Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist?
Scott
<quote>
In a cartoon-strip of Calvin and Hobbes, the mischievous imp Calvin is
listening to the tune, "Santa Claus Is Coming to Town":
He sees you when you're sleeping.
He knows when you're awake.
He knows if you've been bad or good;
So be good, for goodness' sake!
Reflecting deeply on this theme of Santa, Calvin reports his musings to
Hobbes, his striped sidekick and co-conspirator. "This Santa Claus stuff
bothers me . . . especially the judge and jury bit," Calvin mutters. He
wonders why Santa carries such moral authority: "Who appointed Santa? How do
we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for determining bad or
good? And what about extenuating circumstances? Kids should have the benefit
of legal counsel, don't you think?"
In the spirit of this particular brand of "Calvinism," the atheist
philosopher Michael Martin is also bothered?by this "God stuff." In his
essay "Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape," he finds the theistic belief
that God is the locus of objective moral values problematic. Who appointed
God ? How do we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for
determining good or bad?
At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists
can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He
argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic
position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather
than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma. Moreover,
the Bible itself is "insensitive and chauvinistic" in its treatment of rape
victims.
Sed contra, I shall respond that Martin's argument is flawed both
philosophically and biblically. Regarding the philosophical shortcomings,
(a) Martin offers no substantive ontological foundation for an objective
morality within an atheistic framework (which would account for human
dignity, human rights, moral obligations, and moral responsibility), and he
confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Thus I shall argue
that Martin can be a moral realist epistemologically but not ontologically.
Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially perfect
nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
leveled against divine commands (ii) that, if true, his challenge leaves his
own naturalistic moral realism in the same state of arbitrariness. Finally,
(c) his argument is flawed biblically in its handling of Deuteronomy 22:23-9
and other biblical passages pertaining to rape. So I shall, in each section,
present a particular aspect of Martin's position and then respond to it.
I. "Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of
Epistemology vs. Ontology
Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to
reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective.
Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is
independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice
with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's
argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so
whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that
it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if
God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given
their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world
in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.
Martin rightly notes that not all theists share Swinburne's perspective.
These theists, Martin adds, "maintain that atheistic morality must be
subjective," and they usually assert this "without argument."
What is the position of these theists? In Atheism: A Philosophical
Justification, Martin lays out their premises, which we'll call Theistic
Argument A ( TA-A ):
If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists.
Morality is objective and absolute.
Therefore, God exists.
To make their case, Martin argues, theists must refute the following
argument (Atheistic Argument A, or AA-A ) before their views on theistic
morality can be taken seriously:
In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists
must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis fail.
But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on
a nontheistic basis fail.
Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective.
One is led to believe that Martin will provide just such a basis, but, as we
shall see below, his attempts to "ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis" do indeed fail. In addition, the challenge Martin offers can be taken
up by theists, who can show that atheism lacks a sufficient basis for
objective morality and, going further, show how theism furnishes precisely
the necessary moral context. We shall proceed to take up this two-fold
challenge.
To cite J. L. Mackie as the atheistic perspective on ethics, Martin claims,
is unfair, as his is not the only one to consider. Mackie's views "certainly
do not represent the views of all atheists." Nor do Mackie's arguments for a
subjectivist ethic work, Martin holds. For instance, Mackie argues from
disagreement (disagreement in ethical opinions supports ethical
subjectivism) and from strangeness (moral properties are so strange that
they would not fit into a naturalistic worldview). Martin disagrees with
both of these arguments.
In response, Martin directly addresses the matter of disagreement, but his
response to the strangeness argument is that, contra Mackie's internalist
account, "moral realism is compatible with externalism." Martin does not
give much of an argument for the latter except for a passing footnote
However, in the next section of his essay ("Is Theistic Morality Necessarily
Objectivist?"), Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a
nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus
universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We
can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does
not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether
atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm
that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At
the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not
appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing
children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major
mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose
child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is
wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim.
But to affirm this is still not to offer the ontological basis for such
affirmations. In his popular-level book The Big Domino in the Sky, Martin
makes the same sorts of pronouncements, but again without ontological
justification. For instance, he rightly declares that there have been
"atheists of high moral character." Thus there is no reason to think that
atheists are less moral than believers. Of course, Martin concedes, the
question is not one about the moral character of atheists, but "whether they
can justify their actions."
So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of
"justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular
moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic
foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical
philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible
with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human
beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has
meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like.
When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human
beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But
on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human
rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us
with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic
value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see. Moreover, Martin makes no
effort. He merely claims that "ethical absolutism is compatible with
atheism." Martin suggests, following Roderick Firth, an ideal observer view
of ethics (in which a "good" is what "an ideal observer would approve under
ideal condition") is an atheistic alternative. Another suggestion Martin
makes is William Frankena's "sophisticated version of non-cognitivism." Even
if such views could carry the day for the atheistic moral realist, the
problem still remains?namely, accounting for the metaphysical or ontological
status of personhood and its attendant intrinsic goodness still remains.
While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems,
these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human
dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons
have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it
is so:
I see no reason to suppose that if the cultural and intellectual
accomplishments of X are worthless, then X's life is worthless. A mother who
has raised intelligent, healthy, morally upright children, a doctor whose
life has been devoted to caring for the indigent, a teacher who has spent a
lifetime teaching pupils to be just and compassionate?each may have
accomplished little from a cultural or intellectual point of view, but each
has led a worthwhile life nevertheless.
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all
attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must
do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess
intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They
share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being,
and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell
puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns
only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their
having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect
this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made
as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God
personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods
find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to
function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery,
theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social
contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the
furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate
personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a
non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as
mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical
ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
Martin, who frequently cites David Brink as offering a model of moral
realism without appealing to God, may likely argue: "But why can't moral
properties be viewed as comparable to supervening mental properties? After
all, many nontheistic contemporary philosophers of mind hold this view."
Brink himself reasons: "Assuming materialism is true, mental states
supervene on physical states, yet few think that mental states are
metaphysically queer." However, such optimism is misguided, as it assumes a
smooth transition from the nonmental to the mental (and the nonmoral to the
moral). But to use mental supervenience as a plausible analogy for moral
supervenience is astonishingly bold and, so far as contemporary philosophy
of mind goes, unwarranted. Take the mental property of consciousness. Ned
Block forcefully asserts:
We have no conception of our physical or functional nature that allows us to
understand how it could explain our subjective experience . . . [I]n the
case of consciousness we have nothing?zilch?worthy of being called a
research programme, nor are there any substantive proposals about how to go
about starting one. . . . Researchers are stumped ."
The same could be said for moral properties. Just as consciousness is easily
accommodated within a theistic framework (in which a maximally-aware Creator
creates conscious beings), so moral properties fit into a theistic scenario
(in which a supremely-good/moral personal Being creates morally-constituted
persons). Therefore affirming human dignity and universal human rights is
not simply a brute fact. A theistic universe helps make far better sense of
human dignity or human rights than a non-theistic, naturalistic universe.
The Christian offers a superior contextual framework?a "richer metaphysical
account as to why the cosmos is such that there are objective values."
Martin might reply: "You theists might claim that God is the sufficient
reason for the existence of morality, but you are still just positing God in
terms of a brute fact, some ultimate stopping point. So what prevents the
atheist from claiming that objective morality and intrinsic human dignity
simply exist as brute facts?" Up to a point, the atheist is correct:
justification must end somewhere. But this does not mean that the theist and
atheist are at an impasse.
Again, context is important. For instance, a hundred dollar bill has a
greater value than a single dollar bill?even though they are the same size
and contain (roughly) the same amounts of ink. It is the context (in this
case, a conventional one) which enables us to ascribe varying values to
these pieces of paper. What then is Martin's context for making sense of
human worth? From his atheistic viewpoint, "There is no cosmic purpose if
there is no God." We have before us the two relevant alternatives: (a) There
is no cosmic purpose if there is no God and (b) There is a cosmic purpose if
there is a God. At least prima facie, the existence of an objective human
purpose is more obvious if God exists than if he does not.
Now Martin takes position that moral properties do exist independently of
human beings:
Atheists not only can but have rejected this view [that human beings create
values and do not discover them]. There is no reason why atheists cannot
argue that values are discovered. For example, atheists such as Bertrand
Russell in his early ethical writings argued that ?good and bad are
qualities which belong to objects independent of our opinions just as much
as round and square do.' Such qualities were discovered not created.
Now correlated to this affirmation is that somehow, intrinsic worth and a
moral constitution supervene upon human beings through their having achieved
a certain level of organismic complexity . According to David Brink, to whom
Martin approvingly refers, this position is the most plausible position to
take: "it is best for the [nontheistic] moral realist to claim that moral
properties supervene upon physical properties."
So with this moral constitution, human beings have some inherent purpose,
and therefore one ought to live one's life in a certain way (Says Martin:
"Like Kant, I believe that one has a duty to fulfill one's talents.")
But if Martin's claim that there is "no cosmic purpose" is true, the
relevant context for affirming a limited purpose is far from obvious. Martin
moves from purposeless, impersonal, amoral, materialistic or naturalistic
processes to? viol? !?the emergence of intrinsically-valuable, personal,
moral beings. Again, I simply do not see that his worldview has the
ontological resources to bring about this remarkable transformation. Within
theism, on the other hand, there exists a continuity, a smooth transition of
intrinsic dignity?from a maximally-great personal Being to valuable created
persons?as opposed to the naturalistic shift from the nonmoral to the moral.
This moral continuity ?the transference of moral properties from one moral
Being to beings made in his image?has greater explanatory power than the
disjunction between them on the naturalistic view. In the theistic view,
moral properties have an ontological simplicity?as opposed to the
naturalistic construal, in which moral properties are not ontologically
simple.
Thus theists can take up Martin's challenge and offer a far more plausible
basis for objective morality than the atheist can. We noted earlier Martin's
argument ( AA-A ) against the theist who claims to have an objectivist ethic
that the atheist does not have:
In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists
must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis fail.
But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on
a nontheistic basis fail.
Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective.
On the epistemological level, Martin is rightly shocked by "Christian
apologists"?whoever they may be?who claim that "atheists can provide no
objective reason for not raping people." Theists and atheists alike can
affirm the same moral principles as objectively true. But at the ontological
level, it is the theistic apologist who is rightly shocked at Martin's
claim. For Martin's worldview offers no obvious resources to affirm the
uniqueness and dignity of the human being, individual human rights, personal
responsibility, moral obligation, and the moral value of a cohesive social
fabric. Thus, we can reply to Martin with the following syllogism (Theistic
Argument B, or TA-B ): To ground an objective moral order, the atheist must
show how naturalism furnishes an ontological framework for the intrinsic
dignity of human beings, universal human rights, and moral responsibility.
The atheist has shown no such ontological foundation (based on naturalism)
to account for intrinsic human dignity, human rights, etc. Therefore, the
atheist's attempt to ground an objective morality fails.
On the other hand, the theist (as we saw above) can make a plausible moral
connection between God and human beings. It is this personal and moral
connection which grounds the dignity/value, rights, purpose, and
responsibility of human beings. It is only on this assumption ?at the
ontological level?of humans' being intrinsically valuable that we can rise
to the next level?the epistemological ?to know that rape, for instance,
"violates the victim's rights . . . traumatizes the victim . . . undermines
the fabric of society, and so on."
What we have before us is then is a matter of theism's greater contextual
probability. Furthermore, there are certain additional facts about the world
which are much more probable or make much more sense if God exists than if
he does not: The fact of consciousness/subjectivity, intentionality, and
various mental properties: Thomas Nagel writes, "Consciousness is what makes
the mind-body problem really intractable." John Searle notes that "the
leading problem in the biological sciences is the problem of explaining how
neurobiological processes cause conscious experiences." Moving from purely
naturalistic, unconscious processes to the existence of consciousness
appears to require a much greater leap than consciousness' deriving from an
ultimate, conscious Being. the existence of moral beings, which is better
explained by a moral and personal Being than by their emerging through
non-moral processes. the existence of non-utilitarian beauty, which seems to
be better explained by theism than by metaphysical naturalism. We could more
easily expect "useless" beauty if God exists than if he does not. the
beginning of the physical space-time universe, prior to which there was
nothing physical at all. Thus there was lacking (from the naturalist's point
of view) even the potentiality for anything to come into existence from
nothing. The metaphysical principle "out of nothing nothing comes" still
holds. the delicately balanced cosmic constants in the world that make
conditions "just right" for human existence ("the Goldilocks effect,"
astrophysicists have called it). Freeman Dyson notes: "As we look out into
the Universe and identify the many accidents of physics and astronomy that
have worked together for our benefit, it almost seems as if the Universe
must in some sense have known that we were coming." the existence of evil,
which not only presupposes objective moral goodness but also entails design
(i.e., evil is a departure from the way things ought to be ).
As William Davis argues, the skeptic may be able to offer naturalistic
explanations for these features of the universe (or he could insist that
features like objective morality and beauty do not exist at all). "But the
best the skeptic can hope for is to show that metaphysical naturalism
explains as much of what needs explaining as the existence of God explains .
. . . In no case is it plausible that metaphysical naturalism explains the
data better."
Moreover, the theistic foundation for morality has the virtue of greater
simplicity on its side in that it offers a plausible linking of two distinct
entities that, in an atheistic world, must be joined in some ad hoc fashion.
These two entities are objective moral values and human persons.
On the one hand, a metaphysical naturalist like Martin apparently
presupposes that moral properties supervene on "correctly-related" or
"complexly-conjoined" non-moral ones. Then somehow two apparently
unconnected components within the universe?namely, (a) these emergent moral
properties and (b) the moral principles of justice, mercy, and kindness,
which are analytically-true brute givens whether or not any human beings
exist?happen to be, by fantastic coincidence, intimately related. Now Martin
holds that moral truths exist as part of the cosmic furniture, and he also
maintains that humans (independent of these standards) evolved
naturalistically to such a point at which they became moral beings.
But why think that these moral principles which exist even apply to us or
morally obligate us? To say that moral values are "just there" seems
insufficient. Isn't it an extraordinary coincidence that out of all possible
creatures that have evolved, human beings should just happen to have
obligations to these pre-existing, analytically-true objective moral values?
It seems that the evolutionary process somehow anticipated the arrival of
human beings on the scene. But a less ad hoc candidate is the theistic
alternative. (And, we could add, even if moral properties did exist on a
naturalistic scheme of things, why think that moral obligation
exists?particularly when such a duty conflicts with my self-interest?)
Whereas these are two unconnected entities appear to pose a problem for the
metaphysical naturalist, theism brings them together in a much more concise
way: A personal God, who is the source of moral values, makes human persons
in his image, and thus they share important moral and spiritual
characteristics with God. Theism provides a match between our moral make-up
and the structure of ultimate reality.
Thus objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given
God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe
(despite Martin's claims to the contrary), objective morality?along with its
assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility?is unnatural
and surprising and "queer."
Furthermore, theism serves a very useful place in philosophy, as it suggests
answers where there would likely be only conundrums or brute facts. As Alvin
Plantinga maintains, theism "offers suggestions for answers to a wide range
of otherwise intractable questions."
Earlier, we gave the (negative) syllogism as to why the atheist fails to
account properly for objective morality ( TA-B ). Positively, however, we
could put forth another theistic argument (Theistic Argument C, or TA-C ):
To ground the existence of an objective moral order, which assumes human
dignity, human rights, human responsibility, and so on, the theist must show
how this is so. A theistic universe (and not, we have seen, an atheistic
one) furnishes the ontological resources to explain these data?namely, a
good and personal God in whose image humans have been made. Therefore, the
theistic account of morality succeeds where the atheistic one fails.
So while the atheist, who has been made in God's image, correctly believes
( epistemologically ) in moral realism, his own ontological foundation
furnishes no basis for this belief.
II. The Euthyphro Dilemma... Again
We are familiar with the Euthyphro dilemma raised by Socrates: "Is what is
holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is
holy?" Socrates rightly rejected the former--an inferior view--but accepted
the latter. Martin asks us to suppose that rape is wrong because God
condemns it. This raises the arbitrariness horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.
(The other one is the autonomy horn.) He rejects--correctly, in my view--a
divine command theory, which (in its weaker version) views the sinful and
the morally forbidden as coextensive. It appears to me that unless the
commands are tethered to the goodness of God's character, then these
commands can appear arbitrary. But even contemporary divine command
theorists like Philip Quinn and Robert M. Adams seem to go beyond divine
commands to emphasize their grounding in God's character, which is the
proper move to make.
Simply defining moral obligation in terms of being simply "that which God
commands" runs into the problem of tautology, in which "good" and "right"
are redefined. "Goodness" comes to mean nothing more than "God commanded X."
Obedience to divine commands would thus appear to be arbitrary. As Alasdair
McIntyre once asked: "what other reason can there be for such obedience but
the appeal to divine power and to the consequences of flouting it?"
Thus many theists have argued that appealing to God's character as the
source and standard of moral goodness helps us to avoid the horns of the
dilemma. However, Michael Martin claims that theists who root objective
morality in the character of God rather than the commands of God only
postpone the problem since the dilemma can be formulated in terms of his
character. I quote Martin at length:
Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character
good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard
of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the
way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of
goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God
condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this
independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what
a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one
could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use
this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this
character. They could do this whether or not God exists.
Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then
if God's character were cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In
such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with
His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and
unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God
must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then
whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character
would define what good is.
So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the
goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
In response to Martin's revised Euthyphro dilemma, however, the theist can
offer the following responses.
First, we noted earlier that the "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is
wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal
human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral
obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more
robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the
atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective
anticipates a moral universe.
Martin's position on morality reminds me of what Bertrand Russell said in
his BBC debate with F. C. Copleston. After being asked how the universe came
into being, Bertrand Russell asserted, "I should say that the universe is
just there, and that's all." Similarly, Martin appears to be saying, "The
objective moral principles are there, and that's all." But is that really
all? To paraphrase Father Copleston's response, "Why objective morality
rather than none at all? That is the question."
To present a defeater against theism's claim to ontologically ground
morality, Martin must do more than simply say that moral properties exist or
that we can have moral knowledge or that moral properties supervene on
physical entities. Nor will it do to say, "I offer the same reasons the
theist does against rape." For the theist already presupposes?and has a
foundation for presupposing?human rights, human dignity, and the like. We've
already noted even if the theist and atheist end up pitting "brute facts"
against each other, the "brute fact" of a personal, good God who has made
human beings in his image offers a more natural context for affirming human
dignity than does an impersonal, unguided process.
Second, by presenting the revised version of the Euthyphro argument, Martin
simply postpones the inevitable?that is, applying a similar dilemma to his
own atheistic version of moral realism . If Martin thinks that he is forcing
the impalement of the theist on one of the horns of the dilemma, how does
Martin think that he can escape a similar dilemma, mutatis mutandis ?
Now obviously, the atheist's moral position does not deal with the matter of
commands issued by a personal being; so the Euthyphro argument is
inapplicable in this regard. But, in principle, the atheist who raises the
horns of this argument against the theist (whether pertaining to divine
commands or divine character) must himself deal with the horns of autonomy
or arbitrariness. So we can ask Martin, "Are the supervening moral
properties?or even moral principles like justice?good simply because they
are good, or is there some independent standard of good to which they
conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the
very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the
atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of
arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as
platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being
arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less
arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways.
We could carry the argument further by comparing Martin's view of
supervenience with the common view that morality is the result of social as
well as biological forces at work within human evolution. Bertrand Russell
noted that ethics arises from the pressures of the community on the
individual. Man . . . does not always instinctively feel the desires which
are useful to his herd. The herd, being anxious that the individual should
act in its interests, has invented various devices for causing the
individual's interest to be in harmony with that of the herd. One of these .
. . is morality.
In such a scenario, it seems plausible to argue that rape?because of its
enhancement of human survival and reproduction?could easily have developed
into a good activity rather than a reprehensible one. (Male mallards, for
instance, commit acts that look much like rape.) And ethnic or social-class
cleansing, in which apparent "parasitic" or "unwanted" elements of human
society could be eliminated, might also enable the human race to become
hardier and thus better survive. But this obviously would render morality
subjective and arbitrary. Similarly, I do not see how Martin's belief in
intrinsic human dignity via supervenience is any more objective than a herd
morality that develops due to socio-biological forces. It seems that both
scenarios are on par. Martin's own version of atheistic moral realism does
not evade the charge of arbitrariness based on the mindless, impersonal
emergence of morality.
Third, in one sense, Martin's query is pointless. After all, we must
eventually arrive at some self-sufficient and self-explanatory stopping
point beyond which the discussion can go no further. Assume for a moment
that God does not exist and that we have, instead, a Platonic form of the
Good from which all values derive. At this point, it would appear silly to
ask, "Why is the Good good?" It seems evident that Martin's argument is
wrongly conceived. Rather, we have a metaphysical ultimate, and everything
is good in approximation to this. This leads us to ask the question once
more: Why is atheism's basis for morality any less arbitrary a
stopping-point than God's character? Using Martin's own argument, can't we
always push the atheistic moral realist back further, questioning even the
sufficient stopping point for his morality? What makes the objective moral
values that human beings have come to affirm right? To rephrase what I
pointed out above: if these moral values exist (a) externally and
independently of any human beings at all or (b) only in conjunction with the
formation of human beings, then we can ask, "What makes them good?" Some
stopping point will be necessary for both the theist and the atheist. So if
the atheist charges the theist with circularity, the theist can turn the
tables on the atheist. Since the atheist is not off the Euthyphronic hook
(or horn!), the next step would be to examine moral justification in terms
of which worldview provides a more fitting context for affirming the
intrinsic dignity of human beings.
Fourth, Martin presupposes that even if God did not exist, he could still
imagine a moral universe in which moral obligation, human dignity, and human
rights and responsibility would still exist. But this is precisely the point
of contention. In the first place, the question, Why is there something
(including human beings) rather than nothing at all?, is the more
fundamental one. Second, if this fundamental problem could be overcome, the
atheist must be questioned on his assumption that human beings would be
essentially the same if God did not exist. But the theist maintains that
human beings would be radically different (if they were to exist at
all)?more like brutes ?and certainly without a moral constitution. The
problem is still unresolved of how human beings became endowed with
intrinsic value and rights and in the first place.
The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue
of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God?the
ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives
human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and
spiritual capacities?resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems
to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is
no personal God to bestow personhood?and its attendant intrinsic dignity and
moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with
intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."
So for Martin to ask, "Why should I think God is good instead of an evil
creator?", is a wrong-headed attempt to drive a wedge between God and his
image-bearers. This is something Martin persists in doing, but to question
the character of God is to question the moral capacities of human beings.
