Star wars test not faked
Don McGregor
The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
been faked at all.
> WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
>reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
>interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
>of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
> ``To sum up,'' Aspin said, ``the experiment was not rigged and
>deception did not take place, although a program to practice deception
>existed.''
[...]
> ``Overall,'' Aspin said, ``our conclusion on the experiment is this:
>It was not rigged by the inclusion of a radar beacon on the target, nor
>by any other means. The experiment demonstrated that the final guidance
>of the interceptor to a direct hit was done by the on-board heat seeker.
Turns out to have been just another successful piece of technology
in Reagan's overall program of defeating the Soviets in the
Cold War.
--
Don McGregor | "Things were better before, before they
mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu| voted for what's-his-name..."
Mike Schwartz
: The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
: been faked at all.
: > WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
: >reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
: >interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
: >of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
: > ``To sum up,'' Aspin said, ``the experiment was not rigged and
: >deception did not take place, although a program to practice deception
: >existed.''
: [...]
: > ``Overall,'' Aspin said, ``our conclusion on the experiment is this:
: >It was not rigged by the inclusion of a radar beacon on the target, nor
: >by any other means. The experiment demonstrated that the final guidance
: >of the interceptor to a direct hit was done by the on-board heat seeker.
: Turns out to have been just another successful piece of technology
: in Reagan's overall program of defeating the Soviets in the
: Cold War.
I saw the press conference on C-SPAN that Aspin gave. He did say
that there was indeed a program to practice deception. The target missle
did indeed have an explosive charge on it that _could_ have been used
in the case of a near miss. However, in the four experiments, 3 had
nothing close to a near miss and the fourth was a true hit.
Aspin refuted Pope-Chuck-style evidence reported by the NY Times,
as well:
Q1) The target missile had a radar transmitter to guide the test missile
to a direct hit.
Aspin: the test missile had no radar receiver on it. But the target
did have a transmitter, used for tracking during the test.
Q2) The target missile was heated to 100 degrees C to fake the test.
Aspin: the missile was heated, but that was in the design of the
experiment. The sensitivity of the heat seaker in the test
missile was not what was being tested. And the US Office of
Science and Technology said the test was well designed and enacted.
Q3) The test missile had a digital link to help guide it to its target.
Aspin: the link wasn't used.
Q4) Congress was fooled into further funding of SDI.
Aspin: The test was performed in 1984. At the time, there was no
requirement that congress be notified of Special Access (soviet
disinformation parts of experiments). A law requiring congressional
notification was passed in 1988, and it's been adhered to. I refuse
to confirm or deny any such Special Access programs, but 100% of
them are reported to congress. And since the test was a sucess,
congress wasn't fooled into anything. There's also no other test
of any kind that was rigged to fool congress.
Yep, this is off the top of my head. Take my word for it, or don't
take my word for it. I don't care. If you don't take my word for
it, tough doo doo.
: --
Don McGregor
Mike Schwartz <my...@shell.portal.com> wrote:
And since the test was a sucess,
congress wasn't fooled into anything. There's also no other test
of any kind that was rigged to fool congress.
And all that purple prose about the betrayal of the American
people by the evil pentagon gone to waste!
--
Don McGregor | POOR IMPULSE CONTROL
mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu|
Mark Eckenwiler
>Don McGregor (mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU) wrote:
>
>: The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
>: been faked at all.
>
>: > WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
>: >reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
>: >interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
>: >of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
>Aspin refuted Pope-Chuck-style evidence reported by the NY Times,
>as well:
Y'know, if Dan Rostenkowski's best friend made public claims that
Rosty didn't do anything wrong WRT the House post office, the Limbaugh
fans among us would laugh to scorn anyone who offered those claims as
"proof."
Oddly enough, when long-time SDI supporter Les Aspin purports to
debunk the "SDI disinformation" story, he's magically credible.
Curiouser and curiouser . . . .
--
Shut up and wave yer flag, boy.
Mark Eckenwiler e...@panix.com ...!cmcl2!panix!eck
Mike Schwartz
: In <CD5qw...@unix.portal.com>, my...@shell.portal.com sez:
: >Don McGregor (mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU) wrote:
: >
: >: The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
: >: been faked at all.
: >
: >: > WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
: >: >reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
: >: >interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
: >: >of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
: >Aspin refuted Pope-Chuck-style evidence reported by the NY Times,
: >as well:
: Y'know, if Dan Rostenkowski's best friend made public claims that
: Rosty didn't do anything wrong WRT the House post office, the Limbaugh
: fans among us would laugh to scorn anyone who offered those claims as
: "proof."
Not true, Mark. I've said it before and I'll say it now. Pay close
attention: I believe there are reasonable explanations for what Rosty
did. I'm willing to let him have his say, and then make my own judgement.
And my own judgement is just that.
If I have any gripe, it's that the prosecutors aren't "out to get"
Rosty or the Keating 3 or the Senator who leaked the Anita Hill FBI
documents. And that they don't use the clearly ethical and morally
correct technique of making scurrilous accusations against the accused
in the press (Nightline, etc.).
: Oddly enough, when long-time SDI supporter Les Aspin purports to
: debunk the "SDI disinformation" story, he's magically credible.
: Curiouser and curiouser . . . .
The curious part is that it was Aspin's word vs. the New York Times.
Whose word are you gonna take?
: --
Don McGregor
Mike Schwartz <my...@shell.portal.com> wrote:
>Mark Eckenwiler (e...@panix.com) wrote:
>
>: Oddly enough, when long-time SDI supporter Les Aspin purports to
>: debunk the "SDI disinformation" story, he's magically credible.
>
>Whose word are you gonna take?
>
Indeed. The NYT quotes unnamed sources, and changes its story
once or twice about the specifics of the test. Aspin goes on
the public record, by name, in front of the TV cameras, after
an investigation, and refutes the NYT story. If Aspin is
lying, he just kissed his public career goodbye, since you have
to assume that the truth about the test would eventually
have come out. Aspin is a pretty smart guy. I don't think
he's going to hari-kari himself to save the reputation of
a Republican administration about something he had no responsibility
for. (he could play it as the aggreived party, since he was
obstensibly one of the persons being lied to.)
Looks to me like the NYT screwed up, or got bum info.
So just what standard of proof would satisfy Mark that the
initial report was false?
Keith Dow
>
>The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
>been faked at all.
>
>> WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
>>reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
>>interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
>>of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
>> ``To sum up,'' Aspin said, ``the experiment was not rigged and
>>deception did not take place, although a program to practice deception
>>existed.''
>[...]
>> ``Overall,'' Aspin said, ``our conclusion on the experiment is this:
>>It was not rigged by the inclusion of a radar beacon on the target, nor
>>by any other means. The experiment demonstrated that the final guidance
>>of the interceptor to a direct hit was done by the on-board heat seeker.
>
>Turns out to have been just another successful piece of technology
>in Reagan's overall program of defeating the Soviets in the
>Cold War.
Nancy and her astrologer sure knew what they were doing. I am sure
her astrologer said, "Nancy, the answer is in the Stars." Nancy took
this literally and decided the answer to the Soviet threat had to
be in the Stars. That is how Star Wars started.
--
Keith Dow A silicon valley guy.
Give me a Macintosh or give me death.
"Ditto? Ditto? You provincial putz!" Harvey Corman in Blazing Saddles
Michael Carley
>In article <26pbbu...@flop.ENGR.ORST.EDU> mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor) writes:
>>
>>The much bally-hooed "faked" star wars test turns out to have not
>>been faked at all.
>>
>>> WASHINGTON (UPI) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin denied published
>>>reports Thursday that a critical 1984 ``Star Wars'' missile warhead
>>>interception test had been faked, but he revealed that such a deception
>>>of the Soviet Union had at least been tried.
>>> ``To sum up,'' Aspin said, ``the experiment was not rigged and
>>>deception did not take place, although a program to practice deception
>>>existed.''
>>[...]
>>> ``Overall,'' Aspin said, ``our conclusion on the experiment is this:
>>>It was not rigged by the inclusion of a radar beacon on the target, nor
>>>by any other means. The experiment demonstrated that the final guidance
>>>of the interceptor to a direct hit was done by the on-board heat seeker.
>>
>>Turns out to have been just another successful piece of technology
>>in Reagan's overall program of defeating the Soviets in the
>>Cold War.
>Nancy and her astrologer sure knew what they were doing. I am sure
>her astrologer said, "Nancy, the answer is in the Stars." Nancy took
>this literally and decided the answer to the Soviet threat had to
>be in the Stars. That is how Star Wars started.
Actually, the CIA got a fair bit of inspiration from Ian Fleming,
creator of James Bond. On one occasion, he had dinner with JF Kennedy
(then President-elect) and Mr Dulles and was asked how he would handle
Castro. He replied that he would make Castro's beard fall out, because
without bearded revolutionaries, you can't have a revolution. Within 2
years the CIA was experimenting with a sort of facial Agent Orange which
would make Castro's beard fall out and expose him to the ridicule of his
people. This is true.
Keith Dow
>In article <CD9rw...@unix.portal.com>,
>Mike Schwartz <my...@shell.portal.com> wrote:
>>Mark Eckenwiler (e...@panix.com) wrote:
>>: Oddly enough, when long-time SDI supporter Les Aspin purports to
>>: debunk the "SDI disinformation" story, he's magically credible.
>>The curious part is that it was Aspin's word vs. the New York Times.
>>Whose word are you gonna take?
>Indeed. The NYT quotes unnamed sources, and changes its story
>once or twice about the specifics of the test. Aspin goes on
>the public record, by name, in front of the TV cameras, after
>an investigation, and refutes the NYT story. If Aspin is
>lying, he just kissed his public career goodbye,
Yeah, right, and it is called the Reagan effect. As we all know,
anybody who lies in public gets thrown out of public life.
> since you have
>to assume that the truth about the test would eventually
>have come out. Aspin is a pretty smart guy. I don't think
>he's going to hari-kari himself to save the reputation of
>a Republican administration about something he had no responsibility
>for.
The stooge who helped fund it also has his fingers in the pie.
> (he could play it as the aggreived party, since he was
>obstensibly one of the persons being lied to.)
>Looks to me like the NYT screwed up, or got bum info.
Looks like you screwed up Don.
>So just what standard of proof would satisfy Mark that the
>initial report was false?
Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
lab. What more proof does Don need?
Karl Dussik
>
>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>
Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it. They
just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
than the entire Soviet space establishment.
I'd say getting the U.S.S.R. to spend $10B per year of their own money to
counter a system we were spending less than half of that on (and with our
GDP at least twice as large) was useful in itself.
And as for achieving its other goals, perhaps if there had not been so many
members of Congress with the same goal as the U.S.S.R. - stopping SDI -
voting on appropriations for it, it would have had adequate resources.
In any case, SDI was a key ingredient in the U.S. (under Ronald Reagan)
winning the Cold War. You may not like it... which makes me wonder - why
don't you and others of the same political persuasion like it? Do you
hate Reagan so much you'd rather we had not won under his watch? Listen,
I think Carter was one of the greatest boobs ever in the White House
(including those just visiting :-), but if he had piloted our victory over
the U.S.S.R., I would have applauded. If fact, I would have preferred the
victims of communism be freed 8 years earlier than they were. Unfortunately,
Carter's policies strengthened the U.S.S.R. and its grip of tyranny over
the people of many countries. It was only after Afghanistan that Carter
realized how foolish he had been and began the rebuilding of the U.S.
military (in fact, his project defense spending for the early 80's was even
higher than Reagan's). The speed required for this rebuilding was one
reason we had to spend so much. Now we have another boob in the White House
dismantling our defenses again. I sure hope more people don't have to pay
for Clinton's stupidity like they did for Carter's.
>--
>Keith Dow A silicon valley guy.
Karl Dussik
--
Bill Clinton doesn't _feel_ your pain.
He _is_ your pain!
Keith Ramsay
|In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com
(Keith Dow) writes:
|>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
|>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
|>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
|>lab. What more proof does Don need?
|
|Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it.
Hawks in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been happily using this
"the Other Side is doing it, so it must make sense" argument for a
very long time. The Soviets weren't *more* rational about their
military planning than we were, however, so it doesn't make sense to
judge the rationality of our military planning by referring to theirs.
Recall how much effort the U.S.S.R. put into "applying" Lysenko's
genetic theories to agriculture. How the U.S.S.R. spent money is not
a very good way to judge how necessary or useful it was.
|They
|just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
|to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
|than the entire Soviet space establishment.
It is quite possible that the Soviets had people in positions of
authority who were about as intelligent as you, and (for reasons which
probably don't have a lot to do with how intelligent or unintelligent
they were) reasoned similarly to you that if the Other Side was
spending so much money on something, it had to be for a good reason.
In addition, at times people like to spend money doing things which
are known not to be necessary, not because they are idiots, but
because they like to spend money, and because they have enough
influence to get it anyway, perhaps with an excuse about national
security.
The Soviets also probably would have disagreed with you about the
ultimate goal of SDI. When the majority of physicists in the American
Physical Society agree that SDI is unworkable, they are thinking
perhaps of the stated goal of rendering ICBMs "obsolete" as offensive
weapons. But there was also the idea passed around of using SDI in
conjunction with a first strike. I believe that the Soviet planners
were as easily frightened about "the other side" having first-strike
plans as ours were. Someone who is planning a first strike probably
would want to have a missile defense system to minimize the effects of
retaliation, from the weapons which weren't destroyed in the strike.
In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
attack satellites in fixed orbits or installations on the ground, than
to attack ICBMs en route or while boosting from the ground. You also
get to decide when you're ready to do it, rather than having to have a
system ready at all times.
I'm not saying that a first-strike attempt would have been sane. Good
grief no. But this is the kind of thinking that could have caused the
Soviets to worry about an SDI system, even if they were not convinced
it would be enough to serve as a meaningful "defense shield". People
in the U.S. were, after all, citing Soviet civil defense plans as
evidence that the Soviets were interested in trying to win a nuclear
war, even though there was not much evidence that their society could
have survived intact.
I also suspect that some of the Soviet rulers had even more naive
faith in American technology than Ronald Reagan did.
|I'd say getting the U.S.S.R. to spend $10B per year of their own money to
|counter a system we were spending less than half of that on (and with our
|GDP at least twice as large) was useful in itself.
I have heard this idea that we "bankrupted" them before. But remember
that SDI was advertised in a very different manner beforehand. This
"bankrupt the U.S.S.R." notion is being specially emphasized in
hindsight.
|And as for achieving its other goals, perhaps if there had not been so many
|members of Congress with the same goal as the U.S.S.R. - stopping SDI -
|voting on appropriations for it, it would have had adequate resources.
Adequate to do what?
I think that the Congress had, in part, the goal of avoiding putting
the U.S. into economic trouble too. That seems worthwhile, doesn't it?
|In any case, SDI was a key ingredient in the U.S. (under Ronald Reagan)
|winning the Cold War.
The Soviet system had deep, deep, flaws, and was in serious trouble,
even without our giving them additional excuses to increase their
military spending. I think you are making the "post hoc, ergo propter
hoc" fallacy: just because the Soviet system fell apart after we did
certain things doesn't mean that we caused it to happen.
|[...]
Keith Ramsay
ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
Don McGregor
Keith Ramsay <ram...@unixg.ubc.ca> wrote:
>
>Hawks in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been happily using this
>"the Other Side is doing it, so it must make sense" argument for a
>very long time. The Soviets weren't *more* rational about their
>military planning than we were, however, so it doesn't make sense to
>judge the rationality of our military planning by referring to theirs.
>
US military policy should be made _without_ reference to Soviet
responses!?
