RSR WWIII
George Erinjeri
standstill for something like 2 months. I thought that it was always
pretty much a given that in a WWIII in Europe, NATO would lose a ground
war without using nukes. Is this true, or just a misconception.
Not that I'm complaining. It wouldn't have made a good story
to see Alekseyev raising the Red Flag on the Eiffel Tower. :)
Noel Erinjeri
Jess Coker
: In, RSR, the NATO armies manages to hold the Warsaw Pact to a
Are you kidding? Alekseyev was the best character in the book, it
was awfully hard for me to not root _for_ him!
Don Crawford
In reality, I think NATO would be overwhelmed with the predeployed forces
in Germany in the face of a full Soviet armoured asault. The plan from what
I understand would be a delaying tactic, inflict as much damage on the
techonologically inferior Soviet equipment, while minimzing loses and
slowly giving up ground in an effort to buy time for North American
convoys. In RSR, this is a major aspect of the story as the NATO forces try
to continue the convoy duties and is why the loss of Iceland at the
beginning was such a problem and why NATO eventually committed a Carrier
Task Force and the Marines to retake it. In the initial stages of a
convential war in Europe, the balance of power would definitely be on the
side of the Russians as long as they were able to overwhelm the NATO forces
in place and disrupt the NATO convoys before the industrial might of the US
and North America could be brought to bear and change the balance of the
conflict.
Don
Don Crawford
Caledon, Ontario, Canada
EMail craw...@hookup.net
Don Crawford
> But could the industrial might of North America
>compete with the industrial might of the Soviet Union?
>Technologically, NATO is more advanced, but in terms of sheer
>numbers, wouldn't the USSR have the edge?
>
>Noel Erinjeri
>
Actually, based on productivity and such, the North American economies
would still hold an advantage over the Soviet. Though the Soviet industrial
base is or was larger, it was terribly inefficient and obsolete. As well,
if you look at WWII as an example, the Russian economy was no match to the
output of the North American economies and it wasn't until the US came into
the war that the tables were turned on Germany. Now, in RSR or a WWIII
senario, there really would be no time for the economies to make an impact
in new equipment and trained soldiers. It would have been a come as you are
battle. Never the less, reinforcement already in place and some of
equipment that could be made quickly would make a difference if teh
convoys could get through and the airbridge maintained.
Just my $0.02 worth.
C. Thomas Eyford III
: In article <gerinjer....@gmi.edu>, geri...@nova.gmi.edu (George Erinjeri) writes:
: |>
: |> I don't think so. Many (but not all) of the best tank divsions
: |> were committed to the Western Front both in the buildup in the spring and
: |> after the war started. The war was supposed to last 2 weeks. It went on
: |> much longer.
: |> It said somewhere: "...started with 20 A category tank
: |> divisions, and 15 more moved in later..."
: |>
: |> Noel Erinjeri
: |>
: |>
: I am just starting to reread RSR (fifth time) again. CCCP did hold back
: a number of divisions that normally would be commited in a all out war with NATO.
: Alvin
I finished RSR for the 7th time over Christmas break. :) They did hold back
a number of divisions, but most were committed to the European front as losses
to the original complement were much higher than anticipated. If you recall,
the deputy director of the KGB's proposal to the Politburo was the most
optimistic of the reports generated; the war went considerably worse than
that.
As to whether NATO would win or lose in a ground war, I direct your attention
to Desert Storm. The M1A1's performed far better than anticipated against
the T-72 (the tank that it was specifically designed to destroy), forcing
the Soviets to rethink their defense strategy. Perhaps Tom Clancy knew more
than he let on (the man is a genius).
This is not to say that I think it would have been a cakewalk for NATO, but
inferior numbers would have been at least partially compensated for by
superior technology.
-Tom
Ulrich Eckel
: I'm afraid I can not agree with the assessment that the Soviets would
: have won a conventional war in Europe, and for reasons.
: 1) The Soviets could not rely on any Eastern European army except the
: East German. They would have had to detail significant forces to insure
: the safety of supply and communication lines in their rear from the many
: "allied" troops who would have seen the conflict as an opportunity to
: slip from Moscow's empire.
