has a soul that isn't worth a damn.
-- Oliver Wendell Holmes
Bob Tiernan
Ryan wrote:
> I'd have to agree, the temple shot kind of leads me to believe that
> it wasn't an Indian bullet that killed him.
That's hardly evidence at all. The chest shot was what got him first,
and the head shot may have been fired into him while he was on the
ground after his position was overrun. I need to see other examples
of Plains Indians firing into heads to see if they placed any
significance in that spot as a good place to shoot someone. On the
other hand, there is some eyewitness testimony that describes the
head wound as more or less a random shot in the side of the head,
not the temple specifically. Custer may have been hit while prone
or kneeeling behind a dead horse, his head and shoulders all that
was exposed.
Bob Tiernan
> I really enjoyed Gray's book. The time lines established for the
> different elements of Custer's command were fascinating.
Gray's book is brilliant. He was by far the best at analyzing
data and piecing it together, with a great ability to figure
out what some participants meant when writing years later
when memory was fuzzy. Cross-checking well done.
> Since I'm fairly new to the study of GAC and LBH, would you care to
> recommend other books that are unbiased (phile or phobe) in the way
> Gray's book is. At least, I felt it was unbiased !!
It is. Gray was not necessarily a Custer defender, but over time
he came to appreciate his talents as a campaigner.
Other books I'd recommend are:
"Cavalier in Buckskin" by Robert Utley
"Custer Victorious" by Greg Urwin
"Custer's Luck" by Edgar I. Stewart
It's probably time for me to re-post my book reviews
to this newsgroup, since a number of new people are
participating. This may interest some in a few other
books.
Bob Tiernan
(Ryan) writes:
> Anyway, his theory is that Mitch Boyer killed Custer early in the
> battle and then while running to join the Indians a trooper shot him.
I know of this one, and it's interesting but not very good.
Aside from the absurdity of the whole story, Bouyer was
not very fond of the Sioux, and lived with the Crows (bitter
ebemies of the Sioux) so would beu nlikely to help them out.
> Mr. Weibert also says that when they were at the Crow's Nest Boyer
> showed up wearing a new clean jacket when everything else was dirty.
> When asked where he got it he said he found it on the hill. Mr.
> Weibert thinks the Indians gave it to him so they would recognize
> him in the battle and not shoot him.
I remember being told this when the story came out on book form.
So, what is the source of the jacket story? Do you accept this
because Weibert said it, or do you know the name of the scout
or soldier who related the clean jacket story?
Eliot Greene
> It's probably time for me to re-post my book reviews
> to this newsgroup, since a number of new people are
> participating. This may interest some in a few other
> books.
Yes, please do, speaking for myself. And perhaps Laro's reviews of what
he has seen of those mentioned as well, and both folks on Mr. Oxberry's
sale.
ROGER E WATSON
I've read Custer's Luck and enjoyed it very much. I just acquired Cavalier
in Buckskin, so that's on the list to read ! Would really appreciate your
posting the reviews you refer to.
Thanks for the reply....Roger
Bob Tiernan <zu...@teleport.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.GSO.4.10.100010...@user2.teleport.com...
> Other books I'd recommend are:
>
> "Cavalier in Buckskin" by Robert Utley
>
> "Custer Victorious" by Greg Urwin
>
> "Custer's Luck" by Edgar I. Stewart
>
>
> It's probably time for me to re-post my book reviews
> to this newsgroup, since a number of new people are
> participating. This may interest some in a few other
> books.
>
>
Bob Tiernan
CUSTER VICTORIOUS:
THE CIVIL WAR BATTLES OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER
By Gregory J.W. Urwin. Published by the University of Nebraska Press,
Bison Book, 1990. Photographs, Maps, Bibliography and Index.
First published in 1983 and now reissued by Nebraska Press Gregory Urwin's
CUSTER VICTORIOUS is a most welcome addition to Custer literature, one
that helps to fill a void for those Custer aficionados who have never
been entirely satisfied with any particular book covering the man's Civil
War career. Some writers have correctly stated that in order to fully
understand Custer as a military commander one must take a good look at his
performance as a brigade and division commander, and not rely solely on
the study of his last battle or his 7th Cavalry years in general.
The Little Big Horn fight guaranteed that Custer's Civil War exploits
would never sink into obscurity, although he was flamboyant enought to
have remained one of the most popular and interesting cavalry leaders to
those students of the Civil War. At the same time, Custer's final battle
brought him so much attention that his every action has been heavily
scrutinized, and while his Civil War reputation has always been favorable
and much less controversial than his Plains service, some of his critics
have attempted to tear apart his Civil War record as well, although I've
found little evidence to back up their efforts to belittle Custer's
earlier career and to relegate it to one of unbelievable luck,
favoritism, and little or no tactical skill, perfect for flowing
smoothly into his more blemished frontier career. Typical of these is
David Nevin, who wrote in the Time-Life book THE SOLDIERS that Custer's
tactical repertoire consisted solely of charging immediately into the
enemy upon sighting them, with no precautions taken whatsoever. This
is nonsense as Urwin so clearly reveals.
Professor Urwin has used many accounts and reminiscences of Custer's
fellow generals, staff officers, opponents and his own subordinates from
field officers down to enlisted men to give this book a valuable array of
opinions by those who were there. The comments of Custer's own junior
officers and enlisted men are quite interesting, especially when compared
to the remarks made by their counterparts in the 7th Cavalry era.
One of the few truly controversial events in Custer's Civil War career
was his sudden elevation to brigade command shortly before the Battle
of Gettysburg. The controversy stems from the fact that the fairly
reasonable explanation for the simultaneous promotions of Custer, Wesley
Merritt and Elon Farnsworth remain incomplete to many, regardless of
whether or not these promotions seem fair or unfair. Well, it wasn't the
clerical error that some want to believe, and Custer did not have enough
supporters in Washington to give him a purely political appointment. Since
the original publication of the book, however, some missing pieces to
this puzzle have surfaced in an article by Marshall Krolick in Civil War
Magazine. Cavalry Corps commander Alfred Pleasonton's xenophobia,
coupled with string-pulling to acquire additional cavalry regiments to be
commanded by his own choice picks, resulted in the sweeping away of some
high ranking foreigners from their units, creating the vacancies for the
three young officers. Interesting and satisfactory explanations indeed,
they nevertheless do not change the generally held view that Custer and
his two colleagues were lucky as well as talented proteges entrusted by
their mentor with brigade command. They were far from being alone in
the matter.
Urwin provides the reader with more than enough evidence to show that
Custer, as well as Merritt, were highly competent general officers who
moved easily into brigade command, possibly benefiting from staff
backgrounds. Pleasonton apparently knew what he was doing, although we
may never know how Farnsworth would have made out as he was killed only
days after his promotion. Details in this volume reveal a Custer who took
his command responsibilities very seriously, transforming himself almost
overnight from a carefree slob of a staff officer into a responsible
commander whose disciplinary methods did not rub people the wrong way as
they later would in his post-war career. That he, as well as Merritt, not
only pleased the hard-to-please Phil Sheridan (when the latter replaced
Pleasonton) but continued to develop into very reliable and trusted
subordinates with larger commands attests to their abilities. I have
always taken note of the fact that cavalry commanders were often out on
their own, away from their superiors, and thus required a cool head to
take care of their commands when confronted by the enemy, as opposed to
their counterparts in the infantry who almost always fought close to other
units, relieving them of a lot of strain of command that affects many when
on their own. Custer thrived under these conditions, and anybody who is
unfamiliar with the Civil War Custer will have to read this book in order
to get a look at a Custer that is still much overshadowed by his last
performance. Although he wanted to be in combat as often as possible,
Custer displayed more good judgement and caution than he will ever be
given credit for, and Urwin provides the words of Custer's own
subordinates to point this out, which will always carry more weight
than those of a critic such as Van de Water.
If I must point out something about CUSTER VICTORIOUS that bothered me,
I would have to say that I was a little annoyed with the over-usage of
the terms "The Boy General" and "Old Curly" in too many sentences when
"Custer" would have been sufficient. And I wished that the book could
have been longer.
Bob Tiernan
Bob Tiernan
CUSTER AND THE CHEYENNES: GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER'S WINTER CAMPAIGN
ON THE SOUTHERN PLAINS
By Louis Kraft. Published by Upton and Sons, 1995 212p. Photographs,
maps, index, bibliography.
Hardcover, $65.00
George Custer's performance during the winter campaigning of late 68-69
was perhaps the finest of his post-Civil War career, yet, aside from the
Washita fight it gets but a fraction of the attention it deserves. In his
edition of Custer's "My Life on the Plains", Milo Quaife wrote, "[Custer
gave] a remarkable performance which deserves far greater renown than has
ever been accorded it. In its conduct he displayed a complete mastery of
Indian psychology and of the art of frontier warfare". Louis Kraft's new
book is one of the few attempts to draw some attention to this campaign.
One of the problems is that the bulk of Indian Wars historians and
students are, and have been, too obsessed with actual battles, and
therefore fail to see the significance of other aspects of campaigning
on the Plains when it comes to evaluating performances of various army
commanders. Jumping a village at the end of a trail is not the only
thing a commander should be judged on in order to get a high rating with
historians, but that's where the attention has been focused. The result
is that significant results from campaigning that avoided an attacks on
villages have been neglected as lesser achievements. But the lack of any
such attacks should not be ignored in any analysis of a campaign.
The text of this book is written in a simple style, with zillions of
little one-sentence paragraphs, one after the other, which was slightly
annoying to this reviewer.
For what it's worth to some, Kraft uses what he calls "point-of-view
dialogue", and "archaic word usage". When text is written from the point
of view of the white soldiers, for example, Custer is referred to as
"Armstrong", and the Indians by their respective tribal names of Cheyenne,
Osage, etc. When switching over to the point of view of the Plains Indian
participants, Custer is suddenly "Ouchess" (Creeping Panther) in the text,
while the Cheyennes become "Tsistsistas", or Southern People.
Happily, Mr. Kraft takes no part in any historical revisionism based
on political correctness. Let's hope that this scourge dies for lack of
interest. Each book or article that defies this trendy P.C. scourge is
one more step towards reaching that goal.
To this reviewer's distaste, the text is peppered with boyish phrases
like: "Armstrong was ready!", "This was it!", "Could he? You bet!",
"This could not be!", and "The hunt was on!". I find these inappropriate
for any history book not meant for grammar school libraries.
The first few chapters of the book deal with Custer's initial Indian
campaigning in 1867. This must be seen as background material that would
be hard to leave out of any work that is written for general readers as
well as those serious students who could easily understand any Custer
book that starts, as the novice might see it, in the middle of something.
Custer's 1867 actions, and in-actions, make up only about 10% of the text,
but I'd like to see a book on the 68-69 campaigning that does not need to
rehash 1867 before it could get going. In a book I'd like to see, the
importance of 1867 would be its part in an analysis of Custer's rise as a
skilled campaigner. "Custer and the Cheyennes" barely touches upon this.
The coverage of Custer's 1867 activities could have been better utilized,
though, in setting up for the later winter campaign. Despite limited
space, there was ample room to include more of Custer's controversial
actions, both minor and major, that had a great effect on later campaigns
and thus worthy of mention as part of any background material for later
events. To give but a few examples, Custer's arrogance is barely touched
upon. There is a brief reference to Custer learning about the Plains
Indians from scout Will Comstock (just as Custer mentioned this in his "My
Life On The Plains"), but neither Custer nor Kraft mentions that Comstock
and other frontiersmen were pretty much ignored by Custer at that time,
though Custer clearly remembered everything he was told, and was therefore
able to re-evaluate his performance after he was court-martialed, and upon
his return to the Plains in October of 1868 he had better ideas on how to
go about his business.
There also is not much of any mention of Custer's general abrasiveness
during his 1867 rompings and how this did much to create hostility
towards him in the officer corps, much of it long term, and most of it
unnecessary. And as for the famous ride to Fort Riley, the cholera story
is repeated as the main motivation for Custer's ride, but no mention is
made of the possibility that Custer was rushing to catch one of his
officers who, he was apparently informed, was paying a lot of attention
to Mrs. Custer. Again, little of the controversies that make 1867 so
interesting, as well on influential on his later campaigning, make an
appearance even though Custer's reputation never fully recovered from his
initial outing on the Plains. This account of Custer's first campaign is
thus more or less sanitized in a way that it barely hints at how it
affected everyone's opinion of how Custer operated.
Moving on to 1868, Kraft covers the major aspects and phases of the
campaigning without bogging himself down into too many details, keeping
the book's length down to about 200 easy pages for the general reader.
By jumping back and forth between the white point of view and the Indian
point of view, Kraft involves the reader in both camps as they head
towards the major clash of the campaign, followed by a scatter-and-pursue
phase for several months afterward.
Most of the controversies of the Washita fight are covered: Hamilton's
death; non-combatant casualties; Elliott's disappearance, village size,
etc. The myth that Custer was an indiscriminate killer, with he himself
giving the orders for his men to kill anybody in sight, needs to be laid
to rest, and Kraft is the latest writer to point this out. The Elliott
episode, on the other hand, is not so easily dismissed, though Kraft gives
it the pro-Custer try. Not that Custer was guilty of anything, but it was
possible for him to make a better search than was made before leaving the
area. Custerphobes and Custerphiles usually set themselves up for further
questions by contradicting themselves on their general theories. Those who
believe that Elliott's force fought for some time, thus being around long
enough to be rescued, need to be asked why 20 men could do so well for so
long but that Custer was rash to attack at Little Big Horn with an entire
regiment eight years later. And Custerphiles need to be asked why they
think Custer's regiment would have been at risk if a thorough search was
made, or even not made, while at the same time cheering Custer on while he
attacked about 2,000 warriors eight years later. You can't have it both
ways. The truth is, to this reviewer, that while it may have been
difficult to find about 20 bodies lying in the snow and grass (as Jay
Monaghan pointed out) a better search could and should have been made.
The warriors who surrounded the destroyed village area were not the threat
that some make them out to be (can someone please list the casualties
inflicted by these warriors?), and Custer could have sent several
companies out in the general direction Elliott was known to have gone,
with another company or two following about part of the way in case the
searching force became hard pressed by, if anything, the usual harassing
fire. The warriors would have been flushed away as this battalion moved
towards them. It's no guarantee that anything would have been found, but
this is just an example of what was possible to do at the time. Custer,
however, was on a hit-and-run operation of sorts, rather than a longer
assignment, so the limited supplies, coupled with the elements, dictated
how much time he could spend in the village area (thus his withdrawal was
a routine and expected occurrence, and not the "panicky retreat" that Jess
Epple wants us to believe). He was probably convinced that Elliott was
dead, but there was still no reason for him to be as unconcerned as he
seemed to be when Lt. Godfrey reported sounds of firing to Custer (an
account that did not make it into this book). So while Custer can be
defended in this, Kraft could have pointed out more of the arguments that
are made against him.
