Daghistan: A brief history Part 1
The seeker
<farhan_...@my-deja.com> wrote:
Dagestan (Daghestan): Comprehensive Report
1. INTRODUCTION
Dagestan is a republic located between Caspian sea and Caucasus
mountain ranges and counting approximately two million inhabitants
(2,186,000 - 1996). It is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the
world, counting 30 ethnic groups and 80-odd nationalities.1
Dagestan shares the same problems that are felt all over the former
Soviet Union: the development of an complex balance of political,
economical, ethnic and criminal interest groups, lack of investment, a
legacy of distorted economies that serve local needs inadequately,
corruption at all levels of society, a failing judicial system, acute
shortage of administrative and political skills, a spectacular rise of
organized crime, lack of employment, and easy access to arms.
The main factor dividing ethnic groups in Dagestan is the distribution
of power, wealth and land along ethnic lines. The feeling that security can
only be found within the ethnic group and under a system of self-government
dominated political developments in 1989-1991. The political elite has
succeeded, however, in keeping nationalist ambitions in check. They were
helped by the fact that the mountainous and ethnically diverse nature of
Dagestan renders irrelevant any idea of an independent state based on the
concept of a single nation. In addition, local and national leaders act with
great restraint out of fear of possible inter-ethnic violence.
2. SOME BASIC FACTS
2.1 Geography
Dagestan is situated in the North-East of the Caucasus mountain range.
It borders the Caspian Sea in the East, the Chechen Republic and
Stavropol Territory in the West, the Kalmukya Republic in the North,
and Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South. The republic measures 50,300
square km and had 37.5 inhabitants per square km in 1989.2
The Dagestani landscape changes from high mountains in the South to
flat steppe land in the North. Because there is no easily accessible
pass over the Caucasian mountains, the coastal plain of Dagestan,
bordering the Caspian Sea, is an important North-South passage. The
mountainous areas are still extremely isolated, notably in winter.3
2.2 Population
In 1989, according to the USSR census, Dagestan had 1,802,188
inhabitants. At present, the population is estimated at 2 million.4 By
far the largest ethnic group, the Avars, make up just over 25 per cent
of the population.
1989 census 1993 estimates 5
Dagestani nationalities6
Avars 495,721 524,000
Aguls 13,791 18,000
Dargins 280,431 314,000
Kumyks 231,805 249,000
Laks 91,682 98,000
Lezgins 204,370 231,000
Nogai 28,294 32,000
Rutuls 14,955 19,000
Tabasarans 78,196 94,000
Tsakhurs 5,194 7,000
Other North Caucasians
Chechens 57,877 62,000
Osetians 1,195 2,000
Mountains Jews 3,649 ?
Tats 12,937 11,000
Slavs
Russians 165,940 ?
Ukrainians 8,079 9,000
Others
Azeris 75,463 84,000
Jews 9,390 ?
Tatars 5,473 6,000
The above table mentions only ten out of two dozen Dagestani ethnic-
linguistic groups that were considered nationalities by the Soviet
Union. Still other groups were considered ethnographic groups, although
some of them have retained their linguistic, social and cultural
specificity.7
Except for the Kumyks and Nogai, the Dagestani peoples are indigenous
and traditionally mountain dwellers. They speak Caucasian languages and
are related to other Caucasian peoples like the Chechens, Cherkessians,
Kabardins, Adyghe and Abkhaz. The Kumyks and Nogai originate from the
Central Asian plains. They traditionally live in the steppe regions and
speak Turkic languages.
Each Caucasian ethnic group is divided into tribes, clans, sub-clans
and village communities. The basic unit in rural areas is the village
community, corresponding to one or several clans divided into sub-
clans, usually counting approximately 100 people descending from the
same ancestor. A council of elders regulates relations between the
clans and sub-clans. Loyalty to the sub-group is stronger than to the
nationality as a whole.8
This contributes to a sitution whereby the peoples of Dagestan live
ethnically segregated from each other, particularly in the rural areas.
Daughters are generally not allowed to marry outside their own ethnic
group. Mountain people who have settled in the plains tend to stick
together. Even sovkhozes (state agricultural farms) are often de facto
divided between the different ethnic communities that are employed.9
Between 1979 and 1989, the natural population growth in Dagestan as a
whole was 10 per cent, while the mountain peoples increased by 14 per
cent. By comparison, the Russian population decreased by 12 per cent
between 1979 and 1989, mainly through emigration.10
In 1989, there was a 628,000-strong Dagestani diaspora registered in
the former Soviet Union outside Dagestan.11 All Caucasian peoples are
part of a wider diaspora, both because of labour migration and as a
result of the deportations of the late 19th century and in 1944.
