Ray McGovern- Answer: It's the Rockefellers/"Intrepid"
Mort Zuckerman
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Subject: Ray McGovern- Answer: It's the Rockefellers/"Intrepid"
Date: Dec 23, 2009 6:22 AM
ARTICLE BELOW
======================
Read this book:
http://www.amazon.com/Man-Called-Intrepid-William-Stevenson/dp/158574154X
'Close association of the Rockefellers
with the OSS. After the war, Johnny
Rock thought the CIA was his personal
operation. The Rockefellers figgered
that since they won Earth, Earth was
theirs. The CIA/OSS British/Rock
Banksters also explains the banking
operations in Bermuda.
They hired Kissinger to help them
figger out how they were gonna keep
it. Kissinger then thought he was
his own man... and the rest is
IsrOili-Trouble-Making History.
At about 11:30 on 911, Kissinger
phoned into CNN from Europe (Kissinger
does not know who to call when he wants
to call Europe, but when he's in Europe,
he knows who to call, I guess), and
declared his GLOBAL JIHAD: "We're going
after the countries who even HARBOR
terrorists (Pakistan is on the list)."
It really is that Trilateral gang:
http://www.actionlyme.org/DUHRAM_BUSH_CRIME.htm
It's also a joke that the Corrupticut
USDOJ's orifice will be investigating
what, now, I forget. US Attorneygate?
We're not supposed to take such insults
as humorous.
The CDC is the CIA of bioweapons, but like
I always say, HEEyyy Rocky, Watch me pull
a rabbit outta my hat:
http://www.actionlyme.org/RELLS_2.jpg
'Like you're saying now (below).
But they don't work alone. They work
with Kissinger-Netanyahu's Mossad. That's
the axis of evil who pulled the 911 stunt.
Kissinger, Rockefellers private CIA, and
the Mossad. They've been directly involved
with Al Quaeda since the beginning. Since
the 1980s.
Who is going to get into a Rockefeller
WTC building that is also home base
to the CIA and plant the thermate?
http://www.actionlyme.org/070426.htm
Rockefeller was going to create it (WTC)
and then destroy it - like the phoenix -
like the notions in freemasonry - a rebirth,
which is meant to be like a penis that arises
and then "dies" after ejaculation
http://www.actionlyme.org/BRITISH_PSYCHIATRY.htm
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=2%20Timothy+4&version=NASB'
"reprove, rebuke, exhort, with great (F)patience and instruction.
"3For (G)the time will come when they will not endure (H)sound
doctrine; but ***wanting to have their ears tickled, they will
accumulate for themselves teachers in accordance to their own
desires,***
"4and (I)will turn away their ears from the truth and (J)will turn
aside to myths."
"wanting to have their ears tickled,
they accumulate false teachers who
tell them the crazy Penis-centric/
Me-centric psychiatric bullshit
they want to hear..."
... And then the death of this phoenix,
the WTC, and the death of the pre-911 global
order where torture and "indefinite detention"
would have been seen for what it is...
These kooks love symbolism as much as they
love themselves.
- - - - - - - - - -
Answering: Who is behind all these failed
stunts? And how did they think they could
get away with it?
What do they have up their sleeves, next?
I say Canada, because of Zuckerman and
Johhny Rock, himself:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiMiMuMqXrE
Kathleen M. Dickson
http://www.actionlyme.org
==================================
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/12/22-9
Published on Tuesday, December 22, 2009 by CommonDreams.org
Break the CIA in Two
by Ray McGovern
After the CIA-led fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, President
John Kennedy was quoted as saying he wanted to "splinter the CIA into
a thousand pieces and scatter it into the winds." I can understand
his anger, but a thousand is probably too many.
Better is a Solomon solution; divide the CIA in two. That way we can
throw out the bath water and keep the baby.
Covert action and analysis do not belong together in the same agency—
never have, never will. That these two very different tasks were
thrown together is an accident of history, one that it is high time to
acknowledge and to fix.
The effects of this structural fault became clear to President Harry
Truman as he watched the agency at work in its first decade and a
half. He was aghast.
Like oil on water, covert action fouls the wellspring of objective
analysis—the main task for which Truman and the Congress established
the CIA in 1947. The operational tail started wagging the substantive
tail almost right away. It has done so ever since—with very
unfortunate consequences.
An accident of history? How so?