You're engaging in mirror-imaging of the worst sort here. You're
saying "well, if _I_ were in charge of the USSR, I wouldn't
worry about SDI." In point of fact, the Soviets were extremely
worried about SDI, and US policy planners have to consider
what the Soviets actually do, not what we wish they'd do.
So, given the objective fact that the Soviets were deeply worried
about SDI, the question becomes how to exploit that fear to
gain what we can from it. At the _very_ least, the US could
have extracted significant arms control concessions from the
Soviets in exchange for SDI (as advocated by McFarlane, in a
sort of 'great sting' operation.) Reagan's devotion to the
project wound up, serendipitously, to be a magnificent
negotiating position. I think the establishment would have
quickly thrown it to the wolves, without fully exploring
the Soviet fears. Eventually, killing SDI became probably the
primary Soviet objective, for which the were willing to
trade nearly anything.
--
Don McGregor | On the Internet, no one can tell you're
mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu| a dog.
Paul Flaherty
>The Soviets also probably would have disagreed with you about the
>ultimate goal of SDI. When the majority of physicists in the American
>Physical Society agree that SDI is unworkable, they are thinking
>perhaps of the stated goal of rendering ICBMs "obsolete" as offensive
>weapons. But there was also the idea passed around of using SDI in
>conjunction with a first strike. I believe that the Soviet planners
>were as easily frightened about "the other side" having first-strike
>plans as ours were. Someone who is planning a first strike probably
>would want to have a missile defense system to minimize the effects of
>retaliation, from the weapons which weren't destroyed in the strike.
An interesting paragraph. First of all, the vast majority of SDIO money
went to engineering research, not physics, so the opinion of APS is somewhat
irrelevant, if not hostile. Secondly, "Obsolete" is in itself a vague goal.
If obsolete means "destroy every warhead that the Soviets are capable of
lobbing", then yes, it's unworkable. But if the goal is to destroy most of
the warheads, enough to make the outcome of a first strike unpredictable, then
yes, SDI was capable of that, in fact it's arguable that SABRE could have
done it twenty years earlier. A Strategic Defense system is only useful in
support of a first strike if its capable of the first goal, which, by any
reasonable estimate, is untrue.
Finally, as to your last sentence, it is worth noting that the only ballistic
missile defense system currently in operation is the Moscow BMDS, which by
your own argument would imply that the Soviets planned a first strike.
--
-=Paul Flaherty, N9FZX | "The National Anthem has become The Whine."
->pa...@Stanford.EDU | -- Charles Sykes, _A Nation of Victims_
Don McGregor
>that SDI was advertised in a very different manner beforehand. This
>"bankrupt the U.S.S.R." notion is being specially emphasized in
>hindsight.
>
of the 80's: to redress a perceived strategic imbalance in the
favor or the Soviets, and to force arms control concessions.
(The two reasons were often advanced by distinct groups in the
administration. These were two constituencies advocating the
same actions for different reasons). The latter had as an
implicit subtext exactly what you describe above.
Early in the 80's, Reagan was asked what the likely Soviet response
the US buildup would be. He replied that they wouldn't be able to
respond; they were at the end of their economic tether. Therefore
they would be forced to accept the US buildup, and probably be
forced to make concessions to prevent being overwhelmed by the US.
Here's an excerpt from Reagan's 1982 Westminister speech:
"In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing
today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands
of the ecomomic order are conflicting directly with those
of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the
free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet
Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide
of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its
citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty."
It was also realized that SDI would present huge difficulties
to the Soviets compared to the US. Here's another quote
"McFarlane believed taht development of a large-scale US ballistic
missile defense might change the equation, forcing the Soviets to compete
with American technology in the development of highly sophisticated
technologies that required extraordinarily powerful computers and
complex software that could distinguish between real missile
warheads and decoys. The prospective obstacles and costs
of such competition in multiple technologies were staggering."
[_Reagan_, Lou Cannon p. 325]
ADM Watkins, an early advocate, also thought SDI played to
American strengths and Soviet weaknesses:
"Watkins wanted to offset the Soviet advantage in land-based
ICBMs, and he believed that missile defense offered the promise of doing
this. As Watkins told his staff, 'The genius of this country is
to take a new technological concept (which the Soviets may well
have in their minds, as we do) and build it--field it--which
they can't do. So why don't we use our applied technological
genius to achieve oru deterrent instead of sticking with
an offensive land-based rocket exchange which tey will win every time?...
We shouldn't continue to play a game like that."
[ibid, p. 327]
Don McGregor
>conjunction with a first strike. I believe that the Soviet planners
>were as easily frightened about "the other side" having first-strike
>plans as ours were. Someone who is planning a first strike probably
>would want to have a missile defense system to minimize the effects of
>retaliation, from the weapons which weren't destroyed in the strike.
>
have weapons that are not vulnerable to attack. Since SDI
would have decreased the vulnerability of US weapons such as
land-based ICBMs and bomber bases, it should have been considered
a stabilizing influence.
It is unlikely that SDI would have been leak-proof enough to
prevent damage to cities, though. So an actual system would
probably have retained MAD, while increasing the security of
existing weapons systems from preemptive attack. Good all
the way around.
This is just common sense as well. If protecting weapons were
a bad thing, we'd build missile silos out in the open, instead
of with yards of concrete renforcing.
Reagan wanted SDI to ultimately render nuclear weapons "impotent
and obsolete." While Reagan was instinctive rather than analytical,
I think history has shown that his instincts were astonishingly
good. So I think we ignore him at our peril.
The original SALT and ABM treaties essentially banned ABM defense
while channeling competition into offensive weapons. The SALT
treaties weren't limitations in any meaningful sense. For
example, the first treaty set as a 'limit' for Soviet missiles
the *high end estimate* by the Pentagon for what the Soviets were
capable of doing.
I have to wonder if we didn't get it wrong. Perhaps it would
have been better to (mostly) ban _offensive_ weapons while
encouraging competition in _defensive_ weapons. This has the
positive aspects of being "stable" in the face of small-scale
violations, since adding 100 or so warheads might still be
caught via "latent arms control" during the boost phase.
Chris Holt
[SDI and first strikes]
>In classical deterence theory, it is considered _stabilizing_ to
>have weapons that are not vulnerable to attack. Since SDI
>would have decreased the vulnerability of US weapons such as
>land-based ICBMs and bomber bases, it should have been considered
>a stabilizing influence.
This assumes that SDI would not *in and of itself* add to
offensive capabilities; in several of the visualizations,
parts of it could be used in a first strike.
>It is unlikely that SDI would have been leak-proof enough to
>prevent damage to cities, though. So an actual system would
>probably have retained MAD, while increasing the security of
>existing weapons systems from preemptive attack. Good all
>the way around.
However, the way SDI was being sold to the US public was as
foolproof, i.e. good enough to protect cities. You can argue
that the Soviets were sophisticated enough to know that this
was infeasible; but Reagan himself gave the impression of
believing it.
>This is just common sense as well. If protecting weapons were
>a bad thing, we'd build missile silos out in the open, instead
>of with yards of concrete renforcing.
There's a lot more to it than that. It has been argued that
the transition from Minuteman and Polaris was destabilizing,
because the increased accuracy made first strike look more
plausible.
>Reagan wanted SDI to ultimately render nuclear weapons "impotent
>and obsolete." While Reagan was instinctive rather than analytical,
>I think history has shown that his instincts were astonishingly
>good. So I think we ignore him at our peril.
Like when he refused to match the USSR nuclear test ban,
even after it had been running for a year and a half?
>The original SALT and ABM treaties essentially banned ABM defense
>while channeling competition into offensive weapons. The SALT
>treaties weren't limitations in any meaningful sense. For
>example, the first treaty set as a 'limit' for Soviet missiles
>the *high end estimate* by the Pentagon for what the Soviets were
>capable of doing.
>I have to wonder if we didn't get it wrong. Perhaps it would
>have been better to (mostly) ban _offensive_ weapons while
>encouraging competition in _defensive_ weapons. This has the
>positive aspects of being "stable" in the face of small-scale
>violations, since adding 100 or so warheads might still be
>caught via "latent arms control" during the boost phase.
The problem is it's very difficult to develop defensive weapons
that can't be turned to offense very quickly. How do you
certify that the latter hasn't been done?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Science, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am a Bear of Very Little Brain and long proofs Bother Me.
Don McGregor
> [SDI and first strikes]
>
>>In classical deterence theory, it is considered _stabilizing_ to
>>have weapons that are not vulnerable to attack. Since SDI
>>would have decreased the vulnerability of US weapons such as
>>land-based ICBMs and bomber bases, it should have been considered
>>a stabilizing influence.
>
>This assumes that SDI would not *in and of itself* add to
>offensive capabilities; in several of the visualizations,
>parts of it could be used in a first strike.
>
use of laser weapons as offensive weapons; why not just use,
you know, regular offensive weapons?
One of the more popular configurations was kinetic-energy kill
vehicles, which would have essentially nil offensive use.
>However, the way SDI was being sold to the US public was as
>foolproof, i.e. good enough to protect cities. You can argue
>that the Soviets were sophisticated enough to know that this
>was infeasible; but Reagan himself gave the impression of
>believing it.
>
Oh, I think Reagan believed it. Visionaries aren't always
practical.
But even if it _had_ been leakproof, what would we have had?
effectively, perfect arms control.
This would also have redirected the competition more to
conventional forces, which the US might have been at
a disadvantage at, but such is the price of avoiding
nuclear apocalyse, eh?
(Interestingly enough, Johnathon Schell, author of the
anti-nuclear _Fate of the Earth_, also eventually
favored a strategic defense system. Reagan is far more
of a nuclear radical than most people give him
credit for.)
>>This is just common sense as well. If protecting weapons were
>>a bad thing, we'd build missile silos out in the open, instead
>>of with yards of concrete renforcing.
>
>There's a lot more to it than that. It has been argued that
>the transition from Minuteman and Polaris was destabilizing,
>because the increased accuracy made first strike look more
>plausible.
>
The reason they were considered destabilizing was that they
were potentially counter-force weapons, able to destroy
Soviet hard targets such as missile silos. From the MAD
perspective, the perfect weapon is completely invulnerable
until it is used, completely reliable, and only able to be
used against civilian or industrial targets. And
extremely destructive.
SDI would have, in its first release, probably been good
enough to protect the hard-to-kill military targets,
but not good enough to protect the cities against a
determined attack. Ergo, the perfect MAD weapon.
Assuming either 1) only the US has it, or 2) both the
US and the Soviets have it. The US has shown it can handle
a nuclear monopoly; I'd be less sanguine about the Soviets
ability to handle the responsibility.
Either way, the Soviets have to respond, which forces them
to compete in an area in which the US has a comparative
advantage. It also reduces the funds available for offensive
weapons production.
>Like when he refused to match the USSR nuclear test ban,
>even after it had been running for a year and a half?
>
I've never quite grasped what a nuclear test ban is
supposed to accomplish. I doubt that, say, North Korea
is going to be impressed by our restraint and not test.
And reliable weapons sound like a perfectly logical goal
to me.
Chris Holt
>>However, the way SDI was being sold to the US public was as
>>foolproof, i.e. good enough to protect cities. You can argue
>>that the Soviets were sophisticated enough to know that this
>>was infeasible; but Reagan himself gave the impression of
>>believing it.
>Oh, I think Reagan believed it. Visionaries aren't always
>practical.
Well, some of us find it worrying when people make decisions
involving lots of money, with significant political consequences,
and they don't understand what they're talking about.
>But even if it _had_ been leakproof, what would we have had?
>effectively, perfect arms control.
Perfect first-strike capability. Now, suppose you know
someone is building a system that will allow them to
destroy you with impunity, and they have declared that
they think you are evil. What are you going to do when
it's in the middle of being constructed? A very dodgy
question.
>This would also have redirected the competition more to
>conventional forces, which the US might have been at
>a disadvantage at, but such is the price of avoiding
>nuclear apocalyse, eh?
Maybe; I'm not sure it would work that way.
> ... The US has shown it can handle
>a nuclear monopoly; I'd be less sanguine about the Soviets
>ability to handle the responsibility.
I'm less sanguine about the US handling it now than in the
'40s. I'm not convinced there's been a Truman-calibre
president for quite a while.
>>Like when he refused to match the USSR nuclear test ban,
>>even after it had been running for a year and a half?
>>
>I've never quite grasped what a nuclear test ban is
>supposed to accomplish. I doubt that, say, North Korea
>is going to be impressed by our restraint and not test.
>And reliable weapons sound like a perfectly logical goal
>to me.
I'd say mainly it adds to world-wide diplomatic pressure.
If the US tests, it can't very well take the moral high
ground in condemning other tests; and countries just
entering the field probably need testing to develop
weapons they can rely on. [I doubt they have access to
the data and computer models that give confidence in
the absence of tests.]
Of course, a determined leader would go ahead and test
anyway; but a general consensus that testing leads to
trade embargos would help quite a bit. This sort of
thing can only come about after a prolonged period
in which testing does not occur.
drieux, just drieux
In article 25...@anasazi.com, ka...@anasazi.com (Karl Dussik) writes:
>In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com (Keith Dow) writes:
>>
>>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>>
>
>Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it. They
>just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
>to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
>than the entire Soviet space establishment.
the people who REALLY scared me were not the Propoganda
Mouthpieces who had Psychotic Delusions that some how
the SDI Program was Viable, but the IDIOTS who believed
the Propoganda Mouthpieces....
the quick set of questions is:
what is a 65cm tube launched system that
would have negated the whole SILLY SDI Game?
What does the euphenism SSGN mean?
What is the time to target from the coast to DC?
Who would have awaken Ronald Reagan Anyway?????
ciao
drieux
ps: why send a Billion Dollar Ballistic Missle from
Mother Russia......
--
Modern Problems:
"The Real World is Only for those persons who's
number theory has no square root of the negation of one."
Don McGregor
Chris Holt <Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>>Oh, I think Reagan believed it. Visionaries aren't always
>>practical.
>
>Well, some of us find it worrying when people make decisions
>involving lots of money, with significant political consequences,
>and they don't understand what they're talking about.
>
details. Reagan was not analytical, which disturbs some
people. But his instincts were usually right on target.
It's often frustrating or puzzling for me to understand as
well; getting a grip on Reagan is extremely difficult.
Even his offical biographer (mmm, Edmund Morris, book coming out
shortly, prior biographer for TR, well-respected historian
given high-level access during the last term) has said
that he's an impossible man to really know.
>>But even if it _had_ been leakproof, what would we have had?
>>effectively, perfect arms control.
>
>Perfect first-strike capability. Now, suppose you know
>someone is building a system that will allow them to
>destroy you with impunity, and they have declared that
>they think you are evil. What are you going to do when
>it's in the middle of being constructed?
>
During the building phase the same dynamic of MAD applies.
Again, why would they commit national suicide on a doubtful
endeavor?
There's also Reagan's offer to share technology, which was
also interesting in an odd way. Perhaps this was another
instinctive insight, a realization that a dual SDI system with
low offensive weapons was more stable.
Interestingly enough, during the interwar period bombers
were thought of in much the same way that nuclear
weapons are thought of today. The phrase of the day
was "the bomber always gets through." Much of the popular
imagary was of devestated cities. Chamberlain described
flying up the Thames after Munich and imagining he was
in a bomber, ready to rain destruction on the houses
below.
Churchill floated the idea of the League of Nations offering
a prize for the group best able to come up with an idea
for countering bombers, the results to be shared with the
world. And UK research in Radar helped solve the intercept
problem. A sort of bomber-era SDI.
Keith Ramsay
in the following. Re-quote accordingly.