The Interior Ministry of the USSR (MVD) had plenty of troops
capable of carrying out this mission. I wouldn't give much credibility
to the idea of Poland's Army switching sides, either. Besides, the
Soviet and East German forces would be all that was needed (maybe the
Czechs in the south). The pre-glasnost Warsaw Pact was pretty
monolithic. NATO, on the other hand, was very vulnerable to internal
splits. France isn't even a military member of NATO. They're just part
of the alliance politically. Besides, in RSR the Soviets aren't trying
to conquer Europe, they're just trying to divide NATO. If the Soviets
offered West Germany peace in exchange for breaking away from NATO, I
think they would go for it ( Most Europeans don't think very highly of the
saying "Better dead than Red").
: 2) NATO armor was (and is) far superior to anything the Soviets could
: field (this applies to M-1s, Leopard IIIs, and British Challengers, not
: older generation equipment). The NATO tank guns have a roughly
: one-kilometer edge on their Soviet opponents, greater accuracy, and in
: the case of the M-1, superior armor. As an ironic referrence, I suggest
: reading Clancy's Armored Cavalry, which has an anecdote about how an M-1
: shot through two (2) T-72's and how another M-1 took three shots from a
: fellow M-1 (that had been ordered to destroy it to prevent its capture)
: and was still operable. The range advantage would be especially
: important on the North German Plain.
Soviet T-72s (to say nothing of T-80s) are not like their Iraqi
counterparts. They are better armored and are more advanced. In WWII,
the German Tiger was better armed and armored than the Soviet T-34, and
had a much better range on its gun. But who won? You could make the
same argument with the M-4 Sherman. German joke: German Army ran out of
anti-tank shells before the American Army ran out of tanks. Numbers make
a big difference in tank warfare. The Soviet tanks are inferior, but
not inferior enough. The Soviets know how to pile it on in the right
areas and get in close where those big 125s would be killers. Of course,
when RSR was written, M-60s, Chieftans, and Leopard 1s were still in
widespread use among front-line forces.
Another interesting fact about Russian tanks. Kuwait and the
United Arab Emirates, both of which field small, professional armies (and
have plenty of funding), have been equipping them with T-72s and BMPs.
They're even buying whole air-defense systems from Russia. The biggest
shortcoming of Soviet tanks was their lack of thermal sights, which has
now been corrected. Even if they couldn't penetrate the armor of of an
M-1, I bet the concussion effects would be enough to kill or wound the
crew members. When you hit a tank, you kill it (even if its just a
"mission kill")
: 3) SOviet troops were (and Russian troops are) miserably trained. C.f.
: Chechnya, where Russian recruits were given just twelve bullets in basic
: training for target practice.
Don't make the mistake of comparing the Russian Army of today
with the Soviet Army of the Cold War. It wasn't until the fallout from
Afghanistan and the effects of Gorbachev's policies that the Red Army
became what it is now. In addition, the Soviet forces in East Germany,
and the East German Army, were at a much higher state of readiness than
the rest of the Warsaw Pact forces.
: 4) Only with a BOTB attack could the Soviets surprise NATO, and to
: succeed they would have had to overcome immense logistical difficulties.
: The Soviets had amazingly low logistic abilities (compared to the US
: which, it can be argued, had to much invested in logistics).
It can also be argued that NATOs logistics would be badly hurt by
Soviet paratroopers and Spetsnaz running around raising hell in NATOs
rear. If any side would have had to commit significant forces to keeping
their lines of supply open, it would have been NATO. Another thing to
remember, the biggest reason NATO was able to halt the Soviet advance in
RSR was the (unlikely) near total success of "Dreamland".
: 5) The Soviets would have used chemical weapons, which would have hurt
: NATO air power, but were themselves vulnerable. Almost by definition,
: attackers are more congested and narrowly focused than defenders, and
: where troops gather, they are most likely to get hit (and judging by NATO
: performance in the Gulf War, hit hard). This is about the only way that
: the Soviets could have neutralized NATO's air advantage, and it was
: damned convenient for Clancy to leave it out of their plans in RSR.
The most likely outcome of the air war would be HUGE losses on
both sides (with the Soviets being hit the hardest) and, after a couple
of days of this, neither side would be able to call up much airpower.
: I could go on, but I think these are the most important considertaions in
: assessing a hypothetical WWIII in Europe. (The convoys would have made
: it. Even the newest Soviet subs were still easy to track, and 1/4 to 1/3
: of the Northern Fleet's subs would have had to stay back to protect the
: SSBN's, and others would be laid up in port with mechanical problems.
