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Request to NTSB to re-open ValuJet 592 investigation
From: James P. Stevenson <jamesst...@sprintmail.com>
Date: 28 May 1998
Time: 06:59:11
Remote Name: 206.133.1.47
Comments
25 May, 1998
Mr. James Hall, Chairman National Transportation Safety Board 490
L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594
Via Facsimile (202) 314-6018 and Federal Express
Re: Request to re-open ValuJet 592 Investigation based on omission of
evidence of an electrical fire from NTSB Final Report and recently
obtained FAA radar data showing NTSB radar track to crash site is
false.
Dear Chairman Hall,
In response to my letter of August 11, 1997 requesting postponement of
the August 19, 1997 NTSB so called "Sunshine Hearing" on the ValuJet
592 accident, you arranged for us to meet on August 15th with some of
your key staff members to present our findings. Of the many
discrepancies in the NTSB factual reports, the most serious one was
that the radar track presented by the NTSB was false, incomplete, and
led to incorrect conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the
accident. For these and the following reasons, I request a re-opening
of the ValuJet 592 investigation.
NTSB radar track is false and misleading
Mr. Loeb, with one of his radar experts, attempted to rebut our claim
that the radar data & track (relevant portions: attachment A & B)
presented by the NTSB was false. The expert claimed that radar was not
a perfect technology. He stated that on occasions, the NTSB would look
at radar data of an accident that showed a flight path apparently
inconsistent with what it believed happened. Occasionally, he said,
the NTSB had to shape the data to fit the "facts." Mr. Loeb also
dismissed our position by claiming that we did not have all of the
radar data. He promised to get additional radar data to us, which he
did.
FAA radar data proves NTSB radar track is false
The radar data Mr. Loeb and general counsel Dan Campbell provided gave
no new information. Consequently, we filed a Freedom of Information
Act request for radar coverage of the same event. The FAA was more
forthcoming. Although we still have not received all relevant original
radar data, the FAA's data clearly and indisputably now shows that the
ValuJet 592 aircraft continued inbound to the airport past the crash
site distance of 17 miles (from the airport), past the end of the
radar track created by the NTSB, and did not disappear from radar
until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport. (See
attachments C& D.)
Supporting evidence that the NTSB radar track is false
This radar data is consistent with our independent investigation in
which the FAA air traffic controller told us that the ValuJet aircraft
disappeared from the radar scope at 12 miles. Furthermore, the 12
miles position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts
contained in the NTSB factual reports.
On this basis alone, the evidence shows that the NTSB has developed a
false radar track. However, we also have other information, much of
which we detailed to your staff in our meeting, showing additional
flaws in the NTSB's purported radar track and communications with
ValuJet 592.
Unreported Eye witnesses account of ValuJet flying away from the
airport
ValuJet 592 was lost off the FAA radar 12 miles from the airport
inbound for landing but the crash site is 17 miles from the airport.
How did it get there? The answer is contained in the unreported words
of two of the witnesses, who told the NTSB investigators that they saw
the ValuJet aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at a
very low altitude (apparently below the radar horizon) and then make a
180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon.
Although this testimony was also repeated to my associate, the NTSB
failed to record this significant information in the Witness Group
Chairman's Factual Report and in the final NTSB report.
Ostensible attempt at repression of third eye witness testimony
I have expressed to you my concern about another serious omission,
specifically the NTSB's failure to interview the Chinese student pilot
who was an eye witness to the crash. That negligence was compounded by
the NTSB's subsequent claim that no such witness existed. Now that the
witness has finally been interviewed by the NTSB we find that his
testimony is consistent with that of the other eye witnesses mentioned
above. Furthermore, the Chinese pilot's testimony refutes the specious
NTSB radar track since he saw the plane flying west to east for about
fifteen seconds before the crash. In contradiction, the NTSB's
purported radar track of the plane shows it flying south at that time.
The conditions of the ValuJet aircraft were ready for an electrical
fire
Electrical fires often are preceded by indications that the conditions
are ripe for such an event. The FAA's service difficulty reports
indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. The
NTSB's records reveal that it was infamous in the ValuJet fleet for
continuing electrical problems and was experiencing several electrical
problems on the day of the accident. At one point, the flight was
delayed in Atlanta while mechanics were trying to find and fix the
electrical problems. In spite of these attempts, electrical problems
continued while the plane was en route from Atlanta to Miami, which
was the flight immediately preceding the accident flight. Indeed,
these pre-flight 592 electrical failures appear to have culminated in
a series of major electrical failures, which was the initial reason
the plane was attempting to return to Miami. This is well documented
in the NTSB record.
All of this is irrelevant, however, unless there is some evidence of
an electrical fire on ValuJet 592. As it turns out, there is such
evidence. Unfortunately, the NTSB conclusion from this evidence was
negligently derived.
NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding electrical fire on
ValuJet 592
Throughout your group factual report, your investigators claimed that
the wires that were burned showed "little or no evidence of
embrittlement." Lack of embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's
expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire
from an external source. Yet your final report claims that the wires
showed no evidence of an electrical fire. The Final NTSB report
(pg.43) states: "The heat damaged wires . . . were consistent with
those resulting from an external heat source." Such negligent and
seriously misleading interpretations strains the credibility of the
NTSB itself and raises the issue of the competency and motives of your
investigators.