Martin simply assumes that his moral faculties are intact and that he can
make sound moral judgments. Yet this very capacity is a reflection of the
imago Dei, which offers prima facie reasonable assurance that God's
character is non-arbitrary. If Martin has a correct grasp of what is good,
then this reflects that his moral faculties are functioning properly?as God
intended. If he then proceeds to ask about God's capacity to be evil, then
Martin would then have to be a skeptical about the proper functioning of his
own moral faculties. Thus his objection becomes a moot one.
Fifth, Martin also presupposes that in order to avoid the arbitrariness horn
of the revised Euthyphro dilemma, the theist must opt for some moral
standard independent of God. Thus to do what is good, God would have to
conform to that standard. In other words, God is obligated to "obey" or
conform to that standard.
However, the appropriate response to this kind of claim is that God does
not, say, keep promises because he ought to (which would imply some external
moral standard). Rather, the theist claims that God will keep promises. It
is impossible that he not act morally. What we have here is the Anselmian
notion of God's "essential perfection." God is a sui generis being, whose
will operates according to God's very nature .
This view, I believe, brings together the two horns of the Euthyphro
dilemma. It states that, on the one hand, goodness is not independent of God
but rather is part of God's nature and depends upon him for its existence.
On the other hand, God's will operates according to a moral standard. That
standard is God's very nature . The essential perfection view maintains that
God is necessarily good ; he could never will evil, as this is a logical
impossibility. This view avoids the arbitrariness charge, and it avoids the
autonomy charge in that God does not consult a certain moral standard
external to himself before acting. Moral justification ends with God, the
absolute starting point for morality. So God's goodness does not derive from
his adhering to a certain moral standard.
Because God is necessarily good and thus acts in conformity to his nature,
the standards by which he acts are descriptive of his own nature rather than
somehow prescribed to him. As philosophers have done, we can draw a
distinction between following a rule and merely acting in accordance with a
rule . Although empirically indistinguishable, they are logically distinct.
It seems that if we speak in terms of "God ought to do X," then it appears
that there is at least a metaphysical possibility that he not do X. But if
God is essentially good, then no such moral obligations attach to God as
they do to human beings. After all, it appears that when moral laws are in
force (i.e., "one ought to do X"), there is the possibility that they will
be disobeyed.
So God's goodness should not be viewed as his fulfilling moral obligations
but as expressing the way he is . God does not "consult" ontologically
independent moral principles before acting. No, he simply acts as he is
inclined to--which is in accordance with his good character, and this will
necessarily be the best . "No preliminary stage of checking the relevant
principles is required." In this sense, God's goodness should be thought of
along axiological rather strictly moral lines.
Part of God's goodness does consist in his acting in perfect accord with
those principles which would provide duties for a lesser being. This use of
the model would be an explication not of God's moral goodness, but of his
axiological goodness. When religious people claim that God is morally good,
meaning that he acts in accord with moral principles, they are merely using
that axiological conception with which they are most familiar, moral
goodness, to describe or model an aspect of divinity functionally isomorphic
with, though ontologically different from, human goodness.
In other words, although, morally speaking, God acts in the same manner that
humans ought to act (or as the ideal moral agent would act), his goodness is
not a matter of fulfilling moral duties as it is for us. For instance, we
speak of God's making a promise to Abraham to make his descendants as
plentiful as the sands on the shore. Given this understanding of God's not
being morally obligated to act--in this case, to keep a promise, we should
more accurately describe God as expressing his intention, which is
tantamount to a promise from our vantage point. William Alston writes,
Just as we can express intentions without obligating ourselves (provided we
don't promise) so it is with God. The difference, of course, is that we can
count on an expression of intention from God as we can on the promise from a
human being, indeed can count on it much more, because of the utter
stability and dependability of God's character and purposes.
Mark Linville states that "this is not merely an ad hoc construal of God's
relation to moral duties as a result of trying to solve the problem of
essential perfection and divine freedom. Rather, it follows naturally from
the concept of an essentially perfect being." So contrary to Martin's claim,
God is not obligated to some standard of goodness external to himself and
thus does not consult it before acting; rather, he simply does what is in
accordance with his nature.
Now Martin might, for the sake of argument, grant that God's nature is
necessarily good. But this would not entail that God's character is the
standard for human beings or that he is the source of objective morality.
However, in light of the connection between human beings and God via the
imago Dei, then we have good reason to suppose that there is indeed a
necessary link between God's character and our moral constitution. Thus God
would serve as both the standard and source of objective morality.
Sixth, another Anselmian point that follows from the preceding one is this:
God by definition is a being worthy of worship. It is a necessary truth that
he is the standard of goodness. If God were not absolutely good, then he
would not be worthy of worship. The meaningful question to ask, then, is:
Why should we regard God as the standard of goodness? Anselm's perfect-being
theology maintains that God must be absolute goodness itself, the very
embodiment of goodness. Thus he is worthy of worship. But if a being is not
absolute goodness itself, then it would not be worthy of worship.
Getting back to Michael Martin, we had mentioned earlier Martin's tacit
approval of the notion that certain moral truths are analytically true.
However, it appears that some naturalists?relativists and nihilists, for
instance?can easily imagine a world in which objective moral standards do
not exist. Bertrand Russell was one such atheist who seemed to be quite
consistent in this regard.
In sum, Martin's revised Euthyphro dilemma does not raise inescapable
problems for the theist. This brings us to the matter of rape in the Bible.
III. The Bible and Rape
We come to the section, in which it becomes quite evident that Martin is not
interested in doing serious study of the biblical text and its context.
Although I could say much more, I'll let the arguments below speak for
themselves.
Martin claims that in the Bible, "God seems to be tacitly approving of rape"
in some places while in others "rape is condemned but without regard for the
victim's welfare." The main example Martin gives is Deuteronomy 22:23-29.
The text reads:
23 If there is a girl who is a virgin engaged to a man, and another man
finds her in the city and lies with her, 24 then you shall bring them both
out to the gate, and you shall stone them to death; the girl, because she
did not cry out in the city, and the man, because he has violated his
neighbor's wife. Thus you shall purge the evil from among you. 25 But if in
the field the man finds the girl who is engaged, and the man forces her and
lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die. 26 But you
shall do nothing to the girl; there is no sin in the girl worthy of death,
for just as a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this
case. 27 When he found her in the field, the engaged girl cried out, but
there was no one to save her.
28 If a man finds a girl who is a virgin, who is not engaged, and seizes her
and lies with her and they are discovered, 29 then the man who lay with her
shall give to the girl's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall
become his wife because he has violated her; he cannot divorce her all his
days (NASB).
Martin makes the following criticism concerning this passage:
Here [in vv. 28-29] the victim of rape is [treated as] the property of the
father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father's property he must pay a
bridal fee. The [girl] apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to
marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no
negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if
you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.
Before getting further into the discussion, we note that Martin displays a
lack of exposure to the historical and social context in which the Bible was
written. With regard to the Deuteronomy 22 passage, we should note three
distinct scenarios:
#1: Consensual sex/adultery between a man and a betrothed girl: v. 23: "He
lies with her"; this need not imply force or violence. This act is
tantamount to adultery as engagement is tantamount to marriage (?he has
violated his neighbor's wife').
#2: Rape of an engaged girl: v. 25: "[he] forces her [an engaged girl] and
lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die."
#3: Rape of an unengaged/single girl: v. 28: "[he] seizes her [a girl who is
single and not engaged] and lies with her and they are discovered": the word
seize literally means "handle/take hold of." Although rape (as in the NIV)
may be too strong a translation, according to Christopher Wright, this act
does appears to be that of rape.
In response, then, to Martin's criticism, one must point out that only in a
legal sense were children considered "property" of the father in Old
Testament Israel. So, to violate a girl?even with her consent?would be an
offense against her father/parents as well. This is not so foreign as Martin
would make it appear. In the United States, it is not uncommon to hear of
attempts at legislation which a parent should be notified before a young
teenage girl can have an abortion. This is a reasonable demand?even though
this teenager is not the property of her parents.
With regard to the claim that the girl has no say in the matter and must
marry the man, Martin overlooks the cultural background to such a command.
In the latter case (v. 28), the sexual encounter appears to be that of a man
taking advantage of a "minor." Christopher Wright argues: the girl would no
longer attract a potential bridegroom and the exchange of gifts and dowry
that went along with the marriage. It is for this loss that the man must
compensate the father (29a). . . . [This law] gives the offender no option
but to marry the girl (and the father no right to refuse), with no easy way
out through a quick subsequent divorce. The girl is thus assured of security
and provision, in place of virtual widowhood if she had been abandoned after
the loss of her virginity .
In addition, the law offers a further protection to both the girl and the
(possible) child born from this union.
Martin misses the point and engages in an argument from silence when he
says, "Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is
forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an
unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught." First of all, in the case of
casuistic law in the Pentateuch, not all contingencies are accounted for.
Thus it is commonly understood among Old Testament scholars that the
Israelite laws are exemplary rather than exhaustive . So there is no reason
to think that all conditions should be spelled out. Furthermore, common
sense tells us that not much can be done if there is no evidence to act on!
We could rephrase what Martin says and apply it to the crime of a
well-planned murder: "Notice also if a murder is not discovered, no negative
judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you murder
someone, be sure not to get caught." But this is so obvious that Martin's
point seems silly. Thirdly, the mention of the word discovered in the
biblical text (v. 28) is significant. It implies that if a man's taking
sexual advantage of an unengaged single girl becomes public knowledge, then
the girl would certainly not be viewed as a prospective candidate for
marriage within her society.
Let us continue with Martin's argument:
In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that
both the rapist and the victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because
he violated his neighbor's wife and the victim because she did not cry for
help [vv. 25-27]. Again, the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the
property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the
welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that
in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would
be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious. . . .
On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely
different if the rape occurs in "open country." Here the rapist should be
killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help
in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be
blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the
psychological harm to [the victim]. No condemnation is made of a rapist in
open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.
We must clarify this notion of property in the first of the two paragraphs
just cited. In verse 22, the penalty for adultery (to which a betrothed
could be subject) is death (Dt. 22:22; Lev. 20:10). This fact argues against
the assumption that women were nothing more than the property of their
husbands in Old Testament Israel. After all, why destroy the "property" as
well as punish the guilty man? Moreover, there is no other property offense
in Old Testament law that is punishable by death. Thus Martin is simply
wrong when he says "the [dubious] assumption is that the rapist despoiled
the property of another man." Again, contrary to Martin's claim that concern
"for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter," we have seen how
the law provided security and material provision for young women who were
sexually violated.
The other "dubious" assumption Martin mentions is similarly flawed: "it is
assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she
did, she would be heard and rescued." Again, Wright addresses this issue,
urging us to consider both intention, circumstances and action : . . . the
circumstances in which [sexual intercourse] occurs affect the assumptions
the court might make regarding intention and thus also affect its allocation
of guilt and punishment. The contrast between a busy town and a deserted
countryside makes an obvious difference to what could be assumed regarding
the woman's consent. The difference is also expressed in the vocabulary
[i.e., consent in v. 23 vs. rape in v. 25] . . . . In the latter case, the
court should accept what could only be the woman's own testimony in the
matter and assume her innocence .
Regarding the first instance mentioned in our Deuteronomy 22 passage (i.e.,
adultery between an engaged girl and another man), there is a certain
legitimate assumption: Although rape could take place in the city, this
particular case is not one of rape because if the woman had cried for help,
then help most certainly would have come. But because she did not call for
help, it can be assumed that she consented to the man's advances. But pace
Martin, this Deuteronomy 22 passage is not assuming that in all cases the
rape victim would be heard if she cried out, as Wright states. Thus given a
few important facts about the biblical text and the cultural context,
Martin's arguments lose their force.
There is another passage Martin mentions, to which we now turn?Numbers
31:18, where, Martin alleges, "Moses encourages his men to use captured
virgins for their own sexual pleasure, i.e., to rape them" (5). At first
sight, the passage does seem quite harsh: "Now kill all the boys. And kill
every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who
has never slept with a man" (NIV). However, the context for this command?as
in various other OT commands of this nature?should not be overlooked. In
light of the rampant adultery at Baal Peor and its potentially corrupting
influence, this command is put in perspective. It is these young girls who
have not debased themselves in the orgiastic worship of Baal (Num. 25).
Furthermore, Martin's assumption that rape is presupposed here is mistaken.
A similar passage in Deuteronomy 20:13-14 is worth noting:
When the Lord your God gives it [i.e., the city which has rejected Israel's
terms of peace] into your hand, you shall strike all the men in it with the
edge of the sword. Only the women and the children and the animals and all
that is in the city all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourself.
John Sailhamer comments: "The present law ensures the well-being of those
captured women [and children] by giving them protection against being sold
into slavery. It also provides for the assimilation of the captive women
into Israelite society by allowing marriage to them." Thus it was
permissible in such instances to, not rape, but take a wife,who would be
incorporated into the people of Israel through marriage. It seems far less
likely that men could be as readily integrated into early Israel.
Martin again fails to make his case regarding the biblical perspective on
rape. In a number of ways, then, the psychological well-being of the raped
girl is taken into account: (a) she is provided for rather than abandoned to
virtual widowhood because she has been sexually violated; (b) easy divorce
by the man is not possible; (c) a potential child from this union has the
security of a two-parent family. Also, by failing to account for many of the
cultural dimensions of Old Testament Israelite culture, the force of
Martin's point is vitiated.
Conclusion
Michael Martin's use of philosophical argument and the biblical text is
insufficient to make his case. First, he has not established?from an
ontological point of view?the objectivity of naturalistic morality; he has
only dealt with the epistemological dimension. We also saw that theism
rather than atheism furnishes a more fitting context for moral values, which
themselves presuppose human dignity, purpose, rights, and the like. Second,
Martin's raising the Euthyphro dilemma seems purposeless since his atheistic
position is vulnerable to just such a dilemma. Furthermore, Anselm's
perfect-being theology offers a sufficient way out of the Euthyphro dilemma.
In this scenario, we see a God who acts morally naturally and without
consulting any exterior moral standards (i.e., without obligation). Finally,
Martin's argument against the Bible's view on rape fails to make any case
for the atheistic position.
So can Martin be a moral realist? Yes, with regard to the order of knowing;
no, with regard to the order of being.
raven1
>Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially perfect
>nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
>leveled against divine commands
Starting off with a Special Pleading fallacy is not a promising
beginning.
--
"O Sybilli, si ergo
Fortibus es in ero
O Nobili! Themis trux
Sivat sinem? Causen Dux"
Kate
subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
first decide good for what? bad for what?
Morality must therefore be subjective since it's the work towards
goodness and good is subjective.
Theism simply defines good as being what the god or gods wants. It
defines obedience to the god's wishes as good. This doesn't even
narrow down the goal, as every single theist's god is different and
will change gods on a whim. Most of them even admit that in their
dedication to their god they have no clear idea what he wants and
attribute that lack of clarity to the god's wishes - so apparently the
think they god doesn't want them to have the ability to obey his wishes
and therefore, even their god is bad.
Talk about subjective.
Scott
"raven1" <quotht...@nevermore.com> wrote in message
news:mptr021cscjmqagn2...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:56:48 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
>
>>Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially
>>perfect
>>nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
>>leveled against divine commands
>
> Starting off with a Special Pleading fallacy is not a promising
> beginning.
not interested in his theology. But philosophically he says what I say.
Assuming materialism is the correct description of reality there is no room
for moral realism. His observation of martin ignoring his ontology is a
valid criticism. So you might read on...
Josef Balluch
In a message sent 'round the world, Scott poured fuel on the fire with
the following:
> "Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of
> Epistemology vs. Ontology
Subtitle: How to get Maximum Mileage from an Argument from Ignorance.
Regards,
Josef
Ideals are very often formed in the effort to escape from the hard task
of dealing with facts.
-- William Sumner
Kate
must therefore expose you to impossible situations. If a god wishes
contradictory things, then there is no way to satify him (or her),
therefore in order for it to be possible for a human to satisfy a god,
his or her wishes must not be contradictory. This in essense becomes a
rule that is more powerful than the god. The god must then be required
not to wish for contradictory things.
Because humans are not all powerful, it is not possible for them to be
moral if morality if defined as obeying the wishes of a god or gods.
Scott
"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>
There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
subjective.
And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
Subjectivism turns, like materialism, holds moral statments have no
truth-values in themself. Rather they are statments about the person's own
values. For example: George Bush's valuing abortion as immoral and Betty
Friedan valuing abortion as moral are simply statments about them and their
personal values.
http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/Subjectivism
Moral Subjectivism is also called individual relativism.
Cultural Relativism is moral intersubjectivism. A society of people share
the same subjective values...or attempt to.
In materialism there are no universal moral standards independent of
cultures therefore their is no such thing as human rights or human dignity.
To say there is only begs the ontology question. And Martin begs for that
question.
But what I most often observe are atheists making moral realist statments.
Many say evil does exist as though it were an 'out there' truth-valued
statment.
Although I think he could've come up with better examples the guy makes the
same observation http://radicalacademy.com/ethicsmyth.htm
Since materialism is amoral and secular humanism holds to both human
rights/dignity and materialism that begs an ontological question: How can
secular humans hold to these two seemingly contradictory beliefs without
being oxymoronic - amoralism and moral realism? To materialism neither gods
or morals are real.
> Morality must therefore be subjective since it's the work towards
> goodness and good is subjective.
>
> Theism simply defines good as being what the god or gods wants.
No. Theism simply defines good as being god's nature. However, I don't argue
theism even with other theist. So what would be the point in doing so with
atheists since we don't begin to share the same axioms on that subject.
It
> defines obedience to the god's wishes as good. This doesn't even
> narrow down the goal, as every single theist's god is different and
> will change gods on a whim. Most of them even admit that in their
> dedication to their god they have no clear idea what he wants and
> attribute that lack of clarity to the god's wishes - so apparently the
> think they god doesn't want them to have the ability to obey his wishes
> and therefore, even their god is bad.
>
> Talk about subjective.
Scott
Christopher A. Lee
wrote:
>Because humans are not all powerful, it is not possible for them to be
>moral if morality if defined as obeying the wishes of a god or gods.
Translation: you need an imaginary alpha male to tell you what to do.
I hope you're nowhere near my loved ones when you grow out of your
Santa Claus equivalent belief.
Jim07D6
>http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>
<...>
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
<snip elaboration of the Straw man argument WRT the quoted material
above it.>
>But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all
>attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must
>do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
No, he need not provide a basis for grounding objective morality
nontheistically, in order to support the contention that "it has not
been shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a
nontheistic basis fail". What he needs to do show a reason to believe
that it has not been shown that they do fail.
>Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess
>intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They
>share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being,
>and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell
>puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns
>only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their
>having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect
>this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made
>as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God
>personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods
>find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to
>function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery,
>theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social
>contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the
>furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate
>personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a
>non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as
>mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical
>ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
This goes off into an argument for mind-body dualism and all that
flows from that flawed philosophical position. I am not interested in
this aspect, so will snip the rest.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
>
>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>
>
>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>subjective.
>
>And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
>does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
>problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
>materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
That is true only in the sense of "assume" that is used in Reductio
arguments -- in which argument the original assumption is thereby
proved incorrect. The Euthyphro dilemma turns of the point that either
morality is superior to God, such that a thing is not good only
because God says so, or morality is "the whim of God" and so is not
good in itself. So, which is it?
<...>
--- Jim07D6
Scott
"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:o99s02p0guib89ncv...@4ax.com...
that might be a false dichotomy.
wbarwell
>
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>
Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
prove. So morality has nothing to do with god.
Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
Now, let us look at the bible. God commands genocides in Canaan.
God is not moral.
The god of the bible is callous, evil, ammoral.
The Eurythro dilemma asks, does god create morality, is it a
whim, or is it from outside god from a deeper sources.
In the bible, the Israelites are in Egypt for 430 years,
starting with 70 persons. They all but forget god until
he reintroduces himself to Moses.
He then tells Moses to go to Canaan and kill all the Canaanites.
Not because they are evil or wicked, but because the Israelites
are chosen and the Canaanites are not.
At no time in that 430 years does god appear to the Canaanites
to give the moral codes, to teach them, or leadership. Nor
to the Egyptians, Midianites or even for that matter, the
Israelites who will not have such a code until on their way to
kill the Canaanites.
Logically, it seems rather unfair to not give people moral codes,
or to kill them all so your pets can take over their lands.
Why then, does this elemental sense of logic and fairness
collide so heavily with god's brutal and high handed
lack of morality?
Eurythro could not answer thd question, does piety and
morality come from the gods or outside and beyond them?
Obviously outside god, because our sense of logical and
elementary morality is outraged here at gods obvious
and logical lack of mercy, fairness, justice or basic
civilized behavior.
If morality comes outside of god, then this sense of
logic tells us that this command to commit genocide is evil,
morality based on simple logic and empathy is morality.
If god says do otherwise god is immoral.
If this is a command from god, its is still obviously
immoral and bad. So we answer Socrate's question.
Morality does not come from gods. It comes from our built in
logic and our empathy. Thus we do not need gods at all
for morality, and especially a god that outrages all
thinking men and women who see the full extent of the outrageous
and unacceptable behavior of god in this feeble minded
and morality deprived set of fables.
But we can also ask a Eurythro style question about logic.
Where does logic come from. Obviously either its outside god
or god gave us this sense of logic. Why then does our sense
of logic seem to find the god of Joshua so outrageous and nasty?
Because it is outrageous, unfair, unmerciful and nasty.
To give us such a sense of logic and then ask us to believe
such an outrageous command that assaults our sense of logic as
applied to morality is simply proof that god cannot exist as
claimed, an intelligent, moral, just, merciful, omnibenevolent god.
And so we can see that any essay on the sources of morality that
cannot see that this god is neither logical, nor moral is
dangerous and evil in and of itself.
Because it can cause morons to take evil fairy tales
and pervert men's sense of justice to make them do evil
in name of religion.
That is why it is important at all times to strongly
debunk this god at all chances.
It causes evil as shown by some 1600 years of history.
It destroys morality AND logic.
-------------------------------
IS THERE A GOD?
Strong Atheism's answer.
A BASIC DEFINITION OF GOD.
The general overarching definition of god as per
the major religions of the world is:
A. God is personal, God has will and consciousness.
B. God has free will.
C. God is the creator of all.
D. God is omnipotent.
E. God is omnibenevolent.
F. God is omniscient.
G. God is that which nothing more powerful
can be imagined.
These are the basic attributes that can be claimed
for the god of orthodox Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, and Hinduism.
