Damage Control & The Titanic
Douglas King
the discussion would like to get the rest of the group in.
> The best possible way I see to savethe ship using conventional damage
> control would be to patch and shore up Boiler Room #5, then concentrate
> all pumping capacity on BR#6 as Tom Pappas suggested. If #5 would stay
> dry without pumping, and the level could be brought under control in #6,
> she would have stayed up. Possibly even to have plugged, patched, &
> shored #6.
<< What's missing in these discussions, as far as I'm concerned, is a
critical analysis of the rate of flooding in BR#6. Conventional
wisdom is that it was rather low, compared to the rates forward. As
far as I have been able to figure out, the flooding rate is based
solely on Barrett's estimate of 8 feet after 10 minutes. Flooding
diagrams, such as the ones in the RINA report (and Tom's web page)
show BR#6 filling much more slowly that the four compartments forward
of it. Yet, the initial inrush of water so alarmed Barrett and Mr.
Hesketh that they jumped through the watertight door into BR#5. I
wouldn't think that you would start to get worried until the water
gets, say, knee deep? At the 8 feet in 10 minute rate, it would take
several minutes to fill up the 2 feet between the tank top and the
stoking floor, so what was Barrett's hurry? Could it be that the
entire side of the ship seemed to open up and water came roaring in?
What if the rate was 10 feet in 2 minutes (much more in line with what
Barrett says he did in between)? That would probably be enough to get
even the saltiest sailor in the mood for a quick change of vocation.
If so, all bets are off as far as saving the ship, eh? >>
Agreed. I still don't think that Barrett's time estimate was necessarily
so far off.
<< Barrett was talking to [acting] Second Engineer James Hesketh when
the
collision occurred. Based on the crew roster at Encyclopedia
Titanica, there were only three engineers senior to Hesketh: Chief
Engineer Joseph Bell, Senior Second Engineer William Farquharson, and
Junior Second Engineer Norman Harrison. The only other second
engineer was Senior Assistant Second Engineer Bertie Wilson. It's not
clear if Wilson was senior to Hesketh. Since Bell probably didn't
stand watches, Hesketh may well have been the engineer in charge of
the watch. According to Barrett, the engineer in charge of his boiler
section was Junior Second Assistant Engineer Jonathan Shepherd, the
man who later went back to BR#5 with Barrett. I submit that with
Hesketh fully aware of the situation in BR#6, there would be no need
for Barrett to report to anyone. >>
Ah, so. I didn't know that.
> The inside of the ship was a maze, and he would have had to climb
> several decks worth of ladders.
<< The path from 5 to 6 was up the #5 escape ladders to E-deck, out onto
"Scotland Road" and forward about 40 feet, into the escape trunk and
back down the ladders to #6. Based on the distances and some rough
timing of how fast I can climb a ladder, I estimate travel time for
Barett at 90 seconds or less (unless he stops by the head or takes a
smoke break).>>
Well, ninety seconds can seem like a half-hour when you're on a sinking
ship ;) However I still don't think Barrett's time estimate is
necessarily wrong. But it becomes a far less believable way of
estimating the flooding rate. If it took him 5 minutes, the #6 was
flooding twice as fast as calculated!
This discussion has also touched on the status of the bottom tanks,
available DC equipment, DC training, flags-of-convenience, and dozens of
other cool things. Cal & I thought it time to offer the floor to the
rest of the newsgroup.
Regards- Doug King
--
This is what we look like when we're at our best:
http://freehosting.at.webjump.com/ei/eisboch-webjump/45.htm
Tom Pappas
of inflow decreased as the hydrostatic head inside increased. If one
accept's RINA's broad-brush interpretation of volumes vs. times
(disregarding exactly which compartment got how much at what time), then it
is clear that once the water in #6 reached a level sufficient to aggravate
the trim to a dangerous degree, the ingress of water into that compartment
was well within the ship's pumping capacity.