In article <ramsay.7...@unixg.ubc.ca>, I wrote:
|Hawks in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been happily using this
|"the Other Side is doing it, so it must make sense" argument for a
|very long time. The Soviets weren't *more* rational about their
|military planning than we were, however, so it doesn't make sense to
|judge the rationality of our military planning by referring to theirs.
mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor)
|US military policy should be made _without_ reference to Soviet
|responses!?
You're taking me too literally.
Someone indicated that SDI couldn't work. It was suggested he must
consider himself "smarter" than the Soviet military. After all, the
Soviets thought it "workable" enough to consider it a threat.
It was in the context of discussing *that* argument that I claimed we
should not judge the rationality of our military planning by referring
to theirs. (Perhaps "comparing" would've been a better word.) (Don't
you find, by the way, that organizations are sometimes much stupider
than their individual members?)
|You're engaging in mirror-imaging of the worst sort here.
I think not.
|You're
|saying "well, if _I_ were in charge of the USSR, I wouldn't
|worry about SDI."
No, this is not what I said (although it is true that I wouldn't have
been as worried about it as they). I argued that the fact that the
Soviets worried about it doesn't mean that it must've been workable.
Those, like Reagan apparently, who thought it was plausible that it
would serve as a "defensive shield" were being naive. Most of the
others in the U.S. administration "selling" SDI apparently were
willing to fool the public in order to bluff the Soviets.
I find it very annoying that it was considered acceptable to present a
weapons system to the U.S. public in such a deceptive way. It's a
fundamentally anti-democratic strategy.
|In point of fact, the Soviets were extremely
|worried about SDI, and US policy planners have to consider
|what the Soviets actually do, not what we wish they'd do.
Correct. IMHO scaring the Soviets silly was a foolish risk to take,
although I don't expect to convince anybody of that here.
|So, given the objective fact that the Soviets were deeply worried
|about SDI, the question becomes how to exploit that fear to
|gain what we can from it. At the _very_ least, the US could
|have extracted significant arms control concessions from the
|Soviets in exchange for SDI (as advocated by McFarlane, in a
|sort of 'great sting' operation.)
Before one does any of this, one should have a clear idea of what you
consider a "gain" and a "loss". For example, was it desirable or
undesirable to have the Soviets spending more on their military? The
overt position was that additional spending on their part generally
constituted a *threat*, which we didn't want. We wanted to negotiate
them out of making those sorts of expenditures, etc.
Now it is claimed that we had shrewdly recognized it as an beneficial
*opportunity* to push the Soviets over the edge economically, by
getting them to spend more on their military than was to their
advantage in surviving as a system. I propose that there was no such
coherent sophisticated policy; what we really had was a confused
position in which both ideas were being used to sell SDI, with the
emphasis being shifted in hindsight.
| Reagan's devotion to the
|project wound up, serendipitously, to be a magnificent
|negotiating position.
A magnificent negotiating position should start out with a clear view
of one's true objectives.
I wrote:
|The Soviets also probably would have disagreed with you about the
|ultimate goal of SDI. When the majority of physicists in the American
|Physical Society agree that SDI is unworkable, they are thinking
|perhaps of the stated goal of rendering ICBMs "obsolete" as offensive
|weapons. But there was also the idea passed around of using SDI in
|conjunction with a first strike. I believe that the Soviet planners
|were as easily frightened about "the other side" having first-strike
|plans as ours were. Someone who is planning a first strike probably
|would want to have a missile defense system to minimize the effects of
|retaliation, from the weapons which weren't destroyed in the strike.
pa...@Csli.Stanford.EDU (Paul Flaherty) writes:
|An interesting paragraph. First of all, the vast majority of SDIO money
|went to engineering research, not physics, so the opinion of APS is somewhat
|irrelevant, if not hostile.
There was a non-negligible physics component. The engineering research
was, as usual, based ultimately on physical principles. I know of no
indication that the general assessment of the physicists as to what
could and could not be made to work has turned out to be inaccurate.
If their opinion was hostile, I suggest it was with good reason. How
much of your country's research money do you want to go to support a
flim-flam? Should you be content about it? Physicists of my
acquaintance also found it upsetting that the general discourse in
society was going on in the absense of the relevant physical facts,
descending into a maze of posturing, perceptions, and bargaining
chips.
|Secondly, "Obsolete" is in itself a vague goal.
I agree. That was the goal which Reagan first set for it, however-- I
believe he used the phrase "impotent and obsolete" in his speech. As
planned, there was no way SDI was going to come near this goal,
however you interpret it. The only credible way I can see to get near
this requires largely getting out of MAD territory first.
|If obsolete means "destroy every warhead that the Soviets are capable of
|lobbing", then yes, it's unworkable.
Thank you.
|But if the goal is to destroy most of
|the warheads, enough to make the outcome of a first strike unpredictable, then
|yes, SDI was capable of that, in fact it's arguable that SABRE could have
|done it twenty years earlier.
Certainly no sane person would have bet upon succeeding at a first
strike. *Nothing* was needed for this. And none of this can
reasonably be regarded as making ICBMs "obsolete".
|A Strategic Defense system is only useful in
|support of a first strike if its capable of the first goal, which, by any
|reasonable estimate, is untrue.
I happen to agree that it wouldn't have been useful in support of a
first strike. Note however that I was discussing the fears of Soviet
military planners. Do you believe that their response to SDI was based
upon a "reasonable estimate" of its potential efficacy?
|Finally, as to your last sentence, it is worth noting that the only ballistic
|missile defense system currently in operation is the Moscow BMDS, which by
|your own argument would imply that the Soviets planned a first strike.
No, my argument does not support this. Let me be clear about this.
There are other motives for setting up a ballistic missile defense
system than to prepare for a first-strike. Yet certain people, are
liable to _perceive_ it as more likely that the other side was
preparing a first strike, because the other side was working on a
ballistic missile defense system. For example, I remember it being
argued in the U.S. that the Soviets' "defensive" moves (civil defense
e.g.) should be regarded as such a threat. (I didn't buy this argument
myself.) The analogous worry is probably one of the reasons that the
Soviets were worried about SDI, not because we were necessarily
preparing genocide for them, but because they weren't completely sure
about it. This at least may have been used by them as an argument to
spend the reputed $10 billion per year to counter it.
In article <ramsay.7...@unixg.ubc.ca>, I wrote:
|weapons. But there was also the idea passed around of using SDI in
|conjunction with a first strike. I believe that the Soviet planners
|were as easily frightened about "the other side" having first-strike
|plans as ours were. Someone who is planning a first strike probably
|would want to have a missile defense system to minimize the effects of
|retaliation, from the weapons which weren't destroyed in the strike.
mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor) writes:
|In classical deterence theory, it is considered _stabilizing_ to
|have weapons that are not vulnerable to attack. Since SDI
|would have decreased the vulnerability of US weapons such as
|land-based ICBMs and bomber bases, it should have been considered
|a stabilizing influence.
Stabilizing, in the sense that, theoretically, fewer ICBMs and bombers
would be needed to be sure of having an effective retaliation. But we
already had more than enough. Not to mention submarines.
On the other hand, if one uses it to defend cities as well, you are
possibly making the Soviets believe they require more ICBMs to ensure
a retaliation, which is destabilizing. Which tendancy do you suppose
was winning out?
|It is unlikely that SDI would have been leak-proof enough to
|prevent damage to cities, though. So an actual system would
|probably have retained MAD, while increasing the security of
|existing weapons systems from preemptive attack. Good all
|the way around.
If this was the idea, then it should have bloody well been advertised
as such. Oh yes, eventually it was conceded that SDI was (at that
date) mainly for defending weapons-- which makes a mockery of the
originally claimed plan.
If the policy of the administration in the U.S. had anything to do
with retaining MAD, but adding "stability", there would have been more
interest in undoing our big de-stabilizing move, which was to MIRV our
ICBMs. And indeed there were intelligent people proposing that this is
just what we should do: replace the MIRVs with smaller,
single-warhead, mobile missiles. There also would have been more
interest in a moratorium on testing, to slow the development of more
advanced warheads.
|This is just common sense as well. If protecting weapons were
|a bad thing, we'd build missile silos out in the open, instead
|of with yards of concrete renforcing.
Of course.
|Reagan wanted SDI to ultimately render nuclear weapons "impotent
|and obsolete." While Reagan was instinctive rather than analytical,
I'll say. :-)
|I think history has shown that his instincts were astonishingly
|good. So I think we ignore him at our peril.
I think we followed him at our peril. This was the fellow who was
unclear about whether he could recall launched SLBMs. Instincts are
great, but let us try to have leaders who PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO
FACT as well. We shouldn't have to hunt them down with the media and
force them to do it all the time.
[...]
|I have to wonder if we didn't get it wrong. Perhaps it would
|have been better to (mostly) ban _offensive_ weapons while
|encouraging competition in _defensive_ weapons. This has the
|positive aspects of being "stable" in the face of small-scale
|violations, since adding 100 or so warheads might still be
|caught via "latent arms control" during the boost phase.
Could be. You might read the relevant portion of _Infinite in all
Directions_ by Freeman Dyson.
|>This assumes that SDI would not *in and of itself* add to
|>offensive capabilities; in several of the visualizations,
|>parts of it could be used in a first strike.
|>
|Entirely system dependent. I was unpersuaded by one proposed
|use of laser weapons as offensive weapons; why not just use,
|you know, regular offensive weapons?
|
|One of the more popular configurations was kinetic-energy kill
|vehicles, which would have essentially nil offensive use.
I recall some of the research being turned to design/development of
anti-satellite weapons (which is probably easier). Nobody really likes
having their "spy satellites" knocked out of the sky during a crisis,
blinding them. I think this would be generally considered an offensive
act. :-)
It might be interesting, in a sad sort of way, to know what the
worst-case scenario was that the Soviets were worried about.
[...]
|>Like when he refused to match the USSR nuclear test ban,
|>even after it had been running for a year and a half?
|>
|I've never quite grasped what a nuclear test ban is
|supposed to accomplish. I doubt that, say, North Korea
|is going to be impressed by our restraint and not test.
|And reliable weapons sound like a perfectly logical goal
|to me.
I find it hard to believe that this "reliable weapons" claim was
anything but a ruse. The weapons were as reliable as they needed to
be, as far as posing a retaliatory threat. (What, not *every single*
warhead would be delivered and detonated? What a loss!) Meanwhile,
so-called "third generation" nuclear weapons were being developed.
Keith Ramsay
Don McGregor
thought differently. Margret Thatcher also gives credit
to Reagan and SDI, as this description of a rubber chicken
dinner illustrates:
-----
Another questioner asked Lady Thatcher to describe what was most
responsible for the defeat and disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Lady Thatcher replied that two things were responsible for
this. The first was Ronald Reagan and his support for SDI, which
made the USSR realize that it could not keep up with the United
States.
The second reason was how the West kept hounding the Soviets on
the lack of respect for human dignity throughout the Marxist
world. Lady Thatcher recalled that she once pointed out to
President Gorbachev that while the western world put guards on
its borders to keep people out, the Soviet Union was posting
guards to keep its people in. She asked why the USSR was having
this unique problem.
-------------
Karl Dussik
>ka...@anasazi.com (Karl Dussik) writes:
>|In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com
> (Keith Dow) writes:
>|>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>|>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>|>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>|>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>|
>|Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it.
>
>genetic theories to agriculture. How the U.S.S.R. spent money is not
>a very good way to judge how necessary or useful it was.
That's not a fair analogy - supporting Lysenko's theories was more a
fanatical religious act than a military effort. Furthermore, I don't
think the U.S.S.R. was on the brink of economic collapse during Lysenko's
time.
>
>|They
>|just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
>|to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
>|than the entire Soviet space establishment.
>
>It is quite possible that the Soviets had people in positions of
>authority who were about as intelligent as you, and (for reasons which
>probably don't have a lot to do with how intelligent or unintelligent
>they were) reasoned similarly to you that if the Other Side was
>spending so much money on something, it had to be for a good reason.
>
>In addition, at times people like to spend money doing things which
>are known not to be necessary, not because they are idiots, but
>because they like to spend money, and because they have enough
>influence to get it anyway, perhaps with an excuse about national
>security.
>
You keep ignoring the issue of how little money the U.S.S.R. had.
>In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
>offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
>attack satellites in fixed orbits or installations on the ground, than
>to attack ICBMs en route or while boosting from the ground. You also
>get to decide when you're ready to do it, rather than having to have a
>system ready at all times.
My understanding of parts of SDI was that the weapons systems used against
ICBM's were incapable of penetrating the atmosphere.
>
> People in the U.S. were, after all, citing Soviet civil defense plans as
>evidence that the Soviets were interested in trying to win a nuclear
>war, even though there was not much evidence that their society could
>have survived intact.
I heard more about their ability to protect the high command. The U.S.S.R.
hasn't exactly demonstrated an overwhelming interest in protecting its own
citizens, especially considering how many the government has murdered.
>|I'd say getting the U.S.S.R. to spend $10B per year of their own money to
>|counter a system we were spending less than half of that on (and with our
>|GDP at least twice as large) was useful in itself.
>
>I have heard this idea that we "bankrupted" them before. But remember
>that SDI was advertised in a very different manner beforehand. This
>"bankrupt the U.S.S.R." notion is being specially emphasized in
>hindsight.
Really? How do you think the arms race was sold here - certainly not that
we would ever use it first. It was argued that they could not keep up
technologically or financially. I've heard arguments about the disparate
percentage of GNP the respective militaries have been spending since at
least the early 80's.
>|And as for achieving its other goals, perhaps if there had not been so many
>|members of Congress with the same goal as the U.S.S.R. - stopping SDI -
>|voting on appropriations for it, it would have had adequate resources.
>
>Adequate to do what?
Adequate to deploy a system sufficient to 1) counter an accidental or rogue
launch - this is important because if such an event occurred it could put
the President in the position of having to retaliate; 2) make the U.S.S.R.
much less confident that a first strike could succeed.
>
>I think that the Congress had, in part, the goal of avoiding putting
>the U.S. into economic trouble too. That seems worthwhile, doesn't it?
You're joking, right? Congress worried about economic trouble? Then
they should have looked at runaway domestic spending (defense was 50%
of the federal budget under JFK - i.e., before Vietnam; under Reagan
it was only 25%).
>
>|In any case, SDI was a key ingredient in the U.S. (under Ronald Reagan)
>|winning the Cold War.
>
>The Soviet system had deep, deep, flaws, and was in serious trouble,
>even without our giving them additional excuses to increase their
>military spending. I think you are making the "post hoc, ergo propter
>hoc" fallacy: just because the Soviet system fell apart after we did
>certain things doesn't mean that we caused it to happen.
Well, if you have a 60 year-old with a bad heart, who goes out to shovel
snow and subsequently suffers a massive coronary, you can't prove the
exertion caused his death. After all, he had a bad heart and smoked and
he probably would have died soon anyway. I think you show evidence of
an extreme belief in predestination. Actions have consequences. If
the nuclear freeze crowd had had its way, a lot of pressure would have
been taken off the Soviet economy, and if we had then bailed them out
with loans as a reward for their "cooperation", who knows who long they
could have held out. Just like the 60 year old above could have lasted
a long time with bed rest and better life-style habits.
>
>Keith Ramsay
>ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
Karl Dussik
--
"We know we don't have all the answers." - Ira Magaziner, chief architect of
Clinton's health care plan, 9/20/93.
Which is why they want to impose the exact same plan on every friggin' person
in the U.S. of A.
Mark Pundurs
>In article 25...@anasazi.com, ka...@anasazi.com (Karl Dussik) writes:
>>In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com (Keith Dow) writes:
>>>
>>>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>>>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>>>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>>>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>>
>>Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it. They
>>just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
>>to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
>>than the entire Soviet space establishment.