Because of the economic crisis in the Soviet successor states, many
members of the diaspora have returned to Dagestan over the past years.
There are, however, no reliable figures available on this migration.
2.3 Economy
The traditional economy in the mountainous regions of Dagestan was
based on sheep-breeding. In summer, the flocks grazed the alpine
meadows, and in autumn they were brought to winter pastures in the
northern territories of the Caspian lowlands. Small terraces in the
valleys provided grain and other crops. The northern lowlands were
mainly used for cattle-breeding.
Dagestan shares in the general decline of the Russian economy.
Additionally, it struggles with the legacy of being one of the poorest
regions of the Russian Federation. Dagestan is badly connected with the
outside world and has no important natural resources, while foreign
investment is negligible and federal investment has declined since
1991. The weak economic infrastructure can be illustrated by the fact
that 56 per cent of the population live in scattered villages.12 The
return since 1990 of tens of thousands of migrant workers to Dagestan
has added to existing pressures on the labour market.13
Not unlike elsewhere in the Russian Federation, successful new
entrepreneurs are more often found in trade than in manufacturing.
Nevertheless, the new private sector is dynamic and compensates
partially for the economic decline, but lack of statistics makes it
impossible to determine its real importance. The Dagestani industry is
mostly defence related and suffers from acute lack of orders.
Industrial contraction does not only affect the cities, but also
mountain villages, where a number of high-tech military plants are
located.
Agriculture suffers from lack of investment, no reliable transport and
trading system, and uncertainty about landownership. There is a
shortage of agricultural land in the mountains, and, except for the dry
steppes in the North, the lowlands offer only limited opportunities.
Only a negligible part of the agricultural acreage is privately owned.14
In 1992, Dagestan was the fifth most heavily subsidized republic of the
Russian Federation, paying 3,742 million rubles in taxes and receiving
22,939 million rubles in subsidies.15 The 1994 federal budget foresaw a
quarterly subsidy "to equalize the level of social protection for the
population" for Dagestan of 146,417 million rubles, the third highest
in the Russian Federation, only comparable to some northern Siberian
districts and the overcrowded republics of North Osetia and
Ingushetia.16
2.4 Language
Many of the 1.5 million speakers of Dagestani languages live in the
mountainous areas. Linguists distinguish 29 different languages in
Dagestan, which are mutually unintelligible. The most important is
Avar, with approximately half a million speakers.17 The smallest
Dagestani language is Hinukh with only 5,000 speakers in 1994, half of
them living in the village of Hinukh, the other half forming a
community near Makhachkala.18 Nine of Dagestan's indigenous languages
have a literary tradition - Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, Lezgin, Tabasaran,
Nogai, Azeri, Tat and Lak.19
The Russian language serves as the lingua franca in Dagestan. It is the
language of communication in the plains and in the national
administration. Russian is compulsory in primary and secondary school.
Avar also often serves as a lingua franca between different Dagestani
peoples. In order to prevent controversy, the Government of Dagestan in 1991
declined to make a decision on an official state language.20
"Multi-lingualism is common throughout the Caucasus but can take
formidable proportions in Dagestan, where it has been noted that
denizens of the highest areas usually speak the language of the group
living beneath them, and so on down to the lowlands."21 Because in the
mountain villages there are few occasions to speak Russian or Avar,
only those who frequently trade and travel or have followed higher
education have a good command of these languages.22
2.5 Religion
Dagestan has been a centre of Islamic learning since the late Middle
Ages. Eighty-eight per cent of the population of Dagestan belong to
traditionally Muslim peoples. Despite the fact that only a handful of
mosques survived the mass-destruction of the late 1920s and early
1930s, Islam has retained a central role in social life. In virtually
every village in Dagestan there is a new mosque being built or one just
constructed. Classical Arabic and Koran reading has been taught in schools
since 1992.23 Nevertheless, ethnic allegiances are stronger
than the idea of Islamic unity, as is shown by the fact that Islamic
organizations strictly follow ethnic lines.24 The only sizeable non-
Muslim community in Dagestan is that of the Russians.