Assuming that the head among compartments was fairly constant (which is not
totally accurate, but that in #6 would have been the lowest, which
automatically makes our estimate erroneous on the conservative side), then
by apportioning inflow rates according to the area of each breach, we see
the following:
Area Percent x75
Fore Peak 0.57 0.05 3.45
Cargo #1 2.18 0.18 13.21
Cargo #2 4.54 0.37 27.50
Cargo #3 2.49 0.20 15.08
Boiler #6 2.21 0.18 13.39
Boiler #5 0.39 0.03 2.36
The first column of figures is the surmised area of the opening in each
compartment. The middle column expresses that area as a percentage of the
total, and the third column is that percentage times 75 (the tons per minute
that was reached at about T+40). The two boiler rooms add up to less than 16
tpm. Titanic could pump about 28 tpm.
--
Half-baked Titanic theories galore at
http://www.pcslink.com/~tom/titanic
Could the collision be avoided?
Hitting the iceberg head-on
How many could have been saved?
A tale of two icebergs
Could the ship have been kept afloat?
How many could Californian have saved?
"But this script can't sink!"
"She is made of irony, sir. I assure you, she can."
Douglas King wrote in message <381DD0...@mindspring.com>...
Tom Pappas
>predict how many flooded compartments were necessary to sink the ship.
I can't vouch for the methodology, but the RINA report contains several
pages of stability charts and diagrams with dozens of flooding scenarios.
Bob Botts
Douglas King wrote:
> This is conglomerate of several emails. Not private, and those of us in
> the discussion would like to get the rest of the group in.
...snip...
Just curious to know if anyone has actually checked the calculations which
predict how many flooded compartments were necessary to sink the ship.
>
>
> Regards- Doug King
> --
Cheers... Bob
Bob Botts
Tom Pappas wrote:
> >Just curious to know if anyone has actually checked the calculations which
> >predict how many flooded compartments were necessary to sink the ship.
>
> I can't vouch for the methodology, but the RINA report contains several
> pages of stability charts and diagrams with dozens of flooding scenarios.
> --
Thanks Tom. I suppose this should have been one of the first things to check,
but, from past personal experience (ouch!!!) I know how sometimes the simplest
of things get overlooked. My apologies to the authors of the RINA report.
Cheers... Bob
Douglas King
> The other point that I see consistently overlooked is the fact that the rate
> of inflow decreased as the hydrostatic head inside increased. If one
> accept's RINA's broad-brush interpretation of volumes vs. times
> (disregarding exactly which compartment got how much at what time), then it
> is clear that once the water in #6 reached a level sufficient to aggravate
> the trim to a dangerous degree, the ingress of water into that compartment
> was well within the ship's pumping capacity.
True, but then as it was pumped out, the water inflow would speed back
up again. I admit I'm a little weak on differential equations (school
was a long time ago) but the basic relationships are clear.
> Assuming that the head among compartments was fairly constant (which is not
> totally accurate, but that in #6 would have been the lowest, which
> automatically makes our estimate erroneous on the conservative side), then
> by apportioning inflow rates according to the area of each breach, we see
> the following:
>
> Area Percent x75
> Fore Peak 0.57 0.05 3.45
> Cargo #1 2.18 0.18 13.21
> Cargo #2 4.54 0.37 27.50
> Cargo #3 2.49 0.20 15.08
> Boiler #6 2.21 0.18 13.39
> Boiler #5 0.39 0.03 2.36
>
> The first column of figures is the surmised area of the opening in each
> compartment. The middle column expresses that area as a percentage of the
> total, and the third column is that percentage times 75 (the tons per minute
> that was reached at about T+40). The two boiler rooms add up to less than 16
> tpm. Titanic could pump about 28 tpm.
Very good. It looks like the ship could have possibly been saved.
One thing to remember- BR #6's flooding rate may be quite deceptive in
that it was a much bigger space and would have taken a much bigger leak
to flood at the same rate as the forward compartments. One reason I
don't take the RINA report as gospel is that they overlook this sort of
thing. But it's still one of the best technical resources to go by.
Now the question is- would it be better to concentrate on pumping out #6
with a view to keeping the ship afloat longer, possibly getting a DC
party to work on patching and shoring AND/OR a party working on
fothering the leaks; or to start with the easier problem in #5? For the
moment, let's pretend that there is no shortage of manpower and maybe
somebody can dig out what sort of material resources civilian ships had
back then. I haven't seen anything in the BOT rules pertaining....
Another interesting question is what is happening with the bottom tanks
all the while. For riveted mild steel, my WAG is that "crush depth" is
going to be somewhere around a hundred feet. This means that about the
time the foredeck goes under, it's possible that the bottoms tanks (most
of which were empty according to Wilde) start imploding and flooding
very rapidly.