Omnibenevolence and omniscience are actually
logically derivable from the claimed attribute of
omnipotence and so aren't not truly independent
attributes, and may be considered special aspects
of omnipotence.
There are other attributes of god, that he is the
only such god, that he is is immortal and that
god has always existed that are not important
for this discussion and for now, can be ignored.
They are secondary arguments and are for the most
part not foundational or truly necessary, except
those that can be logically derived from the
attributes listed above.
A CLASS OF GODS
It is important to note here that this is a
definition not for a particular god, but an
entire class of gods.
Sub-theories about god are not important here.
Christianity claims one may attain salvation
only through Jesus, Islam claims the Christian
dogma that Jesus was the son of god is
blasphemous.
Ideas like this though, are of little importance
to the overarching and general claims made for a
personal, creator, omni-everything god. I have
coined a term, The Grand God of Grand Theologies
for this sort of god, this sort of theological
system of expansive claims for god.
Grand theologies are those theologies that have
adopted this class of god as their basic
attributes concerning the nature of god. But it
is important to remember here that what is being
discussed here is a class of gods, not particular
gods or specific gods.
THE FOUR GREAT THEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS
Again, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism hold
to this basic Grand God and are typical Grand
Theologies holding to this basic class of god as
their basic definitions of what god is at god's
most basic level.
A big problem with this class of gods is, it
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The free will defense of the problem of evil goes
back to St. Augustine who popularized it. It is
still popular, and is championed most notably
today by Alvin Plantinga, but also by other
theologians.
God gave man free will. Man freely chooses to do
evil. Ability to do evil is less evil than
lacking free will.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE DEBUNKED.
God has free will.
God is omnibenevolent, he has a good nature
incapable of doing evil.
A. If god can have free will, and a good nature,
this good nature is not allowed to count
against god's free will.
B. Nor is god's lack of ability to do evil
allowed to count against god's omnipotence.
C. Likewise, man could easily have a god like
free will and a god like good nature.
D. Inabilty then to do evil would no more count
against man's free will than it does for god's
free will.
E. If so, it also counts against god's free will
and god does not have free will as claimed.
F. If god does not have absolute and total free
will, thus free will is not a true necessity
at all.
F. If god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and
can give man a god like free will and a
god-like good nature incapable of moral evil,
god must do so or god is not moral, not
omnibenevolent.
G. Evil exists because he allows it to.
So free will does not exist, or it does and we can
have a god like free will and a god like good
nature. Either way, free will cannot explain away
the existence of evil. This free will defense
then, is a failed argument.
OMNISCIENCE VERSUS CREATORHOOD OF GOD
God is defined as creator of all in most
religions.
And god is claimed to be omniscient, all knowing.
A. God created the Universe and all in it.
B. God is omniscient, all knowing, he knows all
in the Universe and he knows the future of the
Universe and its contents.
C. If god creates a Universe, he will know that
in 13 billion years this Universe will have a
man named John Smith in it.
D. If John Smith is good and saved, or evil and
damned, God will know that.
E. As he knows that the Universe in its present
state will have a John Smith, god may then
contemplate the future state of Smith and
decide if he will tolerate an evil Smith.
F. If yes, Smith will be evil only because of a
specific personal and will choice made solely
by god.
G. If Smith is evil, then evil exists solely
because of a choice made by god. In fact all
moral evil done by creations of god will be
evil and do evil only because of personal and
willful creations of god allowing evil acts
to be done, by direct decision of god.
H. If evil exists in a world with an omniscient
creator god, it is solely and only because
god allows evil.
I. If evil exists solely because of personal
choices of god, god then is not as defined,
omnibenevolent.
J. Man and any other sentient being in such a
Universe cannot have any free will, not even
in principle. A Universe with a god that
creates all and knows all precludes free will
for all beings god creates in the strongest
possible manner.
The Grand God of Grand
Theology is thus self destroying, it is
incoherent and contradictory as a theory.
THE SITUATION SO FAR.
1. A minimalistic class of gods is defined, this
Grand God has been defined here with as few
terms as possible.
2. The problem of evil dooms such a claimed god.
3. The attempted defense, free will is fatally
flawed. God's good nature and free will doom
claims free will makes evil necessary for man
to have free will.
4. Omniscience and creatorhood of god further
doom claims of god's omnibenevolence and
man's free will free will cannot exist for
man. All evil is the direct and knowing
creation of god contradicting claims of
omnibenevolence.
5. Since Free will for man is totally impossible,
free will cannot be a good quality, much less
necessary.
Here, the Grand God of Grand Theology has
collapsed. As has Grand
Theology. As pointed out, this destroys the claims
and viability of an entire class of possible
gods,
all secondary and tertiary claims for such a god
of
this class also fail, as do dogmas or secondary
or tertiary claims.
If a these Grand Gods cannot exist as defined,
specific gods cannot, nor can claims such as this
or that Grand God sent this or that revelation to
man or some prophet or did this or that.
God is thus disproven and is utter irrelevant
to anything real and existant.
***********
--
An Inuit hunter asked the local missionary priest: "If I did not know about
God and sin, would I go to hell?" "No," said the priest, "not if you did
not know." "Then why," asked the Inuit earnestly, "did you tell me?"
-Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek
Cheerful Charlie
wbarwell
>
> "Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
> news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>
>
> There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
> subjective.
>
> And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
> measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
> does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
> problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
> materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
>
There is no god possible. Therefore only atheistic systems can guarantee
moraity, you can't base morality on cretinous tales told by evil billy goat
herders 2700 years ago.
the evil god of the bible commands genocides such as Canaan.
Tyhis is obviously wrong. and since it clashes
with our sense of logic and fairness, its a problem
then to say why it does that, why we have senses of
empathy and sense of logic.
Some of us anyway.
In the end, these and only these can offer us morality.
Otherwise you are at the mercy of evil fairy tales.
Thus christianity has given us 1600 years of mass murders,
genocides, crusades, religious wars, and pogroms, the last
pogrom in Germany ended in 1945.
And now, to show you your god cannot possibly exist and so is utter
irrelevant to matters of moraity.
contradiction.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
God is thus disprove and is utter irrelevant
to anything real and existant.
***********
OMNIPOTENCE AND OMNISCIENCE
A. Omnipotence is a special sort of attribute, of
all god's alledged attributes the most
important, because from that attribute you
can derive others attributes, including
omniscience. If one says for purposes of
argument god is omnipotent, one is also
implying god is also omniscient.
B. If god is omnipotent, god must also
specifically have omniscience because if
he does not have omniscience, one
cannot claim omnipotence as an attribute.
C. Thus if god is omnipotent, and created all,
free will is impossible because creation
and omniscience rule out free will as was
shown. In this world god supposedly created,
evil exists. So god must not be
omnibenevolent as claimed as all evil is
created by god if man cannot have free will.
D. So omnipotence and omnibenevolence are thus
mutually exclusive in a world that does in
fact have evil in it. Because omniscience
must exist as part of omnipotence and
omniscience and creatorhood cannot coexist
with free will, omnipotence is also not
compatible with creatorhood and
omnibenevolence. One cannot finesse this
all by ignoringomniscience or abandoning
omniscience.
E. One can only dispose of omniscience by also
explicitly abandoning omnipotence. If god is
defined as being omnibenevolent then a god
that is also allegedly also creator of all
must be evil.
CREATORHOOD OF GOD
F. One may be tempted to abandon the idea god
created all. But that creates some very strong
logical problems also.
G. If god is omnipotent, he can create all. Or
modify any other creation he does not himself
create. No other being or process may create
something god could not modify, because of the
power of his omniscience.
H. So if for purposes of argument, we claim the
Universe was not created by god, he could,
being omnipotent, change that creation for
his own purposes, that of creating good due
to his attribute of omnibenevolence.
We are back to the problem of evil again, he
could change creation such that no evil John
Smiths can exist.
If not he then is sole and only cause for
existence of all evil.
If god is omnibenevolent and omnipotent he
still must modify any creations he did not
himself create to destroy evil, if he can
do so. So claiming god did not create all
does not save the concept of an omnipotent,
omnibenevolent god. It cannot avoid the
problem of evil.
I. Omniscience means we cannot dodge the problem
of evil by stating god did not create the
Universe even if one wished to, nor by limiting
his creatorhood, for example saying god did not
create the original material of the Universe,
but used it as a building material.
J. Thus to get rid of the creator problem, we must
explicitly abandon it all and totally. Only by
doing so could one get around the problem of
creatorhood and omniscience. But if we say god
cannot either create the Universe or modify it
as he finds it, we drop omniscience also,
explicitly. God then turns out not to be
creator of all nor omnipotent as a priori
defined, a contradiction disproving that
a priori defined god.
K. If evil exists because god could change the
Universe he did not create, and he fails to do
so, then all evil exists solely because
of knowing and personal choices god makes.
L. God being omnipotent cannot be controlled by
any other process or other entities. He may
modify any works or creations made by them.
M. If god cannot change creations of others, or
the pre-existing materials of the Universe,
omnipotence in not an attribute of god as
claimed a priori.
M. Omnipotence and creatorhood thus are entangled
in a manner that makes it hard to abandon the
doctrine god created all and if one does, one
must likewise abandon claims of omnipotence.
PRE-EXISTING MATTER AND A PRE-EXISTING UNIVERSE.
The Greek writer Hesiod in his Theogony, starts
with a Universe that is a chaotic void. This
void, through the mysterious property of
emanation, created the first generation of gods,
the Titans, who in their turn created the
Olympians gods who eventually displace the
Titans as rulers of the world.
Likewise, some theologians see Genesis as
representing god creating the world out of a
similar void, a primordial sea god did not
himself create, but used as raw material for
his creations.
God's existence is not explained.
This idea god did not create all still would not
absolve an omnipotent god from responsibility
for evil. The biblical god if he did not create
the Universe and its component materials used them
as he pleased. If that god is omnipotent, then he
bears all responsibility for the world he did
create out of pre-existing material. Whether
this god is said to be eternal or like Hesiod's
Titans was somehow emanated from the chaos of
the void does not materially change any arguments
involving omnipotence, omniscience or
omnibenevolence, if god is said to have these
attributes.
************************************************
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD PART THREE
Does god create the rules, the laws, the logic of
the Universe or not? Is 2 + 2 = 4 something god
set as part of the nature of the Universe or is
that outside and beyond god?
Can god change 2 + 2 to 5?
A. If god did in fact make the rules and laws and
logic of the Universe, god could also change
them as needed.
B. A god that creates the rules.laws and logic
of the world he creates could simply make a
world where man has free will yet freely
chooses only to do moral good. Since god
creates the rules of the Universe, he could
change them in name of omnibenevolence, free
will is perserved and evil is banished. Evil
no longer needs to exist to allow for free
will.
C. If god could do this and fails to, evil
exists solely and only because of god's
failure to use his omnipotence to change
the rules and laws and logic of the Universe
to give man free will and a nature incapable
of doing evil.
D. If god can do this and fails to, god is not
omnibenevolent as claimed, a contradiction
in definitions of god as omnibenevolent and
omnipotent.
E. God in fact since he is essentially the
creator and sustaining cause of all evil
that was, is, and shall be is omni-malevolent.
F. If god does not make the rules, the laws, the
very logic of the Universe, then we have the
problem of what these things are and where
they come from.
G. If these laws and rules and logic limit god,
then god is obviously not omnipotent as
claimed.
H. And thus god is not as claimed, the greatest
thing that can be imagined. Obviously laws
and rules and logic that limit the most
powerful in the Universe are greater
still because they do in fact limit such
a being.
I. If such laws and rules and logic outside and
beyond god do exist, and are thus greater
than god, god is not the greatest thing
imaginable and all ontological 'proofs' that
are based on that basic claim fail.
J. Such rules and laws and logic must exist
outside of god's control and must have always
bee outside his control. If there were ever
in god's control, god cannot have reduced his
power to abandon omnipotence voluntarily.
Omnipotence is an inherent ability. It would
be like abandoning a sense of taste or touch.
This observation forstalls attempts at
apologisms claiming god abandoned any
abilities.
K. And if god could indeed abandon omnipotence,
he must avoid that. After all, he is also
omnibenevolent. Omnibenevolence dictates he
must at all times do the good thing, never an
evil thing. Abandoning omnipotence such that
he could no longer create a world where man
has free will, and a nature incapable of evil
is to allow evil to exist. To abandon
omnipotence is to embrace the proposition
evil is to be allowed to flourish. So any
claims god might have for some greater good
abandoned omnipotence freely are not possible.
L. If god is said to be omnipotent, if he at
anytime gave up any abilities he can no
longer said to be omnipotent, if he actually
gave up any abilities.
M. Since god must have had maximum power and
abilities and cannot have at any time
voluntarilyy relinquished any powers or
abilities, at least in the name of banishing
evil the fact that there are laws and rules
and logic of a universe outside and beyond
god, they aretrulyy beyond and outside god,
and always were.
N. Since such laws and rules and laws are outside
god, and always were so,and are properties of
the Universe, the Universe is likewise outside
and beyond god, with its laws and rules and
logic.
O. Since the Universe and its laws and rules and
logic are outside and beyond god, god is not
as, creator of all.
P. Since the Universe no longer relies on god for
its purportedexistencee, nor on god for the
existencee of its laws and rules and logic,
god is no longer a necessary being. If there
are things that have necessaryexistencee, it
would have to be the Universe as whole, or
possibly its laws, its rules or its logic,
or a subset of these rules or laws or the
underlying causes of these things, if any.
None were created by god or can be modified
by god.
Q. If these laws and rules and logic could be
modified by god, then the rules and laws
and logic of the Universe would have been
modified to enexistencece of evil, and must
be modified this if god is actually
omnipotent and omnibenevolent.
R. God then is not omnipotent, or not
omnibenevolent, or is neither, or
does not exist.
THE ATTRIBUTES AND NATURE OF GOD IN LIGHT OF THE
ABOVE EXAMINATION OF GOD
Thus the idea god is omnipotent, omnibenevolent,
and creator of all, clash again
and mutually self-destruct over the issue of
evil'existencece. This raises
serious questions on the nature of the Universe
that cannot be as Grand Theology
claims it is.
A. We have shown god cannot have created the
Universe.
B. We have shown god does not create the laws,
rules and laws of that Universe.
C. That god is thus not omnipotent as these laws
limit him.
D. That god is not the greatest imaginable thing.
E. That ontological proofs of god'existencece
based on claims god is the greatest thing
imaginable are failed arguments.
F. That god cannot be a necessary being, as
claimed.
G. That any possible claims god might for some
reason abandon or limit any abilities cannot
be true in any attempt to avoid this line of
inquiry. Nor can that approach derail logical
examination of consequences of Grand
Theology's overarching claims to god's
attributes or nature.
The fact that god iallegedlyly omnibenevolent and
evil exists, demonstrates god cannot make the
rules of the world. 2 + 2 = 4 because that is
the nature of the Universe, not something god
created.Because if god did create the rules and
laws and logic of the Universe, and was
omnibenevolent, we should have no signs of evil,
especially moral evil of man, Satan, demons and
devils.
But if one admits to that, Many other important
claims collapse, many other arguments about god
and his attributes and nature no longer are
viable. Some of these claims, god's creation
of the Universe are among the oldest and most
basic of theology.
Ontological proofs started with Anselm in the
10th century, all of these now must be abandoned.
The necessary being argument, long a rhetorical
argument is now finally dead.
Free will defenses against the problem of evil
opened up a line of attack here that is powerful
and very final.
**************************************************
wbarwell
It gets worse. We have senses of logic and empathy.
So if god tells the Israelites to kill all the Canaanites,
that seems evil. God does not appear to the Israelites for
430 years and neither to Egyptians, Canaanites or Midianites.
Or Israelites. Remember god does not give them a code of moral
conduct until well on their way to kill all the Canaanites.
To fail thus to give moral codes to all, means god cannot
fairly claim to destroy them because they are evil, because
they cannot have known without a moral code what was evil
if morality comes from god alone. Nobody seems to have
gotten a god given moral code until the Israelites.
Then the question arises, why does that seem unfair in a
logical sense? Why give man a logical sense like that and
then outrage it with unmerciful and unjust action?
And if this sense of logic and empathy is the source
of morality, why does god ignore that obvious fact and demand
immoral and evil genocide?
Again, if god fails to fairly treat all equally, that is
not moral. We know it is not because it is not logical.
It is not merciful, nor just.
If this sense of logic is right, then obviously
it does not come from god who is represented as being
high handed and immoral, unmerciful and unjust.
If it isn't right, then why did god supposedly create
us this way?
wbarwell
His theology sucks and so does his lack of philosphy.
His ignorance of why god cannot exist is distressing also.
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
God is thus disproven and is utter irrelevant
to anything real and existant.
***********
--
Scott
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be, doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
> To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
> the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
> dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
> pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
see." - P Copan
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
Scott
Scott
"wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
news:120sj15...@corp.supernews.com...
> Scott wrote:
> contradiction.
>
> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>
> The problem of evil was first written down by
> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>
> Today's formulation is:
> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
> B. and as omnibenevolent.
> C. Evil exists.
does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might just
prove the paradox as well.
Scott
> Scott wrote:
CC, you really (pun) should just read.
You are an example of what I observe. You simply presupose evil does in fact
exist.
THERE ARE NO MORAL FACTS IN MATERIALISM. Nature is not moral. Aren't you a
part of nature? Or is there something about your being that informs you of
your knowledge of evil existing out there in the *real* world?
>
>>
>> "Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>> news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>>
>>
>> There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>> subjective.
>>
>> And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>> measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals.
>> Evil
>> does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
>> problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
>> materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
>>
>
>
> There is no god possible. Therefore only atheistic systems can guarantee
> moraity,
How? Define what you mean by morality. Is morality only a cultures moral
code (relativism) or is there something intrinsic about the human being that
you have knowledge of going beyond amoral nature?
you can't base morality on cretinous tales told by evil billy goat
> herders 2700 years ago.
> the evil god of the bible commands genocides such as Canaan.
>
> Tyhis is obviously wrong.
That's a positive moral statment. OK how so? What's your logical
explanation?
<snipped what you've already posted.>
Scott
> Scott wrote:
>
>>
> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>>
>
> Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
> prove.
Ok, so prove it.
> So morality has nothing to do with god.
>
never said it did.
> Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
So now empathy is an objective moral principle?
>
> Now, let us look at the bible. God commands genocides in Canaan.
> God is not moral.
>
> The god of the bible is callous, evil, ammoral.
<So is Nature, maybe you should go out and bitch at a tree>
OK, Jim, do you see what I mean about my seeing atheists make such moral
realistic statments about moral facts?
CC is not an exception
< snipped the same crap. you don't need to post it more than once>
Scott
Jim07D6
Jim07D6
It may or may not be true that he is a moral realist, but the thesis
of moral realism does not appear in his argument as you quoted it. I
do not believe we adequately rebut the Euthyphro Dilemma by rebutting
materialism.
>
>If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
>nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in moral
>realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
>morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
>
>I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
>(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
>real?
The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
something. What is His basis?
>
>> To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
>> the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
>> dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
>> pious because it is loved by the gods?"
>
>No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely in
>metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes
>the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose
>(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
>accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties,"
>he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails
>and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can
>human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
>worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
>personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
>see." - P Copan
That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
true of the segment you quoted.
>
>I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If a
>person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
>premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
>moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
>
>Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
>http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
>materialism.
I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
The point is, this argument creates a problem for all those who
believe evil *is* real.
--- Jim07D6
Kate
>
>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>
>
>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>subjective.
That was a rather nonsensical non sequitur.
You can't measure something if you have no where to base the
measurement on. You can't decide if something is bad if you don't
know bad for what.
>
>And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
>does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
>problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
>materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
Of course there is good and bad - but you have to know good for what -
bad for what.
Did you miss what I just said? Or are you purposefully ignoring it?
You cannot make a statement that measures an action as evil that I
can't come up with a reason that makes it good.
>
>Subjectivism turns, like materialism, holds moral statments have no
>truth-values in themself. Rather they are statments about the person's own
>values. For example: George Bush's valuing abortion as immoral and Betty
>Friedan valuing abortion as moral are simply statments about them and their
>personal values.
moral or immoral for what? Without knowing each of their goals, you
have only got a small portion of the story. Without it, nothing has
been determined.
>
>http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/Subjectivism
>
>Moral Subjectivism is also called individual relativism.
>Cultural Relativism is moral intersubjectivism. A society of people share
>the same subjective values...or attempt to.
>
>In materialism there are no universal moral standards independent of
>cultures therefore their is no such thing as human rights or human dignity.
>To say there is only begs the ontology question. And Martin begs for that
>question.
>
>But what I most often observe are atheists making moral realist statments.
>Many say evil does exist as though it were an 'out there' truth-valued
>statment.
You know nothing of atheism if you think what any atheist says about
morals has anything to do with atheism.
Atheism as has been repeated here ad nauseum is simply the lack of
belief in a god or gods. It makes no claims about any other subject.
Even if every atheist ever met says the same thing - it still has
nothing to do with the morality of atheism.
>
>Although I think he could've come up with better examples the guy makes the
>same observation http://radicalacademy.com/ethicsmyth.htm
>
>Since materialism is amoral and secular humanism holds to both human
>rights/dignity and materialism that begs an ontological question: How can
>secular humans hold to these two seemingly contradictory beliefs without
>being oxymoronic - amoralism and moral realism? To materialism neither gods
>or morals are real.
Morality is the means to a goal. That's all. That's all it is to
atheists and theists alike. Theists simply insist that their goal is
created by an imaginary big brother. But since their 'imaginary
brother' is always one that they choose, then obviously the mind that
is creating the goal is their own and the big brother is just there as
muscle.
>
>> Morality must therefore be subjective since it's the work towards
>> goodness and good is subjective.
>>
>> Theism simply defines good as being what the god or gods wants.
>
>No. Theism simply defines good as being god's nature. However, I don't argue
>theism even with other theist. So what would be the point in doing so with
>atheists since we don't begin to share the same axioms on that subject.
So your mind isn't open to other axioms? Pity. I've found that when
people open their minds to real questions that atheism is never far
behind. But it is something you have to come to yourself.
But no - you may define good as being god's nature, but you hardly
speak for all theists. And I find it interesting that anyone would
attempt to make such a claim - for someone to know the true nature of
a god would mean they would have to have supernatural powers - not
exactly a small claim.
And then again, there's the small problem that if a god's command can
only be of his nature, then he has no control over himself and you
have regulated his role as being only the messenger of the real rules
- which is really what you are worshipping - not your god.
