Tragic News - Harrier Down
IainUK
I've missed it.
Tragic news as another Harrier crashed this morning.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2545815.stm
IainUK
www.air-cadets.org
news:alt.military.air-cadets
*** The contents of this post represent entirely my own thoughts, views,
opinions and ideals at the time of writing and should in no way be
considered the views, policies, rulings or actions of any organisation or
employer I may be associated with. ***
TL
only with pilots but also squaddies on training accident etc, most though
are never reported, unless it is a distinguished person, as this case or a
bit bizzare ie the shootings at Deepcut barracks
Jamie Wright
this tragic accident.
Jamie
Evan Brennan
> Apparently though this kind of thing happens quite alot of times a year,
> not only with pilots but also squaddies on training accident etc
Unfortunately, the Harrier has crashed with regularity. The UK has
purchased about 342 Harriers, including the trainers. Four years ago,
there were just 52 remaining in squadron service.
Since July 1998, BBC News online has reported at least nine crashes
of British Harriers, which is a bad accident rate considering the
small number of Harriers in British hands.
> most though are never reported, unless it is a distinguished person
Flying accidents are usually entered into the public record compiled
by the military, but they don't broadcast it to the media unless the
crash is witnessed by civilians, or when the news agencies are tipped
off by an anonymous caller from the services.
Scotty
fast jet - in fact its better than some. Your figures are incredibly
misleading! What you seem to be suggesting is that 290 Harriers have
crashed since they came into RAF service, which is blatantly false!
290 Harriers may have gone through RAF hands, and been scrapped,
upgraded, gone to museums, and even a few might have crashed!
The original Harrier Mk1 was an incredibly complex bit of kit for the
day, and its ability to hover was dependant on a large number of
factors, including the amount of water on board, weights, air temps,
etc. The margin for error was quite small, and there were a fair few
accidents with causes related to this margin of error. This margin
for error increased greatly with the introduction of the Sea Harrier
and the Composite GR5/7/9/T10 family.
With regards to Accident Reporting, ALL accidents are reported to the
media, its just a case of whether the media think its worth reporting
or not. In this case, and most others, they think it was.
evankb...@hotmail.com (Evan Brennan) wrote in message news:<781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com>...
BSD Chapman (ANTISPAM)
You didn't hear me, right?
These are my own interpretations, not official...
"Scotty" <sco...@scottie.org.uk> wrote in message
news:ce2a8198.02121...@posting.google.com...
> Actually the Harrier has an accident rate no worse than any front
line
> fast jet - in fact its better than some. Your figures are
incredibly
> misleading! What you seem to be suggesting is that 290 Harriers
have
> crashed since they came into RAF service, which is blatantly false!
> 290 Harriers may have gone through RAF hands, and been scrapped,
> upgraded, gone to museums, and even a few might have crashed!
>
> The original Harrier Mk1 was an incredibly complex bit of kit for
the
> day, and its ability to hover was dependant on a large number of
> factors, including the amount of water on board, weights, air temps,
> etc. The margin for error was quite small, and there were a fair
few
> accidents with causes related to this margin of error. This margin
> for error increased greatly with the introduction of the Sea Harrier
> and the Composite GR5/7/9/T10 family.
Indeed.
The recent spate of accidents (over the last 5-6 years) with the GR5/7
have generally been associated with engine failures, bird strikes
(remember the first female to eject from an RAF aircraft was the UAS
student, the pilot was killed??), and operating at sea (falling in the
drink etc).
The collection of engine failures was as a result of a fault in the
blade crystals. The money holders decided it was cheeper to risk a
'statistical' couple of harriers crash than to inspect and refit the
blades on the whole fleet.
Other than that, engine failures happen. The harrier is one of only
two single engined jets in the RAF. When the engines die, the plane
goes down. So, it sounds bad when one crashes. Remember that engines
are often powered down or shut down in flight on all types - it just
doesn't end up with a smoking hole in the ground for all the others.
Bird strikes happen. Period. The hawks, harriers, tonkas and cats
will always be at risk, less so for the tucanos, fireflys and tutors.
Falling in the drink. Well, if our boys wanted to fly from ship,
they'd have joined the Navy!!! The RAF chaps weren't trained from the
outset to land on a moving runway, so when they're all asked to give
it a go over a short period of time, I'm not all surprised that a
couple missed the target - either as a result of an emergancy or
through lack of judgement/seamanship in the circumstances.
An additionals 'sea opperations' note wrt the GR7 it that some
component failure is expected due to the harsh conditions encountered
at sea and not compensated for in the aircraft design. Namely, the
corrosive effect of sea water on the engines and airframes. More GR7s
will fail/require heavier maintainence because they have been forced
to operate in conditions that they were not designed for....
>
> With regards to Accident Reporting, ALL accidents are reported to
the
> media, its just a case of whether the media think its worth
reporting
> or not. In this case, and most others, they think it was.
>
Where a bird has hit the wing but not resulted in a crash, or an
outrigger has failed but the pilot kept it straight, where an engine
has failed but the other three kept the aircraft flying or a tire
burst on landing.... it isn't reported. But they are all instances
where it could have gone very wrong...
Cecil Turner
>
> Actually the Harrier has an accident rate no worse than any front line
> fast jet - in fact its better than some. Your figures are incredibly
> misleading! What you seem to be suggesting is that 290 Harriers have
> crashed since they came into RAF service, which is blatantly false!
> 290 Harriers may have gone through RAF hands, and been scrapped,
> upgraded, gone to museums, and even a few might have crashed!
Unless yours are doing a lot better than ours (and they weren't last time I checked),
the mishap rate is quite a bit worse than other front line fast jets. A combination of
single-engine design, challenging (VSTOL) training program, and unique handling
characteristics makes them a bit more likely to be involved in mishaps.
> The original Harrier Mk1 was an incredibly complex bit of kit for the
> day, and its ability to hover was dependant on a large number of
> factors, including the amount of water on board, weights, air temps,
> etc. The margin for error was quite small, and there were a fair few
> accidents with causes related to this margin of error. This margin
> for error increased greatly with the introduction of the Sea Harrier
> and the Composite GR5/7/9/T10 family.
The margin has increased, but some pilots still manage to miscalculate it. More
importantly, engine malfunctions in this regime are unforgiving and represent a sizeable
chunk of the mishap stats. (Also, VSTOL handling characteristics are not intuitive and
cause a good portion of the accidents, especially among newbies.)
> With regards to Accident Reporting, ALL accidents are reported to the
> media, its just a case of whether the media think its worth reporting
> or not. In this case, and most others, they think it was.
The Harrier's a good little jet, fun to fly, and allows combat power projection in many
cases where other jets can't . . . but there are tradeoffs. The engineering is complex,
there are more single-point failures than most systems, and pilots require more training
to achieve its potential. These inevitably impact reliability and safety, as any
impartial review of the statistics will demonstrate.
rgds,
KTF
Tom Joyce
} Unfortunately, the Harrier has crashed with regularity. The UK has
} purchased about 342 Harriers, including the trainers. Four years ago,
} there were just 52 remaining in squadron service.
Are you inclding the GR1/3 airframes in your 342 figure?
--
yours aye,
Tom
Come to think of it, gurls hav to put up with boys. so their lot it hard too.
N Molesworth (1) Esq, Whizz For Atomms
Jamie Wright
> two single engined jets in the RAF. When the engines die, the plane
> goes down. So, it sounds bad when one crashes. Remember that engines
> are often powered down or shut down in flight on all types - it just
> doesn't end up with a smoking hole in the ground for all the others.
Just as a side note - you are more likely to have an engine failure on an
aircraft with more engines, so is it better to have more or less engines?
Who knows, Boeing and Airbus in conjunction with the engine manufacturers
and the regulatory authorities have been bashing their heads against brick
walls with this one for a while.
Jamie
Ralph Savelsberg
Jamie Wright wrote:
>>Other than that, engine failures happen. The harrier is one of only
>>two single engined jets in the RAF. When the engines die, the plane
>>goes down. So, it sounds bad when one crashes. Remember that engines
>>are often powered down or shut down in flight on all types - it just
>>doesn't end up with a smoking hole in the ground for all the others.
>>
>
>Just as a side note - you are more likely to have an engine failure on an
>aircraft with more engines, so is it better to have more or less engines?
>
That depends on whether the multi-engined aircraft can remain airborne
on its remaining engine(s) of course.
When talking about STOVL this is a very important point. The Yak-38
Forger, for instance, relied on two vertically mounted engines and
vectored thrust from its main engine for hover. Failure of any one of
those three engines in hover would result in a crash. In that respect
the Harrier, with its single engine undoubtedly was safer.
I have little doubt that such considerations also played a role in the
initial selection of the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin JSF designs (both of
which relied on a single engine, albeit with the addition of a lift fan
in case of the latter) over the one from McDonnell-Douglas which relied
on a seperate lift engine in addition to vectored thrust from the main
engine.
The Yak-38 had a truly abysmal safety record by the way.
Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg
terrythebarman
However, the Harrier has a job which flying wise is probably the most
demanding combat role in the Service. It is a mud-mover (strike a/c)
intended to get right down there in the weeds to support the front
line troops at the battle-face. Hence they do bang into the ground
quite often. Just think, 500mph, 20 feet or so off the deck and one
half second of slipped concentration in a two hour mission and bang,
St Peter is the next bloke to enter your HUD..... So don't give the
Harrier community too hard a time, the fact is they do exceptionally
well to keep the accident rate as low as they do!
Terrance
Jamie Wright
Definatley one of the hardest a/c to fly. You may have seen the post about
an a/c I was involved in the design of. That was originally a VSTOL a/c but
we decided to ditch the idea due to the dangers involved.
Jamie
Jamie Wright
> That depends on whether the multi-engined aircraft can remain airborne
> on its remaining engine(s) of course.
ETOPS provides a number of requirements for trans-atlantic a/c that ensures
that multi-engine a/c are same when they lose an engine. However, my view on
this would be to lose 2 engines on a twin (and go down!) would be far less
likely than losing 2 engines on a 4 engined a/c, which would more than
likely send you down as well.
Food for thought.
>
> When talking about STOVL this is a very important point. The Yak-38
> Forger, for instance, relied on two vertically mounted engines and
> vectored thrust from its main engine for hover. Failure of any one of
> those three engines in hover would result in a crash. In that respect
> the Harrier, with its single engine undoubtedly was safer.
> I have little doubt that such considerations also played a role in the
> initial selection of the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin JSF designs (both of
> which relied on a single engine, albeit with the addition of a lift fan
> in case of the latter) over the one from McDonnell-Douglas which relied
> on a seperate lift engine in addition to vectored thrust from the main
> engine.
In any case, losing your lifting engine during a hover maneourve would cause
loss of the a/c.
Jamie
John Halliwell
rkstone.freeserve.co.uk> writes
>ETOPS provides a number of requirements for trans-atlantic a/c that ensures
>that multi-engine a/c are same when they lose an engine. However, my view on
>this would be to lose 2 engines on a twin (and go down!) would be far less
>likely than losing 2 engines on a 4 engined a/c, which would more than
>likely send you down as well.
I thought it was ERTOPS (Extended Range Twin engined OPerationS) and as
such only applies to 'twin-engined' airliners. Depending on the engine
reliability, it allows them to fly so many minutes from land, in the
assumption the second engine will make it. It makes no comparisons with
three and four engined aircraft.
The margin for error is much less when dealing with a twin as the
Kegworth 737 crash showed.
--
John
Preston, Lancs, UK.
Sandra_M
"Jamie Wright" <Ja...@36kirkstone.freeserve.co.uk> wrote in message
news:at7i5c$uer$1...@newsg2.svr.pol.co.uk...
> > However, the Harrier has a job which flying wise is probably the most
> > demanding combat role in the Service. It is a mud-mover (strike a/c)
The Sea Harrier is NOT a mud mover, and this was a RN aircraft.
Keith Willshaw
> Don't get me started! :-)
>
> > That depends on whether the multi-engined aircraft can remain airborne
> > on its remaining engine(s) of course.
>
> ETOPS provides a number of requirements for trans-atlantic a/c that
ensures
> that multi-engine a/c are same when they lose an engine. However, my view
on
> this would be to lose 2 engines on a twin (and go down!) would be far less
> likely than losing 2 engines on a 4 engined a/c, which would more than
> likely send you down as well.
>
This turns out not to be the case.
When an engine on a 4 engined aircraft such as a 747
fails it frequently throws out enough debris to make
any engine on the same side also fail.
One such example is the EL-AL freigher that crashed
at Amsterdam some years ago
> Food for thought.
>
> >
> > When talking about STOVL this is a very important point. The Yak-38
> > Forger, for instance, relied on two vertically mounted engines and
> > vectored thrust from its main engine for hover. Failure of any one of
> > those three engines in hover would result in a crash. In that respect
> > the Harrier, with its single engine undoubtedly was safer.
> > I have little doubt that such considerations also played a role in the
> > initial selection of the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin JSF designs (both of
> > which relied on a single engine, albeit with the addition of a lift fan
> > in case of the latter) over the one from McDonnell-Douglas which relied
> > on a seperate lift engine in addition to vectored thrust from the main
> > engine.
>
> In any case, losing your lifting engine during a hover maneourve would
cause
> loss of the a/c.
>
Sure but the manner of failure is critical to the survivability of the
accident. If the thrust falls to all nozzles at the same time the
pilot will likely be able to eject safely. If however you end
up with a sudden asymmetric thrust its likely to flip over
and kill him before he realises whats happening.
Keith
Cecil Turner
>snip
> > > When talking about STOVL this is a very important point. The Yak-38
> > > Forger, for instance, relied on two vertically mounted engines and
> > > vectored thrust from its main engine for hover. Failure of any one of
> > > those three engines in hover would result in a crash. In that respect
> > > the Harrier, with its single engine undoubtedly was safer.
> > > I have little doubt that such considerations also played a role in the
> > > initial selection of the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin JSF designs (both of
> > > which relied on a single engine, albeit with the addition of a lift fan
> > > in case of the latter) over the one from McDonnell-Douglas which relied
> > > on a seperate lift engine in addition to vectored thrust from the main
> > > engine.
> >
> > In any case, losing your lifting engine during a hover maneourve would
> cause
> > loss of the a/c.
> >
>
> Sure but the manner of failure is critical to the survivability of the
> accident. If the thrust falls to all nozzles at the same time the
> pilot will likely be able to eject safely. If however you end
> up with a sudden asymmetric thrust its likely to flip over
> and kill him before he realises whats happening.
>
> Keith
True, but the main point is the one the original poster made: multiple engines required
for VSTOL just multiplies the odds of a critical failure.
rgds,
KTF
Paul J. Adam
<get....@spammer.net> writes
What does the 'A' in FA.2 stand for?
--
Paul J. Adam
TJ
"Sandra_M" <get....@spammer.net> wrote in message
news:at7v8e$474$1...@knossos.btinternet.com...
The aircraft that crashed was not a Sea Harrier. It was a Royal Navy Harrier
T.8.
From the MOD web pages:
"Sea Harrier FA2
The FA2 is a single seat multi-role day/night all-weather aircraft, whose
roles in Air Defence and Surface Attack are interchangeable according to the
tactical requirement. It is the only true multi-role jet aircraft in service
in the UK inventory. Optimised for operations from ships at sea, it's short
take-off and vertical landing capability has dramatically enhanced the
ability of the Invincible class of Aircraft Carriers to project air power in
support of UK interests worldwide."
Sea Harrier FRS.1's mud moved in the Falklands and also attempted mud moving
in Bosnia. Lt Nick Richardson was shot down by a SAM in a Sea Harrier while
attempting to bomb a Bosnian-Serb T-55 during 1994.
TJ
Evan Brennan
> > Unfortunately, the Harrier has crashed with regularity. The UK has
> > purchased about 342 Harriers, including the trainers. Four years ago,
> > there were just 52 remaining in squadron service.
> > Since July 1998, BBC News online has reported at least nine crashes
> > of British Harriers, which is a bad accident rate considering the
> > small number of Harriers in British hands.
> Your figures are incredibly misleading! 290 Harriers may have gone
> through RAF hands, and been scrapped, upgraded, gone to museums, and
> even a few might have crashed!
Known Harrier accidents through 1978:
P.1127 prototypes ( 6 were built )
XP831 -- Damaged in accident, details unknown, 19 Nov 63.
XP836 -- Crashed after nozzle detached, 14 Dec 61.
XP972 -- Crash-landed after engine bearing failure, 30 Oct 62.
XP984 -- Crashed on landing, 31 Oct 75. This aircraft was
damaged previously after crash-landing on 19 Mar 65.
Kestrel FGA Mk I ( 3 delivered to RAF, 1964-65 )
XS693 -- Crashed, details not specified, 21 Sep 67.
XS695 -- Crashed, details not specified, date unknown.
XS696 -- Crashed after ground loop, date unknown.
Harrier GR Mk I ( 84 delivered to RAF, 1966-72 )
XV276 -- Crashed after flameout, 10 Apr 73.
XV739 -- Crashed after pitching down in hover, 24 Sep 73.
XV743 -- Crashed after entering uncontrollable roll, 27 Jan 69.
XV745 -- Crashed after mid-air collision with XV754, 19 Jan 76.
XV746 -- Crashed into mountain, 12 Mar 76.
XV749 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 26 Apr 72.
XV750 -- Crashed after engine failure, 6 Sep73.
XV751 -- Crashed in decelerating transition, 5 Aug 69.
XV754 -- Crashed after mid-air collision with XV745, 19 Jan 76.
XV758 -- Crash-landed after loss of power, 3 Oct 74.
XV776 -- Crashed after engine bearing failure, 9 Apr 75.
XV777 -- Crashed in decelerating transition, 1 May 72.
XV780 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 27 Jun 72.
XV788 -- Crashed after engine surged, 1 Dec 75.
XV791 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 9 Jul 73.
XV792 -- Crashed after loss of directional control, 21 Nov 71.
XV794 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 4 May 72.
XV796 -- Crashed after flameout, 6 Oct 70.
XV797 -- Crashed in uncontrollable dive, 23 Jan 74.
XV798 -- Crashed on vertical landing approach, 23 Apr 71.
XV799 -- Crashed into hillside, 13 Sep 72.
XV800 -- Crashed after flameout, 16 May 75.
XV802 -- Crashed into wooded area, 21 Mar 72.
XV803 -- Crashed, nozzle runaway, 3 Aug 71.
XV805 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 30 Jul 73.
XW918 -- Crashed into building during airshow, 12 Jan 72.
XW919 -- Damaged in accident, details unknown, 28 Jun 73.
XW920 -- Crashed after fuel system failure, 21 Jun 72.
XW764 -- Damaged in accident, details unknown, Jul 75.
XW766 -- Damaged in accident, details unknown, Oct 72.
XW770 -- Crashed after flameout, 6 Jul 76.
Harrier T Mk II & IIA ( 14 aircraft delivered to RAF, 1969-72 )
XW174 -- Crashed after fuel system failure, 4 Jun 69.
XW264 -- Crashed after fuel system failure, 11 Jul 70.
.............................
Kestrel FGA Mk I ( 6 delivered to USA, 1964-65 )
XS694 -- Crash-landed after ground loop, date unknown.
Harrier AV-8A Mk 50 ( 102 delivered to USMC, 1971-76 )
71-58386 -- Crashed after failing to recover from dive, 18 Jun 71.
71-58388 -- Crashed after bird-strike, 27 Mar 73.
71-58708 -- Crashed after engine failure, 29 Nov 1977.
71-58709 -- Crashed on landing, 10 Jan 76.
71-58948 -- Crashed on landing, 5 Jun 76.
71-58952 -- Crashed after engine failure, Feb 78.
71-58953 -- Crashed, details not specified, 27 Jul 77.
71-58957 -- Crashed after engine failure, 27 Aug 76.
71-58967 -- Crashed after engine failure, 11 Feb 77.
71-58970 -- Crashed into mountain while dive bombing, 6 Sep 77.
71-58971 -- Crashed while hovering during demonstration, 27 Jul 74.
71-58974 -- Crashed after running out of fuel, 30 Aug 76.
71-59230 -- Crashed, details not specified, 6 Dec 76.
71-59235 -- Crashed during vertical landing, 13 Feb 75.
71-59236 -- Crashed, details not specified, 4 Jul 75.
71-59237 -- Crashed after engine failure, 16 Jun 76.
71-59244 -- Crashed after engine failure, 4 Jul 75.
71-59245 -- Crashed on landing, 9 Oct 74.
71-59250 -- Crashed during low level attack exercise, 12 Jul 77.
71-59372 -- Crashed during landing transition, 6 Apr 77.
71-59377 -- Crashed during transition, 19 Mar 77.
Harrier TAV-8A Mk 54 ( 8 aircraft delivered to USMC, 1975-76 )
71-59381 -- Crashed during transition, 19 Apr 77.
Matador AV-8A Mk 50 ( 8 aircraft delivered to Spain, 1975-1976 )
71-59561 -- Crashed after pitching up on take-off, 11 Jun 76.
> With regards to Accident Reporting, ALL accidents are reported to the
> media, its just a case of whether the media think its worth reporting
> or not.
According to whom?
Ralph Savelsberg
Keith Willshaw wrote:
>"Jamie Wright" <Ja...@36kirkstone.freeserve.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:at7icj$uig$1...@newsg2.svr.pol.co.uk...
>
>>Don't get me started! :-)
>>
>>>That depends on whether the multi-engined aircraft can remain airborne
>>>on its remaining engine(s) of course.
>>>
>>ETOPS provides a number of requirements for trans-atlantic a/c that
>>
>ensures
>
>>that multi-engine a/c are same when they lose an engine. However, my view
>>
>on
>
>>this would be to lose 2 engines on a twin (and go down!) would be far less
>>likely than losing 2 engines on a 4 engined a/c, which would more than
>>likely send you down as well.
>>
>
>This turns out not to be the case.
>
>When an engine on a 4 engined aircraft such as a 747
>fails it frequently throws out enough debris to make
>any engine on the same side also fail.
>
>One such example is the EL-AL freighter that crashed
>at Amsterdam some years ago
>
That is not a good example.
In this case it wasn't the debris from the engine, but the actual engine
itself that took out the other engine under the wing. The mounting pins
through which the engine is mounted on the pylon failed, causing the
entire engine to come off the wing, taking its neighbour and numerous
control lines with it.
On a side note: these pins were designed to shear if the engine were to
vibrate heavily due to failure, but in this particular case they failed
due to corrosion, something for which Boeing and the FAA had already
warned.
Even after (literally) loosing both engines on one wing, the crew still
had a measure of control over the aircraft, though they were loosing
speed/altitude. Things went really ape when they, unaware that instead
of engine failure the engines weren't even there anymore, tried to lower
the flaps. They deployed on the undamaged wing, but didn't on the
damaged one, causing the aircraft to plunge into a high-rise in the
Bijlmer suburb of Amsterdam.
Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg
Evan Brennan
> fast jet - in fact its better than some.
Really, which ones?
>What you seem to be suggesting is that 290 Harriers have crashed
>since they came into RAF service, which is blatantly false!
How many British Harriers have crashed Scotty?
The US Marine Corps has purchased about 374 Harriers and they
currently have about 135 remaining in squadron service. I'm not
certain about the number of surviving trainers.
More than 140 USMC Harriers have crashed to date. The Marines
have grounded the Harrier 29 times in the last decade.
Evan Brennan
> Scotty wrote:
> > This margin for error increased greatly with the introduction
> >of the Sea Harrier and the Composite GR5/7/9/T10 family.
>
> The margin has increased, but some pilots still manage to miscalculate it.
