OT: Essays by John le Carré, Salman Rushdie, etc...
Daneel
Lot of good essays there, for example, these lot on the coming war:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=88&articleId=882
I note le Carré's one, for its (to me surprising) blistering tone, and
Rushdie's one, because I again find myself in almost perfect agreement
with him.
bye
Daneel
stillsunny
Do you?
That's interesting to me. It's a much more balanced approach than
many of the others. I find much to agree with, but don't know that I
agree that it either must be or can be about how poorly Hussein treats
his people. Lest you think I'm sanguine about what goes on in that
country, I'm not. At all. Yet there are two things that strike me
about that justification. The first is obvious -- if we are so
concerned about the human rights abuses in Iraq, why are we not
equally concerned and champing against the human rights abuses in
Turkey, Egypt, Saudi, Kuwait, and let's whisper, Israel. It's the
same argument used against the US all the time, with or without
justification -- that we went in *here*, but failed to go in *there*.
Implicit in that argument is the assumption that the US either can or
should make the whole world better, and that if it can't do the whole
world, it should do nothing at all, lest it be called hypocrites. I
reject that one.
I'd suspect we are concerned about the Iraqi people, to the extent
that I don't think many in the US are exactly happy about anybody
being abused, ever -- but are reticent to inflict something as
horrific as war on a nation in order to "help" the suffering. It's a
fuzzy line, and not one I'm comfortable with. In this situation, by
use of sanctions, the US/UN are, in some way, complicit in that
suffering, though _not_, I claim, "responsible," though I've heard
that one, too.
The next reason has to do with the first one. Obviously, if the
purpose is all out war on this nearly landlocked country, we're going
to have to have *somewhere* to base operations. If the rationale is
getting rid of Hussein because he's so awful to his people, then that
leaves wide open the question in every Arab leaders mind -- are we
next? What will happen if we let the US do this through us? The WMD
approach is the *one* approach which has the chance of appealing to
those leaders whose cooperation will be required.
All that said, the condition of the Iraqi people *is* a good reason,
and in all this, I do hope they can have a chance at something better.
It's a tri-horned goat we're stuck on here. The world can't afford to
simply have let Saddam go back home after Kuwait and rev up for the
next country he wants to attack; the UN (for some obvious reasons)
lacked the will to give the go-ahead last go round to just take him
out (which is a lesson that needs to be learned about fighting to some
incomplete stalemate when the opportunity is there to eradicate a
threat); and sanctions only limit, but do not prevent, the buildup
that was feared at the end of the last war, and create a terrible
situation for the rest of the citizens in Iraq.
Philip Bobbitt's essay is the best I've seen yet about why the war is
necessary, and necessary now. Yet...
The truth is, I *still* haven't decided how I feel about this thing.
It's surreal, almost, watching this huge event unfold like a movie.
But some things trouble me, and they're related.
The main thing is that there are 150,000 Americans poised to invade a
sovereign state, and there's no declaration of war by congress.
Congress has failed in its duty to the American people, I think, by
not demanding the dialogue that would precede that declaration -- or
lack of declaration. Now, the downside to all that talking is that
sometimes nothing gets done, and sometimes bad guys keep doing bad and
worse things until the American people get Pearl Harbor bombed or
something. But it's the price of a free society, and there's a reason
for that constitutional provision -- to keep so very much power being
vested in the hands of one single individual. Bush may be a homocidal
maniac or the best hero since Audie Murphy -- I don't know, and don't
care at this point. The point is, no matter *what* he is, he's one
man, and this sets a precedent that disturbs me greatly.
The second reason is linked to the first. I have in my head a rough
set of general "rules" for war, and when to engage and when not to.
There are, to me, a couple of things required for a successful
engagement, and one of them is the backing of the American people. I
mean, it's just that simple. It is _immoral_ to send our sons to go
kill or harm or be killed or harmed for a country which will spurn
them when they come home. Without a discussion, with the American
people increasingly getting the sense that this president is pushing
them into a war which they're uncertain is justified, there is no
sense of unity, of purpose, or any of that. We need that.
So.
Saddam's a bad guy.
