Elster's bomb kills Hitler on 8 November *1940*?

[Rich Rostrom]

This may be a longshot... but here goes.

After he too power, each year Hitler visited Munich on the
anniversary of the 1923 "Beer Hall Putsch" for a memorial
ceremony. He would speak at the Burger Brau Keller to the
"Alte Kampfer" ("Old fighters"; those who had been with him
in 1923) and other Nazis.

In 1939, Georg Elster planted a time bomb next to the stage
in the Keller, set to go off during Hitler's speech. But
Hitler cut his speech short and left about 15 minutes
before it went off, killing most of the Nazi dignitaries on
the stage.

However: as the anniversary approached, Hitler had said he
would not go to Munich, because he was very busy with war-
related business. He changed his mind and did go.

Suppose that he didn't go. On 7 November, Hitler announces
that he won't go to Munich because war business, but will
address the meeting by telephoe. He promises to come in
person the next year, after the war has been won.

Elster would hear that. Elster wanted to kill Hitler, not
some second-class figure, like say the Gauleiter of Munich.
He decides that he will wait a year.

He had free access to the Keller. He sneaks into the Keller
during the night of 7/8 November and disarms his bomb. No
one knew it was there. No one suspected Elster at all. The
war continues as OTL for the next year.

As Hitler had promised, he goes to Munich on 8 November
1940. Elster goes into the Keller again, and arms the bomb.

This time, Hitler does not cut off his speech. The bomb
goes off, and kills Hitler. Also some other senior Nazis,
notably Goebbels. Goering is not present, despite being
an Alte Kampfer. (He was wounded in the leg in 1923, and
which caused him pain for the rest of his life; he took
opiates to relieve it.) Instead Goering is at Luftwaffe HQ,
directing the Blitz of Britain.

Goering had been designated as Hitler's successor at the
beginning of the war, and in November 1940 is at just about
the zenith of his power and reputation.

So he takes over with no real opposition.

What follows?

--
Nous sommes dans une pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdés.
--- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Sunday, 6 November 2022 at 13:43:20 UTC-4, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> This may be a longshot... but here goes.

(Details of Hitler's death deleted)

> Goering had been designated as Hitler's successor at the
> beginning of the war, and in November 1940 is at just about
> the zenith of his power and reputation.
>
> So he takes over with no real opposition.
>
> What follows?

Goering gets informed of the following:

- The UK is out of Europe. Italy is fighting the UK in North Africa, and it looks as though they are struggling.
- The Battle of Britain is over, but the Luftwaffe has the winter to learn its lessons and gear up for Round 2, which Goering wants.
- The USSR is rearming, Goering is not aware by how much, but he is aware. Stalin is also making some territorial "suggestions" that involve a lot of Soviet expansion. For the short term, Hitler tried to get them to expand into British-held Middle East and India. I see Goering trying the same policy, minus Ribbentrop.
- Germany is dependent on the USSR for oil and other raw materials. His generals offer the prospect of a 3, maybe 5 month victory, but this may change depending on how extensively Stalin arms.
- The U-boat campaign is at a lull, with the RN convoy system in place. Donitz is proposing a new "wolf-pack" tactic, to counter this.
- Goering's OTL rivals are now his subordinates. Consequently, he may be less inclined to favor Luftwaffe-centric policies and adopt a more combined-arms approach.

The way I see it, Goering has two clear options: See if he can knock out the UK next year, or invade the USSR and knock that out by winter.

Knocking out the UK promises getting Germany getting raw materials via reopened sea lanes, if Germany can launch a 1941 Sealion. I don't believe this is possible, but Goering thought he had the RAF on the ropes, and since he's the one in charge, he may go all in on this. Still, if he fails to knock out the UK, Germany gets exhausted in a fruitless fight as Stalin grows ever stronger. Also, if Stalin decides to invade Germany while most of his forces are arrayed against the UK, or even cut off trade, this is going to pose problems Goering cannot easily fix.

Knocking out the USSR in one brief, successful campaign eliminates Germany's sole continental rival and gives him the raw materials for a long war against the UK. The UK cannot directly fight Germany to any great extent in the time frame Goering's generals give, and even if Stalin doesn't throw in the towel, what is he going to do with everything West of Moscow in German hands?