Kraft then moves on to cover Custer's activities of the following four
months. There are many details, though nothing is new here. Some may
disagree with Kraft's easy acceptance of the Custer-Meotzi relationship,
which he highlights quite a bit, but this is one area where Kraft
separates himself from those in the Larry Frost class. Frost, though
essentially on the right side of the Custer debate, wanted a spotless man,
and this caused him to become the Fred Dustin for the Custerphiles. Both
ignored much evidence they didn't like. Kraft has found the evidence
linking Custer and other officers to some of the Indian women to be
plentiful enough. If this reviewer was asked to prove that there was a
relationship, the reply would be that it cannot be done at this point,
though it appears to be true. Many little things we know about Custer are
derived from comments made by this witness or that one, with no back-ups
to support them. Historians need to be careful about this. So while
there is apparently enough evidence to satisfy Kraft, there is not enough
to convince someone like Jim Willert who, in his own review of this book,
criticized the Kraft for accepting the Meotzi chapter as fact. And
Willert has no pro-Custer axe to grind.
One thing that this book could have used is an analysis of lessons learned
during Custer's campaigning from 1867 to March of '69, and what was
probably behind Custer's decisions all through the winter campaigning when
he obviously knew quite a bit about what he was doing. This book did not
need to get into this, but perhaps someone will write a book to fill the
gaps. Many readers need to find out more information about how these
operations were conducted, why certain tactics were used, why certain
routes were taken, why attacks were made and not made, etc. Custer was
obviously influenced by his own operations here, with some adjustments
made in 1873, so it would have been nice to see a real thorough look at
this winter campaigning that may have been Custer at his best. So the
question of WHY this was an outstanding performance remains unanswered in
this book.
Bob Tiernan
Bob Tiernan
CAVALIER IN BUCKSKIN
By Robert M. Utley. Published by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
226pp. Photographs, Maps and Index. n.p.
This biography of George Custer is by far the best study of the man I have
come across, and may only be surpassed by Mr. Utley himself should he put
together another and more elaborate work which he may not have been able
to accomplish with this Oklahoma Western Biographies format. Utley is one
of the very few Custer scholars who has been able to remain genuinely
neutral and objective towards Custer - if such a thing is possible. Over
the years he has abandoned previously held conceptions and reinforced
others as he dug deeper into the Custer story, and from CUSTER AND THE
GREAT CONTROVERSY (1962), FRONTIER REGULARS (1973), THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN WARS (1977) and now the present volume, Utley's
impressive ability to revise his views on Custer's career and personality
while others refuse to budge, despite mounting and overwhelming evidence
has been noticed. Utley sees Custer for what he was, an extremely complex
and interesting individual, with a broad mix of qualities and stains, full
of contradictions, as well as serious and minor personality flaws to go
along with his good traits, and undeniable, though sometimes incomplete,
military talents. This description of Custer, repeated by many, is
nevertheless understood by few.
Since this biography is to be one in a series of biographies dealing with
figures of the American west, Utley had to condense the Civil War years of
Custer's career into one chapter. Despite this, he provides the reader
with an excellent portrait of Custer as brigade and division commander, a
phase of his career that must be studied in order to fully understand the
man, which many people try to do by studying only the Little Big Horn
battle.
Moving into the postwar frontier phase of Custer's life, Utley does a
commendable job of trying to understand and explain Custer's personality
conflicts as he settled into his regular army career as a lieutenant
colonel of a single cavalry regiment. The prevalent boredom and harshness
of frontier duty easily brought out the worst in many officers, and in
general the enlisted men were less motivated and of lesser quality than
their Civil War counterparts. In this environment, factionalism among the
officers and problems in the ranks festered easily, and, according to
Utley, Custer's overdone frustrations during his first Indian campaign
period exacerbated these problems beyond repair, and while Custer
eventually became a more patient and methodical campaigner, less
frustrated by the realities of frontier service, he was never able to
become the respected commander that he had been during the war, a status
that he probably assumed would automatically continue in the 7th Cavalry.
As for Custer the Indian campaigner, I think that while no officer in the
American frontier service ever fought or campaigned against Indians often
enough to be fully judged (i.e. a few "learning experience" campaigns was
considered to be a lot of experience), Utley clearly points out that
Custer developed a good grasp of that very unconventional warfare after
his 1867 failure. There were always new things to learn on each campaign
and from fellow campaigners, and Utley shows us a Custer who was a
typically incomplete Indian fighter, but among the better handful of leaders
who knew how to operate successfully against the Indians, being able to
know which conventional rules could be ignored and why. None of these
commanders deserves to be ranked as "the best" (no relation to "most
successful"), but each should be appreciated individually for their
performances under difficult circumstances, learning from experience as
they went along. Utley does this for Custer quite well, ignoring - as
many historians are unable to - such scoring systems as total number of
"victories", instead focusing on an understanding of Indian campaigning
methods as a gauge of success. To include my own example of these
differences, I note that while many writers see the Slim Buttes fight as
a real, though minor, combat "success", it pales in comparison to Custer's
January-March, 1869 operations during which hardly a shot was fired.
Since there were no battlefield successes by Custer at that time, the
achievements are usually placed on a lower tier.
Custer and his contemporaries rarely explained enough of the reasoning
behind their decisions, never seeing a real reason for it, and because
of this they were too often criticized by those who only knew their
conventional warfare experiences or studies. Mr. Utley, however, is one
of those who slowly, yet surely have come to appreciate this "lost art",
and over the years to defend, or at least understand, many of the
decisions made by these leaders. Two passages in CAVALIER IN BUCKSKIN
stand out as basic points to remember while studying the Indian Wars.
"In Indian warfare, moreover, such uncertainties (lack of knowledge of
terrain and enemy strength) did not entail as serious risks as in
conventional war", and "because of this style of combat (on the warriors'
part), small but disciplined teams of mediocre soldiers could hope, in
favorable circumstances, to overwhelm large but undisciplined masses of
individually superior Indian warriors". These points, essential for
understanding these operations, are still not taken seriously enough by
many historians.
When not covering these campaigns, Utley describes the moods, trends and
motivations of American society, integrating Custer into his times so as
not to portray him as an isolated military figure. A more interesting
Custer emerges, particularly the New York capitalist Custer whose yearning
for wealth may have led him into unethical business ventures.
As for the Little Big Horn, again Utley shows the results of more than
four decades of objective study, with conclusions not found in his earlier
work, showing him to be the open-minded Custer historian. In a judgmental
final chapter Utley presents, among other things, four scenarios that
were possible at the Little Big Horn, and all of them should be taken
seriously, especially by those historians who approach this battle with
the belief that it was a no-win situation for the cavalry to begin with
(a close-minded approach).
The coverage and summation of the Little Big Horn fight is not a detailed
one as this was not required by this type of book, but Utley has a talent
for cutting right through to the essential particulars, able to be
thorough enough considering the number of pages taken up by this section.
The concluding chapter, a judgment of Custer's final battle as well as his
life and career in general, is the best part of the book, with many of
Utley's interesting conclusions.
Since he is always searching for, and re-evaluating evidence, perhaps Mr.
Utley will someday write the more detailed and comprehensive biography
of Custer that he was unable to do within the limitations of this series.
A number of things can be remedied by this, including the absence of
footnoting, which will annoy many serious readers, but was probably a
casualty of the book's streamlined format. Utley can do the book the
way he chooses to, but in the meantime CAVALIER IN BUCKSKIN is the best
biography, along with Monaghan's CUSTER, and if it is a sample of what an
expanded biography could be, I hope I do not have to wait too long for it.
Bob Tiernan
Bob Tiernan
GENERAL CUSTER'S FINAL HOURS:
CORRECTING A CENTURY OF MISCONCEIVED HISTORY
By Roger Darling. Published by the Potomac-Western Press, Inc. 1992
28pp Paperback $8.00
This booklet by Roger Darling is obviously much shorter than his three
previous works, but he continues to present readers with his offbeat views
of Custer related history. This treatise, in fact, focuses on Darling's
version of the title events which were previously covered in his A SAD
AND TERRIBLE BLUNDER a few years ago, along with an effort at placing the
Battle of the Little Big Horn in proper perspective as the author sees it.
To those students who are not familiar with any of Darling's work, this
booklet is a good introduction to his style and theories which are no
doubt unpopular with many, as Mr. Darling admits.
In a preface that is quite lengthy considering the size of the booklet,
Darling explains his general approach to '76 Sioux War history, detailing
examples of where he avoids what he calls "traditional" or "misconceived"
history and how he arrived at these conclusions, all while shamelessly
praising his earlier books. He does correctly point out that too many
historians have accepted as factual many general and specific statements
and conclusions made by earlier historians without carefully sifting
through the evidence themselves to find if they arrive at the same or
similar conclusions. A case in point is whether or not Custer was
actually aware of the huge village on the valley floor before he saw it
for himself from the east bank bluffs. The specifics of this will be
dealt with below, but this is an excellent point as too many writers take
it for granted that Custer knew more than he could have about the main
village without taking the time to check all of the sources again. Custer
may or may not have, but that's not the point. It's that there are
research lapses carried on from book to book. Darling also cites the
official reports of Generals Sherman and Sheridan as examples of "history"
that contain falsehoods that were passed down as facts, thus adding to
future misconceptions, but this reviewer thinks that few researchers and
students have been influenced by such lightly researched reports made by
individuals who were not there. Mr. Darling, a former employee of the US
State Department, CIA and Department of the Army, apparently attributes
too much importance and influence to anything stamped "official" by the
government.
Now on to the main text. According to Darling, Terry was a poor Indian
War strategist; the 1876 Sioux War campaign histories have been overly
dominated by Custer's personality and actions; Little Big Horn-type
defeats were possible more often than is generally believed; the US Army
never understood even basic Indian tactics; Custer's tactics were even
worse than Fred Dustin claimed, etc.etc. He informs the reader that he
is virtually the first historian to cover these sub-topics properly in
order to arrive at the above conclusions, but similar arguments and
conclusions have been seen before. His focusing is what is different.
Unfortunately, much of Darling's case is weakened by his firm belief that
the Plains Indians were a far superior fighting "army " than almost all
historians realize, capable of competent strategic thinking that came
naturally, tactical co-ordination and superb guerilla warfare methods.
This view tends to cause one to overly-criticize many army actions and
tactics as reckless rather than bold, and Mr. Darling adheres to this
view while also believing that army leadership was arrogant and unable to
learn from experience. He has thus entered very slippery and dangerous
territory. While it is true that in their environment Indian warriors
were individually superior to any outsiders, they were primarily
hit-and-run fighters with great skills in avoiding pitched battles. The
Fetterman fight, and even more so the Little Big Horn were aberrations,
dependent on many circumstances coming into place just right, and should
not be held up as examples of what could have happened more often had not
the army been lucky, or deliberately "spared" (which he claims is what
kept the Terry-Gibbon column from also being wiped out). To say, for
example, that it was inevitable that Custer's battalion was doomed once
it had turned northwestward from Reno Creek, and thus a waste of time to
study Custer's various options, is an opinion that cannot be objectively
supported and shows a lack of knowledge and understanding as to what a 210
man battalion was capable of accomplishing in that situation. Custer's
actions may be hard to fathom, but it was not impossible for him to have
reached a timbered position, for example (if he really did give up on
offense) where he could have held out for a long time in a position that
threatened a large portion of the village area while awaiting further
developments. That Custer did not do so was due more to what HE chose to
do rather than his being prevented from doing so while there was still
time. This is just one example of why one cannot dismiss the movements
of Custer's battalion as inconsequential. There were simply too many
variables to the Custer phase of the battle for anyone to make such a
claim.
One of Darling's criticisms of the frontier army, relevant to his works in
general, is that the War Department never bothered to educate leaders such
as Custer and Miles, or cadets at West Point, by issuing a manual dealing
with Indian warfare. What Darling does not realize is that such a manual,
to be of any value, could only have been written with extensive input by
the very officers Darling claims needed the handbook, namely, Custer and
any other contemporary of his you can name - Carr, Forsyth, Crook,
Mackenzie, etc. Many of these officers were well acquainted with the
details of each other's combats, which was of value considering the long
periods of time between skirmishes, i.e. they learned more from each
other, so in general it's hard to place many of the army's leadership
problems on the lack of a manual, although the War Department should have
shown more interest in these matters than in such things as who could go
to the Centennial Exposition.
Among other points that Darling fails to take seriously is the fact
that, as a fighting force, the Plains Indians lacked even rudimentary
organization (with it accompanying discipline), and organization is
what it's all about. It's what enabled outnumbered groups of average
conventional soldiers to repel and/or decisively defeat much larger groups
of unconventional soldiers over and over again all over the world for
centuries. Darling's fancy terms describing Indian warfare techniques,
such as "force-dissipation", "tactical humility" and "induced-uncertainty"
cannot change this reality. "Tactical humility", for example, was the
breaking off of a no-win fight or shooting match, more or less, in order
to be around for a battle with better odds at a later date. Custer's 1873
battles ended in this manner, and despite Darling's criticism of Custer's
claim of having "driven" the Sioux from the field (thus not learning the
real lesson, i.e. tactical humility) it was simply common flowery
reporting that did not necessarily include everything that Custer thought.
In other words, while still not used to fighting Indians (who was?),
Custer at least knew that the warriors had no reason to fight to hold any
piece of terrain, and he was also not so arrogantly confident of his fewer
yet better trained men that he would ignore the value of a timber or other
advantageous position when offensive action was pointless, i.e. there was
no village in the area. He may not have known why the Indians did certain
things in a battle situation, but he felt that he knew they would do these
things with some consistency just the same. If Darling believes that the
Indian warriors broke off fighting in order to save themselves for a
better situation (rather than just to save themselves), then he's going
to have to explain why, for example, 800 or so warriors could not wipe out
51 or so scouts and soldiers at Beecher's Island, a not very formidable
sandbar, whereas a similar number of Zulus would have made short work of
them. That was an Indian victory opportunity made to order. But the Zulus
had organization and discipline, and were willing to take casualties in
order to overrun some of the smaller groups of soldiers, then even Custer
would have thought differently at the Little Big Horn. In other words,
he might not have had the same confidence in three-company battalions
but would have used battalions of at least four companies, excepting the
pack-train column. Expecting a more aggressive enemy, Custer might not
have ordered the Benteen scout at all, but would have advanced down Reno
Creek with two larger battalions with a harder hitting two-pronged attack
in mind. So any army leaders who recognized or sensed many of the Indian
warrior ways developed their mindsets based on experience, mentally
writing their own manuals as they went along, though as usual the army
had its share of mediocre leaders who could not grasp the significance
of anything. But to call the frontier army's views "unfounded army
presumptions of martial superiority" is to misinterpret much of the
evidence.
As for Darling's opinions of Custer's final performance, he points out
some interesting as well as familiar reasons why division of the 7th
Cavalry was a horrendous mistake in his view, but it may be stretching
it a bit to claim that Custer did not know that there was a very large
village or village area on the valley floor until he saw it from the
bluffs above the river. He may very well have been surprised and glad
that it was even larger than he expected, and that it was still intact,
but the massive trail alone indicated to Custer that a large gathering
was up ahead. Along with that were other signs that a gathering was only
a few hours' ride away although they were less conclusive, such as dust
and smoke, the massive pony herd and other bits of information from the
scouts. Custer may not have been aware of its exact location, and thus
kept eight companies close together until his line of operations narrowed,
but he had become aware of its general location even before he left Reno
Creek. One reason, but by no means the only reason, was acknowledged as
probable by Darling himself in his A SAD AND TERRIBLE BLUNDER, that from
the white bluffs above the Lone Tepee site Mitch Bouyer and some of the
Crows were capable of seeing part of the village through the gap in the
bluffs at the Medicine Tail Coulee ford (shown physically possible by Ray
Meketa and Tom Bookwalter in their THE SEARCH FOR THE LONE TEPEE). While
a lack of documented evidence has caused Darling to drop this earlier
belief that the scouts "probably" told Custer this information, (since
"possibly" is as far as one can objectively go on this one) it is hard to
see why he now claims that no part of the village could be seen from any
of the scouts' viewing points without giving an explanation of the sudden
lack of value of the white bluff tops.