It's obvious the UN resolutions regarding chemical weapons and so
forth have been disregarded by him. I mean, truly -- is there really
a doubt he continued with the things?
But it's not a UN action here. It's a US one.
If the UN can't or won't enforce the things it puts in place, things
the world saw as necessary, if Hussein was going to remain in power,
is the US a bad guy for responding to reports of continued efforts to
obtain nuclear power by going it alone without that same UN, or is it
a good guy for being willing to be the scourge of the world for doing
what everybody knows needs doing, but lacks the will to do?
I just don't know. I wish I did.
Some of these articles are excellent, although I confess, some of them
annoy me. Meena Alexander writes touchingly of the fears of an Iraqi
woman, but fails to note the fears of an Iraqi woman on the wrong side
of Saddam's police state, and says, "Other means of change are
possible, and may be within arm's reach." I just love that, people
who say there's another answer, but fail to elaborate on just what
that answer might be -- because *I* sure can't think of one past the
three I've outlined (lift all restrictions and wait for him to do the
inevitable; keep restrictions, knowing they're not going to stop him,
but hope they'll slow him down, while they starve his people; or go in
and take him out.) Hazhir Teimourian is certainly passionate, and he
at least has been *in* the places he writes about, for some years.
Grr.
Do I sound frustrated?
I am.
Sunny
****************************************
People demand freedom of speech as a
compensation for the freedom of thought
which they seldom use.
Soren Kierkegaard
Daneel
stillsunny wrote:
> Daneel wrote:
> >Do you read OpenDemocracy.org?
> >
> >Lot of good essays there, for example, these lot on the coming war:
> >
>http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=88&articleId=882
> >
> >I note le Carré's one, for its (to me surprising) blistering tone, and
> >Rushdie's one, because I again find myself in almost perfect agreement
> >with him.
>
> Do you?
>
> That's interesting to me. It's a much more balanced approach than
> many of the others.
Surprised? I'm a humanitarian interventionist of long standing :)
Rushdie is an independent thinker and critical idealist who can
capitalise on his between-cultures migrant 'status', whom I hold in high
regard ever since I first read something from him. Being fed up with
isolation, widespread anti-immigrant sentiments in Britain, and some
cold-hearted opinions on state funding of his personal security, also
the naivety or hypocrisy of many of his fellow leftist European
intellectuals, he moved a few years ago to cosmopolitan New York, then
started a hedonistic phase in his life. So I feared his critical mind
might be lost, but this and a few other recent ones showed it did't.
Back to Iraq, I have three primary concerns: the future for the people
after the war, the future of terrorism, and oil.
For the first, I'm not optimistic. The people around Bush have
something against 'nation building' -- yet to prevent Iraq sinking into
anarchy or into another bloody dictatorship, exactly that should be
done, with massive investment. For political stability, a large
peace-keeping force would have to stay, at least for two elections --
but publicised plans are for 18 months "at most", while we know that
the Iraqi opposition couldn't agree on a common line even against
Saddam. And as a test of what to expect, one could look at Afghanistan:
Taliban and al-Qaida alive and well as guerilla, with Hekmatyar joining
them, warlords ruling outside Kabul, with the one in Herat
re-introducing religious police with all the same objectives as in
Taliban times.
For the second, I'm even less optimistic. If al-Qaida ever gets hands
on Saddam's WMD, then in the chaos during or after the war. The war
will mean a massive new recruiting tool for them. The hopes of the
Bush gang are for a 'democratic domino effect' in the Middle East, I'd
rather expect revolutions (speeded up by economic crisis from falling
post-war oil prices) replacing corrupt leaders with elected
fundamentalist idiots. The hopes of draining the financial basis of
Islamic terrorism this way are so ridiculous I won't even comment. To
emphasize: I think Osama is a bigger enemy than Saddam. Finally, the
message to other evil dictators will be: get nukes and make it public
as soon as possible, so that you will be safe from the USA like
Pakistan or North Korea, and don't fare like Saddam.
