It would be interesting to put an Airbus 330 in a chamber where severe
atmospheric electromagnetic radiation patterns could be duplicated to
test the effects on the plane's electrical and electronics systems. I
think it should be done.
Most likely that the pilots could do absolutely nothing to control the
plane. They could perhaps have a last drink before they crash. They
knew this, and that is why the seats are not even folded down in the
cockpit.
By the way the bathroom trouble indicator, at the start of the fault
indications is most likely an electrical fault as is common in that
area on most planes due to way planes are wired.
Aluminum wiring harnesses have another implication. Aluminum, often
used for EMR shielding due to its ability to attract and disperse
electromagnetics can act in the same way in harnesses. It collects and
carries the inductive potential quite readily, potentially creating a
very real danger that is potentially worse than properly shielded
copper. Remember that aluminum is a material of choice in EMR
shielding exactly because it is good at attracting electromagnetic
interference.
Keep in mind that the fly by wire systems are derivative from military
technologies, but are very cheapened versions, without the milspec
standards being applied to protect the system from EMR.
That is the problem with excessively automated modern aircraft such as
Airbus. They tend to disconnect their pilots in an emergency and then
make up their own minds as to crashing. Nothing anyone can really do
when the plane makes up its own mind, closes its mind completely, and
goes down.
Of course right now Boeing would very likely be much happier than
Airbus, if anyone happens to find the lost flight recorder. I doubt
Airbus really ever wants to see that black box ever again.
Robert Morpheal
"Robert Morpheal, Morphealism, Bob Ezergailis" wrote:
> I think the fly by wire, flight computers, issue is probably the most
> significant. The fault indicators show a pattern of electrical
> failure, including the computers.
If so, how how did the ACARS mesages continue being transmitted for some
four minutes ? They weren't getting their data from nowhere.
Almost everyone is looking at the ice in the pitot tubes issue which
explains everything much better, not least that Airbus had recommended
replacing them with an improved type and that had not been done on the
accident plane.
Try .....
http://www.iasa-intl.com/folders/belfast/AF447.htm
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/unusual-attitude/2009/06/af447---the-air-caraibes-story.html
Something like 38 or 39 pitot tube 'upsets' have since surfaced on A330s (
possibly including A340s ) . Not proof but quite damning.
A backup method of indicating IAS is required. The system may be redundant
but has a common-mode failure - icing. That reduces its redundancy to zero
in such situations.
Graham
--
due to the hugely increased level of spam please make the obvious
adjustment to my email address
Nope, wrong again fjukkktard.
Bertie
>
> Nope, wrong again fjukkktard.
:-)
For some strange reason the pitot heat prevents the pitot icing up.
george wrote:
Not if there's not enough heat.
>
>
> george wrote:
>
>> On Jul 5, 10:16 am, Bertie the Bunyip <B...@BB.not.aaaaaaa> wrote:
>>
>> > Nope, wrong again fjukkktard.
>>
>> :-)
>> For some strange reason the pitot heat prevents the pitot icing up.
>
> Not if there's not enough heat.
Yeh, right fjukkwit, so there wasn't enough heat say s the
planespotter..
>
> Graham
>
>
> --
> due to the hugely increased level of spam please make the obvious
> adjustment to my email address
>
>
How wil that prevent you form spamming luser boi?
Bertie
>