Granted, there is a third option: Launch Barbarossa with limited Luftwaffe, while using most of the Luftwaffe to launch Battle of Britain Round 2. This would be Churchill's dream scenario, and I believe Goering's general staff would let him know of the futility of chasing two rabbits at once.

[edstas...@gmail.com]

> lesliem...@gmail.com
> > Rich Rostrom

> >
> - Goering's OTL rivals are now his subordinates. Consequently, he may be less inclined
> to favor Luftwaffe-centric policies and adopt a more combined-arms approach.

The Luftwaffe was still Goering's "baby", so I'd suggest that with him now in charge of
the Reich, there would have been more emphasis on experimental aircraft with more
of them going into production.

This is both good and bad for Germany, as while better aircraft are... better, the cost
and time involved in getting them into action means fewer conventional aircraft.

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Sunday, 2 April 2023 at 09:36:33 UTC-3, edstas...@gmail.com wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> The Luftwaffe was still Goering's "baby", so I'd suggest that with him now in charge of
> the Reich, there would have been more emphasis on experimental aircraft with more
> of them going into production.

> This is both good and bad for Germany, as while better aircraft are... better, the cost
> and time involved in getting them into action means fewer conventional aircraft.

I also forgot to mention Goering's rather disappointing record as an administrator. Since he was the type to prioritize friendships over performance, the experimental aircraft he greenlights may not be the best options available.

[Rich Rostrom]

On 3/29/23 12:34 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Sunday, 6 November 2022 at 13:43:20 UTC-4, Rich Rostrom wrote:
>> This may be a longshot... but here goes.
>
> (Details of Hitler's death deleted)
>
>> Goering had been designated as Hitler's successor at the
>> beginning of the war, and in November 1940 is at just about
>> the zenith of his power and reputation.
>>
>> So he takes over with no real opposition.
>>
>> What follows?
>
> Goering gets informed of the following:
>
> - The UK is out of Europe. Italy is fighting the UK in North Africa, and it looks as though they are struggling.

As of November 1940, Italy has moved a short distance into Egypt, and
the British have not counterattacked. OTOH Italy has invaded Greece.

> - The Battle of Britain is over, but the Luftwaffe has the winter to learn its lessons and gear up for Round 2, which Goering wants.

The battle for air supremacy si over (Germany lost), but the Blitz is
going full steam. At some point Goering will try again to break Fighter
Command.

> - The USSR is rearming, Goering is not aware by how much, but he is aware. Stalin is also making some territorial "suggestions" that involve a lot of Soviet expansion. For the short term, Hitler tried to get them to expand into British-held Middle East and India. I see Goering trying the same policy, minus Ribbentrop.

Very likely.

> - Germany is dependent on the USSR for oil and other raw materials. His generals offer the prospect of a 3, maybe 5 month victory, but this may change depending on how extensively Stalin arms.

Some of them. Others are much less sanguine. Starting a second front
while Britain is undefeated doesn't seem like good idea, except to
someone with a severe case of victory disease. OTL, Goering was strongly
opposed to BARBAROSSA, but never dared say so to Hitler.

> - The U-boat campaign is at a lull, with the RN convoy system in place. Donitz is proposing a new "wolf-pack" tactic, to counter this.

Losses are already biting, and the spring of 1941 will be devastating.

> The way I see it, Goering has two clear options: See if he can knock out the UK next year, or invade the USSR and knock that out by winter.

IMHO Goering won't attack the USSR. He'll try to bomb Britain into
submission.The Blitz will continue indefinitely. He'll also try to
get Spain into the war. I've read somehwere he disliked Franco;
maybe he orchestrates a coup to replace him.

[The Horny Goat]

Generally I agree with everything so far but does Bismarck go to sea
in spring of 1941? OTL it did with the result we all know.

Nothing like a superbattleship running around in circles due to a
damaged rudder while its enemies gather....