For the third, I'm rather certain oil is the main motive now. Not in a
simplicist demonising way -- "politicians from oil business serve oil
companies" --, but along these considerations: 1) Saddam can influence
oil price by regulating output, 2) Saddam could attack neighbouring
countries' oil fields, 3) The Saudi regime could topple and victorious
fundies stop exporting oil, 4) the Bush administration is not willing
to do anything on the demand side (i.e., reduce it massively). These
are part of Dick Cheney's future energy report, leaked in 2001. But
the 'solution' of getting Saddam's oil will backfire, not only because
of the 'hidden' costs of conflict management, but because an oil shock
will happen anyway for simple economic reasons (the reduction of world
oil production below demand, which happens *far* before oil reserves
would run out). So I think letting Bush control Iraqi oil is, on the
long run, even more dangerous than Osama, both to the USA and the
world.
<snip>
> use of sanctions, the US/UN are, in some way, complicit in that
> suffering, though _not_, I claim, "responsible," though I've heard
> that one, too.
I'm not so sure. It was openly argued (tough I don't know if it was
put into the official UN documents on the sanctions) that one of the
aims of having all-encompassing rather than arms-related sanctions is
to 'persuase' people to topple Saddam. That such a method doesn't
work, one should have known from the terror bombing of Germany (or the
terror bombing of Britain, for that matter). However, the sanctions
are hardly just the USA's fault in the UN.
<snip>
> getting rid of Hussein because he's so awful to his people, then that
> leaves wide open the question in every Arab leaders mind -- are we
> next? What will happen if we let the US do this through us? The WMD
> approach is the *one* approach which has the chance of appealing to
> those leaders whose cooperation will be required.
Maybe, but since neo-conservative writer's essays, newspaper articles
about 'leaked' government strategies and James Woolsey's interview
have revealed an intent to reshape the Middle East starting from Iraq,
they know already what to expect. (BTW, I'm all for invading Saudi
Arabia with the exception of Mecca and Medina that remain
Vatican-style enclaves, as part of the War on Terror. ...wait, it
would need only ten times as much peacekeepers as Iraq... :( )
<snip>
> Philip Bobbitt's essay is the best I've seen yet about why the war is
> necessary, and necessary now. Yet...
I read it, I wasn't too convinced. (BTW, I read only the few people I
know and some others, maybe eight or ten, any others you might
recommend?) My main boggle is with the inspectors. I think (but could
be wrong like about fundies attacking the West from within) it is hot
rhetoric that they can't disarm Saddam -- as I said a few times here,
they were so good at cat-and-mouse play that they already destroyed
most of Saddam's WMD, they destroyed more than Gulf War bombs, they
destroyed more than western intelligence *knew about* during the war.
(If Saddam indeed still has WMD, think about whether a post-war
inventory could be complete, and what routes the 'forgotten' WMD
could take.)
Also, it's not just Saddam who 'improved' his methods, but the
inspectors too: now they have helicopters, robot planes, possibly
spy planes, secretive tactics of their own, better satellite photos,
better data processing, better detectors, and new rights to gain
access anywhere. But the Bush admin's moves in the UN are designed to
exclude using this opinion. Resolution 1441 was crafted in a way that
if the inspectors find nothing, they'll claim the inspectors are
useless and attack, but if they find anything, they use it as casus
belli and the inspectors are withdrawn. A lose-lose situation.
<snip>
> The main thing is that there are 150,000 Americans poised to invade a
> sovereign state, and there's no declaration of war by congress. [...]
Interestingly, in an essay in a Newsweek quarterly supplement, I read
similar sentiments have run wild back in the time of the Mexico war,
the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, and the eve of WWII. The
morale was, since-forgotten fierce public opposition always had a
post-war effect But maybe the unintended morale is, never a lasting
one?
(Brings me to a secret fear of myself. I have the hypothesis that the
second generation that hasn't seen a big war will be enthusiastic
about it, ignore grandparent's warnings, and destroy the framework of
peace their parent's generation built. This fits well the *European*
history of the last 300 years, and if it is right, it's my
generation's turn, our turn to cheer some future big war... not seen
its signs so far, tough.)
<snip>
> It is _immoral_ to send our sons to go
> kill or harm or be killed or harmed for a country which will spurn
> them when they come home.