Regards- Doug "Repair 5 Team Leader" King
titanic_...@my-deja.com
force of the collision, along a riveted seam, imposed too great a load
on the shell plating. Wrought iron rivets failed, caulking broke and
steel yielded, allowing the parting of strakes deep below the
waterline. Shock damage was transmitted along the main transverse
bulkhead between Cargo Hold Nos. 1 and 2 and the longitudinal bulkhead
along the Fireman's passageway. Cargo Hold No. 3 flooded immediately,
owing to what was probably the largest area of impact damage (3.3
square feet). The transverse bulkhead between Boiler Rooms Nos. 5 and
6, weakened slightly by the coal fire that had smoldered in the No. 6
aft starboard bunker during the first three days of the voyage, was
also damaged as the berg continued to intermittently strike the hull.
Even though there is evidence of crack propagation around some of these
failed rivet holes, the main influx of water came through the openings
between damaged plates. A total of approximately 12.6 square feet of
separation between plates was opened to the sea and with the damage
estimated at a mean depth of approximately 18 feet below the waterline,
a significant pressure differential existed. That, combined with the
longitudinal extent of the damage, eventually overwhelmed the capacity
of Titanic's pumps. The rate of flooding actually decreased from a high
of approximately 400 tons per minute during the first hour of flooding,
as the pressure began to equalise. The ship attained near equilibrium
during the second hour of flooding, but as the underwater weight of the
flooded bow began to pull hull openings and non-watertight decks under
the surface, flooding increased once again.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Douglas King
> Simply put – collision with an iceberg, as we've known all along. The
> force of the collision, along a riveted seam, imposed too great a load
> on the shell plating. Wrought iron rivets failed, caulking broke and
> steel yielded, allowing the parting of strakes deep below the
> waterline. Shock damage was transmitted along the main transverse
> bulkhead between Cargo Hold Nos. 1 and 2 and the longitudinal bulkhead
> along the Fireman's passageway. Cargo Hold No. 3 flooded immediately,
> owing to what was probably the largest area of impact damage (3.3
> square feet). The transverse bulkhead between Boiler Rooms Nos. 5 and
> 6, weakened slightly by the coal fire that had smoldered in the No. 6
> aft starboard bunker during the first three days of the voyage, was
> also damaged as the berg continued to intermittently strike the hull.
The evidence that the coal bunker fire weakened the bulkhead is not
conclusive.
> Even though there is evidence of crack propagation around some of these
> failed rivet holes, the main influx of water came through the openings
> between damaged plates. A total of approximately 12.6 square feet of
> separation between plates was opened to the sea and with the damage
> estimated at a mean depth of approximately 18 feet below the waterline,
> a significant pressure differential existed. That, combined with the
> longitudinal extent of the damage, eventually overwhelmed the capacity
> of Titanic's pumps.
It is not know to what extent the Titanic's pumps were brought on line,
nor from which compartments they were drawing water. All the engineers
who would have known these details were lost in the sinking.
> ..... The rate of flooding actually decreased from a high
> of approximately 400 tons per minute during the first hour of flooding,
> as the pressure began to equalise. The ship attained near equilibrium
> during the second hour of flooding, but as the underwater weight of the
> flooded bow began to pull hull openings and non-watertight decks under
> the surface, flooding increased once again.
Very good post. However, to imply that all the facts are known and the
matter is quite simple, is wrong. Furthermore, I think you missed the
title of this thread. Do you have any contributions toward what sort of
damage control procedures might have saved the ship, and/or what damage
control practices were followed in 1912?
Tom Pappas
>down to the tank tops about an hour after the collision. Are there
>any historical accounts of this?
Yes. Because when the bulkhead into #6 collapsed (or the door failed),
Engineer Shepherd had fallen into an open manhole and broken his leg. He was
lost in the ensuing torrent. The door into #4 had been opened to route
additional pump hose in.
mf...@my-deja.com
> --
> This is what we look like when we're at our best:
> http://freehosting.at.webjump.com/ei/eisboch-webjump/45.htm
>
The BOT Report says the freeboard with two compartments flooded was
between
2.5 ft. and 3 ft.
