OT: Nixons guardian Germans that controlled him (Hitlers SS guys)
LIBERATOR
controlling Nixon, as the 20th Century Time Life chronicle mentioned
these 3 Germans no one could get through to see Nixon, without their
permission, it's clear these are Hitlers SS in control of the U.S.
Government. I suppose their actual history to the 3rd Reich was purged
and then a false history written, such as they're "Prussian". I read
in the magazine that these Germans would decide who saw Nixon and
would not let anyone through their protective cell.
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http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921113,00.html
WATERGATE: NIXON'S GERMANS
By HP-Time.com;Henry Kissinger Monday, Mar. 08, 1982
The media tended to portray H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman as
Prussian drillmasters implementing with their own sadistic frills
malevolent orders from the Oval Office. I was generally contrasted
favorably with them. I was awarded the white hat, they the black. This
was an oversimplification of all our roles.
In some respects, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were rivals. On the whole,
Ehrlichman sponsored or supported domestic policies that were humane
and progressive. He favored reducing defense expenditures beyond a
point I considered prudent so as to free resources for social
programs; several times I appealed his interventions to Nixon.
Ehrlichman was shaken by student protest following the Cambodian
incursions. He had three teen-age children, and their travail touched
him deeply. But Nixon's favor depended on one's readiness to fall in
with the paranoid cult of the tough guy. The conspiracy of the press,
the hostility of the Establishment, the flatulence of the Georgetown
set were permanent features of Nixon's conversation, which one
challenged at the cost of exclusion from the inner circle.
Rough talk and confrontational tactics did not come naturally to
Ehrlichman. But every presidential assistant is tempted to purchase
greater influence by humoring a President's moods. Ehrlichman
overcompensated. To the mounting protest demonstrations, the leaks and
the drift of the dissenters into extralegal activity, Ehrlichman
responded with a zeal that was sometimes excessive.
Toward me, Ehrlichman showed a mixture of comradely good will and
testy jealousy. Inevitably he resented the contrast drawn between us
by the media. He had been associated with Nixon for too long for the
President to tolerate on his part social contacts and attitudes that
in my case were treated as a congenital defect. Torn between his
prohibited predilections to conciliate and his political survival,
Ehrlichman adopted a supercilious manner. Outsiders considered it a
mark of arrogance; its real fount was ambivalence.
Haldeman, though by instinct conservative, was at bottom uninterested
in policy. Convinced that image defined reality, Haldeman went along
with, and frequently encouraged, Nixon's nearly obsessive belief that
all his difficulties were caused by inadequate public relations. Nixon
never could rid himself of the delusion that only the failings of his
media staff kept him from receiving the acclaim he associated with
John F. Kennedy. President and chief of staff devoted much time to
discussing how to manipulate the press—a doomed quest so long as both
rejected a serious dialogue with the hated, feared and secretly envied
representatives of the media.
Later, Haldeman was accused of isolating Nixon. This was unjust.
Nixon's isolation was self-imposed. He dreaded meeting strangers. He
was unable to give direct orders to those who disagreed with him. The
vaunted Haldeman procedures were an effort to compensate for these
weaknesses. If Haldeman was eventually destroyed because he carried
out the President's wishes too literally, it is also my impression
that many instructions given in the heat of emotion never went further
than the yellow pads where Haldeman dutifully noted them.
Haldeman was free of personal ambition, or at least his ambition was
fulfilled in the position he occupied. And yet there resided in this
almost inhuman detachment the seeds of the eventual destruction of the
Nixon Administration. Haldeman had no deep experience in national
politics, no feel for the propriety, scope and limits of presidential
prerogative. He sought unquestioning obedience from his staff. He
selected miniature editions of himself—people with no political past,
whose loyalty was determined by a chain of command and whose devotion
was vouchsafed by the opportunity to play a part in great events. The
White House staffs attitude to the President resembled that of an
advertising agency—whence most came—to an exclusive, temperamental
client. They were expediters, not balance wheels. And once the machine
started skidding, they accelerated its descent rather than braking it
in time.
Haldeman's relations with me had ingredients for friction. A
conservative middle-class Californian, with all the sentiments and
suspicions of that breed, he had rarely met a man of my background
(though he overestimated how close I really was to the despised
Establishment). He had stuck with Nixon after the gubernatorial defeat
of 1962 and genuinely believed in Nixon's mission. It was bound to be
irritating to him to see a member of the Rockefeller team, one who had
consistently opposed Nixon, garner so much publicity. But he rarely
showed jealousy.
Haldeman's attitude to me was fundamentally a reflection of Nixon's.
When Haldeman harassed me, I could be sure that it was to carry out
some design of the President's. Nixon was convinced that my special
talents would flourish best under conditions of personal insecurity;
he periodically saw to it that I developed some doubts about my
standing with him.
But any tensions caused by these practices had largely evaporated in
early 1973, once I had decided to resign. In the second half of April
1973, therefore, my feelings toward both Haldeman and Ehrlichman were
tinged with sadness. We had been colleagues during turbulent years. I
knew and liked their wives and children. They ruminated on their
chances of survival but not on the circumstances that had produced
their dilemma. And I am not sure that they really fully understood.
They had not seen their conduct as a "coverup" but as a means to
protect the Administration from opponents working against the national
interest as they conceived it. Or they were more skillful actors than
I think possible.
Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921113-2,00.html#ixzz0Y4JX0YSV
Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921113,00.html#ixzz0Y4JOZM7C
David E. Powell
bloodlines didn't mean they loved Hitler. Eisenhower sure didn't.