The only reason that Sea Harriers have a better safety record than
the RAF and USMC is because the Royal Navy mission is different.
They are used for interception so they fly at higher altitudes.
Farther away from the deck, which with the Harrier normally has
had far too many unintended meetings.
Scotty
post to that thread - I hope you find it here!
Before I do reply properly, can you please clarify, are you saying
that of the 374 Harries that have been through USMC service (in all
marks I assume from the stats you quoted)that 239 have crashed, and of
the 342 Harriers that have been through RAF service (of all marks I
again assume from the stats you quoted)that 290 have crashed? This is
clearly what you are saying, but I just want to make 100% certain....
And with regards to accident reporting, you may recall a Nimrod that
crashed into the Moray Firth in 1995. Nobody saw the crash, the
entire crew survived, and it was an ELINT aircraft, therfore highly
classified, and they could have covered the whole thing up, nobody saw
the crash. But they didn't. 2 Tornado F3's collided in mid-air some
years back. 1 crashed, 1 made it back to base, again nobody saw the
crash, and everyone survived. They could have covered it up, but they
didn't. In what circumstances would they NOT report a crash? Who's
interest would it be in not to report the crash? People would surely
find out anyway? (Note, I'm talking about crashes, not nosewheel
collapses, outrigger collapses, etc) You're not suggesting a cover up
I assume, as if you were, you wouldn't have been able to get those
accident stats you have.
Scotty
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
wrote:
>Unfortunately, the Harrier has crashed with regularity. The UK has
>purchased about 342 Harriers, including the trainers. Four years ago,
>there were just 52 remaining in squadron service.
The RAFand RN purchased over 22,000 Spitfires. Forty years ago, none
remained in squadron service. What does this suggest to you about
their attrition rate in crashes?
>Flying accidents are usually entered into the public record compiled
>by the military, but they don't broadcast it to the media unless the
>crash is witnessed by civilians, or when the news agencies are tipped
>off by an anonymous caller from the services.
They don't have any choice but report the circumstances, particularly
in the UK. I'm not aware of any that have been covered up.
Gavin Bailey
Unknown
wrote:
>
>They don't have any choice but report the circumstances, particularly
>in the UK. I'm not aware of any that have been covered up.
>
>Gavin Bailey
I like your last sentence there Gavin!!, can I use that
sometime?... :)
-Gord.
Evan Brennan
> that of the 374 Harries that have been through USMC service (in all
> marks I assume from the stats you quoted)that 239 have crashed, and of
> the 342 Harriers that have been through RAF service (of all marks I
> again assume from the stats you quoted)that 290 have crashed?
> This is clearly what you are saying
In fact, it is clear that I never wrote that.
> And with regards to accident reporting, you may recall a Nimrod that
> crashed into the Moray Firth in 1995. Nobody saw the crash, the
> entire crew survived, and it was an ELINT aircraft, therfore highly
> classified, and they could have covered the whole thing up, nobody saw
> the crash. But they didn't. 2 Tornado F3's collided in mid-air some
> years back. 1 crashed, 1 made it back to base, again nobody saw the
> crash, and everyone survived. They could have covered it up, but they
> didn't. In what circumstances would they NOT report a crash? Who's
> interest would it be in not to report the crash? People would surely
> find out anyway? (Note, I'm talking about crashes, not nosewheel
> collapses, outrigger collapses, etc) You're not suggesting a cover up
> I assume, as if you were, you wouldn't have been able to get those
> accident stats you have.
>
> Scotty
It's amazing how you've managed to turn this into a conspiracy theory.
I never said anything about a cover-up. But your suggestion that
every crash has been 'reported to the media' by the military is
not based on any facts you've presented.
If you want a comprehensive list of military flying accidents you
have to approach the proper government or military office for the
records. They will not come to you. So far, I haven't read any
accusations that the US or UK military has tried to block or
discourage general research about aircraft accidents.
Scottie
certainly confused an awful lot more people than just me by saying (and
please allow me to quote you)
"Unfortunately, the Harrier has crashed with regularity. The UK has
purchased about 342 Harriers, including the trainers. Four years ago, there
were just 52 remaining in squadron service."
.... Maybe you should re-read what YOU wrote, and possibly consider
re-wording it? It clearly suggests that the RAF originally had 342
Harriers, 290 have crashed, leaving 52! Maybe you didn't mean that, hence
the reason I asked for clarification!
As for the conspiracy theory, errr no, that was your interpretation of what
I said. I very much doubt that the military would want to cover up any
accident information - I'd expect them to want to be as open and honest
about them as possible to help prevent future accdeints. Secondly, I know
very well how to get hold of accident statistics from the military having
worked with them for 10 years. Finally you're right - I didn't provide
evidence that the military report every accident, however I did provide
examples which might illustrate situations where they could have got away
with NOT reporting to the media. Can you provide examples of where the
media have NOT been informed about an accident? (and I dont mean where they
have simply decided not to report it...)
"Evan Brennan" <evankb...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com...
Evan Brennan
>what were you getting at with your original post?
That the Harrier has one of the worst safety records of current
combat jets.
>It clearly suggests that the RAF originally had 342 Harriers,
>290 have crashed, leaving 52!
I never wrote that. There is no point in beating your dead horse.
>I know very well how to get hold of accident statistics from
>the military having worked with them for 10 years.
Then where are the statistics to back up your bluster Scottie?
You claimed that, and I quote, " the Harrier has an accident
rate no worse than any front line fast jet "
The US Marine Corps disagrees with your fantasies, based
on more than 30 years of intimate firsthand experience with
the crash-prone Harrier jump jet.
>I very much doubt that the military would want to cover up
>any accident information
What if a plane crashes where the pilot was forbidden to fly
according to sensitive political agreements?
>Can you provide examples of where the media have NOT
>been informed about an accident?
Yes. There were hundreds of US and Allied military aircraft
that crashed in Laos during the Vietnam war, which eventually
went into the record as losses but were never reported to the
media by the military.
>certainly confused an awful lot more people than just me
It's not my fault that you're confused by the truth. That's
a personal demon you'll have to slay on your own.
>Finally you're right - I didn't provide
> evidence that the military report every accident, however I
>did provide examples which might illustrate situations where
>they could have got away with NOT reporting to the media.
Most of what you've written in this thread is complete rubbish.
Scotty
its a conspiracy against your posts and my replying to them! :c) I'll
try to indent everything to make my text a bit clearer, but if I miss
a bit I'm sorry... I've also cut the post down a bit as it is getting
a bit long, so if you feel that the removal of my previous comments
puts your comments out of context, then I apologise.
>That the Harrier has one of the worst safety records of current
>combat jets.
The Harrier statistics you quoted were for the first generation
Harrier, which is far from a current combat jet, and being first
generation of a new breed of aircraft, you would expect accident stats
to be higher until the intricacies of flying them are fully
understood. Perhaps you should use comparable statistics from jets
of the same era? The F104 for example? Phantom? Other
"revolutionalry" aircraft or first generation VSTOL jets such as the
Yak 38? Maybe then your stats would be put into context. The current
jet is a second generation VSTOL aircraft, so perhaps providing
statistics from current aircraft would again put the Harriers into
context?
>>It clearly suggests that the RAF originally had 342 Harriers,
>>290 have crashed, leaving 52!
>I never wrote that. There is no point in beating your dead horse.
Ah, thats what the smell is... :c) So you agree that 290 UK harriers
have not crashed? Sorry...
>Then where are the statistics to back up your bluster Scottie?
>You claimed that, and I quote, " the Harrier has an accident
>rate no worse than any front line fast jet "
>The US Marine Corps disagrees with your fantasies, based
>on more than 30 years of intimate firsthand experience with
>the crash-prone Harrier jump jet.
Any stats I will be able to provide will probably be from RAF aircraft
only I'm afraid, although I will try to provide stats for other users.
I will however put them in context with comparable types from the
same era. If I find you are right, I will happily tell you, but as
you say, where are your statistic comparisons to back up your bluster
Evan? :c)
>What if a plane crashes where the pilot was forbidden to fly
>according to sensitive political agreements?
I thought we were talking about run-of-the-mill peacetime training
accidents, not potential hostile / politically sensitive situations?
That changes the thread and the whole argument about reporting of
accidents... Of course there will be times when National Security is
an issue, or to avert hostilities. Unfortunately for governments,
these things tend to come out in the end anyway....
>Yes. There were hundreds of US and Allied military aircraft
>that crashed in Laos during the Vietnam war, which eventually
>went into the record as losses but were never reported to the
>media by the military.
Wartime rules apply in those situations - up until now, we weren't
talking about wartime rules, and again they change the whole point of
the argument. Many of the crashes may not be "accidents", and because
accident rates are likely to be higher anyway in such situations (more
sorties, taking greater risks, being shot down! etc) public
sensitivities to casualties were taken into account, and I'm sure that
was one of the main issues with the Vietnam war in the publics
perception. I'm sure the military have learned some very valuable
lessons from it with regards to the reporting of crashes, whether
through hostile action or otherwise.
>It's not my fault that you're confused by the truth. That's
>a personal demon you'll have to slay on your own.
Ohhh demon slaying - what fun! I'm not confused by the truth, I am
confused by incorrect and biased use of statistics, a "skill" used
well by politicians. I'm trying to put your stats in context
(although as I'm sure you're aware, finding accident statistics
quickly isn't easy, but we'll get there!)
>Most of what you've written in this thread is complete rubbish.
I could say exactly the same! Oh, and are you conceding to the fact
I've actually written something that wasn't rubbish? :c)
If I find that you are correct, then I'll happily concede, but you see
I tend not to blindly accept what people say as the truth when I feel
there is some doubt as to the way the information is presented.
Just out of interest, so that I know where you are coming from, are
you UK based? I suspect you might be US based, which might explain
different perceptions of such things as reporting of accidents,
etc....?
Scotty
Scottie
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2002/chap4tab44frame.html
This website seems to prove you right Evan! The Harrier (Harrier II and Sea
Harrier only) does indeed have a higher accident rate than any other UK
Military fixed wing asset, unfortunately I cant quickly find stats for the
Harrier 1, but I think we already accept that the accident rate there was
probably a lot worse! This is probably down to its role and the fact its a
single engine aircraft than anything else, although you could be surprised
that the Jaguar, a twin-engined jet, has an accident rate approaching the
Harrier at points in its service life!
I still stand by my original arguement, that your statement and stats
provided were misleading. Had you provided comparisons, then perhaps I
would have listened, and I've had to find this information out for myself to
satisfy my curiosity, which has been an education in itself!
It's been nice to argue the point with you!
Scotty
"Evan Brennan" <evankb...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com...
Scottie
and then I wouldn't have had this stupid arguement!!!!!
http://www.latimes.com/services/site/releases/la-pr-121302.story
Isn't it ironic that they publish it now.... doh!
Scotty
"Evan Brennan" <evankb...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com...
NoSpam
> Oh flipping flip, why couldn't they have published this article a week
ago,
> and then I wouldn't have had this stupid arguement!!!!!
>
> http://www.latimes.com/services/site/releases/la-pr-121302.story
>
> Isn't it ironic that they publish it now.... doh!
>
Havnt followed this thread at all, but a quote from your souce says:
"The Harrier has failed to make a significant and distinctive contribution
on the battlefield."
This is not true. Not a single Harrier was lost to enemy action in the
Falklands campaign in 1982.
That sounds significant to me and certainly distinctive.
Peter Kemp
wrote:
Shame it's not true.
On May 4th 1982 a Sea Harrier of 800 Sqn was lost to ground fire at
Goose Green with the loss of the pilot. That certainly counts as enemy
action.
Several more were lost, including both RAF and RN versions of the
aircraft, before the end of the conflict.
Peter Kemp
Graeme Carrott
<nos...@hotmail.com> writes
>Havnt followed this thread at all, but a quote from your souce says:
>
>"The Harrier has failed to make a significant and distinctive contribution
>on the battlefield."
>
>This is not true. Not a single Harrier was lost to enemy action in the
>Falklands campaign in 1982.
>That sounds significant to me and certainly distinctive.
>
caused a fuel leak. The pilot was forced to eject as the aircraft ran
low on fuel before being able to reach Hermes.
GR.3 XZ972 was shot down by a Blowpipe SAM on 21/05/82 and the pilot
ejected.
GR.3 XZ988 was hit by AAA on 27/05/82 and crashed - the pilot ejected.
There were also losses to the SHAR fleet by enemy action.
--
Graeme
Currently Reading: "Westland Aircraft since 1915" - James
Tom Joyce
However, the Harrier certainly played a siginficant contribution to
the outcome of the confluct, allowing the task force effective air
cover half a globe from freindly airfields without the behemouth,
costly carriers the Americans operate from.
Of course, the source focuses on the USMC's operation of the ac and is
couched in journalese, aimed at presenting facts to non experts in a
order to convince them of the author's viewpoint. F'rinstance;
"In 31 years of flight, however, the Harrier's vaunted ability to take
off vertically has never been used in combat -- only in training
exercises, air shows and the 1994 film "True Lies," when Arnold
Schwarzenegger commandeers a Harrier to save Miami from a terrorist
attack."
True, but this ignores the facts that the thrustvedctoring
capabilities that enable the vertical take off also allow the short
take off and vertical landings which have been used in combat. And
that the Harrier's fatured in at least one Bond film!
The article mentions that Sea Hariers were used in the Flklands in an
AD role, which USMC jets were not meant to fill, but not that they
were used in close air support, which US jets are.
Further into the site it states, "As a result, the corps accepted many
trade-offs for an aircraft that relies on powerful blasts of hot air
to propel it into the sky." Which fixed wing combat ac doesn't?
--
yours aye,
Tom
Come to think of it, gurls hav to put up with boys. so their lot it hard too.
N Molesworth (1) Esq, Whizz For Atomms
Cecil Turner
Yes, but the Harriers undeniably made a significant contribution. The reason the article
failed to give credit is because it focused on USMC Harriers exclusively.
rgds,
KTF
Scottie
"NoSpam" <nos...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:Ii3L9.1652$Om2.2...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
John Halliwell
<gra...@airnorth1.demon.co.uk> writes
>Harrier GR.3 XZ963 was hit by small arms fire on 30/05/82 and this
>caused a fuel leak. The pilot was forced to eject as the aircraft ran
>low on fuel before being able to reach Hermes.
>
>GR.3 XZ972 was shot down by a Blowpipe SAM on 21/05/82 and the pilot
>ejected.
>
>GR.3 XZ988 was hit by AAA on 27/05/82 and crashed - the pilot ejected.
>
>There were also losses to the SHAR fleet by enemy action.
There were 9 losses in total, 4 were accidents where enemy action played
no part in them. 5 Harriers in total were shot down by ground forces.
The 'no losses' quote is usually stated as 'no losses in air to air
combat' with 30 enemy aircraft destroyed.
Of the four accidents; two collided in thick fog, one went into the sea
on take-off and the forth slipped off a rolling deck in very heavy seas
(no pilot present at the time).
Still it had quite a decisive effect on land based combat.
Guy Alcala
No pilot was 'present' at the time the a/c went over the side because he
(Lt. Cdr. Mike Broadwater) had just ejected:
[801 Sq. Senior Pilot (XO in the US) Robin Kent's account to his CO] "'Mike
was sitting on the deck behind Paul's jet down aft. Both were burning and
turning, on the centerline and ready for launch -- so the deck chains had
been taken off. It's wet on the deck and you know how slippery it has
become recently -- like a bloody ice rink. The ship was in a hard turn to
starboard at a fairly high rate and so she was heeling to port quite
markedly. There was also a 40-knot wind over the deck from starboard, and
the deck was heaving up and down badly in the heavy sea. The ship lurched
strongly against the sea when without warning the nose of Mike's aircraft
swung to the left through 90 degrees and, in spite of the brakes, slid
gracefully over the side. He could do absolutely nothing about it and
ejected as the nose dropped. He was picked up by the SAR helicopter in less
than two minutes!'
"Dick Goodenough was on hand to give the final bit of information as to why
it had happened. 'The nose wheel steering is designed so that if too great
an outside side-force is put on it, it will give rather than break. For
example, a tractor on the nose-wheel might apply such a force with the
nose-wheel steering inadvertently engaged. So it looks as though a
combination of the strong wind, the heel of the ship in the turn, and a
sudden heave of the deck from the heavy sea took charge of the nose of the
aircraft and pointed it at the point of least resistance.'"
From "Sea Harrier Over the Falklands," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during the war.
Guy
P.S. Oh, the other SHAR combat loss was a shoot down by a Roland missile.
801's Qualified Weapons Instructor, Flt. Lt. Ian Mortimer, was orbiting in
the area of Port Stanley at a range and altitude where he felt he was out of
all the threat envelopes. He saw the launch and altered pitch/heading to
put some more air between himself and the missile (temporarily putting the
missile in a blind arc), expecting to see it re-appear in his sight falling
harmlessly away below and in front of his a/c. Let's just say his estimate
of his location re the Roland's envelope, was mistaken. Very embarassing
for the Sq. QWI, to say the least.
John Halliwell
<g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> writes
>No pilot was 'present' at the time the a/c went over the side because he
>(Lt. Cdr. Mike Broadwater) had just ejected:
Thanks for the correction and detailed information of the incident. I
assume this is a different incident from the one that 'went into the sea
on take-off' (as I seem to recall the quote) of that incident?
Guy Alcala
Yes, that was Lt. Cdr. Gordon Batt of 800 Sq. on Hermes. It was a night
launch for a strike mission, and chances are he got disoriented by the lack
of horizon and hit the sea. Here's Sharkey's take (note that Sharkey
disparages 800 Sqds. training level and radar competence throughout the book,
along with Hermes' tasking, with some reason):
" . . . on the evening of 24 May, that morale was dented when the night sky
was lit up by a huge explosion close to the task Group. The Hermes Sea
Harrier team had been tasked with a night-bombing effort, presumably
high-level bombing of Stanley airfield. It was not possible for the Harrier
GR.3s to do this sort of task by day or night because they lacked both radar
and the Navhars.
"Why, after a heavy day's flying on CAP, the Hermes Sea Harriercrews should
have had to turn their minds to a four-aircraft night-bombing mission was
beyond me. Especially as they were definitely lacking in night deck
experience and had certainly not been able to practice any form of
co-ordinated attack in the dark. They also lacked radar expertise, according
to our recent visitors [note: Ferranti technical team and some of the 809 Sq.
pilots who were assigned to Hermes] and, following some educated guesswork, I
believed that this was the root cause of theaccident which lit up the night
sky and killed Lieutenant-Commander Gordie Batt.
"Invincible were informed in the briefest terms that Gordie had flown into
the sea while attempting to join up visually in formation with the other
three aircraft. It seemed probable that the join-up was being conducted
without making full use of the Blue Fox radar -- the Staff having attempted
to ban the latter's use and the command of 800 squadron having little faith
in the aircraft's avionics package. I had already listened with dismay to
one join-up by night by two pairs of 800jets preparing to go on CAP. I and
Steve [Thomas; his wingman] had launched at the same time as the Hermes team
and set off silently for the briefed climb-out point [to remain under the
radar/radio horizon from Argentine radars on the falklands, when within 50 nm
or so of the carriers], checking our weapon systems out on each other as we
did so, and climbing to high level for transit en route to the CAP station.
we were already 120 miles en route to CAP before the two Hermes pairs at last
managed to join up with each other. They were still overhead their carrier.
"It was with that background in mind that I tried to imagine what post-launch
join-up instructions had been given during the briefing for the bombing
mission. It sounded as though it had been left to individuals to join their
leader visually, and on a black night it was not surprising that one pliot
would become slightly disoriented and forget how close he was to the water.
it was even easier to lose track of your position in the sky if you were
tired. And after a reported three days of CAP missions plus alerts, gordie
was very tired. But he was also game, and his untimely death was a great
loss to the Task Force and to the Navy."
Please note that this is all Sharkey's speculation. The only thing certain
is that Batt's a/c crashed into the sea and exploded, or vice versa, shortly
after takeoff. It's unknown whether this was due to disorientation,
malfunction or what have you.
Guy
Evan Brennan
> } On May 4th 1982 a Sea Harrier of 800 Sqn was lost to ground fire at
> } Goose Green with the loss of the pilot. That certainly counts as enemy
> } action.
> }
> } Several more were lost, including both RAF and RN versions of the
> } aircraft, before the end of the conflict.
>
> However, the Harrier certainly played a siginficant contribution to
> the outcome of the confluct, allowing the task force effective air
> cover half a globe from freindly airfields without the behemouth,
> costly carriers the Americans operate from.
One bright spot in over three decades of service does not make
the Harrier an unqualified success. The FAA Sea Harrier did
a remarkable job in the air superiority role, but not without
the US Sidewinder missiles. The RAF Harrier was a non-player
in air-to-air combat during the Falklands war. And they didn't
do anything significant in the ground attack mission either.
Apparently the RAF Rapier SAM units did not compensate. I'll
cite Commander 'Sharkey' Ward because the UK loves to quote
him, sometimes selectively. As some of you probably know,
Sharkey derided every organization he came into contact with.
He offered this of the RAF Regiment:
"I heard of dinners being held commemorating up to 30 Rapier
kills when statistics showed that they didn't actually score a
single one". He observed that, "the only aircraft that the RAF
had shot down since the 1940s were their own--by accident?"
It must have been a hoot to work with Sharkey.
>
> Of course, the source focuses on the USMC's operation of the ac and is
> couched in journalese, aimed at presenting facts to non experts in a
> order to convince them of the author's viewpoint.
Forget your perception of those viewpoints. Look at the facts.
The Harrier has not excelled in the ground attack/CAS mission
in combat so it has been a very expensive proposition for the
UK and US. In view of high losses from accidents, questionable
value in the Gulf war and Balkans, the costs of 35 years of
operations and purchase of over 700 Harriers is not justified
by the ACM success of two squadrons of Sea Harriers during
a few weeks in 1982! The overall history of the aircraft is not
sufficiently addressed by the more positive SHARkey-isms.
Evan Brennan
>"Sea Harrier Over the Falklands," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
>Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during the war.
>
>Guy
Regarding training combats, Sharkey writes to an unfortunate
double-standard. He tends to drop names and many details when
things went favorably. But when the kill ratio was not in favor
of the British Navy, he avoided quoting the numbers altogether
along with the names of the vanquished Sea Harrier pilots.
As published elsewhere, British Sea Harriers were tested against
Mirages flown by French pilots - who dominated the Sea Harriers.
Even Sharkey admitted this in "Sea Harrier Over The Falklands".
Although he described these engagements vaguely and obviously
attempted to dismiss the superior performance by the Frenchmen,
rejecting it as a fluke.
In Ch.8, Sharkey claims that before they went to the Falklands,
Sea Harrier pilots compiled a 3:1 kill ratio in practice ACM
with F-15s. I wasn't surprised by this since F-15s had been
bested on occasion by outdated US Phantoms. In 1978, US Navy
F-4s of VF-202 took on USAF F-15s from the 49th TFW in an ACM
exercise at Holloman. The post-engagement pictures show the
intakes of the Phantoms decorated with kills:
F-4N--151463 (CDR Tiny Mize): ten F-15s.
F-4N--150492 (LCDR Bill Lightstone): five F-15s.
F-4N--152277: ten F-15s.
F-4N--153056: nine F-15s.
Unknown if the F-15s scored or if they got locked up with
heaters or BVR. The photographs are in Bert Kinzey's C&M
Vol. 17, Atlantic Coast US Navy Phantoms. As the caption
suggests, the Navy pilots were either very good or the USAF
pilots had a bad day.
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote:
> >"Sea Harrier Over the Falklands," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
> >Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during the war.