>the people who REALLY scared me were not the Propoganda
>Mouthpieces who had Psychotic Delusions that some how
>the SDI Program was Viable, but the IDIOTS who believed
>the Propoganda Mouthpieces....
>the quick set of questions is:
> what is a 65cm tube launched system that
> would have negated the whole SILLY SDI Game?
> What does the euphenism SSGN mean?
>
> What is the time to target from the coast to DC?
The "SDI is worthless because it won't defend against X" argument is
silly. It won't defend against sub-launched missiles -- or the
common cold. What of it? That the Soviets felt a ground-based force
worth maintaining was prima facie evidence that it was worth
countering.
(The first two questions also refer to sub-launched missiles, right?)
--
Mark Pundurs ma...@wri.com
any resemblance between my opinions and those
of Wolfram Research, Inc. is purely coincidental
John R. Moore
>In article 25...@anasazi.com, ka...@anasazi.com (Karl Dussik) writes:
>>In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com (Keith Dow) writes:
>>>
>>>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>>>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>>>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>>>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>>>
>>
>>Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it. They
>>just had SO much extra money hanging around they thought it might be fun
>>to try to defend against an impossibility. I'm glad to see you are smarter
>>than the entire Soviet space establishment.
>the people who REALLY scared me were not the Propoganda
>Mouthpieces who had Psychotic Delusions that some how
>the SDI Program was Viable, but the IDIOTS who believed
>the Propoganda Mouthpieces....
>the quick set of questions is:
> what is a 65cm tube launched system that
> would have negated the whole SILLY SDI Game?
Beats me. Does it exist?
> What does the euphenism SSGN mean?
Nuclear submarin, although you mean SSBN for ballistic missile
submarine.
>
> What is the time to target from the coast to DC?
Zero. SDI wasn't there to protect the cities (Reagan propaganda to
the contrary) - it was there to protect American second strike
forces.
Again, drieux, if it was such a dumb idea, WHY WERE THE SOVIETS SO SCARED
OF IT?
>ps: why send a Billion Dollar Ballistic Missle from
>Mother Russia......
Okay, let me answer this one for you. Someone I know very well was years ago on
a secret US government committee that had the job of answering that
question. They determined the following things:
For such a strike to be successful (meaning, for it to destroy the
retaliatory capability) it would have to be precisely timed.
There are two ways to do this with submarines:
(1) as they leave port, give them a set of orders to fire at a
certain date
(2) tell them by radio to strike.
The first option is not viable - no one wants to turn them loose
with that information well in advance. Thus they need the
second option.
For submarines to receive detailed and reliable communications they
need to approach the surface. For them to receive very short
messages, they can stay deep but must trail a very long antenna
(the ocean is a VERY effective shield against radio waves)
If they approach the surface, they are very vulnerable to detection.
Thus the only reasonable approach is to send them a VLF or ELF
message.
Thus they need to be able to count on those trailing wire antennas.
The committee recommended countermeasures that would prevent them from knowing
whether the antennas would be working when needed - specifically occasional
US actions to CUT the antennas from the subs while on patrol.
All of this information is unclassified (they WANTED the soviets to know).
What is deeply secret (and what I don't know the answer to) is whether the
US did it, but they DID have the capability.
In addition to that, the US was successfully tracking most Soviet SSBN's
from the time I left port.
PS - my military service was largely spent chasing Soviet Submarines from
a P-# electra, so I have a bit of personal experience in this line also.
And we could kill a submarine between the time it took to prepare for
firing and the first launch of a missile. The missiles had to be
fired from shallow depths.
In other words, SDI cannot guarantee a perfect shield, and low trajectory
SSBN's could definitely get through, but it COULD prevent a first strike
from taking out enough retaliatory capability (and there is a reason
that the Soviets cared about our land based capability and it was
worth protecting even though we had SSBN's also).
>--
>Modern Problems:
> "The Real World is Only for those persons who's
> number theory has no square root of the negation of one."
--
DISCLAIMER: These views are mine alone, and do not reflect my employer's!
John Moore 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale, AZ 85253 USA (602-951-9326)
jo...@anasazi.com Amateur call:NJ7E Civil Air Patrol:Thunderbird 381
- - A conservative is a liberal who has been mugged by reality! - -
- - Support ALL of the bill of rights, INCLUDING the 2nd amendment! - -
Keith Ramsay
|That's not a fair analogy - supporting Lysenko's theories was more a
|fanatical religious act than a military effort. Furthermore, I don't
|think the U.S.S.R. was on the brink of economic collapse during Lysenko's
|time.
I'm not convinced that military efforts are necessarily more rational
than fanatical religious acts.
|>In addition, at times people like to spend money doing things which
|>are known not to be necessary, not because they are idiots, but
|>because they like to spend money, and because they have enough
|>influence to get it anyway, perhaps with an excuse about national
|>security.
|
|You keep ignoring the issue of how little money the U.S.S.R. had.
Not at all. It's perfectly plausible that an elite would protect its
turf and privileges, even to the point of draining very scarce
resources and making a big mess of the society at large. They'd
already been doing this to a considerable degree.
|>In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
|>offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
|>attack satellites in fixed orbits or installations on the ground, than
|>to attack ICBMs en route or while boosting from the ground. You also
|>get to decide when you're ready to do it, rather than having to have a
|>system ready at all times.
|
|My understanding of parts of SDI was that the weapons systems used against
|ICBM's were incapable of penetrating the atmosphere.
You may be right that the bulk of these would have been useless against
ground targets. Various ideas were being tried out, however, and the
Soviets could well have been speculating about the possible
implications. There was a fairly well publicized experiment with the
space shuttle, intended to test how well one could correct for the
refraction of the atmosphere. Is there an argument which one could
readily have used to persuade the Soviets that this technology would
not be useful in penetrating the atmosphere the other direction? I
think my claim about use as anti-satellite weapons still holds good.
|> People in the U.S. were, after all, citing Soviet civil defense plans as
|>evidence that the Soviets were interested in trying to win a nuclear
|>war, even though there was not much evidence that their society could
|>have survived intact.
|
|I heard more about their ability to protect the high command. The U.S.S.R.
|hasn't exactly demonstrated an overwhelming interest in protecting its own
|citizens, especially considering how many the government has murdered.
Yes, and this argument also was used to raise fears in the U.S. about
a Soviet first-strike. It was said by some that unlike the U.S., they
would have relatively few scruples about sacrificing their own
population in order to "get" the U.S.
Even a murderous government is not going to be keen on being left
governing a depopulated wasteland, whatever their other feelings about
their populace may be.
|>I have heard this idea that we "bankrupted" them before. But remember
|>that SDI was advertised in a very different manner beforehand. This
|>"bankrupt the U.S.S.R." notion is being specially emphasized in
|>hindsight.
|
|Really? How do you think the arms race was sold here - certainly not that
|we would ever use it first.
Mostly not.
|It was argued that they could not keep up
|technologically or financially. I've heard arguments about the disparate
|percentage of GNP the respective militaries have been spending since at
|least the early 80's.
I was careful to write "specially emphasized". You are right, this
"spend them into the ground" argument was made before. But it was not
nearly so emphasized before.
It would be easier to argue with "the position" of the administration
if it had been a stable, coherent position.
Most of the time, this higher % of GNP being spent on the military in
the U.S.S.R. was sold as a sign of the dangerous militarism in the
U.S.S.R., not as an opportunity to be taken advantage of by prodding
them to raise it higher. Unlike the U.S. government, it was said, the
Soviet government was readily able to squeeze resources out of their
population without regard to their individual freedom. (Recall also
the emergency wartime plans which were prepared in the Reagan
administration, for a vastly increased military expenditure.)
There is some truth in all of this. The huge Soviet military had a big
part to play in messing them up. It's also true that they could more
thoroughly ignore public opinion and force sacrifices of certain kinds
than leaders in a democratic country could. I personally wouldn't give
anybody a lot of (positive, laudatory) credit for that, however. Note
that Yeltsin is still having problems with it. Just today the Globe
and Mail cited the difficulty in cutting their military spending as
contributing to their economic problems. The world still gets to live
with the negative side effects.
I would say that the predominant "selling" argument for the arms
buildup was that their military was very powerful, not that it was at
the end of its tether. Why have all this worry about the Soviets
spontaneously invading Europe? Time and time again the Soviets were
presented as though they had the resources to get away with
world-dominating schemes of the most ridiculous kind, and Reagan was
one of the big hawkers of these fears. People like me who said that
this was paranoid, that the Soviet Union was not as strong as that,
and that such big expenditures were not needed to defend the U.S., or
even Europe, were told we were being naive.
If you believe that the Reagan administration had a policy all along
of trying to bankrupt the Soviets, it puts their public claims about
interest in arms control in a rather weird light. Take for example the
negotiations over "theatre" nuclear weapons (cf. _Dangerous_Gambits_
(or perhaps it was "deadly gambits"?)). Reagan was sold by his own
people on the idea of "going for zero" in the negotiations, and
allegedly because he liked the idea of getting rid of these weapons.
But would this fit into such a "bankrupt the Soviets" policy? The
state department didn't like this, because they thought the Soviets
wouldn't go for it. On the other hand, there were those like Perle who
wanted to make "zero" the goal, hoping that the Soviets would find it
unacceptable. But then the Soviets turned out to be more agreeable to
"zero" than had been thought! Okay, I'm willing to credit Reagan with
optimism, but would this combination constitute coherent leadership?
"Let's bankrupt them with an arms race, except that maybe we'll make
some `meaningful' arms-limitation deals with them anyway along the
way."
|>|And as for achieving its other goals, perhaps if there had not been so many
|>|members of Congress with the same goal as the U.S.S.R. - stopping SDI -
|>|voting on appropriations for it, it would have had adequate resources.
If members of congress didn't like SDI, it was because they thought
SDI was bad for our interests, not because they thought it was good
for Soviet interests.
This type of remark-- that some people have "the same goal" as a
declared enemy or enemies-- is commonly used to make people look bad.
The reader can infer what the suggested implications are. I don't
believe they fit.
|>Adequate to do what?
|
|Adequate to deploy a system sufficient to 1) counter an accidental or rogue
|launch -
This is not such a bad point, so long as you're talking about that
specific kind of nuclear terrorism which might have been countered.
|this is important because if such an event occurred it could put
|the President in the position of having to retaliate;
The President should not feel automatically obliged to retaliate under
such circumstances.
|2) make the U.S.S.R.
|much less confident that a first strike could succeed.
I think this is overkill.
|>I think that the Congress had, in part, the goal of avoiding putting
|>the U.S. into economic trouble too. That seems worthwhile, doesn't it?
|
|You're joking, right?
You're cynical, aren't you? :-)
| Congress worried about economic trouble? Then
|they should have looked at runaway domestic spending (defense was 50%
|of the federal budget under JFK - i.e., before Vietnam; under Reagan
|it was only 25%).
Have you considered why the Congress doesn't spend (didn't spend) even
more than it did? You may think their willingness to spend excessive,
but it's not as though money were simply no object at all. Distinguish
carefully between having too little of a motive and not having it at
all. The desire not to cause economic trouble (especially taxes, which
are unpopular) keeps them from going much farther than they do.
When SDI was being "sold", people would periodically come out with
estimates of how much the final package would cost. Often these were
large estimates-- in the hundreds of billions even. Opponents of SDI
would then cite these as reasons for not proceeding with it.
Don't you agree, then, that the members of congress trying to kill SDI
were motivated in part by the desire to save tax money? Even if they
are not as keen on it as you.
|>The Soviet system had deep, deep, flaws, and was in serious trouble,
|>even without our giving them additional excuses to increase their
|>military spending. I think you are making the "post hoc, ergo propter
|>hoc" fallacy: just because the Soviet system fell apart after we did
|>certain things doesn't mean that we caused it to happen.
|
|Well, if you have a 60 year-old with a bad heart, who goes out to shovel
|snow and subsequently suffers a massive coronary, you can't prove the
|exertion caused his death.
Most events have multiple causes, so to be perfectly exact, we have to
talk about degrees to which various factors contributed to the result.
We like to credit ourselves with being the most "direct" cause of good
things and at most a very indirect cause of bad things. The effect in
this case is somewhat indirect. It was not that they couldn't have
decided not to spend this extra money, they just felt like it was
needed.
One difference between the 60-year-old and the U.S.S.R. is that the
60-year-old is cheaper to bury. The Russians are still there, it would
be immoral to regard them as "buried" and out of the way. Recent
events remind us that their "democritization" is hardly complete. An
economically weaker U.S.S.R. has also meant that there is now an
economically weaker Russian democracy.
|After all, he had a bad heart and smoked and
|he probably would have died soon anyway. I think you show evidence of
|an extreme belief in predestination.
Au contraire. I am less extreme than I seem when posting to newsgroups
like these! :-) I do think that this particular trend (toward the
Soviet system falling apart) was a rather long time in coming,
however. Even in prior centuries you can see the Russian Tsars having
historically related problems.
| Actions have consequences.
Are we simply going to give credit for "winning" to whoever happens to
be in office when the manure finally "hits the fan"? Would you,
similarly, be interested in crediting Carter with having prepared the
way for the breakdown of OPEC?
|If the nuclear freeze crowd had had its way, a lot of pressure would have
|been taken off the Soviet economy,
and some off of our (U.S.) economy too...
Keith Ramsay
ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
Don McGregor
>would serve as a "defensive shield" were being naive. Most of the
>others in the U.S. administration "selling" SDI apparently were
>willing to fool the public in order to bluff the Soviets.
>
>I find it very annoying that it was considered acceptable to present a
>weapons system to the U.S. public in such a deceptive way. It's a
>fundamentally anti-democratic strategy.
>
discussed completely banning strategic nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. As I mentioned before, the role of SDI
becomes different in a situation in which offensive weapons
are limited to very low levels. So Reagan's vision of SDI
rendering what offensive weapons are left impotent and
obsolete was actually within the realm of possibility.
I'm curious as to how the Soviets could be bluffed by spokesmen.
Clearly the Soviet embassy had a subscription to the NYT
and Aviation Week, and had some idea of the probable limitations.
That they still feared it suggests that we had an imperfect
understanding of their strategy.
>Correct. IMHO scaring the Soviets silly was a foolish risk to take,
>although I don't expect to convince anybody of that here.
>
Adversarial relationships are driven by fear. Each side is
seeking an advantage, and imposes its will on the opponent
by exploiting strengths inherent in its position. It's
_good_ that the Soviets feared a major sea change in the
military balance to their detriment. This fear drove
other changes in their society, leading to restructuring,
and ultimately their collapse.
So long as the intermediate military balance of terror remained,
they were faced with the unpalatable choice of nuclear
apocalyse or a modified system. This may have been an unpleasant
choice for a Soviet to make, but it was entirely in the West's
interest that the Soviets be faced with just that decision.
The relative risks to the Soviets in the above choice are
fairly clear, so the actual risk of the apocalypse option
was rather low.
>|So, given the objective fact that the Soviets were deeply worried
>|about SDI, the question becomes how to exploit that fear to
>|gain what we can from it. At the _very_ least, the US could
>
>Before one does any of this, one should have a clear idea of what you
>consider a "gain" and a "loss". For example, was it desirable or
>undesirable to have the Soviets spending more on their military? The
The gain we were seeking was increased relative security. Given
a decision to build, there are two likely outcomes: 1) the system
gets built, and US retlaliatory forces have increased survivability.
2) the Soviets decide to reduce their offensive forces in exchange
for SDI. This also increases survivability, and therefore US
security.