Darling has studied the movements up to and beyond the Lone Tepee area in
order to try to figure out what Custer could have known of the existence
of a large village and has concluded that he knew nothing of it and in
fact was concentrating solely on the withdrawing Lone Tepee band during
the latter stages of his advance down Reno Creek. Well, Custer didn't
survive to tell us what he knew at the time, but this conclusion is also
one that is not as challenge-proof as Darling believes. Again, the trail
was so wide and cut up, and the large pony herd and other signs clearly
seen by the scouts who knew what to look for in their environment, that
it is hard to imagine that Custer and his scouts believed that the Lone
Tepee band was the only thing at the end of the trail, that they were not
thinking beyond it. One can fault Custer for sending Reno off before
knowing more, and perhaps his reasoning was that he could no longer wait
to get a part of the regiment to initiate the fighting and knew enough
about what was ahead to feel that the trail and the fleeing Lone Tepee
band would take Reno to the main village area. Or perhaps not. But
again, this debate is far from over.
Darling also makes the incredibly absurd statement that Custer, even in
the light of what he knew at the time, did not need to advance after being
spotted several times near the divide. Since it was "possible" that those
few hostiles "might not" warn the village, Darling guesses, or take a very
long time in doing so. This shows Darling's still weak grasp of this kind
of campaigning, and since he has not looked into other frontier campaigns
and battles his understanding of this is shallow. Custer knew that
Indians had been used to seeing troops in the field which did not go
looking for villages, and thus the troop commanders did not spend too much
time worrying about being seen days or weeks earlier, but at the divide
Custer was much too close to the village to take any chance that the
village might not "get the word". The last thing he wanted was for the
warriors to come streaming out to his position for a larger scale version
of the 1873 battles, with the result being a very time consuming shooting
match during which he would lose some men and animals, leaving him with
less mobility and dozens of wounded to care for while the village (the
real target) scattered out of reach some miles away. In other words, a
good (and rare) opportunity wasted by cautious delay. Custer knew that
in order to have any success against the nomadic Indians he would have
to bring the fight to a village where he could destroy and/or carry away
their possessions, this being the most effective method used in these
campaigns. This was not conventional war. There would be no second chance
any time soon. The army could not afford to stay out in the field all
summer chasing scattered bands around, and it mattered little that there
was, as Darling states, "three months of good campaigning weather
remaining" at the time of the strategy session aboard the Far West, which
was supposed to give Terry more of a reason to be in less of a hurry to
get the job over with. Supply was a major concern in these campaigns and
it was proper to move troops unhurriedly into the area of operations and
then move swiftly and boldly when a fresh trail was found, showing a bold
front in attack as well, despite the odds. In fact, Custer may very well
have met his end because he dropped his bold front upon reaching the
Medicine Tail Coulee area and found little opportunity to switch back to
it. So here again, Mr. Darling is on shaky ground and needs to look into
this some more. He may arrive at the same conclusions, but a better
understanding of this type of campaigning is needed.
In conclusion, this reviewer was not very impressed with this treatise
that, according to the author, incorporates long neglected "professional
military-intelligence analysis of Custer's field tactics". In attempting
to correct "a century of misconceived history" Mr. Darling has only added
some misconceived history of his own to the large mass of it that is out
there already.
Bob Tiernan
Bob Tiernan
CUSTER: THE CONTROVERSIAL LIFE OF GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER
by Jeffry Wert 1996 Simon & Schuster 462 pp. photos, maps,
index, bibliography $27.50
Well, here it is, "the first complete biography" of Custer "in decades",
as the book flap says. Utley's 1989 "Cavalier in Buckskin" probably
does not count as a complete biography because the format for that book
required that it concentrate on Custer's 's frontier service, so it had a
token, albeit excellent, chapter devoted to the Civil War Custer. Before
that, one may first think of Monaghan's "Custer" from the late 50's, but
we can't forget D.A. Kinsley's two-volume "Favor the Bold", from the 60's.
Or can we? Admirers of the General will not be disappointed with this
one while his detractors will not find an updated "Glory Hunter".
The book flap includes a very accurate opening statement: "George
Armstrong Custer has been so heavily mythologized that the human being has
been all but lost". Quite true, but after years or even decades of study
a number of us may claim that we know the man by now. But this book is
for the general reader and perhaps should be reviewed with this in mind.
But even so, it appears to have fallen short of one important claim: "From
beginning to end this masterful biography peels off the layers of leg end
to reveal for us the the real George Armstrong Custer". If a strip joint
offered the same amount of "peeling off layers", it would be shut down for
defrauding the consumers.
Now let's take a look at how Wert progresses through Custer's life.
Custer's pre-West Point years are covered with slightly more detail than
can be found in Monaghan's "Custer". Monaghan apparently had access to
the Mary Holland materials, but either did not dwell on this too much
or was not shown everything. No real surprises here, anyway. For
interesting background to what it was like growing up in Ohio in the
1840's and early 50's, see Ambrose's "Crazy Horse and Custer". Similar
material would have been interesting had it been included by Wert, but
as usual, Custer's early life is over after just a few pages.
Custer's appointment to West Point, whether it was made primarily to get
him away from a certain teenage girl or not, was perhaps the first of
Custer's really lucky breaks, unless one counts the fact that he was the
first child of the Emanuel Custer-Maria Ward Kirkpatrick union to be born
healthy enough to survive.
The coverage of the West Point years is once again routine, with a few
exceptions. One is the continuing Custer-Holland correspondence and how
this shows how preoccupied he may have been with plans for his
long-awaited summer furlough granted after two years at the Academy.
Again, this reviewer does not know if Jay Monaghan knew of all of these
letters and, if so, why further details from them were left out of his
book. Another episode Wert elaborates on which is new to those outside a
few historic organizations is Custer's bout with gonorrhea upon his return
from his above mentioned furlough. The effects of this illness figure in
a later episode in Custer's life which will be dealt with later.
One aspect of Custer's West Point years that needs to be pointed out
often, but isn't, is the fact that a study of Custer's demerits shows
that when he really needed to, he could control himself. This he rarely
felt he needed to do, but the point is that his detractors rely so much
on the image of Custer as a person impossible to control and discipline
himself. Ambrose pointed this out in particular when he wrote that a
certain three month period during which Custer received no demerits was
evidence that Custer could curb himself if he really had to, and to
receive more demerits at the pace they were being accumulated would have
meant probably dismissal from the Academy. This was what he needed to
prevent for he was determined to graduate, or deter mined to barely
graduate. It was very difficult to go for three months without a
demerit, and the contrast between this and the carefree, uncontrollable
Custer, though hinted at by Wert, was not stressed enough.
Custer's Civil War career is covered fairly well, and detailed enough.
It may not be as detailed as Urwin's "Custer Victorious", and Wert adds
more details to some incidents than Monaghan does, while in turn comes up
short compared to Monaghan on other incidents. Examples are First Bull
Run, the 1862 amphibious raid across the Rappahannock, and Sayler's Creek.
One thing is becoming more apparent all the time, and that is that
Custer's Civil War career was quite sound and solid. Van de Water's
"Glory Hunter" from 1934 has not been followed by a modern biography with
the same theme, though some more recent writers have trashed the Civil War
Custer in some general works like Wurmser's "Yellowlegs" and David Nevin's
Time/Life book "The Soldiers". The latter in particular was quite biased
against Custer. And calling him over-rated , which some may do, is not
the same as saying that he was a bad general. When you get right down to
it, it's very difficult to find material critical of the Civil War Custer
that was written by his contemporaries, from general officers down to the
lowest privates. When there IS criticism, it's usually something like
that written by Custer's fellow cavalry leader James Wilson who had a
problem with Custer's ego, rather than his military talents which he
praised. Even some negative comments that we know of, such as those
by Grant and Reno, were written after the war and, in Grant's case,
contradict what he wrote during and immediately after the war. And
Reno was the type who let his opinion of braggarts cloud his ability to
objectively judge a braggart's talents. In short, Custer's Civil War
career is not where one can go if searching for evidence of military
mediocrity, or even averageness.
One phrase caught my attention on page 51: "Here [Baldy] Smith learned
from a black contraband that a road cut through the woods". Well, how
many general readers know what a black contraband is? Many do not, and
while I am as politically incorrect as one can get, without an explanation
this was a poor choice of words. I half-expected to read a few pages
later that Custer posed for that photo with Confederate captive Lieut.
James Washington and a "pickaninny", but fortunately the little fellow
was not even mentioned.
There's an incident at the very end of the war that Wert may have cleared
up for most people who are still even slightly doubtful, or confused, and
that is the Custer-Longstreet controversy. It was an interesting
confrontation that no one doubts took place, though whether it was Custer
or someone else has been hard to figure out for some years. Custer
apparently never mentioned it himself, and Confederate officers present,
including Longstreet, wrote about it only after many years had passed.
Monaghan concluded that Longstreet probably exchanged hot words with
Custer's Chief-of-staff Col. Edward Whitaker, whom he mistook for Custer.
This was not entirely implausible. People need to be reminded that it was
a time when people did not really know hat other people looked like until
they met in person. An occasional Harper's Weekly sketch may not have
been enough to overcome this, and though the number of photographs was
increasing, they weren't exactly passed around in great numbers. In the
latter half of this century it has been very easy to recognize many
prominent and not so prominent people because they are seen in newspapers,
magazines, television, films etc. In 1865 this was not the case. While
there were many cases where generals on the same as well as opposing sides
would not know who the other was until introduced, I do not think that
there was a case of mistaken identity here. Wert's previous research into
Longstreet's career led him to sources overlooked by Monaghan and others,
including an account by a Confederate who was present and was someone who
knew Custer from West Point days. This reviewer has been neutral on this
one for some time, but at this time I can accept that Custer was there.
Wert has left out, by the way, Longstreet's claim that he scared Custer
away by threatening an attack by Pickett's corps (which was not much of a
threat), but even so, Wert's conclusion that Custer was simply embarrassed
by the incident is probably on the mark, as Custer would not have been
afraid of an attack at that point, particularly from a corps that he knew
must have been pretty hollow by that time.
Wert then covers Custer's movement into Texas as head of an occupying
force, and shows us a Custer that begins to resemble the post-war Custer
that we all know - the strict disciplinarian who had trouble remaining
popular when there were few or no battles, nor a cause, in which to forge
a bond with the rank and file. When commanding troops who were either in
it for the 50 cents a day, or only because they had not been mustered out
yet, Custer was at his worst, though he improved somewhat after 1867.
Custer's 7th Cavalry years follow, and Wert does a pretty good job on
this, though it does not come close to matching Utley's account of these
years in "Cavalier in Buckskin", a book that covered the same years with a
similar number of pages but which included far more background material of
the times, more details, and more insight into the man himself. One thing
that Wert could have done, though he has a good basic understanding of it,
was to study the art of Indian campaigning in more detail. This is just
a sore point with this reviewer, but since it's entirely different from
conventional campaigning, it's practically a requirement. Lacking this
knowledge, Wert stumbles occasionally amidst his flashes of understanding
it all. One example is when he quotes Utley concerning Custer's Washita
operation. On page 279 he writes that "while Custer deserves praise for"
the way he withdrew his regiment from the valley, "he deserves criticism
for his tactical leadership at Washita". He then quotes Utley who wrote
that Custer "violated a fundamental military precept: he attacked an enemy
of unknown strength on a battlefield of unknown terrain". Well, Utley
followed this with a very good explanation based on his knowledge of
Indian warfare and perhaps wrote all this as though he were playing
Devil's advocate. I even criticize Utley for the way he wrote this for he
structured the paragraph in such a way that readers may fail to see that
he's stressing the explanation rather than the initial criticism. This
was his way of pointing out that the by-the-book rules could be tossed
aside while west of St. Louis. And Wert fails to clarify this as well.
He repeats the valid explanations of the rule-breaking, but the "deserves
criticism" comment remains the point of the paragraph. So, if the reasons
for breaking the rules were sound, is the criticism still valid? If the
criticism is correct, why are the excuses so reasonable? Which is it?
The fact is that the reasons for breaking the rules WERE the rules, as
many an Indian campaigner discovered.
For some reason the Custer-Monahsetah wedding during the battle, and her
subsequent part in Custer's winter operations, are not mentioned until the
coverage of the campaigning is over. Custer's earlier bout with gonorrhea
may have caused sterility, and causes some to question his ability to
father a child by Monahsetah, as Wert points out, but this would not
affect his desire to have her with him on cold winter nights in the field.
This Wert fails to clarify. And even Custer's well known romance and
relationship with his wife, well-covered in this book when there's no
shooting going on, is not enough of a reason to doubt the relationship
with Monahsetah.
The text then covers Custer's years following the end of the winter
campaign, including his Kentucky service, hunting with dignitaries, trips
to New York, his business dealings and dreams, etc, and then we have
Custer's transfer to Dakota Territory.
The 1873 Campaign and the 1874 Black Hills Expedition are covered, but
there's much detail left out of these. One particular episode from the
latter is one of this reviewer's favorites: Scout Luther North and Custer
testing their marksmanship at a duck pond by shooting duck's heads off,
with Custer missing each time and North scoring. Custer became jealous
and called it off, and showed jealousy later when hearing about the good
marksmanship of others. These little incidents are quite interesting and
are hard to leave out of a book that claims to show the real man.
A single chapter is devoted to the Battle of the Little Big Horn, with the
preceding chapter covering the events leading up to the campaign and the
troop movements up to the eve of battle. This may not be enough for many
people, but it's probably about as much as one could give while still
calling this a biography of Custer and more a half-biography, half-Little
Big Horn book, something that Wert did not want to write.
The coverage of the battle is not bad, with Wert mentioning most of the
important points. He had apparently read all of the quality books about
the battle and absorbed the significance of many aspects of this battle.
His opinion of Benteen's performance up to the time he joined Reno is
right on the mark. Indeed, "the rigors of duty, the standards of conduct,
orders, and the situation" are exactly what needs to be considered when
judging him, and others as well, and Benteen fails this test. Reno
apparently comes off a little better, if only because there's a chance
that his actions to save his battalion may have been a good move. Wert
acknowledges that there's plenty to be said about these two subordinates,
both pro and con.
As for Custer's role, Wert at least understands what may have been behind
Custer's decisions based on knowledge of Indian campaigning, and wisely
refuses to accept as fact many of the speculative motives driving Custer
towards this confrontation. Custer escapes serious criticism here, and
Wert even leaves an opening that Custer may indeed have been quite
justified in making most or all of his decisions that day.