Didn't thought of this. You are a much more accomplished moraliser
than myself :)
<snip rest>
bye
Daneel
"I'm proud to be an old European!"
stillsunny
> [some massive snippage -- only for brewity]
>
> stillsunny wrote:
> > Daneel wrote:
> > >Do you read OpenDemocracy.org?
> > >
> > >Lot of good essays there, for example, these lot on the coming war:
> > >
> http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=88&articleId=882
> > >
> > >I note le Carré's one, for its (to me surprising) blistering tone, and
> > >Rushdie's one, because I again find myself in almost perfect agreement
> > >with him.
> >
> > Do you?
> >
> > That's interesting to me. It's a much more balanced approach than
> > many of the others.
>
> Surprised? I'm a humanitarian interventionist of long standing :)
Do you mind an outline of how you differentiate between situations
where intervention will actually increase suffering, and when
intervention will have a net gain, despite a period of yuckiness?
That's not a dare. I'm still trying to muddle things out.
<snip>
> Back to Iraq, I have three primary concerns: the future for the people
> after the war, the future of terrorism, and oil.
>
> For the first, I'm not optimistic. The people around Bush have
> something against 'nation building' -- yet to prevent Iraq sinking into
> anarchy or into another bloody dictatorship, exactly that should be
> done, with massive investment. For political stability, a large
> peace-keeping force would have to stay, at least for two elections --
> but publicised plans are for 18 months "at most", while we know that
> the Iraqi opposition couldn't agree on a common line even against
> Saddam. And as a test of what to expect, one could look at Afghanistan:
> Taliban and al-Qaida alive and well as guerilla, with Hekmatyar joining
> them, warlords ruling outside Kabul, with the one in Herat
> re-introducing religious police with all the same objectives as in
> Taliban times.
The history if Afghanistan is rather different, though. Even when
they were united against the Soviet invasion, there was tribal
bickering and even warring at the same time they were fighting the
Soviets. Iraq *had* a fairly impressive record of education and so
forth before this mess. Mostly, contact with the outside world to a
degree significantly greater than the people of Afghanistan.
To be honest, I'm ambivalent about nation building in that region,
too. We don't have a good record of success at it, to be perfectly
frank, and whatever government potentially emerges from this mess is
going to have to be both strong and credible -- and no one supported
by the US is going to be so. One of the emotional motivations of
Qaeda et al is the presence of (I forget -- is it infidels, heathens,
something) in Saudi, an insult to Osama personally because outsiders
were brought in to protect against another Arab state, and an affront
to religious sensibilities, and more importantly, cultural ones.
> For the second, I'm even less optimistic. If al-Qaida ever gets hands
> on Saddam's WMD, then in the chaos during or after the war. The war
> will mean a massive new recruiting tool for them.
My fear, too -- but from whom? The Iraqis?
<snip>
> For the third, I'm rather certain oil is the main motive now. Not in a
> simplicist demonising way -- "politicians from oil business serve oil
> companies" --, but along these considerations: 1) Saddam can influence
> oil price by regulating output, 2) Saddam could attack neighbouring
> countries' oil fields, 3) The Saudi regime could topple and victorious
> fundies stop exporting oil, 4) the Bush administration is not willing
> to do anything on the demand side (i.e., reduce it massively). These
> are part of Dick Cheney's future energy report, leaked in 2001.
Dick Cheney, or James Baker? If you're talking about Baker, I don't
know that it was leaked. My impression is that it's open record. If
it's Cheney, I've not seen it. Do you have it?
> But
> the 'solution' of getting Saddam's oil will backfire, not only because
> of the 'hidden' costs of conflict management, but because an oil shock
> will happen anyway for simple economic reasons (the reduction of world
> oil production below demand, which happens *far* before oil reserves
> would run out). So I think letting Bush control Iraqi oil is, on the
> long run, even more dangerous than Osama, both to the USA and the
> world.
Perhaps I'm naive, but I simply can't credit this as a push for Bush
to "control" Iraqi oil. To diminish threat to other oil sources, I
can see. To overthrow a regime which we, the UN, the world, has said
must do X before the oil can be freely sold on the open market, I can
even see. Direct control of that oil is sort of beyond what I can
envision.