Within this framework, it is desirable for the US to force
expenditures of the Soviets to areas that do not directly
threaten the US. For example, this arguemnt was often made
for US penetrating bombers--it would force the Soviets
to spend money on air defense rather than armored divisions
for East Germany or ICBMs or submarines. We wanted them to
spend as much money as possible on non-offensive weapons.
The Soviet air defense network didn't cause much anxiety.
A couple guards shock armies in East Germany did.
>Now it is claimed that we had shrewdly recognized it as an beneficial
>*opportunity* to push the Soviets over the edge economically, by
>getting them to spend more on their military than was to their
>advantage in surviving as a system. I propose that there was no such
>coherent sophisticated policy; what we really had was a confused
>position in which both ideas were being used to sell SDI, with the
>emphasis being shifted in hindsight.
>
I posted a couple of earlier sources from Watkins and McFarlane
which contradicted this. They viewed it as a beneficial area
of competition, one in which the US had a comparative advantage.
A West German sovietoligist wrote in 1986:
"For the first time the Soviet Union fears that, although it has so far
been able to equal all American innovations in Western
technology more quickly than expected, it will be unable to
make the leap from simple offensive systems to as yet unknown and
cost-intensive defensive systems. All objections to star wars
can be reduced to one basic formula: Moscow does not wish to have
its future overall strategy dictated by the Americans."
The US was also interested in putting pressure on the Soviets
from a variety of directions. Strobe Talbot (who has the
dubious distinction of being wrong in nearly everything he
wrote during the 80's) wrote "Some members of the Administration
persisted in an unprecedented assertion that the United States
had the ability to effect crucial changes at the very core, and
at the very top, of the Soviet system. The Reagan administation
believed, for along time, that it could influence the composition
and orientation of the post-Brezhnev leadership." (Needless
to say, he thought this was wrong-headed and led to a deterioration
to the tone and substance of Soviet-American relations.) [_Russians
and Reagan_, p. 72, written in 1984.]
The 1988 book by Martin Anderson listed as one of Reagan's
basic principles
"A belief taht the productive power of the Unites States economy was vastly
superior to the Soviet economy, that if we began a drive to
upgrade the power and scope of our military forces, the
Soviets would not be able to keep pace."
[_Revolution_, Anderson]
At least as early as 1980, in an interview wit the Washington
Post, he said that it "would be of great benefit to the
United States if we started a buildup...I think there's
every indication and every reason to believe that the Soviet Union cannot
increase its production of arms...Right now we're hearing of strikes
and labor disputes because people aren't getting enough to
eat. They've diverted so much to military [spending] that
the can't provide for the consumer needs. So as far as an arms
race is concerned, there's one going on right now, but there's
only one side racing." [WP interview, June 18 1980].
Martin Anderson also says Reagan often made the same point
to his advisors.
>Certainly no sane person would have bet upon succeeding at a first
>strike. *Nothing* was needed for this. And none of this can
>reasonably be regarded as making ICBMs "obsolete".
>
This is often asserted, but I'm not sure the Soviets agreed with
it. From examining the force structure the Soviets built, it
would appear that they were interested in possessing a first
strike capability. If they operate under the assumption that
such a thing is possible, we should act accordingly.
>On the other hand, if one uses it to defend cities as well, you are
>possibly making the Soviets believe they require more ICBMs to ensure
>a retaliation, which is destabilizing. Which tendancy do you suppose
>was winning out?
>
An infinite number of Soviet warheads would not be destabilizing,
so long as US retaliatory forces could ride out an initial attack.
The interest is in reducing the incentives to offensive action.
Perhaps a defense-vs-offense arms race would occur; the winner
would likely depend on the marginal cost of shooting down one
more warhead vs. the cost of building a launcher for the
warhead.
At any rate, persistent Soviet interest in acquiring an ability
to devestate US retaliatory forces would say something about
their objectives, and point out an asymmetry between US thinking
on the subject and Soviet thinking.
>If this was the idea, then it should have bloody well been advertised
>as such. Oh yes, eventually it was conceded that SDI was (at that
>date) mainly for defending weapons-- which makes a mockery of the
>originally claimed plan.
>
Again, this is not neccesarily true. In an offense-poor
environment, SDI could well achieve its advertised goal.
>If the policy of the administration in the U.S. had anything to do
>with retaining MAD, but adding "stability", there would have been more
>interest in undoing our big de-stabilizing move, which was to MIRV our
>ICBMs.
>
And indeed the administration funded midgetman programs. But, in
the absence of a prod like SDI, the Soviets would have been unlikely
to reciprocate. The marginal cost for a MIRV warhead is far
less than the cost for a single warhead missile. This would suggest
that the likely response for the Soviets would have been adding
one SS-18 for every 10 midgetmen. They wind up retaining
their advantage, and there is no net gain in stability.
>I think we followed him at our peril. This was the fellow who was
>unclear about whether he could recall launched SLBMs. Instincts are
>
This is a highly debatable gaffe. It's far more likely that
his syntax simply got garbled.
Here's the full exchange, from the May 13 1982 press conference:
That is the missile sitting there in its silo in which there
could be the possibility of miscalculation. That is the one
that people know that once the button is pushed, there is no defense; there
is no recall. And it's a matter of minutes, and the missiles reach
the other country. Those that are carried in bombers, those that are carried
in ships of one kind or another, or submersibles, you are dealing there
with a conventional type of weapon or instrument, and those instruments can
be intercepted. They can be recalled if there has been a miscalculation.
And so they don't have the same, I think, psychological effect
that the presence of those other ones that, once launched,
that's it; they're on their way,and there's no preventing, no
stopping them."
It's fairly obvious here that he was refering to the submarines
themselves, not the missiles. I'd hate to try to diagram any
of those sentences, though.
>|I've never quite grasped what a nuclear test ban is
>|supposed to accomplish. I doubt that, say, North Korea
>|is going to be impressed by our restraint and not test.
>|And reliable weapons sound like a perfectly logical goal
>|to me.
>
>I find it hard to believe that this "reliable weapons" claim was
>anything but a ruse. The weapons were as reliable as they needed to
>be, as far as posing a retaliatory threat. (What, not *every single*
>warhead would be delivered and detonated? What a loss!) Meanwhile,
>so-called "third generation" nuclear weapons were being developed.
>
If you're going to build them, you might as well make
sure they work. Component testing of systems has some
problems of its own.
If the argument is that banning testing reduces confidence in
warheads, why buy warheads? If the argument is that we can
determine they're reliable without testing, what does it
accomplish? If effective weapons are not the goal, doesn't
that undermine deterrence?
The idea that our not testing will set an example for other
nations is a non-obvious, to say the least.
BEIJING (UPI) -- Foreign Minister Qian Qichen refused to rule out
Thursday that China was planning an underground nuclear test, saying
Beijing had not agreed to a test moratorium as proposed by the United
States.
Um.
Chris Holt
>ram...@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith Ramsay) writes:
>>ka...@anasazi.com (Karl Dussik) writes:
>>|In article <1993Sep15....@vertex.com> do...@vertex.com
>> (Keith Dow) writes:
>>|>Star Wars was a crock to start with. The proof is that they
>>|>never even got close to achieving any of the goals. It has
>>|>been ten years, and nothing useful has even come out of the
>>|>lab. What more proof does Don need?
>>|
>>|Which is why the U.S.S.R. spent $10 BILLION per year against it.
>>
>>Recall how much effort the U.S.S.R. put into "applying" Lysenko's
>>genetic theories to agriculture. How the U.S.S.R. spent money is not
>>a very good way to judge how necessary or useful it was.
>That's not a fair analogy - supporting Lysenko's theories was more a
>fanatical religious act than a military effort. Furthermore, I don't
>think the U.S.S.R. was on the brink of economic collapse during Lysenko's
>time.
Supporting SDI as originally presented was also a fanatical
religious act. An impervious umbrella? A real time system
consisting of millions of lines of code that would have to
work without actual testing? Parnas was the most outspoken
of the critics, perhaps, but I don't know of any software
engineers who didn't realize that it would require a breakthrough
in verification techniques that still hasn't happened.
BTW, the USSR was in miserable economic shape during Lysenko's
time. There was less international trade, so exchange rates
weren't so much of a problem; but don't underestimate the
misery of the people.
>>In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
>>offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
>>attack satellites in fixed orbits or installations on the ground, than
>>to attack ICBMs en route or while boosting from the ground. You also
>>get to decide when you're ready to do it, rather than having to have a
>>system ready at all times.
>My understanding of parts of SDI was that the weapons systems used against
>ICBM's were incapable of penetrating the atmosphere.
If you mean the scaled down versions that were advertized in the late
'80s, that could well be true; but the original ideas were so
vague and there were so many versions that nobody knew whether
SDI could be used for that or not. It was certainly nothing to
give a military planner on the other side any confidence.
>> People in the U.S. were, after all, citing Soviet civil defense plans as
>>evidence that the Soviets were interested in trying to win a nuclear
>>war, even though there was not much evidence that their society could
>>have survived intact.
>I heard more about their ability to protect the high command. The U.S.S.R.
>hasn't exactly demonstrated an overwhelming interest in protecting its own
>citizens, especially considering how many the government has murdered.
In the past 30 years?
>>|I'd say getting the U.S.S.R. to spend $10B per year of their own money to
>>|counter a system we were spending less than half of that on (and with our
>>|GDP at least twice as large) was useful in itself.
>>
>>I have heard this idea that we "bankrupted" them before. But remember
>>that SDI was advertised in a very different manner beforehand. This
>>"bankrupt the U.S.S.R." notion is being specially emphasized in
>>hindsight.
>Really? How do you think the arms race was sold here - certainly not that
>we would ever use it first. It was argued that they could not keep up
>technologically or financially. I've heard arguments about the disparate
>percentage of GNP the respective militaries have been spending since at
>least the early 80's.
I've heard them since the '60s. But the arms race was always sold
on the premise "If we don't spend more, they'll attack us and win";
and nobody paid any attention to Eisenhower's warnings about the
military-industrial complex.
>>|And as for achieving its other goals, perhaps if there had not been so many
>>|members of Congress with the same goal as the U.S.S.R. - stopping SDI -
>>|voting on appropriations for it, it would have had adequate resources.
>>
>>Adequate to do what?
>Adequate to deploy a system sufficient to 1) counter an accidental or rogue
>launch - this is important because if such an event occurred it could put
>the President in the position of having to retaliate; 2) make the U.S.S.R.
>much less confident that a first strike could succeed.
(1) was only introduced late in the day, after they finally
managed to convince Reagan that he wasn't going to get his
foolproof umbrella. As for (2), they weren't confident of
it in the first place, what with all the US subs.
Chris Holt
>Chris Holt <Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
[SDI]
>>>Oh, I think Reagan believed it. Visionaries aren't always
>>>practical.
>>Well, some of us find it worrying when people make decisions
>>involving lots of money, with significant political consequences,
>>and they don't understand what they're talking about.
>There is far more to being president than mere mastery of
>details.
Certainly.
>Reagan was not analytical, which disturbs some people.
Perhaps; it wasn't what disturbed me. I was disturbed
by the fact (as I see it) that he didn't know what he
was talking aboutk, either w.r.t. defense or the economy.
>But his instincts were usually right on target.
And we'll have to agree to differ.
>It's often frustrating or puzzling for me to understand as
>well; getting a grip on Reagan is extremely difficult.
>Even his offical biographer (mmm, Edmund Morris, book coming out
>shortly, prior biographer for TR, well-respected historian
>given high-level access during the last term) has said
>that he's an impossible man to really know.
I think it's because people are looking for something that
simply isn't there. Occam's razor. A very nice, friendly
man who spoke sincerely about things he didn't have a clue
about. Of course, YMMV.
>>>But even if it _had_ been leakproof, what would we have had?
>>>effectively, perfect arms control.
>>
>>Perfect first-strike capability. Now, suppose you know
>>someone is building a system that will allow them to
>>destroy you with impunity, and they have declared that
>>they think you are evil. What are you going to do when
>>it's in the middle of being constructed?
>>
>During the building phase the same dynamic of MAD applies.
>Again, why would they commit national suicide on a doubtful
>endeavor?
Game theory suggests that if you have a MAD that kills maybe
half of each side, you're better off than if you lose half and
the other side loses nothing. At least with MAD, you're
rebuilding from scratch together. It's a weird kind of
pride that lots of people seem to have; sacrifice yourself
so the other side doesn't get to laugh at you.
>There's also Reagan's offer to share technology, which was
>also interesting in an odd way. Perhaps this was another
>instinctive insight, a realization that a dual SDI system with
>low offensive weapons was more stable.
I don't know anyone who believed that this would actually
happen. The more likely scenario would be that his advisors
would take him aside (or, in practice, his successors) and
just not do it. Heavens, the US still doesn't allow the
export of encryption algorithms that are published in texts
(e.g. I think Tanenbaum's book has one that is on the forbidden
list).
Chris Holt
>While drieux is dismissive of SDI, the Soviets apparently
>thought differently. Margret Thatcher also gives credit
>to Reagan and SDI, as this description of a rubber chicken
>dinner illustrates:
[description deleted]
I'm afraid I don't place any credence in Thatcher's opinion
either. She thought it was perfectly all right to decimate
the Navy in order to build the next generation of nuclear
subs (which depend on the D5 Poseidon which still hasn't
been built and may never be, if I remember aright). She
left the military in such a state that the UK would be
unable to fight the Falklands war today.
Don McGregor
>>well; getting a grip on Reagan is extremely difficult.
>I think it's because people are looking for something that
>simply isn't there. Occam's razor. A very nice, friendly
>man who spoke sincerely about things he didn't have a clue
>about.
>
The people opposed to Reagan on arms control had elegant
theories about the arms race, international relations,
and the conduct of conflict. They applied these theories
to the conduct of US affairs from the early 60's to
the late 70's without notable success.
Reagan had an instinctive understanding of the dynamics
of the cold war, and applied them to its conduct.
The Soviet Union was put on the defensive, forced to
re examine itself, and finally defeated.
Who was smarter?
Steve Fischer
>mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor) writes:
>
>>While drieux is dismissive of SDI, the Soviets apparently
>>thought differently. Margret Thatcher also gives credit
>>to Reagan and SDI, as this description of a rubber chicken
>>dinner illustrates:
>
> [description deleted]
>
>I'm afraid I don't place any credence in Thatcher's opinion
>either. She thought it was perfectly all right to decimate
>the Navy in order to build the next generation of nuclear
>subs (which depend on the D5 Poseidon which still hasn't
>been built and may never be, if I remember aright). She
>left the military in such a state that the UK would be
>unable to fight the Falklands war today.
>
--
Steve Fischer / Atlanta, Georgia
Don McGregor
>religious act. An impervious umbrella? A real time system
>
Perceptions matter, and the Soviets perceived it as a
critical threat to their international postion. Keith
Ramsey commented that it would have been interesting, in a sad
sort of way, to know what the Soviets were so worried about.
It was nothing of the kind--knowing _why_ they feared and
respected SDI goes to the very heart of the matter. One might
as well attempt to read _Paradise Lost_ knowing nothing about
Christianity.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
>>>In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
>>>offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
What if it _was_ offensive? So what? If we could have achieved the
same results by building offensive weapons, I'd have supported that
too. I can imagine the Soviets having a roughly similar reaction
to a massive US strategic offensive weapons buildup. If the Soviets
would have been intimidated by a return to disco I'd have
supported a Bee Gees reunion.
The discussions of SDI and deterence so far have been rather abstract, but we
were not dealing with a theoretical opponent. We had a
_specific, concrete_ opponent, with a limited range of actions,
a specific mindset, and certain capabilities. A theoretical
opponent might have been able to match a US buildup, but the
correct judgement of the Reagan administration was that the
Soviets could not. This was a conscious decision, dating from the
earliest days of the administration--even before the start of
the administration, as that excerpt from a June 1980
Washington Post interview with Reagan I posted showed.