This book should help Custer's reputation a good deal, particularly if
it winds up in many libraries where it may turn out to be the one Custer
book that is read by numerous people. It has enough detail to hook many
people, which will cause them to seek out other books. But I also think
that the book could and should have had more details in it so that it
really could "show the real man". There's a glaring lack of analysis,
and the maps are poor, too. And it would have been interesting to repeat
some criticisms of Custer's Civil War record, particularly what some say
about Trevilian Station and the attack on Appomattox Station on the
evening before the surrender, so that these charges can be answered.
Perhaps such a biography will come out eventually, and considering the
amount of material available on Custer, there will be a massive one-volume
biography of Custer sooner or later.
Bob Tiernan
ro...@webtv.net
Star." Altho it seemed to ramble at times, I found it very interesting.
Charlie
Eliot Greene
Elizabeth wrote some of her own stuff. Great, in it's own regard. "Tenting
On The Plains". Let us do not overlook the ladies' support of what we now
call heroes.
Bob Tiernan
> Sounds hokey to me. You've got 1,500 to 2,000 battle-frenzied
> warriors running about and the air full of bullets and arrows and
> you're gonna put out the word, "Don't hurt the guy in the clean
> jacket"?
Sure it's hokey, and stupid, and as absurd as you think it is
(but not for your stated reason). You see, the idea, as
explained to me by a friend of Weibert's long ago, was that
Bouyer would, *before the battalion was engaged*, accompany Custer
to a vantage point a number of yard from the troopers (tho' Custer
would moslt likely have Adjutant Cooke and aide-de-camp T. Custer
with him), and take advantage of the situation and shoot Custer
and ride away as fast as he could with a minimum of possible return
fire being aimed at him, which would be very inaccurate anyway
because it would most likely be from revolvers. Nobody said
anything about this happening during the fighting, tho' it's
absurd either way.
Bill Shatzer
Ry...@webtv.net (Ryan) wrote:
> Mr. Weibert
> also says that when they were at the Crow's Nest Boyer showed up
wearing
> a new clean jacket when everything else was dirty. When asked where
he
> got it he said he found it on the hill. Mr. Weibert thinks the
Indians
> gave it to him so they would recognize him in the battle and not shoot
> first I've ever heard of it. Thanks.
Sounds hokey to me. You've got 1,500 to 2,000 battle-frenzied warriors
running about and the air full of bullets and arrows and you're gonna
put out the word, "Don't hurt the guy in the clean jacket"?
Indians were not renowned for following "orders" anyway. And Boyer would
know that.
The visability was not likely the best that day either - not with the
smoke from a couple hundred or more black powder firearms on each side
and the dust kicked up by 2,000 horses and ponies. There would have
been a lot of "firing into the brown" - a general discharge of guns and
arrows in the general direction of the mass of the soldiers.
Marksmanship vis-a-vis individual targets was unlikely to have been high
and I'd think it would take more than a clean jacket to avoid picking up
a bullet or arrow - or three or four - even if no one was trying to hit
you. I'd put more faith in one of those Indian amulets which allegedly
made the wearer bullet-proof!
How long would a jacket remain visibly clean under those circumstances
anyway?
Seems a terribly long stretch to me.
--
- Bill Shatzer - bsha...@orednet.org-
"Being weak minded is not necessarily a detriment"
-Jesse Ventura
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Steven B. Harris
>
>ro...@webtv.net wrote:
>
>> The book that got me really intterested in GAC was "Son of the
Morning
>> Star." Altho it seemed to ramble at times, I found it very
interesting.
The rambling is Connell's very deliberate swirling workup to the
final battle by going back and forth in time, so you don't fall asleep
before the end of the book. Think of it as historical striptease.
Recommended, if only for the writing style, which is wonderfully dry,
and approaches Twain at times.
lin...@mindspring.com
girl who was 7.5 months pregnant.
Of all the choices that were allegedly available, he picks out a pregnant girl?
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
biblio.
Also, he used a lot of theories of Lecki'es on Custer's alleged "unethical" business deals
when it is a fact that Custer often got ripped off by these deals and the deals themselves were
not unethical for the victorian era. That a scheme had a questionable ethical core
is not necessarily known to GAC. He had little business sense and even less
financial sense and was the first to admit it.
Barnett's TOUCHED BY FIRE pretty much trashes Lecki's theories.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
myself on reading this.
I have problems with historians who write "He must have known" in place of
probably or possibly. The historian in hind sight knows, but Custer didn't.
linda t
Bob Tiernan
> My biggest quibble with this book is that Utley did not footnote it.
> Only a biblio.
That was the format he had to comform to for that series of
books on Old West figures (others to be written by different
writers seem to have never been published).
> Also, he used a lot of theories of Lecki'es on Custer's alleged
> "unethical" business deals when it is a fact that Custer often got
> ripped off by these deals and the deals themselves were not unethical
> for the victorian era.
[snip]
> Barnett's TOUCHED BY FIRE pretty much trashes Lecki's theories.
My review was written in 1993 (and may be re-printed in Bill's
Advocate), so it pre-dated Barnett's book. I think Utley was
careful (as I was) to avoid specifically claiming that Custer
was deliberately engaging in crooked business ventures, if that's
what they were. I have not read Touched By Fire yet.
Bob Tiernan
Eliot Greene
I, myself, love book reviews. I love passion. And reading. Thanks Bob for
sharing with us all your level of care. And your discernment. Maybe there should
be a group: 'alt.custerphilian' where those who give one danged fart about that
dead fool can fliffer. History is better than George Armstrong Custer. And this
group certainly can be. But my opinion on him should easily be dismissed: he was
a bad guy of the Old West. Not worth consideration today. I cannot imagine
caring about Mr. Custer. Not today. Elizabeth accomplished more than he ever
did, historywise, on top of that.
Sorry. But too bad.
Todd
According to Utley's "Buckskins," Custer had apparently become a Christian
at some point. I can't recall exactly when Utley reaches this conclusion but it
is in there. Therefore, whether he was of Victorian ethics or not, (and by and
large Christianity was the bedrock of Victorian sensibility), he would not have
been "morally challenged" when it came to whether a business deal was honest or
not. That is, of course, unless he had never really accepted Christianity.
Please develop your assertion a bit further. Perhaps you can give us a
better explanation.
--
Best regards,
Todd Sauve
Todd
Whether one is enamoured with a particular individual or not cannot be a
criterion for their discussion in a history-based newsgroup. Custer, of course,
provokes strong opinions even today. However, to claim that Libby was a
historically more significant figure merely betrays the fact that presently you
are unable to discuss Custer in an even-handed and dispassionate manner. I think
you are not trying hard enough to divorce your emotions from your reasoning.
Having an opinion is both natural and reasonable, but not elucidating upon it
with specific, well-informed and unprejudicial arguments does not add to the
general level of discussion for this newsgroup.
lin...@mindspring.com
He writes of it and I have a book with the minister's view of it.
Most of the "deals" Custer got into were NOT "unethical". They were
"questionable" in that they were not good deals and eventually failed due
to mismanagement. And GAC ended up ripped off fairly often for it. He had no
head for finances or the "market"
Some antiCuster historians like to point to the "good enough" letter that Custer
received sometime in 1875 in which someone connected with the Good Enough
horseshoe company tries to nudge GAC to push for getting them appointed a
military supplier and suggests a kickback. There is no evidence that GAC ever
replied to this letter. Then there was a mining deal gone bad. GAC signed a note
for $8000 and of course, Libbie got stuck with it as the pay back was summer of
1876. But at the time GAC signed the note, he knew he had a deal with RedPath
Lyceum to do a 3-4 month lecture tour (that would likely have been extended to
6 months at $200 an engagement, 5 days a week guaranteed)that would have
paid it off and left them with a considerable nest egg for retirement.
According to a letter GAC wrote to Libbie at the time, he seemed to consider it
a good deal in a silver mine that if the mine came through (which he aparently
was led to believe it would)would have left them with a more than comfortable
retirement.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
SOP in Custer's time. And few thought twice about it.
linda t
Eliot Greene
> --
> Best regards,
> Todd Sauve
No kidding. Custer has been done to death in other groups. I have nothing to add in
any discussion of him, I grab Elizabeth just to lift from the swirling waters and
clouds of dust. I think she's overlooked, but even that comment isn't needed. And
yes, the group is big enough to hold plenty of threads about him. And just watch,
plenty threads there will grow and not one iota of genuine conclusion. As before.
And before. And before.
Still, Tiernan's book reviews and any one else's make great posts. I look forward to
them.
Todd
SOP in Custer's time. And few thought twice about it.
Ahhhh, but there is the rub. Unethical business dealing could never be SOP
for a Christian (Victorian era or not), if indeed Custer was one.
Todd
conclusion.
Well, you know the old saying: "If you laid every historian end to end, they
still wouldn't reach a conclusion!"
lin...@mindspring.com
by the average victorian, Christian or not.
and Custer very much considered himself Christian, having acctepted Christ in
March of 1865.
linda
lin...@mindspring.com
on the Earps that have been about 90% of the discussion in this NG for OVER
THREE YEARS!?
Custer shows up 3-4 times a year and you whine. But prattling about Earp for
OVER THREE YEARS os OK.
linda t
In <hmVd4.14774$G55.1...@news1.rdc1.ab.home.com>, "Todd" <nospam...@home.com> writes:
>>And just watch, plenty threads there will grow and not one iota of genuine
>conclusion.
It's called SPECULATION.
George Szaszvari
says...
>
>Well, Elliot, do you mean like the thread after thread after thread after
thread
>on the Earps that have been about 90% of the discussion in this NG for OVER
>THREE YEARS!?
>Custer shows up 3-4 times a year and you whine. But prattling about Earp
for
>OVER THREE YEARS os OK.
Hey, Linda, stop exaggerating...Custer gets far more attention
here...how do I know? A big fan of GAC, perhaps his biggest
[bless her], somewhere out in Florida, posts a lot more here
about GAC than anyone else has about Earp. Its only when Steve
Grimm really going with his personal mission to assassinate
Wyatt's character that the Earps get some attention here ;-)
Todd
The thing is, Christian standards of right and wrong don't change from age
to age. I don't recall what the allegations against Custer are, and I don't know
if they are true either. My only point is this, what would be wrong for a
Christian to do in an 1875 business deal would still be wrong today or even in
the 25th century.
Bookman
lin...@mindspring.com wrote in message
<85a5es$tqm$2...@nntp6.atl.mindspring.net>...
>Well, Elliot, do you mean like the thread after thread after thread after
thread
>on the Earps that have been about 90% of the discussion in this NG for OVER
>THREE YEARS!?
>
>Custer shows up 3-4 times a year and you whine. But prattling about Earp
for
>OVER THREE YEARS os OK.
>
Actually, I am as annoyed by the repeated threads concerning
Wyatt Earp, as well as the 'overdone' Custer. There were other
characters, other threads, in the old West. These two, it seems,
have captured more of the imagination of today's bank of readers
and writers. And folks usually tend to write about what they
know/have studied. (at least I hope so.)
I doubt the writer (above) can substantiate her claim that "about 90% of
the discussion in the NG for OVER THREE YEARS!?" (caps not mine)
has been Earp-related.
My own impression, not stated here as fact, is that it has probably
been about even between earp/custer, with those two taking about
half the entire ng. That would put Earp/Custer much lower than
the 90% she attributes to Earp.
And Custer "shows up 3-4 times a year ..." ??? That was a joke,
right?
This is accurate only if you add the qualifier "and each time,
lasts for 3-4 months!"
I would HOPE that the facts Linda so often presents about Custer
are more reliable than this stuff. (But, since I'm not that interested
in Custer, I'll probably never know. Or care!)
Note to Todd: I once read a book which involved some pretty
extensive research about LIBBY. I was left with the idea
that she was in NO SMALL way responsible for GAC's rapid rise in
military rank (perhaps almost as responsible as were his own
military exploits.) She didn't just sit home and knit during
all his career, I gather. Generals, Congressmen, lots of high
contacts that lady made! She should at least be considered as
a "Co-General". :-)
In today's Army, politics and connections certainly play a big
part... but maybe the 1860s Army was more moral and straight!
(choke! cough!) :-)
I have always believed that his ongoing legend 'would not be' nearly
so widespread were it not for his leaving the widowed Libby as 'the
world's greatest press agent'. I don't dislike Custer and will
credit him as having done some favorable things here in Texas.
But I think believe Libby 'made' GAC! Eliot might not have been
as far off the mark as you and he initially believed.
I have always felt that Ranald MacKenzie was a much better officer
in his heyday. But there has been so much more written about Custer.
His death was on the glorious battlefield, etc., etc., etc. Is it any
wonder Custer is so widely known?
I think Custer slightly more interesting than a truckload of road apples.
but that's my OPINION only, not fact.
Here are some facts concerning MacKenzie's record, very very briefly,
as extracted, piecemeal, from the New Handbook of Texas On-Line:
"Ranald Slidell Mackenzie received his education at Williams College
and at the United States Military Academy, where he graduated on
June 17, 1862, at the head of his class."
(NOTE: Hmm, how does that compare with Custer?)
"He was commissioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the Army of
the Potomac. Within two years he had fought in eight major battles
and been promoted to the rank of colonel. Later, in the Shenandoah
valley, he commanded troops in five battles, and in the final campaign
against Robert E. Lee he was a brevet major general. At Appomattox
he took custody of surrendered Confederate property and afterward
commanded the cavalry in the Department of Virginia. In three years
he had received seven brevets and six wounds."
(Note: and how does this compare with Custer? This is not a
rhetorical question: I really don't know)
"In 1867 Mackenzie accepted an appointment as colonel of the
Forty-first Infantry, a newly formed black regiment reorganized
two years later as part of the Twenty-fourth United States Infantry.
The unit had its headquarters at Fort Brown, Fort Clark, and later at
Fort McKavett. On February 25, 1871, he assumed command of the
Fourth United States Cavalry at Fort Concho and a month later moved
its headquarters to Fort Richardson. That summer he began a series of
expeditions into the uncharted Panhandle and Llano Estacado in an
effort to drive renegade Indians back onto their reservations. In
October his troops skirmished with a band of Comanches in Blanco
Canyon, where he was wounded, and on September 29, 1872, they
defeated another near the site of the present town of Lefors."
"In 1873 Mackenzie was assigned to Fort Clark to put an end to
the plunder of Texas livestock by Indian raiders from Mexico.
On May 18, in an extralegal raid, he burned a Kickapoo village
near Remolino, Coahuila (see REMOLINO RAID), and returned
with forty captives. That and effective border patrols stopped
the raiding."
"In July 1874 Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan ordered five commands
to converge on the Indian hideouts along the eastern edge of the
Llano Estacado. Mackenzie, in the most daring and decisive battle
of the campaign, destroyed five Indian villages on September 28
in Palo Duro Canyon and on November 5 near Tahoka Lake won a
minor engagement, his last, with the Comanches. His destruction of
the Indians' horses after the battle of Palo Duro Canyon, even more
than the battle itself, destroyed the Indians' resistance. In
March 1875 Mackenzie assumed command at Fort Sill and control
over the Comanche-Kiowa and Cheyenne-Arapaho reservations.
On June 2 Quanah Parkerqv arrived at Fort Sill with 407 followers
and 1,500 horses. The Red River War was over."