>> The way I see it, Goering has two clear options: See if he can knock out the UK next year, or invade the USSR and knock that out by winter.
>
>IMHO Goering won't attack the USSR. He'll try to bomb Britain into
>submission.The Blitz will continue indefinitely. He'll also try to
>get Spain into the war. I've read somehwere he disliked Franco;
>maybe he orchestrates a coup to replace him.

I agree on the Soviets; not really sure about the Spaniards. I don't
see Goering going for assassination - I do think the Condor Legion
alumni (and a few more) may be offerred to Spain to "protect" them
from Gibraltar

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Thursday, 27 April 2023 at 10:44:53 UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> > - Germany is dependent on the USSR for oil and other raw materials. His generals offer the prospect of a 3, maybe 5 month victory, but this may change depending on how extensively Stalin arms.

> Some of them. Others are much less sanguine. Starting a second front
> while Britain is undefeated doesn't seem like good idea, except to
> someone with a severe case of victory disease. OTL, Goering was strongly
> opposed to BARBAROSSA, but never dared say so to Hitler.

(rest of post deleted)

OTL, Goering didn't have the information Hitler had. Hitler deliberately kept information compartmentalized within competing ministries so that he alone had the big picture, not to mention he could lie to his subordinates in order to further his own preferred course of action. I agree Goering was not as reckless as Hitler, but he may change his tune once he sees how Stalin is exploiting the war against the UK.

That's the problem with the UK at the moment. Goering may be convinced he can win, but sooner or later he is going to realize he is fighting a war of attrition where broadcasts of lopsided victories will be overshadowed by knowledge of missing sons, boyfriends, and husbands, not to mention the continued rationing.

Also, the people Goering chooses to staff his government are going to matter. IIRC, Goering's staffing of the Luftwaffe was poor enough for at least one historian to list it as a factor for Germany losing the BoB. Granted, Goering should be able to replace Ribbentrop with someone more trustworthy, if not more competent. How is Goering going to get rid of Himmler without bloodshed? Does Goering trust Bormann? Goebbles should be easy enough to trust, or at least monitor.

Does Goering keep Hitler's "Divide and Rule" approach as a guarantee of personal safety, or does he risk allowing freer information among his own inner circle so people could better offer informed courses of action? What about the Holocaust?

[Rich Rostrom]

On 5/3/23 6:50 AM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Thursday, 27 April 2023 at 10:44:53 UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
>>> - Germany is dependent on the USSR for oil and other raw materials. His generals offer the prospect of a 3, maybe 5 month victory, but this may change depending on how extensively Stalin arms.
>
>> Some of them. Others are much less sanguine. Starting a second front
>> while Britain is undefeated doesn't seem like good idea, except to
>> someone with a severe case of victory disease. OTL, Goering was strongly
>> opposed to BARBAROSSA, but never dared say so to Hitler.
>
> (rest of post deleted)
>
> OTL, Goering didn't have the information Hitler had.
> Hitler deliberately kept information compartmentalized
> within competing ministries so that he alone had the big
> picture, not to mention he could lie to his subordinates
> in order to further his own preferred course of action. I
> agree Goering was not as reckless as Hitler, but he may
> change his tune once he sees how Stalin is exploiting the
> war against the UK.

I don't see what additional information would make invading
the USSR more desirable.

> That's the problem with the UK at the moment. Goering may
> be convinced he can win, but sooner or later he is going

> to realize he is fighting a war of attrition...


The BoB was a battle of attrition, but by November 1940 it
was over and the Blitz was on. Bomber Command was attacking
Germany, but at this time it was relatively ineffective.

> ...where broadcasts of lopsided victories...

The British government issued wildly exaggerated claims
of bombers shot down.

> ...will be overshadowed by
> knowledge of missing sons, boyfriends, and husbands...

In Britain, knowledge of cities going up in flames or
bombed into ruins.

> not to mention the continued rationing.

Much tighter in Britain (Germany has most of Europe to
loot), and getting worse as the U-boats run wild in early
1941. (In late 1941, the British cracked naval Enigma and
were able to evade the U-boats for six months. But that
was in part due to some lucky captures...)