> >
> >Guy
>
> Regarding training combats, Sharkey writes to an unfortunate
> double-standard. He tends to drop names and many details when
> things went favorably. But when the kill ratio was not in favor
> of the British Navy, he avoided quoting the numbers altogether
> along with the names of the vanquished Sea Harrier pilots.
>
> As published elsewhere, British Sea Harriers were tested against
> Mirages flown by French pilots - who dominated the Sea Harriers.
> Even Sharkey admitted this in "Sea Harrier Over The Falklands".
> Although he described these engagements vaguely and obviously
> attempted to dismiss the superior performance by the Frenchmen,
> rejecting it as a fluke.
No, he doesn't dismiss it as a fluke or describe it vaguely, he says that
he knew who the SHAR pilots were, and he didn't think much of their ACM
skills. Page 125-126:
"[During the trip south in Invincible]: Flag Officer Naval Air Command had
signalled to report the results of some practice air combat sorties flown
between Sea Harriers and Mirage IIIs, the fighters they were about to
face. At the close of the Command Briefing one evening, [Invincible CO]
J.J. Black passed the signal to me with a look of genuine concern in his
eyes. The report described how three unnamed Sea Jet pilots had fared
against the French-made fighter. It would have been depressing reading to
anyone but myself -- the three had hardly held their own against the
supersonic fighter, and were certainly not trying to claim they came out
on top.
" 'Don't worry about what this says, Sir. I know exactly who these three
SHAR boys were from the remarks made by them in the report and from how
they acquitted themselves in combat. The are not what you would wish to
call 'aces of the base' in fighter combat and they certainly don't measure
up to our own team. Their tactics as described by the signal were
inadvisable, but predictable for the individual pilots involved. None has
flown against the F-15, F-5E, F-16, as we have, and those fighters will
all knock spots off a Mirage III -- and you will remember that we have
easily held our own against those top jets. So, in my view, the report
isn't worth the paper it's written on.'
"JJ looked half relieved, but not totally convinced.
" 'Are you blowing smoke up my arse again, Sharkey?' I had pulled the
wool over the Captain's eyes once before, or so JJ had thought. Was it
happening again?
" 'Mostly [sic] certainly not, Sir! Our ability to cope with the Mirage
III must be judged on our proven performance in the air against similar
jets on instrumented ranges [referring to Decimomannu], and on two other
factors: our confidence in combat -- knowing that we can and will win; and
our own personal levels of expertise, or "time in the saddle". Regular
air combat training is particularly important in the Sea Harrier so that
you learn to use the aircraft aggressively and to fly it smoothly at one
and the same time. We have had stacks of practice -- much more than the
boys back home -- and we know that we can do the job.'
"Wings intervened in the discussion. ' I think you can accept Sharkey's
opionion of this signal, Sir. He knows all the pilots pretty well,
especially in combat. And I would rather believe his expert view than
anyone else's.' "
"JJ relaxed more and the signal was forgotten. I later went through it
with my pilots to extract any useful tips on Mirage III performance, then
ditched it."
> In Ch.8, Sharkey claims that before they went to the Falklands,
> Sea Harrier pilots compiled a 3:1 kill ratio in practice ACM
> with F-15s. I wasn't surprised by this since F-15s had been
> bested on occasion by outdated US Phantoms. In 1978, US Navy
> F-4s of VF-202 took on USAF F-15s from the 49th TFW in an ACM
> exercise at Holloman. The post-engagement pictures show the
> intakes of the Phantoms decorated with kills:
>
> F-4N--151463 (CDR Tiny Mize): ten F-15s.
> F-4N--150492 (LCDR Bill Lightstone): five F-15s.
> F-4N--152277: ten F-15s.
> F-4N--153056: nine F-15s.
>
> Unknown if the F-15s scored or if they got locked up with
> heaters or BVR. The photographs are in Bert Kinzey's C&M
> Vol. 17, Atlantic Coast US Navy Phantoms. As the caption
> suggests, the Navy pilots were either very good or the USAF
> pilots had a bad day.
The answer is simple, and is for the same reasons that Sharkey mentions.
A good, wisely aggressive pilot in a less capable plane can defeat a less
skilled pilot in a better one. VF-202 is a reserve outfit, and the pilots
are old heads who've BTDT. Reserve and Guard Squadrons regularly
outperform their active duty opponents in practice and combat, because the
latter are on average far less experienced. That's what happened when
that Israeli squadron stomped on the USN fighters sent to do ACM training
against them a couple of years back; it was a reserve F-16A squadron
filled with very experienced pilots, against a bunch of mostly nuggets;
the USN sent its new guys because they needed the practice a lot more than
the guys who'd been around.
Same goes with the Aggressor and Top Gun instructors who routinely beat up
on teen-fighters in A-4s and F-5Es; they also benefit from constant
practice to keep their skills sharp. Situational awareness and making
your opponent fight your fight, is far more important than any difference
in a/c performance. Or, as another friend of mine is fond of saying, the
most important thing in air combat is the quality of the baggage holding
down the ejection seat. Ed, Walt, Dudley and others have been making the
same point in another thread, and if it came to choosing who to put my
money on in an ACM hassle -- one of these guys in their '60s or '70s
versus some guy with 500 total hours in his twenties, my money would be on
the social security crowd.
Guy
Evan Brennan
>> >"Sea Harrier Over the Falklands," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
>> >Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during the war.
>
>> Mirages flown by French pilots - who dominated the Sea Harriers.
>> Even Sharkey admitted this in "Sea Harrier Over The Falklands".
>> Although he described these engagements vaguely
>
[snip quote for brevity]
I don't see any details about the engagements with French Mirage
pilots. I don't see any information provided about the number of
engagements. I don't see any data about victories for and against.
In other words, Sharkey described it vaguely.
What I did see in your quote, is the same thing I saw last time
I read it - a lash-up by an egomaniacal hypocrite.
>> Regarding training combats, Sharkey writes to an unfortunate
>> double-standard. He tends to drop names and many details when
>> things went favorably. But when the kill ratio was not in favor
>> of the British Navy, he avoided quoting the numbers altogether
>> along with the names of the vanquished Sea Harrier pilots.
> he says that he knew who the SHAR pilots were
But he didn't mention the names of SHAR pilots. This is verified
by your own message.
>> and obviously attempted to dismiss the superior performance
>> by the Frenchmen, rejecting it as a fluke.
> he didn't think much of their [SHAR pilots] ACM skills.
There were few people who Sharkey thought much of. But I have no
reason to believe that he was better than they. I accept his
remarks only as opinion, not fact. And Sharkey didn't seem to be
in a hurry to fight the French himself, so it was inappropriate
for him to publicly belittle his fellow Sea Harrier pilots, even
though they were defeated soundly.
>> In Ch.8, Sharkey claims that before they went to the Falklands,
>> Sea Harrier pilots compiled a 3:1 kill ratio in practice ACM
>> with F-15s. I wasn't surprised by this since F-15s had been
>> bested on occasion by outdated US Phantoms. In 1978, US Navy
>> F-4s of VF-202 took on USAF F-15s from the 49th TFW in an ACM
>> exercise at Holloman. The post-engagement pictures show the
>> intakes of the Phantoms decorated with kills:
>>
>> F-4N--151463 (CDR Tiny Mize): ten F-15s.
>> F-4N--150492 (LCDR Bill Lightstone): five F-15s.
>> F-4N--152277: ten F-15s.
>> F-4N--153056: nine F-15s.
>>
>> Unknown if the F-15s scored or if they got locked up with
>> heaters or BVR. The photographs are in Bert Kinzey's C&M
>> Vol. 17, Atlantic Coast US Navy Phantoms. As the caption
>> suggests, the Navy pilots were either very good or the USAF
>> pilots had a bad day.
>
Cecil Turner
snip
> The answer is simple, and is for the same reasons that Sharkey mentions.
> A good, wisely aggressive pilot in a less capable plane can defeat a less
> skilled pilot in a better one. VF-202 is a reserve outfit, and the pilots
> are old heads who've BTDT. Reserve and Guard Squadrons regularly
> outperform their active duty opponents in practice and combat, because the
> latter are on average far less experienced. That's what happened when
> that Israeli squadron stomped on the USN fighters sent to do ACM training
> against them a couple of years back; it was a reserve F-16A squadron
> filled with very experienced pilots, against a bunch of mostly nuggets;
> the USN sent its new guys because they needed the practice a lot more than
> the guys who'd been around.
>
> Same goes with the Aggressor and Top Gun instructors who routinely beat up
> on teen-fighters in A-4s and F-5Es; they also benefit from constant
> practice to keep their skills sharp. Situational awareness and making
> your opponent fight your fight, is far more important than any difference
> in a/c performance. Or, as another friend of mine is fond of saying, the
> most important thing in air combat is the quality of the baggage holding
> down the ejection seat. Ed, Walt, Dudley and others have been making the
> same point in another thread, and if it came to choosing who to put my
> money on in an ACM hassle -- one of these guys in their '60s or '70s
> versus some guy with 500 total hours in his twenties, my money would be on
> the social security crowd.
>
> Guy
Sorry guys, but this is all horse-puckey. Most of the differences in multiplane training
engagements is the simulated weapons capabilities, ROE, and who assesses the kills (gets to
the chalkboard first). Someone downloading my own tapes could easily come to the conclusion
that we had a 100% or 0% kill ratio--from the same mission--just by selecting different
engagements. Nobody in the business takes these stories seriously, except as a PR issue,
and neither should you.
That said, assuming permissive ROE and competent handling, there is nothing in the world
more discouraging than facing a "wall of eagles" with AWACS support. And in the days of
multiple "rammer" shots targeting enemy groups, my money is on the snot-nosed pinball
wizards (assuming competent training and leadership) vs the geriatric crowd looking for the
gun shot (which I am unfortunately now one of).
rgds,
KTF
Scottie
For info, there is a chance that Evan's PC is infected with the W32.Klez.H
virus, which is an Email worm which will distribute itself to people in
Evan's address book. (I received an infected Email - I feel privileged to
be in his address book, but that means if I'm in it and got sent a virus, so
might you be!)
The subject line of the Email may be something along the lines of "Lets Be
Friends" (appropriate?!!), "how are you", or possibly one of a number of
other subject lines. The Email may not have any text in it, however will
contain an attachment. DO NOT OPEN THE ATTACHMENT! Use standard safe
computing practice to deal with the Email. You are advised to ensure that
your Mail software, Browser, or Operating System have been updated to ensure
that all security loopholes have been fixed. The fix for Microsoft apps can
be found at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/
bulletin/MS01-027.asp
If you have any worries about virus infection, or if you think you might be
infected, details on how to remove the virus can be found on any reputable
anti-virus vendor, however here are a couple of links to keep you going:
http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32klezh.html
http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.k...@mm.html
Cheers
Scotty
"Evan Brennan" <evankb...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com...
Scottie
chips on his shoulders (which is a minor understatement), and is happy
portraying himself as a minor god in the world of military aviation, while
happily laying into anyone who might disagree or wish to do things
differently - rightly or wrongly. Great book, but he is certainly highly
opinionated, and does destroy some of his credibility with his attacks on
his superiors, his peers, and anyone else who might get in the way. But
being very much "light blue" I would say that...!
However, the record of the Sea Harrier in Air-Air combat certainly stands up
for itself - not even you can shoot that down Evan! Describing situations
where pilots are getting defeated in mock combat, but who are working up on
a relitively new and untested aircraft going to war, is completely
pointless considering the outcome of the real air war in the South Atlantic.
The Sea Harrier always has been potent in the Air-Air environment, and
certainly the F/A2 is widely regarded as one of the best fighters currently
in service - and that IS highly documented and publicised.
Scotty
"Evan Brennan" <evankb...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:781bdac.02121...@posting.google.com...
Scottie
>
> One bright spot in over three decades of service does not make
> the Harrier an unqualified success. The FAA Sea Harrier did
> a remarkable job in the air superiority role, but not without
> the US Sidewinder missiles. The RAF Harrier was a non-player
> in air-to-air combat during the Falklands war. And they didn't
> do anything significant in the ground attack mission either.
The RAF Harrier wasn't supposed to be a player in the Air-Air war, duh,
hence the GR designation - Ground Attack & Recconosance - as opposed to the
FRS designation - FIGHTER, Recconosance & Strike! I would have thought even
you would have know that? As for not doing anything significant in the
ground war, thats where you're wrong. No other aircraft in the British
inventory could have done the job of the Harrier in the Falklands, being
able to deploy on RN Invincible class carriers, fly from bulk freighters
such as Atlantic Conveyor and Contender Berent, deploy on short temporary
forward airstrips (such as at San Carlos), actually be deployable in the
field, carry out 6-12 sorties per day, and carry out conventional and
precision attacks on airfields, AAA sites, CAS, etc. If thats no
significant, what is? Some examples of well documented successful strikes
are on Stanley Airport (especially 1 May where Sea Harriers closely followed
the first of the Black Buck missions),and Darwin and Goose Green during 2
Paras attacks. You could rightly argue that had the Royal Navy not got
rid of their conventional carrier force, then they would have been better
prepared to support any liberation attempt, however who knows whether the RN
would have committed such resources so readily, and who knows whether
conventional aircraft would have suffered similar losses? The Harrier
losses in the Falklands were not due to problems with the aircraft, but due
to normal combat attrition.
>
> Apparently the RAF Rapier SAM units did not compensate. I'll
> cite Commander 'Sharkey' Ward because the UK loves to quote
> him, sometimes selectively. As some of you probably know,
> Sharkey derided every organization he came into contact with.
> He offered this of the RAF Regiment:
>
> "I heard of dinners being held commemorating up to 30 Rapier
> kills when statistics showed that they didn't actually score a
> single one". He observed that, "the only aircraft that the RAF
> had shot down since the 1940s were their own--by accident?"
>
With regards to the Rapier, it was credited with 14 kills and 6 probables
from 24 missiles fired. This clearly goes against Sharkey Wards claims, and
I suppose it would only be fair to include a quote from 63 Squadron, RAF
Regiment:
"When 63 Squadron came ashore at San Carlos, there were obvious difficulties
in locating, and unloading, their Rapier equipment and vehicles from the
Atlantic Causeway while the squadron personnel, who had transhipped from the
QE II in South Georgia to the Canberra and the Norland, did not land as a
formed unit. These were not unlike the problems which Regiment LAA flights
and squadrons had encountered in Operations Torch and Husky almost forty
years earliest It took over 12 hours to land 59 Land Rovers and 57
trailers - including the Rapier equipment - by Mexefloats from the Atlantic
Causeway and .s another 24 hours before the last of the squadron personnel
was ashore from the passenger vessels. The squadron commander had received
no briefing on his tasks, no preliminary reconnaissance of fire unit sites
had been possible and the logistic and administrative support left something
to be desired - there were, for example, only twenty-four sets of Arctic
clothing for the whole squadron."
Royal Artillery crews encountered similar problems. Any teething problems
with the Rapier crews could therefore be understood, unfortunately the first
36 hours were the critical period for the landing forces, and with their
specialist air defence facilities non-operational, there were a number of
high profile successes for the Argentine Air Force. These successes were
wrongly attributed by the media to failure of the Rapier air defence system.
Once the Rapier was fully operational on the islands, it proved highly
successful. Of course success tends not to be reported in the same was as
"failure", and the reputation seemed to have stuck.
> It must have been a hoot to work with Sharkey.
Mmmmm I bet...!
> The Harrier has not excelled in the ground attack/CAS mission
> in combat so it has been a very expensive proposition for the
> UK and US. In view of high losses from accidents, questionable
> value in the Gulf war and Balkans, the costs of 35 years of
> operations and purchase of over 700 Harriers is not justified
> by the ACM success of two squadrons of Sea Harriers during
> a few weeks in 1982! The overall history of the aircraft is not
> sufficiently addressed by the more positive SHARkey-isms.
The raison d'etre of the AV-8B, as far as the USMC was concerned, is that it
can be available at very short notice near the beachhead either from FOBs on
the beach or from light carriers off-shore. The USN, meanwhile, would never
risk a CV that close in-shore and would also be limited by launch/recovery
rates in their response. They're regarded as super hand-grenades to save the
lives of troops on the ground on-call. The USN will look at the loss rate of
the AV-8B against the loss rate of the FA-18, the USMC will look at the
relevant response time and the lives saved on the battlefield, chalk and
cheese.
As we have already discovered together through the wonders of modern media,
there was a fairly large attrition rate among Harriers in operation, but
this was due to the demanding nature of low-level operations. The Harrier is
not regarded as "bad" aircraft, just a "unique" one because of its unique
capabilities, and is generally flown by the most experienced pilots who are
given extensive training to convert to the type. As you are no doubt aware,
what's makes the Harrier so unique, and constitutes its major strength, is
its ability to operate in the field, whether that be a supermarket carpark,
a forest clearing, a grass strip, etc. This places it closer to the action,
therefore gives it greater availability, higher sortie rate, greater
availability, etc. You are also, I'm sure, aware that most aircraft
accidents happen at take-off and landing - the same is true in the
commercial world. If an aircraft has a higher cycle rate, then it is likely
to have a higher accident rate. Harriers have some of the highest cycle
rates of combat jets due to the nature of their role. Combat attrition is
likely to be higher, again due to the nature of their role (low level close
air support either over the front line or behind enemy lines, therefore in
the most highly defended airspace). Finally, with such a unique and
dangerous role, the aircraft has one engine. Any failure means the loss of
a jet. Although physical accident rates may show the Harrier to be more
accident prone, I say show me a plane that does the same role, and I'll say
that accident rates will be broadly similar. Unfortunately there is no such
other plane...
Scotty
Evan Brennan
> Ahhh Sharkey Wards book... Colourful character, but seems to
> have many chips on his shoulders
The chips are big enough to sink a battleship. : )
>(which is a minor understatement), and is happy
> portraying himself as a minor god in the world of military aviation, while
> happily laying into anyone who might disagree or wish to do things
> differently - rightly or wrongly. Great book, but he is certainly highly
> opinionated, and does destroy some of his credibility with his attacks on
> his superiors, his peers, and anyone else who might get in the way.
This is true.
>
> However, the record of the Sea Harrier in Air-Air combat certainly
> stands up for itself - not even you can shoot that down Evan!
I never tried to.
Evan Brennan
> All,
>
> For info, there is a chance that Evan's PC is infected with the W32.Klez.H
> virus, which is an Email worm which will distribute itself to people in
> Evan's address book. (I received an infected Email - I feel privileged to
> be in his address book, but that means if I'm in it and got sent a virus,
> so might you be!)
While I'm no expert about viruses, it is unlikely that you got an e-mail
transmitted from my hotmail account because there are no names in
the address book there. I ignore and delete all messages to hotmail
without opening them, since I use my business account for e-mail
traffic. An anti-SPAM measure.
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
>>They don't have any choice but report the circumstances, particularly
>>in the UK. I'm not aware of any that have been covered up.
>
>I like your last sentence there Gavin!!, can I use that
>sometime?... :)
Well, it is a bit idiotic, but coverups tend to become exposed over
time, and the chances of that exposure are increased by the amount of
evidence and the exposure of witnesses to the event and the surviving
evidence. Claiming that the RAF and RN have covered up Harrier losses
is just not true, and I doubt the USMC is any different.
I am impressed by the resiliance of "Harrier is dangerous - wooooo!!!"
stories in the US media, which have been recurring for decades. I
wonder if anybody's compared the accident rate of Harriers and
equivalent aircraft: the closest of which might be single-engined
helicopters in terms of landing profile.
Gavin Bailey
Scotty
>While I'm no expert about viruses, it is unlikely that you got an
e-mail
>transmitted from my hotmail account because there are no names in
>the address book there. I ignore and delete all messages to hotmail
>without opening them, since I use my business account for e-mail
>traffic. An anti-SPAM measure.
That is possibly good news, however i'd still ensure you clean boot,
and virus check your PC. One of the other ways this virus tries to
hide its origins is to take an Email address from someones address
book, and spoof the "From" address using this Email address. For
example, lets pretend my PC is infected with the virus, and it sends
itself to everyone in my address book, however the Email may look like
it is sent from someone else in my address books Email address. I
dont know I'm infected, and it looks like someone else is sending the
virus, not me.
The most reliable form of protection is to ensure that your Email
program cannot execute attachments on its own (bugs in many of the
Microsoft products have been widely advertised, and you should
download the security updates to protect yourself), and that you have
a reliable anti-virus product, which is updated regularly with new
virus definitions. Dont trust any Email attachments, even if they are
from someone you know! Virus check everything...
Scotty
The Adj
"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" <occu...@bonkers.net> wrote in
message news:3e006c1f...@News.CIS.DFN.DE...
It's funny you should say that...
A quick look at the stats provided by Scottie earlier in the thread
(http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2002/chap4tab44frame.html) seem
to show, at least in the Navy's case, that the Harrier's accident rate is
comparable to the average rotary-wing accident rate.
RobC.
Ad absurdum per aspera
> transmitted from my hotmail account because there are no names in
> the address book there.
Sorry to be the bearer of bad news, but the real question is whether
your name and address were in certain likely locations within the
computer of the person who got infected.
Some viruses forge your name while running on somebody else's
computer. That's right, somebody else's computer. You didn't
contract these viruses, you didn't do anything to aid and abet their
dissemination and functioning, and most likely, unless you are so
fortunate as to identify that computer, there isn't much you can do
about it.
See for instance
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.k...@mm.html
I've seen this before and the only "solution" apparent to me in most
cases is to hunker down until the virus is through dragging your good
name through the mud, and (if the account is one that you read,
instead of a grenade well for spam) send soothing e-mail responses
from the real you to any irate recipients who give you a piece of
their mind.
Meanwhile, at least you know that -- since you are presumably a
practicioner of safe computing*, you have the courage of your
convictions when you send these responses... and the knowledge that
viruses are not corrupting your own computer.
Hopng this helps,
--Joe
* To wit: bu name-brand antivirus software, update its virus
definitions files frequently, and don't double-click or, heaven help
us, automatically execute received code when you're not sure of its
bona fides.
Unknown
wrote:
Just struck me funny that's all Gavin, pulling your leg... :)
-Gord.
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
>Just struck me funny that's all Gavin, pulling your leg... :)
You seem to believe I am not omnipotently able to see through all the
coverups ever perpetrated. Nothing could be further from the truth.
You forget, us pan-dimensional beings of supreme occult power
originated all of them.
Now for a lie down before concocting the next Strategic Defence Review
White Paper.
Gavin Bailey
Unknown
Please be more careful with your attributions sir...I wrote
nothing in this post. Mind you, there's no text with 'one more'
right wedge than my attrib but some may not know about that. Not
a good idea to include a name when they contribute nothing.
Thanks.
-Gord.
Unknown
wrote:
>On Wed, 18 Dec 2002 17:12:26 GMT, "Gord Beaman" (ve...@rac.ca) wrote:
:-)
-Gord.
NoSpam
"Peter Kemp" <pk...@iee.org> wrote in message
news:kulpvu8forrn9v6mj...@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 15 Dec 2002 17:43:31 -0000, "NoSpam" <nos...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scottie" <sco...@scottie.org.uk> wrote in message
> >news:UbudnZFWQfg...@brightview.com...
> >> Oh flipping flip, why couldn't they have published this article a week
> >ago,
> >> and then I wouldn't have had this stupid arguement!!!!!
> >>
> >> http://www.latimes.com/services/site/releases/la-pr-121302.story
> >>
> >> Isn't it ironic that they publish it now.... doh!
> >>
> >
> >Havnt followed this thread at all, but a quote from your souce says:
> >
> >"The Harrier has failed to make a significant and distinctive
contribution
> >on the battlefield."