: Russians are soldiers, not sailors).
You're probably right, here. What about Backfires (nearly as
fast as a fighter with alot more fuel, and big ship-killing missles with
a 250 nm. range). Still, the Soviets counted on being able to score big
enough victories in the first week to force a favorable political
solution. The reason we kept all those tactical nukes in Europe was that
we felt that we couldn't stop them any other way. And once the use of
nukes came under serious consideration in NATO HQ, I think countries like
France and W. Germany would start looking for a way out.
: Respectfully,
: Sean
You make many good points, Sean. RSR is still my favorite WWIII
book but I would recommend that anyone interested in the topic read _Red
Army_, by Ralph Peters. It'll give you a different perspective. We did
make the Red Army out to be ten feet tall during the Cold War, but we
shouldn't be fooled into thinking that we could have easily beat them.
I'd be very interested to hear Sean's, TC's, or anyone else's
opinion on all this.
Sincerely,
Jon Eckel
Shannon M. Aker
One thing that should be taken into consideration is that the Soviet
tanks had controlled atmospheres, where the US didn't. (the M1s may now,
but they really weren't around at the timr RSR was conceptualized).
How this could alter the war was the Soviets could have just gassed the
shit out of the areas where the armor was and the NATO forces would have
been forced to fight in full MOPP gear (which is EXTREMELY
uncomfortable!) And if the season was dead summer (don't recall, been
years since I read it) the morale of the NATO armor divisions would have
been about as low as it could be.
Take it from an ex M60A1-3 tank gunner (& later TC), sighting in MOPP-4
is nearly impossible.
All of this whilst the Soviets were stripped to their underwear and
fully comfortable..
Also, how would the use of chemical warfare cause the airstrikes to
diminish? I fail to see the connection.
The point I took from RSR was nearly at the very end. The main thing
that averted a nuclear war was that the Soviets did not have strike
capabilities for two or three days; which meant the US could have
dictated any terms it wanted (like in Japan after the bombs) [if it had
known]. Clancy really likes getting VERY close to GThN War. I see
similar situations in RSR, HfRO, SoaF, and kinda skirts it in CaPD. So,
maybe Clancy is really trying to warn us of how easily it COULD happen
What if the CIA director had been the guy Ryan was fighting with in
Patriot Games in the last few pages of SoaF? Would he have turned the
key?
Taki Kogoma
<3ghocm$2...@news.ecn.bgu.edu> in alt.books.tom-clancy:
>I would have done a followup, but there was too much stuff in there...
>
>One thing that should be taken into consideration is that the Soviet
>tanks had controlled atmospheres, where the US didn't. (the M1s may now,
>but they really weren't around at the timr RSR was conceptualized).
Erm. Then the thing that Sgt. (brevet Lt.) McCall was driving was a
gas-turbine M60A3? ;-)
[...]
>Also, how would the use of chemical warfare cause the airstrikes to
>diminish? I fail to see the connection.
If one pre-emptive strikes NATO airfields with persistent chemical
agents, it becomes that much more difficult to send up sorties.
--
Capt. Gym Z. Quirk (Known to some as Taki Kogoma) qu...@unm.edu
One of many article detectors on the Information Supercollider
Don Crawford
>Maybe not. After all, Desert Storm seems to have proved (at least to my
>satisfaction) that the technological superiority of NATO's weapons over
>Soviet equipment can be a decisive edge in a real combat situation. Sheer
>numbers do count for something, but I'm not sure it's necessarily quantity
>over quality.
Yes in Desert Storm, the technological edge in weapons as well as the skill
of a professionally trained army did indeed hold a desicive edge over a
third rate "goon squad" like the Iraqi Army. Numbers were not all that
different though. On the whole, each side fielded similar number of men
(about 500,000 - 600,000), number of tanks would be about the same, Iraqi
held an edge in artillery, and airforce power edge definately went to the
coalition. All in all, considering the poor shape of the Iraqi army, in
reality, the coalition held a numerical superiorty over them when you
consider the number of useless tanks, obsolete equipment and the mass
surrendering of Iraqi soldiers who did not want to die. But the Iraqi army
is not the former Soviet army, though based on recent events in Russia, I
question their skills. Though NATO would have a technological edge, the
Soviets in a RSR senario would still definately have a numerical edge of
2:1, maybe 3:1, maybe more (?). Unless reinforcements are brought in, and
supplys replenished,(there are only so many weapons to go around) I highly
doubt the predeployed forces could sustain the Soviet attack with out
reinforcements, even with a supior technological advantage.