Among the mountain populations, Islam is of especially great importance
in social life. Virtually all adult males are members of a wierd, one
or other of the secret Sufi brotherhoods. Membership of the
brotherhoods often follows the lines of membership of sub-clans. The
brotherhoods regulate the religious life of their members and take care of
the rituals that accompany important events in life like birth, marriage and
death.25 Religious leaders mediate between clans and individuals and thus
play a crucial role in the on-going process of palaver and peacemaking that
accompanies a complicated society like
that of Dagestan, but religious groups as such do not play an important role
in politics.26
3. A SHORT HISTORY
3.1 Pre-1917 History
From the 5th century B.C. Dagestan was part of Caucasian Albania. In
the 7th century A.D. it came under Arab domination and its population
was converted to Islam. The Arabs were succeeded by Seljuk Turks in the 10th
century, followed in the 13th century by the Mongols and the Golden Horde,
of which the Nogai are descendants. The Ottoman Empire came to dominate the
region in the 16th and the Persians in the 18th century.27
Even though nominally subject to foreign rulers, the people of Dagestan
always retained a virtually independent position. Their own local leaders
were extremely powerful, which partially explains the ferocious resistance
that the mountainous peoples put up against the Russian Empire when it tried
to impose effective political dominance.28 After the Napoleonic Wars, the
Russian Empire tried to extend its influence to the Caucasus. The ensuing
Caucasian War (1816-1856) is the most celebrated period in the history of
Dagestan, especially of the Avars. Under their charismatic leader Imam
Shamil, the Caucasians resisted the Russian advance in a bloody and often
heroic war. By the end of the 19th century, millions of Caucasians had
either been killed or forced to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. The
subsequent immigration of Russians and other Christian peoples radically
changed the inter- ethnic balance in most Caucasian regions.29
3.2 The Soviet Era
During the Russian Revolution, the Caucasian peoples of Dagestan
actively supported the Bolsheviks. Vladimir I. Lenin's promises of
autonomy for ethnic minorities appeared more attractive to them than
the Russian nationalism of General Anton Denikin and his mainly Cossack
White Army. The routing of the anti-Bolshvik ("White") forces in 1919
brought a bloody suppression of Cossacks, in which bands of Chechen,
Avar and other Caucasian fighters sometimes voluntarily assisted the
Red Army Commissars.30 Later, in 1920-1921, an anti-Bolshevik uprising,
mainly supported by Avars, was brutally crushed.31
In 1921, the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was
proclaimed (DASSR). The DASSR was formed out of the former Tsarist
Dagestan plus the Kumyk district of Terskaia region, later subdivided
into Khazbekov, Novolaksky and Khasav Yurt districts. In 1922, the
republic was extended to the north with former Terek-Cossack lands and
parts of Stavropol Territory and Astrakhan Province, now called Kizlar,
Tarumovsky and Nogaisky districts. In 1938, all the land north of the
Terek river was returned to the Astrakhan Province. Lands west of the
Kizlar district, formerly belonging to the Grebenovsky Cossacks, were
added to Dagestan in 1923 and attached to Chechnya in 1957.
Under Communist rule, government posts were judiciously divided
according to nationality, often with no regard to professional ability.
Power and resources were distributed according to a complicated system
of ethnic quotas.32
3.3 The Post-Soviet Era
In 1990-1991, a movement for national independence emerged in Dagestan.
This movement reached its peak in April 1991, when 39 out of 54
regional soviets supported a resolution to create a sovereign Dagestan
Republic. The regions that voted against the resolution were those
dominated by national groups that wished to secede from Dagestan, i.e
the Kumyks, the Nogai and the Lezgins.
In 1990, the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus
(CMPC) was founded by representatives of most Caucasian nations. The
Confederation considered the actual territorial division of the whole
Caucasus region artificial, constructed by and in the interest of
Russian imperialism. The CMPC considered the unification of the
Caucasian peoples a prerequisite for their survival. The organization
received much attention when, during the Abkhaz-Georgian war in 1992-
1993, it channelled sizeable North Caucasian military assistance to the
Abkhaz.33 The ideas of the CMPC are shared by many Caucasians, but its
reliance on the Government of Chechnya as well as its failure to play
any role in the Chechen war has eroded its political relevance.34
4. THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT
Like in most other regions in the Russian Federation, the current
leadership in Dagestan is largely made up of former communist
nomenclatura, supplemented with successful businessmen. The national
movements that emerged during 1989-91 were mostly led by second echelon
politicians. They directed their activities against each other and the
Supreme Soviet of Dagestan, the main forum of the republic's leaders,
but never succeeded in challenging the incumbent elite. If successful
in building a strong following, new leaders were absorbed by the
established elite. One of the reasons for the failure of the national
movements to play a leading role in Dagestan politics was that Dagestan
society is characterized by strong bonds of loyalty to local
clanleaders, and interest in national politics is low.35 Another factor
is that the old communist party had been infiltrated by the clan-
system. As most present-day national leaders come from the old power
structures, ethnic interests are already represented in the
government.36
By the mid 1990s, the nationalist movements that emerged in the late
1980's have lost much of their political relevance. Election results in
1990, and most likely, in 1995 too, were manipulated, but this did not
arouse much popular indignation.37 Today, a mixture of old nomenclatura
and new businessmen effectively maintain the internal peace.