>
>
>
> It
>> defines obedience to the god's wishes as good. This doesn't even
>> narrow down the goal, as every single theist's god is different and
>> will change gods on a whim. Most of them even admit that in their
>> dedication to their god they have no clear idea what he wants and
>> attribute that lack of clarity to the god's wishes - so apparently the
>> think they god doesn't want them to have the ability to obey his wishes
>> and therefore, even their god is bad.
>>
>> Talk about subjective.
>
>Scott
>
So tell me Scott - according to your god and his 'nature' - if you had
to decide between every human being dying or all the rest of the life
on the planet earth being snuffed out - which would be the 'moral'
choice? And how do you know this?
Kate
>
>"wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>news:120sj15...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>
>
>> contradiction.
>>
>> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>>
>> The problem of evil was first written down by
>> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>>
>> Today's formulation is:
>> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
>> B. and as omnibenevolent.
>> C. Evil exists.
>
>
>does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might just
>prove the paradox as well.
>
define it and then defend your definition as constant for all theists.
wbarwell
>
> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
> news:120siak...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>
>
> CC, you really (pun) should just read.
>
> You are an example of what I observe. You simply presupose evil does in
> fact exist.
Since god cannot exist, morality must come from
logic and our inate senses of empathy and common sense.
wbarwell
>
> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
> news:120sj15...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>
>
>> contradiction.
>>
>> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>>
>> The problem of evil was first written down by
>> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>>
>> Today's formulation is:
>> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
>> B. and as omnibenevolent.
>> C. Evil exists.
>
>
> does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might just
> prove the paradox as well.
>
>
Let us say, your 9 year old daughter is raped,
tortured and murdered. Is that evil?
Yes. would you say no? Do you have to have a
god to say yes this is evil?
And yourIS THERE A GOD?
Strong Atheism's answer.
contradiction.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
***********
god still demonstratably does not exist.
You are a kook and an idiot.
wbarwell
>
> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
> news:120shi1...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>>
>>>
>>
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>>>
>>
>> Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
>> prove.
>
> Ok, so prove it.
>
>> So morality has nothing to do with god.
>>
>
> never said it did.
>
>> Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
>
>
> So now empathy is an objective moral principle?
Empathy is base for all morality. Non-existant
gods are not.
Les Hellawell
wrote:
It isn't a morality anyway. According to Christian teaching you
can be a virtuous person, and live a perfect life but because but you
do not 'confess' to the Christian god and consider yourself
subsevient to it you are destined to go to something they call 'hell'.
On the other hand you could go through life being thoroughly
nasty, you can steal, kill, lie and cheat but if you confess to this
god 'heaven' is assured
This heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all
it is simply a worship god or else threat nothing more. History
is stained by the activities of Christians, they come here
daily showing their total lack of humanity and tolerance,
lying and denigrating us simply because we do not share their
beliefs. Their actions serve to divide not unite humanity.
They daily show us their inhumanty to man and yet they have
the cheek and temerity to castigate and scorn us for having
the morality they lack.
It is only in recent years as religion starts to decline that a
momentum against priest blessed wars has begun to take off.
We have all seen the sickening images of priests blessing
machinery of war and invoking soldiers to go out and kill in
the name of their god and thundering from the pulpit how god
is on their side
Apart from the recent religious war in the Balkans, Europe has
been at peace for the longest period in its entire history.
It is no coincidence that it coincides with a collapse of
religious observance. There is hope for a peaceful world
free of religion with Europe showing the way out of the
nightmare
I don't hate gods, since I have no reason to believe they
exist but religion, which is a degenerate human activity
has a lot to answer for.
--
Les Hellawell
Greetings from:
YORKSHIRE The White Rose County
Les Hellawell
wrote:
>One more point - to have a god's wishes be the objective of morality,
>must therefore expose you to impossible situations. If a god wishes
>contradictory things, then there is no way to satify him (or her),
>therefore in order for it to be possible for a human to satisfy a god,
>his or her wishes must not be contradictory. This in essense becomes a
>rule that is more powerful than the god. The god must then be required
>not to wish for contradictory things.
Again this morality is one of satifying the gods desires not the
needs of human society upon which morality is based.
Kate
<myshr...@leswell.freeuk.com> wrote:
>On 7 Mar 2006 14:43:04 -0800, "Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com>
>wrote:
>
>>One more point - to have a god's wishes be the objective of morality,
>>must therefore expose you to impossible situations. If a god wishes
>>contradictory things, then there is no way to satify him (or her),
>>therefore in order for it to be possible for a human to satisfy a god,
>>his or her wishes must not be contradictory. This in essense becomes a
>>rule that is more powerful than the god. The god must then be required
>>not to wish for contradictory things.
>
>Again this morality is one of satifying the gods desires not the
>needs of human society upon which morality is based.
Ain't it amazing how every god's supposed desires always ends up being
those which satisfy the desires of the guy leading the group
worshipping him?
chibiabos
Lee <ca...@optonline.net> wrote:
Might be wise for you to go back and actually read what Kate wrote. You
appear to have misunderstood her logic, which argues against gods as
lawgivers.
Also, get that problem with your knee fixed.
-chib
--
Member of S.M.A.S.H.
Sarcastic Middle-aged Atheists with a Sense of Humor
Scott
"Kate " <cob...@newscene.com> wrote in message
news:442666ef....@news-west.newscene.com...
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 21:36:39 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>"wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>news:120sj15...@corp.supernews.com...
>>> Scott wrote:
>>
>>
>>> contradiction.
>>>
>>> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>>>
>>> The problem of evil was first written down by
>>> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>>>
>>> Today's formulation is:
>>> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
>>> B. and as omnibenevolent.
>>> C. Evil exists.
>>
>>
>>does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might just
>>prove the paradox as well.
>>
>
> define it and then defend your definition as constant for all theists.
>
Nah, nah. I didn't make the postive statement. Charlie did. It's up to him
to defined what he means by it and then to prove it.
Scott
Scott
Exactly, Jim. Now a theist will likely refer to an (admittedly irrational)
justification like revelation or gnosiology. That is a conversation stopper
as it can't be tested.
But what rationalism do atheists, like CC here, us to justify their
believing evil *is* real? That's the point of my quoting Copan and his
criticism of Martin. Both CC and Martin presuppose evil without a rational,
ontological justification for doing so.
When ever I press such atheists they fall back onto examples as an 'appeal
to reason', which to my thinking is no different then appeals to revelation.
Using moral examples as an appeal to the existence in real evil is
structurally identical to IDer's using examples from nature as an appeal to
intellegent design.
Scott
Scott
> Scott wrote:
>
>>
>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>> news:120sj15...@corp.supernews.com...
>>> Scott wrote:
>>
>>
>>> contradiction.
>>>
>>> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>>>
>>> The problem of evil was first written down by
>>> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>>>
>>> Today's formulation is:
>>> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
>>> B. and as omnibenevolent.
>>> C. Evil exists.
>>
>>
>> does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might
>> just
>> prove the paradox as well.
>>
>>
>
> Let us say, your 9 year old daughter is raped,
> tortured and murdered. Is that evil?
> Yes. would you say no? Do you have to have a
> god to say yes this is evil?
Yeow!! thank you CC.
I spoke to soon, Jim. You see what I mean by CC here using an appeal to
reason? He hasn't proven anything. His argument isn't conclusive that evil
does exist but he sure believes it does.
He's not alone. All anyone has to do is browse alt.atheism to see that the
vast majority believe (by their actions) that they think evil exists and
that evil is *generated* in organized religions. On any given day you see
most atheist posters fighting their demons living in the religious news
groups.
Scott
Scott
In Christian theology the only command I can think of is the *prescribed*
Golden Rule.
As far as God, good and evil goes. In Christian moral theology God *is* good
where goodness is apart of His nature. God doesn't create himself. Evil
isn't a negative but an absences of good.
I'm not saying that's rational. I'm only saying that's how theolgians define
it.
Scott
Scott
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 16:45:52 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>>
>>
>>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>>subjective.
>
> That was a rather nonsensical non sequitur.
>
> You can't measure something if you have no where to base the
> measurement on. You can't decide if something is bad if you don't
> know bad for what.
The question is: Is the 'what' rational or arbitrary?
If you attempt to justify good based upon a factual measurment you'll incure
a genetic fallacy.
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.skeptic/msg/1b7cd4b426876db3?output=gplain
an objective mearsument (E=mc^2) is rational.
'Good' is not rationally measurable
Moral codes evolve within cultures. But cross-culturally moral codes are
diverse so moral and immoral can be defined and then measured contradictorly
to another culture's moral code.
>
>>
>>And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>>measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
>>does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
>>problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
>>materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
>
> Of course there is good and bad - but you have to know good for what -
> bad for what.
>
> Did you miss what I just said? Or are you purposefully ignoring it?
>
Nope.
> You cannot make a statement that measures an action as evil that I
> can't come up with a reason that makes it good.
>
>>
>>Subjectivism turns, like materialism, holds moral statments have no
>>truth-values in themself. Rather they are statments about the person's own
>>values. For example: George Bush's valuing abortion as immoral and Betty
>>Friedan valuing abortion as moral are simply statments about them and
>>their
>>personal values.
>
> moral or immoral for what? Without knowing each of their goals, you
> have only got a small portion of the story. Without it, nothing has
> been determined.
Why does their subjective moral values need a goal?
Subjectivism equate ethics to etiquette and tastes preferences.
Do I need a goal when deciding the proper placement of tableware?
Do I need a goal if I prefer chocolate to vanilla?
No to both.
>
>>
>>http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/Subjectivism
>>
>>Moral Subjectivism is also called individual relativism.
>>Cultural Relativism is moral intersubjectivism. A society of people share
>>the same subjective values...or attempt to.
>>
>>In materialism there are no universal moral standards independent of
>>cultures therefore their is no such thing as human rights or human
>>dignity.
>>To say there is only begs the ontology question. And Martin begs for that
>>question.
>>
>>But what I most often observe are atheists making moral realist statments.
>>Many say evil does exist as though it were an 'out there' truth-valued
>>statment.
>
> You know nothing of atheism if you think what any atheist says about
> morals has anything to do with atheism.
>
> Atheism as has been repeated here ad nauseum is simply the lack of
> belief in a god or gods. It makes no claims about any other subject.
Yes I know hince the use materialism....but most atheists are materialist
because of their materialism
I have no interest in discussing either your or my personnal values.
Atheists are constantly trying to get me to go there and imagine that I have
gone there.
I assure I don't and will not.
Scott
Scott
"Les Hellawell" <myshr...@leswell.freeuk.com> wrote in message
news:evat02h8ts3mof1g1...@4ax.com...
> On 7 Mar 2006 13:49:19 -0800, "Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com>
> wrote:
>
>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>>subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>>first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>
>>Morality must therefore be subjective since it's the work towards
>>goodness and good is subjective.
>>
>>Theism simply defines good as being what the god or gods wants. It
>>defines obedience to the god's wishes as good. This doesn't even
>>narrow down the goal, as every single theist's god is different and
>>will change gods on a whim. Most of them even admit that in their
>>dedication to their god they have no clear idea what he wants and
>>attribute that lack of clarity to the god's wishes - so apparently the
>>think they god doesn't want them to have the ability to obey his wishes
>>and therefore, even their god is bad.
>>
>>Talk about subjective.
>
> It isn't a morality anyway.
What do you mean by morality?
Everyone has their subjective moral values. That they differ doesn't mean
one is more correct than another. In relativism all moral points of view are
equivalent.
According to Christian teaching you
> can be a virtuous person, and live a perfect life but because but you
> do not 'confess' to the Christian god and consider yourself
> subsevient to it you are destined to go to something they call 'hell'.
>
> On the other hand you could go through life being thoroughly
> nasty, you can steal, kill, lie and cheat but if you confess to this
> god 'heaven' is assured
Not in Catholicism.
>
> This heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all
> it is simply a worship god or else threat nothing more.
to relativism it *is* morality.
History
> is stained by the activities of Christians, they come here
> daily showing their total lack of humanity and tolerance,
You see, Jim? So now humanity is a factual moral quality and tolerance is an
objective moral principle.
Les is not as overt as CC but he is, by his argumentive actions, a moral
realist.
> lying and denigrating us simply because we do not share their
> beliefs. Their actions serve to divide not unite humanity.
> They daily show us their inhumanty to man and yet they have
> the cheek and temerity to castigate and scorn us for having
> the morality they lack.
What is your jutified ontology for this statment?
>
> It is only in recent years as religion starts to decline that a
> momentum against priest blessed wars has begun to take off.
> We have all seen the sickening images of priests blessing
> machinery of war and invoking soldiers to go out and kill in
> the name of their god and thundering from the pulpit how god
> is on their side
>
> Apart from the recent religious war in the Balkans, Europe has
> been at peace for the longest period in its entire history.
> It is no coincidence that it coincides with a collapse of
> religious observance. There is hope for a peaceful world
> free of religion with Europe showing the way out of the
> nightmare
<moral realist statment>
>
> I don't hate gods, since I have no reason to believe they
> exist but religion, which is a degenerate human activity
> has a lot to answer for.
does "a degenerate human activity' have a factual moral quality?
Scott
I never said that rebutting materialis did rebut ED. The ED problem is only
valid if one assumes moral realism. The ED vanishes in materialism since
both gods and morals aren't real in this metaphysic.
>>
>>If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
>>nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
>>moral
>>realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
>>morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
>>
>>I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
>>(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
>>real?
>
> The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
> problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
> this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
> God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
> something. What is His basis?
This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
theolgoy.
I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
realism the ED is based upon.
>>
>>> To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
>>> the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
>>> dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
>>> pious because it is loved by the gods?"
>>
>>No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely
>>in
>>metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply
>>presupposes
>>the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective
>>purpose
>>(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
>>accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making
>>properties,"
>>he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which
>>snails
>>and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis
>>can
>>human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
>>worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
>>personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
>>see." - P Copan
>
> That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
> true of the segment you quoted.
I simply quoted the whole thing. It's the part of his argument on
materialism that relates to my question:
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? I don't see how they honestly
can be. But I do see so-called self-procalimed materialist make moral
realist statment all the time. At least CC and Les just in my reviewing
their post so far.
>>
>>I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If
>>a
>>person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
>>premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
>>moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
>>
>>Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
>>http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
>>materialism.
>
> I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
> defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
> accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
> buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
> neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
there is only one reality. The metaphysical problem is whether it is
monistic, dualistic, other. We can't prove our meta. I'm not defending or
condemning materialism. But I do base my moral epistemic argument on
materialism and then point out that I observe materialists making statements
that are implicitly moral realistic in nature. Moral realism is not
compatible with materialism. I and Copan cannot see how it could be
compatible. Materialists/atheists simply presuppose, as Martin does, there
moral realism without a *rational* justification for their knowledge. My
pointing out the incompatibility doesn't encumber me to present an
alternative argument for moral realism.
Scott
Scott
> Scott wrote:
>
>>
>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>> news:120shi1...@corp.supernews.com...
>>> Scott wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>
> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>>>>
>>>
>>> Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
>>> prove.
>>
>> Ok, so prove it.
>>
>>> So morality has nothing to do with god.
>>>
>>
>> never said it did.
>>
>>> Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
>>
>>
>> So now empathy is an objective moral principle?
>
>
> Empathy is base for all morality. Non-existant
> gods are not.
That might explain morality but that in no why justifies any morality as
being the correct one.
If I lived in Africa or Serbia having empathy for my family could be used
justification for my doing genocide to the rival neighbors.
<snip the same ol same ol>
Are you on something?
Jim07D6
You seem to be saying the Euthyphro Dilemma poses a real problem for
theistic moral realism. If so, I previously misconstrued your
position.
>
>
>
>>>
>>>If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
>>>nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
>>>moral
>>>realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
>>>morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
>>>
>>>I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
>>>(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
>>>real?
>>
>> The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
>> problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
>> this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
>> God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
>> something. What is His basis?
>
>This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
>theolgoy.
>
>I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
>should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
>realism the ED is based upon.
>
I have the same attitude toward materialism that you have toward
debating theology. ;-) BTW I assume that you encompass physicalism
under this category, classical materialism is untenable even in
science, as it leaves out fields.
When you say "atheist/materialist" are you saying "an atheist who is
also a materialist?" or are you saying "a person who is either an
atheist, a materialist, or both"? It is this term that got me
interested.
>
>
>
>>>
>>>I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If
>>>a
>>>person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
>>>premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
>>>moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
>>>
>>>Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
>>>http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
>>>materialism.
>>
>> I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
>> defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
>> accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
>> buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
>> neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
>
>there is only one reality. The metaphysical problem is whether it is
>monistic, dualistic, other. We can't prove our meta. I'm not defending or
>condemning materialism. But I do base my moral epistemic argument on
>materialism and then point out that I observe materialists making statements
>that are implicitly moral realistic in nature. Moral realism is not
>compatible with materialism. I and Copan cannot see how it could be
>compatible. Materialists/atheists simply presuppose, as Martin does, there
>moral realism without a *rational* justification for their knowledge. My
>pointing out the incompatibility doesn't encumber me to present an
>alternative argument for moral realism.
Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
actually falling under this category. Many supposed moral realists
might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
I guess I have to see the position that is taken, to see what might
rebut it. There appear to be some varieties of moral realism, as at:
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthChew.htm
I am especially wondering whether a materialist can hold moral realism
as supervenient, or must he be a reductionist about it?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#6
"So long as our characterization of natural properties is broad enough
to include both all of the mental properties and all of the properties
that would figure in the best physical theory, it is very plausible to
suppose that the moral supervenes on the natural in the following
sense: there can be no moral difference between two situations or
entire possible worlds without some natural difference but not
vice-versa (there can be non-moral differences without moral
differences)."
--- Jim07D6
Scott
Of course it's are real problem for it. It *is* a theolgical problem for
theists.
But the Euthrphro Dilemma is not something I'm interested in. It was only a
side comment in relation to it's lack of validity assuming materialism. You
keyed in on the side comment as being the major point I'm making.
You're a smart guy, Jim. Think about. If materialism is true then gods and
morals are not real. They don't exist indpendently of human subjectivism -
of an inventive mind. Within the ED morals are assumed to be...real...,
independent of human subjectivism. For a person to use the ED as a valid
argument he, in that moment, must be assuming materialism is false. That is
an epistemic observation.
ED = morals are real
materialism = moral are not real.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>>If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of
>>>>this
>>>>nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
>>>>moral
>>>>realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
>>>>morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
>>>>
>>>>I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil
>>>>exists
>>>>(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
>>>>real?
>>>
>>> The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
>>> problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
>>> this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
>>> God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
>>> something. What is His basis?
>>
>>This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
>>theolgoy.
>>
>>I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
>>should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
>>realism the ED is based upon.
>>
> I have the same attitude toward materialism that you have toward
> debating theology. ;-) BTW I assume that you encompass physicalism
> under this category, classical materialism is untenable even in
> science, as it leaves out fields.
Correct. In this argument materialsim = physicalism = naturalism since the
focus is on moral theory.
The first. Even though it isn't necessarily so for the sake of economy I'm
equating the two.
A person can be an atheist and not a materialist. So an atheist can reject
materialism and not moral realism.
But a materialist is necessarily an atheist and a moral anti-realist; That
is to say, a materialist is necessarily a moral relativist. There are no
moral facts in materialism.
Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
Many supposed moral realists
> might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
BTW While it's on my mind. If this thread keeps going into the weekend I'll
be gone for spring break. I don't even what to see a computer next week.
Scott
Scott
In the normative sense you could say morals and gods are real. Cultures
invent their gods and their moral codes. Both of which are the factual
mythology of that culture. But that doesn't tell us that morals are
*factually* real in themselves. Evil is not a fact in Nature.
Notice: <quote> "Besides traditional theistic-based approaches, there have
been attempts which seek to establish some objective foundation (usually in
practical reason or human interest) that is independent of, but which can be
used to generate, or involve, an ethical outlook." will lead to a genetic
fallacy. It makes no difference whether that genises is founded upon a god
or a materialistic evolution. Mateialism is amoral.
>
> I am especially wondering whether a materialist can hold moral realism
> as supervenient, or must he be a reductionist about it?
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#6
>
> "So long as our characterization of natural properties is broad enough
> to include both all of the mental properties and all of the properties
> that would figure in the best physical theory, it is very plausible to
> suppose that the moral supervenes on the natural in the following
> sense: there can be no moral difference between two situations or
> entire possible worlds without some natural difference but not
> vice-versa (there can be non-moral differences without moral
> differences)."
By mental properties I assume the quote means Mind. Is there one and if so
does if have the capacity of knowledge in recognizing these moral supervene.
Let's suppose morals do supervene in nature, what is the ontology for kowing
so when there is, seemingly, no scientific way to rationalize that knowing?
A Christian might say revalation as being in gods image but that isn't
logical. What logic is available to the materialist not available to the
theist? I can't see any.
Scott
Jim07D6
>
>"wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>news:120svsg...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>> news:120shi1...@corp.supernews.com...
>>>> Scott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
>>>> prove.
>>>
>>> Ok, so prove it.
>>>
>>>> So morality has nothing to do with god.
>>>>
>>>
>>> never said it did.
>>>
>>>> Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
>>>
>>>
>>> So now empathy is an objective moral principle?
>>
>>
>> Empathy is base for all morality. Non-existant
>> gods are not.
>
>That might explain morality but that in no why justifies any morality as
>being the correct one.
Does this imply that if moral statements state objective facts, there
is one correct "morality"?
If we grant for the sake of argument that there are objective moral
facts, doesn't it remain to be discussed, whether there is one correct
morality? Or, perhaps, the one "correct morality" might be a massive
collection of rule books -- one rule book for each person. Some rules
might be the same for every person, and so, be the same in every book,
and some rules might apply to only one person, and be the opposite for
others. And yet, this would no more make them non-objective than would
be, a set of books each describing a that person's eye color, gender,
nationality, the language spoken, jobs held, etc.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
<...>
<...>
>>
>> Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
>> bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
>> set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
>> realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
>> actually falling under this category.
>
>Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
There are a lot of moral realists out there. I think most people who
regard themselves as moral realists are traditional theists, ergo they
are not materialists.
>
>Many supposed moral realists
>> might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
>
>You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
>heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
>emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
You are right. I find theories of moral development to be useful here.
Kohlberg classifies the carrot and stick level as "pre-convenional" in
the sense that there is no emphasis on moral rules as conventions
(socially agreed/approved) but only on what's in it for the agent.
http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/kohlberg.html
>
>
>BTW While it's on my mind. If this thread keeps going into the weekend I'll
>be gone for spring break. I don't even what to see a computer next week.