My $0.02 worth.
Richard Rostrom
answers were deus ex machina (e.g. the DDR government effectively vetoing
Soviet use of chemical warfare).
The Soviets tried to redress their problems in training by several months
of intensive preparation; but in doing so alerted Western intelligence to
the fact that _something_ big was planned.
The Soviets attacked with superior numbers but inferior technology -
given. They push NATO back - but NATO has enough warning to stage
DREAMLAND and get mobilized. The Soviets hold back a large reserve for
the Middle East; they have not quite enough force to break through in the
West.
I thought the outcome was optimistic - too much Western equipment and
tactics working right the first time, no major surprise deficiencies. (It
took the US Navy a _year_ after Pearl Harbor to learn that its torpedoes
were junk.) Two Soviet brilliancies (the attack on Iceland, and the decoy
maneuver against the carrier group). Could three 688-class SSNs, one
damaged, really fight their way through a fleet of alerted Soviet ASW
craft, sinking at least a dozen ships and subs (before the final ambush
gets two of them)?
The US losses alone probably exceed 50,000 dead (count the major warship
losses that are reported, add in the Marine assault ships lost, then
realize how small a part of the story that is).
Mr M R Powell
> I'm afraid I can not agree with the assessment that the Soviets would
> have won a conventional war in Europe, and for reasons.
>
> 1) The Soviets could not rely on any Eastern European army except the
> East German. They would have had to detail significant forces to insure
> the safety of supply and communication lines in their rear from the many
> "allied" troops who would have seen the conflict as an opportunity to
> slip from Moscow's empire.
>
> 2) NATO armor was (and is) far superior to anything the Soviets could
> field (this applies to M-1s, Leopard IIIs, and British Challengers, not
> older generation equipment). The NATO tank guns have a roughly
> one-kilometer edge on their Soviet opponents, greater accuracy, and in
> the case of the M-1, superior armor. As an ironic referrence, I suggest
> reading Clancy's Armored Cavalry, which has an anecdote about how an M-1
> shot through two (2) T-72's and how another M-1 took three shots from a
> fellow M-1 (that had been ordered to destroy it to prevent its capture)
> and was still operable. The range advantage would be especially
> important on the North German Plain.
>
> 3) SOviet troops were (and Russian troops are) miserably trained. C.f.
> Chechnya, where Russian recruits were given just twelve bullets in basic
> training for target practice.
>
> 4) Only with a BOTB attack could the Soviets surprise NATO, and to
> succeed they would have had to overcome immense logistical difficulties.
> The Soviets had amazingly low logistic abilities (compared to the US
> which, it can be argued, had to much invested in logistics).
>
> 5) The Soviets would have used chemical weapons, which would have hurt
> NATO air power, but were themselves vulnerable. Almost by definition,
> attackers are more congested and narrowly focused than defenders, and
> where troops gather, they are most likely to get hit (and judging by NATO
> performance in the Gulf War, hit hard). This is about the only way that
> the Soviets could have neutralized NATO's air advantage, and it was
> damned convenient for Clancy to leave it out of their plans in RSR.
>
> I could go on, but I think these are the most important considertaions in
> assessing a hypothetical WWIII in Europe. (The convoys would have made
> it. Even the newest Soviet subs were still easy to track, and 1/4 to 1/3
> of the Northern Fleet's subs would have had to stay back to protect the
> SSBN's, and others would be laid up in port with mechanical problems.
> Russians are soldiers, not sailors).
>
> Respectfully,
> Sean
>
>
Anyone interested in the capability of Soviet and US weaponry, and how
they influence each other should read Andrew Cockburn, The Threat
(Hutchinson: London, 1983) - the anecdotes are extremely funny in
themselves and reflect interestingly on this debate, personally I feel
Tom got it about right. I don't feel Chechnya is entirely relevant
because 1) it was effectively a guerrila war, and an urban one at that,
against a lightly armed populist resistance whereas Soviet training is
for a full scale mechanised war, with massive use of firepower, over
relatively favourable terrain, and this is effectively how they tried to
fight in Chechenya, and Afghanistan and the americans did similiar in
Vietnam, which is another debate
Mike
Ulrich Eckel
make some further points on some of the subjects that all of us have been
talking about.