Conflicts of interest in Dagestan are generally settled behind closed
doors. The main political conflicts are about the distribution of power
and money, rather than ideological or ethnic issues. The distribution
of federal subsidies is one of the dominant issues in Dagestan
politics. All inter-ethnic controversies in Dagestan are linked to
economic issues like possession of land, distribution of jobs, and
housing.38
Nevertheless, the political leadership of Daghestan is aware of the
importance of fair representation of Dagestan's ethnic groups in local
and national politics. The 26 July 1994 constitution was designed to
achieve this. The borders of the constituencies have been drawn in
order to prevent mono-ethnic units and promote cross-nationality
voting. Informal arrangements between national groups should guarantee
proportionality. If this is not achieved, the Electoral Commission can
allocate certain seats to members of one national group.39
The Government can intervene directly if the outcome of local elections
is undesired. In the June 1994 elections for the City Council of
Makhachkala, Avars obtained 50 per cent of the seats while only
constituting 20 per cent of the electorate, while the Dargins obtained
30 per cent with only 10 per cent of the population. Ethnic Russians
obtained no seats at all, although they constitute about 20 per cent of
the population. To counter this imbalance 10 new seats were created in
the City Council and no Avars or Dargins were allowed to stand for
these.40
Part of the Dagestan Supreme Soviet is elected by general suffrage, the
remainder is appointed by the districts. The 14 members of the State
Council are elected by the Supreme Soviet. No nationality can have more
than one member on the State Council and in order to be elected
candidate for the State Council, one must be among the three
representatives of one's own ethnic group who has gained the most
nominations from the whole Supreme Soviet. Both at the local and the
national level, the need to obtain votes from other than one's own
nationality, keeps radicals and leaders of national movements away from
positions of power.41
Partially as a result of these electoral arrangements, members of the
former Communist Party still dominate politics in Dagestan. The country
has kept its Soviet symbols intact. A bronze statue of Lenin stands
firm in the centre of Makhachkala. Although Communist Party structures
here are weak, members of the party won 50 per cent of the vote during
the all-Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993. Other
explanations for the electoral success of the communists range from
fear of economic change and aversion to the collusion between organized
crime and state institutions, to a conscious choice of an
internationalist ideology as an alternative to the threats of
nationalism.42
The importance of informal arrangements in Dagestan politics fosters
the development of an oligarchy. The parliamentary elections of March
1995 saw the rise to power of a number of successful businessmen, some
of whom are allegedly involved in criminal activities, at the expense
of economically unsuccessful members of the former nomenclatura.43 But
they did not bring any fundamental changes in the composition of the
ruling elite.44
The emergence of criminals in Dagestan's national politics was
illustrated by brutal attacks on leading politicians during the summer
of 1995. On 14 August a grenade was fired at the home of Prime Minister
Abdurazak Mirzabekovand on 23 August 1995, State Duma Deputy and
candidate for the post of secretary of the Communist Party, Sergei
Reshulsky, was badly wounded by unknown assailants .45
The emergence of businessmen and clanleaders in national politics can
be viewed in different ways. On the one hand, it may be said that they
do not advance the development of a transparent democracy, and that
they turn the state into a source of personal enrichment. On the other
hand, they have introduced a new type of leadership, which leaves
greater personal freedom to the population, and they are more open to
the needs and complaints of the population than the former
nomenclatura.46 However, at the same time it is true that national
movements lacking influential and rich leaders are politically
marginalized. It is generally assumed that an important part of the
electorate is guided by gratitude to a certain candidate for favours
rendered, rather than by political considerations.47
While understanding the need for mutual compromise, the leaders of the
ethnic and business interests groups that dominate Dagestan politics
suppress any trully democratic opposition. In August 1995, a group of
Duma members of different parties, including Russia's Choice, sent an
open letter to President Boris Yeltsin in which they denounced the
denigration and persecution of democrats by local leaders. They noted
several cases of criminal proceedings against democrats who had
publicly expressed their views, as well as cases of dismissal and
denial of access to the media. The letter mentions the Government of
Dagestan among the six most oppressive local regimes within the Russian
Federation.48
Relations between the Dagestani and Federal Governments are mainly
good. The Dagestani leadership is generally convinced that it cannot
afford any serious friction with the Federal Government. As Bagaudin
Akhmedov, the vice-chairman of the Dagestani parliament, put
it: "Without Russia, we are unable to survive; 80 per cent of our
budget is financed by Moscow".49
5. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE LAND ISSUE
The mountainous regions have always had a population surplus, but until
the 1950s, migration to the lowlands was limited due to the occurence
of malaria. Since malaria has been brought under control, migration to
the plains has been a dominant feature of Dagestan's social evolution.