Covert action practitioners, many of whom showed great courage and
imagination in the European and Far Eastern theaters of World War II
arrived home wondering whether there was still a call for their
expertise. With the Soviet Union taking over large chunks of Europe
and the KGB plying its covert-action wares worldwide, the question
answered itself; a counter capability was needed.
The big mistake was shoehorning it into an agency being created to
fulfill an entirely different mission. As former CIA senior analyst
Mel Goodman points out in his most recent book, Failure of
Intelligence, there was uncertainty and confusion over where to place
responsibility for this capability.
The term "covert action" is a euphemism covering the broad genus of
dirty tricks, from overthrowing governments (we now blithely call that
particular species "regime change") to open but nonattributable
broadcasting into denied areas.
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal didn't want the Pentagon to be
responsible for covert action in peacetime. And, to their credit,
neither did senior leaders of the fledgling CIA. They were no
neophytes, and could see that covert operations might easily end up
tainting the intelligence product if one Director were responsible for
the two incompatible activities.
The experience of the past 62 years has showed, time and time again,
that their concern was well founded, as the covert action side has not
only polluted substantive analysis but also expanded into high-tech
warfare.
Predators
Trying to overthrow governments via covert action is one thing.
Flying Predator drones with Hellfire missiles is quite another. There
would be real hellfire on that from Harry Truman, were he still with
us.
Even former CIA Director George Tenet of flexible conscience had
second thoughts about the CIA assuming responsibility for flying the
Predator and firing Hellfires. In his memoir, At the Center of the
Storm, he writes that there was a "legitimate question about whether
aircraft firing missiles...should be the function of the military or
CIA." Resorting to the all-purpose catch-all (and excuse-all), Tenet
adds, "But that was before 9/11."
Of equal importance is the kind of question to which Tenet normally
paid little heed; namely, what would flying Predators do to CIA
credibility.
Think about it for a minute. You are ordered and given funding to
conduct Predator attacks on "suspected al-Qaeda bases" in Pakistan.
(Our armed forces cannot do it since the Pentagon is not supposed to
be striking countries with whom we are not at war.) You salute, find
some contractors to help, and conduct those attacks.
The President then asks his CIA morning briefer about the
effectiveness of the drone attacks, including the longer-term
political as well as military effects. When the briefer checks with
the substantive analysts watching Pakistan, he learns that the attacks
are very effective—indeed, the very best recruitment tool Osama bin
Laden and the Taliban could imagine. Jihadists are flocking to
Pakistan and Afghanistan like moths to a light blub.
Problem. Do you think mealy-mouthed CIA Director Leon Panetta will
have the courage to whisper that unwelcome finding to the President?
Suppose Gen. David Petraeus or Gen. Stanley McChrystal found out.
No NIE on Af-Pak
The proof is in the pudding. Were not Panetta a self-described
"creature of the Congress" (be wise, compromise), he would have long
since ordered up a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on prospects
for Afghanistan AND—far more important—Pakistan.
Would you believe that at this stage there is still no such NIE?
And the reason Panetta and his managers are keeping their heads way
down is the same reason former CIA Director George Tenet for years
shied away from doing an NIE on whether Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction. The findings would smell like skunks at a picnic.
It was only after Sen. Bob Graham, then-Chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, told the White House in September 2002, "No
National Intelligence Estimate, no congressional vote on war with
Iraq," that Tenet was ordered by the White House to commission an NIE
with pre-ordained conclusions.
That NIE was to be completed in record time (less than three weeks),
in order to emerge several weeks before the mid-term elections and it
was to reflect the alarmist views expressed by Vice President Dick
Cheney in a major speech on August 26, 2002.
In Tenet's memoir he admits that Cheney "went well beyond what our
analysis could support." But never mind; Tenet and his lieutenants
had become quite accomplished in cooking intelligence to order. And
so they did.
Like Cheney's speech, the Estimate was wrong on every major count—
deliberately so. At the conclusion of an exhaustive investigation by
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Jay Rockefeller, Chair from
2007 to 2009, bemoaned the fact that the Bush/Cheney administration
"presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was
unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent."
Non-existent? You mean fabricated or forged? With the advent of the
George W. Bush administration we had learned about "faith-based
intelligence," but the mind boggles at the use of "non-existent"
intelligence.