You might not like this, but the Reagan administration's
"simplistic" foreign policy was better able to shape the
world to US desires than the "sophisticated" foreign
policy advocated by the likes of Strobe Talbot. On
issue after issue, the Reaganauts wre scored for being
fools, unrealistic, or warmongers. On issue after issue,
hindsight has shown that Reagan was right, that his policies
pressured the Soviets and hastened their decline.
Luck? Luck is a valuable quality to have in a president. It's
also been called the residue of good planning.
Did Reagan expect the Soviets to collapse? perhaps not. But
it was the premeditated decison of his administration to
deal with the Soviets from a position of strength, to
oppose Soviet adventures abroad, to limit technology
transfer, and to push an agenda of human rights, freedom,
and capitalism. They _expected_ this to put the Soviets
on the defensive and to limit the mischief they could
do abroad, and to improve US security. That it worked
better than expected is perhaps an extra benefit, but no accident.
[The prescient Westminster speech also suggests that Reagan
realized the weakness and vulnerability of the Soviet system,
and the possibility of a Soviet collapse.]
>I've heard them since the '60s. But the arms race was always sold
>on the premise "If we don't spend more, they'll attack us and win";
The two are not mutually exclusive. If the Soviets _had_ managed
to keep it together, the US would still have benefited from
the 80's arms buildup. It _both_ reduced the threat of war
_and_ put pressure on the Soviet system.
Don McGregor
Chris Holt <Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>>It's often frustrating or puzzling for me to understand as
>>well; getting a grip on Reagan is extremely difficult.
>
>I think it's because people are looking for something that
>simply isn't there. Occam's razor. A very nice, friendly
>man who spoke sincerely about things he didn't have a clue
>about.
Sorry about the dual followup, but this is preying on my mind.
I hate it when I get the urge to write this stuff out
of me when I'm on a software deadline.
Edmund Morris (the biographer I mentioned earlier) is no
fool. He's capable of spotting people for what they are,
in fact makes a living at it. After years of intense study--
he was given unprecedented high level access during the
second term--he still can't get a handle on Reagan. I
can't either, to my never-ending frustration. The
Democrats here in the US never understood Reagan--they
dismissed him as a simpleton, and he crushed them
repeatedly at the polls.
I think, as I've posted here, that Reagan's foreign policy
as a whole sped up the defeat and collapse of the Soviet
Union. Determining the critical points of pressure to
accomplish that was no mean feat. There _was_ a coherent
policy, but how did he arrive at it? Clearly someone like
my favorite wrong-headed fool, Strobe Talbot, is more
clever in the conventional sense. Rhodes scholar, author
of several books, FOB, editor at Time (OK, that one
is a strike against), member of the CFR. Currently the
Russian policy czar for the US. (He said he was surprised
when he was offered the job; cynics said he'd have to
learn how to lie better than that if he wanted to be
a diplomat.) But on issue after issue, Reagan was
proven right while Talbot was left with the task of
writing revisionist columns explaining away Reagan's success.
I supsect that it was a sort of intellectual arrogance or
love of novelty that led Talbot astray. What's the fun of
being an intellectual if you can't look down your nose at
those less clever than yourself, those with a common and
widely held belief? The problem was that the "sophisticated"
ideas that the Reagan opponents adopted ignored the basics
at the core of international relations.
Patrick Glynn (fine book; highly recommended) describes
Churchill in the interwar period:
"No one was more eloquent than Churchill in the defense of liberal
_principles_, in supporting the cause of democracy, in calling
attention to the illiberalism of totalitarian regimes in their
actions both at home and abroad. But at the same time he
enjoyed a kind of immunity to the operational assumptions
of the new liberal-pacifist paradigm of international relations--
the presumption, in particular, that because of the emergence
of new weapons and new diplomatic arrangements, the presevation
of peace and the survival of democracy could be guaranteed
without serious resort to the traditional tools of statecraft:
alliances and military power. It was his detailed alertness to
such factors, deprecated by others--his military planner's grasp of the
strategic and political implications of military weakness--that
accounted for the prophetic character of his vision."
The people of Talbot's stripe weren't quite so bad as Churchill's
opponents, and Reagan was certainly no Churchill. (I think
Reagan would have made a poor wartime president, while
Bush would have been excellent--as DS proved.) But the
Talbots of the world still too often missed the essential
character of the cold war, the ruling dynamics--a _competition_,
based on _intimidation_. Despite what their elegant theories
predicted or assumed, it was not a relationship that could
be fundamentally manipulated by arms control, gestures of
good will, or politely overlooking Soviet transgressions.
Reagan was no intellectual, but he _did_ understand the basics.
Understanding the basics--and being stubborn enough to
apply the basics in the face of considerable establishment
firepower--proved to be enough. Being right in a mundane
way still counts for more than being wrong in complex
ways. Reagan's beliefs may have been unexamined or intuitive, but
they were fundamentally correct.
[Those that think Reagan amiable didn't cross him, or
do battle with him on his core beliefs. Take a PATCO
worker to lunch and talk about it. When Paul Nitze,
the arms negotiator for the INF, complained to Reagan
that the Soviets would refuse to negotiate the US
position, Reagan replied "Well Paul, you just tell the
Soviets you work for one tough son of a bitch." The US
later got a much better deal.]
But Reagan's approach had more than simple applied power
politics going for it. I can imagine a Nixon or Kissinger
coming up with the basic approach Reagan followed. I have
less faith that they would execute it in the face of determined
establishment opposition. But I also think they would lack
Reagan's inspirational or leadership abilities. I mentioned
this a couple weeks ago as a factor in the Soviet collapse,
while acknowleding that it is difficult to quantify or put
your finger on. Reagan was quintessentially American, and
the American idea is no small thing to counter if
you're a communist in a baggy suit. I'd have a hard time
imagining Nixon or Kissinger or Pat Buchannan giving
a gracious and bang-on summation of what it is to
live in a free society, as Reagan did at Moscow
university in 1988 and on many other occasions.
<Mumble vas Mumble>, the Peruvian novelist who ran for
president of that country a couple years ago, wrote that
"The fox knows many small things, but the hedgehog knows
one big thing." Reagan knew the big things. That's
what's most critical for a president.
--
Don McGregor | "A whop-bob-a-lu-bop, a whop-bam-boom!"
mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu|
Kevin Gowen
I just couldn't pass this up...
In article <CDr9s...@newcastle.ac.uk> Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
>
>Well, some of us find it worrying when people make decisions
>involving lots of money, with significant political consequences,
>and they don't understand what they're talking about.
Then we can conclude that you're strongly opposed to Clinton's health care
proposals...? :)
> Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Science, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-kevin
kgo...@cie.uoregon.edu
Kevin Gowen
>[much excellent material deleted]
Don, thanks for your eloquent defense of Reagan's foreign policy. Your posts
are a pleasure to read.
>
><Mumble vas Mumble>, the Peruvian novelist who ran for
>president of that country a couple years ago, wrote that
>"The fox knows many small things, but the hedgehog knows
>one big thing." Reagan knew the big things. That's
>what's most critical for a president.
I think his name is Mario Vargas Lhosa and I probably mangled the spelling
on his name pretty good. Anyway, the fox/hedgehog analogy is apt and helps
to explain why really intelligent men (like Clinton, like Carter) do not
necessarily make good presidents or good leaders. And what concerns me is
that we now have a president who is very much the fox and who is busy peopling
his administration with the Strobe Talbots and the Morton Halperins of this
world.
>--
>Don McGregor | "A whop-bob-a-lu-bop, a whop-bam-boom!"
>mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu|
-kevin
kgo...@cie.uoregon.edu
Chris Holt
>Chris Holt <Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>>Supporting SDI as originally presented was also a fanatical
>>religious act. An impervious umbrella? A real time system
>Still, how do you account for the Soviet's reaction to it?
As a fanatical religious act. I don't see the Cold War as
very different from the Reformation.
>The discussions of SDI and deterence so far have been rather abstract, but we
>were not dealing with a theoretical opponent. We had a
>_specific, concrete_ opponent, with a limited range of actions,
>a specific mindset, and certain capabilities.
I'm just not sure how close the mindset was to what many people
suggested, how it changed over time, and how it could have been
affected by US actions. "The Russians love their children too."
No, I don't mean anything so gooey as if we'd offered them
flowers they would have embraced us as brothers; but a lot of
the confrontational aspects were encouraged by the US.
>You might not like this, but the Reagan administration's
>"simplistic" foreign policy was better able to shape the
>world to US desires than the "sophisticated" foreign
>policy advocated by the likes of Strobe Talbot. On
>issue after issue, the Reaganauts wre scored for being
>fools, unrealistic, or warmongers. On issue after issue,
>hindsight has shown that Reagan was right, that his policies
>pressured the Soviets and hastened their decline.
Do you think that the world is now the way the US wants it
to be? Does the US like what's been going on for the past
few years, both in Russia and elsewhere? I see a lot of
political instability, much of it engendered by the way the
US fought the cold war in the '80s. I see a lot of economic
uncertainty, much of it caused by the same. I hope it
doesn't happen, but I see some large and nasty chickens
wondering whether to come home to roost; and I fear that
if they do, people will say "These things couldn't have been
predicted, they're not our fault".
Don McGregor
>Do you think that the world is now the way the US wants it
>to be? Does the US like what's been going on for the past
>few years, both in Russia and elsewhere? I see a lot of
>political instability, much of it engendered by the way the
>US fought the cold war in the '80s. I see a lot of economic
>uncertainty, much of it caused by the same.
Yes, the world is better off. Think about what we worried about
before (the existence of a democratic West; nuclear incineration
of the civilized world) with what we worry about now (preventing
the new democrats in the Soviet Union from being ousted; figuring
out a way to safely demilitarize thousands of nuclear warheads;
transitioning 3% of the US GNP from military use to other
purposes). I know which problem set I'd take.
Worried about political instability? You sound like George Bush :-)
When half of Europe switches from one economic and political
system to another there's bound to be some political instability.
There's going to be some shifting around in the world as
new regional power structures form, since the superpowers are
losing interest in obscure countries. The great powers kept
their clients in line to a remarkable degree, mainly to prevent
a potential superpower showdown. But after a while, things will
settle back down to a mostly stable equilibrium.
Stop being so grumpy. The good guys won, and we're faced
with the pleasant prospect of trying to establish a new world
based on free men and free markets. Things could be worse.
Keith Ramsay
|There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
|Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
I'll say. :-)
|>>>In other respects, SDI also appeared suitable for conversion into an
|>>>offensive system. It's much easier in certain ways to use a system to
|What if it _was_ offensive? So what? If we could have achieved the
|same results by building offensive weapons, I'd have supported that
|too.
The context of the original posting you quoted from would have told
you. I was arguing that the Soviets could have been worried about SDI,
without it being "workable", for the purposes presented to the public.
This is crucial: I don't believe in having leaders wander off and work
hidden schemes, misrepresenting them, and when pressed suggesting the
public not bother its pretty little head with what the actual plan is.
That's the kind of message I got from Mr. "If you knew what I knew"
Teller and the former president.
Keith Ramsay
ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
Keith Ramsay
|I think it's because people are looking for something that
|simply isn't there. Occam's razor. A very nice, friendly
|man who spoke sincerely about things he didn't have a clue
|about.
mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor) writes:
|Edmund Morris (the biographer I mentioned earlier) is no
|fool. He's capable of spotting people for what they are,
|in fact makes a living at it. After years of intense study--
|he was given unprecedented high level access during the
|second term--he still can't get a handle on Reagan. I
|can't either, to my never-ending frustration.
With all due respect to Mr. Morris, I also think that people like him
are looking in the wrong place.
Reagan was the type of person who was focussed on the "image" or even
cinematic aspect of life. He was thus able to pick up images, or
"archetypes" perhaps, as he perceived them, which are passed in the
popular American mind.
So what certain people see as a kind of mysterious depth to the man
probably has more to do with their own attitude toward these thematic
images as played out by Reagan. For example, there is this standard
Churchill-based image of the strong leader fighting the vicious enemy.
Some people's version of this image obviously fits Reagan well enough
that he begins to be identified somewhat as an avatar of it. On the
other hand, there are those of us who also have, on this same
imagistic level, as components of this "strong leader" image the sense
of someone who works harder than Reagan did, was better versed in
history than Reagan, and so on. The image doesn't fit for us, and
instead of getting a sort of warm comfy feeling, we get a kind of
jarring "this is a pretend version of Churchillian statesmanship he is
trying to pull on us" gut feeling. This is prior to intellectually
analyzing what is good and bad about it, and helps to explain why some
of us found him very annoying, rather than simply disagreeing with
many of his policies.
So if you want to understand Reagan, first understand the images
projected from your own mind-set and the American collective mind-set,
and then see beyond them as well.
|The Democrats here in the US never understood Reagan--they
|dismissed him as a simpleton, and he crushed them
|repeatedly at the polls.
Many people probably underestimated his "native" intelligence, because
of the way he had directed it. Intelligence is a tool. If the theme of
the day is sagely explaining how overly concerned environmentalists
are, this image may call for some striking statistical evidence of
this, even if it is made up. This doesn't mean that the intelligence
required to dig up a more complete and accurate picture of the world
is not there; it just means that it's not being used for that purpose.
It's being used filling in little touches of the image.
"Crush" is an overstatement. Many people were happy to vote for
Democratic congress members and for Reagan as president. I remember
hearing comparisons between his popularity at various points in his
term with the popularity of other presidents, and I don't remember
there being any impressive superiority on his part. You can correct me
if you think I'm wrong. In a country in which you can find something
like 1/5 who weren't aware Alaska was a state, I'm also inclined to
add "+-20%" to many poll results. Moreover there are a lot of people
who didn't vote. There were a lot of the poor who didn't think it
worth the trouble, figuring it would not likely do any good.
I remember polls also indicated that despite Reagan's popularity, the
majority of the public disagreed with him on many of his basic views.
Keith Ramsay
ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
ryan johnson
>PPPP Many people probably underestimated his "native" intelligence, because
>of the way he had directed it. Intelligence is a tool. If the theme of
>the day is sagely explaining how overly concerned environmentalists
>are, this image may call for some striking statistical evidence of
>this, even if it is made up. This doesn't mean that the intelligence
>required to dig up a more complete and accurate picture of the world
>is not there; it just means that it's not being used for that purpose.
>It's being used filling in little touches of the image.
>"Crush" is an overstatement. Many people were happy to vote for
>Democratic congress members and for Reagan as president. I remember
>hearing comparisons between his popularity at various points in his
>term with the popularity of other presidents, and I don't remember
>there being any impressive superiority on his part. You can correct me
>if you think I'm wrong. In a country in which you can find something
I could be wrong about this but I believe that he defeated Mondall in '84 by
the by the greatist margin of victory(in the popular vote) than any other
president in US history.
>like 1/5 who weren't aware Alaska was a state, I'm also inclined to
>add "+-20%" to many poll results. Moreover there are a lot of people
>who didn't vote. There were a lot of the poor who didn't think it
>worth the trouble, figuring it would not likely do any good.
Voting is a right given to all US citzens(sp) over the age of 18. If one
desides to abstain from voting then one has chosen the side that the
majority of those voting has chosen.
>I remember polls also indicated that despite Reagan's popularity, the
>majority of the public disagreed with him on many of his basic views.