In the 19th century, as part of the effort to subdue the mountain
peoples, Tsarist Russian troops destroyed many of the terraces
constructed to make high altitude agriculture possible. This policy was
continued under Soviet rule and in the 1930s a system of collective
farming was imposed, forcing 39,000 families to move to newly formed
Kolkhozes (collective agricultural farms) in the plains. In the years
immediately following 1944, another 17,740 families were forcibly
resettled.50
From the early 1960s until the mid 1970s, it was the Government policy
was to resettle mountain peoples in the plains. The resettlements
involved all Caucasian ethnic groups, but the Avars, Chechens and Lak
in particular. This "voluntary" migration was accompanied by an
aggressive propaganda campaign and a virtual end to the financing of
public services in the mountains.51
The migration to the plains has led to the domination of both urban
society and much of the rural lowlands by mountain peoples. Mountain
dwellers settling in the lowlands have introduced intensive cultivation
techniques to areas traditionally inhabited by pastoral peoples.52 The
situation of the pastoral peoples has deteriorated seriously since the
beginning of the last century when the Kumyks still dominated the
coastal areas. Some of the current inter-ethnic controversies result
from the fact that the mountain peoples' agricultural practices and
attitudes clash with those of cattle-breeding Nogai and Kumyks.53
Without development of the mountainous areas, there will be continued
migration to the lowlands. The competition over scarce resources and
jobs that accompanies the migration process carries the danger of
aggravating inter-ethnic tensions.
6. PEOPLES OF DAGESTAN
6.1 Avars
The Avars are subdivided into 17 sub-groups, each speaking their own
dialect. They form the largest ethnic group in Dagestan. Their
traditional territories in the mountainous districts of south-west
Dagestan are almost exclusively populated by Avars. The Avar elite,
together with Darghins, are firmly entrenched in the Dagestan state
structures.54
The Avar national movement is the People's Front Imam Shamil, led by
Gadzi Makhachev.55 The front never gained much significance. In 1992,
it announced a moratorium on any activity unless other national
movements were to challenge them.56
There are 45,000 Avars in the Belakan and adjoining districts in
Northern Azerbaijan. On several occasions since 1991, local Avar
leaders have expressed their hope that the Avar villages in the north-
west of the district could be joined with Dagestan. The Avars' wish is
supported by dubious Russian historians who claim that Belakan belongs
to Russia.57 In June 1995, the press in Azerbaijan accused unspecified
Russian circles of encouraging separatism among the Avars.58
On 11 July 1994, troops of Azerbaijan clashed with armed locals in the
village of Gabakchel in the Belokanskii rayon of northwest Azerbaijan
after the seizure of arms. The armed groups were reportedly linked with
separatist Avars active in the regions bordering Dagestan.59
6.2 Dargins
The Dargins are subdivided into three groups, Dargins, Kubachins and
Kaitags. They live mostly in Central Dagestan. Like the Avars and the
Laks, they are relatively well represented in the Dagestan state
structures. The establishment of the Dargin national movement Tsadesh
(Unity) in 1991 was not aimed at undoing perceived injustices, but at
countering the ambitions of other ethnic groups. Tsadesh has never
shown much activity. According to one observer Dargins "follow
everything that the Laks do".60
6.3 Kumyks
The origin of the Kumyks is not clear, but it seems probable that they
are rooted in an intermingling of indigenous Caucasian elements with
Turkic-speaking tribes who migrated to Dagestan in the 10th century.61
Once dominating the Caspian lowlands, the Kumyks have become a minority
of only 22 per cent in their homelands by the early 1990s, owing to
massive migration of mountain peoples, principally Avars, Laks and
Dargins. The wanton destruction of mountain villages and farming lands
by the Soviet authorities has made this migration irreversible.62
The collectivization and the forced resettlement of mountain peoples to
Kumyk territory destroyed the Kumyk's traditional settlement pattern
and deprived them of half of their arable land.63 They have a high
proportion of city-dwellers.64
In 1990, the newly formed national movement of the Kumyk, Tenglik
(Equality), led by Salav Aliev, announced its intention to create a
Kumyk national state. Referring to their past as the dominant group
along the Dagestan coast, the advocates of Kumyk independence argued
that only through full cultural sovereignty could the Kumyk language
and culture recover after decades of russification and Soviet culture
influence. It remains unclear what the culturally sovereign Kumyk
national state should look like, considering that the Kumyk form such a
tiny proportion of the population in their traditional territories.65
According to Tenglik, the Kumyk are under-represented in the state
structures and economically underprivileged.66 The organization is
opposed to what it consideres Avar over- representation in leading
functions. It became the favourite target of the Avar national
movement, Shamil.67
In November 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Dagestan
Autonomous Republic voted to create a Kumyk republic within Dagestan,
but the Kumyk representatives considered the level of autonomy
envisaged insufficient.68
In October 1991, Tenglik mobilized virtually the whole of the Kumyk
population in protest against the dominant political position of the
Avars in regions with important Kumyk presence, as well as to express
dissatisfaction with the ongoing resettlement of mountain people in
traditional Kumyk territories. The movement subsided when the
Government of Dagestan nominated an ethnic Kumyk as Minister of
Justice. Tenglik has not displayed much activity since.
