http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his311/archives/sec/kanya1.htm
. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (Cambridge University
Press, 1969).
in the University of Delaware library.
Notes © 2002 by Jim Jones , Ph.D.
SUMMARY
This is a detailed description of how the French Marines (naval soldiers)
created a military empire in the Western Sudan. They were able to do this
because they were the only effective instrument of French policy in a remote
region, and because they operated at a time when fear of British strength,
fear of Islamic jihad, the loss to Prussia and the weakness of the civilian
government of the Third Republic made arguments about the security of
Frenchmen in Africa compelling.
I. Introduction: the Colonial Army and the Western Sudan
(p1) The French conquest of the Sudan was remarkable because it was
accomplished by a relatively small number of French naval troops who created
an empire that was larger than France. This book seeks to explain why it
came about.
(p8) The development of the colonial military mind began in Algeria in the
19th century. There, they learned to be insubordinate to civilian control by
systematically disregarding instructions from Paris, and "During the
Governorship of General Bugeaud (1840-47), military insubordination was
raised to the level of an art."
(p9) The Algerian experience also taught two generations of soldiers
everything that they thought they knew about colonial warfare. They learned
the tactics of the "daring and rapid advance" and the organization of
compact mobile units used to combat an equally mobile enemy. In addition,
they acquired the attitude and confidence that only they understood
conditions in the colonies. They learned to resent any interference from
Paris and to believe that only they could make policy decisions. They
distrusted military science and had nothing but contempt for civilians.
Eventually, this mystique pervaded the entire army, with terrible
consequences for the French army.
(p19) The French thought that Islamic states were a problem because
theocratic rule made peaceful acceptance of French advance impossible. In
1832, after the French invasion of Algiers, the interior tribes united,
declared a jihad against the French, and appointed Abd el-Kader of the
Qadiriyya order as their leader. The resulting war lasted fifteen years and
required a third of the French army to defeat it. Muslim opposition
cvontined after Abd el-Kader's defeat.
(pp20-21) Several French officers brought memories of the anti-French jihad
in Algeria to the Sudan and vowed to eliminate Islam. This "ends justified
the means" attitude leading to French atrocities against civilian
populations.