(Note: I've always believe RSM to be a successful strategist in this
period of fighting the "Indian Wars" even if I don't think the war
itself was necessarily fought on defensible moral grounds. How does
that compare with Custer? GAC's strategy does not appear to have
been 'an unqualified success' to me.)
"After Lt. Col. George A. Custer's troops had been annihilated on the
Little Bighorn River in 1876, Mackenzie was placed in command of
the District of the Black Hills and of Camp Robinson, Nebraska.
In October he forced Sioux Chief Red Cloud, who had won a campaign
in 1868 against the United States, to return his band to the reservation.
On November 25 Mackenzie decisively defeated the Northern Cheyennes."
(Note: The comparison here seems to be easy enough to make. MacKenzie
was successful; Custer was annihilated! But, then, I'm neither a
Custer apologist nor a Custer afficionado. Those folks will probably
see this in a much different light. Oh well, so be it. Let's see how this
can be viewed in a more favorable light.)
Shall we continue to re-fight the Battle of the Little Big Horn? I
really don't care. After the first 25 or so times, I now usually just
step over it! :-)
Now that my shoes are just about clean, it seems interesting to
bring up another USA Brevet Major General (RSM) who retired
as a Brig. General and was a contemporary of GAC. I wonder if
resident ng historians have already solidified opinions on RSM.
As I said, I think he stands head-and-shoulders over GAC. He
didn't have much of a press agent after his death and his demise
was not on the field of glory.
I think these two factors play a much more decisive role in
maintaining the large "loyal followers of Custer" rolls than does
GAC's military record.
But that is only my opinion, not to be read as fact. I do hope
for wider and more interesting discussion than simply jumping
from Custer to Earp. I find the ng grows very small if one
has to step over all those road apples!
Plus, I wondered if Lindat would even try to substantiate her
statement about the 90% factor. It seems extremely unrealistic
to me.
Regards,
David
Bob Tiernan
> another thing to remember is that things WE consider "unethical" were
> business SOP in Custer's time. And few thought twice about it.
Or go back a few years and slavery was SOP. Is that what
you mean as a defense? Well, I don't think you do, but
at the same time it's not a good defense of SOP to say
"they did that back then". What we are talking about is
not something that later generations felt was some sort
of abuse or exploitation, like using 14-year olds to work,
but whether or not Custer and associates *knew was unethical
at the time*. Now, Custer may have been completely innocent
of any knowledge of the known inadequacies of the Goodenough
horseshoe to be sold to the government, and he may not have
been involved at all, or maybe the horseshoe was adequate
anyway. But if someone knowingly produced and sold crappy
horseshoes to the government, well, I don't know if you
are saying this was SOP for the 1870's or not. Certainly
the worst Custer can be accused of (lacking more evidence)
would be engaging in entrepreneurialism, and that's
perfectly normal. Anyway, I take it this is a different
story from the one of the patent on a horseshoe actually
patented by another George Custer (cousin to the General).
I read all of this some time ago, but it has faded.
Bob Tiernan
"Ecologically speaking, the term 'wet-land' has no
meaning....For regulatory purposes, a wetland is
whatever we decide it is."
-- [National Wetlands Newsletter, Nov,Dec 1991, p.12]
Steve Grimm
Steve Grimm
sgr...@dimensional.com
George Szaszvari wrote:
> In article <85a5es$tqm$2...@nntp6.atl.mindspring.net>, lin...@mindspring.com
> says...
> >
> >Well, Elliot, do you mean like the thread after thread after thread after
> thread
> >on the Earps that have been about 90% of the discussion in this NG for OVER
> >THREE YEARS!?
> >Custer shows up 3-4 times a year and you whine. But prattling about Earp
> for
> >OVER THREE YEARS os OK.
>
lin...@mindspring.com
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
built upon a poor core. Custer had no control, or possibly even knowledge
of the mining deals and stock deals he put his name to. Business then as
today used famous names to attract investors. But those name didn't often get
the returns todays celebs do.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
exagerated the amount of Earp that has been on this NG for years now.
I see some afre still unable to recognize back-handed sarcasm.
And Custer's Legend status was well established and carried on in the
Press even befroe Libbie started writing. Her first book didn't come out until
1886.
Custer went to LBH already a "legend." It was because this "legend" was killed
there that we talk of LBH at all now.
But remember, Custer got his promotion to Brig. General long before he
married Libbie.
MacKensie was what Custer would have been had he not been "tamed" by a wife.
Poor Ranald, rather mad at the end because no one "took care" of him.
linda t
Todd
significant a factor in the northern Plains campaigns as Custer, and probably
more so. But the small number of books written on him makes it hard to involve
more than a handful of newsgroup participants, I suspect. Nevertheless, let's
give it a shot.
Yes, "poor" Mackenzie would have been much better off had he been married,
Linda. He might not have made that fateful trip to the brothel where he
contracted syphilis, thus ending up dying in a New York City loony bin. What a
ghastly end! Apparently, he was a very reluctant politicker, with only Little
Phil Sheridan consistently singing his praises and finally pulling enough
strings to get him the covetted star, only to have him go insane shortly
thereafter.
(As for politicking, David, the true master of the art must be acknowledged as
Nelson A. Miles. Like Custer, his wife was the point "man" in Washington for
him, being fortuitously related to the Sherman brothers, William Tecumseh and
John--General of the Army and Secretary of the Treasury! Miles & Wife were a
shameless but formidable pair, to say the least.)
lin...@mindspring.com
deal after shady deal, went to war, drove people off their lands, burned them out
if they would not sell, well generall all "Christians." The Southern slave owners were
"Christians." The eastern industrial magnates, with their dirty facrotires, polluting,
and working children 12 hours a day; working de facto "slaves" 12-14 hours a day
for barely living wages -- they were "Christian."
Your own historial analysis of the shady dealings in the Grant administration were
by a group of men who were, by and large, "Christian."
some of the most infamous mass murderers of the last millenium were
"Christians."
linda t
n <9y5e4.15306$G55.1...@news1.rdc1.ab.home.com>, "Todd" <nospam...@home.com> writes:
>Linda,
>
> The thing is, Christian standards of right and wrong don't change from age
>to age. I don't recall what the allegations against Custer are, and I don't know
>if they are true either. My only point is this, what would be wrong for a
>Christian to do in an 1875 business deal would still be wrong today or even in
>the 25th century.
>
lin...@mindspring.com
that have filled this NG in the last 3 years or so. When this NG goes off on
an Earp kick, I just lurk. But whenever Custer subject comes in,at least 2 to 3
complain.
linda t
In <85aa68$mah$1...@lure.pipex.net>, g...@dial.pipex.com (George Szaszvari) writes:
>In article <85a5es$tqm$2...@nntp6.atl.mindspring.net>, lin...@mindspring.com
>says...
>>
>>Well, Elliot, do you mean like the thread after thread after thread after
>thread
>>on the Earps that have been about 90% of the discussion in this NG for OVER
>>THREE YEARS!?
>>Custer shows up 3-4 times a year and you whine. But prattling about Earp
>for
>>OVER THREE YEARS os OK.
>
lin...@mindspring.com
after the LBH. Libbie didn't write her first book until 1886. by that time Custer
was a towering figure.
GAC went o the LBH a "legend" It wa sbecause this "legend" was lilled there
that we even discuss the subject. The CW hero, the Indian Fighter, the mana
who stood up in Public and denounced the Grant administration corruption --
PR like this couldn't be bought and the newspapers had a fling.
And of course, Libbie maintained polite relations with the "right people"in DC
during CW. And she was a perfect Fort Commander's wife, keeping constant open
house, entertaining, putting visitors up. Expertly changing the subject whenever
GAC got too long winded on his hunting exploits and his dogs. . .GAC rarely ever
bragged about his war or frontier exploits, he preferred to talk about his hunting
prowess and his dogs and his dogs and his dogs. . .
But the FACT remains that Custer got his promotion to Brigadier General WITHOUT
political help or Libbie. He and Merritt were later promoted to Major Generals
by Sheridan after Third Winchester.
If Libbie is responsible for anything, it is that there is not one statue of GAC
in any major American City because of her.
there was a statue of GAC at WP in the early 1880's. Libbie was not consulted
on it and hated it.(I've seen phot sof it and it was pretty ludicrous, with GAC on
Foot!) She "cried the statue" off its pedestal by annoying Merritt
for years. The statue was taken down, head and shoulders cute off as a bust and
put into a WP basement where it may still be.
When the City of Detroit wanted to put up a formidable statue of GAC, they
did not consult Libbie and in effect told her to stay out of it. Several big name
artists had been lined up, including the woman who'd done a very fine bust from
life of GAC and with whom Libbie had carried on an extensive correspondence.
When she contacted Libbie to see if Libbie would help her get the appointment
to do the statue, Libbie's reply was short and terse and thereafter she ignored
the artist.
Some years later, Libbie wrote to WP asking if the bust part of the statue could
be put up in a public setting. WP ignored her.
but it shows that perhaps she'd realized her mistake.
linda t
Todd
Not everyone who claims to be a Christian actually is one. I think you
understand that, so don't judge the religion by some of the professed followers.
The Bible is full of examples of those who claimed to be followers of God--and
clearly weren't. Those who are Christians will actively be loving their fellow
man, not exploiting them with 12 hour work days, enslaving them, etc. It will
all come out on the Judgement Day.
Todd
I don't think I was evangelising. I was merely honing a point.
Steve Grimm
I would ignore the complaints. Any old west subject is applicable here and you are
not going to please everybody. I have received hate mails from somebody(ies) who
is/are not brave enough to give a real email address. Who cares. I feel we are
lucky to have you contributing to this group and I have learned a lot from you and
the Custer posts. The posts are clearly marked and can be ignored by people who are
not interested in the subject. As Ryan said - post your own information if you
don't like what is being discussed.
Steve Grimm
sgr...@dimensional.com
Arizona Vixen
>
> (As for politicking, David, the true master of the art must be acknowledged as
> Nelson A. Miles. Like Custer, his wife was the point "man" in Washington for
> him, being fortuitously related to the Sherman brothers, William Tecumseh and
> John--General of the Army and Secretary of the Treasury! Miles & Wife were a
> shameless but formidable pair, to say the least.)
> Best regards,
> Todd Sauve
Ah, Nelson A. Miles, of Nez Perce war fame. Francis Haines calls
him 'something of a "glory chaser" like Custer,' and that he pursued
the Indians to gain a general's star. Do you agree?
Vicki
--
Free audio & video emails, greeting cards and forums
Talkway - http://www.talkway.com - Talk more ways (sm)
Todd
There were a gaggle of colonels chasing the Indians around Montana, Wyoming
and Dakota hoping to get a star out of it at the time. Custer, Mackenzie,
Gibbon, Hazen and others. Miles seems to have been a much bigger schemer than
the others, though, and was a true 19th century imperialist, well aware that the
real US goal was to ultimately gobble up the whole continent. His connections to
the top were incredible. You should see who was at his wedding in 1868!
Miles was ruthless and vain, seeing himself not only as a general but also
the secretary of war and later as president. He ended up general of the army,
which is pretty impressive for a soldier who entered the army during the Civil
War with no West Point education, only tons of military talent. He was the
youngest major general in the army, next to Custer, and also won the
Congressional Medal of Honor. His arch-nemesis, like Custer's, was Sitting Bull,
whom he pined to invade Canada in order to attack. There is a lot more to that
story but you'll have to wait for the book to see it.
lin...@mindspring.com
Outstanding! It's not like we sneak up on anybody. And anyone can start another
thread on anything.
Thanks for the post.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
even though Custer and Miles were good friend, MIles' PR pursuits made
even Custer nervous. And probably a bit jealous.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
had to be replaced. And Merritt got his Full Colonelcy because Custer
was killed.
Ironically, Custer was due for an appontment that summer on the retirement
of Col. Emory of the 2nd (5th?) Cavalry.
linda t
In <trBe4.17108$G55.2...@news1.rdc1.ab.home.com>, "Todd" <nospam...@home.com> writes:
>Hi Vicki,
>
> There were a gaggle of colonels chasing the Indians around Montana, Wyoming
>and Dakota hoping to get a star out of it at the time. Custer, Mackenzie,
>Gibbon, Hazen and others. Miles seems to have been a much bigger schemer than
>the others, though, and was a true 19th century imperialist, well aware that the
>real US goal was to ultimately gobble up the whole continent. His connections to
>the top were incredible. You should see who was at his wedding in 1868!
>
Steven B. Harris
writes:
>Hey, Linda, stop exaggerating...Custer gets far more attention
>here...how do I know? A big fan of GAC, perhaps his biggest
>[bless her], somewhere out in Florida, posts a lot more here
>about GAC than anyone else has about Earp. Its only when Steve
>Grimm really going with his personal mission to assassinate
>Wyatt's character that the Earps get some attention here ;-)
And did we mention that the Earp assassinators have recently had a
big kick in the butt with publication of Allen Barra's _Inventing Wyatt
Earp_ (1998, now out in paperback). Barra looks as closely at the
evolution of the Earp mythos as anybody has, and concludes, rather
interestingly, that it's probably more or less deserved. History got
the good guys and the bad guys right, for once, as Barra says. Stuart
Lake put in some stretchers, as we all know, but his bio is not simply
a big fabrication.
And Barra has the politically incorrect gumption to call a few
spades as spades. He correctly labels Paula (_And Die in the West_)
Marks' analysis neo-Marxist. He remarks that the Cowboys are described
as `pastoral' so often that one begins to see Ike Clanton reclining on
a hill with sheep and a lute. Most of Marks' dirt is based on a book
she badly wants to believe word for word, the "history" supposedly
given by Allie Earp (Virgil's feisty Irish wife) to Frank (_The Earp
Brothers of Tombstone_ ) Waters (1960). Alas, Allie not only never saw
this book, but there is new evidence from Waters papers that Allie had
no grudge at all against Wyatt, and may not even have KNOWN Josie/Sadie
Earp in Tombstone. Waters had apparently perpetrated a hoax, with
Allie's "memories" drawn in part from those of "Big Nose" Kate Elder
nee Horoney, and a lot more made up stuff than most people accused Lake
of putting in. In breif, it's hot air. So also, interestingly enough,
with much of Glenn Boyer's _I Married Wyatt Earp_, which for years he
claimed was the marriage of a well-known manuscript, plus a secret one
he had from John Clum (!), better covering Josie's Tombstone
recollections. The second manuscript is now known not to exist. Much
of the juicy stuff in _I Married Wyatt Earp_ was therefore made up by
Boyer, or again taken from Big Nose Kate. Boyer had done as much
before in his 1966 _Illustrated Life of Doc Holliday_ (not to be
confused with Bob Boze Bell's excellent recent picture book). Boyer has
admitted the 1966 book, supposed taken from Holliday letters (which
don't exist), is mostly fiction.
Barra has a few things to say about that other muckraker of the
Earps, Ed Bartholomew. He wonders why someone who hated his subject
that much, should spend two books worth of time on a biography, and
suggests that there so some kind of psychopathology at work here.