>Keith Ramsay
>ram...@unixg.ubc.ca
Ryan Johnson
Rjoh...@nyx.cs.du.edu
HALLAM-BAKER Phillip
|>mcg...@prism.CS.ORST.EDU (Don McGregor) writes:
|>
|>>While drieux is dismissive of SDI, the Soviets apparently
|>>thought differently. Margret Thatcher also gives credit
|>>to Reagan and SDI, as this description of a rubber chicken
|>>dinner illustrates:
|>
|> [description deleted]
|>
|>I'm afraid I don't place any credence in Thatcher's opinion
|>either. She thought it was perfectly all right to decimate
|>the Navy in order to build the next generation of nuclear
|>subs (which depend on the D5 Poseidon which still hasn't
|>been built and may never be, if I remember aright). She
|>left the military in such a state that the UK would be
|>unable to fight the Falklands war today.
Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
that the USSR could not strike back.
In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
balisitic missiles. If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
--
Phillip M. Hallam-Baker
Not Speaking for anyone else.
DT
(HALLAM-BAKER Phillip) writes:
[ cutting here for brevity....]
|> Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
|> come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
|> Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
|> that the USSR could not strike back.
|>
[ snip snip cut cut snip ]
|> The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
|> chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
|> was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
|> might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
|> sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
|> even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
|>
|>
|> --
|> Phillip M. Hallam-Baker
|>
|> Not Speaking for anyone else.
One detail that bears mentioning (IMHO) is that the Soviets did believe
that SDI would work. So much so, that a number of Western Engineers who
were working on the practical aspects of SDI were killed by Soviet assassins.
Some were found shot, others homes just burst into flames, and one
as I recall was a suicide: he tied a rope around his neck, connected the other
end to a tree, set the interior of his car on fire with gasoline, and drove
into another tree.
While I doubt it would work using our present technology, the theory was
sound. And the Soviets knew that we had a habit of taking far-fetched
fantasy and making them reality.
Regards
DT
gar...@ingres.com
>>
>>Do you think that the world is now the way the US wants it
>>to be? Does the US like what's been going on for the past
>>few years, both in Russia and elsewhere? I see a lot of
>>political instability, much of it engendered by the way the
>>US fought the cold war in the '80s. I see a lot of economic
>>uncertainty, much of it caused by the same.
>
>Yes, the world is better off. Think about what we worried about
>before (the existence of a democratic West; nuclear incineration
>of the civilized world) with what we worry about now (preventing
>the new democrats in the Soviet Union from being ousted; figuring
>out a way to safely demilitarize thousands of nuclear warheads;
>transitioning 3% of the US GNP from military use to other
>purposes). I know which problem set I'd take.
>
worry about. (not in any order) Unemployment, the economy, environmental
destruction, overpopulation, crime.
>Stop being so grumpy. The good guys won,
Said one Visagoth to another. ;^)
>Don McGregor | "A whop-bob-a-lu-bop, a whop-bam-boom!"
>mcg...@prism.cs.orst.edu|
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that which he has, and that which he thinks he has." Garrett Johnson
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Donald R. McGregor
>cinematic aspect of life. He was thus able to pick up images, or
>"archetypes" perhaps, as he perceived them, which are passed in the
>popular American mind.
>
>So what certain people see as a kind of mysterious depth to the man
>probably has more to do with their own attitude toward these thematic
>images as played out by Reagan. For example, there is this standard
>Churchill-based image of the strong leader fighting the vicious enemy.
Just for the record, I do _not_ think that Reagan is comparable to
Churchill. They were very different. Churchill was energetic
about details. In Reagan's words, "they say hard work never killed
anybody, but I say why take the chance."
Reagan also lacked Winston's inate bellicosity. While Churchill was
a fine wartime leader, I doubt that the thematic archetypes he
projected would wear as well in peacetime. Reagan projected
the _peacetime_ hopes and dreams of Americans. The defense buildup
was never an end in itself, only a means to attain the shining city
on the hill of a free world with free markets.
But they both were excellent at creating and making real the dreams
or images they choose to focus on. This is good. The main
product of the peacetime presidency is leadership, not white papers.
Staffers, policy wonks, and think tankers are perfectly adequate
to the job of creating detailed policy, given overall
philosophical direction. And Reagan had the basics of that
philosophical direction down well.
I posted something earlier by the author of another book that
depricated the value of "intelligence" in presidents. His
contention was that the "smarter" presidents tended to get
lost in the details, while the more humble ones were able to
delegate the tasks to their subordinates. While it is
theoretically possible for someone to have both abilities,
I think it to be fairly rare.
>
>So if you want to understand Reagan, first understand the images
>projected from your own mind-set and the American collective mind-set,
>and then see beyond them as well.
>
Oh, I do. I sometimes shared your frustration about the lack
of an explicit analytical background or justification for
some of Reagan's policies. I think they did exist, and
Reagan understood them on an instinctive level, but was
unable or unwilling to present them analytically.
You don't get extra credit for showing your work in politics.
And purely analytical approaches do not sway the
electorate to any overwhelming degree.
Just sorting through the images presented by the Reagan presidency
is fascinating in itself. The theory that supported those images
is a step beyond that.
>|The Democrats here in the US never understood Reagan--they
>|dismissed him as a simpleton, and he crushed them
>|repeatedly at the polls.
>
>"Crush" is an overstatement. Many people were happy to vote for
>Democratic congress members and for Reagan as president. I remember
>hearing comparisons between his popularity at various points in his
>term with the popularity of other presidents, and I don't remember
>there being any impressive superiority on his part.
The popular vote split in the 84 election was about 60-40, a
crushing defeat by anyone's standards. The electoral margin
was the largest in history--Mondale carried only Minnesota, his
home state, and DC. He carried Minnesota by only a percentage
point. Practically every group and socioeconomic sector went
for Reagan; a majority of everyone earning more than $10,000
per year, a majority of whites earning more than $5,000/year,
54% of the women (some gender gap), and a quarter of the
_registered Democrats_. Three out of five young people voted
for Reagan (proving that the young can have a head before 30).
The 80 election, against a sitting president, was also quite
handy. From memory the split was 50/40/10, and another convincing
electoral margin. He also swept in a Republican majority into
the senate on his coattails. Even during the worst post-war
recession he kept up solid polling numbers.
He won a couple convincing elections in California, the first
also against an incumbent.
I recall reading somewhere that Reagan left
office as the most popular president at that point, but I can't
track down the reference right now.
Lou Cannon writes in his bio
"The Democrats compounded their problems in 1984 by presenting a
foreign policy caricature of Reagan little changed from the
one rejected by the voters four years earlier. An early
1980 Richard Wirthlin memo had anticipated that Carter's
team would portray Reagan as "dumb, dangerous, and a distorter
of facts." Refute any one of these propositions, Wirthlin
reasoned, and the others would have less credibility. Carter's
overstatement made the task easier for the Reagan side. Reagan
was not dangerous, and the Democrats were not good learners.
In 1984 they made little of Lebanon and much of Reagan's
commitment to Star Wars, which the Mondale team described as a
refusal to restrain the arms race. Reagan wanted to end the arms race
and saw Star Wars as a path to this goal. When Wirthlin tested
the Mondale team's Star Wars commercials, he found that the actually
helped Reagan."
[Reagan, pp. 500-501]
One of my favorite quotes from the campaign, by a voter:
"He really isn't like a Republican. He's more like an American,
which is what we really need."
[Looks like the HUAC is coming after me.]
>I remember polls also indicated that despite Reagan's popularity, the
>majority of the public disagreed with him on many of his basic views.
>
Again from the Lou Cannon bio:
"A majority of Americans strongly backed Reagan's policies
in 1984. While it was often said, sometimes in derogation,
that Americans 'liked' Reagan, this landslide victory was much
more than a personality triumph. Two-thirds of the voters
surveyed in the ABC exit polls said they liked Reagan personally,
but those (about one in every 13) who liked him but disapproved
of his policies voted for Mondale. Most Americans not only
liked Reagan but agreed with what he was saying, at least on
the issues most important to them. "one need simply imagine
that instead of talking about God, family and country, the
President was extolling Zen Buddhism, unilateral disarmament and
sexual license [...] His rating would of course crash within
a week. No matter how great an actor he is, the script is still
what matters most to most Americans.""
[I'm at another site while OSU's NNTP/prism problem gets fixed.]
--
Don McGregor | The Beavs are just saving their first
mcg...@crl.com | string for the Rose Bowl.
Laurence Marshall Wright
generation BMD can be constructed now using off the shelf
technology, and that such a defence system would be from 50% to
90%+ effective against current ICBM technology, on what grounds
do you base your assertion that SDI is a deception?
LMW
John R. Moore
>Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
>come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
>Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
>that the USSR could not strike back.
This strikes me as highly unlikely. While it is true that Reagan's knowledge
of science is about as low as Rush Limbaugh's, Reagan was a master at
picking advisors, and THEY knew that it wouldn't work well enough to
allow a first strike attack to succeed. Finally, if this logic were
correct, the Soviets wouldn't have expended money to develop their own SDI,
but in fact they DID do a lot of work on an SDI and in fact Gorbachev
started his reforms partly because of the threat of SDI (according to
him).
>In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
>balisitic missiles.
This is most certainly not true, since the US never broke that treaty at
all. Sure, the final deployment would have been against the ABM treaty
(not SALT treaty), but the US did not deploy. The US was planning on waiting
for the treaty to expire, Furthermore, the USSR was
in blatant violation (since admitted by them) of the ABM treaty, with
the battle management radar at Krasnoyarsk (sp?) as just one example.
>If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
>arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
This is really funny when you consider Soviet cheating.
>The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
>chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
>was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
>might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
>sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
>even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
Actually, the consensus among scientists was that it was impossible to
build a perfect shield, something that SDI proponents have never
disagreed with. A masterful anti-SDI propaganda campaign, aided by Reagan's
mistaken characterization of it, was directed totally at that strawman.
In fact, SDI was designed to greatly reduce the probability of success of
a first strike, and to provide a significant probability of preventing damage
from an accidental or small scale rogue launch. I don't think you will find
many scientists even commenting on this, much less disagreeing with it. I am
really tired of the strawman argument about SDI. Strategic missile defense
IS possible, as long as it doesn't have to be perfect - and no defense
is perfect. It is criminal today that many countries in the world could
put nukes into american cities by SRBM's and we have no defenses whatsoever!
--
DISCLAIMER: These views are mine alone, and do not reflect my employer's!
John Moore 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale, AZ 85253 USA (602-951-9326)
jo...@anasazi.com Amateur call:NJ7E Civil Air Patrol:Thunderbird 381
"Modern liberals are the termites in the structure of our society."
HALLAM-BAKER Phillip
In article <john.749235352@misty>, jo...@anasazi.com (John R. Moore) writes:
|>hal...@dxal18.cern.ch (HALLAM-BAKER Phillip) writes:
|>
|>>Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
|>>come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
|>>Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
|>>that the USSR could not strike back.
|>
|>This strikes me as highly unlikely. While it is true that Reagan's knowledge
|>of science is about as low as Rush Limbaugh's, Reagan was a master at
|>picking advisors, and THEY knew that it wouldn't work well enough to
|>allow a first strike attack to succeed. Finally, if this logic were
|>correct, the Soviets wouldn't have expended money to develop their own SDI,
|>but in fact they DID do a lot of work on an SDI and in fact Gorbachev
|>started his reforms partly because of the threat of SDI (according to
|>him).
Reagan was bad, Quayle?
Imagine you are a soviet scientist being told that the US has a working
SDI system. Do you tell your boss that its impossible? Only if you
enjoy the weather in Siberia. The problem with Stalinism is that you
get structural paranoia in the organisation.
|>>In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
|>>balisitic missiles.
|>
|>This is most certainly not true, since the US never broke that treaty at
|>all. Sure, the final deployment would have been against the ABM treaty
|>(not SALT treaty), but the US did not deploy. The US was planning on waiting
|>for the treaty to expire, Furthermore, the USSR was
|>in blatant violation (since admitted by them) of the ABM treaty, with
|>the battle management radar at Krasnoyarsk (sp?) as just one example.
Developing a weapon that could not be deployed without breaking a treaty is
pretty much the same as saying that you intend to break the treaty. When
the cost is as high as the cost of SDI only a fool would imagine that they
did not intend to deploy which would break the ABM treaty.
SALT was predicated on the ABM treaty so to break one would be to break
the other.
The ABM treaty allowed for 100 anti balistic missiles per side. Russia
bent the treaty - as did the US. But nobody is claiming that Krasnoyarsk
was in any way equivalent to SDI which had it lived up to the claims
made for it would have wiped out the strategic value of the USSR weapons.
Excusing the US on the grounds of non deployment when they were unable to
since they had not built it yet seems at best a slanted approach. there
was a clear intention to do what they wanted regardless of the treaty.
Remember that the recent bombing of Iraq was justified mainly on the grounds
that Iraq was intending to develop a weapon that would break the non
proliferation agreement. Had Saddam not been trying to get nukes much of
Iraq would today be intact (and Kewait would be part of greater Iraq with
little more than protests from April Galsepie)
|>>If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
|>>arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
|>
|>This is really funny when you consider Soviet cheating.
Generally whenever the evidence was produced of USSR cheating it was merely to
justify US cheating. Which is precisely what you are doing here.
|>>The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
|>>chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
|>>was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
|>>might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
|>>sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
|>>even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
|>
|>Actually, the consensus among scientists was that it was impossible to
|>build a perfect shield, something that SDI proponents have never
|>disagreed with. A masterful anti-SDI propaganda campaign, aided by Reagan's
|>mistaken characterization of it, was directed totally at that strawman.
If the President hasn't a clue what its about and he came up with the idea
dosen't that tell you something?
|>In fact, SDI was designed to greatly reduce the probability of success of
|>a first strike, and to provide a significant probability of preventing damage
|>from an accidental or small scale rogue launch. I don't think you will find
|>many scientists even commenting on this, much less disagreeing with it. I am
Want names? There is a group here at CERN which has disagreed with that very
assertion. For any system you suggest there are countermeasures that can
be taken. Chevalene for example.
That is beside the fact that many computer scientists beleived that the
problem of writing the software was impossible.
If you set your standards very low it is obvious that a system that works at
some level is a possibility. Luck will probably get you 5% or so. But
when there are 20,000 warheads on the other side a system that is even
99% efficient leaves 200 of them. Thats enough to wipe out every city in
the NFL entirely.
What was SDI maent to protect?
|>really tired of the strawman argument about SDI. Strategic missile defense
|>IS possible, as long as it doesn't have to be perfect - and no defense
|>is perfect. It is criminal today that many countries in the world could
|>put nukes into american cities by SRBM's and we have no defenses whatsoever!
Today your main threat of a nuclear use in the US comes from the sort that
travels at 90Kmh. Get yourself a petrol truck (new, you want to weld onto
it) and build a bomb inside it.
There is no defense against a nuclear strike. Only one needs to get through.
If you had SDI all it would mean is that a first use would have to be
against a civilian target as opposed to a military one that was covered
by the shield.
Even if I was to accept the position you push, that SDI was not an effective
shield for the civilian population and that the President did not know what he
was talking about SDI makes no sense. A trillion dollars more on the debt for a
system that would protect only weapons and threaten world peace makes no
sense whatsoever.
Kenneth C. Mitchell
Good points all, John; let me add a few minor things.
John R. Moore (jo...@anasazi.com) wrote:
: hal...@dxal18.cern.ch (HALLAM-BAKER Phillip) writes:
: >Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
: >come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
: >Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
: >that the USSR could not strike back.
: This strikes me as highly unlikely. While it is true that Reagan's knowledge
: of science is about as low as Rush Limbaugh's, Reagan was a master at
: picking advisors, and THEY knew that it wouldn't work well enough to
: allow a first strike attack to succeed. Finally, if this logic were
: correct, the Soviets wouldn't have expended money to develop their own SDI,
: but in fact they DID do a lot of work on an SDI and in fact Gorbachev
: started his reforms partly because of the threat of SDI (according to
: him).