I think my involvement in this thread is wrapping up, too.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
>
>"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
<...>
>> I am especially wondering whether a materialist can hold moral realism
>> as supervenient, or must he be a reductionist about it?
>>
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#6
>>
>> "So long as our characterization of natural properties is broad enough
>> to include both all of the mental properties and all of the properties
>> that would figure in the best physical theory, it is very plausible to
>> suppose that the moral supervenes on the natural in the following
>> sense: there can be no moral difference between two situations or
>> entire possible worlds without some natural difference but not
>> vice-versa (there can be non-moral differences without moral
>> differences)."
>
>By mental properties I assume the quote means Mind. Is there one and if so
>does if have the capacity of knowledge in recognizing these moral supervene.
>Let's suppose morals do supervene in nature, what is the ontology for kowing
>so when there is, seemingly, no scientific way to rationalize that knowing?
>A Christian might say revalation as being in gods image but that isn't
>logical. What logic is available to the materialist not available to the
>theist? I can't see any.
There seem to be two ontological issues: what *is* the non-theistic
methodology for ascertaining whether or not there are moral facts, and
what is the non-theistic methodology for ascertaining what these moral
facts are? If there is no such methodology, the claim that there are
such facts is at the least, suspect, and at the most, meaningless.
--- Jim07D6
Scott
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>
> <...>
> <...>
>>>
>>> Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
>>> bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
>>> set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
>>> realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
>>> actually falling under this category.
>>
>>Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
>
> There are a lot of moral realists out there. I think most people who
> regard themselves as moral realists are traditional theists, ergo they
> are not materialists.
Let me re-word that: If the vast majority of self-proclaimed materialists
hold a moral realist ideolgy either implicitly or explicitly there are in
fact (epistemiologically) few true materialists.
>>
>>Many supposed moral realists
>>> might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
>>
>>You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
>>heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
>>emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
>
> You are right. I find theories of moral development to be useful here.
> Kohlberg classifies the carrot and stick level as "pre-convenional" in
> the sense that there is no emphasis on moral rules as conventions
> (socially agreed/approved) but only on what's in it for the agent.
>
> http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/kohlberg.html
<hmm. first Baylor now Notre Dame>
To materialism there is no *arrow* of progression in either evolution or
moral progressive *reasoning*. If one assumes metaphysical materialism it
follows that such a person should also assume moral relativism. The notion
of moral progress does not make sense to moral relativism.
If assuming materialism/naturalism, it seems to me that Kohlberg is
confusing moral complexification with moral progress. It's similar to
creationist confusing biological complexification to an intelligently
designed evolution. Naturalism holds that all of nature (including humans)
has no moral purpose.
scott
Scott
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>
>>
>>"wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>news:120svsg...@corp.supernews.com...
>>> Scott wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>>> news:120shi1...@corp.supernews.com...
>>>>> Scott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Its simple really, god does not exist. That is almost trivial to
>>>>> prove.
>>>>
>>>> Ok, so prove it.
>>>>
>>>>> So morality has nothing to do with god.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> never said it did.
>>>>
>>>>> Morality is based on common sense and empathy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So now empathy is an objective moral principle?
>>>
>>>
>>> Empathy is base for all morality. Non-existant
>>> gods are not.
>>
>>That might explain morality but that in no why justifies any morality as
>>being the correct one.
>
> Does this imply that if moral statements state objective facts, there
> is one correct "morality"?
No. Not anymore that if a person makes objective statments about God does
that imply is a one true god. However, it does mean the person believes
there is at least one objective moral fact that everyone should adhere to.
In this case it was empathy. Usually the term most often used is tolerance.
But relativism has nothing to do with tolerence.
<quote>
http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/Subjectivism
R. Eric Barnes offers the following hypothesis to account for moral
relativism being so widespread in societies today:
Moral relativism is a commonly held belief - mostly by people who do not
fully understand the theory. [...] I present a hypothesis as to the cause of
many people's belief in moral relativism. It is a fairly common goal in
education today to teach young people to be accepting of other people and
cultures that are different from their own, and this is an exceedingly
admirable goal. To achieve this one must prevent naive youths from making
hasty moral judgments (including simple moral judgments concerning manners
and everyday customs) about other cultures. It is easy to prevent young
people from being judgmental in this way by teaching them that they cannot
make (i.e., are not allow to make or are not justified in making) moral
judgments about other cultures. This blanket prohibition on cross-cultural
judgment has the positive effect of making people more tolerant of other
cultures, but it has the unfortunate negative effect of indoctrinating
people with an incorrect conception of morality. (Though it would be harder
to teach, it would be best to teach people that although there are objective
moral facts, that we should still be very accepting of other cultures, since
truly bad cultures are rare.) [...]
Individual relativism may come from a similar source. People have a desire
to get along with others, and real disagreements about serious moral issues
can really keep people from getting along. However, if two people are moral
relativists, then it does not matter what each of them believes morally,
because it is impossible for them to really disagree. Each of them can say,
"Well, that's your opinion, but it's not my opinion - and we are both
entitled to our moral opinions." The subtext here is that two people are
refusing to behave as though they have a moral disagreement - even though
they really do disagree. (Barnes, p. 148 - 149)
<end quote>
>
> If we grant for the sake of argument that there are objective moral
> facts, doesn't it remain to be discussed, whether there is one correct
> morality? Or, perhaps, the one "correct morality" might be a massive
> collection of rule books -- one rule book for each person. Some rules
> might be the same for every person, and so, be the same in every book,
> and some rules might apply to only one person, and be the opposite for
> others. And yet, this would no more make them non-objective than would
> be, a set of books each describing a that person's eye color, gender,
> nationality, the language spoken, jobs held, etc.
If I write books about god (the koran or bible) does that, in itself, make
god objective - real in this sense? Same for morals. If we grant for the
sake of agument that there are objective moral facts then it follows that
those facts may be discoverable. The goal of ethics then becomes the
discovery of those objective morals.
Scott
Scott
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
snip
>>
>>By mental properties I assume the quote means Mind. Is there one and if so
>>does if have the capacity of knowledge in recognizing these moral
>>supervene.
>>Let's suppose morals do supervene in nature, what is the ontology for
>>kowing
>>so when there is, seemingly, no scientific way to rationalize that
>>knowing?
>>A Christian might say revalation as being in gods image but that isn't
>>logical. What logic is available to the materialist not available to the
>>theist? I can't see any.
>
> There seem to be two ontological issues: what *is* the non-theistic
> methodology for ascertaining whether or not there are moral facts, and
> what is the non-theistic methodology for ascertaining what these moral
> facts are? If there is no such methodology, the claim that there are
> such facts is at the least, suspect, and at the most, meaningless.
Correct. But that in no what leave theism of the hock...if that's what
you're leading to. That's a theological issue I don't even begin to engage
in. And I don't need to. Pointing out the inconsistency of materialists'
implicit/explicit moral realistic statements to materialism/naturalism does
not engender me to present a theistic argument for objective morality. I'm
not defending or being critical of moral relativism or moral objectivism.
If there is no rational methodology, what then do rational materialists base
there truth-valued moral statements on? All I've ever seen are
presuppositions. It's as if I'm suppose to take their statment as though it
were the *gospel* truth, so to speak.If I press them they might give me an
argument like the ones wbarwell (aka Chearful Charlie) has given. Those are
nothing more than appeals to reason without a rational justification.
Scott
Scott
Jim07D6
>
>"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
>news:ho8u029hullls2fhh...@4ax.com...
>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>>
>> <...>
>> <...>
>>>>
>>>> Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
>>>> bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
>>>> set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
>>>> realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
>>>> actually falling under this category.
>>>
>>>Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
>>
>> There are a lot of moral realists out there. I think most people who
>> regard themselves as moral realists are traditional theists, ergo they
>> are not materialists.
>
>Let me re-word that: If the vast majority of self-proclaimed materialists
>hold a moral realist ideolgy either implicitly or explicitly there are in
>fact (epistemiologically) few true materialists.
I would like to see an argument to the contrary, but as a default
position, that seems reasonable.
>
>
>>>
>>>Many supposed moral realists
>>>> might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
>>>
>>>You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
>>>heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
>>>emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
>>
>> You are right. I find theories of moral development to be useful here.
>> Kohlberg classifies the carrot and stick level as "pre-convenional" in
>> the sense that there is no emphasis on moral rules as conventions
>> (socially agreed/approved) but only on what's in it for the agent.
>>
>> http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/kohlberg.html
>
><hmm. first Baylor now Notre Dame>
>
>To materialism there is no *arrow* of progression in either evolution or
>moral progressive *reasoning*. If one assumes metaphysical materialism it
>follows that such a person should also assume moral relativism. The notion
>of moral progress does not make sense to moral relativism.
>
>If assuming materialism/naturalism, it seems to me that Kohlberg is
>confusing moral complexification with moral progress.
He might hold to progressivism in this regard, as a philosophical
commitment, but his research on moral development attempts to be
descriptive in nature.
>It's similar to
>creationist confusing biological complexification to an intelligently
>designed evolution. Naturalism holds that all of nature (including humans)
>has no moral purpose.
Naturalism is not alone here, IMO. I personally do not see a way to
conclude that the universe (all that exists, in toto) has moral
purpose, on the basis of naturalism or any alternative to it. I
suppose it can be stated as an axiom, that the universe has moral
purpose, but it is, and has to be, an irreducible one.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
I'm not seeing empathy being a candidate for a moral fact.
True, but my point is that, for example, the exact age of each human
is an objective fact, but ages differ from person to person. Other
objective facts describe groups of people, some describe all people.So
it could be with moral objective facts. You might in theory discover a
different moral fact about me, than about another person. "Objective
morals" is a bit of an equivocation if it means "moral absolute"
instead of "moral fact".
--- Jim07D6
Llanzlan Klazmon
news:1ZSdneDL_YBTzpPZ...@wcc.net:
>
> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
> news:120siak...@corp.supernews.com...
>> Scott wrote:
>
>
> CC, you really (pun) should just read.
>
> You are an example of what I observe. You simply presupose evil does in
> fact exist.
Case 1. Evil exists ---> no omni everything gods.
Case 2. Evil doesn't exist ----> most religions are false.
Take your pick.
Klazmon.
<SNIP>
wbarwell
First of all, if gods as basic concepts are doubtful,
morality cannot have anything to do with gods.
many people are onbviously highly moral people,
religion seems unable to explain that.
And, if the god of the bible existed, and it does
not, that god created all and is omniscient
(can't have prophecy without omniscience).
But if god is omniscient and creates all as I have shown,
free will cannot exist even in principle.
This shoots down all theist moral arguments right there.
Heads I win, tails I win.
Scott cannot think at all apparently.
--
An Inuit hunter asked the local missionary priest: "If I did not know about
God and sin, would I go to hell?" "No," said the priest, "not if you did
not know." "Then why," asked the Inuit earnestly, "did you tell me?"
-Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek
Cheerful Charlie
wbarwell
>
> What do you mean by morality?
>
You tell us first since you started this argument.
If morality cannt be proven to exiost, why bother with you?
If you can't define it, you aren't worth dealing with?
Morality exists. People are moral.
You seem to think only religious peole can claim
to be moral.
I showed you god canbnot exist, so the morality you
seem to think exists exists with a god to support it.
And if there is a christian god, creator of all,
and omniscient (which is necessary for prophecy)
free will cannot exist as I have proven, not even
in principle.
All evil is thus god's faults.
Even if we had free will, and we cannot if god
is omniscient and creator of all, he is said
to have a good nature incapable of evil and yet
have free will.
If he can have free will land do no moral evil, we too
can be given exactly the same god-like free will and
good-like good nature. If he can do this and will not,
he is evil.
In either case, creator god vs omniscient destroys
free will, or god-like good nature and god-like free will,
if there is evil, it is strictly and only god's doing.
And again as I have strongly proven, god is a rather unlikely
being, there is no evidence for god, and the claims made for
god create impossible contradictions.
even if I allow god for sake of argument, you cannot
have free will. If for sake of argument I allow free
will, evil should not exist if god is good.
So morality obviously can have nothing to do with
god in any way.
*****************************************************
OMNISCIENCE VERSUS CREATORHOOD OF GOD
God is defined as creator of all in most religions.
And god is claimed to be omniscient, all knowing.
A. God created the Universe and all in it.
B. God is omniscient, all knowing, he knows all in
the Universe and he knows the future of the Universe
and its contents.
C. If god creates a Universe, he will know that in 13 billion
years this Universe will have a man named John Smith in it.
D. If John Smith is good and saved, or evil and damned, God
will know that.
E. As he knows that the Universe in its present state will
have a John Smith, god may then contemplate the future state
of Smith and decide if he will tolerate an evil Smith.
F. If yes, Smith will be evil only because of a specific
personal and will choice made solely by god.
G. If Smith is evil, then evil exists solely because of a choice
made by god. In fact all moral evil done by creations of god
will be evil and do evil only because of personal and willful
creations of god allowing evil acts to be done, by direct
decision of god.
H. If evil exists in a world with an omniscient creator god,
it is solely and only because god allows evil.
I. If evil exists solely because of personal choices of god,
god then is not as defined, omnibenevolent.
J. Man and any other sentient being in such a Universe cannot
have any free will, not even in principle. A Universe with
a god that creates all and knows all precludes free will for
all beings god creates in the strongest possible manner.
***********************************************************
Milan
"Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:2JEPf.45609$H71....@newssvr13.news.prodigy.com...
[snip]
>
> A person can be an atheist and not a materialist. So an atheist can reject
> materialism and not moral realism.
>
> But a materialist is necessarily an atheist and a moral anti-realist; That
> is to say, a materialist is necessarily a moral relativist. There are no
> moral facts in materialism.
>
Yes. Most materialists are moral relativists. However, it could be argued
that it is not unlikely that some of our moral drive might be genetic. If we
are driven by our genetic makeup towards displaying certain types of moral
behaviour then this "genetic morality" would be as objective as it could
possibly be.
regards
Milan
wbarwell
>
> "Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
> news:o99s02p0guib89ncv...@4ax.com...
>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>>
>>>
>>>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>>>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>>>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>>>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>>>
>>>
>>>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>>>subjective.
>>>
>>>And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>>>measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals.
>>>Evil does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for
>>>Epicurus' problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil
>>>exists) and materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid
>>>argument.
>>
>> That is true only in the sense of "assume" that is used in Reductio
>> arguments -- in which argument the original assumption is thereby
>> proved incorrect. The Euthyphro dilemma turns of the point that either
>> morality is superior to God, such that a thing is not good only
>> because God says so, or morality is "the whim of God" and so is not
>> good in itself. So, which is it?
>> <...>
>> --- Jim07D6
>
> that might be a false dichotomy.
There are several falsities to consider.
1. God is porvably non-existant.
Morality has mnothing then to do with god.
2. If god exists, god is omniscient and creator of all.
This makes free will for man impossible. All
is decided by god. Morality cannot exist.
3. If man has free will, god is by duty bound to
give man a godlike free will and a godlike
good nature incapable of moral evil.
God then that is omnipotent and morally good cannot exist.
No matter how you slice it or dice it, god and morality obviously have
nothing to do with each other.
GOD, MAN AND FREE WILL.
1. For sake of argument, let us say man has free will.
God also has free will, this of course is a basic
claim for god, what could limit god's free will?
If free will exists at all it must exist for god
in the strongest sense, and for one, St. Thomas
Aquinas makes that explicit in his Summa Theologica.
1A. "Summa Theologica, The One God, Does God have free will?"
"Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but
other things not necessarily, as shown above (3), He
has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily
will."
2. God also has a good nature, incapable of doing evil.
Yet the fact god is said to be incapable of doing
moral evil because of his good nature, theology does
not allow that god lacks free will. This and similar
sorts of arguments limiting god's free will (God cannot
sin, therefore lacks a totally free will) have uniformly
been denied by theology.
3. So if god can have a good nature incapable of doing
moral evil and if god still has free will, man likewise
can also have a god like free will and a godlike good
nature incapable of moral evil.
4. Since Augustine, many theologians have claimed that
man has free will amd that god allows man to do evil
to perserve that free will. But we see this must be
false. Man can have free will and a good nature incapable
of doing moral evil exactly as god has free will and a good
nature, the free will defense of Augustine is simply false.
5. Since man can indeed have a godlike free will and a god like
good nature incapable of evil, we must then confront the problem
that moral evil does exist.
6. If god is morally good, he must then give man a godlike free will
and a god like good nature, if he does not, god is then directly
responsible for all moral evil that exists and god is then morally
evil, not morally good, a contradition in basic claims, god is
morally good.
7. Or one must contradict claims god made all, or claims god is
omnipotent. The idea that claims god created man can be
abandoned are impossible on several grounds, mainly that
this is not what the Bible or Quran or other sacred books
plainly state. And leave the question of where man came from open
and unsolved.
8. That leaves omnipotence, but there is no reason to think god
creates man and yet cannot give man a god like good nature.
CONCLUSIONS
OMNIPOTENCE AND A GOOD NATURE AND FREE WILL
1. A godlike good nature incapable of moral evil as we see cannot
contradict free will by theology's rules.
2. There is no inherent reason that is contradictory to common sense
or reason, or logic in the sense of an married batchelor or a
square circle.
3. Nor is the concept impossible in the sense of something undesirable
from god's point of view, being good, he would want his creations
also to be good and would attempt to make them good if he could.
4. Omnipotence puts this ability to create man with free will
and a good nature well within god's abilities, there is no
logical or rationaly reason to deny man can have free will and
a good nature.
FREE WILL IS NOT VALUED BY GOD
1. The argument free will is valuable to god and accounts for man's
moral evil is false and cannot stand.
2. The Bible also shows us in Romans and elsewhere we do not
have free will, hardening of hearts so as to manipulate men
as seen in Exodus and Joshua also debunk the claim god strongly
favors free will.
2A.God hardens men's hearts. Exodus 4, 71-12, Joshua 11:20, Deuteronomy
2:30)
2B. Predestination, John 12:37-41, Romans 8:29-30, Romans 9:13-38
Romans 11:5-10 2 Corinthians 4:3-4 Ephesians 1:1 - Ephesians 1:23
Ephesians 2:8-9
A GOD THAT HAS FREE WILL AND A GOOD NATURE CANNOT EXIST
The existance of moral evil then shows us even if we accept
that man has free will, this does not explain away evil, but
compounds the problems.
1. God has free will
2. God has a good nature
3. Because God is supremely good, god should by the duty
imposed on him by his supreme goodness have given man a
godlike free will and a godlike good nature.
4. Thus a god that has free will land is supremely good
cannot exist.
-------
wbarwell
Evil, like everything is defined.
Evil. like everything defined has different definitions.
Many people would define mass murder as evil. unless you are a religious
sunuvabicth defining pogroms and religious wars as necessary works of the
Lord.
Part of modern definitions of evil in modern, progressive societies
is based on looking back at history and see what works and what does
not as far as definitions of evil, and morality.
If some sunuvabitch looks that the mass murders of Hitler and dares tell us
we are not allowed to call that evil for some pissy, stupid bent brained
religious of head-in-the-asshole species of philosophy, everybody
else, secularist or religious is going to call that freak a freak.
We don't need a god or some ivory tower, wool gathering
philosopher here.
Or a usenet kook.
Ed. Stoebenau
wrote:
<snip Scott's plagiarism; followups reset>
You know, Copan should look up some work on Hume and the
naturalistic fallacy, on being unable to derive ought from is.
(And the name of the fallacy, BTW, has nothing to do with
naturalism vs. supernaturalism.) It appears that at least a good
portion of his argument is demanding the atheist to derive ought
from is, and claiming the failure is as significant as that if
someone were to demand giving an exact number for pi as a
fraction and drawing some big conclusion from that. (As you did
not post an original article, I see no reason why we should have
to read it.) Copan should have just enumerated some of the
objective meta-ethical theories, such as deontological ethics,
consequentialism, and virtue ethics, and then shown how each of
these were incompatible with atheism. Yet this was not done,
even though incompatibility arguments are not that difficult
(assuming that which to be proven incompatible really are!).
Perhaps you can do that.
--
Ed. Stoebenau
a #143
Chris H. Fleming
> "raven1" <quotht...@nevermore.com> wrote in message
> news:mptr021cscjmqagn2...@4ax.com...> >>Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially
> >>perfect
> >>nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
> >>leveled against divine commands
> >
> > Starting off with a Special Pleading fallacy is not a promising
> > beginning.
>
> not interested in his theology. But philosophically he says what I say.
> Assuming materialism is the correct description of reality there is no room
> for moral realism.
You need to prove that. The author never did. So his entire essay was
actually pointless.
> His observation of martin ignoring his ontology is a
> valid criticism.
No it isn't. Martin never gives an ontology more fundamental than
"hurting people is wrong". The author of this paper wants a more
fundamental ontology (which is understandable, we all want more
fundamental understanding of things), but his alternative is actually
much worse. The author's ontology is that human life has worth because
humans are made in the image of god. But the author never explains why
god has value, he takes it as an axiom. So the author merely shifts his
explaination onto his premise.
The author has no good argument and he is pathetically incompetent at
basic logic.
> So you might read on...
Unfortunately I did. And I want my 15 minutes back.
Richo
Scott wrote:
> "Kate " <cob...@newscene.com> wrote in message
> news:4425610a....@news-west.newscene.com...
> > On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 16:45:52 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
> >>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
> >>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
> >>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
> >>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
> >>>
> >>
> >>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
> >>subjective.
> >
> > That was a rather nonsensical non sequitur.
> >
> > You can't measure something if you have no where to base the
> > measurement on. You can't decide if something is bad if you don't
> > know bad for what.
>
>
> The question is: Is the 'what' rational or arbitrary?
>
Why are they the only two choices?
I am quite certain morality is not derived (directly) by reason from
facts and I am equally certain they are non arbitary.
Morality rests on compasion and empathy which are non rational aspects
of human nature.
Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
Morality *requires* an entity making choices - if you are mechanically
following the dictates of a rule book, or a king, or a god you are not
being moral.
Morality is situational and relative and inter-subjective.
Mark.
Chris H. Fleming
> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>
> <quote>
> In a cartoon-strip of Calvin and Hobbes, the mischievous imp Calvin is
> listening to the tune, "Santa Claus Is Coming to Town":
> He sees you when you're sleeping.
> He knows when you're awake.
> He knows if you've been bad or good;
> So be good, for goodness' sake!