> >
> >This is not true. Not a single Harrier was lost to enemy action in the
> >Falklands campaign in 1982.
> >That sounds significant to me and certainly distinctive.
>
> Shame it's not true.
>
> On May 4th 1982 a Sea Harrier of 800 Sqn was lost to ground fire at
> Goose Green with the loss of the pilot. That certainly counts as enemy
> action.
>
> Several more were lost, including both RAF and RN versions of the
> aircraft, before the end of the conflict.
>
> Peter Kemp
Peter Kemp
wrote:
N.B. Top posting corrected.
>Ground Fire, yes but not by an enemy plane.
I was pointing out that your claim was incorrect, not commenting on
the air to air engagements. If you don't want answers correcting you,
then be precise in your claims.
Peter Kemp
Scottie
Gord Beaman" <ve...@rac.ca> wrote in message
news:v4d10vkslc6j0vk7f...@4ax.com...
Guy Alcala
> Ahhh Sharkey Wards book... Colourful character, but seems to have many
> chips on his shoulders (which is a minor understatement),
Ain't that the truth;-)
> and is happy
> portraying himself as a minor god in the world of military aviation, while
> happily laying into anyone who might disagree or wish to do things
> differently - rightly or wrongly. Great book, but he is certainly highly
> opinionated, and does destroy some of his credibility with his attacks on
> his superiors, his peers, and anyone else who might get in the way. But
> being very much "light blue" I would say that...!
I agree with all of the above. Indeed, in the past I've cross-checked many of
Sharkey's claims in the book (usually about how 801 was getting the short end of
the stick) with the facts, and let's just say that his objectivity re other
people's actions outside his own group isn't of the highest quality. But he's
hardly unique that way, among fighter pilots.
<snip>
> The Sea Harrier always has been potent in the Air-Air environment, and
> certainly the F/A2 is widely regarded as one of the best fighters currently
> in service - and that IS highly documented and publicised.
I think that's overstating things. The SHAR is far better than nothing, and can
certainly hold its own against less-skilled opponents, but "one of the best
fighters currently in service" is over the top.
Guy
Guy Alcala
ago, and just as I was finishing up I had a power failure and lost it all.
Evan Brennan wrote:
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote:
> >> >"Sea Harrier Over the Falklands," by Commander (ret.) Nigel 'Sharkey'
> >> >Ward, CO of 801 Sq. during the war.
> >
> >> As published elsewhere, British Sea Harriers were tested against
> >> Mirages flown by French pilots - who dominated the Sea Harriers.
> >> Even Sharkey admitted this in "Sea Harrier Over The Falklands".
> >> Although he described these engagements vaguely
> >
> >No, he doesn't dismiss it as a fluke or describe it vaguely
>
> [snip quote for brevity]
>
> I don't see any details about the engagements with French Mirage
> pilots. I don't see any information provided about the number of
> engagements. I don't see any data about victories for and against.
> In other words, Sharkey described it vaguely.
Okay, I see your take. See below.
> What I did see in your quote, is the same thing I saw last time
> I read it - a lash-up by an egomaniacal hypocrite.
Egomaniac, sure -- it's not exactly an uncommon trait among fighter pilots.
Hypocritical, well, to me hypocrisy is knowing that what you say doesn't square
with the facts. Sharkey, like many of his brethren, is absolutely convinced
that he's right and everyone who disagrees with him is wrong -- Self-doubt
isn't exactly encouraged.
> >> Regarding training combats, Sharkey writes to an unfortunate
> >> double-standard. He tends to drop names and many details when
> >> things went favorably. But when the kill ratio was not in favor
> >> of the British Navy, he avoided quoting the numbers altogether
> >> along with the names of the vanquished Sea Harrier pilots.
From his perspective, what was the point of providing details, especially
since, by his own admission, he'd tossed the paper after extracting any useful
information from it? I suppose he could have guessed at the numbers, but from
his perspective they were irrelevant -- he'd fought far better a/c with better
pilots, and been able to win. He does give full details of those latter
exchanges, and names the pilots with their personal scores. These are the
three most experienced pilots in the squadron, himself, Mortimer, and
Braithwaite, and probably the ones at the top of the A-A ladder. Even so,
Mortimer goes 9:3, Braithwaite only manages 6:6 against the F-5Es, with similar
ratios against the F-15s, so clearly it's not as if the average squadron pilot
couldn't be beaten. His point is that the SHAR could hold its own, and was by
no means completely outclassed by fighters with far better book stats. Add
superior weaponry (AIM-9L) and tactics on his side, and the odds are in his
favor.
>
> > he says that he knew who the SHAR pilots were
>
> But he didn't mention the names of SHAR pilots. This is verified
> by your own message.
Sure. What would have been the point of identifying them? He's made clear
that he didn't have a high opinion of their A-A skills despite them being
relatively senior, but since they're peripheral to the story, why embarrass
them publicly? He also doesn't identify the 809 (or was it 899) pilot who
challenged his authority, because he handled that in house. His opinion of 800
Squadron's practice and skills, OTOH, is directly relevant to the story and the
point he's trying to make, and since the individuals' involved are reasonably
well known, concealing their identity would be pointless.
> >> and obviously attempted to dismiss the superior performance
> >> by the Frenchmen, rejecting it as a fluke.
No, he rejected it as non-representative of what better-skilled and trained
SHAR pilots were capable of. He writes that the paper says that the three "had
hardly held their own." You could almost as easily say the same about Dave
Braithwaite's 1:1 exchange ratio vs. the Aggressor F-5Es.
> > he didn't think much of their [SHAR pilots] ACM skills.
>
> There were few people who Sharkey thought much of. But I have no
> reason to believe that he was better than they. I accept his
> remarks only as opinion, not fact. And Sharkey didn't seem to be
> in a hurry to fight the French himself,
Given that he was on his way to the Falklands, that would have been a bit
difficult, don't you think?
> so it was inappropriate
> for him to publicly belittle his fellow Sea Harrier pilots, even
> though they were defeated soundly.
Given that he states he went 12:1 against F-5Es, reports that he and his SHARs
went 7:1 two v. two against F-15s, and he achieved 7:0 single ship against 2
F-5Es and two F-15s on the ACMR range at Deci, he's either lying though his
teeth or else he's provided more than enough evidence of his own abilities.
Unless you think that Mirages are superior A-A a/c than F-4s, F-14s, F-15, and
F-16s. Oh, that and the SHAR results in the South Atlantic flying against
Argentine-piloted Mirages and Daggers, where the kill ratio was 11:0 in favor
of the SHARs. Since he didn't identify the pilots his belittling of them is
something less than public, in my view.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Sorry guys, but this is all horse-puckey. Most of the differences in multiplane training
> engagements is the simulated weapons capabilities, ROE, and who assesses the kills (gets to
> the chalkboard first). Someone downloading my own tapes could easily come to the conclusion
> that we had a 100% or 0% kill ratio--from the same mission--just by selecting different
> engagements. Nobody in the business takes these stories seriously, except as a PR issue,
> and neither should you.
Have Aggressor debriefs become less objective over the years? How about ACMR range data, which
he also reports?
> That said, assuming permissive ROE and competent handling, there is nothing in the world
> more discouraging than facing a "wall of eagles" with AWACS support. And in the days of
> multiple "rammer" shots targeting enemy groups, my money is on the snot-nosed pinball
> wizards (assuming competent training and leadership) vs the geriatric crowd looking for the
<snip>
Oh, given AWACS, modern data-links, slammers and allowed BVR shots, I quite agree. I was
restricting my comments to WVR shots with the technology of the time. OTOH, Sharkey and his
squadron mates did go 2 v. 2 vs F-15s with both sides having GCI (the SHARs didn't have their
radars yet) and BVR AIM-7 shots allowed, and beat them 7:1. The SHARs were able to deny valid
FQ AIM-7 shots (40nm head-on set-ups), then beat the Eagles WVR. Of course, the F-15s had never
fought SHARs before, but then neither had the Argentine pilots.
Guy
Cecil Turner
>
> Cecil Turner wrote:
>snip
> > Sorry guys, but this is all horse-puckey. Most of the differences in multiplane training
> > engagements is the simulated weapons capabilities, ROE, and who assesses the kills (gets to
> > the chalkboard first). Someone downloading my own tapes could easily come to the conclusion
> > that we had a 100% or 0% kill ratio--from the same mission--just by selecting different
> > engagements. Nobody in the business takes these stories seriously, except as a PR issue,
> > and neither should you.
>
> Have Aggressor debriefs become less objective over the years? How about ACMR range data, which
> he also reports?
Aggressor debriefs are designed to critique deficiencies in pilot technique. It's subjective.
ACMR range data is based on what you program into the machine--and generally you use kill criteria
from the training rules instead of what the computer spits out. It's objective, but the analysis
is not (and perhaps especially if done by Sharkey).
> > That said, assuming permissive ROE and competent handling, there is nothing in the world
> > more discouraging than facing a "wall of eagles" with AWACS support. And in the days of
> > multiple "rammer" shots targeting enemy groups, my money is on the snot-nosed pinball
> > wizards (assuming competent training and leadership) vs the geriatric crowd looking for the
>
> <snip>
>
> Oh, given AWACS, modern data-links, slammers and allowed BVR shots, I quite agree. I was
> restricting my comments to WVR shots with the technology of the time. OTOH, Sharkey and his
> squadron mates did go 2 v. 2 vs F-15s with both sides having GCI (the SHARs didn't have their
> radars yet) and BVR AIM-7 shots allowed, and beat them 7:1. The SHARs were able to deny valid
> FQ AIM-7 shots (40nm head-on set-ups), then beat the Eagles WVR. Of course, the F-15s had never
> fought SHARs before, but then neither had the Argentine pilots.
>
> Guy
At least according to Sharkey. The SHAR has no BVR magic--in fact, the Pegagus makes for quite a
large radar signature. "Deny valid FQ AIM-7 shots" means the shots didn't correspond to whatever
training rules were in effect . . . not that they wouldn't have hit. And I suspect the Eagle
drivers did not concur with the 7:1 ratio.
Again, this is all horse-puckey. There are some tactics to deny FQ shots in a canned setup,
especially if you require the radar fighters to stay in one group. It doesn't work in real life,
in larger scenarios, or where the radar shooters are allowed to pince (which they normally won't
do in training, because the objective is to practice section tactics). And after-action reports
regarding kill ratios are more an indicator of which side sent the newest non-qualified pilots to
get their first look at dissimilar aircraft than any comment on the aircraft involved. If you
want to compare kill ratios, look to combat results (and check your facts carefully, cuz folks lie
even about them).
rgds,
KTF
Guy Alcala
Points which Sharkey himself mentioned, and looking at the thing it's obvious what causes the latter.
Being able to see almost the entire fan from the front is about as counter radar-stealth as you can
get (a problem the F-15 also suffers from, only double). His point was that the F-15s had a total
radar advantage; the SHARs were dependent on GCI.
> "Deny valid FQ AIM-7 shots" means the shots didn't correspond to whatever
> training rules were in effect . . . not that they wouldn't have hit.
Gven the demonstrated effectiveness of Sparrow at that time, the last must remain speculation.
Specifically, what he says on the matter is
"The visitors were fully equipped with their radar and were simulating Sparrow AIM-7E missiles
[possibly a typo for AIM-7F, as I don't think the AIM-7E was compatible with a pulse-doppler
illumination, and IIRC the AIM-7F went into service with the F-15], Sidewinders and guns. The SHARs
were without radar but were fitted with their radar warning receivers and were simulating Sidewinders
and guns . . . . [snip location data]
"Having spent years flying the Phantom and using the Sparrow missile, which has an excellent head-on
capability, I knew how to deny the F-15 a valid sparrow shot from head-on and had briefed my pilots
accordingly. The tactic worked well. There were no head-on claims from the F-15s as they ran in and,
as thetwo aircraft types entered the same airspace, fully developed combat began..
"Initially, the F-15s had the advantage. Their radars pinpointed the SHARs and directed their pilots'
eyes on to the smaller jets. the SHARs flew at about 12,000 feet, which was where we wanted to meet
the opposition, and so the F-15s came in from very high level (30,000 feet plus), rolling over and
looping down towards the stern of our Sea Jet formation. his was when the SHAR was most vulnerable.
It was essential that visual contact was made. Morts came to the rescue."
"'High in the 6 o'clock, Boss! Break port and up! They are about 3 miles and closing fast!'
"The aircraft shuddered in the hard turn with the nose rising to meet the threat. 'Tally-ho! On
both! I'm flying through the right-hand man and reversing on to him. Your tail is clear.'
"The nose of the Sea Jet passed through the vertical, with my head strained round as far as it would
go to keep tabs on the F-15 which, feeling threatened, had engaged burners and had also pulled
vertically upwards and over the top (about 5,000 feet above me). As the 15 came down the other side
of the vertical maneuver he found me still pointing at him all the way. Trying the same move twice
was not a good idea, but that's what he did. I predicted the move, sliced my nose early through
through the vertical and found myself sitting astern the two white-hot plumes at the back of the US
fighter. 'Fox Two away!' I called, simulating the release of the Sidewinder missile. Morts fared
just as well."
"The detailed post-flight debriefs showed a 7 to 1 valid kill claim by the SHARs. The Alconbury
experience [against the Aggressors] had been no flash in the pan. the Sea Harrier had really arrived
on the fighter combat scene."
I'll point out that the debrief was held at Yeovilton, with the F-15 pilots participating. Now, it's
clear that the F-15 pilot made mistakes (but air combats are usually lost, not won), and in real
combat they'd probably be best off blowing through and (if they had enough fuel) trying for another
in the face RHM shot. OTOH, this particular combat is almost identical to the tactics Argentine
Mirages used against the SHARs in their first combat, with lethal results to the Mirages, which
lacked the F-15's radar, flight performance and an effective FQ missile, while the SHARs had a big
weapons advantage (as much or more psychological as physical) with the AIM-9L.
> And I suspect the Eagle
> drivers did not concur with the 7:1 ratio.
Well, if they didn't, then Sharkey is lying though his teeth, because they were at the debrief.
Lacking a more objective source, you either have to choose to believe him, or not. Given that many
pilots in inferior a/c have beaten the F-15 and F-16 in such training, I find it perfectly reasonable
that SHARs flown by pilots well-experienced in ACM were able to do so, especially on the first
meeting. Once the F-15 guys learned the Harrier's tricks, I'd think it would be a lot more difficult,
but people will always make mistakes.
> Again, this is all horse-puckey. There are some tactics to deny FQ shots in a canned setup,
> especially if you require the radar fighters to stay in one group. It doesn't work in real life,
> in larger scenarios,
Define larger scenarios. The SHARs went 2 v. 2 against the Mirages and A/A Daggers, just as they did
against the F-15s; only the Mirages had even a nominal FQ capability, with the extremely
limited-capability R.530EM and a radar generations behind the APG-63.
> or where the radar shooters are allowed to pince (which they normally won't
> do in training, because the objective is to practice section tactics). And after-action reports
> regarding kill ratios are more an indicator of which side sent the newest non-qualified pilots to
> get their first look at dissimilar aircraft than any comment on the aircraft involved.
And no one in their right mind would claim that a SHAR is the air combat equal of an F-15, but they
can still win, because of pilot quality and tactics. Wasn't my whole point (and Sharkey's) that pilot
quality was the most important single factor? You seem to be approaching that point above, with your
statement about the "newest non-qualified pilots," so where's the disagreement?
> If you
> want to compare kill ratios, look to combat results (and check your facts carefully, cuz folks lie
> even about them).
I've checked and compared combat results -- 23:0 for the SHARs, admitted by the Argentine side during
the "debrief". Of course many of them were laden strikers, but the 11:0 scored against
Mirages/Daggers (including the 3:0 scored against those tasked A-A) certainly shows that Sharkey's
opinion in this matter was far more valid than those holding the belief (which he so violently
disagreed with) that the SHARs would be massacred. I give full credit to the psychological effect of
the AIM-9L in helping the SHARs establish a moral ascendancy over the Argentine pilots, but better
British tactics also played a big part in the A-A fights on 1 May. The first ones were inconclusive
sparring as both sides felt each other out, but as soon as combat was actually joined the British came
out ahead, and the Fuerza Aerea gave up even trying to contest the air superiority battle from that
point on. That may or may not have been a mistake for them -- both sides' ability to replace losses
during the conflict was limited to non-existent.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> "Having spent years flying the Phantom and using the Sparrow missile, which has an excellent head-on
> capability, I knew how to deny the F-15 a valid sparrow shot from head-on and had briefed my pilots
> accordingly. The tactic worked well. There were no head-on claims from the F-15s as they ran in and,
> as thetwo aircraft types entered the same airspace, fully developed combat began..
Wow. This is incredible. (Like--not credible.) Again, there is no such thing as a magic FQ defense, and
if there were, the Harrier would not be particularly well suited for it.
> "Initially, the F-15s had the advantage. Their radars pinpointed the SHARs and directed their pilots'
> eyes on to the smaller jets. the SHARs flew at about 12,000 feet, which was where we wanted to meet
> the opposition, and so the F-15s came in from very high level (30,000 feet plus), rolling over and
> looping down towards the stern of our Sea Jet formation. his was when the SHAR was most vulnerable.
> It was essential that visual contact was made. Morts came to the rescue."
>
> "'High in the 6 o'clock, Boss! Break port and up! They are about 3 miles and closing fast!'
>
> "The aircraft shuddered in the hard turn with the nose rising to meet the threat. 'Tally-ho! On
> both! I'm flying through the right-hand man and reversing on to him. Your tail is clear.'
>
> "The nose of the Sea Jet passed through the vertical, with my head strained round as far as it would
> go to keep tabs on the F-15 which, feeling threatened, had engaged burners and had also pulled
> vertically upwards and over the top (about 5,000 feet above me). As the 15 came down the other side
> of the vertical maneuver he found me still pointing at him all the way. Trying the same move twice
> was not a good idea, but that's what he did. I predicted the move, sliced my nose early through
> through the vertical and found myself sitting astern the two white-hot plumes at the back of the US
> fighter. 'Fox Two away!' I called, simulating the release of the Sidewinder missile. Morts fared
> just as well."
Notice how we went from a general discussion about tactics and a large exercise to a debrief of a single
engagement? That Sharkey and his wingman spanked a pair of Eagles in a single engagement is perfectly
believable. Happens all the time. It's drawing all those conclusions about AA tactics that's faulty.
> "The detailed post-flight debriefs showed a 7 to 1 valid kill claim by the SHARs. The Alconbury
> experience [against the Aggressors] had been no flash in the pan. the Sea Harrier had really arrived
> on the fighter combat scene."
>
> I'll point out that the debrief was held at Yeovilton, with the F-15 pilots participating. Now, it's
> clear that the F-15 pilot made mistakes (but air combats are usually lost, not won), and in real
> combat they'd probably be best off blowing through and (if they had enough fuel) trying for another
> in the face RHM shot. OTOH, this particular combat is almost identical to the tactics Argentine
> Mirages used against the SHARs in their first combat, with lethal results to the Mirages, which
> lacked the F-15's radar, flight performance and an effective FQ missile, while the SHARs had a big
> weapons advantage (as much or more psychological as physical) with the AIM-9L.
Blowing through takes less fuel, not more. But if the point of the training is to see the flight
characteristics of a dissimilar aircraft, merging is usually part of the training objectives. And
comparison to Mirages is silly--they have essentially no FQ threat. The point is not that the Harrier
can't fight, but that it is not the equal of an Eagle. Nor is it close. And an AIM-9L threat that keeps
the adversary from holding nose-on during the engagement is both a physical and psychological advantage.
> > And I suspect the Eagle
> > drivers did not concur with the 7:1 ratio.
>
> Well, if they didn't, then Sharkey is lying though his teeth, because they were at the debrief.
Judging from the rest of the book, are you actually claiming that a self-aggrandizing bit of exaggeration
is unlikely?
> Lacking a more objective source, you either have to choose to believe him, or not. Given that many
> pilots in inferior a/c have beaten the F-15 and F-16 in such training, I find it perfectly reasonable
> that SHARs flown by pilots well-experienced in ACM were able to do so, especially on the first
> meeting. Once the F-15 guys learned the Harrier's tricks, I'd think it would be a lot more difficult,
> but people will always make mistakes.
Again, there are no Harrier-specific forward quarter tricks. I have no doubt they got lucky in an
engagement or two (probably aided by the training rules). All the good Harrier tricks are for engaged
fights (though Sharkey is on record as claiming not to use them--but the veracity of that statement is
also open to some question).
> > Again, this is all horse-puckey. There are some tactics to deny FQ shots in a canned setup,
> > especially if you require the radar fighters to stay in one group. It doesn't work in real life,
> > in larger scenarios,
>
> Define larger scenarios. The SHARs went 2 v. 2 against the Mirages and A/A Daggers, just as they did
> against the F-15s; only the Mirages had even a nominal FQ capability, with the extremely
> limited-capability R.530EM and a radar generations behind the APG-63.
A larger scenario is one in which you can't be certain of the threat vector. And FQ tactics were
unnecessary in the Falklands, because you could safely ignore the Mirages' limited capability. Doing the
same against an F-15 in real life will get you a letter to your wife.
> > or where the radar shooters are allowed to pince (which they normally won't
> > do in training, because the objective is to practice section tactics). And after-action reports
> > regarding kill ratios are more an indicator of which side sent the newest non-qualified pilots to
> > get their first look at dissimilar aircraft than any comment on the aircraft involved.
>
> And no one in their right mind would claim that a SHAR is the air combat equal of an F-15, but they
> can still win, because of pilot quality and tactics. Wasn't my whole point (and Sharkey's) that pilot
> quality was the most important single factor? You seem to be approaching that point above, with your
> statement about the "newest non-qualified pilots," so where's the disagreement?
Unfortunately for your point, many claim that the SHAR is/was the air combat equal of an F-15. Sure they
can still win. But not against competent adversaries flying Eagles. (And assuming competent pilots--who
are plentiful--the best pilots in the world can't make it an even fight in a non-radar aircraft.)
> > If you
> > want to compare kill ratios, look to combat results (and check your facts carefully, cuz folks lie
> > even about them).
>
> I've checked and compared combat results -- 23:0 for the SHARs, admitted by the Argentine side during
> the "debrief". Of course many of them were laden strikers, but the 11:0 scored against
> Mirages/Daggers (including the 3:0 scored against those tasked A-A) certainly shows that Sharkey's
> opinion in this matter was far more valid than those holding the belief (which he so violently
> disagreed with) that the SHARs would be massacred. I give full credit to the psychological effect of
> the AIM-9L in helping the SHARs establish a moral ascendancy over the Argentine pilots, but better
> British tactics also played a big part in the A-A fights on 1 May. The first ones were inconclusive
> sparring as both sides felt each other out, but as soon as combat was actually joined the British came
> out ahead, and the Fuerza Aerea gave up even trying to contest the air superiority battle from that
> point on. That may or may not have been a mistake for them -- both sides' ability to replace losses
> during the conflict was limited to non-existent.
>
> Guy
Try switching the missiles around and re-fighting it. And this has absolutely no correlation to any fight
against more capable fighters--let alone a 7:1 kill claim against Eagles.
rgds,
KTF
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> snip
> > "Having spent years flying the Phantom and using the Sparrow missile, which has an excellent head-on
> > capability, I knew how to deny the F-15 a valid sparrow shot from head-on and had briefed my pilots
> > accordingly. The tactic worked well. There were no head-on claims from the F-15s as they ran in and,
> > as thetwo aircraft types entered the same airspace, fully developed combat began..