ABM research started in the early '70's, and the ABM treaty was an attempt
to keep the lid on spending for an ABM system. Each side was allowed to
build two ABM launcher sites, one to protect the national capitol, the
other to protect ICBM launching fields. This was later negotiated down to
ONE site; the Soviets built their "Henhouse"/"Gallosh" system (to use the
NATO codenames) around Moscow. Would it have worked? Probably not, given
the state of Soviet technology (and how shitty all their other stuff was)
but it was there. We built launchers for the Safeguard system in North
Dakota, intending to deploy our system there, but Teddy Kennedy lead the
fight to eliminate all funding for it.
An aside; _WE_ didn't initiate the ABM treaty; the _USSR_ proposed it. A
classic example of the Soviets winning at the negotiating table something
they NEVER could have won in the field. The USSR had already fielded
their system, and panicked when they say how far ahead of theirs our
Safeguard system would have been.
: >In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
: >balisitic missiles.
: This is most certainly not true, since the US never broke that treaty at
: all. Sure, the final deployment would have been against the ABM treaty
: (not SALT treaty), but the US did not deploy. The US was planning on waiting
: for the treaty to expire, Furthermore, the USSR was
: in blatant violation (since admitted by them) of the ABM treaty, with
: the battle management radar at Krasnoyarsk (sp?) as just one example.
AND the SA-9.
: >If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
: >arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
: This is really funny when you consider Soviet cheating.
: >The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
: >chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
: >was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
: >might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
: >sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
: >even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
: Actually, the consensus among scientists was that it was impossible to
: build a perfect shield, something that SDI proponents have never
: disagreed with. A masterful anti-SDI propaganda campaign, aided by Reagan's
: mistaken characterization of it, was directed totally at that strawman.
: In fact, SDI was designed to greatly reduce the probability of success of
: a first strike, and to provide a significant probability of preventing damage
: from an accidental or small scale rogue launch. I don't think you will find
: many scientists even commenting on this, much less disagreeing with it. I am
: really tired of the strawman argument about SDI. Strategic missile defense
: IS possible, as long as it doesn't have to be perfect - and no defense
: is perfect. It is criminal today that many countries in the world could
: put nukes into american cities by SRBM's and we have no defenses whatsoever!
It's even simpler than that, John; the Soviets were working toward
acquiring a credible "first-strike disarming" attack, destroying enough of
our ICBM and SSBN force to eliminate the possibility of a US response. An
even VAGUELY effective ABM defense, defending our missile silos, would
have made it impossible to be CERTAIN of a disarming strike.
Our SSBN force would have been a problem, but it's not for nothing that
ASW was the largest part of the USSR's military research budget. I'm not
aware that they ever MADE a technical breakthrough that would have allowed
them to find and destroy our "boomers", but it wasn't for lack of trying.
--
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Ken Mitchell | "I've been to communist countries. They're crap-
8037 Stone Canyon | your-pants ugly, dull-as-church, dead-from-the-dick-
Citrus Heights, CA | up places where government is to life what panty hose
95610 | are to sex."
kmit...@netcom.com | P.J. O'Rourke, "Holidays in Hell"
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John R. Moore
>In article <john.749235352@misty>, jo...@anasazi.com (John R. Moore) writes:
>Imagine you are a soviet scientist being told that the US has a working
>SDI system. Do you tell your boss that its impossible? Only if you
>enjoy the weather in Siberia. The problem with Stalinism is that you
>get structural paranoia in the organisation.
This is certainly a bunch of conjecture. First of all, the Soviet Union
by that time was not Stalinism, it was more of a mobocracy. As such, scientists
COULD say what they believed about TECHNICAL things. They learned something
from the Lamarckian nonsense, after all.
>|>>In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
>|>>balisitic missiles.
>|>
>|>This is most certainly not true, since the US never broke that treaty at
>|>all. Sure, the final deployment would have been against the ABM treaty
>|>(not SALT treaty), but the US did not deploy. The US was planning on waiting
>|>for the treaty to expire, Furthermore, the USSR was
>|>in blatant violation (since admitted by them) of the ABM treaty, with
>|>the battle management radar at Krasnoyarsk (sp?) as just one example.
>Developing a weapon that could not be deployed without breaking a treaty is
>pretty much the same as saying that you intend to break the treaty. When
>the cost is as high as the cost of SDI only a fool would imagine that they
>did not intend to deploy which would break the ABM treaty.
Actually, I was incorrect in my post above. The treaty had ALREADY expired.
>SALT was predicated on the ABM treaty so to break one would be to break
>the other.
>The ABM treaty allowed for 100 anti balistic missiles per side. Russia
>bent the treaty - as did the US. But nobody is claiming that Krasnoyarsk
>was in any way equivalent to SDI which had it lived up to the claims
>made for it would have wiped out the strategic value of the USSR weapons.
The US bent the treaty? How? With our ZERO defense? Excuuuuse me :-)
>Excusing the US on the grounds of non deployment when they were unable to
>since they had not built it yet seems at best a slanted approach. there
>was a clear intention to do what they wanted regardless of the treaty.
See above... the treaty was long dead.
>Remember that the recent bombing of Iraq was justified mainly on the grounds
>that Iraq was intending to develop a weapon that would break the non
>proliferation agreement. Had Saddam not been trying to get nukes much of
>Iraq would today be intact (and Kewait would be part of greater Iraq with
>little more than protests from April Galsepie)
The nuclear proliferation issue was only part of the picture. Equally
important was the immediate threat to Saudi Arabia, and that threat was
conventional, not nuclear.
>|>>If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
>|>>arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
>|>
>|>This is really funny when you consider Soviet cheating.
>Generally whenever the evidence was produced of USSR cheating it was merely to
>justify US cheating. Which is precisely what you are doing here.
WHAT cheating? We have NEVER deployed a single ABM missile (hardsite was
killed).
>|>Actually, the consensus among scientists was that it was impossible to
>|>build a perfect shield, something that SDI proponents have never
>|>disagreed with. A masterful anti-SDI propaganda campaign, aided by Reagan's
>|>mistaken characterization of it, was directed totally at that strawman.
>If the President hasn't a clue what its about and he came up with the idea
>dosen't that tell you something?
What is that supposed to tell me? And Reagan didn't come up with SDI. First
of all, it was an OBVIOUS thing - the technology was coming together. Second,
you forget the contribution of the High Frontier organization, which advocated
strategic defense.
Sorry, but you can't shoot down the technical aspects of SDI with this sort
of weak argument.
>|>In fact, SDI was designed to greatly reduce the probability of success of
>|>a first strike, and to provide a significant probability of preventing damage
>|>from an accidental or small scale rogue launch. I don't think you will find
>|>many scientists even commenting on this, much less disagreeing with it. I am
>Want names? There is a group here at CERN which has disagreed with that very
>assertion. For any system you suggest there are countermeasures that can
>be taken. Chevalene for example.
Fine.
>That is beside the fact that many computer scientists beleived that the
>problem of writing the software was impossible.
As a computer scientist, I think that's a bunch of bunk. There were a lot
of assumptions that went into that assessment - such as the belief that
it had to be a single monolithic system. As one who develops distributed
systems, I KNOW you can make these things work.
>If you set your standards very low it is obvious that a system that works at
>some level is a possibility. Luck will probably get you 5% or so. But
>when there are 20,000 warheads on the other side a system that is even
>99% efficient leaves 200 of them. Thats enough to wipe out every city in
>the NFL entirely.
>What was SDI maent to protect?
It was meant to protect land based missiles against a massive strike,
and cities against lesser strikes. Remember, deterrence is about maintaining
a credible retaliatory force.
Another thing the opponents of SDI conveniently forget: with and SDI,
the US could have gone from a "launch on warning" posture to a "launch
on impact" posture - one that is inherently more stable!
>|>really tired of the strawman argument about SDI. Strategic missile defense
>|>IS possible, as long as it doesn't have to be perfect - and no defense
>|>is perfect. It is criminal today that many countries in the world could
>|>put nukes into american cities by SRBM's and we have no defenses whatsoever!
>Today your main threat of a nuclear use in the US comes from the sort that
>travels at 90Kmh. Get yourself a petrol truck (new, you want to weld onto
>it) and build a bomb inside it.
Actually, more likely is freighter in New York harbor. But it is only one
threat. If Saddam had had ICBM's instead of IRBM's (and future Saddam's
WILL have them), he could have held our cities hostage while he went on
in to take Saudi Arabia! He could have done that even without nukes -
he could have threated chemical attack or radiological attack.
>There is no defense against a nuclear strike. Only one needs to get through.
>If you had SDI all it would mean is that a first use would have to be
>against a civilian target as opposed to a military one that was covered
>by the shield.
There IS a defense against a nuclear strike. There is no PERFECT defense,
but as I say, bringing that up is a strawman.
Furthermore, nukes are NOT as destructive as you might think. For example,
to take out the Phoenix metropolitan area with 1 megaton weapons optimally
placed would take 43 hits!
>Even if I was to accept the position you push, that SDI was not an effective
>shield for the civilian population and that the President did not know what he
>was talking about SDI makes no sense. A trillion dollars more on the debt for a
>system that would protect only weapons and threaten world peace makes no
>sense whatsoever.
Well, let's take these one at a time...
The way you shield civilians from massive attack is by deterring
war in the first place
You CAN save lives against a smaller attack with a partially effective
system. I don't know about you, but I think we would be better off
with 10 million dead than with 50 million dead, for example! Again,
you take the perfectionist position.
The president made a political statement to gain support. Did he
believe it? I don't know. Does it make any difference, no it
doesn't. The technical feasability of SDI is unrelated to who does
or does not believe in it. The laws of physics have this nasty habit
of being unaffected by politics or belief!
A trillion dollars is the estimate of the critics. Supporters were
estimating $100 billion (one tenth as much). The system proposed
by High Frontier would have been much cheaper (it was a point defense
system only - it ONLY protected deterrent power, not cities). Meanwhile
we have spent FOUR trillion dollars in a totally failed attempt to
solve our social and crime problems, but I don't hear SDI opponents
complaining about this?
--
DISCLAIMER: These views are mine alone, and do not reflect my employer's!
John Moore 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale, AZ 85253 USA (602-951-9326)
jo...@anasazi.com Amateur call:NJ7E Civil Air Patrol:Thunderbird 381
- - Gun Control Means Hitting What You are Aiming At! - -
- - - "It is better to be judged by twelve, than carried by six." - - -
John R. Moore
>Our SSBN force would have been a problem, but it's not for nothing that
>ASW was the largest part of the USSR's military research budget. I'm not
>aware that they ever MADE a technical breakthrough that would have allowed
>them to find and destroy our "boomers", but it wasn't for lack of trying.
There have been recent rumours in the ASW community that it is possible to
track submerged submarines from minute wakes on the surface. This is done
with active radar and MASSIVE digital signal processing. If so, it could
destroy the SSBN deterrent. Oh, and guess who was running high power,
sophisticated radar satellites for it's navy.... yup, the Soviets.
One of the important reasons for protecting the land based retaliatory force
was that the submarine forces were susceptible to a single, secret
technological breakthrough, such as the rumoured one above.
Keith Ramsay
| The popular vote split in the 84 election was about 60-40, a
| crushing defeat by anyone's standards.
No. I think that one has become too accustomed to overinterpreting the
narrow margins which are usual in such votes, and that less narrow
margins are correspondingly exaggerated. American politics is quite
stable, and my Canadian friends assure me that Republicans and
Democrats are regarded as being fairly similar, abroad.
The Globe and Mail recently quoted a poll taken during the gulf war in
which 15% of American respondents said that they believed it was
Armageddon. This illustrates why I don't take polls (or votes even) as
accurate indicators of informed opinion, certainly to within such a
modest margin as 10 or 20 percent; I'm sure further examples can be
found.
I think one can say that whatever his other minuses, Mondale certainly
shot himself in the foot by saying that he would raise taxes. The
public prefers to hear "read my lips, no new taxes".
Keith Ramsay
drieux, just drieux
In article 17...@dxcern.cern.ch, hal...@dxal18.cern.ch (HALLAM-BAKER Phillip) writes:
>
>Good reasons for the USSR to be afraid of a non functional SDI system
>come from the fact that Reagan might have beleived it to have worked.
>Thus he might well have launched an attack under the eroneous beleif
>that the USSR could not strike back.
>
>In addition the USSR was furious because SDI broke the SALT treaty on anti
>balisitic missiles. If the US could not be trusted to abide by existing
>arms control agreements there was no hope of future agreements.
>
>The fact that the USSR was against SDI does not mean that it ever had a
>chance of working. While the consensus amongst scientists was that it
>was impossible there was a minute chance that a technological breakthrough
>might make it possible. You may think that a 0.1% chance of success may be
>sufficient to justify a 1 trillion dollar weapons program. I do not. But
>even a miniscule chance is sufficient to worry the other side.
>--
>Phillip M. Hallam-Baker
So barring the UnPleasant fact that once again the USA
decided to VIOLATE International Treaties, and then
CROW ABOUT IT.....
One of the DownSides of the PsychoPhantasy that some how
our Scientists would Come UP with the New Wonder Weapon
which would be able to Make Everything Nice and WONDERFUL
is that even with 'Real Time Processing' one still has to
account for the Fact that HUMANS only provide computational
services at Very Very VERY Slow rates....
That Many of the Propogandists have been Crooning about
their Great Propoganda Victory, is nothing New, that so
many people fell for 'the big lie' is SCARY!!!
That there are still folks who are interested in supporting
PsychoticDeslusions as Foreign Policy Decisions....
We can all sleep safer knowing they are just posting to the net
and Not Actually making UP US Foreign Policy....
ciao
drieux
ps: Support the American Armed Forces as they LIBERATE Somalia
from the Hiddeous and Heinous Hand of the International EVIL WarLordKabal!!!!
pps: or can we sleep safely????
--
Modern Problems:
"The Real World is Only for those persons who's
number theory has no square root of the negation of one."
Donald R. McGregor
>| The popular vote split in the 84 election was about 60-40, a
>| crushing defeat by anyone's standards.
>
|which 15% of American respondents said that they believed it was
|Armageddon. This illustrates why I don't take polls (or votes even) as
|accurate indicators of informed opinion, certainly to within such a
|modest margin as 10 or 20 percent; I'm sure further examples can be
|found.
|
|I think one can say that whatever his other minuses, Mondale certainly
|shot himself in the foot by saying that he would raise taxes. The
|public prefers to hear "read my lips, no new taxes".
This isn't a lot less than an indictment of representative
democracy. While it is pretty ugly at times, it still beats
the alternatives.
The "informed opinion" sector of societies have their own blind spots.
I'd certainly be nervous if I were governed by, say, those people
who post to USENET. Though the debates in congressional
committees might be more entertaining. CSPAN would be better
than pro wrestling.
The elites or "informed" people tend to have a disposition towards
intellectually trendy ideas that don't neccesarily correspond
to reality. The broad mass of people can usually see through the
cant.
At least regular
broad-based elections keeps the elites in government worrying
about the needs and wants of the people they're serving, benighted
ignorant fools though they may be.
Of course, this only works on fairly broad issues of government,
not on particular issues. Which is why we have a representative
government.
Mondale lost in '84 because most people thought Reagan was doing
pretty well, and that they were better off than four years prior.
Not many were enthused about going back to the failed Carter-Mondale
policies. Anything worse than 40% in a two party system is probably
a good indicator that the losing party is seriously out of touch with
the electorate. A two-party system has a natural tendency to
gravitate towards the center.