> Reflecting deeply on this theme of Santa, Calvin reports his musings to
> Hobbes, his striped sidekick and co-conspirator. "This Santa Claus stuff
> bothers me . . . especially the judge and jury bit," Calvin mutters. He
> wonders why Santa carries such moral authority: "Who appointed Santa? How do
> we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for determining bad or
> good? And what about extenuating circumstances? Kids should have the benefit
> of legal counsel, don't you think?"
> In the spirit of this particular brand of "Calvinism," the atheist
> philosopher Michael Martin is also bothered?by this "God stuff." In his
> essay "Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape," he finds the theistic belief
> that God is the locus of objective moral values problematic. Who appointed
> God ? How do we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for
> determining good or bad?
> At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists
> can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He
> argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily
> subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic
> position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather
> than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma. Moreover,
> the Bible itself is "insensitive and chauvinistic" in its treatment of rape
> victims.
> Sed contra, I shall respond that Martin's argument is flawed both
> philosophically and biblically. Regarding the philosophical shortcomings,
> (a) Martin offers no substantive ontological foundation for an objective
> morality within an atheistic framework (which would account for human
> dignity, human rights, moral obligations, and moral responsibility), and he
> confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Thus I shall argue
> that Martin can be a moral realist epistemologically but not ontologically.
The author goes on a big journey questioning Martin's lack of an
ontology more fundamental than "hurting people is wrong".
The author then asserts his alternative ontology, that human life has
value because man is made in the image of god. But this does not
explain why human life has value until you can explain why god has
value. The author is thus arguing from his premise.
> Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially perfect
> nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
> leveled against divine commands (ii) that, if true, his challenge leaves his
> own naturalistic moral realism in the same state of arbitrariness. Finally,
This is a very bad argument becase it takes the author somewhere he
didn't want to go. If I can't level accuasation's at God, then I cannot
distinguish God from being good or bad. If I cannot determine that God
is good, then I can't even know that God is God at all. God could be
Devil and I cannot know.
> (c) his argument is flawed biblically in its handling of Deuteronomy 22:23-9
> and other biblical passages pertaining to rape. So I shall, in each section,
> present a particular aspect of Martin's position and then respond to it.
These passages in the bible are quite clear and understandable. The
fact that the author must reinterpret them "correctly" to make the
bible not seem barbaric in places, only furthers the point that
biblical theists don't have a coherent, objective morality at all. In
light of that it seems a bit rediculous to argue a superior ontology,
when you lack the thing for which the ontology explains.
This article makes too many logical errors for me to take it seriously.
It also contains a couple of blatant lies as well (if they aren't lies,
the the author would have to be monumentally ignorant).
Kate
>
>"Kate " <cob...@newscene.com> wrote in message
>news:4425610a....@news-west.newscene.com...
>> On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 16:45:52 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>>>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>>>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>>>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you must
>>>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>>>>
>>>
>>>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are necessarily
>>>subjective.
>>
>> That was a rather nonsensical non sequitur.
>>
>> You can't measure something if you have no where to base the
>> measurement on. You can't decide if something is bad if you don't
>> know bad for what.
>
>
>The question is: Is the 'what' rational or arbitrary?
>
>If you attempt to justify good based upon a factual measurment you'll incure
>a genetic fallacy.
>http://groups.google.com/group/sci.skeptic/msg/1b7cd4b426876db3?output=gplain
>
>an objective mearsument (E=mc^2) is rational.
>'Good' is not rationally measurable
>
>Moral codes evolve within cultures. But cross-culturally moral codes are
>diverse so moral and immoral can be defined and then measured contradictorly
>to another culture's moral code.
Uh, I'm sorry - you aren't making much sense at all.
You evidently know a lot of big words and they are getting away from
you and flying all over the place.
The closest I can come to, to making any sense out of all that is that
you agree with me, but don't want to admit it.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>And actually in moral subjectivism there are no standards *out there* to
>>>measure. Materialism holds there are no moral facts - no real morals. Evil
>>>does not exist as any kind of fact to be measured; So much for Epicurus'
>>>problem of evil. You must assume moral realism is true (evil exists) and
>>>materialism is false before the dilemma can be valid argument.
>>
>> Of course there is good and bad - but you have to know good for what -
>> bad for what.
>>
>> Did you miss what I just said? Or are you purposefully ignoring it?
>>
>
>Nope.
Doesn't sound like it.
>
>> You cannot make a statement that measures an action as evil that I
>> can't come up with a reason that makes it good.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>Subjectivism turns, like materialism, holds moral statments have no
>>>truth-values in themself. Rather they are statments about the person's own
>>>values. For example: George Bush's valuing abortion as immoral and Betty
>>>Friedan valuing abortion as moral are simply statments about them and
>>>their
>>>personal values.
>>
>> moral or immoral for what? Without knowing each of their goals, you
>> have only got a small portion of the story. Without it, nothing has
>> been determined.
>
>
>Why does their subjective moral values need a goal?
>Subjectivism equate ethics to etiquette and tastes preferences.
>
>Do I need a goal when deciding the proper placement of tableware?
>Do I need a goal if I prefer chocolate to vanilla?
>
>No to both.
Uh, more gibberish.
No, subjectivism and theism has to know what they want before they can
make decisions about what actions would get them closer.
Theism needs to know what does their god want, nontheists need to know
what is it that is valued.
Both are subjective since Gods don't say what they want so a theist
has to either make it up, or take someone else's word for it and what
is valued is not constant from person to person.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>http://www.skepticwiki.org/wiki/index.php/Subjectivism
>>>
>>>Moral Subjectivism is also called individual relativism.
>>>Cultural Relativism is moral intersubjectivism. A society of people share
>>>the same subjective values...or attempt to.
>>>
>>>In materialism there are no universal moral standards independent of
>>>cultures therefore their is no such thing as human rights or human
>>>dignity.
>>>To say there is only begs the ontology question. And Martin begs for that
>>>question.
>>>
>>>But what I most often observe are atheists making moral realist statments.
>>>Many say evil does exist as though it were an 'out there' truth-valued
>>>statment.
>>
>> You know nothing of atheism if you think what any atheist says about
>> morals has anything to do with atheism.
>>
>> Atheism as has been repeated here ad nauseum is simply the lack of
>> belief in a god or gods. It makes no claims about any other subject.
>
>Yes I know hince the use materialism....but most atheists are materialist
>because of their materialism
Now there's a pack of anecdotal evidence. Most atheists I know don't
have a clue about materialism. They've never thought it through. All
they know, is that they don't believe all that religous stuff.
>
>
>>
>> Even if every atheist ever met says the same thing - it still has
>> nothing to do with the morality of atheism.
>>
>>>
>>>Although I think he could've come up with better examples the guy makes
>>>the
>>>same observation http://radicalacademy.com/ethicsmyth.htm
>>>
>>>Since materialism is amoral and secular humanism holds to both human
>>>rights/dignity and materialism that begs an ontological question: How can
>>>secular humans hold to these two seemingly contradictory beliefs without
>>>being oxymoronic - amoralism and moral realism? To materialism neither
>>>gods
>>>or morals are real.
>>
>> Morality is the means to a goal. That's all. That's all it is to
>> atheists and theists alike. Theists simply insist that their goal is
>> created by an imaginary big brother. But since their 'imaginary
>> brother' is always one that they choose, then obviously the mind that
>> is creating the goal is their own and the big brother is just there as
>> muscle.
>>
>>>
>>>> Morality must therefore be subjective since it's the work towards
>>>> goodness and good is subjective.
>>>>
>>>> Theism simply defines good as being what the god or gods wants.
>>>
>>>No. Theism simply defines good as being god's nature. However, I don't
>>>argue
>>>theism even with other theist. So what would be the point in doing so with
>>>atheists since we don't begin to share the same axioms on that subject.
>>
>> So your mind isn't open to other axioms? Pity. I've found that when
>> people open their minds to real questions that atheism is never far
>> behind. But it is something you have to come to yourself.
>>
>> But no - you may define good as being god's nature, but you hardly
>> speak for all theists. And I find it interesting that anyone would
>> attempt to make such a claim - for someone to know the true nature of
>> a god would mean they would have to have supernatural powers - not
>> exactly a small claim.
>>
>> And then again, there's the small problem that if a god's command can
>> only be of his nature, then he has no control over himself and you
>> have regulated his role as being only the messenger of the real rules
>> - which is really what you are worshipping - not your god.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It
>>>> defines obedience to the god's wishes as good. This doesn't even
>>>> narrow down the goal, as every single theist's god is different and
>>>> will change gods on a whim. Most of them even admit that in their
>>>> dedication to their god they have no clear idea what he wants and
>>>> attribute that lack of clarity to the god's wishes - so apparently the
>>>> think they god doesn't want them to have the ability to obey his wishes
>>>> and therefore, even their god is bad.
>>>>
>>>> Talk about subjective.
>>>
>>>Scott
>>>
>>
>> So tell me Scott - according to your god and his 'nature' - if you had
>> to decide between every human being dying or all the rest of the life
>> on the planet earth being snuffed out - which would be the 'moral'
>> choice? And how do you know this?
>
>I have no interest in discussing either your or my personnal values.
You have made the claim that gods have moral characters and that is
what you use to make your moral decisions. You are not backing up
that claim with any knowledge. That you refuse to back it up will
only make me assume you can't. That's a very strong sign that there
is nothing objective about your morals.
>
>Atheists are constantly trying to get me to go there and imagine that I have
>gone there.
>
>I assure I don't and will not.
So when someone tries to put a concrete example on the table to
clarify the discussion, you run away. Doesn't sound like you have
anything worth saying.
But once again, you agree with me. You don't want to discuss your
particular moral goals or values - so you must think they are
different than other's have. That's a subjective goal.
Richo
> http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
>
> <quote>
>
> philosopher Michael Martin is also bothered?by this "God stuff." In his
> essay "Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape," he finds the theistic belief
> that God is the locus of objective moral values problematic. Who appointed
> God ? How do we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for
> determining good or bad?
All good questions.
> At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists
> can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling."
I actually find the objective/subjective dichotomy not very useful in
the case of ethics.
> Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic
> position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather
> than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma.
He is correct.
Moreover,
> the Bible itself is "insensitive and chauvinistic" in its treatment of rape
> victims.
True, but not interesting. 8-)
> Sed contra, I shall respond that Martin's argument is flawed both
> philosophically and biblically.
The bible can be used to support or oppose any arbitary proposition -
so I have no interest in arguing "from the bible" - it's worthless.
> Regarding the philosophical shortcomings,
> (a) Martin offers no substantive ontological foundation for an objective
> morality within an atheistic framework (which would account for human
> dignity, human rights, moral obligations, and moral responsibility), and he
> confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Thus I shall argue
> that Martin can be a moral realist epistemologically but not ontologically.
> Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially perfect
> nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
> leveled against divine commands
That is an assertion that cannot be supported - only held on faith.
This is a purely declaritive statement.
> (ii) that, if true, his challenge leaves his
> own naturalistic moral realism in the same state of arbitrariness.
Possibly.
> Finally,
> (c) his argument is flawed biblically...
Don't care.
Empathy and compassion are real human traits ( and like all traits nore
strongly present in some individuals than in others) - and since these
real objectively present traits are the basis for morality - there is a
sense in which objective basis for morality exists.
This is NOT the same thing as "the rules" or "the laws" - the end
products of moral decision making - existing objectively.
Morality isnt an objectively existing end product it is an objectively
existing process.
The belief in "Objective morality" is the fallacy of reifying an
abstraction.
Any entity (including God ) declaring X moral or immoral does not make
it moral or immoral for all beings in all situations for all time -
that is an absudity.
Mark.
Scott
"Richo" <m.rich...@utas.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1141884467....@e56g2000cwe.googlegroups.com...
You were doing well down to here. While empathy and compassion may give an
explaination as to why humans 'construct' moral codes. Empaty and Compassion
doesn't justify any moral code as being the correct or better code in any
objective sense. To justify any morality as based upon an objective god or
an objective evolution is to commit the genetic fallacy.
In an amoral materialism/naturalism all moral codes are equviloent since
they are all relative to the subjective values held by an individual or
culture.
>
> This is NOT the same thing as "the rules" or "the laws" - the end
> products of moral decision making - existing objectively.
> Morality isnt an objectively existing end product it is an objectively
> existing process.
>
> The belief in "Objective morality" is the fallacy of reifying an
> abstraction.
>
> Any entity (including God ) declaring X moral or immoral does not make
> it moral or immoral for all beings in all situations for all time -
> that is an absudity.
So is basing it on empathy and compassion because what you end up doing is
*declaring* empathy, compassion, tolerence an objective moral principle.
Scott
Jim07D6
Actually, the degree to which a moral code embodies empathy and
compassion would be a good measure of its quality, and can be
structured so as to be a fairly reproducible measure, but the problem
is that the weight given to different aspects of the code in this
assessment, would itself reflect another moral code. For example, an
evaluation of the degree of correctness of moral code under which the
empathy shown in that code for a woman's right to reproductive choice
was afforded a different "weight" than that shown the fetus as an
(alleged) moral victim, would merely verify the degree to which the
moral code under evaluation matched the moral code underlying the
rating system. What would validate the correctness of the moral code
underlying the rating system?
This problem is inescapable under *all* metaphysical models --
materialist and immaterialist, dualist, theistic, etc.
--- Jim07D6
Scott
Is in how one uses the term that implies whether that person is a moral
realist.
In this sense empathy equates to tolerance
The long answer: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#7
The condensed straightforward one:
http://www-phil.tamu.edu/~b-everman/victor/moral/Relativism_handout.pdf
"VI. The Issue of Tolerance: many people endorse relativism because they
believe it to be a more tolerant view. They reason that since each culture
has its own ethical standards, and there is no objective standard to speak
of, one culture cannot criticize another culture for having an inferior set
of values. But tolerance and relativism are in no way related. A cultural
relativist cannot insist that cultures be tolerant of one another because
tolerance might not be a value in those cultures. Indeed, if a culture
values intolerance, then the relativist must hold that such a culture must
be intolerant of others. In general, if the relativist says that we ought to
be tolerant of other cultures, she is being flagrantly inconsistent. She is
assuming that being tolerant is an objective moral principle to which
everyone should adhere."
Take the Bush/Betty disagreement over the abortion issue.
Bush values abortion as immoral. Betty values abortion as moral. Is abortion
moral or immoral? In materialism/naturalism it is factually neither. Values
in this sense is relative to the subjects' (Bush and Betty) personal
subjective values.
I think we could say Bush is intolerant of Betty's moral values and would
find a way to impose his values onto her. Betty thinks abortion is a matter
of **personal** choice therefore Bush *should* be tolerant towards her
subjective values. Why? Why *should* Bush be tolerant? In this sense, to
Betty, tolerance has become an objective moral principle that she thinks
everyone should adhere.
BUT...if the abortion only affects Betty and nobody else of what is it to
Bush to interfere with her personal decision? Enter 'personhood': Personhood
is a moral philosophical problem and not a scientific one. There is no
scientific discription for personhood. To materialism/naturalism nobody has
any presonhood (**personal**) status, neither the fetus, or Bush and Betty
(nor did the Jews of Auschwitz for that matter).
To materialism: Bush's subjectively values the fetus as having personhood
status. Is he wrong? NO
To materialism: Betty subjectiviely values the fetus as not having
personhood status. I she wrong? NO
Since Bush values the fetus as having personhood status, he *feels*
justified in trying to have abortion made illegal - that law of the land.
Since he values the life of the fetus as a person he is intolerant of
Betty's values. Betty feels the oposite and at least for the moment her
subjective value is the law of the land.
To materialism: Bush thinks the Supreme Court use psudo-science to establish
the beginning of personhood. Factually, is he correct? Yes. Why? Because
personhood is not a scientific problem. It is a moral philosophical one.
Since materialism holds there are no real morals, there are no real
personhoods either for science to establish. Personhood is an arbitrated
intersubjective value that has no *bases* grounding it in Naturalism. So any
argument using embryo/fetal/infant science to rationally *justify* moral
personhood is based upon a genetic fallacy.
So, to materialism, what you have in the case of abortion is a tug-of-war in
subjective values where an effort to establish/maintain, if by force, an
intersubjective value onto everyone else. Pro-lifers what to establish their
subjective "personhood' onto pro-choicer social sensibilities. Pro-choicer
what to maintain their non-personhood onto pro-lifers social sensibilities.
Materialism, being amoral, is indifferent. Both faction's moral code (even
if seen as intolerant or lacking empathy) is equivolent to the other.
Yet I'm always observing materialists arguing as though their abortion
stance *is* the _more_ correct moral code (in moral realism sense). In those
moments, at least, they factually stop being materialist.
I don't see it. The is no objective physics different for you than for
anyone else. Objective morals would have to be as you suggested supervened
relative the facts of the act itself and not on the individual.
Scott
Scott
"Ed. Stoebenau" <reverse-ude.rcu@sdrawde> wrote in message
news:kj3t02pljl4u8flo1...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 14:56:48 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net>
> wrote:
>
> <snip Scott's plagiarism; followups reset>
since when is quoting plagiarism? I linked it and <quote>
Scott
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>
>>
>>"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
>>news:ho8u029hullls2fhh...@4ax.com...
>>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>>>
>>> <...>
>>> <...>
>>>>>
>>>>> Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
>>>>> bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
>>>>> set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
>>>>> realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
>>>>> actually falling under this category.
>>>>
>>>>Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
>>>
>>> There are a lot of moral realists out there. I think most people who
>>> regard themselves as moral realists are traditional theists, ergo they
>>> are not materialists.
>>
>>Let me re-word that: If the vast majority of self-proclaimed materialists
>>hold a moral realist ideolgy either implicitly or explicitly there are in
>>fact (epistemiologically) few true materialists.
>
> I would like to see an argument to the contrary, but as a default
> position, that seems reasonable.
thank you
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>>Many supposed moral realists
>>>>> might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
>>>>
>>>>You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
>>>>heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
>>>>emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
>>>
>>> You are right. I find theories of moral development to be useful here.
>>> Kohlberg classifies the carrot and stick level as "pre-convenional" in
>>> the sense that there is no emphasis on moral rules as conventions
>>> (socially agreed/approved) but only on what's in it for the agent.
>>>
>>> http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/kohlberg.html
>>
>><hmm. first Baylor now Notre Dame>
>>
>>To materialism there is no *arrow* of progression in either evolution or
>>moral progressive *reasoning*. If one assumes metaphysical materialism it
>>follows that such a person should also assume moral relativism. The notion
>>of moral progress does not make sense to moral relativism.
>>
>>If assuming materialism/naturalism, it seems to me that Kohlberg is
>>confusing moral complexification with moral progress.
>
> He might hold to progressivism in this regard, as a philosophical
> commitment, but his research on moral development attempts to be
> descriptive in nature.
Descriptive in nature is objective. (Science describes)
Perscriptive is subjective.
He refers to use of dilemmas to develop a moral sense in individuals. Moral
dilemmas imply there *is* a right thing to do an we stress ourselves trying
to rationally discover what that right thing is. To materialism there is
nothing factual to discover; moral right and wrongs aren't real. I will give
you that the a person can stress himself over determining if his subjetive
value is in accord with his society's intersubjective value.
>
>>It's similar to
>>creationist confusing biological complexification to an intelligently
>>designed evolution. Naturalism holds that all of nature (including humans)
>>has no moral purpose.
>
> Naturalism is not alone here, IMO. I personally do not see a way to
> conclude that the universe (all that exists, in toto) has moral
> purpose, on the basis of naturalism or any alternative to it. I
> suppose it can be stated as an axiom, that the universe has moral
> purpose, but it is, and has to be, an irreducible one.
Metaphysical Naturalism is also irreducible. It can't be proven true. I must
be assumed. So I won't argue for or against its being correct description of
reality. But I can rationally point out that when materialists slip into
moral realists stances they factually have rejecting metaphysical
Materialism/Naturalism whether they realize they've done so or not.
Scott
Scott
>
> Scott wrote:
>> "Kate " <cob...@newscene.com> wrote in message
>> news:4425610a....@news-west.newscene.com...
>> > On Tue, 7 Mar 2006 16:45:52 -0600, "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>"Kate" <Ka...@twoangryliberals.com> wrote in message
>> >>news:1141768159.8...@j52g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
>> >>>A morality must have a goal or it doesn't exist. The word good is
>> >>> subjective - since to measure something's goodness or badness, you
>> >>> must
>> >>> first decide good for what? bad for what?
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>There are objective measurements. So not all measurements are
>> >>necessarily
>> >>subjective.
>> >
>> > That was a rather nonsensical non sequitur.
>> >
>> > You can't measure something if you have no where to base the
>> > measurement on. You can't decide if something is bad if you don't
>> > know bad for what.
>>
>>
>> The question is: Is the 'what' rational or arbitrary?
>>
>
> Why are they the only two choices?
>
> I am quite certain morality is not derived (directly) by reason from
> facts and I am equally certain they are non arbitary.
>
> Morality rests on compasion and empathy which are non rational aspects
> of human nature.
That may discribe *why* humans construct moral codes but that in no way
*justifies* any of those moral code.
Why should someone have compasion and empathy for all everyone else?
>
> Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
> situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
>
> Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
Secular humanism is an oxymoron because SH holds to two incompatible beliefs
simultaniously, amoral materialism and the inherent moral realism in
universal human rights.
> Morality *requires* an entity making choices - if you are mechanically
> following the dictates of a rule book, or a king, or a god you are not
> being moral.
>
> Morality is situational and relative and inter-subjective.
Not quite: morality is relative to the subjective/intersubjective as defined
by the code in a piticular situation. In that way moral codes are
corss-culrually diverse where no code is better than any other. For example:
in at least some Islamic societies it is moral to honor kill a female who
has been defined in that situation as having dishonored the family. The
empathy and compassion is for the family members saving face.
Scott
Jim07D6
<...snip interesting and worthwhile exposition on moral relativism>
>>>
>> True, but my point is that, for example, the exact age of each human
>> is an objective fact, but ages differ from person to person. Other
>> objective facts describe groups of people, some describe all people.So
>> it could be with moral objective facts. You might in theory discover a
>> different moral fact about me, than about another person. "Objective
>> morals" is a bit of an equivocation if it means "moral absolute"
>> instead of "moral fact".
>
>I don't see it. The is no objective physics different for you than for
>anyone else. Objective morals would have to be as you suggested supervened
>relative the facts of the act itself and not on the individual.
Even though the same physics applies, if you and I are simultaneously
dropped from an airplane without parachutes, we might hit the ground
at different times, depending on some of the individual differences
between us, and independently of other differences. So the
predictions of objective physics do supervene on facts about the
individual. Why an objective morality would differ, needs explanation.
--- Jim07D6
Scott
No. I have a bit of a dyslexia thing and spell checkers can screw with me. I
might miss the the checker's suggest word.