1. INDUSTRIAL MIGHT
Irrelevant. The war just wouldn't last long enough for it to
have an impact. I thought that TC was going out on a limb in RSR by
having the war last more than two weeks. Even if combat were to last
more than a month or two, industrial production wouldn't have any impact.
2. NUKES
I think neither side would use them at first. The Soviets
wouldn't need to, and the NATO side would hesitate. England and France
might use their own if their territory was threatened, but the Red Army
would have little to gain by going beyond the Rhine.
And if NATO were to seriously contemplate using the nuclear
option to prevent a Soviet breakthrough? Two problems. First, Soviet
troops are engaged with NATO units and both sides are somewhat
intermixed. Second, the Red Army is now well into West German territory.
Nuking Warsaw Pact combat formations means wiping out alot of your own
troops and German civilians. Or are you planning on hitting Kiev or
Moscow? This is where I think the West Germans would decide "Better Red
than dead" and make peace with the Soviets.
Chemical weapons is a different story. I couldn't say whether I
think they would be used are not. Soviet strategy calls for their use,
but there are plenty of reasons to decide against it. Chemical weapons
would actually be better utilized if they were held back at first in
order to have another uncertainty hanging over Bonn's head.
3. NATO/WARSAW PACT
Alot's been said about possible disloyalty in the Warsaw Pact
ranks (esp. Poland and Hungary). I'll concentrate on Poland since
Hungary would only be relevant if the Pact decided to attack Bavaria by
way of Austria. Remember that the Polish Army could be counted on to
fire on its own people in the early '80s (remember when they put down
Solidarity with no Soviet involvement?). In addition, all the Pact
countries have their own interior ministry forces who are infamous for
their extreme political reliability.
France would probably fight on NATO's side, but nothing is
forcing them to. And they refused to help with the retalitory strike on
Libya (this is an entirely different matter, though). France has no
troops in Germany, contains no American bases, and has no real quarrel
with the USSR/Russia. If Moscow offered to leave them untouched in
exchange for neutrality, I'd say there's at least a fair chance Paris
would go for it. After all, that would leave them the dominant player in
the new Western Europe and would spare their country the horrors of
another World War.
Remember the diversity of the the NATO units on the front line.
There's the Bundeswehr, who would insist on a "forward defense" policy
and refuse to voluntarily give any ground. Then you have the US 5th and
7th Corps, who would advocate a (wiser) strategy of giving ground in
order to let the Soviet offensive lose some of its steam. The British
Army of the Rhine would remain closest to American policy. Finally,
there are 2 other corps, one Dutch and one Belgian, in the north who have
the interests of their own nations to take into account. For political
reasons, largely West German insistance, NATO forces are deployed in a
"forward defense" manner (i.e. they are all right on the border with
little in reserve).
By contrast, the Warsaw Pact's divisions all are subordinate to
an Army, which are always under Soviet command. A Warsaw Pact Army
contains between 4 and 6 tank or motor-rifle divisions, one or two of
which might be East German, Czech, or Polish.
4. AIR WAR
I'll stick with my claim that both sides would take heavy
losses. Soviet/Warsaw Pact pilots are professional officers and the
MiG-29 and Su-27 are a match for anything the West has. The Pact would
probably launch a HUGE air offensive on the eve of the war, saturate
NATO's air defense, take enormous casualties, while at the same time
inflicting equally appalling losses on NATO air forces (on the ground and
in the air). There would continue to be high attrition rates until
neither side had much left (certainly not enough to conduct close air
support on a large scale). Also, we didn't have the AMRAAM at the time
of RSR, and the Sparrow and AA-10 Alamo are about equal.
5. LOGISTICS/REINFORCEMENTS
Even if we assume that the convoys make it without heavy losses,
it will take close to a week to get reinforcements in place. And in
addition to Spetsnaz disruption of logistics (which cannot be accurately
determined), you also have to take into account the Warsaw Pact's
airborne forces. 7 Soviet divisions, some independent regiments, at
least 4 air-assault brigades in the Western Theater (more in other
areas), as well as another division's worth of East Europeans, all very
well trained and, due to Afghanistan, led by combat veterans. These guys
would be all over NATO's rear area and, while taking heavy casualties
during insertion, would seriously disrupt lines of supply and communication.