Having read Bartholomew (Wyatt Earp, the Untold Story), I'm inclined to
agree. Alas for Bartholomew, his ranting today, with better research,
sounds more and more tired. Barra makes an excellent case that
newspapers of the time did not report certain kinds of troubles, and
these are exactly the kind which Bartholmew, if he cannot find a report
in the papers, is most likely to label "fabrication." Does a newspaper
report the Johnny Behind the Deuce standoff? No? Well, then, it never
happened. No matter that Parsons reports it in his diary, and that
Billy Breakenridge (of all people) puts Wyatt in front of it in
Helldorado, long before Lake ever got to print. It never happened.
Did the Army go looking on McLaury ranch for a bunch of stolen mules,
as Wyatt said in his bio? It never happened. No matter that
Bartholomew himself finds evidence that the officer (Lt. J.H Hurst)
existed. It never happened. No matter that court records after the
shootout have Wyatt testifying in writing to the matter, when he and
his attorney have good reason to think that a later full trial will
expose such testimony to cross examination. It never happened. Never
mind that we actually have a paid advertisement published in the 5 Aug
1880 Tombstone Nugget, by Frank McLaury, angrily denying that he ever
stole mules from the army, and calling one Lt. J.H. Hurst a liar! The
incident never happened. Berra's message is: sorry, it happened. The
more closely we look, the better Earp gets. Which is more than we can
say for Ike Clanton, long a victim these many years of class struggle,
shot while rustling cattle, no doubt in his rustic, pastoral way....
Steve Harris
Steve Grimm
"Steven B. Harris" wrote:
> And did we mention that the Earp assassinators have recently had a
> big kick in the butt with publication of Allen Barra's _Inventing Wyatt
> Earp_ (1998, now out in paperback). Barra looks as closely at the
> evolution of the Earp mythos as anybody has, and concludes, rather
> interestingly, that it's probably more or less deserved. History got
> the good guys and the bad guys right, for once, as Barra says. Stuart
> Lake put in some stretchers, as we all know, but his bio is not simply
> a big fabrication.
Barra's book is interesting using sound judgement. However, to say this
book is the definitve last word on the subject is celebrating early.
There are items yet to be revealed and found.
> And Barra has the politically incorrect gumption to call a few
> spades as spades. He correctly labels Paula (_And Die in the West_)
> Marks' analysis neo-Marxist. He remarks that the Cowboys are described
> as `pastoral' so often that one begins to see Ike Clanton reclining on
> a hill with sheep and a lute. Most of Marks' dirt is based on a book
> she badly wants to believe word for word, the "history" supposedly
> given by Allie Earp (Virgil's feisty Irish wife) to Frank (_The Earp
> Brothers of Tombstone_ ) Waters (1960).
Battering Marks for using sources thought reliable at the time the book was
written is hindsight.
> Alas, Allie not only never saw
> this book, but there is new evidence from Waters papers that Allie had
> no grudge at all against Wyatt, and may not even have KNOWN Josie/Sadie
> Earp in Tombstone. Waters had apparently perpetrated a hoax, with
> Allie's "memories" drawn in part from those of "Big Nose" Kate Elder
> nee Horoney, and a lot more made up stuff than most people accused Lake
> of putting in. In breif, it's hot air.
Water's Tombstone information in EBOT most certainly did not come from
Allie. Whether Allie held a grudge against Wyatt is still not known.
Allie may have actually said some of the things in "Tombstone Travesty"
(the original ms. which EBOT was based), but had second thoughts after
pressure from Sadie and other members of the family. We just don't know.
The pro-Earp people are swimming in the newly discovered manuscript
psychoanalysing Waters, but failing to separate writing style from
substance.
> Barra has a few things to say about that other muckraker of the
>Earps, Ed Bartholomew. He wonders why someone who hated his subject
> that much, should spend two books worth of time on a biography, and
> suggests that there so some kind of psychopathology at work here.
> Having read Bartholomew (Wyatt Earp, the Untold Story), I'm inclined to
> agree. Alas for Bartholomew, his ranting today, with better research,
> sounds more and more tired.
A pseudo-psychoanalysis trying to discount important points raised by
Bartholomew (which Barra does not address). Bartholomew's work is flawed
and I have never used those questionable items here, but totally
discounting this work is not good practice.
> Barra makes an excellent case that
> newspapers of the time did not report certain kinds of troubles, and
> these are exactly the kind which Bartholmew, if he cannot find a report
> in the papers, is most likely to label "fabrication."
While Barra's argument for the lack of newspapers articles regarding Wyatt
is a good one, I still have problems when I look at other lawmen and towns
where incidents were documented in newspapers. It seems to be only in the
towns where Wyatt was a resident that documentation is lacking. A problem
I have not solved.
> Does a newspaper
> report the Johnny Behind the Deuce standoff? No? Well, then, it never
> happened. No matter that Parsons reports it in his diary, and that
> Billy Breakenridge (of all people) puts Wyatt in front of it in
> Helldorado, long before Lake ever got to print. It never happened.
Frederick Bechdolt wrote "When the West Was Young" in 1922 which gives
Wyatt credit for the JBTD incident. The question is "Did Wyatt supply
Bechdolt with the story?". Did subsequent publications (Breakenridge
-1928, Lake - 1929) merely use this as a source (which may be originally
from Wyatt) as a means of filling in gaps for their books? Parsons'
original diary entry does not mention Wyatt. It was only years later that
Parsons places Wyatt in the role of legend. If Parsons was asked a leading
question, he would naturally back his friend Wyatt. Parsons was a pall
bearer at Wyatt's funeral. People don't mention this.
> Did the Army go looking on McLaury ranch for a bunch of stolen mules,
> as Wyatt said in his bio? It never happened. No matter that
> Bartholomew himself finds evidence that the officer (Lt. J.H Hurst)
> existed. It never happened. No matter that court records after the
> shootout have Wyatt testifying in writing to the matter, when he and
> his attorney have good reason to think that a later full trial will
> expose such testimony to cross examination. It never happened. Never
> mind that we actually have a paid advertisement published in the 5 Aug
> 1880 Tombstone Nugget, by Frank McLaury, angrily denying that he ever
> stole mules from the army, and calling one Lt. J.H. Hurst a liar! The
> incident never happened.
As stated above, Bartholomew's book is flawed, but should not be
discounted. There are still unaswered questions from this source which
were not addressed by Barra.
> Berra's message is: sorry, it happened. The
> more closely we look, the better Earp gets. Which is more than we can
> say for Ike Clanton, long a victim these many years of class struggle,
> shot while rustling cattle, no doubt in his rustic, pastoral way....
While the pendulum is swinging Wyatt's way, it does swing both ways and
there are items yet to be revealed and discovered.
I need to make an apology to this group about my bashing Casey Tefertiller
in the past. Although I still think his book was a zealous presentation of
the Earp legend, I feel he is in pursuit of the truth - whatever that truth
may be. I have found his perspective objective about the material he
finds. He does not back away from negative items he discovers about
Wyatt.. As Tefertiller has stated "Wyatt was not one dimensional." (maybe
not be his exact words).
In conclusion, if Wyatt did all the things of legend - so be it. Just
prove it. This has been my only point all this time. New items are
constantly being found and revealed, but the vote still is not in.
Steve Grimm
sgr...@dimensional.com
Todd
If such a thing is possible, Custer looks like a piker compared to Miles
when it comes to politicking! And what is so nice about it is the fact that we
have much of Miles' political manoeuvrings preserved for posterity. Libby could
have taken notes from Mary Miles, too! Talk about shameless!!!
I'll break down here and post a small section from chapter seven of my yet
unfinished and unpublished book, "Manifest Destiny and Western Canada: Sitting
Bull, the Little Bighorn and the North-West Mounted Police Revisited," simply to
illustrate the lengths Nelson and Mary Miles went to in order to climb the
military ladder.
The first paragraph is an analysis of the internal political firestorm the
US was facing in 1878-79, which was threatening to produce another civil war.
___________________
The remainder of the Southern Democrats, furious at having their Texas camp so
skill-fully rustled, responded to Hayes’ ending of Reconstruction with the most
severe political perse-cution and disenfranchisement of their former slaves.
They also chose to once again hold the army’s wages captive to their political
electioneering agenda. Back and forth the two sides swayed until in the November
1878 elections the Democrats, astonishingly enough, gained the Senate in
addition to the House! Now even the North didn’t seem to care for the thoroughly
tainted Republicans, (largely because more blacks were seeking their freedom in
the North and thus came into competition with whites for the small number of
jobs available in the still severely depressed economy). Under these political
circumstances the Democrats could legally repeal the very electoral laws that
had vexed their party in the South since the end of the Civil War. For that
matter they could render the military results of the Civil War almost null and
void. The war that only thirteen years earlier had cost more than six hundred
thousand North American’s their lives appeared to have been fought in vain.
It was a despairing and desperate Republican party that looked ahead to the new
year of 1879. By mid-December of 1878 President Hayes and General Sherman were
examining the Brit-ish military situation on a worldwide basis.
It was into this Washington, DC milieu that Colonel Nelson Miles carried his
campaign over the winter of 1878–79, as part of his duties in heading the Army
Equipment Board. Mon-tana’s politicians were as grateful for the army’s
protection as the Texans on the other Western frontier, and informed Miles that
they would back him in his efforts to make war on Sitting Bull. Previously, on
September 12, 1878, Montana Republican governor Benjamin Potts had written his
friend from the Civil War, General Sherman, that “our people are clamorous for
Miles to command all Montana troops.” (Colonel Miles had already been stroking
his Montanans’ van-ity, declaring their cattle grew fatter than those in lesser
places like Colorado and Texas. De-lighted, the “Big Sky” ranchers, frontiersmen
and politicians embraced the transplanted Easterner as if he were one of their
own.) Governor Potts had himself, in 1869, been the recipient of
ex-traordinarily heavy patronage in attaining his pre-eminent political position
in Montana from then-President Grant. A former member of the Ohio state senate,
Potts had been one of General Sherman’s favourite division commanders in his
Georgia campaign during the Civil War, and was the longtime personal friend and
intimate political ally of fellow Ohio Republicans Ruther-ford B. Hayes, James
A. Garfield and John Sherman. Like his mentors, a perennial champion of the
Northern Pacific Railroad, it is safe to assume Potts and his fellow Montana
legislators per-ceived their young army hero had larger national territorial
objectives in mind, which could only bode well for the financial prosperity of
everyone involved.
Precisely how the mechanics of Miles’ lengthy political manoeuvrings worked, or
the entirety of those he managed to enlist, is as difficult to discern as it is
labyrinthine. But the over-all methodology employed was tested and true. Besides
writing directly to General Sherman, (in-stead of, as was proper, through
General Sheridan or even more properly through General Terry, whom he ignored),
Miles corresponded and visited with any politician who might advance his
designs. One of these legislators was the powerful Republican House leader,
James A. Garfield of Ohio, longtime protégé and, as previously mentioned,
confidant of fellow Ohioans John Sherman and President Rutherford B. Hayes.
Along with Governor Potts, each of these men were notorious Canadian
annexationists and, taken as a whole, the happiest line-up of advocates a
su-per-ambitious young colonel like Miles could hope to obtain.
Garfield had first been impressed with Miles during a Western tour, in which he
noted in his diary that the young colonel “was a good talker and very bright.”
It is almost certain that one of Miles’ pipelines to Garfield was Cleveland
Leader journalist Eugene Cowles, who had ac-companied Miles on his 1878
Yellowstone expedition. (It was during this “vacation” that the refugee Idaho
Bannock crossed Miles’ path. He quickly organized an army column, killing or
capturing most of them. A small number eventually did make it to Canada.) Cowles
served as a type of secret agent amongst the Washington-based newspaper
reporters, funneling confidential information to the Republican Garfield from
his covert sources.
Miles likewise had half a dozen senators, in addition to former secretary of
war and now Senator James Don Cameron of Pennsylvania (who had recently married
his wife Mary’s sister, Elizabeth), in his camp. Cameron was still on very good
terms with longtime ally Garfield, who occasionally spent pleasant weekends at
his Harrisburg, Pennsylvania farm.
Brevet Major-General Miles also likely cultivated contacts in the
Washington-based Staff section of the army, a division that both Sherman and
Sheridan constantly and bitterly com-plained they had little control over. Of
the three main divisions of the army—Command, Staff and Line—the Staff
department had best carved out its own little empire by politicking with the
Executive and Congressional branches of government they were continually in
contact with. Through the tortuous communications channels that existed between
the frontier Line officers and the Washington Staff headquarters, all of which
ran covertly around the general of the army at his Command headquarters, it was
possible for Miles to pass on and receive information of the sort that
eventually drove Sherman mad with rage.
Mary Miles was not indisposed to leap into the political fray on the side of
her husband either. In 1876–77, when Nelson had been busy chasing Sitting Bull’s
Lakota all over the eastern half of Montana, Mary had been forced to stay with
uncle William in Washington and spent her time beating Nelson’s political drum,
much to her host’s chagrin. “You may be assured that I personally am well
informed of his special merits,” the besieged general frankly lamented in a
letter of distress to Civil War comrade Brigadier-General Oliver O. Howard, on
March 29, 1877. Now, in early-March 1879, while visiting Aunt Cecelia Sherman
(wife of Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman), Mary discovered that a cabinet
meeting with President Hayes was scheduled for that very afternoon. The equally
ambitious Mrs. Miles immediately flew to a nearby desk and inked the following
letter to Uncle John:
“… The President told Genl Miles and myself that he had been so strongly
peti-tioned to send Genl [Miles] back to Montana [as a Department Commander], he
had de-termined to do so. The Postmaster General as well as yourself told us the
matter had been discussed in Cabinet and decided upon. The matter however was
referred to General Sherman on his return. He has vetoed it and is about sending
Genl Ruger to that Depart-ment, an officer who has never been west of the
Mississippi River and never seen a hos-tile Indian. He ranks Genl Miles as a
Col[onel] and of course would have command. Un-cle Cump [William Tecumseh] certa
inly loses all sight of justice, in his peculiar sensi-tiveness about doing any
thing for a relation. If Genl Miles were a stranger he would do this in a moment
and listen to the petitions of the people but he seems to regard this as a favor
to be refused because he happens to be connected with his family. An officer
should have some reward for such faithful and successful work as Genl Miles has
done in that country. Genl will not speak to Uncle [Cump] on the subject he is
so indignant and hurt and he does not know that I am appealing to you. Perhaps
you might have some influence with him if not the Secretary of War, and the
President can easily … give him the De-partment and Command he has so well
earned. Uncle [Cump] will probably say the old Col’s would make a fuss about it
but none of them [have] done the work deserving it. I regret having to trouble
you on the subject but there is no point appealing to Uncle Cump …”
Reeling before his niece’s frontal attack Uncle John did as he was bid, handing
the letter to President Hayes that afternoon after writing on the back, “Mr.
President: Please read this let-ter, which explains itself.”
The president did read the correspondence but ultimately decided to defer to
the general of the army’s decision once more. And once more General Sherman
refused to acquiesce.
Indeed, greatly annoyed at not having his position adequately acknowledged by
politicians, subordinates or relatives, “Uncle Cump” went out of his way to
thwart nephew Nelson’s ambitions. In a confidential correspondence to General
Sheridan on March 9, 1879, Sherman fumed:
“… I have told him plainly that I know no way to satisfy his ambitions but to
sur-render to him absolute power over the whole Army, with President & Congress
thrown in … He wants to remain on the Equipment Board and at the same time to
command all of [General] Terry’s troops, to advance north of the British line,
drive back Sitting Bull & Co., and if necessary follow them across the Border as
Mackenzie did on the Mexican Border.”