>
> Wow. This is incredible. (Like--not credible.) Again, there is no such thing as a magic FQ defense, and
> if there were, the Harrier would not be particularly well suited for it.
Magic, no. OTOH, I'm also aware that F-104Cs were able to do exactly the same thing to navy F-4Bs during the
maneuvering target tests in the mid-'60s, denying FQ shots until inside min range. That ain't from Sharkey.
Admittedly, the F-15 radar's a whole lot better than the F-4B's APQ-72 pulse set, but then the APQ-72's a
whole lot better than the Cyrano in the Mirage III.
>
>
> > "Initially, the F-15s had the advantage. Their radars pinpointed the SHARs and directed their pilots'
> > eyes on to the smaller jets. the SHARs flew at about 12,000 feet, which was where we wanted to meet
> > the opposition, and so the F-15s came in from very high level (30,000 feet plus), rolling over and
> > looping down towards the stern of our Sea Jet formation. his was when the SHAR was most vulnerable.
> > It was essential that visual contact was made. Morts came to the rescue."
> >
> > "'High in the 6 o'clock, Boss! Break port and up! They are about 3 miles and closing fast!'
> >
> > "The aircraft shuddered in the hard turn with the nose rising to meet the threat. 'Tally-ho! On
> > both! I'm flying through the right-hand man and reversing on to him. Your tail is clear.'
> >
> > "The nose of the Sea Jet passed through the vertical, with my head strained round as far as it would
> > go to keep tabs on the F-15 which, feeling threatened, had engaged burners and had also pulled
> > vertically upwards and over the top (about 5,000 feet above me). As the 15 came down the other side
> > of the vertical maneuver he found me still pointing at him all the way. Trying the same move twice
> > was not a good idea, but that's what he did. I predicted the move, sliced my nose early through
> > through the vertical and found myself sitting astern the two white-hot plumes at the back of the US
> > fighter. 'Fox Two away!' I called, simulating the release of the Sidewinder missile. Morts fared
> > just as well."
>
> Notice how we went from a general discussion about tactics and a large exercise to a debrief of a single
> engagement? That Sharkey and his wingman spanked a pair of Eagles in a single engagement is perfectly
> believable. Happens all the time. It's drawing all those conclusions about AA tactics that's faulty.
He gave data for a series of engagements, against various a/c. This one is representative, no more.
> > "The detailed post-flight debriefs showed a 7 to 1 valid kill claim by the SHARs. The Alconbury
> > experience [against the Aggressors] had been no flash in the pan. the Sea Harrier had really arrived
> > on the fighter combat scene."
> >
> > I'll point out that the debrief was held at Yeovilton, with the F-15 pilots participating. Now, it's
> > clear that the F-15 pilot made mistakes (but air combats are usually lost, not won), and in real
> > combat they'd probably be best off blowing through and (if they had enough fuel) trying for another
> > in the face RHM shot. OTOH, this particular combat is almost identical to the tactics Argentine
> > Mirages used against the SHARs in their first combat, with lethal results to the Mirages, which
> > lacked the F-15's radar, flight performance and an effective FQ missile, while the SHARs had a big
> > weapons advantage (as much or more psychological as physical) with the AIM-9L.
>
> Blowing through takes less fuel, not more. But if the point of the training is to see the flight
> characteristics of a dissimilar aircraft, merging is usually part of the training objectives.
Sure.
> And
> comparison to Mirages is silly--they have essentially no FQ threat.
Quite so, which is just one of the reasons that Sharkey dismissed the claim that the Harriers would have a
tough time holding their own.
> The point is not that the Harrier
> can't fight, but that it is not the equal of an Eagle. Nor is it close.
And I never claimed it was, nor did Sharkey. What he is claiming is that the SHAR, properly handled, can be
quite effective A/A, and certainly isn't a pushover for Mirages, which is what others were claiming at the
time.
> And an AIM-9L threat that keeps
> the adversary from holding nose-on during the engagement is both a physical and psychological advantage.
I do believe that's exactly what I said. the Mirages were loathe to close, and approached in idle.
>
> > > And I suspect the Eagle
> > > drivers did not concur with the 7:1 ratio.
> >
> > Well, if they didn't, then Sharkey is lying though his teeth, because they were at the debrief.
>
> Judging from the rest of the book, are you actually claiming that a self-aggrandizing bit of exaggeration
> is unlikely?
Weighing it all together and adding a healthy dose of skepticism, yes. I've had a fair amount of experience
evaluating claims made by pilots, and always look for similar, corroborating data from outside sources in
similar circumstances. Lower-performing a/c have beaten higher performing ones on many occasions, because the
pilots were better. I have accounts of denying valid AIM-7 shots to F-15s and other RHM-equipped a/c from
various countries, in various types of fighters. I've debunked many of the claims Sharkey makes in the book
(and those of other pilots made elsewhere), and the man's ego certainly makes me skeptical of some of his
wilder claims. But on balance, because he's so specific about the details of the kill ratios in this and
other instances, I lean towards accepting tem as accurate, while maintaining a healthy skepticism of other
claims. For instance, in the book he was whining about how 800 Sq. had a higher pilot:a/c ratio than 801. I
once did a day by day analysis of pilots assigned to a/c assigned, and whattya know, 800 Sq. has a worse
ratio than 801 throughout the conflict. Then there's his bitching about 801 getting a greater percentage of
the night CAPs relative to the number of assigned a/c. But he forgets that he _asked_ the Flag to give his
Squadron the preference for A/A tasking, if any specialization of squadron tasking was to take place.
I could list many other instances where his objectivity and his his ability to see a bigger picture is
non-existent, and those chips on his shoulder do get tiresome. His opinion that Woodward was a sub and
surface ship driver who was literally out of his depth trying to run a (predominantly) air campaign is
obvious, but I think Sharkey makes many valid points about the stupidity of some of the orders issued.
> > Lacking a more objective source, you either have to choose to believe him, or not. Given that many
> > pilots in inferior a/c have beaten the F-15 and F-16 in such training, I find it perfectly reasonable
> > that SHARs flown by pilots well-experienced in ACM were able to do so, especially on the first
> > meeting. Once the F-15 guys learned the Harrier's tricks, I'd think it would be a lot more difficult,
> > but people will always make mistakes.
>
> Again, there are no Harrier-specific forward quarter tricks. I have no doubt they got lucky in an
> engagement or two (probably aided by the training rules). All the good Harrier tricks are for engaged
> fights (though Sharkey is on record as claiming not to use them--but the veracity of that statement is
> also open to some question).
And nowhere did he or I claim that there were Harrier-specific FQ tricks. He said he used the same technique
he'd used to defeat FQ Sparrow shots from F-4s, (which he'd flown for some years).
>
> > > Again, this is all horse-puckey. There are some tactics to deny FQ shots in a canned setup,
> > > especially if you require the radar fighters to stay in one group. It doesn't work in real life,
> > > in larger scenarios,
> >
> > Define larger scenarios. The SHARs went 2 v. 2 against the Mirages and A/A Daggers, just as they did
> > against the F-15s; only the Mirages had even a nominal FQ capability, with the extremely
> > limited-capability R.530EM and a radar generations behind the APG-63.
>
> A larger scenario is one in which you can't be certain of the threat vector. And FQ tactics were
> unnecessary in the Falklands, because you could safely ignore the Mirages' limited capability. Doing the
> same against an F-15 in real life will get you a letter to your wife.
And since he wasn't facing F-15s for real, but Mirages, ISTM that you're agreeing with his opinion re the A/A
abilities of the SHAr pilots who flew the DACT tests against the Mirage, the conclusions of which he was at
great pains to point out to his Ship's CO were "horse-puckey." And so it proved.
> > > or where the radar shooters are allowed to pince (which they normally won't
> > > do in training, because the objective is to practice section tactics). And after-action reports
> > > regarding kill ratios are more an indicator of which side sent the newest non-qualified pilots to
> > > get their first look at dissimilar aircraft than any comment on the aircraft involved.
> >
> > And no one in their right mind would claim that a SHAR is the air combat equal of an F-15, but they
> > can still win, because of pilot quality and tactics. Wasn't my whole point (and Sharkey's) that pilot
> > quality was the most important single factor? You seem to be approaching that point above, with your
> > statement about the "newest non-qualified pilots," so where's the disagreement?
>
> Unfortunately for your point, many claim that the SHAR is/was the air combat equal of an F-15.
But many doesn't include Sharkey (at least not in the book. He may have said so elsewhere, but I haven't seen
it) or myself.
> Sure they
> can still win. But not against competent adversaries flying Eagles. (And assuming competent pilots--who
> are plentiful--the best pilots in the world can't make it an even fight in a non-radar aircraft.)
And yet, marginally competent pilots in non-radar a/c have beaten radar-equipped a/c in real combat. Like
North Vietnamese MiG-17s beat F-4 and F-105s. Does this mean that it's an even fight? If the larger and
heavier radar-equipped a/c allows itself to get sucked into a knife-fight, or the other side has good GCI or
just better vision arcs (or low smoke vs. high-smoke motors), then it may be very uneven in favor of the
non-radar-equipped a/c, but AOTBE, sure you want to have a search radar. Indeed, Sharkey was the Blue Fox's
biggest fan, and one of his criticisms of 800 Squadron was that they were inadequately trained in its use,
didn't know how to tweak it to achieve peak performance (and refused his squadron's help in doing so) and had
little confidence in it, which was why the idiotic order was given to _not use them_ on CAPs, which he
ignored. Now, regardless of what chips there may have been on his shoulder, that's nuts.
> > > If you
> > > want to compare kill ratios, look to combat results (and check your facts carefully, cuz folks lie
> > > even about them).
> >
> > I've checked and compared combat results -- 23:0 for the SHARs, admitted by the Argentine side during
> > the "debrief". Of course many of them were laden strikers, but the 11:0 scored against
> > Mirages/Daggers (including the 3:0 scored against those tasked A-A) certainly shows that Sharkey's
> > opinion in this matter was far more valid than those holding the belief (which he so violently
> > disagreed with) that the SHARs would be massacred. I give full credit to the psychological effect of
> > the AIM-9L in helping the SHARs establish a moral ascendancy over the Argentine pilots, but better
> > British tactics also played a big part in the A-A fights on 1 May. The first ones were inconclusive
> > sparring as both sides felt each other out, but as soon as combat was actually joined the British came
> > out ahead, and the Fuerza Aerea gave up even trying to contest the air superiority battle from that
> > point on. That may or may not have been a mistake for them -- both sides' ability to replace losses
> > during the conflict was limited to non-existent.
> Try switching the missiles around and re-fighting it.
Actually, I've wargamed that, and numerous variants: Brits have AEW.2 Sea Kings during the war (much higher
interception rate, Argentina suffers unsustainable losses earlier, Sheffield [probably], Coventry and Atlantic
Conveyor [almost certainly] survive, Brits win earlier); Brits have the Ark Royal with AIM-7E/AIM-9G armed
F-4s with their PD radars, Gannet AEW and Buccaneer tanker/strikers (even the Junta wasn't that stupid);
Falklands II with the SHARs being FA.2s with Blue Vixen and AIM-120 (even worse than above); Argentina has a
decent FQ RHM capability (I gave their Mirages Super 530Fs and Cyrano IV radar, like a Mirage F1. It puts the
Brits much more on the defensive, improving the chances for rear-quarter follow-up IRM shots by the Argentine
a/c. The Brits counter by making use of ground clutter [and chaff], which decreases their interception rate
owing to fuel limits, but fewer Argentine strikers are available owing to more a/c being used for escort/CAP,
somewhat easing the burden in the first days of the landing although preserving their strike capability in the
later stages. In any case, Brits have a considerable numerical advantage over the Mirage IIIEAs, so still
attrit them sufficiently to win); Argentina has A/A refueling capability for their Mirage/Daggers (mainly
improves the striker's loads and approach options), etc.
Giving the Mirage/Daggers AIM-9Ls (or P3s) improved the odds for Argentine pilots a very great deal, as it
gave them the maximum number of a/c to use for air superiority (both Mirages _and_ Daggers) and caused a
considerable number of British losses. This is the most dangerous scenario for the Brits. Argentina might
have been willing to stay in the air superiority battle, assuming they got some early victories and the
exchange ratio was fairly balanced (IIRR it ran from 1:3 to 1.5:1 Arg./Britain, depending on weather, GCI,
start setup, etc. plus random factors); the British would probably have needed to use their GR.3s for A/A,
which was intended but rescinded owing to the lack of SHAR losses. However, many (most) of the British kills
were scored as most kills have been; from the rear, with the prey spotting the hunter too late to do anything
about it. Both sides usually had GCI, and the Mirage's Cyrano II radar isn't anything to write home about
(the Dagger just has a ranging radar). Better British pilots and tactics along with the AIM-9G (or if you
prefer, Magic/Shafrir II, which is what the Argentines had) usually still prevailed, but it was getting very
dicey, as the morale balance tilted towards Argentina.
> And this has absolutely no correlation to any fight
> against more capable fighters--let alone a 7:1 kill claim against Eagles.
And every correlation to Sharkey's contention that if they were able to hold their own against far
better-equipped and piloted a/c, they sure as hell could give the Argentine air force and navy air arms, who
had extremely limited radar and essentially no FQ capability, lower-performing a/c, poor spares support, and
absolutely zero experience fighting a real war, a tough time. And so it proved.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> > > "Having spent years flying the Phantom and using the Sparrow missile, which has an excellent head-on
> > > capability, I knew how to deny the F-15 a valid sparrow shot from head-on and had briefed my pilots
> > > accordingly. The tactic worked well. There were no head-on claims from the F-15s as they ran in and,
> > > as thetwo aircraft types entered the same airspace, fully developed combat began..
> >
> > Wow. This is incredible. (Like--not credible.) Again, there is no such thing as a magic FQ defense, and
> > if there were, the Harrier would not be particularly well suited for it.
>
> Magic, no. OTOH, I'm also aware that F-104Cs were able to do exactly the same thing to navy F-4Bs during the
> maneuvering target tests in the mid-'60s, denying FQ shots until inside min range. That ain't from Sharkey.
> Admittedly, the F-15 radar's a whole lot better than the F-4B's APQ-72 pulse set, but then the APQ-72's a
> whole lot better than the Cyrano in the Mirage III.
Not sure what the Mirage and F-4Bs have to do with the discussion. Again, the BVR threat from these aircraft is
almost negligible. The F-15 is an entirely different animal, and if Sharkey wanted to try those tactics in real
life, he wouldn't have written a book.
> > Try switching the missiles around and re-fighting it.
>
snip
> Giving the Mirage/Daggers AIM-9Ls (or P3s) improved the odds for Argentine pilots a very great deal, as it
> gave them the maximum number of a/c to use for air superiority (both Mirages _and_ Daggers) and caused a
> considerable number of British losses. This is the most dangerous scenario for the Brits. snip
Try it again, giving your Argentinian strikers AIM-9Ls as well. It will illustrate clearly that the main
difference was the aircraft/weapons mix--and predominantly the missiles.
> > And this has absolutely no correlation to any fight
> > against more capable fighters--let alone a 7:1 kill claim against Eagles.
>
> And every correlation to Sharkey's contention that if they were able to hold their own against far
> better-equipped and piloted a/c, they sure as hell could give the Argentine air force and navy air arms, who
> had extremely limited radar and essentially no FQ capability, lower-performing a/c, poor spares support, and
> absolutely zero experience fighting a real war, a tough time. And so it proved.
>
> Guy
Sounds like a "I can stay in the ring with Lennox Lewis for a minute, so I should be able to beat up this boy
scout" type of argument to me. Which is fine, and probably true. It does not, however, support the original
contention which ran something like:
"Same goes with the Aggressor and Top Gun instructors who routinely beat up on teen-fighters in A-4s and F-5Es;
they also benefit from constant practice to keep their skills sharp. Situational awareness and making
your opponent fight your fight, is far more important than any difference in a/c performance."
Which just isn't true. Try hanging actual missiles on the teen jets and see how many of those guys want to
strap on stripped-down aggressors with simulated weaponry.
The primary British advantage in the Falklands was superior GCI, aircraft, and missiles. Tactics were
unremarkable, though competent (which is important . . . as you correctly pointed out, most fights are lost, not
won). Trying to show it proves the opposite is silly. The biggest danger to the British fleet was that their
air cover would not prove adequate to stop strikers from sinking their ships . . . not that they would be
outclassed in dogfighting.
rgds,
KTF
Evan Brennan
>> In Ch.8, Sharkey claims that before they went to the Falklands,
>> Sea Harrier pilots compiled a 3:1 kill ratio in practice ACM
>> with F-15s. I wasn't surprised by this since F-15s had been
>> bested on occasion by outdated US Phantoms. In 1978, US Navy
>> F-4s of VF-202 took on USAF F-15s from the 49th TFW in an ACM
>> exercise at Holloman. The post-engagement pictures show the
>> intakes of the Phantoms decorated with kills:
>
>> F-4N--151463 (CDR Tiny Mize): ten F-15s.
>> F-4N--150492 (LCDR Bill Lightstone): five F-15s.
>> F-4N--152277: ten F-15s.
>> F-4N--153056: nine F-15s.
>
>> Unknown if the F-15s scored or if they got locked up with
>> heaters or BVR. The photographs are in Bert Kinzey's C&M
>> Vol. 17, Atlantic Coast US Navy Phantoms. As the caption
>> suggests, the Navy pilots were either very good or the USAF
>> pilots had a bad day.
> Given that [Sharkey] states he went 12:1 against F-5Es, reports that he and
> his SHARs went 7:1 two v. two against F-15s, and he achieved 7:0 single ship
> against 2 F-5Es and two F-15s on the ACMR range at Deci
Harriers have been invited to Top Gun and Red Flag several times. And probably
William Tell and other like exercises. Why don't you post the overall results
in air-to-air combat instead of selected samples.
If the Limey Harrier pilots had consistent success at any of the above, they
would have been boasting about it by now. That is their style after all. : )
John Halliwell
Brennan <evankb...@hotmail.com> writes
>Harriers have been invited to Top Gun and Red Flag several times. And probably
>William Tell and other like exercises. Why don't you post the overall results
>in air-to-air combat instead of selected samples.
>
>If the Limey Harrier pilots had consistent success at any of the above, they
>would have been boasting about it by now. That is their style after all. : )
From 'Sea Harrier and AV-8B', Robert Jackson, ISBN 0-7137-1808-0, Pg 54:
Quoting Sharkey:
'The table below gives an overall summary of our experiences with the
Sea Harrier in air combat engagements (the kill ratio is Sea Harrier
wins against adversary wins).'
Venue Adversary Kill ratio
Decimomannu 1981 F-15 & F-5E 12:4
Decimomannu 1983 F-16 31:14
Alconbury F-5E 3:1
NATO sea exercise F-14 3:1 - 10:1
UK F-4 10:1
Australia Mirage III 3:1
UK Lightning 2:1
Not sure how complete this list is, the book was published around 1989.
--
John
Preston, Lancs, UK.
Evan Brennan
>> Mirages flown by French pilots - who dominated the Sea Harriers.
>> Even Sharkey admitted this in "Sea Harrier Over The Falklands".
>> Although he described these engagements vaguely
>> Regarding training combats, Sharkey writes to an unfortunate
>> double-standard. He tends to drop names and many details when
>> things went favorably. But when the kill ratio was not in favor
>> of the British Navy, he avoided quoting the numbers altogether
>> along with the names of the vanquished Sea Harrier pilots.
>
> From his perspective, what was the point of providing details
None to Sharkey obviously. To him there was no point in providing
details when his mates had been whipped, especially at the hands
of Frenchmen. For Sharkey to explain that in more detail would
force him to demonstrate credibility, to which he seems allergic.
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> snip
> > > > "Having spent years flying the Phantom and using the Sparrow missile, which has an excellent head-on
> > > > capability, I knew how to deny the F-15 a valid sparrow shot from head-on and had briefed my pilots
> > > > accordingly. The tactic worked well. There were no head-on claims from the F-15s as they ran in and,
> > > > as thetwo aircraft types entered the same airspace, fully developed combat began..
> > >
> > > Wow. This is incredible. (Like--not credible.) Again, there is no such thing as a magic FQ defense, and
> > > if there were, the Harrier would not be particularly well suited for it.
> >
> > Magic, no. OTOH, I'm also aware that F-104Cs were able to do exactly the same thing to navy F-4Bs during the
> > maneuvering target tests in the mid-'60s, denying FQ shots until inside min range. That ain't from Sharkey.
> > Admittedly, the F-15 radar's a whole lot better than the F-4B's APQ-72 pulse set, but then the APQ-72's a
> > whole lot better than the Cyrano in the Mirage III.
> snip
>
> Not sure what the Mirage and F-4Bs have to do with the discussion. Again, the BVR threat from these aircraft is
> almost negligible. The F-15 is an entirely different animal, and if Sharkey wanted to try those tactics in real
> life, he wouldn't have written a book.
The FQ BVR threat from a PD-equipped Phantom over the sea is negligible, with no visual RoE requirement? I wasn't
the one claiming that there was some magic defense, merely pointing out that denying a FQ shot by a semi-active RHM
is certainly possible. The Sparrow, even the AIM-7F normally used by the F-15 at the time, wasn't exactly a wonder
weapon. The AIM-7M was a lot better, but even when used in conjunction with usually fantastic control and F-15Cs in
DS, often fired BVR, it appears to have achieved well under .5 pK, against Iraqi pilots who were far less
well-trained than the Brits.
> > > Try switching the missiles around and re-fighting it.
> >
> snip
> > Giving the Mirage/Daggers AIM-9Ls (or P3s) improved the odds for Argentine pilots a very great deal, as it
> > gave them the maximum number of a/c to use for air superiority (both Mirages _and_ Daggers) and caused a
> > considerable number of British losses. This is the most dangerous scenario for the Brits. snip
>
> Try it again, giving your Argentinian strikers AIM-9Ls as well. It will illustrate clearly that the main
> difference was the aircraft/weapons mix--and predominantly the missiles.
Can't be done with the Daggers. Carrying missiles as well as bombs the Daggers don't have the range; that's why
they weren't carrying Shafrirs along with their bombs (AAR capability would help the Daggers here); the A-4Cs of
Grupo IV could do so with AAR (the A-4Bs of Grupo V and the Navy only had three pylons, two of which were carrying
tanks), but at the price of even lower speed, of more value to them in avoiding the CAPs. Staying to fight would
have meant that a fair number of them would have been lost to fuel exhaustion, although it might have been worth it
if they "took one with them." They also lacked much A-A training, much as the RAF Harrier GR.3 pilots did; the SHAR
pilots primary mission was A-A.
Even if the strikers had carried missiles, the strikers were so busy flying low and trying to avoid CFIT that they
rarely spotted the SHARs until it was too late. Most of the SHAR AIM-9 kills were scored in this environment, from
low AoT on non-maneuvering targets.
> > > And this has absolutely no correlation to any fight
> > > against more capable fighters--let alone a 7:1 kill claim against Eagles.
> >
> > And every correlation to Sharkey's contention that if they were able to hold their own against far
> > better-equipped and piloted a/c, they sure as hell could give the Argentine air force and navy air arms, who
> > had extremely limited radar and essentially no FQ capability, lower-performing a/c, poor spares support, and
> > absolutely zero experience fighting a real war, a tough time. And so it proved.
>
>
> Sounds like a "I can stay in the ring with Lennox Lewis for a minute, so I should be able to beat up this boy
> scout" type of argument to me. Which is fine, and probably true.