The Soviets can reinforce, too. In fact, if they're willing to
risk it, they can reinforce massively by drawing on units based on the
Chinese border. This goes for airplanes, as well.
6. TANKS
For reasons I've already stated in previous posts, numbers make a
big difference in armored warfare. The Soviets would saturate our
defenses, get in close, and punch the hole(s) in the front line.
The T-72s used by the Arab states are very different from their
Soviet counterparts. They have nowhere near the level of sophistication
of "real" T-72s or T-80s. They are also estimated to have perhaps as
little as 1/3rd of the effective armor protection of Soviet versions.
Not that this really makes a big difference. In armored warfare, you can
hit what you can see and kill what you hit. Keep in mind that Soviet
weapons require decent maintenance, something Arabs aren't known for.
In RSR, not only was the M-1 still fairly new (and not deployed
with all units), but it was not the M1/A1 used in Desert Storm. The
original M-1 only carried a 105mm main gun and had less armor than the
later versions.
7. HOW GOOD IS/WAS THE RED ARMY?
This is too long of a post already. I'll save this one for
another day.
This is a good discussion we've got going here. Let's keep it up.
Jon Eckel
Tom Clancy
When I researched Red Storm Rising in 1985, I concluded that NATO could
stop the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Army was particularly good at military
theory. The Sov military venerated military history, and had some superb
officers who wrote a lot of fascinating stuff.
The problem for them was the soldiers. In for only two (2) years, and
entirely without a professional NCO corps, their army was rather like a
Ferrari with flat tires. For any army, if it doesn't happen at the squad
level, then it simply does not happen, regardless how smart the commanding
general is. Add to that the fact that Soviet hardware was abyssmal (I've
been in a lot of their equipment; to say it sucks is generous); that they
allowed no flexibility at the tactical (hell, hardly any) level. Most
important of all, perhaps, was will-to-combat. What would a Sov soldier be
fighting FOR? For what purpose would he be willing to risk his life in the
face of determined opposition (viz., the Soviet army in Afghanistan)? It's
not about equipment. It's about the skills and motivation of the soldiers.
By 1985, certainly, we had a decisive edge, and the Russian knew it.
On Cockburn--did his father discover gonnorhea?--the book was amusing, but
almost entirely wrong. It was really a thinly disguised attack on the
American military, and every American weapons system he criticized turned
out to be quite effective in combat operations.
TC
Tom Clancy
Which are almost entirely wrong.
Where do I start?
Soviet fighter aircraft (the MiG-29 and SU-27) are aerobatically exciting
to watch, but their fire-control systems are early F-4 (mid-1960s)
technology. NATO had the E-3A/B. The Soviets would not--their "Mainstay"
is a primitive substitute. What makes the AWACS effective is computer
software, not the fairly pedestrian radar antenna. Moreover, Sov pilots
were allowed roughly a third of the stick time allowed their NATO
counterparts--a gross and lethal disadvantage.
It's not equipment, guys, it's PEOPLE who win wars.
The T-72 tank, now known to American tankers as the Jack-in-the-Box by
American tankers (hit a T-72 and the top flies off) used by Iraq was
essentially identical with that used by Russian formation--and, oh, by the
way, Sov tankers typically exercised with T-55s, leaving their -72s in
warehouses so that they would not wear them out (you have to wonder who
thought that one up!).
The Soviet army was NEVER a professional army by the common use of the
term. It NEVER had a professional NCO corps. A Sov conscript was in for
two (2) years, and nobody re-upped. THAT was their greatest weakness, and
that weakness was never addressed.
Mr. Eckel, they were never as good as they looked, and never as good as
the intelligence community said they were.
TC
Mike Enderby
> In response to Mr. Jon Eckel's post on WW3, he talked about
>the Soviet intention to split NATO, and going for a political solution.
>This would only hold true if the scenario was something like in RSR, i.e.
>the Pact's objective was to cripple NATO to prevent NATO interference in
>the pursuit of another objective. If the pact was actually trying to
>conquer Europe, and the Pact did break the NATO front, and NATO did not
>respond with nukes, the Pact's next stop would be the English Channel. In
>which case the French, and maybe the British, would unilaterally intiate
>nuclear warfare to prevent being conquered, since of course most of the
>first rate units will have been lost in Germany.