Earlier that same day Miles had confidentially requested this permission,
citing as a precedent Mackenzie’s 1873—not 1878—adventure, which had been
carried out solely on the spoken orders of Lieutenant-General Sheridan. As can
be seen, the suspicious General Sherman had scolded him for it and then
immediately written a letter to Sheridan relating their dispute. At once two
questions come to mind.
1. Why had Miles sought private approval from Sherman for a western Canadian
adventure against Sitting Bull?
2. Why had Sherman immediately written of the incident to Sheridan?
____________________________
Alas, you shall all have to wait for the book to see the answer to these
last two questions--and many more.
George Szaszvari
says...
>Linda,
>I would ignore the complaints. Any old west subject is applicable
>here and you are not going to please everybody. I have received
>hate mails from somebody(ies) who is/are not brave enough to give
>a real email address. Who cares.
I, for one, care, and denounce all such unsolicited mail. You
have every right to post it here and expose the culprit(s).
Should anyone want to express their opinion about anyone else's
stance on this NG, then let them do it openly and reply on the
forum they found the original message. Anonymous mail can,
I believe, still be traced should one have a real cause to do
so and be willing to pursue the matter...
It will be a sad day when any genuine Old West lover is chased
off this NG.
Arizona Vixen
wrote:
<clip, clip>
In breif, it's hot air. So also, interestingly enough,
> with much of Glenn Boyer's _I Married Wyatt Earp_, which for years he
> claimed was the marriage of a well-known manuscript, plus a secret one
> he had from John Clum (!), better covering Josie's Tombstone
> recollections. The second manuscript is now known not to exist. Much
> of the juicy stuff in _I Married Wyatt Earp_ was therefore made up by
> Boyer, or again taken from Big Nose Kate. Boyer had done as much
> before in his 1966 _Illustrated Life of Doc Holliday_ (not to be
> confused with Bob Boze Bell's excellent recent picture book).
<deleted to save bandwidth>
> Steve Harris
I'm glad to see you call the Bell book ("The Illustrated Life and
Times of Doc Holliday") excellent, but describing it as a "picture
book", IMHO, can give the wrong impression to people who haven't seen
it. While it's richly illustrated, enough to make my copy a
"coffeetable book," it contains a good deal of narrative and
interesting information.
I don't know if this is off-topic, but he (Bob Boze Bell) recently
purchased True West Magazine and its sister publication; moved it to
Cave Creek, Arizona, from Oklahoma. Made all the papers here. I
personally have noticed an enormous improvement in the magazine, and
was wondering what you folks here thought about it? Even the type of
paper they're using is better, and the editor (Marcus Huff) moved out
here with the rest of the magazine.
Bob Tiernan
> According to Utley's "Buckskins," Custer had apparently become a
> Christian at some point. I can't recall exactly when Utley reaches
> this conclusion but it is in there.
I seem to recall reading (earlier) that he got into this in early
65 or so, perhaps based on what his staff members wrote regarding
their time with the 3rd Division. I also know of Crow eyewitness
accounts (at least one or two) that related that Custer, while
at the head of the Yates/Keogh Battalions at LBH, stopped to
get on his knees to pray and that when others saw him they got
quiet and waited til he was done. I don't know if this is true
or not. Rev. Vince Heier, I believe, is gathering info relating
to this aspect of Custer's life.
Steve Grimm
traced, but nothing can be done unless it is life threatening. Abusive
emails can result in a disconnected service, but that person can always
signup with another ISP. I don't feel like wasting my time on idiots who
"challenge" me, but do not leave a method to accept it. Any discussion
resulting from the board should stay on the board, but sadly it does not.
Steve Grimm
sgr...@dimensional.com
Steve Grimm
ok. Just give me a method to respond.
Eliot Greene
There was for so long among the AO-W group an odd individual who changed
names (i.e.: net handles; nicknames), and fake addresses, constantly and
basically descended at will with some viciousness. The last posted name was
"Iva Rednoss". We labeled the same as the 'Drive-By Poster', from the legion
of such posts. Perhaps such silliness has hibernated. Hopefully a deep sleep.
Could be the candidate. Their true ID my company did finally catch.
'No spam' and such concerns may be reasonable but a true identity, we feel,
is crucial to the net now. Dang the spam, most ISPs now handle it quite well,
a true ID is far more important than being cute. Or distrusted.
Bookman
sarcasm" and 'exaggeration,' huh?
Okay, if you say so!
But since you admit to exaggeration, I can continue to believe
that Custer takes up more space than his accomplishments merit.
I think I'll drop that right there.
I'll give you this: you apparently have your facts together
on Custer. I must add this: it is quite easy to make/prove
a point with facts, even if the point ain't so. One simply
takes those facts which support their position and omits
those which don't!
I work in a setting which makes me know that...and we try to
be continually on guard to see that we do not do it. But I'm
sure we do it, even if unintentionally.
Please know that when I question your "facts" that I am not
accusing, merely wondering how far you have walked down that
same road of choosing facts which support your hypothesis.
For example, your writing below has Custer a legend before
Libbie started writing. That may be, but I'd say that her
writings may have "kept the legend alive" well after it would
have died a normal death... Would you argue that?
The men who died at the Alamo became part of a legend, as well.
Does that mean they were special? Or just got themselves into
a situation where they couldn't (with any honor) get out! Thieves
and bandits they might have been, they did die with honor, thus
providing fuel for later legends.
The legends are quick to come when a bunch of men die under
such circumstances. There is still much being written about
the Alamo and the legend grows and grows. Some historians even
have the first numbers wrong...more Texians died than have ever been
credited, some say, citing errors in the first major research work
on the Alamo battle done over 60 years ago.
I'd personally disagree that Custer was any sort of a "legend"
before the LBH, but I guess that would depend on how you define
"legend." He doesn't seem to merit that status, at least to me.
Jim Bowie may have been a pre-Alamo legend, Davy Crockett may
have been the same. They may also have been merely unique
individuals in a 'frontier' mode who became known (not legendary,
merely widely known) It was, I think, their Alamo deaths which
guaranteed them a special place in the book of everlasting legends.
Or so it would seem.
And you say Custer was brevetted to BG before he married Libby?
Okay, but I'd wonder if he may possibly have KNOWN Libby
and even been benefitting from her behind-the-scenes lobbying,
even tho unmarried at that time? That point may be more
significant than their marriage date! I'd suspect he was!
Can you respond to that without referring to a book!
OH well, here I am talking Custer. How do we keep doing that?
I was trying to compare Custer and MacKenzie, and there has been
some interesting history shared with the ng in that regard. The
direction taken seems to be more looking at Miles, however! He is
a familiar name, but since I avoid digging deeply into Civil War
history, I've not done a lot of reading on Miles.
I was very interested in Todd's input that had Miles with more
of a w'ifely cheering section and superactive lobby' than even
Custer had! Amazing, eye-opening, to me!
Hey, I'm learning something on this ng! Great. Can we see
more history in context in the future, I hope? It is helpful
to see a broader picture of the Civil War generals jockeying
for power in the post-CW period, and their actions during
this period of National Expansion westward.
It is necessary to remember that not all Americans were
in total agreement with this national policy of expansion, however!
Especially the Plains Indians! Even so, it is our history. Did we
learn anything from it? Not without taking a broader look
at the period, I think.
Thanks for the broadening of the topic!
David
lin...@mindspring.com wrote in message
<85bi01$tdm$3...@nntp5.atl.mindspring.net>...
Bookman
you take a position I can not agree with.
I think two consenting adults can take a discussion which began
on the ng to a private line for discussion that does not involved
the entire group. I know of no rule that says "if it starts here,
it must stay here!"
Or was that what you meant?
If you refer to nasty and anonymous e-mail, I don't like that, either.
I avoid anonymous posters like they have plague... and they might!
The tone of things on the board currently is much improved, I think.
David
Steve Grimm wrote in message <387BCCFF...@dimensional.com>...
Todd
on the newsgroup. So if it shows up twice (as it doubtless now will since Murphy
has become involved) please forgive me.
________________
Linda,
If such a thing is possible, Custer looks like a piker compared to Miles
when it comes to politicking! And what is so nice about it is the fact that we
have much of Miles' political manoeuvrings preserved for posterity. Libby could
have taken notes from Mary Miles, too! Talk about shameless!!!
For the sake of those who haven't seen anything of my manuscript yet, (Linda
has), I'll break down here and post a small section from chapter seven of my yet
Arizona Vixen
<snip>
> But since you admit to exaggeration, I can continue to believe
> that Custer takes up more space than his accomplishments merit.
> I think I'll drop that right there.
I heard something yesterday that surprised me because I'd never
heard it mentioned before; it's probably something that Custerphiles
are aware of, though. I guess two of his brothers also died at the
Little Big Horn...which I found a little surprising...but what was
eye-opening to me was the fact that one of them had earned TWO
Congressional Medals of Honor in the Civil War.
I guess it doesn't pay to have a relative who's so well-promoted
by his widow that your accomplishments get tossed into the shadows.
lin...@mindspring.com
through a third party at that because Libbie's father had forbidden her to see or
correspond with Custer! She had nothing whatsoever to do with Custer's promotion
as she was no where near DC at the time and had no correspondence with anyone
in that city or the Congress. She was the dutiful daughter trying to wear her
father down into seeing she and Custer were meant for each other. And even
then she often blew hot and cold regarding Autie. He asked for her hand in Fall
of 1863 when home for a leave when he was wounded in the leg Now that he
was a national hero, Judge Bacon began to see him in a different light, though
he still did not really want his daughter to marry a soldier and end up a widow
in a few months.
She didn't keep GAC's legend alive any more than several dozen people did. Godfrey
wrote a sound defense of Custer in his story of the LBH in Centruy Magazine in 1891.
Edgerly wrote articles and letters. Terry's brother in law, Hughes, wrote a scathing
trashing of GAC int he latge 1880's that, among other things, sought to discredit
Custer by LEAVING OUT important parts of the last orders and leaving out parts of the
official itinerary that made it look like Custer rush to LBH against orders when in
fact he and Terry had agreed before hand that it would REQUIRE "forced marches"
of 30 miles per day to even be in the area. (and forced march merely means that
instead of the average 20 -25 miles per day Cavalry usually did, marching from
6 a.m. to 2 pm, they marched until 4 or 5 pm, with all the usual breaks still in
place) by the time the 7th set out on the last march on June 22, they were
all hardened to 25 miles per day. Hughe's article really only backfired.
But Custer was indeed a "legend" -- the Boy General, the CW hero, the
Indian fighter, the writer, the sportsman, the General who stood up and went
head to head with Grant administration on corruption in the Indian agencies
and sutler appointments at the western garrisons. (actually Hazen had attempted
it in 1872 and ended up in a backwater post for it)
If Custer hadn't been the PR darling that he was, no one would be discussing
the LBH as they still do. It was because CUSTER died there that made it
memorable. We'd not be discussing Reno's Last Stand. Oh, we might mention it
but it wouldn't get the tremendous in-depth analysis of the LBH. How many
discuss the Fetterman Fight for years and years? How many archeological digs
have there been there? How often does anyone even know about the Dade
Massacre 60 miles north of where I live in Florida? Or the Raisen River Massacre
in Custer's Monroe?
Last Stands get the PR. The idea of the outnumbered small group being overwhelmed
and dying fighting to a man has always caught the human imagination. But for
a really well-done Last Stand you need a National Hero, like Saul. Or an
incredible sacrifice, like Thermoplae. Or a great charge like the Light Brigade.
And a couple of Big Names being involved really sear it into the national psyche.
linda t
>I'd personally disagree that Custer was any sort of a "legend"
>before the LBH, but I guess that would depend on how you define
>"legend." He doesn't seem to merit that status, at least to me.
>
>Jim Bowie may have been a pre-Alamo legend, Davy Crockett may
>have been the same. They may also have been merely unique
>individuals in a 'frontier' mode who became known (not legendary,
>merely widely known) It was, I think, their Alamo deaths which
>guaranteed them a special place in the book of everlasting legends.
>Or so it would seem.
>
>And you say Custer was brevetted to BG before he married Libby?
>
>Okay, but I'd wonder if he may possibly have KNOWN Libby
>and even been benefitting from her behind-the-scenes lobbying,
>even tho unmarried at that time? That point may be more
>significant than their marriage date! I'd suspect he was!
>
>Can you respond to that without referring to a book!
>
>OH well, here I am talking Custer. How do we keep doing that?
>David
>
>
lin...@mindspring.com
both know that and Honor it.
tom is buried at Leavenworth and has the gold marking on his gravestone that
designate a Medal of Honor Winner.
However during the CW, the Medal of Honor wasn't quite the honorific it is
now and sometimes was handed out like candy. Because it was about the only
MEDAL that anyone could earn then. Until it came along just about the only medal
anyone got was a Purple Heart. Which is why Brevets were given out -- in place
of medals. Custer was brevetted General 4 times.
Two brothers died with Custer -- Tom and Boston. Also 18 year old Nephew
Harry Reed and two brothers in law. The remaining brother, Nevin, was asthmatic
and never joined the army, though he tried during CW. He had a farm which he
owned jointly with Armstrong. Had 5 children.
linda t
In <Cq_e4.1942$OA2.1...@c01read04.service.talkway.com>, "Arizona Vixen" <vic...@usa.net> writes:
>On Tue, 11 Jan 2000 23:46:49 -0600 "Bookman" <la...@idworld.net> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>
>> But since you admit to exaggeration, I can continue to believe
>> that Custer takes up more space than his accomplishments merit.
>> I think I'll drop that right there.
>
Steve Grimm
lin...@mindspring.com wrote:
> Two brothers died with Custer -- Tom and Boston. Also 18 year old Nephew
> Harry Reed and two brothers in law. The remaining brother, Nevin, was asthmatic
> and never joined the army, though he tried during CW. He had a farm which he
> owned jointly with Armstrong. Had 5 children.
I believe Boston Custer is buried in Monroe, MI. Was it because he was a "civilian" that he was not
buried at Little Big Horn?
Steve Grimm
sgr...@dimensional.com
Todd
the LBH as they still do. It was because CUSTER died there that made it
>memorable.
I must disagree. It was, in my estimation, because so many soldiers were
killed but mostly because it makes for great historical theatre and drama. What
with fierce war-bonnet bedecked Plains Indians (the absolute world favourites)
charging the horsebacked cavalrymen, it is this sort of thing that has always
been the apple of peoples' eyes. Custer dying there helped, but not to the
degree imagined.
Bob Tiernan
> However during the CW, the Medal of Honor wasn't quite the honorific
> it is now and sometimes was handed out like candy.
That's true, but while his actions may not have earned him
a modern MOH, he was in the think of it, taking flags,
which was very dangerous as one was a target trying to
get them. He also got his right after the actions,
rather than based on reports 20 and 30 years later like
so many others.
> Two brothers died with Custer -- Tom and Boston. Also 18 year old
> Nephew Harry Reed and two brothers in law.