>
> The closest I can come to, to making any sense out of all that is that
> you agree with me, but don't want to admit it.
There are no standards at all
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/moral2.html
<quote>
Subjectivism then, properly defined, does not fail to meet Schick's criteria
for an adequate ethical theory. It doesn't sanction "immoral actions"
because in a naturalistic universe there are just actions--'moral' and
'immoral' are man-made distinctions that do not exist in nature, but exist
only in our minds. Whatever people consider moral or immoral is not
sanctioned by subjectivism because this metaethical theory is a factual
theory--a theory about what morality is--and thus does not itself make any
value judgments whatsoever but is morally neutral about all actions. It
doesn't imply that people are morally infallible because to do so would be
to assume that there is some objective moral standard existing independently
of human opinion by which people could measure whether an act is right or
wrong--an assumption subjectivism obviously denies. >>In Schick's misleading
definition of subjectivism that standard is the individual's own approval.
But on a truly subjectivist account, there's no standard at all for 'what
makes an action moral' just as there's no standard for 'what makes art
beautiful'.
In a sense, if moral subjectivism is true, one cannot err morally; but one
cannot succeed morally either, because morality is akin to aesthetics. One
can judge a work of art as poor but we do not say they 'erred' simply
because we enjoy it. When we disagree about whether rock music is pleasing
we do not say that, because this is a matter of taste, we are therefore all
'aesthetically infallible' or that the idea that whether something is
aesthetically good or bad is a matter of taste does not constitute an
'adequate aesthetic theory'.
Subjectivism also does not deny that there are substantial moral disputes.
It simply acknowledges that morality is a human (or sentient) invention.
Once an individual or community has accepted a general set of basic moral
premises (e.g. murder is wrong), moral disputes can arise when applying
those premises in real-life cases--such as when one has to choose between
two children joined at the head at birth when only one could survive an
operation. Moral disputes can arise even if the premises they arise from are
invented; the premises of those disputes need not reside independently of us
in some Platonic realm of ideas.<end quote>
What does that mean? It factually means that honor killing in some society
*is* moral as subjectively defined. It factually means that infanticide of
girls in India and China is moral by local social customs. It factually
means the gassing jews is moral as defined by Nazi subjective moral
standards of morality.
Do you disagree?
BTW just to anticipate the usual response back: I'm not interested in your
personal moral subjectivism so don't fall back on the old (and I mean old)
montra: "well that doesn't comform to my an other's subjective values".
I'm only interested in the Subjectivism and Mateialism/Naturalism as factual
theories and what they conclude about morality.
maybe I should keep to Jim. He and I have had civil discussion in the past
and he usually understands me.
<snipping>
>>Yes I know hince the use materialism....but most atheists are materialist
>>because of their materialism
>
> Now there's a pack of anecdotal evidence. Most atheists I know don't
> have a clue about materialism. They've never thought it through. All
> they know, is that they don't believe all that religous stuff.
Well Halleluiah!! We most certainly do agree on something! That is the very
bases of my argument. Most materialist do not understand the moral
implication of their metaphysical ideology. Hince, it is quite easy to
observe so-called self-proclaimed materialist making moral realist
statments. If all materialist really understood how morality fits within
materialism/naturalism you'd see most moral debates between a.a and religous
groups dry up.
The debate, for example, isn't about what is or isn't moral but about what
is the nature of morality within Materialism. Most materialist don't have a
(exuse my french) a fucking clue. They truely believe they *are* more moral
in an objective sense.
snipped
>>
>>I have no interest in discussing either your or my personnal values.
>
> You have made the claim that gods have moral characters and that is
> what you use to make your moral decisions.
If you think so go find where I've said so. My quoting PC on his theology is
NOT relavent to my question of this thread. What does "
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist?" have to do with god and
theology. I don't see. I've made no positive claim to any god or that morals
must be based upon one. If you thik I have go find it.
You are not backing up
> that claim with any knowledge. That you refuse to back it up will
> only make me assume you can't. That's a very strong sign that there
> is nothing objective about your morals.
>
>
>>
>>Atheists are constantly trying to get me to go there and imagine that I
>>have
>>gone there.
>>
>>I assure I don't and will not.
>
> So when someone tries to put a concrete example on the table to
> clarify the discussion, you run away. Doesn't sound like you have
> anything worth saying.
>
> But once again, you agree with me. You don't want to discuss your
> particular moral goals or values - so you must think they are
> different than other's have. That's a subjective goal.
I don't give a damn about your personal values. Why should I? I haven't
expressed mine why should I care about yours.
You yourself said most mateialist don't crasp Materialism. I'm helping them
out to more fully understand how morals fit into that metaphysic. You
wouldn't want to keep them in the dark now would you?
Scott
Scott
"Llanzlan Klazmon" <Kla...@llurdiaxorb.govt> wrote in message
news:Xns978177FC4A799Kl...@203.97.37.6...
Case 1. Materialism => evil of any kind does not factually exist. All moral
codes are equivolent. Atheist saying he is more moral that any theist
because.....is basing his belief on a fallacy and at the same time, knowing
or not, rejecting materialism.
Case 1 continued. Evil doesn't exist => all truth-valued statments in ethics
are false. Secular humanism is fallacious since all attempted justification
for moral codes (human rights) are based upon a non existent moral reality.
Take your pick. Maybe instead you'd like to explain that to CC
Scott
Jim07D6
Isn't it becoming obvious that there is no way to justify a moral code
without reducing it to something you would not call a moral code?
>>
>> Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
>> situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
>>
>> Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
>
>Secular humanism is an oxymoron because SH holds to two incompatible beliefs
>simultaniously, amoral materialism and the inherent moral realism in
>universal human rights.
Secular Humanism does not entail either materialism or moral realism,
so there may be SH's who hold contradictory beliefs, but this is not
inherent in SH, since no belief on either matter is required.
--- Jim07D6
Scott
I've said there is no *rational* justification for any moral code. For
example, is intuitionism a rational bases for defining moral truth? No, but
the Declaration of Independence and the UN's Universal Declaration of Human
Rights does exactly that. They are based upon a *declared* moral truth. I
question how obviouse it is then.
>>>
>>> Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
>>> situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
>>>
>>> Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
>>
>>Secular humanism is an oxymoron because SH holds to two incompatible
>>beliefs
>>simultaniously, amoral materialism and the inherent moral realism in
>>universal human rights.
>
> Secular Humanism does not entail either materialism or moral realism,
> so there may be SH's who hold contradictory beliefs, but this is not
> inherent in SH, since no belief on either matter is required.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanist#Secular_humanism
<quote> Humanism is a broad category of active ethical philosophies that
affirm the dignity and worth of all people, based on our ability to
determine what is right using the qualities innate to humanity, particularly
rationality. Humanism is a component of a variety of more specific
philosophical systems, and is also incorporated into some religious schools
of thought.
Humanism entails a commitment to the search for truth and morality through
human means in support of human interests. In focusing on our capacity for
self-determination, humanism rejects transcendental justifications, such as
a dependence on faith, the supernatural, or divinely revealed texts.
Humanists endorse a recognition of a universal morality based on the
commonality of human nature, suggesting that solutions to our social and
cultural problems cannot be parochial. <end quote>
that is in no way compatible with materialism as it holds to a belief in
moral truths - discoverable morals. If anything its more compatible with a
strong anthropic principle or pantheism.
<continue quote>
Secular humanism is the branch of humanism that rejects theistic religious
belief and the existence of a supernatural. It is often associated with
scientists and academics, although it is not at all limited to these groups.
Secular humanists generally believe that following humanist principles
naturally leads to secularism, on the basis that religious views cannot be
supported rationally. There are secular humanistic organizations, though
these could not be accurately described as churches.
More often than not, secular humanism is what people are referring to when
they speak of humanism in general, making it something of a default. Some
secular humanists take this even further by denying that religious humanists
qualify as genuine humanists. Others feel that the ethical side of humanism
transcends the issue of religion, because being a good person is more
important than supernatural beliefs. <end quote>
What does "humanism transcends....because *being* a _good_...." mean if not
an implicit belief in an objective moral reality, a moral realtiy that is
rejected by materialism?
Scott
Scott
<Gotcha> Sure, that's a possibility unless there is no such thing as an
objective morality. In which case there is no such thing as a universal
human Evil or Right. Yes/no?
Scott
Scott
Jim07D6
<...>
>If there is no rational methodology, what then do rational materialists base
>there truth-valued moral statements on? All I've ever seen are
>presuppositions. It's as if I'm suppose to take their statment as though it
>were the *gospel* truth, so to speak.If I press them they might give me an
>argument like the ones wbarwell (aka Chearful Charlie) has given. Those are
>nothing more than appeals to reason without a rational justification.
<..>
I can't speak for what rational materialists base their truth-valued
moral statements on. But if they are based on other truth-valued moral
statements, then they have gotten nowhere, and if they are based on
truth-valued non-moral statements, then they have to explain how they
get moral statements from non-moral statements.
How would *anybody* who claims to make truth-valued moral statements,
get around this problem?
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
You are right.
I don't think so. I think that all of the varieties of morality except
theistic varieties fall under the umbrella of secular humanism and the
somewhat uncareful wording "*being* a good person" is not fatal to
this idea. For example "Being a good person is important" can be
exhortative.
--- Jim07D6
Scott
agree. Except I would refrain from call it a *good* measure because someone
may think of that as an objective standard. I can relate empathy in moral
codes to what others might call monstrous acts.
For example, an
> evaluation of the degree of correctness of moral code under which the
> empathy shown in that code for a woman's right to reproductive choice
> was afforded a different "weight" than that shown the fetus as an
> (alleged) moral victim, would merely verify the degree to which the
> moral code under evaluation matched the moral code underlying the
> rating system. What would validate the correctness of the moral code
> underlying the rating system?
>
> This problem is inescapable under *all* metaphysical models --
> materialist and immaterialist, dualist, theistic, etc.
It most certainly is rationally inescapable. "alleged" should be changed to
"defined" as alleged implies an objective standard. An aborted fetus is a
moral victim to a lot of people based upon their values.
Scott
Scott
Thank you, Jim. You mght be surprised how many self-prclaimed materialists
would disagree with that....or maybe you wouldn't.
snipping
>>What does "humanism transcends....because *being* a _good_...." mean if
>>not
>>an implicit belief in an objective moral reality, a moral realtiy that is
>>rejected by materialism?
>
> I don't think so. I think that all of the varieties of morality except
> theistic varieties fall under the umbrella of secular humanism and the
> somewhat uncareful wording "*being* a good person" is not fatal to
> this idea. For example "Being a good person is important" can be
> exhortative.
Let's say it is. That still doesn't relieve materialists of the inherent
problem that materialism has for the belief in such things as UN's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights since such a document is necessarily committed
to a belief in moral truth.
Scott
Jim07D6
I don't know if the axis "universal - particular" is the same as the
axis "objective - subjective". I don't think it is.
--- Jim07D6
Malcolm
> Naturalism is not alone here, IMO. I personally do not see a way to
> conclude that the universe (all that exists, in toto) has moral
> purpose, on the basis of naturalism or any alternative to it. I
> suppose it can be stated as an axiom, that the universe has moral
> purpose, but it is, and has to be, an irreducible one.
>
Axiom two, you accept that you have a mind with a state.
Axiom three, you accept that this mental state has value - whether that be
happiness or freedom from pain or intellectual coherence. It matters what
your mental state is.
Therefore you have accepted that there is such a thing as morality.
--
Buy my book 12 Common Atheist Arguments (refuted)
$1.25 download or $6.90 paper, available www.lulu.com
Scott
Not by rational means for sure ;). But what people in fact do is make
unsubstantial, in an empirical sense, *declarations* of moral truths. Taking
a metaphysical neutral stance, I can't say if those declarations are based
upon an acual truth. However, I can say if I assume metaphyscial
materialism/naturalism/physicalism then all such declartions of human
rights/dignaty are founded upon the same fallaciouness as any god(s), as
there are no such qualities in nature. No gods, no dignity, no Rights, no
moral meaning in nature.
Scott
Scott
Scott
universal is to moral universalism...another name for moral realism
Scott
Jim07D6
<...>
>> How would *anybody* who claims to make truth-valued moral statements,
>> get around this problem?
>
>Not by rational means for sure ;). But what people in fact do is make
>unsubstantial, in an empirical sense, *declarations* of moral truths. Taking
>a metaphysical neutral stance, I can't say if those declarations are based
>upon an acual truth. However, I can say if I assume metaphyscial
>materialism/naturalism/physicalism then all such declartions of human
>rights/dignaty are founded upon the same fallaciouness as any god(s), as
>there are no such qualities in nature. No gods, no dignity, no Rights, no
>moral meaning in nature.
When naturalism is more or less lumped with physicalism and
materialism, I agree. I don't lump naturalism this way, and neither do
some thinkers more philosophically more pedigreed than I. The only
distinction that naturalism draws, as I think of it, is between belief
that the world that has a transcendent, external cause, and belief
that it does not; the latter being naturalism. The other two
metaphysics draw much greater distinctions between themselves and
supernaturalism.
So, this definition does not exclude the possibility of dignity,
rights, moral meaning. It says that whether they are part of the
universe is TBD, and if they are, all that is required is that they
need explanations that do not invoke supernaturalism.
For example, consciousness could be a "substance" under naturalism.
Another example is that moral meaning could be an actual attribute of
some actions. Although ascertaining the moral meaning might require
omniscience. ;-)
This gets immediately into reductionism. To cut that discussion short,
I see no *metaphysical* reason to believe that explanations that
involve physics are more *true* than explanations that involve, say,
psychology or sociology.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
>"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote
>> Naturalism is not alone here, IMO. I personally do not see a way to
>> conclude that the universe (all that exists, in toto) has moral
>> purpose, on the basis of naturalism or any alternative to it. I
>> suppose it can be stated as an axiom, that the universe has moral
>> purpose, but it is, and has to be, an irreducible one.
>>
>Axiom one, you accept that you exist.
>Axiom two, you accept that you have a mind with a state.
>Axiom three, you accept that this mental state has value - whether that be
>happiness or freedom from pain or intellectual coherence. It matters what
>your mental state is.
>
>Therefore you have accepted that there is such a thing as morality.
Agreed, as axioms. Axiomatic systems are a matter of raw choice.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
>
>"Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
>news:ui11125681ufrtn2f...@4ax.com...
>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
>>
<...>
>>><Gotcha> Sure, that's a possibility unless there is no such thing as an
>>>objective morality. In which case there is no such thing as a universal
>>>human Evil or Right. Yes/no?
>>
>> I don't know if the axis "universal - particular" is the same as the
>> axis "objective - subjective". I don't think it is.
>
>universal is to moral universalism...another name for moral realism
>
Then the axis is moral realism - moral idealism? That too, would be
orthogonal to "objective - subjective". I don't know what to do with
that, either.
--- Jim07D6
Jim07D6
Jim07D6
I take the operational words in the DOI to be "WE HOLD these
truths...."
>
>snipping
>
>>>What does "humanism transcends....because *being* a _good_...." mean if
>>>not
>>>an implicit belief in an objective moral reality, a moral realtiy that is
>>>rejected by materialism?
>>
>> I don't think so. I think that all of the varieties of morality except
>> theistic varieties fall under the umbrella of secular humanism and the
>> somewhat uncareful wording "*being* a good person" is not fatal to
>> this idea. For example "Being a good person is important" can be
>> exhortative.
>
>Let's say it is. That still doesn't relieve materialists of the inherent
>problem that materialism has for the belief in such things as UN's Universal
>Declaration of Human Rights since such a document is necessarily committed
>to a belief in moral truth.
Yes, the operative words being "COMMITTED TO".
--- Jim07D6
Richo
It does however make them non arbitary since they have a real basis.
> In an amoral materialism/naturalism all moral codes are equviloent since
> they are all relative to the subjective values held by an individual or
> culture.
>
Why is subjective a "bad" thing?
And please give an objective abswer.
8-)
>
> >
> > This is NOT the same thing as "the rules" or "the laws" - the end
> > products of moral decision making - existing objectively.
> > Morality isnt an objectively existing end product it is an objectively
> > existing process.
> >
> > The belief in "Objective morality" is the fallacy of reifying an
> > abstraction.
> >
> > Any entity (including God ) declaring X moral or immoral does not make
> > it moral or immoral for all beings in all situations for all time -
> > that is an absudity.
>
> So is basing it on empathy and compassion because what you end up doing is
> *declaring* empathy, compassion, tolerence an objective moral principle.
>
Humans generally have two legs - and they don't have two legs *because*
I declare it.
Same with empathy and compassion - people have them and it was not my
declaration that caused this to be.
I am declaring that any morality worthy of the word must be derived
from empathy and compassion.
I am declaring that if you are talking about morality that is derived
from some divine command theory or similar then it is not morality as I
understand it (and as I believe it is generally intuitively understood)
and have an interest in.
Mark.
Milan
"Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:xr%Pf.46646$H71....@newssvr13.news.prodigy.com...
>
> "Jim07D6" <Jim...@nospam.net> wrote in message
> news:4bs012t52th2j5a5u...@4ax.com...
> > "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
> >
>> I've said there is no *rational* justification for any moral code. For
> example, is intuitionism a rational bases for defining moral truth? No,
but
> the Declaration of Independence and the UN's Universal Declaration of
Human
> Rights does exactly that. They are based upon a *declared* moral truth. I
> question how obviouse it is then.
>
The UN declaration establishes a number of political norms which regulate
the way individuals should be treated by their governments. They are
essentially legal rights rather than moral rights. Any organization is
entitled to generate a set of policies and regulations with which its
members must comply. Such policies and regulations are constructed by
consensus and do not necessarily imply a "moral truth" (whatever a moral
truth might be). It is a declaration of what the member states believe to be
the way their citizens must be treated.
This is a rather convoluted interpretation of a rather contentious
description of what humanism is. To say that humanism involves a search for
truth and morality doesnt necessarily mean that humanism holds a belief in
moral truths.
> <continue quote>
>
> Secular humanism is the branch of humanism that rejects theistic religious
> belief and the existence of a supernatural. It is often associated with
> scientists and academics, although it is not at all limited to these
groups.
> Secular humanists generally believe that following humanist principles
> naturally leads to secularism, on the basis that religious views cannot be
> supported rationally. There are secular humanistic organizations, though
> these could not be accurately described as churches.
>
> More often than not, secular humanism is what people are referring to when
> they speak of humanism in general, making it something of a default. Some
> secular humanists take this even further by denying that religious
humanists
> qualify as genuine humanists. Others feel that the ethical side of
humanism
> transcends the issue of religion, because being a good person is more
> important than supernatural beliefs. <end quote>
>
> What does "humanism transcends....because *being* a _good_...." mean if
not
> an implicit belief in an objective moral reality, a moral realtiy that is
> rejected by materialism?
"Being a good person" is a rather vague statement and certainly doesnt imply
a belief in an objective morality. And the vagueness of the statement is a
good reminder that wikipedia (thought a convenient tool) is not the final
word for many searches for definitions.
regards
Milan
Richo
No reason.
Why is a reason required?
Who made *that* rule?
What reasoning establishes the rule that "a reason is required" ?
Etc ad infinitum.
Everything has to start somewhere - an infinite regress or reasons and
questioning of reasons is not a basis for anything. All systems of
morality (and metaphysics etc) start from some (necessarily) non
rationally justified axioms.
That's what axioms are - the basic "atoms" of belief that are not
derivable from more basic things.
I am saying start with human nature.
In a sense asking why humans are they way they are is - to an extent -
irrelavent to the fact that we are indeed who we are.
Lets assume we are what we are and go from there.
> >
> > Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
> > situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
> >
> > Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
>
> Secular humanism is an oxymoron because SH holds to two incompatible beliefs
> simultaniously, amoral materialism and the inherent moral realism in
> universal human rights.
I think you are wrong here.
Materialism is indeed amoral which means it has nothing to say about
moral systems - it is totally neutral - and so it cannot be inherently
incompatible with any moral system.
I am not sure that humanists are moral realists to the extent that they
believe morals have some seperate existence as some ectoplasmic
entities - I suspect that may be a strawman , at least for some, of
their position.
I would say some would be quite happy to admit that their moral system
has no absolute rationaly justifiable basis like every other sytstem
including those that pretend to have such a basis.
>
> > Morality *requires* an entity making choices - if you are mechanically
> > following the dictates of a rule book, or a king, or a god you are not
> > being moral.
> >
> > Morality is situational and relative and inter-subjective.
>
> Not quite: morality is relative to the subjective/intersubjective as defined
> by the code in a piticular situation. In that way moral codes are
> corss-culrually diverse where no code is better than any other.
I could test any system of moral values against the moral values of
Saddam Hussien for example - and find that most are superior in
demonstrating and developing compassion and empathy for others.
I am quite confident that the vast majority of my fellow humans could
do the same.
I cannot show you why that is the correct way of measuring these things
- I assume it as axiomatic.
Of course nobody else can say why their system is better than mine -
although some pretend that they can.
> For example:
> in at least some Islamic societies it is moral to honor kill a female who
> has been defined in that situation as having dishonored the family. The
> empathy and compassion is for the family members saving face.
>
I am not convinced that those that participate in honor killings are
being compassionate and emphatic.
This is an example of competing values - and the values of honor -
social status and reputation - are (self evidently) being given a
higher value than compassion and the desire to avoid the suffering of
others.
Mark.
Richo
No reason.
Why is a reason required?
Who made *that* rule?
What reasoning establishes the rule that "a reason is required" ?
Etc ad infinitum.
Everything has to start somewhere - an infinite regress or reasons and
questioning of reasons is not a basis for anything. All systems of
morality (and metaphysics etc) start from some (necessarily) non
rationally justified axioms.
That's what axioms are - the basic "atoms" of belief that are not
derivable from more basic things.
I am saying start with human nature.
In a sense asking why humans are they way they are is - to an extent -
irrelavent to the fact that we are indeed who we are.
Lets assume we are what we are and go from there.
> >
> > Absolute (rule based, declarative ) morality will sometimes, in some
> > situations, lead to outcomes I will find (subjectively) immoral.
> >
> > Absolute morality is an oxymoron.
>
> Secular humanism is an oxymoron because SH holds to two incompatible beliefs
> simultaniously, amoral materialism and the inherent moral realism in
> universal human rights.
I think you are wrong here.
Materialism is indeed amoral which means it has nothing to say about
moral systems - it is totally neutral - and so it cannot be inherently
incompatible with any moral system.
I am not sure that humanists are moral realists to the extent that they
believe morals have some seperate existence as some ectoplasmic
entities - I suspect that may be a strawman , at least for some, of
their position.
