Dover in Review, pt. 2: Did Judge Jones read the evidence submitted to him in the Dover trial?
by John G. West
3. Judge Jones wrongly claims that intelligent design "requires
supernatural creation." (p. 30, emphasis added)
Contrary to Judge Jones, there was extensive evidence in the trial
record and documents submitted in briefs that intelligent design does
NOT "require supernatural creation." Indeed, Judge Jones seems to
willfully misrepresent the claims of intelligent design scientists, who
consistently have made clear from the very start that empirical evidence
cannot tell one whether the intelligent causes detected through modern
science are inside or outside of nature. For extensive documentation of
this fact, see Appendix A to the Discovery Institute amicus brief
submitted in the case, available here.
As a scientific theory, all ID claims is that there is empirical
evidence that key features of the universe and living things are the
products of an intelligent cause. Whether the intelligent cause involved
is inside or outside of nature cannot be decided by empirical evidence
alone. That larger question involves philosophy and metaphysics.
To justify his false claim that ID requires a supernatural cause, Judge
Jones also completely misrepresents the content of the textbook Of
Pandas and People. He claims at one point that "Pandas indicates that
there are two kinds of causes, natural and intelligent, which
demonstrate that intelligent causes are beyond nature." (p. 30) In fact,
Pandas explicitly and repeatedly makes the opposite claim: Intelligent
causes may be either inside or outside of nature, and empirical evidence
alone can't determine which option is correct. Pandas made this
distinction even in its early drafts, one of which emphatically stated
that "in science, the proper contrary to natural cause is not
supernatural cause, but intelligent cause." (FTE Amicus Brief, Appendix
B, Document B; emphasis added.) Also consider the following passages
from the edition of Pandas actually used in Dover (both of these
passages were highlighted for Judge Jones in Appendix A of the FTE
amicus brief):
"If science is based upon experience, then science tells us the
message encoded in DNA must have originated from an intelligent
cause. But what kind of intelligent agent was it? On its own,
science cannot answer this question; it must leave it to religion
and philosophy. But that should not prevent science from
acknowledging evidences for an intelligent cause origin wherever
they may exist."(Of Pandas and People, 2nd ed., 1993, pg. 7;
emphasis added)
"Today we recognize that appeals to intelligent design may be
considered in science, as illustrated by current NASA search for
extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI). Archaeology has pioneered the
development of methods for distinguishing the effects of natural and
intelligent causes. We should recognize, however, that if we go
further, and conclude that the intelligence responsible for
biological origins is outside the universe (supernatural) or within
it, we do so without the help of science." (Of Pandas and People,
2nd ed., 1993, pg. 126-127; emphasis added)
Again, the intelligent causes detected through empirical evidence may be
either inside or outside of nature; and contrary to Judge Jones, this
point is made in the very book he cites to justify his position.
Incredibly, Judge Jones at another point in his opinion (p. 25)
misinterprets the Pandas' quote on p. 7 as further proof that ID
requires a belief in a supernatural cause, claiming:
In fact, an explicit concession that the intelligent designer works
outside the laws of nature and science and a direct reference to
religion is Pandas' rhetorical statement, "what kind of intelligent
agent was it [the designer]" and answer: "On its own science cannot
answer this question. It must leave it to religion and philosophy."
Contrary to Judge Jones, the above statement clearly does NOT concede
that "the intelligent designer works outside the laws of nature and
science." Instead, it merely reaffirms that empirical science cannot
determine whether the intelligent cause detected resides inside or
outside of nature. That further determination requires more than
empirical science. Far from being merely "rhetorical," this claim is
central to the definition of intelligent design as a scientific theory,
and it is reaffirmed and further explained in other passages in Pandas
that the Judge ignores (such as the passage on pp. 126-127 cited above).