> Which leads to an interesting question. Assuming the above
>scenario did occur, what would happen to the US? If the British and
>French nuclear arsenals was enough to cripple Russia and the U.S. did not
>participate in this nuclear exchange, is it possible that the USSR would
>not attack the U.S.? Leaving the U.S. winner by default?
In order to make the US act in such a scenario, it would be possible for
either the UK or France to lauch a missile at the US to ensure that it
responded. If such missiles were sub launched then it would be very dificult
to tell the difference between such a missile and a Warsaw Pact one. Another
alternative would be to take a nuke by ship/airliner and detonate it when it
arrived, disguising it origin.
The US would be forced to act if the above happened.
Michael Enderby
#include <std_disclaimer.h> Arm powered - Intel outside
George Erinjeri
REALITY CHECK!!! First of all, any land based missile could
be traced back to its launch point. Which eliminates that. Second of all,
when it comes to subs, it's hard to find the _sub_, but when 24 missiles
suddenly appear in the middle of the ocean, it's pretty obvious where the
sub is. If you saw missiles rising out of the Bay of Biscay, it's pretty
safe to assume that they aren't Russian. Third of all, how are the Brits
or the French going to make it look like a Soviet plane or ship got all
the way to the East coast and without escaping detection? And finally,
the UK and/or France is going to nuke the United States? Be serious. If
they got caught, invite nuclear attack from the U.S. _and_ the USSR.
Which would, in the space of approximately half an hour, reduce London
and/or Paris to a puddle of radioactive water.
Noel Erinjeri
Jess Coker
: I would have done a followup, but there was too much stuff in there...
: One thing that should be taken into consideration is that the Soviet
: tanks had controlled atmospheres, where the US didn't. (the M1s may now,
: but they really weren't around at the timr RSR was conceptualized).
: How this could alter the war was the Soviets could have just gassed the
: shit out of the areas where the armor was and the NATO forces would have
If I rmember correctly from RSR the reason the Sov's didn't use
gas was political. It was in their invasion plan but the east germans
refused to allow gas to be used nead their homeland, fearing that the
shifting winds would push it back over them.
Michael DeCleene
: In response to Mr. Jon Eckel's post on WW3, he talked about
: This would only hold true if the scenario was something like in RSR, i.e.
: the Pact's objective was to cripple NATO to prevent NATO interference in
: the pursuit of another objective. If the pact was actually trying to
: conquer Europe, and the Pact did break the NATO front, and NATO did not
: respond with nukes, the Pact's next stop would be the English Channel. In
: which case the French, and maybe the British, would unilaterally intiate
: nuclear warfare to prevent being conquered, since of course most of the
: first rate units will have been lost in Germany.
: Which leads to an interesting question. Assuming the above
: scenario did occur, what would happen to the US? If the British and
: French nuclear arsenals was enough to cripple Russia and the U.S. did not
: participate in this nuclear exchange, is it possible that the USSR would
: not attack the U.S.? Leaving the U.S. winner by default?
: Noel Erinjeri
The situation desribed above is tantamount to suicidal by the
British and French. Do you really think that the British and the French
would attack Soviet CITIES, or regions deep in Russia? I'm going from
memory here, but I think the USSR has more than enough power to outnuke
both Britan and France in short order. The Soviets had enough power to
destroy the US several times over at this point, and Britan and France
are MUCH smaller countries, areawise. I think that, if a nuclear
exchange began, Britan and France would use tactical nukes only, directly
on the battlefield. Attacking cities would 1.) force the soviets to
respond in kind and 2.) probably cut them off from the US by instigating
a nuclear war. Battlefield nukes, on the other hand, have some chance of
success. If the Soviets respond in kind, the battlefield gets vaporized,
but that's about all. And if the Soviet Union chooses to escalate to a
strategic attack, they face the possibility of the US responding. I'm
not saying that I think a "controlled" nuclear exchange is likely, or
would definatly go no further, but I think it extremely unlikely the
Britan and France would begin a strategic nuclear exchange, nor would the
USSR, because I don't think anybody would think the US would simply stand
on the sidelines.
My Ever-Changing Fraction of a Peso,
Mike
Niraj Agarwalla
: : Alvin
: -Tom
I have heard that when the Soviet Union exports their weapons, they give
their customers substandard equipment. I think the reason for it was
two-fold: one, to ensure that they keep coming bact to purchase more of the
equipment (this was done to earn foreign currency, I believe); two, in the
topsy-turvy world of Third World counties (where most of the purchases were
made) the Soviet Union wanted to ensure that these same weapons wouldn't be
used against them. Any opinions for, or to the contrary?