What Harry Would Did Say
For those of you who may have forgotten, today (Dec. 22nd) is the 46th
anniversary of the most important op-ed of all the 381,659 written
about the CIA since its founding. Do not feel bad if you missed it;
the op-ed garnered little attention—either at the time or
subsequently.
The draft came from Independence, Missouri and was published in the
Washington Post early edition on Dec. 22, 1963. (http://tinyurl.com/
ycffs3x ) The first and the last two sentences of Harry Truman's
unusual contribution bear repeating:
"I think it has become necessary to take another look at the purpose
and operations of our Central Intelligence Agency....
"We have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and
for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is
something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a
shadow over our historic position and I feel that we need to correct
it."
Truman began by describing what he saw as CIA's raison d'être,
emphasizing that a President needs "the most accurate and up-to-the-
minute information on what is going on everywhere in the world, and
particularly of the trends and developments in all the danger spots."
He stressed that he wanted to create a "special kind of an
intelligence facility" charged with the collection of "all
intelligence reports from every available source, and to have these
reports reach me as President without ‘treatment' or interpretations"
by departments that have their own agendas.
A Warning
The "most important thing," he said, "was to guard against the chance
of intelligence being used to influence or to lead the President into
unwise decisions." It is a safe bet that Truman had uppermost in mind
how senior CIA officials tried to mousetrap President John Kennedy
into committing U.S. armed forces to attack Cuba, rather than to sit
by and let Fidel Castro's troops kill or capture the rag-tag band of
CIA-trained invaders at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.
The operation was a disaster, pure and simple. Truman was no doubt
aware of how Kennedy initially gave the go-ahead to a CIA plan that
had been approved by President Dwight Eisenhower; how the new
President belatedly saw the trap; and how he had the courage to face
down the tricksters and then take responsibility for the consequences
that came of having trusted them.
Still, Kennedy did not feel he could follow his instinct to "splinter
the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it into the winds."
Instead, he fired CIA Director Allen Dulles, a quintessential
Establishment figure—something one does at one's peril. Allen Dulles
later played a key role in selecting those who were allowed to testify
before the Warren Commission on the JFK assassination, and in shaping
its highly questionable findings. In JFK and the Unspeakable, author
James Douglass adduces persuasive evidence that some of Dulles' old
buddies were involved in the murder of President Kennedy.
It may be just coincidence that President Truman chose to publish his
CIA op-ed exactly one month after Kennedy was killed, but it seems
equally possible that he deliberately chose that first monthiversary.
"Disturbed" at CIA Operational Role
In his Dec. 22, 1963 op-ed, Truman addresses the structural fault
alluded to above:
"For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted
from its original assignment [collection, analysis, and reporting].
It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the
Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our
difficulties in several explosive areas....
"Some of the complications and embarrassment I think we have
experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet
intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its
intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and
mysterious foreign intrigue..."
"The last thing we needed was for the CIA to be seized upon as
something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of other
people."
Think Iran. In early 1963 when I began work at the CIA it had been
almost a decade since the overthrow of the first democratically
elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mosaddeq in August 1953. The
joint CIA and British intelligence "Operation Ajax" was cited proudly
as a singularly successful covert action operation.
Just before electing Mosaddeq in 1951, the Iranian Parliament had
nationalized Iran's oil industry, which until then had been controlled
exclusively by the British government-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company—Britain's largest overseas investment at the time.
Unfortunately for Britain, there were upstarts in Iran ("militants,"
in today's parlance) who made bold to think that Iranians should be
able to profit from the vast oil reserves in Iran. Winston Churchill
asked Truman to order the fledgling CIA to join the British service,
MI-6, in arranging a coup. Truman said No. (I can imagine him
saying, Hell, No!)
Truman's successor, Dwight Eisenhower, however, said Yes. And the
coup that Eisenhower approved goes a long way toward explaining why
the Iranians don't much like us. After throwing out Mosaddeq and
bringing in the Shah, the Iranian people suffered untold horrors at
the hands of SAVAK, the Shah's notorious secret police.
Every Iranian knew/knows that the CIA and MI-6 did what the British
would call a "brilliant" job training SAVAK. Many students of Iran
believe that it was SAVAK's widespread and widely known torture, as
much as Ayatollah Khomeini's charisma, that brought revolution and
dumped the Shah in 1979.
And the Oil?