I'd call 23:0 a lot more than _probably_ true. I'd call it decisively established, but that's just me. ;-)
> It does not, however, support the original
> contention which ran something like:
>
> "Same goes with the Aggressor and Top Gun instructors who routinely beat up on teen-fighters in A-4s and F-5Es;
> they also benefit from constant practice to keep their skills sharp. Situational awareness and making
> your opponent fight your fight, is far more important than any difference in a/c performance."
>
> Which just isn't true. Try hanging actual missiles on the teen jets and see how many of those guys want to
> strap on stripped-down aggressors with simulated weaponry.
If they outnumber the other side by 2, 4 or 8:1, and/or can fly 3 times the hours for the same amount of money?
Then please expain how poorly trained North Vietnamese pilots, many of whom had never driven a car before they
entered flight training, and operating in a/c with lower performance and/or inferior weapon/sensor systems (inferior
to the Mirage III, even), were able to achieve a 77:193 kill ratio or roughly 1:2.5 (using only U.S. data; the
actual exchange ratio is probably a bit more in the VPAF favor, owing to our improperly attributing A-A kills to
ground defenses) against U.S. a/c over Vietnam. The MiG-21s alone got about 1:1 for the period from late '67 through
1973. Is their doubt in your mind that if each side had exchanged pilots, the MiG-17s and MiG-21s would have
reversed that ratio, the difference being purely due to better piloting skills and SA? Numerous U.S. pilots from
that era from Robin Olds on down have claimed that's just what would have happened, given the advantages in GCI and
RoE they would have had.
> The primary British advantage in the Falklands was superior GCI, aircraft, and missiles.
What superior GCI? Both sides had decent to good control, the Brits from their ships (although most lacked
height-finding capability), and the Argentine pilots from the TPS-43 of Grupo 2 VYCA. Both sides suffered from
terrain masking, the British more so. And the British suffered more from problems of ground clutter, as they only
had two ships (Broadsword and Brilliant) with radars able to filter it out. And you're now saying that the SHAR was
superior to the Mirage, right? We agree on the missiles.
> Tactics were
> unremarkable, though competent (which is important . . . as you correctly pointed out, most fights are lost, not
> won). Trying to show it proves the opposite is silly.
British A-A tactics were competent. Argentine ones often weren't, starting with their A/A formations (fighting
wing; the Brits were using tactical spread). I'm not sure where I ever tried "to prove the opposite"; opposite of
what? The Brits had pilots with a big advantage in A-A training and experience, and it showed. They made far fewer
mistakes than the Argentine pilots did, on the few occasions where A-A birds actually fought.
> The biggest danger to the British fleet was that their
> air cover would not prove adequate to stop strikers from sinking their ships . . . not that they would be
> outclassed in dogfighting.
Quite agree: as usual there was little dogfighting, mostly quick assassinations. AEW and/or PD radars on the SHARs
was their biggest need to stop the strikers.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<3E02D9FB...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
> Harriers have been invited to Top Gun and Red Flag several times. And probably
> William Tell and other like exercises. Why don't you post the overall results
> in air-to-air combat instead of selected samples.
Because I don't have them. And quite frankly, once the Harrier's tricks were known I'd expect it to lose regularly to
modern fighters, given roughly equal pilots on both sides. It's got good combat persistence, but can't run away from
anyone.
> If the Limey Harrier pilots had consistent success at any of the above, they
> would have been boasting about it by now. That is their style after all. : )
Boasting about their superior prowess is the style of fighter pilots around the world. Nationality doesn't enter into it.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> In article <781bdac.02122...@posting.google.com>, Evan
> Brennan <evankb...@hotmail.com> writes
<snip>
> >If the Limey Harrier pilots had consistent success at any of the above, they
> >would have been boasting about it by now. That is their style after all. : )
>
> From 'Sea Harrier and AV-8B', Robert Jackson, ISBN 0-7137-1808-0, Pg 54:
>
> Quoting Sharkey:
>
> 'The table below gives an overall summary of our experiences with the
> Sea Harrier in air combat engagements (the kill ratio is Sea Harrier
> wins against adversary wins).'
<snip list>
> Not sure how complete this list is, the book was published around 1989.
I'd expect the exchange ratio to be far lower and probably negative now, given that
most of our allies have been exposed to the SHAR over the last 20 years. Its
potential enemies, OTOH . . . . Here's the opinion of one Marine DS F-18 pilot on
the AV-8B's A/A capability (no APG-65 or AIM-120s, and probably no -408 or bigger
LERX either), vs. fourth-gen fighters:
"Some people have written of the Harrier's supposed unrivaled prowess in air-to-air
combat, a prowess lent to them by their supposed ability to [VIFF]. That is, they
can adjust their nozzles, much as they would in hovering flight, to get an opponent
to overshoot. These people are idiots. An AV-8B that does that simply slows down
to a point where sacrifices its already inferior maneuverability (relative to
fourth-generation fighters). Never in my experience, in Phantoms or Hornets, have
I seen a Harrier do this effectively. The aircraft simply isn't in the
fourth-generation class in terms of maneuverability. I have never even _heard_ of
a Harrier beating a Hornet, or an F-16 or an F-15, in a dogfight. Perhaps more
telling, I have never heard a Harrier pilot boast that he could do it. . . .
"I am not being parochial. The F-16, F-15, Mirage 2000, and latest Russian
designs, except that they lack VSTOL/STOL capabilities, are all much more capable
than the AV-8B. . ."
Elsewhere, he compares the F-18 against other modern fighters (which may help
disabuse Evan of his amusing notion that only British fighter pilots have big egos,
with watches to match). I've deleted irrelevant comments:
"Here you go: an honest comparison of how the aircraft [F-18] performs relative to
some of the other stuff that's out there. The F-15 carries the same air-to-air
weapons as the F/A-18, but has a better radar and and associated systems that allow
it to be more discriminatory about who and how it's targeting at long range.
Within visual range, similarly configured, the hornet is more maneuverable and a
better dogfighter. From a visual neutral start, similarly configured, I have never
lost a "knife" fight with an Eagle. . . .
"At beyond visual range the F/A-18 is comparably equipped to the F-16, which is
_now_ (post Gulf War) capable of launching a radar missile. Within visual range I
consider a well-flown Falcon . . . to be a more formidable foe than the F-15. The
Hornet's slow-speed capabilities are still superior. Again, from a visual neutral
start, similarly configured, I have never lost a knife fight with an F-16. Like
the F-15 and just about everything else, the F-16 is faster than the F/A-18 and can
run it down in a pinch."
"I've gotten engaged visually with a Mirage 2000 just once. I was carrying two
external tanks, he was carrying none, and I beat him. The AV-8B Harrier doesn't
stand a chance against the F/A-18, or any of the other fourth-generation fighters.
The Air Defense Variant (ADV) of the Tornado is no match for the Hornet. The F-14
and F-4, likewise, are older and much less capable than the F/A-18. It is my
opinion that the Hornet can handle any Russian fighter currently fielded in any
arena.
"I don't mean to imply that Hornets don't get beaten in dogfights by other
aircraft. They do. The performance figures of most fourth-generation fighters are
very close. My personal contention is that an F/A-18, with an experienced pilot,
in the visual arena against any similarly configured aircraft, is very difficult if
not impossible to beat, depending on the other aircraft type and pilot. If you
break out the performance charts and start crunching numbers, you'll find that
several fourth-generation fighters have a certain envelope or regime within which
they are superior to another given fighter. But, in a slow-speed fight (where most
fights end up), the Hornet is tops."
"Having said all that, let me say that I think the F-16/F-15/Mirage 2000 are
beautiful and tremendous jets. I would love to have an exchange tour flying one or
more of them. I'm sure those pilots feel the same about the Hornet. No doubt
Porsche drivers look at Ferraris, and vice versa."
Quoted from "Hornets over Kuwait, by Jay Stout. Obviously, if Stout has never
heard a Harrier pilot boast that he'd beaten F-15s or F-16s, he'd never read
anything by Sharkey. But it appears he was restricting his remarks to USMC
AV-8Bs. There are several possible reasons why Sharkey was able to achieve far
better results than Stout claims.
1. SHAR flight characteristics/weapons/sensors markedly different from the AV-8B.
The SHAR is somewhat faster, but doesn't turn as well except at high speeds. They
all have multimode radars, while most AV-8Bs have none.
2. Opposite side's unfamiliarity with the Harrier at the time Sharkey achieved his
results.
3. Very different bias between A/A and A/G in the Marine AV-8 community vs. the
FAA SHAR one; for the latter the A/A mission is primary, for the latter it's
secondary or tertiary. A more direct comparison between would be to compare the
AV-8A/C training/mission syllabus with GR.1/3 units, and the AV-8B one with GR.5/7
ones, then compare them both to SHAR training and tasking.
Guy
Guy Alcala
I think he and his squadorn mates demonstrated all the credibility they needed to against Mirages, in the South Atlantic.
Again, are you claiming that the Mirage III has superior performance or superior sensors/weapons, to the F-4 or F-15? Or
that Argentine pilots are likely to be as good as NATO ones are? If not, I fail to understand what your point is.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> > Which just isn't true. Try hanging actual missiles on the teen jets and see how many of those guys want to
> > strap on stripped-down aggressors with simulated weaponry.
>
> If they outnumber the other side by 2, 4 or 8:1, and/or can fly 3 times the hours for the same amount of money?
> Then please expain how poorly trained North Vietnamese pilots, many of whom had never driven a car before they
> entered flight training, and operating in a/c with lower performance and/or inferior weapon/sensor systems (inferior
> to the Mirage III, even), were able to achieve a 77:193 kill ratio or roughly 1:2.5 (using only U.S. data; the
Is the gist of your argument that a poorly equipped force lost 2.5:1? If so, I fail to
see how it bolsters the "training is the important thing" point.
> actual exchange ratio is probably a bit more in the VPAF favor, owing to our improperly attributing A-A kills to
> ground defenses) against U.S. a/c over Vietnam. The MiG-21s alone got about 1:1 for the period from late '67 through
> 1973. Is their doubt in your mind that if each side had exchanged pilots, the MiG-17s and MiG-21s would have
> reversed that ratio, the difference being purely due to better piloting skills and SA? Numerous U.S. pilots from
> that era from Robin Olds on down have claimed that's just what would have happened, given the advantages in GCI and
> RoE they would have had.
The MIG-21 is an interesting aircraft. It's certainly a better dogfighter than an F-4
without a gun. It's also got some horrible design flaws. The VN era is also a bit of
an special case because of the transition from guns to missiles as primary weapons . . .
and the rather optimistic predictions by designers leading to innovative idiocies--like
an F-4 without a gun. Obviously the US (and especially the Navy) was not happy with the
result, mainly because the disparity in equipment should have resulted in better kill
ratios. But much of that was due to flaws in the equipment (e.g., sparrow reliabiity
off carriers)--and much of it was due to pilots' not taking capitalizing on the
advantages they had.
> > The primary British advantage in the Falklands was superior GCI, aircraft, and missiles.
>
> What superior GCI? Both sides had decent to good control, the Brits from their ships (although most lacked
> height-finding capability), and the Argentine pilots from the TPS-43 of Grupo 2 VYCA. Both sides suffered from
> terrain masking, the British more so. And the British suffered more from problems of ground clutter, as they only
> had two ships (Broadsword and Brilliant) with radars able to filter it out. And you're now saying that the SHAR was
> superior to the Mirage, right? We agree on the missiles.
In the vicinity of the ships, where it counted, the British GCI (and comm) was superior.
And yes, a SHAR/AIM9L is superior to the Mirages (mainly due to the AIM9L). And *far*
superior to every other Argentinian aircraft--which represented the bulk of their air
force.
> > Tactics were
> > unremarkable, though competent (which is important . . . as you correctly pointed out, most fights are lost, not
> > won). Trying to show it proves the opposite is silly.
>
> British A-A tactics were competent. Argentine ones often weren't, starting with their A/A formations (fighting
> wing; the Brits were using tactical spread). I'm not sure where I ever tried "to prove the opposite"; opposite of
> what? The Brits had pilots with a big advantage in A-A training and experience, and it showed. They made far fewer
> mistakes than the Argentine pilots did, on the few occasions where A-A birds actually fought.
I thought your point was that the equipment was relatively unimportant, and pilot skill
the decider. And that the Falklands was an example, as the Brits overcame a deficit to
win. They did not--their equipment was superior. I agree British tactics were superior
as well . . . hence the very lopsided result. ISTM if you want to prove your point, you
need to show a poorly-equipped force defeating a better-equipped one.
In real life.
rgds,
KTF
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> snip
>
> > > Which just isn't true. Try hanging actual missiles on the teen jets and see how many of those guys want to
> > > strap on stripped-down aggressors with simulated weaponry.
> >
> > If they outnumber the other side by 2, 4 or 8:1, and/or can fly 3 times the hours for the same amount of money?
> > Then please expain how poorly trained North Vietnamese pilots, many of whom had never driven a car before they
> > entered flight training, and operating in a/c with lower performance and/or inferior weapon/sensor systems (inferior
> > to the Mirage III, even), were able to achieve a 77:193 kill ratio or roughly 1:2.5 (using only U.S. data; the
>
> Is the gist of your argument that a poorly equipped force lost 2.5:1? If so, I fail to
> see how it bolsters the "training is the important thing" point.
Finish the paragraph;-)
> > actual exchange ratio is probably a bit more in the VPAF favor, owing to our improperly attributing A-A kills to
> > ground defenses) against U.S. a/c over Vietnam. The MiG-21s alone got about 1:1 for the period from late '67 through
> > 1973. Is their doubt in your mind that if each side had exchanged pilots, the MiG-17s and MiG-21s would have
> > reversed that ratio, the difference being purely due to better piloting skills and SA? Numerous U.S. pilots from
> > that era from Robin Olds on down have claimed that's just what would have happened, given the advantages in GCI and
> > RoE they would have had.
>
> The MIG-21 is an interesting aircraft. It's certainly a better dogfighter than an F-4
> without a gun. It's also got some horrible design flaws.
Yup, lousy cockpit visibility, poor radar, crummy armament (most NVN versions only carried a pair of Atolls), bad
ergonomics, heavy controls.
> The VN era is also a bit of
> an special case because of the transition from guns to missiles as primary weapons . . .
> and the rather optimistic predictions by designers leading to innovative idiocies--like
> an F-4 without a gun. Obviously the US (and especially the Navy) was not happy with the
> result, mainly because the disparity in equipment should have resulted in better kill
> ratios. But much of that was due to flaws in the equipment (e.g., sparrow reliabiity
> off carriers)--and much of it was due to pilots' not taking capitalizing on the
> advantages they had.
Which ignores the F-8s, which were getting a 6:1 kill ratio while navy F-4s were achieving something like 2:1 (too lazy to
check "Clashes" for the exact figure), using the same AIM-9s as the F-4s, which also had2 or 4 AIM-7s. Since the F-4 has
it over the F-8 in everything except instantaneous turn rate and high altitude sustained turn, what exactly was the navy's
conclusion as to why the F-8's did so much better during Rolling Thunder? Gee, could it have been pilot training? ;-) Or
was Top Gun a waste of time?
> > > The primary British advantage in the Falklands was superior GCI, aircraft, and missiles.
> >
> > What superior GCI? Both sides had decent to good control, the Brits from their ships (although most lacked
> > height-finding capability), and the Argentine pilots from the TPS-43 of Grupo 2 VYCA. Both sides suffered from
> > terrain masking, the British more so. And the British suffered more from problems of ground clutter, as they only
> > had two ships (Broadsword and Brilliant) with radars able to filter it out. And you're now saying that the SHAR was
> > superior to the Mirage, right? We agree on the missiles.
>
> In the vicinity of the ships, where it counted, the British GCI (and comm) was superior.
Only in the open ocean, not around San Carlos. Indeed, the British interception rate was very poor in the latter days of
the campaign, because Grupo 2 had 'gone to school' on the Brits and figured out their deployment patterns.
> And yes, a SHAR/AIM9L is superior to the Mirages (mainly due to the AIM9L).
Quite agree, given the weapons the Mirages had at the time.
> And *far*
> superior to every other Argentinian aircraft--which represented the bulk of their air
> force.
There were 34 single-seat Daggers, which had more fuel than the Mirage IIIs but lacked a search radar (irrelevant at the
low altitudes they were usually flying). The Daggers also had RWRs, which the Mirages lacked, and maybe decoy dispensers
(I'll have to check). So it's a question of whether you rate the Shafrir II or the Magic higher. The Magic's stats in
open sources usually look better. I've been told by an IAF type that the Magic seeker had some problems (I won't go into
the details), but can't confirm that. Shafrir had already established its combat credentials.
> > > Tactics were
> > > unremarkable, though competent (which is important . . . as you correctly pointed out, most fights are lost, not
> > > won). Trying to show it proves the opposite is silly.
> >
> > British A-A tactics were competent. Argentine ones often weren't, starting with their A/A formations (fighting
> > wing; the Brits were using tactical spread). I'm not sure where I ever tried "to prove the opposite"; opposite of
> > what? The Brits had pilots with a big advantage in A-A training and experience, and it showed. They made far fewer
> > mistakes than the Argentine pilots did, on the few occasions where A-A birds actually fought.
>
> I thought your point was that the equipment was relatively unimportant, and pilot skill
> the decider. And that the Falklands was an example, as the Brits overcame a deficit to
> win. They did not--their equipment was superior. I agree British tactics were superior
> as well . . . hence the very lopsided result.
Ah, I see where the confusion came in. I claimed that pilot skill was more important than the last 10% (or more, in some
cases) of performance, assuming not too lopsided a force ratio (but see the end of the post). I also believe that the
Brits would have achieved virtually the same results if they'd only had the AIM-9G instead of the AIM-9L, because of their
superior training and tactics. Do you think the Fuerza Aerea and CANA would have won in this situation, or that they
would have been able to inflict serious losses on the British? None of the reading I've done suggests that to be the
case. In most combats, the Brits were saddled and shooting before the Argentine pilots were aware of them. In only a few
instances were missiles launched at high AoT at evading targets. That being the case, the AIM-9G would have gotten almost
as many kills as the -9L.
Here's an example of Argentine pilot attitude:
"It is clear, however, that the Argentine fighter-bomber units had little awareness of how aircraft in a formation could
give each other mutual cover using their cannon armament, if enemy fighters attacked. 'We were briefed to avoid dogfights
and escape at low level and alone, 'every man for himself,' commented Ruben Zini, who flew with Grupo 5. The naval
Skyhawk pilots also felt outclassed by the combination of Sea Harrier and AIM-9L, so that there was no point in attempting
to fight back. 'What were we briefed to do if jumped by Sea Harriers? Well, we had a lot of experience of air combat
maneuvering [of what quality, we don't know], but in the A-4 there was not much choice. Not only were we too slow, but we
knew very well we could not outmaneuver the Sea Harrier. All we could do was try to escape at low level at full
throttle,' commented [Lt.] Benito Rotolo of the 3rd Escuadrilla. 'We never mounted Sidewinders on our Skyhawks because
our mission was always one of attack, never air-to-air combat*. The Sidewinder L is a very effective missile and our
older models could not hope to equal them.' "
*3 Escuadrilla, in addition to strike missions, also trained and flew CAP/escort armed with AIM-9Bs from the carrier, the
only Argentine A-4 unit with any training for this. No such missions were flown from land during the war, owing to lack
of numbers and range.
Quoted from "Air War South Atlantic", pg. 98. Not exactly the most aggressive sounding group primed for mutual defense,
are they? Now, if the Brits had been armed with the AIM-9G, would it have made the slightest difference against these
guys? After the first kill or two had been scored, nope. They would have been just as intimidated by the AIM-9G.
And here's a British view, from the same source, referring to the combats against the Mirages and escort-tasked Daggers
on May 1st::
"We were ahead, we were confident we would stay ahead, but we couldn't believe they would continue to use the same
pathetic tactics,' said Flt. Lt. Ian Mortimer of 801 Squadron [Sharkey's squadron Air Warfare Instructor]." Pg. 48.
And here's another, referring to the strike missions on May 21st:
"The British pilots considered their opponents to be good 'stick and rudder' men, but felt they had little idea of modern
air fighting tactics. Flt. Lt. Paul Barton commented, 'Their pilots were not bad. Any guy that can fly at 60 ot 70 feet
above the waves, picking his way between ship's masts, is a pretty skillful pilot. But basically they had not been
trained sufficiently in tactical flying. Nothing their fighter or attack aircraft did struck me as being particularly
clever or original. That said, however, I would give them 9 1/2 out of 10 for sheer guts and courage.' " (pg. 99)
BTW, while I accept that the A-4B and C were slower and had far less thrust than the SHARs, I do wonder about the comment
that the A-4s couldn't out-maneuver them. The A-4 is no slug maneuver-wise, and while the B/C model were almost certainly
inferior in sustained performance at most speeds, I'd think they would best the SHAR in instantaneous turn rate and roll.
What do you think?
>ISTM if you want to prove your point, you
>need to show a poorly-equipped force defeating a better-equipped one.
> In real life.
Israel in 1948-49, '56, and even '67 when looked at as a whole, real life enough? After '67 the Israeli equipment quality
advantage starts to take off.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> Ah, I see where the confusion came in. I claimed that pilot skill was more important than the last 10% (or more, in some
> cases) of performance, assuming not too lopsided a force ratio (but see the end of the post). I also believe that the
> Brits would have achieved virtually the same results if they'd only had the AIM-9G instead of the AIM-9L, because of their
> superior training and tactics. Do you think the Fuerza Aerea and CANA would have won in this situation, or that they
> would have been able to inflict serious losses on the British? None of the reading I've done suggests that to be the
> case.
The part I called BS on was Sharkey's claim to Harrier superiority over F-15's, and
proving it in a training environment. The Argentinians would have done better to 1)aim
at transports instead of warships; 2) get someone with a clue to do their fuzing; and 3)
try to saturate defenses. AIM-9Ls helped mainly in that it made British air attacks
more deadly--which may have saved a ship or two.
snip
> BTW, while I accept that the A-4B and C were slower and had far less thrust than the SHARs, I do wonder about the comment
> that the A-4s couldn't out-maneuver them. The A-4 is no slug maneuver-wise, and while the B/C model were almost certainly
> inferior in sustained performance at most speeds, I'd think they would best the SHAR in instantaneous turn rate and roll.
> What do you think?
An A-4M is inferior to a Harrier in a dogfight . . . but it's fairly close. Add in a
significant missile disparity and the missiles determine the fight.
> >ISTM if you want to prove your point, you
> >need to show a poorly-equipped force defeating a better-equipped one.
> > In real life.
>
> Israel in 1948-49, '56, and even '67 when looked at as a whole, real life enough? After '67 the Israeli equipment quality
> advantage starts to take off.
>
> Guy
Well, I was thinking of something a bit more recent and having something to do with
relative missile envelopes. (And IMO, Korea would be a better illustration of superior
pilots in similar aircraft.)
But we've drifted into an entirely different discussion. In the not-too-distant past,
ending in about the 1980's, there was a tendency in ACM training to ignore the radar
missile shots and achieve bragging rights in the gunfight. Sharkey's claims are
consistent with the practice (which included some radar rope-a-dope which only worked in
very canned scenarios). If it ever was a valid tactic (which is arguable), it ceased
sometime around the 1980's. Even if the Pk of the radar shot is only .5, it is not
something you can ignore, and the side without it is at a debilitating disadvantage.
The other point I was trying to make is that training does not accurately simulate
reality. (In the case in question, I doubt even an attempt at it--the F-15's were
probably trying to mix it up to see how the Harrier's revolutionary nozzle arrangement
affected engaged maneuverability, not play to their own strengths--and based on other
flaws in the book I doubt Sharkey's description of the outcome is objective.)