In 1994, the Kumyk National Congress was formed. It is less radical
than Tenglik, and is believed to be an initiative of the Government of
Dagestan meant to counterbalance the radicals within Tenglik.69
6.4 Lezgins
The Lezgins are predominantly Sunni Muslims living in the south-east of
Dagestan and the north-west of Azerbaijan. 376,000 ethnic Lezgins were
officially registered in 1989, 205,000 in Dagestan and 171,000 in
Azerbaijan. The disintegration of the USSR has transformed internal
administrative boundariess into international borders, threatening the
unity of the Lezgins.
The Lezgins live mainly in rural areas. Their national organizations
estimate their actual number in Azerbaijan between 600,000 and 700,000,
instead of the official 171,000. They explain the disparity by saying
that the majority of Lezgins had registered themselves as Azeris during
the Soviet period, due to social and political pressure.70
The Lezgin national movement Sadval (Unity) was founded in July 1990 in
the town of Derbent in Azerbaijan. It is led by General Kochimanov and
Ruslan Ashuraliev. Sadval is aiming at the unification of the Lezgin
people. In December 1991 the All-national Congress of Lezgins even
called for the creation of a "national-state formation Lezgistan".71
In 1991, a rival Lezgin national organization, Samur, was established
in Azerbaijan. This organization opposes any revision of state borders
and advocates integration of Lezgins in Azerbaijan. In July 1992, this
was followed by the establishment of the Lezgin Democratic Party of
Azerbaijan, which holds similar views. Both organizations are sponsored
by the Government of Azerbaijan to counter the percieved threat posed
by Sadval.72
In April 1995, a new political party, Alpan, was founded in Dagestan,
which has as its main objective the unification of the Lezgin
territories in Azerbaijan with Russia. The secretary of Alpan, Amiran
Babaev, stated in an interview that Azerbaijan continues to suppress
the rights of the Lezgins and other minorities living there. Observers
believe that Russia is using the dissatisfaction of the Lezgin minority
to increase pressure on Azerbaijan.73
6.5 Russians
The Russians in Dagestan consist of two groups. Cossacks, who settled
on the left bank of the Terek river from the 16th century, and 19th and
20th century immigrants, who mainly settled in the cities. The latter
group is by far the largest as a result of the severe repression that
the Cossacks suffered in 1919-1920 and because of the 20th century
immigration of Russians.74
The traditional Cossack territories on the left bank of the Terek river
roughly coincide with the present Kizlar region. In the 1960s, non-
Russians still formed a small minority of less than 15 per cent in this
region. Because of their higher birth rate and the migration of
mountain peoples to the plains, non-Russians now make up an estimated
50 per cent of the population in the Kizlar region. Russians are under-
represented in the local administration, e.g. constitute less than 10
per cent of the region's police corps.75 At least 40,000 people in
Stavropol and Dagestan claim to be Terek Cossacks.76 In 1990, the
Cossacks formed the Low-Terek Cossack Association, led by Ataman
Alexandr Elson, which strives for the unification of all Terek Cossacks
and the recovery of traditional Cossack territories. The Association is
a member of the Vladikavkaz based Terek-Cossack Host. Russian-speakers
were also organized in the Slav Movement of Russia, led by Sergei
Sinitsin. In July 1994, a new organization, Russian Community (Russkaia
Obshchina), was registered in Makhachkala. It claims to represent
200,000 Russian speakers and its main declared task is the "protection
of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Dagestan".77 Its
establishment is seen by some observers as an attempt by the Federal
Government to increase its influence over Dagestan internal politics.78
The Cossacks and Russians are politically under-represented in the
higher echelons of the state and believe that they therefore profit
relatively little from the economic reforms and privatization, in which
patronage by powerful politicians is often a prerequisite for success.79
Cossack organizations are trying to revive the tradition whereby a
Cossack line of defence in the northern Caucasus protected southern
Russia. The emigration since 1989 of hundreds of thousands of Russian
speakers from North Caucasian republics, notably Chechnya, Ingushetia
and Dagestan, served as a catalyst for the formation of Cossack defence
units, while the establishment of these armed forces created unrest
among the other ethnic groups.80 The Cossacks do not push their claims
in Dagestan, however, and links with the more radical Vladikavkaz based
mother-organization are often strained.81
6.6 Chechens
In February 1944, within a period of two weeks, the entire Chechen
population of the Caucasus was deported to the deserts of Kazakstan. An
estimated quarter of the deportees died during the first five years of