NTSB/FAA oxygen canister fire test ignored the Scientific Method
American's pride themselves as practitioners of the Western tradition
of applying the scientific method, a self-correcting process of
observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Fundamental to
the validity of the scientific method is the use of the double-blind
study. However, it was not used to prove the viability of the oxygen
canister theory nor was the demonstration set up to maximize the
potential for failure, a mandatory element in the intellectual
tradition of the scientific method. Instead, the NTSB, using heuristic
reasoning, activated the canisters (manually)--itself an assumption
without evidence--and proceeded as a given that throwing a box full of
oxygen canisters into the cargo hold would activate one or more of
them.
Another fundamental element of the scientific method is that the
experiment can be duplicated and repeated by third parties. If we
assume, for the sake of argument, that throwing the canister boxes
onto ValuJet 592 would ignite them, then we should be able to
duplicate such a test. The NTSB should have demonstrated that the
oxygen canisters would ignite by having them thrown into a cargo hold.
It failed to do that. Consequently, since the ignition of one or more
oxygen canisters is a condition precedent to any speculation that they
(1) started the fire or (2) that they exacerbated a fire, everything
that followed is moot.
We have also obtained test reports and videos from the NTSB/FAA fire
tests on the oxygen canisters. Again, an independent forensic
laboratory, with extensive experience in fire/arson investigation, has
reviewed the data and issued a report highly critical of the tests.
This laboratory maintains that this appears to have been an electrical
fire, not a fire caused by oxygen canisters.
The NTSB provided radar data and ATC transcripts with altered time
The NTSB has failed to provide: (1) the actual radar data, (2) the
actual radar track, (3) an accurate time clock of the radar data and,
(4) the true time on the voice transcripts of the conversation between
Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the ValuJet pilot. Consequently, none of
the times provided by the NTSB can be used to determine the actual
time of the accident. Our investigation so far reveals that the NTSB
radar time clock is fast by about 18 seconds at the beginning of the
flight and by about 50 seconds at the NTSB's claimed time of the crash
(18:13:42). The recently obtained FAA radar data is similarly plagued.
NTSB chose the least reliable reference time
Given a choice between the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to
which the FAA radar data tapes are slaved and the Cockpit Voice
Recorder (CVR), the NTSB chose the latter which, as the record shows,
failed twice during the ill fated flight. As your factual reports
state: "Times recorded on the CVR transcript were used as the
reference time, and FDR and radar clocks were adjusted accordingly."
Not only is the CVR suspect, it was made more so because, as your
factual reports state: "timing on the tape was established using the
known time of several air traffic control transmission recorded on a
cassette tape provided by the FAA." Our conclusion that the time is
inaccurate follows because the air traffic control (ATC) transmission
tape was tampered with. We know this because the same independent
audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident has confirmed that
approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape. The
19 minute tape was recorded at different speeds and made to fit an
inaccurate transcript 20 minutes long (see attachment E). Moreover, a
comparison of the CVR times (the NTSB reference time) and the
distorted times in the ATC transcripts show that they only differ by a
second or so.
NTSB attempts at time correlation were debased further by the non
sequitur "merry-go-round" in which "the correlation was established
through a comparison of the Microphone Keying information recorded by
the FDR, Cockpit Voice Recorder and the (ATC). For more details, see
Airplane Performance Group factual report."
The NTSB ignored evidence of the actual time of the crash
An eye witness made a 911 call 20-30 seconds after viewing the crash.
The time of the call was recorded on a clock slaved to the same atomic
clock used by the FAA's radar. The call was received at 14:15:22. That
puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00 local time
(18:15:00 UTC).
Missing time was adequate for ValuJet to fly from 12 miles back to the
crash site
Between the NTSB's claimed time of the crash at 18:13:42 (which is
fast by about 50 seconds and should be approximately 18:12:50 UTC) and
the eyewitness 911 call to the Broward Sheriff's Department within
20-30 seconds of the accident, there is approximately one minute and
17 seconds missing (or about two minutes when adjusted as noted
above).
Whatever manipulation has been done to the time clocks, the plane had
to fly from where it was lost off the radar 12 miles from the airport
back to the crash site 17 miles from the airport. There was sufficient
time to have flown in the manner described by the unreported testimony
of eye witnesses.
Integrity of NTSB should be re-established by re-opening the ValuJet
592 investigation
Chairman Hall, in light of the foregoing, the integrity of the NTSB
must be seriously questioned. I believe you owe it to the relatives
and friends of the victims in this tragic accident and to the American
public to re-open the ValuJet investigation and have the truth
revealed. What other purpose does the NTSB have than to reveal all the
facts in an accident and then make recommendations consistent those
facts and related findings. I encourage you to do so with dispatch.
Meanwhile, I look forward to your early response to this letter and to
the September 11, 1997 letter from our Counsel, Mr. Hadley to you
concerning "ValuJet Flight 592- Possible Tampering with
Evidence/Criminal Conduct" (attachment F).
Sincerely, VisionSafe Corporation
Bert Werjefelt President
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Last changed: May 28, 1998