But even if you were to engineer a realistic scenario, the results would still be
suspect. [As an aside, one of the things that struck me when in (ground) combat was the
total difference in the way everyone acted. Instead of bounding overwatch with sweeping
armor maneuvers, individual tanks crept forward at 1-2 mph, then stopped and inspected
the area in detail, followed by continued cautious advances.] Similarly, nobody in
their right mind is going to take a 50% chance of dying just to get into position to
start a dogfight . . . but we do it in training every day. Other training limitations
(canned scenarios, limited airspace, aircraft regeneration) cause conclusions to be
skewed as well--almost always to the detriment of long-range missile shots and fighter
sweeps.
If you're saying training is important, fine. If you're saying it will offset an
advantage like one side having BVR missiles and the other not, that hasn't been true for
about four decades.
rgds,
KTF
Evan Brennan
> And yet, marginally competent pilots in non-radar a/c have beaten
> radar-equipped a/c in real combat. Like North Vietnamese MiG-17s
Because North Vietnamese pilots had radar-equipped ground control
and they often attacked slow-flying, heavily laden fighter-bombers and
attack planes like the F-105, F-4, A-1, A-4, A-6 and A-7...rather than
engaging clean and light fighter interceptors like the F-5.
The same could be said of Sea Harrier pilots in the Falklands. We
cannot help but notice they had only -one- confirmed kill against
a Mirage interceptor. That is significant.
>> Then please expain how poorly trained North Vietnamese pilots
They were not poorly trained. After essentials were learned, most
of their energies and flying hours were focused on one task, the
short-range interception of maneuverable aircraft.
US fighter pilots had done the opposite. They had been fixated
on bomber interception (i.e. less maneuverable aircraft) and
their choice of using very large interceptors with greater range
reflected that philospophy.
For this reason one could argue that overall, Communist MiG-17
pilots had gotten -more- ACM training than USAF fighter pilots,
with the exception of certain US fighter pilots with experience
from World War II and Korea. After the US bombing halt in 1968,
Communist fighter pilots had several years to build up flying
hours with no interference from US aircraft. This also afforded
them a little time to experiment with other specialties like
ground attack.
Evan Brennan
> 'The table below gives an overall summary of our experiences with the
> Sea Harrier in air combat engagements (the kill ratio is Sea Harrier
> wins against adversary wins).'
>
> Venue Adversary Kill ratio
> Decimomannu 1981 F-15 & F-5E 12:4
> Decimomannu 1983 F-16 31:14
> Alconbury F-5E 3:1
> NATO sea exercise F-14 3:1 - 10:1
> UK F-4 10:1
> Australia Mirage III 3:1
> UK Lightning 2:1
>
> Not sure how complete this list is, the book was published around 1989.
Well for all these high-falutin' claims against enemy interceptors
shot down (in simulated combat) all the Brits have to show for it
(in real combat) is ONE Mirage III flown by Lt. Perona of the
Argentine Air Force.
John Halliwell
<evankb...@hotmail.com> writes
>None to Sharkey obviously. To him there was no point in providing
>details when his mates had been whipped, especially at the hands
>of Frenchmen. For Sharkey to explain that in more detail would
>force him to demonstrate credibility, to which he seems allergic.
Apart from the other reasons pointed out in earlier posts, there are
possibly other reasons behind his comments. The task force set sail with
a grand total of something like 20 Sea Harriers (initially no GR3s),
facing a possible Argentinean force many times greater. The powers that
be back in London were very apprehensive and had reckoned on one SHAR
loss a day. Given that up to that time, only 33 SHARs existed, these
figures put FAA loses as total in about a month.
It's quite possible that without a confident brush off of seemingly very
bad news, the wrong tactics might have been deployed which may have put
the SHARs at a disadvantage. Perhaps it was as much 'gut feel' as
anything else?
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> snip
> > Ah, I see where the confusion came in. I claimed that pilot skill was more important than the last 10% (or more, in some
> > cases) of performance, assuming not too lopsided a force ratio (but see the end of the post). I also believe that the
> > Brits would have achieved virtually the same results if they'd only had the AIM-9G instead of the AIM-9L, because of their
> > superior training and tactics. Do you think the Fuerza Aerea and CANA would have won in this situation, or that they
> > would have been able to inflict serious losses on the British? None of the reading I've done suggests that to be the
> > case.
>
> The part I called BS on was Sharkey's claim to Harrier superiority over F-15's, and
> proving it in a training environment.
I'm not aware that Sharkey claimed "superiority" over F-15s. He said he beat them, which is hardly the same thing.
> The Argentinians would have done better to 1)aim
> at transports instead of warships;
Sure, although we can put down many of the early attacks on warships on 21 May to the fog of war. The first wave or two was
unsure just what was going on. Although CW is that the Argentine pilots ignored the transports in San Carlos Water on 21 May,
it's not correct. In fact, they did attack transports in San Carlos Water and probably an attack was frustrated on Fort Austin
while she was still anchored in the Sound; they just missed. Canberra was very lucky to avoid almost all attacks, apparently
because most Argentine pilots who saw her assumed she must be a hospital ship (her nickname in the Task Group being 'The Great
White Whale') and thus bypassed her. Here's an account from one of the STUFT ships in SCW that day, the Ro/Ro Europic Ferry:
"In this first attack by Mirage [Sic.], Skyhawk, and Pucara on the beachhead, the action was concentrated around the Canberra
and Norland and during this engagement Intrepid brought down a Pucara with her Seacat missile. In subsequent attacks the length
of San Carlos Water was overflown, now the LSLs and ouselves were becoming targets. There were some near misses especially one
bomb that dropped between us and Intrepid."
From 23 May on, the transports were attacked regularly, but by that time it was too late. The British were fortunate on the
22nd that the weather on the mainland was too bad to launch a/c, even though it was fine over the islands.
> 2) get someone with a clue to do their fuzing;
Depends what fuzes they had available. Lacking Snakeye fins or para-retard tails for their bombs, their choices are somewhat
limited. The Fuerza Aerea had Mk.82 slicks and British 1,000 lbers, and later seem to have acquired French 400kg. para-retard
bombs from somewhere (the Navy had Mk.82 Snakeyes). I can't speak for the fusing options on the British bombs, but I've got an
F-4C-34 which lists the fusing options for the Mk.82 slicks, and there seems to be only one choice for the conditions, the
FMU-26A/B electric fuse with medium delay. This gives them a sufficently short arming time with the required detonation delay.
Everything else listed (FMU-113 Radar prox., FMU-72 Long delay, M904 Nose and M905 Tail Impact fuses) doesn't meet the
requirements in one way or another. The FMU-26A/B should have been adequate, IF they had any. The navy could have used FMU-54s
with their Snakeyes.
and 3)
> try to saturate defenses. AIM-9Ls helped mainly in that it made British air attacks
> more deadly--which may have saved a ship or two.
They did try to saturate the defenses, but they lacked the numbers and were operating from multiple bases with fuel-limited
a/c. The required low-level attack modes (due to SHARs and SAMs) and the wish to get as many a/c on target in the shortest
possible time (to saturate ship defenses) limited their fuze options; they had to attack from level flight or make themselves
extremely vulnerable to the defenses, and they had to use medium delay bombs so that they didn't frag the wingmen or themselves.
> snip
> > BTW, while I accept that the A-4B and C were slower and had far less thrust than the SHARs, I do wonder about the comment
> > that the A-4s couldn't out-maneuver them. The A-4 is no slug maneuver-wise, and while the B/C model were almost certainly
> > inferior in sustained performance at most speeds, I'd think they would best the SHAR in instantaneous turn rate and roll.
> > What do you think?
>
> An A-4M is inferior to a Harrier in a dogfight . . . but it's fairly close. Add in a
> significant missile disparity and the missiles determine the fight.
>
> > >ISTM if you want to prove your point, you
> > >need to show a poorly-equipped force defeating a better-equipped one.
> > > In real life.
> >
> > Israel in 1948-49, '56, and even '67 when looked at as a whole, real life enough? After '67 the Israeli equipment quality
> > advantage starts to take off.
> >
> > Guy
>
> Well, I was thinking of something a bit more recent and having something to do with
> relative missile envelopes. (And IMO, Korea would be a better illustration of superior
> pilots in similar aircraft.)
Too obvious ;-) The MiG-15 was superior in performance in much of the envelope to the Sabre, and definitely superior to
everything else in theater, but the Sabre has a fair number of equipment advantages that even things out. Of course, there are
numerous individual occasions where better pilots defeated poorer ones in better a/c, which is really what I'm talking about.
But let's cut to the nitty gritty. Assume that Britain and Argentina swap countries and air forces. It's the Brits flying the
Mirages and Daggers, while the Argentinians have the SHARs and carriers. Do you think that the SHARs would win, or would it be
the Mirage/Daggers? I know who I'd choose.
> But we've drifted into an entirely different discussion. In the not-too-distant past,
> ending in about the 1980's, there was a tendency in ACM training to ignore the radar
> missile shots and achieve bragging rights in the gunfight. Sharkey's claims are
> consistent with the practice (which included some radar rope-a-dope which only worked in
> very canned scenarios).
I don't see that he ignored the shots, he says he and his pilots denied valid ones, apparently on the Deci range as well as over
England. Doesn't mean they didn't react to acquisition or lock-on attempts in any way, just that they were able to deal with
them and still win.
> If it ever was a valid tactic (which is arguable), it ceased
> sometime around the 1980's. Even if the Pk of the radar shot is only .5, it is not
> something you can ignore, and the side without it is at a debilitating disadvantage.
Who says they ignored it? Hell, Martin Hale apparently had a Shafrir fired at him head-on which managed to acquire him and,
according to his account, tracked him for a considerable time. He rolled over, went down vertical for the clouds while cracking
his speedbrake to dump the chaff carried there (maybe he'd have gotten lucky and fooled the prox. fuse). But was the Sparrow pK
anywhere near .5? It appears to have been well below that in DS with better radars, missiles and C2 than were available in
1982. In Vietnam, it was far worse. And the navy experience in the Gulf of Sidra in 1987? wasn't exactly an endorsement of the
missile's effectiveness (0/2 by an F-14, head-on and look-up over water). The kills were scored by AIM-9s fired WVR.
> The other point I was trying to make is that training does not accurately simulate
> reality. (In the case in question, I doubt even an attempt at it--the F-15's were
> probably trying to mix it up to see how the Harrier's revolutionary nozzle arrangement
> affected engaged maneuverability, not play to their own strengths--and based on other
> flaws in the book I doubt Sharkey's description of the outcome is objective.)
What's to stop them from mixing it up after calling Fox 1 shots? Nothing I can see, and the scenario seems to have been setup
to allow them to use there strengths -- otherwise, why start at 40nm on the nose, with the SHARs at medium altitude and the
F-15s up where they want to play, at 30kft+? It's not as if he doesn't describe setups done specifically to see how the SHAR
VIFF capability affected engaged maneuverability -- they did that with the aggressor F-5Es on the second mission, letting the
527th set up on the perch.
As to Sharkey's objectivity in this case (and the results he reported in the book John H. mentioned), we'll just have to leave
it there lacking any other source. At least he's consistent with his numbers and claims.
> But even if you were to engineer a realistic scenario, the results would still be
> suspect. [As an aside, one of the things that struck me when in (ground) combat was the
> total difference in the way everyone acted. Instead of bounding overwatch with sweeping
> armor maneuvers, individual tanks crept forward at 1-2 mph, then stopped and inspected
> the area in detail, followed by continued cautious advances.] Similarly, nobody in
> their right mind is going to take a 50% chance of dying just to get into position to
> start a dogfight . . . but we do it in training every day. Other training limitations
> (canned scenarios, limited airspace, aircraft regeneration) cause conclusions to be
> skewed as well--almost always to the detriment of long-range missile shots and fighter
> sweeps.
Sure, and that caution applies to both sides.
> If you're saying training is important, fine. If you're saying it will offset an
> advantage like one side having BVR missiles and the other not, that hasn't been true for
> about four decades.
Given that in the real life combat where BVR missiles have been available to only one side, the side with the BVR missiles has
also always had the training advantage (with the strictly limited exception of India with their Mirage IIIs/R.530s in '71), I
don't think any such thing has been proven, especially given such a small data base. Again, in your opinion which side would
have won achieved a better kill ratio if the U.S. and VPAF had switched pilots? How about if the Arabs and Israelis had done so
in '73?
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<3E0587A2...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
> > And yet, marginally competent pilots in non-radar a/c have beaten
> > radar-equipped a/c in real combat. Like North Vietnamese MiG-17s
>
> Because North Vietnamese pilots had radar-equipped ground control
Ah, so radar-equipped a/c aren't strictly necessary, as long as you've got good radar control. Good, we agree.
> and they often attacked slow-flying, heavily laden fighter-bombers and
> attack planes like the F-105, F-4, A-1, A-4, A-6 and A-7...rather than
> engaging clean and light fighter interceptors like the F-5.
I wasn't talking about loaded strikers, as they're relatively easy to get OTOH, "slow" is relative. The F-105, even loaded,
is tough for the MiG-17 to catch; same goes for the F-4, although less so. And you might want to check the number of A-4s,
A-6s and A-7s credited to MiG-17s; it's very low. According to USN analysis, there were exactly two USN strikers lost to
VPAF MiGs during the war, and only one to a MiG-17. Actual totals are almost certainly somewhat higher, owing to
misattribution of cause, but it's still quite low. No, I was referring to MiGs getting CAP/Escort birds, or strikers on
their way out having dumped their bombs.
> The same could be said of Sea Harrier pilots in the Falklands. We
> cannot help but notice they had only -one- confirmed kill against
> a Mirage interceptor. That is significant.
Actually, it's two Mirage kills (with an assist from Argentine AAA. The a/c was a write-off even if the pilot had been able
to land safely, a distinctly dubious prospect given the damage to the a/c, and the short length of and damage to the
runway), both a/c of a single formation, plus a Dagger of another flight tasked for CAP. And you neglect to mention the
reason the total is so low -- the Argentine Air Force stopped flying CAP/escort missions from that day on. I agree, that IS
significant.
> >> Then please expain how poorly trained North Vietnamese pilots
>
> They were not poorly trained. After essentials were learned, most
> of their energies and flying hours were focused on one task, the
> short-range interception of maneuverable aircraft.
Yes, they were poorly trained for ACM. They had fairly standard Soviet training, emphasizing rigid control, canned
intercepts, and little ACM maneuvering. They had some stars who rose above the average and learned to move the a/c, but the
average pilot was well below the U.S. average.
> US fighter pilots had done the opposite. They had been fixated
> on bomber interception (i.e. less maneuverable aircraft) and
> their choice of using very large interceptors with greater range
> reflected that philospophy.
Not all had, and they were stilled trained to exercise far more initiative than the vietnamese pilots were. And you also
need to distinguish between periods and a/c. Navy F-8 and many of the Air Force pilots prior to 1967 were well-skilled in
hassling. From '67 on, the great leavening occurred with Air Force pilots coming in from other commands, including bomber
and transport, and the tactical experience levels dropped way off. This was less of a problem with the former ADC pilots,
but it was still there.
> For this reason one could argue that overall, Communist MiG-17
> pilots had gotten -more- ACM training than USAF fighter pilots,
> with the exception of certain US fighter pilots with experience
> from World War II and Korea. After the US bombing halt in 1968,
> Communist fighter pilots had several years to build up flying
> hours with no interference from US aircraft. This also afforded
> them a little time to experiment with other specialties like
> ground attack.
Odd that this supposed ACM training didn't show up in improved kill rates or changed tactics. The MiG-17 was almost
completely ineffectual in 1972, and had been since 1967. The MiG-19s were slightly more so. The MiG-21s continued their
one pass and haul ass missile tactics from the latter part of 1967, and almost never stuck around to hassle. No reason they
should -- it worked, and it suited their experience level and positive control system.
Guy
Guy Alcala
And one flown by Capitan Garcia-Cuerva severely damaged and effectively lost to Argentina regardless of
subsequent events, and one Dagger flown by 1st Lt. Ardiles, followed within hours by the Fuerza Aerea conceding
the air superiority battle to the Brits for the remainder of the war. Kinda difficult to shoot down a/c that
refuse to engage.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> > The part I called BS on was Sharkey's claim to Harrier superiority over F-15's, and
> > proving it in a training environment.
>
> I'm not aware that Sharkey claimed "superiority" over F-15s. He said he beat them, which is hardly the same thing.
He said he beat them 7:1, in a large exercise, and he obviously meant the reader to draw
a [false] conclusion.
>
> > The Argentinians would have done better to 1)aim
> > at transports instead of warships;
>
> Sure, although we can put down many of the early attacks on warships on 21 May to the fog of war. The first wave or two was
> unsure just what was going on. Although CW is that the Argentine pilots ignored the transports in San Carlos Water on 21 May,
> it's not correct. In fact, they did attack transports in San Carlos Water and probably an attack was frustrated on Fort Austin
snip
A smart targeteer would have focused exclusively on transports, which they clearly did
not do.
> > 2) get someone with a clue to do their fuzing;
>
> Depends what fuzes they had available. Lacking Snakeye fins or para-retard tails for their bombs, their choices are somewhat
> limited. The Fuerza Aerea had Mk.82 slicks and British 1,000 lbers, and later seem to have acquired French 400kg. para-retard
> bombs from somewhere (the Navy had Mk.82 Snakeyes). I can't speak for the fusing options on the British bombs, but I've got an
> F-4C-34 which lists the fusing options for the Mk.82 slicks, and there seems to be only one choice for the conditions, the
> FMU-26A/B electric fuse with medium delay. This gives them a sufficently short arming time with the required detonation delay.
> Everything else listed (FMU-113 Radar prox., FMU-72 Long delay, M904 Nose and M905 Tail Impact fuses) doesn't meet the
> requirements in one way or another. The FMU-26A/B should have been adequate, IF they had any. The navy could have used FMU-54s
> with their Snakeyes.
A 904 will work, you just have to play with it a bit. (The electric stuff is harder to
trick.) I suspect they had something that could be made to work--if not they maybe
should buy fuzes that corresponded to their deliveries . . . or change their deliveries
to match the fuzes. This ain't rocket science. (And it doesn't make sense to keep
safeties on a weapon keeping the probability of frag down to .0001 if it compromises
weapon function and the probability of losing the aircraft to enemy action runs to .3)
> and 3)
>
> > try to saturate defenses. AIM-9Ls helped mainly in that it made British air attacks
> > more deadly--which may have saved a ship or two.
>
> They did try to saturate the defenses, but they lacked the numbers and were operating from multiple bases with fuel-limited
> a/c. The required low-level attack modes (due to SHARs and SAMs) and the wish to get as many a/c on target in the shortest
> possible time (to saturate ship defenses) limited their fuze options; they had to attack from level flight or make themselves
> extremely vulnerable to the defenses, and they had to use medium delay bombs so that they didn't frag the wingmen or themselves.
They didn't try hard enough. And notice how the decision to go low caused them fuel
problems, fuzing problems, and wingman frag considerations . . . all of which didn't
keep their attrition rate down to acceptable levels. If the bombs had fuzed, the rest
would be excusable. Since they didn't, it wasn't.
snip
> But let's cut to the nitty gritty. Assume that Britain and Argentina swap countries and air forces. It's the Brits flying the
> Mirages and Daggers, while the Argentinians have the SHARs and carriers. Do you think that the SHARs would win, or would it be
> the Mirage/Daggers? I know who I'd choose.
Actually, I think it's the A-4s that matter. If they sink enough ships, the rest is
moot. And the problem with the Argentinians' performance is mainly big-picture, not
individual pilot training. if you send the Brits in with the same tactics, I'm not sure
you'd see a qualitatively different result. It would be more interesting to swap only
the leadership.
> > But we've drifted into an entirely different discussion. In the not-too-distant past,
> > ending in about the 1980's, there was a tendency in ACM training to ignore the radar
> > missile shots and achieve bragging rights in the gunfight. Sharkey's claims are
> > consistent with the practice (which included some radar rope-a-dope which only worked in
> > very canned scenarios).
>
> I don't see that he ignored the shots, he says he and his pilots denied valid ones, apparently on the Deci range as well as over
> England. Doesn't mean they didn't react to acquisition or lock-on attempts in any way, just that they were able to deal with
> them and still win.
Yeah, rignt. And I'm saying I can take an F-15 unit at random and in any semi-realistic
scenario set up a CAP that will kill Sharkey and his buddies 99+ percent of the time as
they try their "deny valid shot" tactics. And so can any competent FWS grad. And the
fact that he reports wildly different results either means that he purposely set up a
scenario for that purpose or is misreporting the results. I choose both.
rgds,
KTF
Evan Brennan
> Evan Brennan wrote:
>
> > John Halliwell <jo...@photopia.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<oUHa9CAZ...@photopia.demon.co.uk>...
> > > 'The table below gives an overall summary of our experiences with the
> > > Sea Harrier in air combat engagements (the kill ratio is Sea Harrier
> > > wins against adversary wins).'
> > >
> > > Venue Adversary Kill ratio
> > > Decimomannu 1981 F-15 & F-5E 12:4
> > > Decimomannu 1983 F-16 31:14
> > > Alconbury F-5E 3:1
> > > NATO sea exercise F-14 3:1 - 10:1
> > > UK F-4 10:1
> > > Australia Mirage III 3:1
> > > UK Lightning 2:1
> > >
> > > Not sure how complete this list is, the book was published around 1989.
> >
> > Well for all these high-falutin' claims against enemy interceptors
> > shot down (in simulated combat) all the Brits have to show for it
> > (in real combat) is ONE Mirage III flown by Lt. Perona of the
> > Argentine Air Force.
>
> And one flown by Capitan Garcia-Cuerva severely damaged and effectively
> lost to Argentina regardless of subsequent events
His aircraft was effectively destroyed by Argentine friendly fire.
Evan Brennan
> > attack planes like the F-105, F-4, A-1, A-4, A-6 and A-7...rather than
> > engaging clean and light fighter interceptors like the F-5.
>
>I wasn't talking about loaded strikers, as they're relatively easy to get
>OTOH, "slow" is relative. The F-105, even loaded, is tough for the
>MiG-17 to catch; same goes for the F-4
Any attack jet is tough to catch if it's too far from the pursuer.
That's why the Reds invested in MiG-21s, since the MiG-17 was slow
and unable to intercept some targets, much like the Sea Harrier.
The bomb-laden F-105 and F-4 fighter-bombers flew to the targets at
subsonic speeds. If in range of MiG-17s, they were just as vulnerable
as the bomb-loaded A-4 Skyhawk, if not more so.
> No, I was referring to MiGs getting CAP/Escort birds, or strikers on
>their way out having dumped their bombs.
The MiG pilots were instructed to engage USAF fighter-bombers before
they dumped bombs, i.e. before they could reach higher speeds after
coming off the target. The reason is self-explanatory.
> > They were not poorly trained. After essentials were learned, most
> > of their energies and flying hours were focused on one task, the
> > short-range interception of maneuverable aircraft.
> > US fighter pilots had done the opposite. They had been fixated
> > on bomber interception (i.e. less maneuverable aircraft) and
> > their choice of using very large interceptors with greater range
> > reflected that philospophy.
>
> Not all had, and they were stilled trained to exercise far more initiative
> than the vietnamese pilots were.
I'm afraid that "initiative" is not a substitute for "lack of ACM
training" in any air force. : )
Evan Brennan
>> North Vietnamese MiG-17 pilots were not poorly trained.
>Yes, they were poorly trained for ACM. They had fairly standard
>Soviet training, emphasizing rigid control, canned intercepts, and
>little ACM maneuvering.