>
> <snip>
> > use of sanctions, the US/UN are, in some way, complicit in that
> > suffering, though _not_, I claim, "responsible," though I've heard
> > that one, too.
>
> I'm not so sure. It was openly argued (tough I don't know if it was
> put into the official UN documents on the sanctions) that one of the
> aims of having all-encompassing rather than arms-related sanctions is
> to 'persuase' people to topple Saddam. That such a method doesn't
> work, one should have known from the terror bombing of Germany (or the
> terror bombing of Britain, for that matter). However, the sanctions
> are hardly just the USA's fault in the UN.
Of course, I think everyone *hoped* that would happen. I think,
though, the rationale for the all encompassing sanctions had more to
do with a fear that looser sanctions wouldn't offer sufficient
protection against his ability to gain the means to create arms.
You know what? When the Gulf War ended, and Saddam was still in
power, and there was no opportunity for any sort of Marshall kind of
program, I said then that the thing wasn't over. It isn't fun to be
right.
<snip>
> > Philip Bobbitt's essay is the best I've seen yet about why the war is
> > necessary, and necessary now. Yet...
>
> I read it, I wasn't too convinced. (BTW, I read only the few people I
> know and some others, maybe eight or ten, any others you might
> recommend?)
Shoot, I read all of them. The one fellow who spent a great deal of
time in Iraq was at least informed (I can't retrieve it, as I'm
replying by Google right now). And I'm not convinced either way right
now, which is a stinky place to be.
> My main boggle is with the inspectors. I think (but could
> be wrong like about fundies attacking the West from within) it is hot
> rhetoric that they can't disarm Saddam -- as I said a few times here,
> they were so good at cat-and-mouse play that they already destroyed
> most of Saddam's WMD, they destroyed more than Gulf War bombs, they
> destroyed more than western intelligence *knew about* during the war.
There is that, but if memory serves, the entire nuclear program was
conducted right under the nose of inspectors, both before the Gulf War
and afterward, and it was only the accidental finding of some black
book that uncovered it (I'm dim on this, but I'll look it up if you
like).
> (If Saddam indeed still has WMD, think about whether a post-war
> inventory could be complete, and what routes the 'forgotten' WMD
> could take.)
I know. It's the same concern I have with the breakaway republics,
rumors of hundreds of "missing" warheads, and nobody knows whether to
credit the rumors, or where the warheads are.
> Also, it's not just Saddam who 'improved' his methods, but the
> inspectors too: now they have helicopters, robot planes, possibly
> spy planes, secretive tactics of their own, better satellite photos,
> better data processing, better detectors, and new rights to gain
> access anywhere. But the Bush admin's moves in the UN are designed to
> exclude using this opinion. Resolution 1441 was crafted in a way that
> if the inspectors find nothing, they'll claim the inspectors are
> useless and attack, but if they find anything, they use it as casus
> belli and the inspectors are withdrawn. A lose-lose situation.
I take it you see the conflict as inevitable?
<snip>
> > It is _immoral_ to send our sons to go
> > kill or harm or be killed or harmed for a country which will spurn
> > them when they come home.
>
> Didn't thought of this. You are a much more accomplished moraliser
> than myself :)
Oh, nonsense! I'm living in a nation with Vietnam vets as friends, so
the memory is fresh with respect to what that can mean.
> bye
>
> Daneel
> "I'm proud to be an old European!"
What does this mean?
Sunny
Daneel
> Daneel wrote:
<snip first half>
> > Also, it's not just Saddam who 'improved' his methods, but the
> > inspectors too: now they have helicopters, robot planes, possibly
> > spy planes, secretive tactics of their own, better satellite photos,
> > better data processing, better detectors, and new rights to gain
> > access anywhere. But the Bush admin's moves in the UN are designed to
> > exclude using this opinion. Resolution 1441 was crafted in a way that
> > if the inspectors find nothing, they'll claim the inspectors are
> > useless and attack, but if they find anything, they use it as casus
> > belli and the inspectors are withdrawn. A lose-lose situation.
>
> I take it you see the conflict as inevitable?