*Two* bro's-in-law? Other than Jimmy Calhoun, please
fill me in. Custer had one sister (check), and Libby
had no brother. That leaves little room for another.
Now, Moylan was a bro-in-law to Calhoun, but of course
he was not killed.
Bookman
lin...@mindspring.com wrote in message
<85i915$6hh$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>...
<snip>
>But Custer was indeed a "legend" -- the Boy General, the CW hero, the
>Indian fighter, the writer, the sportsman, the General who stood up and
went
>head to head with Grant administration on corruption in the Indian agencies
>and sutler appointments at the western garrisons. (actually Hazen had
attempted
>it in 1872 and ended up in a backwater post for it)
You include "Custer, the Indian fighter" in your list.
Im fact, was Custer really a successful Indian fighter in terms of
battles fought and battles won?
I've always had the uneducated impression that was not true. I
wonder if you can help here...?
And being called the "boy General?" He was an honorary
general during a portion of the Civil War, but not a 'real one'.
Vicki asked earlier "What is a brevet?"
I'd suggest that his "generalship" was an honorary one for
which he never received "general's pay." His being called 'the
boy general' was also honorary, roughly akin to a lot of former
CW officers being called "Colonel" for the remainder of
their lives, isn't it?
The honor (brevet) was accorded for his bravery and leadership,
but his highest actual rank ever given Congressional confirmation
was really as a Light Colonel, wasn't it?
Or am I wrong in my understanding?
David
Bookman
Hmm, could the long-running PR effort by Libby be a factor?
david
lin...@mindspring.com wrote in message
<85jepe$a6$2...@nntp8.atl.mindspring.net>...
>then why aren't we remembvering and analysing the Fetrterman Massacre or
the
> Dade Massacre? Same circumtances, same type of Last Stand.
>
>linda
>
>
>In <k18f4.21264$G55.3...@news1.rdc1.ab.home.com>, "Todd"
Eliot Greene
> Steve
>
> Outstanding! It's not like we sneak up on anybody. And anyone can start another
> thread on anything.
>
> Thanks for the post.
>
> linda t
>
> In <387A96CA...@dimensional.com>, Steve Grimm <sgr...@dimensional.com> writes:
> >Linda,
> >
> >I would ignore the complaints. Any old west subject is applicable here and you are
> >not going to please everybody. I have received hate mails from somebody(ies) who
> >is/are not brave enough to give a real email address. Who cares. I feel we are
> >lucky to have you contributing to this group and I have learned a lot from you and
> >the Custer posts. The posts are clearly marked and can be ignored by people who are
> >not interested in the subject. As Ryan said - post your own information if you
> >don't like what is being discussed.
> >
> >Steve Grimm
> >sgr...@dimensional.com
> >
>
"And just watch, plenty threads there will grow ........."
Bob Tiernan
> Linda wrote:
> > If Custer hadn't been the PR darling that he was, no one would be
> > discussing the LBH as they still do. It was because CUSTER died
> > there that made it memorable.
> I must disagree. It was, in my estimation, because so many soldiers
> were killed but mostly because it makes for great historical theatre
> and drama. What with fierce war-bonnet bedecked Plains Indians (the
> absolute world favourites) charging the horsebacked cavalrymen, it is
> this sort of thing that has always been the apple of peoples' eyes.
> Custer dying there helped, but not to the degree imagined.
Well, few battles with Indians were of that scale so it
was destined to be discussed more than most others. BUT,
Custer's presence there added a lot more interest to it
than you think. Fetterman also commanded a wiped-out
force, yet that battle gets a tiny fraction of the attention
that the LBH does.
Bob T.
Arizona Vixen
> However during the CW, the Medal of Honor wasn't quite the honorific it is
> now and sometimes was handed out like candy. Because it was about the only
> MEDAL that anyone could earn then. Until it came along just about the only medal
> anyone got was a Purple Heart. Which is why Brevets were given out -- in place
> of medals. Custer was brevetted General 4 times.
>
Thank you -- I didn't know that. I had just assumed that other
awards (e.g., silver star, etc.) were available.
Now if I just knew what a brevet was... ;o)
lin...@mindspring.com
Most of the Custer family is still gets buried in Monroe although they
don't live there anymore. There is a large family plot there.
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
Dade Massacre? Same circumtances, same type of Last Stand.
linda
In <k18f4.21264$G55.3...@news1.rdc1.ab.home.com>, "Todd" <nospam...@home.com> writes:
>>If Custer hadn't been the PR darling that he was, no one would be discussing
>the LBH as they still do. It was because CUSTER died there that made it
>>memorable.
>
> I must disagree. It was, in my estimation, because so many soldiers were
>killed but mostly because it makes for great historical theatre and drama. What
>with fierce war-bonnet bedecked Plains Indians (the absolute world favourites)
>charging the horsebacked cavalrymen, it is this sort of thing that has always
>been the apple of peoples' eyes. Custer dying there helped, but not to the
>degree imagined.
Todd
coming on the July 4, 1876--the Centennial--guaranteed it a definite notoriety.
Bill Shatzer
On Wed, 12 Jan 2000, Bob Tiernan wrote:
-snips-
> Well, few battles with Indians were of that scale so it
> was destined to be discussed more than most others. BUT,
> Custer's presence there added a lot more interest to it
> than you think. Fetterman also commanded a wiped-out
> force, yet that battle gets a tiny fraction of the attention
> that the LBH does.
Well, Fetterman's wiped-out force equalled, what, a third of Custer's
losses at LBH? Eighty-one troopers including Fetterman himself as I
recall. While the "wiped-out" was moderately significant, the total
casualties were not in the over all scheme of things. The Army had
suffered that level of casualties several times previously during the
Indian wars.
Fetterman's timing wasn't at all good either. Coming so soon on the heels
of Cold Harbor and Petersburg, no one was likely to pay much attention to
81 casualties - a total which was likely incurred in a couple minutes, or
less, of stiff fighting during the Civil War.
And, of course, your correct that Fetterman was Fetterman and GAC was the
Boy General, Civil War hero, published author, and egregious
self-promoter.
No Mark Kellogg rode with Fetterman.
Cheers and all,
Bill Shatzer
On Wed, 12 Jan 2000, Bookman wrote:
-snips-
> And being called the "boy General?" He was an honorary
> general during a portion of the Civil War, but not a 'real one'.
GAC was a "real" general during the civil war - he commanded a division of
cavalry, a "real" major general's position. There was nothing "honorary"
about the rank - rather it was a temporary or "hostilites only" rank in
the US Volunteers as opposed to a regular Army rank
> Vicki asked earlier "What is a brevet?"
> I'd suggest that his "generalship" was an honorary one for
> which he never received "general's pay." His being called 'the
> boy general' was also honorary, roughly akin to a lot of former
> CW officers being called "Colonel" for the remainder of
> their lives, isn't it?
No. And, GAC recieved general's pay while serving as a general.
> The honor (brevet) was accorded for his bravery and leadership,
> but his highest actual rank ever given Congressional confirmation
> was really as a Light Colonel, wasn't it?
> Or am I wrong in my understanding?
Yes. GAC was appointed major general in the US Volunteers while
remaining, I believe, a 1st Lieutenant in the regular army. But he
certainly commanded a full division of cavalry - albeit Volunteer
Cavalry.
A brevet rank is a temporary rank and not an "honorary" one.
Cheers,
Todd
It became honorary after the Civil War. For instance, if you were brevetted
a general you could sign your correspondences as such, or ask to be addressed as
such.
lin...@mindspring.com
linda t
lin...@mindspring.com
Army didn't have that many.
As Bi\ob Tiernan pointed out in his review of CUSTER AND THE CHEYENNES,
sucessful Indian fighting shoul dnaot bge measured in victories -- because
the Army didn't have that many.
Negotiating with the Indians, understanding them (and Custer did make an
effort to understand them and he was quite adept at sign language) these
were also the mark of an Indian "fighter" Custer's handling of the Indains
at Standing Rock reservation -- inviting them into his home, talking with them,
settling their grievances with the agents; trying to send them a wagon load of
food and blankets in winter of 1875 when he found out they were starving
But the agents thwarted it , so he tried an end run and invited the head of
families to come to Fort Lincoln so he could send them home with the usual
gifts of blankets and food -- but the agents wouldn't let them leave the
reservation. Custer exploded and sent off a letter to Sheridan, et al, that the
continued starving of these Indians would drive them off the reservation and
into war.
Brevet General is every bit as real as a "real" General. And Custer got the pay
that went with the rank. It was a reward in place of the medals that didn't
exist then. It was a FIELD PROMOTION. and totally Legitimate. Unfortunately,
at that time, when the conflict was over, the Field Promotions reverted back to
original rank. They do not do that anymore.
Brevets were most often given for volunteer units, but Custer's last brevet
was Major General of Regulars. With the pay of that rank, $8000 a year.
Custer was a very "real" General. His brevet appointments had to be approved
by the Congress.
So yes, you are totally wrong about it.
Please read Urwin's CUSTER VICTIRIOUS and find out just how very real Custer
was as a commander of horse and a Brigade then a Division.
linda t
>You include "Custer, the Indian fighter" in your list.
>
>Im fact, was Custer really a successful Indian fighter in terms of
>battles fought and battles won?
>
>I've always had the uneducated impression that was not true. I
>wonder if you can help here...?
>
>And being called the "boy General?" He was an honorary
>general during a portion of the Civil War, but not a 'real one'.
>
>Vicki asked earlier "What is a brevet?"
>
>I'd suggest that his "generalship" was an honorary one for
>which he never received "general's pay." His being called 'the
>boy general' was also honorary, roughly akin to a lot of former
>CW officers being called "Colonel" for the remainder of
>their lives, isn't it?
>
>The honor (brevet) was accorded for his bravery and leadership,
>but his highest actual rank ever given Congressional confirmation
>was really as a Light Colonel, wasn't it?
>
>Or am I wrong in my understanding?
>
>David
>
>
>
ROGER E WATSON
Greetings Linda:
Me, again !! Any suggestions for reading material on the Fetterman fight ?
Regards....Roger
<lin...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:85kqhe$f3n$2...@nntp5.atl.mindspring.net...
ro...@webtv.net
called religion and way of living, doesn't necessarily mean it is so.
Here in New Orleans, we have a group of people that call themselves
"Saints", and proport to be a professional football team. So far we
have seen nothing to make us feel that they are in fact, either.
Charlie
Todd
"Saints", and proport to be a professional football team. So far we
>have seen nothing to make us feel that they are in fact, either.
I hear you! Iron Mike wasn't much help there, was he? But how did Jima Mora
do so well with the Colts? I just don't get it. Now you folks have lost all of
your best draft picks just to get Ricky Williams, who was sidelined so much this
year. It looks like a pretty grim time for the next several seasons. Maybe you
should be trying to get Doug Flutie from Buffalo, eh? The rumour is he's gonna
pull the plug and come back to Canada since Wade Philips stiffed him.
lin...@mindspring.com
Cold Harbor or Petersburg?
Steven B. Harris
Vixen" <vic...@usa.net> writes:
> I'm glad to see you call the Bell book ("The Illustrated Life and
>Times of Doc Holliday") excellent, but describing it as a "picture
>book", IMHO, can give the wrong impression to people who haven't seen
>it. While it's richly illustrated, enough to make my copy a
>"coffeetable book," it contains a good deal of narrative and
>interesting information.
Yes. For the person wanting to know what to see in Tombstone, this
is the book to buy first. Alas, it's hard to get outside Tombstone
without special order. Some Arizona bookstores have it. Perhaps the
thing to do is buy it the day you roll into town read it in your hotel
room, and see the sights the next day.
If somebody needed 3 books as complete introduction to the entire
Tombstone saga, it would probably be Bell's Halliday book (for the
illustrations, but also the rich and up to date text), The Berra book
on Earp, and finally Inquest At the O.K. Corral, which contains the
bulk of the premium primary historical information about the gunfight.
Bookman
lin...@mindspring.com wrote in message
<85kq71$f3n$1...@nntp5.atl.mindspring.net>...
>Succesful Indian "fighting" should not be measure din victories, because
the
>Army didn't have that many.
This started with your description of Custer as a legend before the
LBH, partly due to his reputation as a successful Indian fighter!
I asked you to identify his successes as an Indian fighter and your
reply merely offered his kindnesses and efforts to understand the
Indians.
I can't imagine that -- in those days -- such efforts were widely
praised as hallmarks of a "successful Indian fighter." (Sherman
didn't seem to have that attitude when he was fighting the Rebs!)
But when you say here that "the Army didn't have that many"
victories, I'll have to take that under advisement and ask if
you don't perhaps mean "Custer's victories shouldn't be
measured in victories because he didn't have that many?"
That I can easily accept.
>Brevets were most often given for volunteer units, but Custer's last brevet
>was Major General of Regulars. With the pay of that rank, $8000 a year.
>
>Custer was a very "real" General. His brevet appointments had to be
approved
>by the Congress.
>
>So yes, you are totally wrong about it.
Well, since you've pointed out with such characteristic
sublety that I was totally wrong, I'll have to own up to it!
:-)
And I do appreciate two or three of y'all clearing that up!
When Vicki asked that question, she got no replies so I gave
her the one I found in my Websters dictionary under "brevet."
I didn't mean to imply that his rank wasn't operative during
the wartime period, merely that it wasn't permanent and was
'honorary' in that respect.
Sorry, guess I was working with a modern definition and was
therefore "totally wrong?"
:-)
David
Bookman
(smiling)
David
ro...@webtv.net wrote in message
<15159-38...@storefull-116.iap.bryant.webtv.net>...
Just because certain persons call themselves "Christian" as their so
called religion and way of living, doesn't necessarily mean it is so.
Here in New Orleans, we have a group of people that call themselves
"Saints", and proport to be a professional football team. So far we
have seen nothing to make us feel that they are in fact, either.
Charlie
Eliot Greene
> Just because certain persons call themselves "Christian" as their so
> called religion and way of living, doesn't necessarily mean it is so.
>
> Here in New Orleans, we have a group of people that call themselves
> "Saints", and proport to be a professional football team. So far we
> have seen nothing to make us feel that they are in fact, either.
>
> Charlie
ROFLM... Yes, any more than our "Cowboys" can rope a blind heifer!
ro...@webtv.net
Brevet promotions are, as I understand it, are what are sometime called
"battlefield promotions. Audie Murphy received such promotions, but his
were finalized. I may be a little off on this, but I think this is
right.
While he was a "breveted" general, he was indeed a general in all
respects. And his salary was that of a general. When the war was over
and he was reverted to the rank of I, believe, captain, it was a
terrible financial as well as social blow to Libby. The pay scale
difference was very wide, and military protocol does not allow much
socializing between lower officer ranks and those of generls. ( That
holds true today as well.)
Thanks to his political connections he was promoted to major, then to
Lt. Col, a rank he never rose above again. When he died he was a
Lt.Col., and was paid at that scale. He was still called "General" as a
term of respect, just as former presidents are often refered to as "Mr.
President" as if still in office.
Incidentally New York Life had a policy on him for $2,500.00, a copy of
which is shown in the Time-Life series on the old west, in the bok "The
Soldiers". Other than that, he left Libby with very little but debts.
Charlie