> Also, the people Goering chooses to staff his government
> are going to matter. IIRC, Goering's staffing of the
> Luftwaffe was poor enough for at least one historian to
> list it as a factor for Germany losing the BoB. Granted,
> Goering should be able to replace Ribbentrop with someone
> more trustworthy, if not more competent. How is Goering
> going to get rid of Himmler without bloodshed?

Easy. in November 1940, Himmler is far less powerful than
in 1943-45.

> Does Goering trust Bormann?

Bormann is nothing without Hitler.

> Goebbels should be easy enough to trust, or at least monitor.

No problem there.

> Does Goering keep Hitler's "Divide and Rule" approach as a
> guarantee of personal safety, or does he risk allowing
> freer information among his own inner circle so people
> could better offer informed courses of action? What about
> the Holocaust?

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Friday, 5 May 2023 at 00:30:28 UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:

(stuff deleted, regarding how Goering as Fuhrer would consider launching Barbarossa)

> I don't see what additional information would make invading
> the USSR more desirable.

As Hitler's successor, Goering is going to receive Stalin's demands to alter the Neutrality Pact to allow Stalin to expand westward. He is going to get reports of increasing Soviet forces on the border.

> > That's the problem with the UK at the moment. Goering may
> > be convinced he can win, but sooner or later he is going
> > to realize he is fighting a war of attrition...

> The BoB was a battle of attrition, but by November 1940 it
> was over and the Blitz was on. Bomber Command was attacking
> Germany, but at this time it was relatively ineffective.

The Blitz was also a battle of attrition, as was the Battle of the Atlantic. North Africa might allow a chance to Blitz the British there, but from what I've heard of Goering's view, he wanted to knock the UK out of the war as directly as possible. He saw North Africa as Italy's problem, so I do not see much support for an Afrika Korps.

> > ...where broadcasts of lopsided victories...

> The British government issued wildly exaggerated claims
> of bombers shot down.

To the Germans, the British would issue exaggerated claims of Luftwaffe effectiveness, partially as a means to get them to listen, and also as a means of encouraging them to continue the BoB.

(stuff deleted regarding a war of attrition. Essentially it will take a toll on both sides.)

Historically, the British weathered the storm. In this ATL, the Germans had a string of spectacular victories under Hitler, and now with Goering at the helm, the war would start to fall into a war of attrition.

(stuff deleted, regarding Goering's possible subordinates)

> > Does Goering trust Bormann?

> Bormann is nothing without Hitler.

(rest of post deleted)

Bormann's advantage was his ability to make life easy for Hitler, and consequently become the chief gatekeeper to the dictator's office.
If Bormann can convincingly present himself as a loyal asset to Goering, he can become the power behind the throne much like he did with Hitler. Having an administrator who can present him with easy choices and relieve him of all the irritating details of national leadership would be very appealing to a man like Goering who loved to live the good life.

[Rich Rostrom]

On 5/9/23 10:27 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> To the Germans, the British would issue exaggerated claims of
> Luftwaffe effectiveness, partially as a means to get them to listen,
> and also as a means of encouraging them to continue the BoB.

????

In BBC broadcasts to Germany? How would this be be separate from other
British government statements? In this period, Britain was frantically
working to keep the support of the US, hold the support of the
Dominions, win over support in French colonies, encourage resistance
in occupied Europe, and deter neutrals from supporting Germany or even
joining the Axis. Exaggerating the effects of the Blitz would work
against all those goals.

And the British did not want the Battle of Britain to continue. By mid-
September, Fighter Command was on the brink of collapse. When Churchill
ordered the "retaliation bombing" of Berlin, it was with the conscious
expectation that Hitler would redirect German attacks from RAF bases
to British cities, especially London. He said "London can take it."
The Blitz was _not_ part of the Battle of Britain.

> Historically, the British weathered the storm.

Germany called off the Blitz and sent the Luftwaffe against the USSR.

> In this ATL, the Germans had a string of spectacular victories under
> Hitler, and now with Goering at the helm, the war would start to fall
> into a war of attrition.

There's no particular reason why the Balkans/Greece campaign of 1941
should not play out as OTL: another spectacular victory.