To use a commonplace, war is never inevitable :) IMO it is not
inevitable on the level of possible decisions politicians could take,
but it is inevitable on the level of possible choices of actual
politicians. IMO if from nothing else, US and British push for war is
quite obvious from the shifting arguments they use (the latest line
they adopted is "the role of the inspectors is to check whether Saddam
is cooperative").
France? Some short news I read this weekend: "US troop deployment
suffers delays", "UK Defense Ministry is displeased with BAE Systems,
French rival could get $ 5 billion aircraft carrier contract", "US
considers to grant more time to inspectors to please allies". If I put
these together, I see Chirac playing his cards and winning: a
demonstration that nothing happens without France, and even some cash
from Britain. I predict next time he will bolt, and legitimise the war
when US troops are ready.
Saddam? As I see it, he looks to want this war, too. Why, is another
question: does he hope Arabs will rise all around the Middle East, or
does he hope he can draw out the bloodshed long enough for US public
opinion to stop Bush, or does he count on al-Qaeda 'opening a second
front'? (Funny thing is, Saddam would prefer a split between Europe
and the USA, while Osama needs the opposite for his War of Cultures.)
Or does he count on remaining WMD? (If I were Saddam, and I had WMD to
hide, they would be in Washington. In some container with fake papers.)
<snip>
> > "I'm proud to be an old European!"
>
> What does this mean?
Refers to one of Rumsfeld's calculated provocations. He said:
"You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't, I think
that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the
centre of gravity is shifting to the east and there are a lot of new
members."
Most French and some German politicians, in a just as calculated
evasion of the essence of Rummy's message, took the chance to take
theatrical affront at this "old", while intellectuals across the
continent took the chance to take pride in it ("old Europe's wisdom").
Of course, the real message is laying open what was Clinton policy
already, to count on us, USA-friendly post-communist Eastern Europe,
i.e. New Europe, to weaken possible Western European resistance to US
policies.
But, Rumsfeld miscalculated with this "New Europe". People here either
view Old Europe as a role model, something to grow up to, whose culture
(material, social, political) one wishes to adopt (in communist times,
'Europe' was a magic word too, not just 'America'), something to
*re-join* rather than change -- or one wants national independence,
sovereignity after the Warshaw Pact, and rejects policy on a European
dimension. "New Europe" might be an easy thought for a pioneering
American mindset, but doesn't make much sense with prevailing notions
here -- hence, Rummy's comment only brings integrationists closer to
France&Germany (after the recent bloody disputes over money), gives
governments the uneasy feeling (and to-be-warded-off image) of having
been outed as vassals, and makes nationalists even more paranoid about
being vassals again.
In short, I want to thank Rummy :)
Daneel
> Daneel wrote:
<snip>
>
> Do you mind an outline of how you differentiate between situations
> where intervention will actually increase suffering, and when
> intervention will have a net gain, despite a period of yuckiness?
Outline? Well, I rather tend to be lost in details, but broadly: I
count as factor how well the invader knows the invaded, how much the
invader is willing to invest in the effort (this includes a probable
main concern of yours: the security and lives of peace-keepers), how
long the invader is willing to stay, what political groups of the
invaded will be there after intervention, and what social and economic
and cultural features can be built on by these various groups. Plus,
what role third parties would like to play in the invaded country.
Whether these factors are enough, and whether they can be estimaded
fair enough, I don't know -- but I believe chances of net gain are
the greater the more thought invasors give to them. (Remember what I
wrote of an invasion of Saudi Arabia -- I'm not so sure either...)
<snip>
> > Back to Iraq, I have three primary concerns: the future for the people
> > after the war, the future of terrorism, and oil.
> >
> > For the first, I'm not optimistic. The people around Bush have
> > something against 'nation building' -- yet to prevent Iraq sinking into
> > anarchy or into another bloody dictatorship, exactly that should be
> > done, with massive investment. For political stability, a large
> > peace-keeping force would have to stay, at least for two elections --
> > but publicised plans are for 18 months "at most", while we know that
> > the Iraqi opposition couldn't agree on a common line even against
> > Saddam. And as a test of what to expect, one could look at Afghanistan:
> > Taliban and al-Qaida alive and well as guerilla, with Hekmatyar joining
> > them, warlords ruling outside Kabul, with the one in Herat
> > re-introducing religious police with all the same objectives as in
> > Taliban times.