And who got control of the oil? That seems always to be the question,
doesn't it?
The Shah let the US and UK split 80 percent of control, with the rest
going to French and Dutch interests. The Shah got 50 percent of the
revenues. When the Shah and SAVAK became history, the new Iranian
government took control of the oil. Today, there is scant applause
among thinking people for the "singularly successful" U.S.-U.K.-
sponsored coup in Iran.
The same goes for the CIA-run coup in Guatemala the following year.
American media initially sold both operations as victories over
leftist leaning governments vulnerable to Communist blandishments.
It was about really oil in Iran, as it was about land claimed by the
United Fruit Company in Guatemala. But the kind of suffering in store
for the people of both countries was the same.
Having learned from the British how this kind of thing is done, CIA
operatives were ready to try out their newly acquired skills and
succeeded in overthrowing the government or Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who
had been elected President in 1950 with 65 percent of the vote.
His offense was giving land to the peasants—unfarmed land that private
corporations earlier had set aside for themselves. The United Fruit
Company was allergic to real land reform in Guatemala and lobbied hard
for Washington to remove Arbenz.
The Dulles brothers, Allen and John Foster, who happened to be
shareholders of the United Fruit Company, took the line that Arbenz'
actions smacked of "Communism." Then-CIA Director Allen Dulles
stoked fears by describing Guatemala as a "Soviet beachhead in the
Western hemisphere."
The overthrow of Arbenz in 1954 made Guatemala safe for United Fruit,
but not for democracy. The coup ended a hopeful decade-long
experiment with representative democracy known as the "Ten Years of
Spring." The outcome's implications for democracy in Central American
were immense.
Other examples could be adduced, but let us stop here with the two
with which Harry Truman would have been most familiar—from a
statecraft point of view. (I doubt that he held stock in either Big
Oil or United Fruit.)
At the end of his op-ed, Truman puts his conclusion right out there
with characteristic straightforwardness:
"I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be restored to its original
assignment as the intelligence arm of the President...and that its
operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere."
Media Un-Reaction
A blockbuster op-ed, no?
Well, no. Investigator Raymond Marcus is among those struck by the
curious lack of response—one might say embargo—regarding Truman's
Washington Post article. Marcus has written:
"According to my information, it was not carried in later editions
that day, nor commented on editorially, nor picked up by any other
major newspaper, or mentioned in any national radio or TV broadcast."
What are we to make of this? Was/is it the case, as former CIA
Director William Colby is quoted as saying in a different connection,
that the CIA "owns everyone of any significance in the major media?"
Or at least that it did in the Sixties? How much truth lies beneath
Colby's hyperbole?
Did the CIA and its White House patrons put out the word to squelch a
former President's op-ed already published in an early edition of the
Post? Or is there a simpler explanation. Do any of you readers
perhaps know?
The tradecraft term of art for a "cooperating" journalist,
businessperson, or academic is "agent of influence." Some housebroken
journalists have previously worked for the CIA. Some take such
scrupulous notes that they end up sounding dangerously close to their
confidential government sources.
Think back, for example, to those vengeful days in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, and the macho approach being modeled by President
Bush and aped down the line by CIA operatives and their "agents of
influence."
CIA operative Gary Schroen told National Public Radio that, just days
after 9/11, counterterrorism chief Cofer Black sent him to Afghanistan
with orders to "Capture bin Laden, kill him, and bring his head back
in a box on dry ice." As for other al Qaeda leaders, Black reportedly
said, "I want their heads up on pikes."
This quaint tone—and language—reverberated among Bush-friendly
pundits. One consummate insider, Washington Post veteran Jim Hoagland
went a bit overboard in publishing a letter to President Bush on Oct.
31, 2001. It was no Halloween prank. Rather, Hoagland strongly
endorsed what he termed the "wish" for "Osama bin Laden's head on a
pike," which he claimed was the objective of Bush's "generals and
diplomats."
At the same time, there are dangers in sharing too much information
with pet insider/outsiders. In his open letter to Bush, Hoagland
lifted the curtain on the actual neoconservative game plan by giving
Bush the following ordering of priorities.
"The need to deal with Iraq's continuing accumulation of biological
and chemical weapons and the technology to build a nuclear bomb can in
no way be lessened by the demands of the Afghan campaign. You must
conduct that campaign so that you can pivot quickly from it to end the
threat Saddam Hussein's regime poses."