There was probably even less freeboard available with the first four
compartments flooded.
Flooding in BR #6 would further reduce the freeboard. At some point,
the combination of the flooding in the first four compartments and BR
#6 will sink the ship.
With the first four compartments flooded, how much water can BR #6 take
without exceeding the available freeboard? 10 tons? 500 tons? At some
point the camel's back is going to break.
The valves for the piping system were controlled from the bulkhead
deck. Any action to isolate the cargo holds from the main bilge pipe
would have to occur before this deck was underwater.
Captain Smith and Mr. Andrews spent about half an hour surveying the
damage to the hull. Some of the crew could have been put to work
gathering mattresses and rope during this time.
Didn't the "United States" have a damage control officer assigned?
The flooding figures I'm using here are from Tom's web page.
Dividing 450 tons/min by 12.6 SQF equals 35.7 tons/min per SQF
initially.
The hole in BR #6 has been estimated at 2.8 SQF. This works out to
about 100 tons/min for this compartment.
It would probably take 700 tons or so to flood BR #6 so Barrett's time
estimate isn't too far off.
The hole in BR #5 was estimated at 1.3 SQF. This should have admitted
46.4 tons/min initially.
The total capacity of the bilge and ballast pumps is 1700 tons/hour.
This works out to 28.3 tons/min. Some of the other pumps may have
been connected later on but I think initially all they had to work
with was 28.3 tons/min, maybe less if there was a pump in BR #6.
The coal bunker must have been holding back most of the water for the
pumps to keep BR #5 dry. It's possible all of the pumping capacity was
being used on this one compartment.
RINA says BR #5 had 10 feet of water by midnight and it was pumped back
down to the tank tops about an hour after the collision. Are there
any historical accounts of this?
--
Just plain Morgan Ford
mf...@my-deja.com
"Tom Pappas" <t...@pcslink.com> wrote:
> >RINA says BR #5 had 10 feet of water by midnight and it was pumped
back
> >down to the tank tops about an hour after the collision. Are there
> >any historical accounts of this?
>
> Engineer Shepherd had fallen into an open manhole and broken his leg.
He was
> lost in the ensuing torrent. The door into #4 had been opened to route
> additional pump hose in.
This supports the idea that the water level in BR #5 was under control
before the bulkhead failed but it doesn't give a source for the figure
of 10 feet of water by midnight. Did one of the survivors mention the
depth of the flooding in his testimony? Did RINA calculate the
flooding in BR #5 or base it on a survivor's statement?
Outnumbered
> <snip>
>
> I've heard that Fox TV is planning to crash a 747 and film the
> results. Thats going to be expensive! Didn't someone irritate the
> French back in the 60's by making a disaster film with one of their old
> liners?
The Liner, was the Ile de France....the movie revolved around a resue of a
passenger, story derived from the Andrea Doria., I believe
>
>
> --
mf...@my-deja.com
What we need is a dam or lock owner who is interested in testing damage
control theories. A lock would be an ideal place to test different
methods of plugging a hole underwater. I'll call up the Panama canal
operators and see if they'd be willing to shut down a set of locks in
the name of science<g>.
Get a major TV network to buy an old ship from a scrapper. Place
damage control supplies on deck and tow the ship out to a suitable spot
for an artificial reef. Cut a hole in the hull about the same size and
shape of the one in BR #6. Allow a small team to try to plug the
hole. If the compartment was isolated from the rest of the ship it
would be possible to repeat the experiment many times.
I've heard that Fox TV is planning to crash a 747 and film the
results. Thats going to be expensive! Didn't someone irritate the
French back in the 60's by making a disaster film with one of their old
liners?
--
jagu...@worldnet.att.net
Malone.
On Fri, 05 Nov 1999 19:32:04 -0800, Outnumbered
<otn...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>mf...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
>> <snip>
>>
>> I've heard that Fox TV is planning to crash a 747 and film the
>> results. Thats going to be expensive! Didn't someone irritate the
>> French back in the 60's by making a disaster film with one of their old
>> liners?
>
>The Liner, was the Ile de France....the movie revolved around a resue of a
>passenger, story derived from the Andrea Doria., I believe
>
>>
>>
mf...@my-deja.com
bit you can download some of the training material.
http://www.swos.navy.mil/dca/dca.htm