exile.82 Among the deportees were approximately 30,000 Chechens from
Dagestan.83
Subsequently, about 15,000 Laks, who lived in a high mountain region in
the centre of Dagestan, were forced to resettle in traditional Chechen
territories, mainly in the Auskovsky district, which was renamed
Novolaksky district.84
In 1957, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Nikita Kruchev denounced a number of policies of his predecessor,
Joseph Stalin, and rehabilitated most deported peoples, including the
Chechens.85 About 25,000 Chechens returned to Dagestan during 1957-
1958, only to find that they had been dispossessed and were forced to
resettle in the Khasav Yurt district, on the border with the newly
formed Chechen-Ingushetia Republic. As a result, most of Dagestan's
62,000-plus Chechens currently live in the Khazbekov and Khasav Yurt
districts.86
In 1991 conflict arose with the Laks and Avars, when the Chechen
National Council of the Republic of Dagestan demanded the recovery of
their former territories and the re- establishment of the pre-1944
Auskhovsky district.87 The Avars were opposed to the Chechen demands.
They did not accept that a number of mixed Chechen-Avar villages in
Khazbekov district would join the Novolaksky/Auskovsky district.
The Chechens in Dagestan have refrained from active involvement in the
Chechen war. After a December 1994 appeal to all Caucasian peoples from
President Dzokhar Dudayev to start military action against Russian
federal forces in Dagestan, the Chechen National Council of the
Republic of Dagestan adopted a decision to suspend contacts with him.
They stressed that it would be unacceptable for the conflict to flare
up in Dagestan. The separatist Chechen Government failed to obtain any
public support from Chechen organizations in Dagestan.88
6.7 Lak
The Lak traditionally live in the mountainous Koshu region and use
lands in the northern steppe and north of Makhachkala as winter
pastures. They are well represented in the urban centres and there is a
considerable Lak diaspora in Moscow89. The Lak possess greater cohesion
than the other nationalities in Dagestan, which partially explains
their relative importance in society.90 Being the most educated and
cosmopolitan of the people of Dagestan and speaking Russian rather than
Lak at home, many of them fear the disappearance of their ethnic
identity.91
The Lak national movement, Tsubars (New Star), was established in 1990.
It mainly focuses on the development of Lak culture and national
identity. Its chairman is Hirytdin Khadziev, at present Minister of
Agriculture. Another important leader of the Lak national movement is
Magomed Khachilaev. The Laks are well integrated in Dagestan's
political elite and are staunch supporters of an undivided Dagestan.92
Beside Tsubars, the Novolak Popular Front was established in August
1991 in reaction to the activities of the Chechen organization Vainakh.
It has been dormant ever since the 1992 agreement on the resettlement
of the Laks from Novolaksky district. President of the Novolak Popular
Front is Ismailov Dalgat.93
6.8 Nogai
The Nogai descend from the Golden Horde. Their historical territory,
the once huge Nogai steppe, includes the northern part of Dagestan and
the eastern part of Stavropol Territory. Most Nogai live in dispersed
communities on the steppes that form the Nogai, Babaurt, Tarum, and
Kizlar districts of Dagestan, the adjoining Neftekumsky district of
Stavropol Province, and Sholkovsky district in Karachay-Cherkessia.
There are also several Nogai settlements in the north-east of
Chechnya.94
Living mainly in the rural areas and forming small minorities in all
these three republics, ethnic Nogai occupied hardly any leading
positions during the Soviet era and their cultural development has been
stunted. In Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria, the Nogai have lost much
of their ethnic cohesion while in Dagestan the Nogai live more
compactly and have greater cultural and political autonomy. They form a
75 percent majority in the Nogai region of Dagestan, the only place
where Nogai language education is offered in secondary education.95
Other peoples have settled on the Nogai steppe over the past thirty
years, notably Avars, Laks and Darghins. The state supports these
settlements with cheap credit and the distribution of land ownership
rights. The newcomers build villages and compete with the Nogai for
good pasture. Only 20 per cent of the Nogai steppe is still in use by
the Nogai themselves. They rate this development as a kind of
annexation. Their grievances are aggravated by the fact that the
newcomers live in permanent houses while the Nogai consider the steppe
collective property and traditionally live in movable houses, called
cutan. It is expected that the Nogai will be a minority on the steppe
by the end of this century, but they lack the power to counter this
process.96
The Nogai national movement Birlik (Unity), led by K. Balbek and B.