This is fececious babble. "Fairly standard Soviet ACM training of
the 1960s" was not poor by the standards of the 1960s. Their ACM
training was as good or superior to that of the USAF and the RAF,
with the exception of certain units staffed with old hands from WWII
or Korea. It could be that the ACM training of US Navy F-8 Crusader
pilots was better than all the above, but I doubt if the same could
be said about Navy F-4 pilots until after they formed the so-called,
TopGun school.
Fighting a manueverable target with a large interceptor like the
F-105 or F-4 requires much more ACM training than a easier-to-fly,
low weight interceptor like a MiG-17. There is no evidence that
such ACM training entered into USAF programs until the 1970s.
>And you also need to distinguish between periods and a/c. Navy F-8
>and many of the Air Force pilots prior to 1967 were well-skilled in
>hassling. And you might want to check the number of A-4s, A-6s
>and A-7s credited to MiG-17s; it's very low.
I did check and noticed that the number of F-8 interceptors shot down
by MiGs is also very low. So you're just rambling here.
> > For this reason one could argue that overall, Communist MiG-17
> > pilots had gotten -more- ACM training than USAF fighter pilots,
> > with the exception of certain US fighter pilots with experience
> > from World War II and Korea. After the US bombing halt in 1968,
> > Communist fighter pilots had several years to build up flying
> > hours with no interference from US aircraft. This also afforded
> > them a little time to experiment with other specialties like
 > ground attack.
> Odd that this supposed ACM training didn't show up in improved kill
> rates or changed tactics. The MiG-17 was almost completely ineffectual
> in 1972, and had been since 1967.
Not surprising. Because both sides were learning from mistakes.
Paul J. Adam
<turn...@mindspring.com> writes
>Guy Alcala wrote:
>snip
>> Sure, although we can put down many of the early attacks on warships
>>on 21 May to the fog of war. The first wave or two was
>> unsure just what was going on.
>A smart targeteer would have focused exclusively on transports, which
>they clearly did
>not do.
They were ordered to go for the transports... but on coming over the
terrain, they were presented with a narrow valley full of grey ships,
all firing at them (from SAMs to 4.5" down to small-arms, plus flares
and allegedly the occasional anti-tank rocket).
Lacking intelligence on what ships were parked where in Falkland Sound,
under heavy fire and with very little time, the FAA pilots predictably
went for the first targets they saw. More effective attack profiles
would have brought better results... and much faster attrition.
--
Paul J. Adam
Cecil Turner
Okay, but being told to aim for transports without any practical method of picking
them out is a leadership failure. As is picking a delivery that ensures you won't be
able to acquire the correct target, and precluding weapon function. (Doubly so, since
it was apparent they'd not practiced enough to realize the weapons wouldn't
function.)
Dropping duds on the wrong targets is not going to win a war. So you can either
change your tactics (and I'd debate the relative loss rates of higher angle deliveries
if done intelligently) or run multiple unsuccessful missions until you run out of
aircraft.
rgds,
KTF
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> snip
> > > The part I called BS on was Sharkey's claim to Harrier superiority over F-15's, and
> > > proving it in a training environment.
> >
> > I'm not aware that Sharkey claimed "superiority" over F-15s. He said he beat them, which is hardly the same thing.
>
> He said he beat them 7:1, in a large exercise, and he obviously meant the reader to draw
> a [false] conclusion.
Having read and re-read the book recently, I don't come to that conclusion. BTW, just to make sure, have you read it yourself
(recently), or are you basing your comments on the excerpts I've posted?
> > > The Argentinians would have done better to 1)aim
> > > at transports instead of warships;
> >
> > Sure, although we can put down many of the early attacks on warships on 21 May to the fog of war. The first wave or two was
> > unsure just what was going on. Although CW is that the Argentine pilots ignored the transports in San Carlos Water on 21 May,
> > it's not correct. In fact, they did attack transports in San Carlos Water and probably an attack was frustrated on Fort Austin
> snip
>
> A smart targeteer would have focused exclusively on transports, which they clearly did
> not do.
Not on Day 1, although they did on the 23rd-25th (other than the attack on Coventry to degrade the early warning capability). We
don't know what their orders were in many cases, whether they were told to go for the first ships they saw, or get into San Carlos
Water and hit the transports which were presumably there (they had the results of one visual recon by an MB-339 pilot, but nothing
else to go on when the first and possibly the second wave were briefed). Who knows whether it was a failure of the brief or one of
the pilots tending to go for the first ship they saw. I agree that their orders on 21 May SHOULD have been to ignore the pickets and
get the 'phibs at all costs, and the pilots should have acted accordingly.
> > > 2) get someone with a clue to do their fuzing;
> >
> > Depends what fuzes they had available. Lacking Snakeye fins or para-retard tails for their bombs, their choices are somewhat
> > limited. The Fuerza Aerea had Mk.82 slicks and British 1,000 lbers, and later seem to have acquired French 400kg. para-retard
> > bombs from somewhere (the Navy had Mk.82 Snakeyes). I can't speak for the fusing options on the British bombs, but I've got an
> > F-4C-34 which lists the fusing options for the Mk.82 slicks, and there seems to be only one choice for the conditions, the
> > FMU-26A/B electric fuse with medium delay. This gives them a sufficently short arming time with the required detonation delay.
> > Everything else listed (FMU-113 Radar prox., FMU-72 Long delay, M904 Nose and M905 Tail Impact fuses) doesn't meet the
> > requirements in one way or another. The FMU-26A/B should have been adequate, IF they had any. The navy could have used FMU-54s
> > with their Snakeyes.
>
> A 904 will work, you just have to play with it a bit.
How do you get a 12 to 20 second functional delay from a 904 (or 905)? Max. functional delay for both is only .25 seconds (and you'd
want to use a shorter delay to make the bombs go off before they pass completely through the ship), which means any a/c dropping
slicks at low altitude in level flight is going to be in the frag zone, especially the follow on guys (who are in short trail to
saturate the defenses). You could use the 2 second arming delay option (only on the 904, not the 905) instead of 4 or 6 to allow the
bombs to arm if dropped from below 300 feet, but again you're going to frag yourself and/or your wingmen without a functional delay of
10-20 seconds (not available for the 904/905), rather than some fraction of a second.
> (The electric stuff is harder to
> trick.) I suspect they had something that could be made to work--if not they maybe
> should buy fuzes that corresponded to their deliveries . . . or change their deliveries
> to match the fuzes.
Re buying fuses that corresponded to their deliveries, the air force units were never expected to have to attack ships. Indeed, the
navy pilots had to give them a quick course in ship attack. You'll note the navy didn't have the fuse problem, because they were
doing the same mission they were ttrained and tasked to do normally. And changing the deliveries to match the fuses just puts them up
out of ground clutter, making the SAMs more effective. They were facing defenses far more sophisticated than they would have in their
assumed role, attacking the Chilean (or other neighbor's) army.
> This ain't rocket science. (And it doesn't make sense to keep
> safeties on a weapon keeping the probability of frag down to .0001 if it compromises
> weapon function and the probability of losing the aircraft to enemy action runs to .3)
The probability of frag wasn't .001. Using M904s or 905s on slicks making low altitude level deliveries, it would be just about 1.0,
especially for the trailers. Consider that 1 second after detonation, the top of a Mk.82's frag envelope is 650 feet high at a radius
of slightly over 1,000 feet. Directly above the detonation, it's up to 1,300 feet at 1 second. In this case, any follow-on a/c would
be just short of the ship at detonation, at or below 300 feet (300 feet AGL being the nominal safe drop altitude for a Mk.82 slick
level delivery at 500 knots, assuming a 4.0g turn or pullup immediately after pickle). One of the bombs that hit Ardent blew her
entire SeaCat launcher ino the air and over the side, so clearly there'll be lots of smaller but still quite large debris blown into
any overflying a/c.
> > and 3)
> >
> > > try to saturate defenses. AIM-9Ls helped mainly in that it made British air attacks
> > > more deadly--which may have saved a ship or two.
> >
> > They did try to saturate the defenses, but they lacked the numbers and were operating from multiple bases with fuel-limited
> > a/c. The required low-level attack modes (due to SHARs and SAMs) and the wish to get as many a/c on target in the shortest
> > possible time (to saturate ship defenses) limited their fuze options; they had to attack from level flight or make themselves
> > extremely vulnerable to the defenses, and they had to use medium delay bombs so that they didn't frag the wingmen or themselves.
>
> They didn't try hard enough. And notice how the decision to go low caused them fuel
> problems, fuzing problems, and wingman frag considerations . . . all of which didn't
> keep their attrition rate down to acceptable levels. If the bombs had fuzed, the rest
> would be excusable. Since they didn't, it wasn't.
I quite agree that if they had been willing to go to almost certain death, more of the bombs they managed to drop would have gone
off. So it's a question of 1, whether the increased losses would have balanced out the more effective (but fewer) hits scored, and
2), whether the pilots would have had the guts to fly what would have been essentially Kamikaze missions. The sortie loss rate in the
21-25 May period was about 20% of effective sorties (defined as those a/c which at least crossed the coast of West Falkland). Coming
in high eases the fuel/fuzing/frag problem for them, but means that the SHARs can now orbit at higher altitude, increasing their time
on CAP. It also means that there's more warning time from ship-based radars, allowing the CAPs to be augmented in time to be
effective, no terrain masking to degrade GCI, , and that the SHAR radars don't have look-down problems. In addition, Sea Dart comes
into its own (cf. Exeter's kills of a Canberra and Lear Jet at altitude, at least one of them at a range of 34nm), and even Sea Slug
can be effective. All the Seacat and Sea Wolf point defense missiles now have time for acquisition, and the fire control systems on
the ships controlling 4.5" guns will have enough time to acquire also, putting prox.fused shells in the approach path. All of this,
and the bombing is less accurate, both because of the greater slant range at drop and because they're facing more effective defenses,
which have killed more a/c on the way in.
Having gamed it a few times, the loss rate is somewhere in the .5-1.0 range if they come in high and dive bomb. The most
> snip
> > But let's cut to the nitty gritty. Assume that Britain and Argentina swap countries and air forces. It's the Brits flying the
> > Mirages and Daggers, while the Argentinians have the SHARs and carriers. Do you think that the SHARs would win, or would it be
> > the Mirage/Daggers? I know who I'd choose.
>
> Actually, I think it's the A-4s that matter. If they sink enough ships, the rest is
> moot.
True, but if the Mirages and Daggers successfully attrit the SHAR force (with whatever help from mutual defense that the A-4s and
strike Daggers manage), then sinking ships may be moot, as the Brits may decide not to try a landing.
> And the problem with the Argentinians' performance is mainly big-picture, not
> individual pilot training. if you send the Brits in with the same tactics, I'm not sure
> you'd see a qualitatively different result.
My assumption in the above was that each side's pilots would retain their training and tactics, just swap cockpits.
> It would be more interesting to swap only
> the leadership.
If we did that, then Argentina wouldn't have invaded in the first place;-)
> > > But we've drifted into an entirely different discussion. In the not-too-distant past,
> > > ending in about the 1980's, there was a tendency in ACM training to ignore the radar
> > > missile shots and achieve bragging rights in the gunfight. Sharkey's claims are
> > > consistent with the practice (which included some radar rope-a-dope which only worked in
> > > very canned scenarios).
> >
> > I don't see that he ignored the shots, he says he and his pilots denied valid ones, apparently on the Deci range as well as over
> > England. Doesn't mean they didn't react to acquisition or lock-on attempts in any way, just that they were able to deal with
> > them and still win.
>
> Yeah, rignt. And I'm saying I can take an F-15 unit at random and in any semi-realistic
> scenario set up a CAP that will kill Sharkey and his buddies 99+ percent of the time as
> they try their "deny valid shot" tactics. And so can any competent FWS grad. And the
> fact that he reports wildly different results either means that he purposely set up a
> scenario for that purpose or is misreporting the results. I choose both.
Well, we'll just have to disagree on that point, then. Have a good holiday.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<3E06C581...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
> > Evan Brennan wrote:
<snip>
> > > Well for all these high-falutin' claims against enemy interceptors
> > > shot down (in simulated combat) all the Brits have to show for it
> > > (in real combat) is ONE Mirage III flown by Lt. Perona of the
> > > Argentine Air Force.
> >
> > And one flown by Capitan Garcia-Cuerva severely damaged and effectively
> > lost to Argentina regardless of subsequent events
>
> His aircraft was effectively destroyed by Argentine friendly fire.
No, it was shot down by friendly fire. It was effectively lost to Argentine use during the war due to a prox. missile hit,
which holed the fuel tanks and damaged the controls. Let's assume that his control problems become no worse, and he manages
to set the thing down on the runway. Now all he has to do is try and stop, on a runway that is a good 2,000 feet shorter
than a Mirage really requires under normal, undamaged circumstances, possibly wet, which has a crater and a couple of scabs
in it about halfway down it from the Vulcan and SHAR attacks that morning, plus bits of shrapnel FOD capable of cutting
tires if they hadn't had a chance to remove them yet. On the off chance that he's got sufficient braking power to stop
before running off the end (unlikely), he still needs to avoid the obstacles with damaged controls. All this assumes that
he hasn't suffered any flat tires or damage to the brakes or hydraulic systems, that would preclude him from lowering the
gear/steering/or braking once he's down.
Okay, assuming he's got the a/c stopped, it's going to take a lot of repair work to fix the damage we know it had (ignoring
any we don't know about) before the a/c can be flown out itself, or it would have to be dismantled and flown out by C-130
(assuming that's even possible; I don't know how the Mirage breaks down for shipping, and whether it would fit). All of
this probably has to be undertaken in the open, because there really isn't much in the way of hangarage at Stanley.
Meanwhile, the British are shelling the airfield nightly, and dropping bombs on it fairly frequently, so we have to assume
that no further damage is caused to the a/c while it's under repair. Taking all of the above into consideration, what are
the odds that this a/c would be usable again during the course of the conflict? assuming that he managed to land safely, I
figure the most likely result would be stripping it for parts and leaving it as a decoy on the airfield. Even if they
managed to patch it together sufficiently to fly it back to the mainland, the most likely use for it would be as a hangar
queen.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<3E06C330...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
> > > and they often attacked slow-flying, heavily laden fighter-bombers and
> > > attack planes like the F-105, F-4, A-1, A-4, A-6 and A-7...rather than
> > > engaging clean and light fighter interceptors like the F-5.
> >
> >I wasn't talking about loaded strikers, as they're relatively easy to get
> >OTOH, "slow" is relative. The F-105, even loaded, is tough for the
> >MiG-17 to catch; same goes for the F-4
>
>
> Any attack jet is tough to catch if it's too far from the pursuer.
> That's why the Reds invested in MiG-21s, since the MiG-17 was slow
> and unable to intercept some targets, much like the Sea Harrier.
>
> The bomb-laden F-105 and F-4 fighter-bombers flew to the targets at
> subsonic speeds. If in range of MiG-17s, they were just as vulnerable
> as the bomb-loaded A-4 Skyhawk, if not more so.
No, because while they're all subsonic when loaded, the cruise speed of the more powerful air force jets was far higher than
the A-4 and A-7. This is reflected in the VPAF decision to station all their MiG-17 force at Kep, to face the slower navy
strikes. The air force strikes were typically moving at 540 kts TAS inbound, whild typically loaded A-4s would be at least
100 knots slower (accounts mention 325-350 knots, presumably CAS rather than TAS).
> > No, I was referring to MiGs getting CAP/Escort birds, or strikers on
> >their way out having dumped their bombs.
>
> The MiG pilots were instructed to engage USAF fighter-bombers before
> they dumped bombs, i.e. before they could reach higher speeds after
> coming off the target. The reason is self-explanatory.
The problem being that MiG-17s found engaging USAF strikes very difficult, unless they were perfectly positioned. If the
turn was poorly judged, they'd be sucked into trail and couldn't catch up.
> > > They were not poorly trained. After essentials were learned, most
> > > of their energies and flying hours were focused on one task, the
> > > short-range interception of maneuverable aircraft.
>
> > > US fighter pilots had done the opposite. They had been fixated
> > > on bomber interception (i.e. less maneuverable aircraft) and
> > > their choice of using very large interceptors with greater range
> > > reflected that philospophy.
> >
> > Not all had, and they were stilled trained to exercise far more initiative
> > than the vietnamese pilots were.
>
> I'm afraid that "initiative" is not a substitute for "lack of ACM
> training" in any air force. : )
Quite so, but there was a far higher percentage of ACM-trained pilots in U.S. forces than the _total_ number of VPAF
pilots. Even the rather poor ACM training of the RTU retreads was probably equal or better than most VPAF training. And
fostering initiative allows people to adapt to new situations quicker.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<3E06C330...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
>
> >> North Vietnamese MiG-17 pilots were not poorly trained.
>
> >Yes, they were poorly trained for ACM. They had fairly standard
> >Soviet training, emphasizing rigid control, canned intercepts, and
> >little ACM maneuvering.
>
> This is fececious babble. "Fairly standard Soviet ACM training of
> the 1960s" was not poor by the standards of the 1960s. Their ACM
> training was as good or superior to that of the USAF and the RAF,
> with the exception of certain units staffed with old hands from WWII
> or Korea. It could be that the ACM training of US Navy F-8 Crusader
> pilots was better than all the above, but I doubt if the same could
> be said about Navy F-4 pilots until after they formed the so-called,
> TopGun school.
Sorry, but Soviet training of the '60s, at least as available to their clients and customers, was just as I described it.
The Indians in particluar were very frustrated by it when the initial cadres did Mig-21 tranistion training for the MiG-21,
and most of the tactical development had to be done in house. Chinese training was similar, and the Vietnamese pilots got
their lead-in fighter transition training in one or the other country.
> Fighting a manueverable target with a large interceptor like the
> F-105 or F-4 requires much more ACM training than a easier-to-fly,
> low weight interceptor like a MiG-17.
Certainly, a simple angles fighter like a MiG-17 is easier to fight in the orizontal than an energy fighter like an F-105 or
F-4. OTOH, the MiG-21 was used almost sans maneuvering, which was a good thing considering the low experience levels of
most of its pilots.
> There is no evidence that
> such ACM training entered into USAF programs until the 1970s.
Yup, the USAF definitely lagged, but there were still USAF units here and there that kept the faith.
> >And you also need to distinguish between periods and a/c. Navy F-8
> >and many of the Air Force pilots prior to 1967 were well-skilled in
> >hassling. And you might want to check the number of A-4s, A-6s
> >and A-7s credited to MiG-17s; it's very low.
>
> I did check and noticed that the number of F-8 interceptors shot down
> by MiGs is also very low. So you're just rambling here.
No rambling: F-8s are credited with an 18:3 kill ratio, and the staked out goats of navy strike a/c were well-protected by
USN escorts from VPAF fighters, despite their lack of speed.
> > > For this reason one could argue that overall, Communist MiG-17
> > > pilots had gotten -more- ACM training than USAF fighter pilots,
> > > with the exception of certain US fighter pilots with experience
> > > from World War II and Korea. After the US bombing halt in 1968,
> > > Communist fighter pilots had several years to build up flying
> > > hours with no interference from US aircraft. This also afforded
> > > them a little time to experiment with other specialties like
>  > ground attack.
>
> > Odd that this supposed ACM training didn't show up in improved kill
> > rates or changed tactics. The MiG-17 was almost completely ineffectual
> > in 1972, and had been since 1967.
>
> Not surprising. Because both sides were learning from mistakes.
But according to you (and I agree), U.S.A.F. ACM training had declined in the same period, so the MiGs should have been
effective against USAF strikes. Unless, of course, the USAF strikes were just too fast for them (and the best tactics for
dealing with miG-17s had been worked out by 1967), causing the VPAF to move the MiG-17s to face the navy strikes that they
could catch. Which is exactly what they did, and got their heads handed to them by Navy F-4s.
Guy
Cecil Turner
snip
> > fact that he reports wildly different results either means that he purposely set up a
> > scenario for that purpose or is misreporting the results. I choose both.
>
> Well, we'll just have to disagree on that point, then. Have a good holiday.
>
> Guy
Yes, we will.
Merry Christmas,
KTF
Evan Brennan
> > Any attack jet is tough to catch if it's too far from the pursuer.
> > That's why the Reds invested in MiG-21s, since the MiG-17 was slow
> > and unable to intercept some targets, much like the Sea Harrier.
> >
> > The bomb-laden F-105 and F-4 fighter-bombers flew to the targets at
> > subsonic speeds. If in range of MiG-17s, they were just as vulnerable
> > as the bomb-loaded A-4 Skyhawk, if not more so.
>
> No, because while they're all subsonic when loaded, the cruise speed of the more powerful air force jets was far higher than
> the A-4 and A-7. This is reflected in the VPAF decision to station all their MiG-17 force at Kep, to face the slower navy
> strikes. The air force strikes were typically moving at 540 kts TAS inbound, whild typically loaded A-4s would be at least
> 100 knots slower (accounts mention 325-350 knots, presumably CAS rather than TAS).
Your remark about Kep is deliberately misleading and your numbers,
even if accurate by taking selected samples, does not verify your
assumption that a fully loaded F-105 was a more difficult target for a
MiG-17 than a fully loaded A-4.
The Skyhawk was obviously much more manueverable than F-105s,
especially after discharging ordnance and possibly even when
loaded up. The A-4 was slower than the F-105, but then so was the
MiG-17. Fewer Skyhawks were shot down by MiGs so the F-105 was
not "harder to catch" going by statistics.
Paul J. Adam
<turn...@mindspring.com> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
>> They were ordered to go for the transports... but on coming over the
>> terrain, they were presented with a narrow valley full of grey ships,
>> all firing at them (from SAMs to 4.5" down to small-arms, plus flares
>> and allegedly the occasional anti-tank rocket).
>>
>> Lacking intelligence on what ships were parked where in Falkland Sound,
>> under heavy fire and with very little time, the FAA pilots predictably
>> went for the first targets they saw. More effective attack profiles
>> would have brought better results... and much faster attrition.
>Okay, but being told to aim for transports without any practical method
>of picking
>them out is a leadership failure.
It's reality - how do you get timely intelligence, given the distance
from the Argentine bases to the target? Sending a recce aircraft over,
would be a good way to lose it to Sea Dart or even Sea Slug.
>As is picking a delivery that ensures you won't be
>able to acquire the correct target, and precluding weapon function.
>(Doubly so, since
>it was apparent they'd not practiced enough to realize the weapons wouldn't
>function.)
Tradeoffs all around: I doubt the FAA deliberately chose ineffective
profiles and weapons, rather that the volume of defensive fire persuaded
the pilots to shave their deliveries on the side of survival.
Coming in higher would have put them in the Sea Dart envelope, and Sea
Dart proved to be rather effective when it had a target. (The
Argentinians knew this, having two Type 42s of their own)
>So you can either
>change your tactics (and I'd debate the relative loss rates of higher
>angle deliveries
>if done intelligently) or run multiple unsuccessful missions until you
>run out of
>aircraft.
Not sure how much higher the loss rate could have gone, even given the
demonstrated courage of the Argentinian fliers. On the first day they
sent out 45 sorties, of which 36 reached the islands and 26 pressed
attacks on British ships; and ten aircraft didn't come back.
[Middlebrook].
Overall, the Argentinians launched about 120 sorties against British
shipping in Falkland Sound. About a quarter aborted for various reasons,
and twenty-one were shot down: 20% attrition is not sustainable, shown
in the very rapid falloff in Argentine sortie rates, and if they'd come
in higher to improve weapon effectiveness they'd have been easier
targets for most of the radar-directed weaponry.
--
Paul J. Adam