>
> The history if Afghanistan is rather different, though. Even when
> they were united against the Soviet invasion, there was tribal
> bickering and even warring at the same time they were fighting the
> Soviets. Iraq *had* a fairly impressive record of education and so
> forth before this mess. Mostly, contact with the outside world to a
> degree significantly greater than the people of Afghanistan.
But, they are just as tribal, divided, and can't even look back at a
past golden age of national unity (Iraq is a recent creation). I can't
see democracy self-creating from this, even less than in Afghanistan,
which at least had the tradition of Loya Jirga to build on. (BTW,
before the Soviets, Kabul was viewed by Pakistanis as a city of
freedom, modernism and cosmopolitanism, where they could evade the
mental cage of their homeland. Admittedly, Kabul is not Afghanistan.)
> To be honest, I'm ambivalent about nation building in that region,
> too. We don't have a good record of success at it, to be perfectly
I wonder what you mean. Germany, Japan, Somalia, perhaps South Korea:
I can't see more US attempts at nation building, off the top of my
head. You had 3:1 successes! (I count Bosnia as UN attempt, along with
East Timor and Cambodia -- all half-successes so far.)
> frank, and whatever government potentially emerges from this mess is
> going to have to be both strong and credible -- and no one supported
> by the US is going to be so.
But no one coming after a US-led invasion will be non-US-supported, so
one can't get around it by pulling out.
> One of the emotional motivations of
> Qaeda et al is the presence of (I forget -- is it infidels, heathens,
> something) in Saudi, an insult to Osama personally because outsiders
> were brought in to protect against another Arab state, and an affront
> to religious sensibilities, and more importantly, cultural ones.
The question is, do we want to appease Osama and his followers, or the
one billion ordinary Muslims and potential Osama followers? The former
will bomb anyway, their reasons already exist. The latter, from what I
read, don't care that much about "holy Muslim land", but they do about
hypocrisy regarding their corrupt leader's democratic values, and
about Palestine. What I'm saying is that a democratic Iraq prospering
from American material 'sacrifice' would, in itself, positively
impress the ordinary Muslim, but the "backward solution" (i.e., Iraq
first and Palestine last) counteracts that.
> > For the second, I'm even less optimistic. If al-Qaida ever gets hands
> > on Saddam's WMD, then in the chaos during or after the war. The war
> > will mean a massive new recruiting tool for them.
>
> My fear, too -- but from whom?
From the desperates of the entire Muslim world -- what else could I
have meant? I mean, al-Qaeda is *international* terrorism. If they
get but 1/1000th of all Muslims to follow, that's already over a
million.
> The Iraqis?
Among them, too, even if post-war Iraq doesn't go all wrong. Not that
I have put much significance to this fraction.
> <snip>
> > For the third, I'm rather certain oil is the main motive now. Not in a
> > simplicist demonising way -- "politicians from oil business serve oil
> > companies" --, but along these considerations: 1) Saddam can influence
> > oil price by regulating output, 2) Saddam could attack neighbouring
> > countries' oil fields, 3) The Saudi regime could topple and victorious
> > fundies stop exporting oil, 4) the Bush administration is not willing
> > to do anything on the demand side (i.e., reduce it massively). These
> > are part of Dick Cheney's future energy report, leaked in 2001.
>
> Dick Cheney, or James Baker? If you're talking about Baker, I don't
> know that it was leaked. My impression is that it's open record. If
> it's Cheney, I've not seen it. Do you have it?
The problems of working from memory... (excuses, excuses...) I indeed
messed up more things, and most of them were public -- the Cheney
Report, an interview with Cheney, a speech by Cheney (all three in
2001), the CFR's "Strategic Energy Policy” [is this the Baker report
you mean?], and truly 'leaked' bits about Middle Eastern Grand Plans.
> > But
> > the 'solution' of getting Saddam's oil will backfire, not only because
> > of the 'hidden' costs of conflict management, but because an oil shock
> > will happen anyway for simple economic reasons (the reduction of world
> > oil production below demand, which happens *far* before oil reserves
> > would run out). So I think letting Bush control Iraqi oil is, on the
> > long run, even more dangerous than Osama, both to the USA and the
> > world.
