Two Errors in Thinking That We Must Avoid: The Naturalistic Fallacy & The Moralistic Fallacy.
Immortalist
be - that is, the tendency to believe that what is natural is good;
that what is, ought to be.
2. The moralistic fallacy refers to the leap from ought to be to what
is; the claim that the way things should be is the way they are. This
is the tendency to believe that what is good is natural; that what
ought to be, is.
-----------------------------
In any discussion of evolutionary psychology, it is very important to
avoid two serious mistakes in thinking. They are called the
naturalistic fallacy and the moralistic fallacy. The naturalistic
fallacy, which was coined by the English philosopher George Edward
Moore in the early twentieth century though first identified much
earlier by the Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the leap from what
is to ought-that is, the tendency to believe that what is natural is
good; that what is, ought to be. For example, one might commit the
error of the naturalistic fallacy and say, "Because people are
genetically different and endowed with different innate abilities and
talents, they ought to be treated differently."
The moralistic fallacy, coined by the Harvard microbiologist Bernard
Davis in the 1970s, is the opposite of the naturalistic fallacy. It
refers to the leap from ought to is, the claim that the way things
should be is the way they are. This is the tendency to believe that
what is good is natural; that what ought to be, is. For example, one
might commit the error of the moralistic fallacy and say, "Because
everybody ought to be treated equally, there are no innate genetic
differences between people." The science writer Matt Ridley calls it
reverse naturalistic fallacy.
Both are errors in thinking, and they get in the way of progress in
science in general, and in evolutionary psychology in particular.
However, as Ridley astutely points out, political conservatives are
more likely to commit the naturalistic fallacy ("Nature designed men
to be competitive and women to be nurturing, so women ought to stay
home to take care of their children and leave politics to men"), while
political liberals are equally likely to commit the moralistic fallacy
("The Western liberal democratic principles hold that men and women
ought to be treated equally, and therefore men and women are
biologically identical and any study that demonstrates otherwise is
aj&riorifalse"). Since academics, and social scientists in particular,
are generally left-leaning liberals, the moralistic fallacy has been a
much greater problem in academic discussions of evolutionary
psychology than the naturalistic fallacy. Most academics are above
committing the naturalistic fallacy, but they are not above committing
the moralistic fallacy.
We will avoid both errors—both leaps of logic—in this book by never
talking about what ought to be at all and only talking about what is.
It is not possible to make either mistake if we never talk about
ought. We will not draw moral conclusions from the empirical
observations we describe in subsequent chapters, and we will not be
guided in our observations by moral principles.
There are only two legitimate criteria by which you may evaluate
scientific ideas and theories: logic and evidence. Accordingly, you
may justifiably criticize evolutionary psychological theories
(including those presented in this book) if they are logically
inconsistent within themselves or if there is credible scientific
evidence against them. As scientists, we will take all such criticisms
seriously. However, it would hardly be appropriate to criticize
scientific theories simply because their implications are immoral,
ugly, contrary to our ideals, or offensive to some. We can tell you
right now that the implications of many of the ideas we present in
this book (whether ours or someone else's) are indeed immoral, ugly,
contrary to our ideals, or offensive to either men or women (or some
other groups of people). However, we must state them as they are
because, to the best of our scientific judgment, they are true. That
does not mean that we endorse all possible consequences and
implications of our observations or believe that they are somehow
good, right, desirable, or justifiable.
Truth is the guiding principle in science, and it is the most
important thing for scientists. We also believe that any solution to a
social problem must start with the correct assessment of the problem
itself and its possible causes. We can never devise a correct solution
to a problem if we don't know what its ultimate causes are. So the
true observations are important foundations of both basic science and
social policy.
Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters
From Dating, Shopping, and Praying to Going to War and Becoming a
Billionaire-Two Evolutionary Psychologists Explain Why We Do What We
Do.
by Alan S. Miller (Author), Satoshi Kanazawa
http://www.amazon.com/Beautiful-People-Have-More-Daughters/dp/0399533656
ZerkonX
Drive, Scotty.
On Sat, 30 Aug 2008 20:27:12 -0700, Immortalist wrote:
> For example, one might commit the
> error of the naturalistic fallacy and say, "Because people are
> genetically different and endowed with different innate abilities and
> talents, they ought to be treated differently."
Here is another error that this 'we' must avoid: the 'natural' bottom
line here or the natural active agent is not in the need to 'treat'
people. Rather, given genetic differences people will act differently,
treated or not treated. After this is recognized then the question
becomes: if people act differently should they then be treated
differently?
'Endowed' and 'innate' are loaded and ambiguous terms. Are they being
used here to force some other issue (eg Endowed by a creator)?
It is fallacy to say "People are genetically different". They, (or is it
'we'?) are not. People have genetic differences but also have
similarities, in fact relative to everything else, people have very few
differences which does not mean they are the same but not different
either. The simple binary same/different definition that is implied here
is a fallacy.
Now my favorite:
> Since academics, and social scientists in particular, are generally
> left-leaning liberals...
What, on earth, does this mean exactly other than through the fallacy of
taking some meaning for granted. Everyone 'just knowing' what left-
leaning liberals are may A-OK on talk radio but under the cover of
science?
> Truth is the guiding principle in science..
This can also be said of religion. Like religion, claims really can go no
further then actions of the claimant. With all due respect to the late
Alan Miller, I for one, see his work here as another cheap, simplistic
piece of commercial pandering in the shameful tradition of "I'm OK,
You're OK" and "Men Are From Mars..."
Science in devolution.
jerry warner
Immortalist wrote:
> We will avoid both errors傭oth leaps of logic擁n this book by never