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Sunday, 14 May 2023 at 13:34:57 UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> On 5/9/23 10:27 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> > To the Germans, the British would issue exaggerated claims of
> > Luftwaffe effectiveness, partially as a means to get them to listen,
> > and also as a means of encouraging them to continue the BoB.
> ????
>
> In BBC broadcasts to Germany?

Perhaps not as the BBC, but the British did exaggerate Luftwaffe effectiveness in certain areas to the Germans. The example I was given was one Luftwaffe raid where the Germans claimed to have crippled an RAF air base for 1 week while shooting down 10 fighters. The British broadcast to the Germans that the airbase was crippled for 2 weeks and 20 RAF fighters were shot down.

> How would this be be separate from other
> British government statements? In this period, Britain was frantically
> working to keep the support of the US, hold the support of the
> Dominions, win over support in French colonies, encourage resistance
> in occupied Europe, and deter neutrals from supporting Germany or even
> joining the Axis. Exaggerating the effects of the Blitz would work
> against all those goals.

That depends on who gets which message. It is one thing for the British to broadcast news of a crippled air base to Germany, while it is quite another to give a few choice representatives a tour of the airbase and show how functional it really is.

> And the British did not want the Battle of Britain to continue. By mid-
> September, Fighter Command was on the brink of collapse.

By mid-September, Air Group 11 had more fighters than the Luftwaffe opposing it, with around 2.4 pilots per aircraft as opposed to the Luftwaffe's 1.8 ratio. Yes Fighter Command was exhausted, but the Luftwaffe was bled white.

> When Churchill
> ordered the "retaliation bombing" of Berlin, it was with the conscious
> expectation that Hitler would redirect German attacks from RAF bases
> to British cities, especially London. He said "London can take it."

> The Blitz was _not_ part of the Battle of Britain.

It started mid-September, while the Battle of Britain was raging, and was launched with the side purpose of reducing German casualties, as Goering hoped he could attack undefended areas in the UK and thus suffer fewer casualties.

> > Historically, the British weathered the storm.
> Germany called off the Blitz

...in large part to the unsustainable casualties the Luftwaffe was suffering.

> and sent the Luftwaffe against the USSR.

...in June 1941. Even if Goering continues BoB round 2, it will be after the UK has had months to recover, and it has recovered faster than the Luftwaffe. Goering overestimated the Luftwaffe's effectiveness, and is likely to repeat certain mistakes he made in the original BoB.

> > In this ATL, the Germans had a string of spectacular victories under
> > Hitler, and now with Goering at the helm, the war would start to fall
> > into a war of attrition.
> There's no particular reason why the Balkans/Greece campaign of 1941
> should not play out as OTL: another spectacular victory.

This occurs after the Italians suffer their string of setbacks in North Africa. Granted, this keeps the UK off the continent proper, but it stops at the sea shore, much like it did with Napoleon. Again, aside from keeping the UK off the continent, this does not knock the UK out of the war, and Goering is faced with BoB round 2, or Barbarossa and all the resources a quick theoretical victory would provide.

[Rich Rostrom]

On 5/21/23 1:13 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> Perhaps not as the BBC, but the British did exaggerate Luftwaffe
> effectiveness in certain areas to the Germans. The example I was
> given was one Luftwaffe raid where the Germans claimed to have
> crippled an RAF air base for 1 week while shooting down 10 fighters.
> The British broadcast to the Germans that the airbase was crippled
> for 2 weeks and 20 RAF fighters were shot down.

Cite? How _did_ Britain "broadcast" this misinformation to the Germans?

This example is the British telling the Germans they did better than
they thought they had.

What was the actual damage to the base and actual RAF aircraft lost?

_Possibly_ the British did something like this to encourage the Germans
to repeat an ineffectual attack.

> ...in large part to the unsustainable casualties the Luftwaffe > was suffering.

Cite? British nightfighters were minimally effective in 1941; their AI
radar was primitive and GCI was also in its infancy.

Every source I have ever read says that the Blitz was halted because the
aircraft were needed for BARBAROSSA.

[The Horny Goat]

On Sun, 11 Jun 2023 14:33:26 -0500, Rich Rostrom
<rros...@comcast.net> wrote:

>Every source I have ever read says that the Blitz was halted because the
>aircraft were needed for BARBAROSSA.