I would say some would be quite happy to admit that their moral system
has no absolute rationaly justifiable basis like every other sytstem
including those that pretend to have such a basis.
>
> > Morality *requires* an entity making choices - if you are mechanically
> > following the dictates of a rule book, or a king, or a god you are not
> > being moral.
> >
> > Morality is situational and relative and inter-subjective.
>
> Not quite: morality is relative to the subjective/intersubjective as defined
> by the code in a piticular situation. In that way moral codes are
> corss-culrually diverse where no code is better than any other.
I could test any system of moral values against the moral values of
Saddam Hussien for example - and find that most are superior in
demonstrating and developing compassion and empathy for others.
I am quite confident that the vast majority of my fellow humans could
do the same.
I cannot show you why that is the correct way of measuring these things
- I assume it as axiomatic.
Of course nobody else can say why their system is better than mine -
although some pretend that they can.
> For example:
> in at least some Islamic societies it is moral to honor kill a female who
> has been defined in that situation as having dishonored the family. The
> empathy and compassion is for the family members saving face.
>
I am not convinced that those that participate in honor killings are
Malcolm
>
>>Axiom one, you accept that you exist.
>>Axiom two, you accept that you have a mind with a state.
>>Axiom three, you accept that this mental state has value - whether that be
>>happiness or freedom from pain or intellectual coherence. It matters what
>>your mental state is.
>>
>>Therefore you have accepted that there is such a thing as morality.
>
> Agreed, as axioms. Axiomatic systems are a matter of raw choice.
>
For instance you could try to build a mathematical system in which all
operations were commutative ( so 6 / 3 = 3 / 6 ), but it would be very hard
and could only be an exercise for a mathematical specialist.
Llanzlan Klazmon
news:iw_Pf.21330$rL5....@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net:
>
> "Llanzlan Klazmon" <Kla...@llurdiaxorb.govt> wrote in message
> news:Xns978177FC4A799Kl...@203.97.37.6...
>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote in
>> news:1ZSdneDL_YBTzpPZ...@wcc.net:
>>
>>>
>>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>> news:120siak...@corp.supernews.com...
>>>> Scott wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> CC, you really (pun) should just read.
>>>
>>> You are an example of what I observe. You simply presupose evil does
>>> in fact exist.
>>
>> Case 1. Evil exists ---> no omni everything gods.
>> Case 2. Evil doesn't exist ----> most religions are false.
>>
>> Take your pick.
>
> Case 1. Materialism => evil of any kind does not factually exist. All
> moral codes are equivolent. Atheist saying he is more moral that any
> theist because.....is basing his belief on a fallacy and at the same
> time, knowing or not, rejecting materialism.
This is a non sequitur to the point being made above. Nevertheless
materialism does not imply that evil does not exist. Materialism does not
disallow subjective concepts. Evil is related to the idea of justice. I.e
the weighing up of consequences versus the weighing up of evidence. This
doesn't mean that everyone will agree on what is evil just as everyone does
not agree that the earth isn't flat. You weigh up the evidence for the
possible consequences and decide from that if something should be lablled
evil. Not everyone will agree. This is true even amoung members of the same
religious faith were they are supposedly working from the same absolute
moral code.
Klazmon.
<SNIP>
Scott
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> said:
<snipping>
>>>>
>>>>I've said there is no *rational* justification for any moral code. For
>>>>example, is intuitionism a rational bases for defining moral truth? No,
>>>>but
>>>>the Declaration of Independence and the UN's Universal Declaration of
>>>>Human
>>>>Rights does exactly that. They are based upon a *declared* moral truth.
>>>>I
>>>>question how obviouse it is then.
>>>
>>> You are right.
>>
>>Thank you, Jim. You mght be surprised how many self-prclaimed materialists
>>would disagree with that....or maybe you wouldn't.
>
> I take the operational words in the DOI to be "WE HOLD these
> truths...."
"...to be self-evident". Meaning there is no empirical evidence for the
moral truths I'm about to declare...."that all men are created equal with
certain inalienable rights..." Irrational intuitionism all the way and in no
forseeable empiricaism to support such a claim.
What can I conclude from that? It seems to me that honest materialists
should (like gods) reject declared truths no matter the source when there is
no possible means of collecting evidence to support those declarations...be
that the declared moral truths in documents like the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights or the declared truths in the Bible. To materialism they are
both just so much paper. There are no real gods and no real moral
truths/facts. Occam's Razor cuts pretty close here.
>>
>>snipping
>>
>>>>What does "humanism transcends....because *being* a _good_...." mean if
>>>>not
>>>>an implicit belief in an objective moral reality, a moral realtiy that
>>>>is
>>>>rejected by materialism?
>>>
>>> I don't think so. I think that all of the varieties of morality except
>>> theistic varieties fall under the umbrella of secular humanism and the
>>> somewhat uncareful wording "*being* a good person" is not fatal to
>>> this idea. For example "Being a good person is important" can be
>>> exhortative.
>>
>>Let's say it is. That still doesn't relieve materialists of the inherent
>>problem that materialism has for the belief in such things as UN's
>>Universal
>>Declaration of Human Rights since such a document is necessarily committed
>>to a belief in moral truth.
>
> Yes, the operative words being "COMMITTED TO".
not quite "IS NECESSARILY COMMITTED TO" is the operative words.
Scott
Milan
You can perhaps conclude that the authors of the DOI of the US were not
materialists. And for all we know they were not. The authors of the UN
declaration, on the other hand, dont declare anything to be self-evident.
They just make the point that they believe that the member states should
treat their citizens in such and such way. Not much to derive what you
derive above.
regards
Milan
>
>
Scott
If keep this up and your might make me believe your a Thomists ;)
>
> For example, consciousness could be a "substance" under naturalism.
> Another example is that moral meaning could be an actual attribute of
> some actions. Although ascertaining the moral meaning might require
> omniscience. ;-)
I would think a moral theologian would say it only requires being made in
his god's image ;)
Is that rational? nope. Is it as equally valid as Intuionism? Depends on
one's metaphysic. Materialism however says neither is valid.
>
> This gets immediately into reductionism. To cut that discussion short,
> I see no *metaphysical* reason to believe that explanations that
> involve physics are more *true* than explanations that involve, say,
> psychology or sociology.
Sociology is decidedly moral relativistic. There is no moral realism in
sociology or anthropology that I'm aware of. And moral relativism is
critical of concepts as human rights.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/ "Nonetheless, the
increasing awareness moral diversity (especially between Western and
non-Western cultures) on the part of Europeans in the modern era is an
important antecedent to the contemporary concern with moral relativism.
During this time, the predominant view among Europeans and their colonial
progeny was that their moral values were superior to the moral values of
other cultures. Few thought all moral values had equal or relative validity,
or anything of that sort. The main impetus for such a position came from
cultural anthropology. Anthropologists were fascinated with the diversity of
cultures, and they produced detailed empirical studies of them - especially
"primitive," non-Western ones. Early on anthropologists accepted the
assumption of European or Western superiority. But this was challenged by
Franz Boas, and his students - in particular, Ruth Benedict, Melville J.
Herskovits, and Margaret Mead - explicitly articulated influential forms of
moral relativism in the twentieth century. In 1947, on the occasion of the
United Nations debate about universal human rights, the American
Anthropological Association issued a statement declaring that moral values
are relative to cultures and that there is no way of showing that the values
of one culture are better than those of another. Anthropologists have never
been unanimous in asserting this, and in recent years human rights advocacy
on the part of some anthropologists has mitigated the relativist orientation
of the discipline. Nonetheless, prominent contemporary anthropologists such
as Clifford Geertz and Richard A. Shweder continue to defend relativist
positions."
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm#SH5a "Philosophical supporters of human
rights are necessarily committed to a form of moral universalism. As moral
principles and as a moral doctrine, human rights are considered to be
universally valid. However, moral universalism has long been subject to
criticism by so-called moral relativists. Moral relativists argue that
universally valid moral truths do not exist. For moral relativists, there is
simply no such thing as a universally valid moral doctrine. Relativists view
morality as a social and historical phenomenon."
Scott
Scott
It's getting late and so I'm getting a little lazy.
Moral universalism - moral realism. Moral relativism - moral anti-realism
To put my though into perspective I'm going to just quote
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm#SH5a
a. Moral relativism
Philosophical supporters of human rights are necessarily committed to a form
of moral universalism. As moral principles and as a moral doctrine, human
rights are considered to be universally valid. However, moral universalism
has long been subject to criticism by so-called moral relativists. Moral
relativists argue that universally valid moral truths do not exist. For
moral relativists, there is simply no such thing as a universally valid
moral doctrine. Relativists view morality as a social and historical
phenomenon. Moral beliefs and principles are therefore thought of as
socially and historically contingent, valid only for those cultures and
societies in which they originate and within which they are widely approved.
Relativists point to the vast array of diverse moral beliefs and practices
apparent in the world today as empirical support for their position. Even
within a single, contemporary society, such as the United States or Great
Britain, one can find a wide diversity of fundamental moral beliefs,
principles, and practices. Contemporary, complex societies are thus
increasingly considered to be pluralist and multicultural in character. For
many philosophers the multicultural character of such societies serves to
fundamentally restrict the substance and scope of the regulative political
principles governing those societies. In respect of human rights,
relativists have tended to focus upon such issues as the presumed
individualist character of the doctrine of human rights. It has been argued
by numerous relativists that human rights are unduly biased towards morally
individualist societies and cultures, at the necessary expense of the
communal moral complexion of many Asian and African societies. At best, some
human rights' articles may be considered to be redundant within such
societies, at worse they may appear to be positively harmful if fully
implemented, replacing the fundamental values of one civilization with those
of another and thereby perpetuating a form of cultural and moral
imperialism.
The philosophical debate between universalists and relativists is far too
complex to adequately summarise here. However, certain immediate responses
to the relativist critique of human rights are immediately available. First,
merely pointing to moral diversity and the presumed integrity of individual
cultures and societies does not, by itself, provide a philosophical
justification for relativism, nor a sufficient critique of universalism.
After all, there have existed and continue to exist many cultures and
societies whose treatment of their own people leaves much to be desired. Is
the relativist genuinely asking us to recognize and respect the integrity of
Nazi Germany, or any other similarly repressive regime? There can be little
doubt that, as it stands, relativism is incompatible with human rights. On
the face of it, this would appear to lend argumentative weight to the
universalist support of human rights. After all, one may speculate as to the
willingness of any relativist to actually forego their possession of human
rights if and when the social surroundings demanded it. Similarly,
relativist arguments are typically presented by members of the political
elites within those countries whose systematic oppression of their peoples
has attracted the attention of advocates of human rights. The exponential
growth of grass-roots human rights organizations across many countries in
the world whose cultures are alleged to be incompatible with the
implementation of human rights, raises serious questions as to the validity
and integrity of such 'indigenous' relativists. At its worst, the doctrine
of moral relativism may be being deployed in an attempt to illegitimately
justify oppressive political systems. The concern over the presumed
incompatibility between human rights and communal moral systems appears to
be a more valid issue. Human rights have undeniably conceived of the
principal bearer of human rights as the individual person. This is due, in
large part, to the Western origins of human rights. However, it would be
equally fair to say that the so-called 'third generation' of human rights is
far more attuned to the communal and collective basis of many individuals'
lives. In keeping with the work of political philosophers such as Will
Kymlicka, there is increasing awareness of the need to tailor human rights
principles to such things as the collective rights of minorities and, for
example, these minorities' claims to such things as communal land rights.
While human rights remain philosophically grounded within an individualist
moral doctrine, there can be no doubt that attempts are being made to
adequately apply and human rights to more communally oriented societies.
Human rights can no longer be accused of being 'culture-blind'.
Back to Table of Contents
b. Epistemological criticisms of human rights
The second most important contemporary philosophical form of human rights'
criticism challenges the presumed objective basis of human rights as moral
rights. This form of criticism may be thought of as a river into which run
many philosophical tributaries. The essence of these attempts to refute
human rights consists in the claim that moral principles and concepts are
inherently subjective in character. On this view moral beliefs do not
emanate from a correct determination of a rationally purposive will, or even
gaining insight into the will of some divine being. Rather, moral beliefs
are fundamentally expressions of individuals' partial preferences. This
position therefore rejects the principal ground upon which the concept of
moral rights rests: that there exist rational and a priori moral principles
upon which a correct and legitimate moral doctrine is to be founded. In
modern, as opposed to ancient, philosophy this argument is most closely
associated with the 18th. Century Scottish philosopher David Hume. More
recently versions of it have been defended by the likes of C.L.Stevenson,
Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L.Mackie, and Richard Rorty. Indeed, Rorty (1993) has
argued that human rights are based not upon the exercise of reason, but a
sentimental vision of humanity. He insists that human rights are not
rationally defensible. He argues that one cannot justify the basis of human
rights by appeal to moral theory and the canons of reason since, he insists,
moral beliefs and practices are not ultimately motivated by an appeal to
reason or moral theory, but emanate from a sympathetic identification with
others: morality originates in the heart, and not in the head.
Interestingly, though unambiguously sceptical about the philosophical basis
of human rights, Rorty views the existence of human rights as a 'good and
desirable thing', something whose existence we all benefit from. His
critique of human rights is this not motivated by an underlying hostility to
the doctrine. For Rorty, human rights are better served by emotional appeals
to identify with the unnecessary suffering of others, than by arguments over
the correct determination of reason.
Rorty's emphasis upon the importance of an emotional identification with
others is a legitimate concern. It may, for example, provide additional
support for the philosophical arguments presented by the likes of Gewirth.
However, as Michael Freeman has recently pointed out, 'Rorty's
argument.confuses motivation and justification. Sympathy is an emotion.
Whether the action we take on the basis of our emotions is justified depends
on the reasons for the action. Rorty wishes to eliminate unprovable
metaphysical theories from philosophy, but in his critique of human-rights
theory he goes too far, and eliminates reasoning.' (2002:56) Rorty's own
account of the basis and scope of moral knowledge ultimately prohibits him
from claiming that human rights is a morally desirable phenomenon, since he
explicitly rules out the validity of appealing to the independently
verifiable criteria required to uphold any such judgement. What we require
from Rorty is an independent reason for accepting his conclusion. It is
precisely this that he denies may be legitimately provided by moral
philosophy.
Rorty aside, the general critique of moral objectivity has a long and very
well-established heritage in modern moral philosophy. It would be false to
claim that either the objectivists or the subjectivists have scored any
ultimate 'knock-down' over their philosophical opponents. Human rights are
founded upon the claim to moral objectivity, whether by appeal to interests
or the will. Any critique of moral objectivism is bound, therefore, to have
repercussions for the philosophical defence of human rights. As I noted
above, philosophers such as Alan Gewirth and John Finnis, in their separate
and different ways, have attempted to establish the rational and objective
force of human rights. The reader interested in pursuing this particular
theme further is therefore recommended to pursue a close philosophical
analysis of either, or both, of these two philosophers.
Back to Table of Contents
6. Conclusion
Human rights have a long historical heritage. The principal philosophical
foundation of human rights is a belief in the existence of a form of justice
valid for all peoples, everywhere. In this form, the contemporary doctrine
of human rights has come to occupy centre stage in geo-political affairs.
The language of human rights is understood and utilized by many peoples in
very diverse circumstances. Human rights have become indispensable to the
contemporary understanding of how human beings should be treated, by one
another and by national and international political bodies. Human rights are
best thought of as potential moral guarantees for each human being to lead a
minimally good life. The extent to which this aspiration has not been
realized represents a gross failure by the contemporary world to institute a
morally compelling order based upon human rights. The philosophical basis of
human rights has been subjected to consistent criticism. While some aspects
of the ensuing debate between philosophical supporters and opponents of
human rights remain unresolved and, perhaps, irresolvable, the general case
for human rights remains a morally powerful one. Arguably, the most
compelling motivation for the existence of human may rest upon the exercise
of imagination. Try imagining a world without human rights!
Scott
"Llanzlan Klazmon" <Kla...@llurdiaxorb.govt> wrote in message
> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote in
> news:iw_Pf.21330$rL5....@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net:
>
>>
>> "Llanzlan Klazmon" <Kla...@llurdiaxorb.govt> wrote in message
>> news:Xns978177FC4A799Kl...@203.97.37.6...
>>> "Scott" <sc...@nospam.net> wrote in
>>> news:1ZSdneDL_YBTzpPZ...@wcc.net:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> "wbarwell" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>>>> news:120siak...@corp.supernews.com...
>>>>> Scott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> CC, you really (pun) should just read.
>>>>
>>>> You are an example of what I observe. You simply presupose evil does
>>>> in fact exist.
>>>
>>> Case 1. Evil exists ---> no omni everything gods.
>>> Case 2. Evil doesn't exist ----> most religions are false.
>>>
>>> Take your pick.
>>
>> Case 1. Materialism => evil of any kind does not factually exist. All
>> moral codes are equivolent. Atheist saying he is more moral that any
>> theist because.....is basing his belief on a fallacy and at the same
>> time, knowing or not, rejecting materialism.
>
> This is a non sequitur to the point being made above. Nevertheless
> materialism does not imply that evil does not exist. Materialism does not
> disallow subjective concepts.
Subjective concepts of evil are like subjective concepts of gods
Why would materialism give more weight to one over the other.
Evil is related to the idea of justice. I.e
> the weighing up of consequences versus the weighing up of evidence. This
> doesn't mean that everyone will agree on what is evil just as everyone
> does
> not agree that the earth isn't flat. You weigh up the evidence for the
> possible consequences and decide from that if something should be lablled
> evil. Not everyone will agree. This is true even amoung members of the
> same
> religious faith were they are supposedly working from the same absolute
> moral code.
I think you're conflating moral realism to justice. In philosophical
materialism there is no such thing as a Natural Moral Law. So there is only
positive law (aka man-made law). In moral law theory, whenever a positive
law in not in accord (is contrary) to natural law then that positive law is
deemed an unjust law. If there is only postive law (as in materialism),
there is no such thing as an unjust law. In that sense evil equates to
unlawful. A society can actually define a race of people as unlawful, put
them in a camp, and gas them.
Your attempting to invoke empathy, compassion, and/or tolerance as some
(rational) standard to *justify* a more correct moral code would be
fallacious. To relativism there is no correct moral standard. There are no
standards at all.
<quoting, it's late> http://radicalacademy.com/ethicsmyth.htm == "None of
the above judgments regarding a human act can be judged as right or wrong
without appealing to some standard used as a criterion for judging the
behavior. This standard, by its very nature, is "absolutist." Moral
relativism cannot appeal to a standard, simply because "relativism" itself
means there are no standards.
I could continue with many other examples of the "moral absolutist"
masquerading as a "moral relativist." But brevity forbids it. And, besides,
I want to make another important point. The pseudo-moral relativist (because
that's what they really are!) do not really want to convince you that his or
her philosophical position is correct or true by engaging in an intellectual
discourse. Rather, in American society, the pseudo-moral relativist wants to
appeal to the legislative bodies (Congress, et al) or the judiciary bodies
(the Supreme Court, etc.) to have their "beliefs" encased in law. This means
that what is "legal" is the same as what is "moral," and nothing else. And
this is the final nail in the coffin of the moral relativist.
We are not talking about morality at all! We are talking about positive law.
Morality or ethics has nothing to do with the situation. Positive law is now
all that matters. Making some "human act" legal is to be distinguished from
the "morality" of any human act. All we need to do, according to this
philosophical position, is declare something to be "legal" and it is, ipso
facto, "moral." This, by the way, is, in my opinion, the current state of
affairs in American society today.
Okay, let us accept that for the sake of the current argument: What is
"legal" is equivalent to what is "moral," as a defining example of moral
relativism. The so-called moral relativist is dead in the water. Because if
"legality" is to define "morality" then any outrage against such phenomena
as the Nazi "Holocaust" or the attack on America by terrorists on September
11, 2001 or the "circumcision" of little girls in many black-African
countries or the "abuse" of women in Taliban Afghanistan or the practice of
owning black slaves in 19th-century America is misplaced and unfair. These
are or were "legal." Therefore, according to the logic of this type of moral
relativists, all these practices are or were "moral."
No moral relativist I am familiar with will accept the above. They will
insist these are "evil" acts. But by what standards, or on what grounds, or
by what criteria, if judging human acts is relative matter and there are no
absolute standards that can be used to make a judgment? Either all moral
principles are relative or there is at least one moral principle which is
absolute, or, in the case of the logical positivists and some others,
morality is simply a semantic game which has no real content (which is not
at issue here since no one really believes that anyway, including the
logical positivists who promoted it)." <end quote>
Scott
>>>>> Scott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> contradiction.
>>>>>
>>>>> THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem of evil was first written down by
>>>>> Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
>>>>>
>>>>> Today's formulation is:
>>>>> A. God is defined as omnipotent;
>>>>> B. and as omnibenevolent.
>>>>> C. Evil exists.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>does evil exist? Prove it. Prove evil is real. If you could you might
>>>>just prove the paradox as well.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
>>>>> E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
>>>>> F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
>>>>> omnibenevolent.
>>>>> G. Or god is not existant.
>>>>
>>> The point is, this argument creates a problem for all those who
>>> believe evil *is* real.
>>
>> Exactly, Jim. Now a theist will likely refer to an (admittedly
>> irrational)
>> justification like revelation or gnosiology. That is a conversation
>> stopper as it can't be tested.
>>
>> But what rationalism do atheists, like CC here, us to justify their
>> believing evil *is* real? That's the point of my quoting Copan and his
>> criticism of Martin. Both CC and Martin presuppose evil without a
>> rational, ontological justification for doing so.
>>
>
> Evil, like everything is defined.
> Evil. like everything defined has different definitions.
> Many people would define mass murder as evil. unless you are a religious
> sunuvabicth defining pogroms and religious wars as necessary works of the
> Lord.
>
> Part of modern definitions of evil in modern, progressive societies
> is based on looking back at history and see what works and what does
> not as far as definitions of evil, and morality.
>
> If some sunuvabitch looks that the mass murders of Hitler and dares tell
> us
> we are not allowed to call that evil for some pissy, stupid bent brained
> religious of head-in-the-asshole species of philosophy, everybody
> else, secularist or religious is going to call that freak a freak.
You're not playing with a full deck are you?
You, like Hitler, can define evil any way you want. It's all subjective and
all relative to you and him. There are no evil actions *out there*. They are
all in you fantasizing head. You believe that? If you don't, you are no
materialist.
>
> We don't need a god or some ivory tower, wool gathering
> philosopher here.
> Or a usenet kook.
I take it you just know evil when you see it.