Thus, Hoagland surfaced the "pivot" plan three weeks before Donald
Rumsfeld called Gen. Tommy Franks to tell him the President wanted him
to shift focus to Iraq. Franks and his senor aides had been working
on plans for attacks on Tora Bora where bin Laden was believed to be
hiding, but attention, planning, and resources were abruptly diverted
toward Iraq. And Osama bin Laden walked out of Tora Bora through the
mountain passes to Pakistan, according to a recent Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report.
The point here is that some media favorites are extremely well briefed
partly because they are careful not bite the hands that feed them by
criticizing the CIA. Still less are they inclined to point out basic
structural faults—not to mention the crimes of recent years. So it is
up to those of us who know something about intelligence and how
structural faults, above-the-law mentality, and flexible consciences
can spell disaster.
Split Up the Agency
Here's what should be done.
Expunge the one sentence in the National Security Act of 1947 that
gives a President wide latitude to direct the CIA to perform "other
such functions and duties related to intelligence." Make it crystal
clear that the sense conveyed by that sentence, whether the sentence
itself stays in or is deleted, cannot authorize activities that
violate international or U.S. criminal law—crimes like kidnapping and
torture.
"Other such functions and duties?" What was meant by this wording
were activities additional to what President Truman describes in his
op-ed as the "original assignment" of the CIA—a central place with
access to all collection that enables analysts to advise the President
with candor, without department "treatment" or interpretations, and
not sparing him "unpleasant facts" so as not to "upset" him.
As Truman himself suggests, terminate "other such functions and
duties" or put those operations elsewhere.
And imagine into existence different, effective ways to exercise
oversight, not totally dependent on the highly politicized "overlook"
committees of the Congress.
That done, there will still be a baby NOT to be thrown out with the
bath water.
The good news is that there remains a core of analysts willing and
able to seek truth and speak truth to power. This was shown in 2007,
when Tom Fingar, a senior analyst with integrity and courage, led to
conclusion a National Intelligence Estimate that helped prevent the
attack that Dick Cheney, the neoconservatives, and Israel were
planning on Iran.
That NIE assessed with high confidence that Iran had ceased working on
the warhead-related part of its nuclear program in the fall of 2003—a
judgment that holds to this day, however unpopular and unwelcome it
may be among those who would have the President give Israel carte
blanche to strike Iran's nuclear facilities.
That is the capability Truman wanted—the baby that must be rescued and
reared. But the baby is still in danger.
With Tom Fingar now retired, the absence of an NIE on Afghanistan/
Pakistan speaks volumes about the timidity that persists within the
hierarchy of the CIA and the intelligence community. It boggles the
mind that, amid all the assessment and reassessment prior to the
President's decision to escalate by sending 30,000 more troops, no
policy maker or congressional leader wanted to know what the 16
agencies of the intelligence community were thinking. Or did the
White House make it clear to those interested that it would be better
not to ask?
Gloom Avoidance
Gen. Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal are not interested in CIA analysis,
just CIA drones (the aircraft). Sources inside the intelligence
community tell us that they assess the prospects for success of the
generals' approach as very low, but that this word does not seem to be
getting to the President.
It is not entirely clear whether it is a case of Panetta being
reluctant to relay to Obama the kind of "unpleasant facts" or "bad
news" that Truman wanted the CIA to give him in a straightforward way,
or that Obama himself has discouraged such truth seeking/telling lest
the abysmal prognosis of the analysts leak and complicate his Faustian
bargain with the top brass—and cause even more political damage in his
dissatisfied Democratic "base."
As things get still worse in "Af-Pak"—and they will—it will be
important for Obama to have a group of analysts able to give him an
objective read on the quagmire into which his benighted policies have
led, and how he might attempt to pull himself and U.S. troops out.
Perhaps then he will ask.
So save that baby. Throw out the other one with the bathwater.
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the
ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. During his
27-year career at the CIA, he worked for nine CIA directors, several
of them at close remove. Primarily a substantive analyst and briefer,
he nonetheless served in all four of CIA's main directorates and,
during one of his postings abroad, helped manage a large covert action
project. In January 2003, he co-founded Veteran Intelligence
Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
"[Real] scientists are *fiercely* independent. That's the good
news."-- NIH's Top Fool, Anthony Fauci