Kildasov, has existed as a cultural organization since 1957 and was
transformed into a political movement in December 1989, when it spoke
out in favour of an autonomous Nogai republic separate from Dagestan
and which would include include parts of Chechnya. Its main goal was to
undo the breaking up of their territories between three different
administrative entities in which they form insignificant minorities.
They considered a concentration of the remaining Nogai essential for
the preservation of the Nogai people and hoped that such a republic
would attract other Nogai from the North Caucasus.
Birlik never acquired much political muscle. Being dispersed and
traditionally nomadic, the Nogai cannot claim any region as their
historic homeland. Furthermore, the Nogai are lagging behind in
education attainment and lack a powerful elite that would be capable of
organizing its people. It is questionable whether a large proportion of
the Nogai is aware of the programme of Birlik.97
7. ETHNIC CONFLICTS
7.1 Laks and Chechens
After the deportation of Chechens from Auskhovsky district in 1944, the
then Soviet Government forced 15,000 Laks to move into what was renamed
Novolaksky district. They came from traditional high mountain villages,
which the Soviet administration wanted to clear and found the Chechen
villages fully intact. They have lived in Novolaksky district since and
their present prosperity is mostly the fruit of their own labour. Laks
and Chechens generally agree that their quarrels are a result of Soviet
divide-and-rule policies and that they have nothing to blame each other
for.
Chechens are determined to return to their ancestral lands. In 1992,
radicals placed signs along Novolaksky's border, saying "Auskovsky
district". Encouraged by their local committee, thousands of Chechens
moved into Novolaksky district and threatened not only to oust the
Laks, but also to move into two Avar villages. In September 1992,
groups of Chechens clashed with Laks and Avars, martial law was
imposed, and special armoured police units of the Russian OMON (Otriady
Militsyy Osobogo Naznacheniya, attached to the Interior Ministry) were
brought into the region. The authorities of the Chechen Republic
expressed their strong support for the Chechen demands, creating fear
of a widening of the conflict.98
However, the crisis was quickly averted. The Government of Dagestan
made a series of concessions to the Chechens, including the abolition
of legislation hampering the registration of Chechens in Novolaksky
district, payment for property that was lost in 1944, and promises that
funds would be made available for the resettlement of Laks.99
The Laks agreed to leave Novolaksky district, provided they were
resettled on equally attractive land and fully compensated. They
accepted resettlement on Kumyk territory in Khazav-Yurt and north of
Makhachkala on condition that significant investment was made to
compensate for what they had to leave behind in Novolaksky district.
The Government promised to make these investments, but only token
amounts were actually spent on the resettlement. No more than a dozen
families left Novolaksky district.100
All parties are trying to profit as much as possible from the
agreement. The Chechens claim their ancestral homes, while keeping
their present property in Kasav Yurt. The Laks want spacious houses and
an infrastructure at least as good as that in Novolaksky district. They
demand that their villages are moved as a whole. Individual Laks have
until now refused all houses offered to them on the grounds that they
are inferior to the ones they would leave behind.101
7.2 Laks and Kumyks
The difficulties between Laks and Kumyks are a direct result of the
allocation in 1992 of Kumyk territory to the Laks from Novolaksky
district. Kumyk irritation is intensified because the Laks require
large lots of land, larger than the Kumyks themselves generally dispose
of. In July 1992, when a small group of Laks from Novolaksky district
was relocated in Kumyk territory north of Makhachkala, Kumyks plead
armed guards around the area. The situation was defused after Lak and
Kumyk elders and religious leaders agreed that the first group of Laks
would return to Novolaksky district.102
The number of Laks that have left for Kumyk land is negligible because
the Government of Dagestan Government has so far failed to invest in
the Lak resettlement. As long as the implementation of the 1992
agreement is not seriously pursued, there is no risk of conflict
between Laks and Kumyks.103
7.3 Russians and Avars
Relations between Cossacks and Avars are often tense, and were
especially so in 1990-1991, when Cossacks vehemently opposed proposals
for the loosening of Dagestan's ties with the Russian Federation, an
idea that the Avars in general supported. Instead, Cossacks wanted
recognition as a military caste inside the Russian Federation. They
threatened to transfer their settlements to the Russian Republic in the
event that Dagestan should declare full sovereignty.104 The
establishment of an unofficial Terek Cossack Army in 1990 in
Vladikavkaz worried their neighbours. The Terek Cossack Army, heavily
engaged in the war in North Ossetia in 1991, remained essentially an
affair of more western Cossack communities, and never obtained the
support from the Federal Government of Russia it had hoped for.105
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.