One of the more interesting scenarios I've seen has the Germans doing
NOTHING AT ALL after the surrender of France. Declaring victory if you
will. (The U-boat war continued but the Luftwaffe spent the time
training and there were no barges being assembled)

The idea being that after 3 months or so of a second "Sitzkrieg"
Hitler would make a peace offer. all the while focussing his efforts
on preparing for Barbarossa.

The scenario author suggested that it would give Churchill severe
problems getting US aid in nearly the quantities they actually got
while enabling a faster and more effective build up for Barbarossa.

To me it was one of the more plausible what-if scenarios I've read.
Can't remember the author or I'd try to look it up on whatever Deja
News is called these days.

[lesliem...@gmail.com]

On Sunday, 11 June 2023 at 16:33:29 UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> On 5/21/23 1:13 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:
> > Perhaps not as the BBC, but the British did exaggerate Luftwaffe
> > effectiveness in certain areas to the Germans. The example I was
> > given was one Luftwaffe raid where the Germans claimed to have
> > crippled an RAF air base for 1 week while shooting down 10 fighters.
> > The British broadcast to the Germans that the airbase was crippled
> > for 2 weeks and 20 RAF fighters were shot down.

> Cite?

My source was a WW2 veteran who led an AAA unit during WW2. He was a guest lecturer in a history course I took in University.

> How _did_ Britain "broadcast" this misinformation to the Germans?

It was by radio. The British broadcast their propaganda to the Germans both directly (think of an Allied version of Axis Sally), and via "rogue" broadcasters, who actually worked for the British (One was a supposedly disgruntled, rather foul-mouthed, old German officer who criticized Hitler's performance, while repeatedly referring to Churchill as "that drunken Jew-loving bastard.").

> This example is the British telling the Germans they did better than
> they thought they had.

Yep, part of the reason was to get the Germans to listen to British propaganda sources, either knowingly or unknowingly.

> What was the actual damage to the base and actual RAF aircraft lost?

Unknown, the lecturer stated that as an example of British propaganda starting to gets its act together (Step 1: Encourage the intended audience to listen and believe).

> _Possibly_ the British did something like this to encourage the Germans
> to repeat an ineffectual attack.

...or, since the British claimed the base was out of action, it would encourage the Luftwaffe to concentrate on other, hopefully harder targets. Initially, there were RAF structures vulnerable to air attack that the British scrambled to harden.

> > ...in large part to the unsustainable casualties the Luftwaffe > was suffering.

> Cite?

https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-the-beams-the-time-germany-devised-an-invisible-weapon-that-could-devastate-britain/

> British nightfighters were minimally effective in 1941; their AI
> radar was primitive and GCI was also in its infancy.

From the above webpage:
--Start Quote--
In April, during another attack on Coventry, five of KGr 100’s 12 pathfinders were unable to find the X-Device beams. The following month, in a raid on nearby Derby, none of the Vikings could pick up the beam signal, suggesting the British were getting better at jamming.

And night-bombing of Britain was no longer a safe job. The RAF now had airborne radar. At the start of May 1941, KGr 100 was losing around one plane a night. It was also clear that Britain wouldn’t be bombed out of the war. That Coventry was a target again five months after it had become a byword for bombing destruction showed the limits of such a strategy.
--End Quote--

> Every source I have ever read says that the Blitz was halted because the
> aircraft were needed for BARBAROSSA.

That was one reason, but it wasn't the only one.

[Rich Rostrom]

On 6/15/23 12:10 PM, lesliem...@gmail.com wrote:

> It was by radio. The British broadcast their
> propaganda to the Germans both directly (think of an
> Allied version of Axis Sally), and via "rogue"
> broadcasters, who actually worked for the British (One
> was a supposedly disgruntled, rather foul-mouthed, old
> German officer who criticized Hitler's performance,
> while repeatedly referring to Churchill as "that
> drunken Jew-loving bastard.").

That would be Sefton Delemr's "Soldaten Sender".

> At the start of May 1941...

That was very near the end of the Blitz, and well into
the prep for BARBAROSSA, which included redeploying
most of the Luftwaffe.