Niraj Agarwallna
agar...@woods.uml.edu
ni...@max.tiac.net
Frank Nelson
: If I rmember correctly from RSR the reason the Sov's didn't use
: gas was political. It was in their invasion plan but the east germans
: refused to allow gas to be used nead their homeland, fearing that the
: shifting winds would push it back over them.
I thought that the wind patterns in Europe were from the west-North to
the East-South. This would blow all the gas back over Germany and
Eastern Russia.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Francopoli Fire. I think for nobody, NRA life member
mrf...@cts.com nobody thinks for me. Eater of Meat
Tom Clancy
The French had what some call a "drop-dead line." That means a line
somewhere in Germany which, if the Russian crossed it, would trigger a
French nuclear strike. Maybe the river Rhein, maybe a meter east of the
French border. That fact is widely known--just the location was sensitive.
That is also why the French were committed to NATO.
The Russians for their part anticipated the offensive use of nukes. We
have SEEN their warplans for heading west, and interviewed the guys who
drew them up. Moreover, NATO strategy was NOT to sit passively on the west
side of the border and play passive defense. NATO plans involved a
counter-strike from Southern Germany towards Berlin. A casual look at the
correlaton of forces (a Russian term, and a useful one) leads one to
believe that such a plan might actually have worked.
TC
Mr M R Powell
I seem to remember that a few years ago when India was buying Mig 29
Fulcrums from the Soviets that there was a significant row over the
purchase because the Sovs attempted to sell an inferior version and the
Indians demanded, I think successfully, that they recieved the current
frontline Soviet version
Mike
Niraj Agarwalla
: In article <D363C...@serval.net.wsu.edu> i942...@unicorn.it.wsu.edu (C.
: Thomas Eyford III) writes:
: >As to whether NATO would win or lose in a ground war, I direct your
: attention
: >to Desert Storm. The M1A1's performed far better than anticipated against
: >the T-72 (the tank that it was specifically designed to destroy), forcing
: >the Soviets to rethink their defense strategy. Perhaps Tom Clancy knew
: more
: >than he let on (the man is a genius).
: I may have already said this in another post, I can't remember. Anyway,
: the T72 used by Iraq would definatly be different then those used in
: Europe by Warsaw pact. The version used in Iraq, and only by the ellite
: Republican Guard and some other select groups who were held back and
: unfortunately got blind sided by the US 7th corp, were M1 variants
: that is the export version. They are inferior to the other versions
: used by the Soviets like the T72M2 as well, the T80 series are even
: better. The high success rate in DS was also attributed to the fact that
: many of the front line Iraqi tanks were T55, T69's, etc and were not
: even close to the capabilities of the M1A1 Abrams, USMC-M60, UK Challanger
: and not to forget the A10's and Apaches. Those tanks were nothing more then
: sitting ducks.
: Anothyer of my $0.02 worth. I think I'm upto $0.25 by now. <g>
: Don
: Don Crawford
: Caledon, Ontario, Canada
: EMail craw...@hookup.net
Weren't the Iraqi T-72s outfitted with French electronics and other
enhancements? I heard a story that when the war broke out, the French
refused to give the proper codes to the Iraqis, so when the time for war
came, the tanks weren't fully operational.
Niraj Agarwalla
agar...@woods.uml.edu
ni...@max.tiac.net
PAUL ANTHONY SERROUL
phy...@phys-irc.novell.leeds.ac.uk (Mike Enderby) writes:
In this message, Mr. Enderby claims that a sub-launched missile would be
very difficult to detect (as far as ID'ing the country of origin). Well, it
may not be all that difficult. Since the US has the Atlantic sonared all to
hell with constant sub patrols and sonar nets, the detection may not be all
that hard. ID contacts, you can hear the damned gun go off, presto! Instant
culprit. Now, it isn't always that easy, but your chances of finding the
guy who does launch a missile are (I'd say) pretty decent.
--Tony Serroul : ps91...@caper1.uccb.ns.ca
P.S. Somebody please summarize DOH for me. Here in Cape Breton we're still
living in hardcover-ville. I'm not paying 29.95 for any novel.