>
> Perhaps I'm naive, but I simply can't credit this as a push for Bush
> to "control" Iraqi oil. To diminish threat to other oil sources, I
> can see. To overthrow a regime which we, the UN, the world, has said
> must do X before the oil can be freely sold on the open market, I can
> even see. Direct control of that oil is sort of beyond what I can
> envision.
I didn't wrote "direct" :) It's enough if a friendly or puppet
government cooperates perfectly and busts the OPEC with an output
resulting in 15-18 dollars per barrel oil prices (and Iraqi National
Congress's Chalabi brothers already made such promises in public).
It's enough if this government secures an oil output equaling that of
another country whose oil sources are threatened more by the
instability within than by Iraq, and already regulates output as main
member of the OPEC. And given that regulation, the current two-thirds
share of the Middle East in global oil reserves is bound to increase,
just when the imports percentage of US oil consumption is bound to
increase too (from 50% in 2000 to 65% in 2020, according to the Cheney
Report). If one doesn't seriously consider reducing consumption (and
the Cheney Report's projections of 33% increase until 2020 attest to
that), and already has to secure more than a quarter of the world's
consumption, one has *no*other*choice*but* to look at the Middle East.
If the Bush admin's connections with oil business have any
significance here, then it is that they surely are all fully aware of
these points.
<snip>
> You know what? When the Gulf War ended, and Saddam was still in
> power, and there was no opportunity for any sort of Marshall kind of
> program, I said then that the thing wasn't over. It isn't fun to be
> right.
Welcome to the Cassandra Club :) :(
<snip>
> > My main boggle is with the inspectors. I think (but could
> > be wrong like about fundies attacking the West from within) it is hot
> > rhetoric that they can't disarm Saddam -- as I said a few times here,
> > they were so good at cat-and-mouse play that they already destroyed
> > most of Saddam's WMD, they destroyed more than Gulf War bombs, they
> > destroyed more than western intelligence *knew about* during the war.
>
> There is that, but if memory serves, the entire nuclear program was
> conducted right under the nose of inspectors, both before the Gulf War
> and afterward, and it was only the accidental finding of some black
> book that uncovered it (I'm dim on this, but I'll look it up if you
> like).
Hm, hardly under the inspector's noses *before* the Gulf War, and IIRC
the nuclear program was already discovered in 1991 (i.e., if it was
accidental finding, it was one bound to come), but I would be thankful
for your reference.
<snip rest>
stillsunny
> > Daneel wrote:
> <snip>
> > > Surprised? I'm a humanitarian interventionist of long standing :)
> >
> > Do you mind an outline of how you differentiate between situations
> > where intervention will actually increase suffering, and when
> > intervention will have a net gain, despite a period of yuckiness?
>
> Outline? Well, I rather tend to be lost in details, but broadly: I
> count as factor how well the invader knows the invaded, how much the
> invader is willing to invest in the effort (this includes a probable
> main concern of yours: the security and lives of peace-keepers), how
> long the invader is willing to stay, what political groups of the
> invaded will be there after intervention, and what social and economic
> and cultural features can be built on by these various groups. Plus,
> what role third parties would like to play in the invaded country.
> fair enough, I don't know -- but I believe chances of net gain are
> wrote of an invasion of Saudi Arabia -- I'm not so sure either...)
That sounds reasonable, and what I'd put as important. It pretty much
precludes intervention anywhere, though, particularly the part about
how much the invader is willing to invest in the effort, particularly
of rebuilding — which is why I tend to be fairly
non-interventionist, though there are times I've screamed at the news
that someone (usually the US) should be doing something. I think I've
mentioned before that I thought the US should have moved into Bosnia
long before things got as bad as they were (and no, I didn't say UN,
or EU — and the irony is that I didn't because I knew that the
US at least had the ability and will to act in the face of global
uncertainty, and it seemed clear something needed doing, and quickly.
That's funny to me, because where it would have been an asset then,
I'm feeling particularly nervous about it now).
Unfortunately, any one individual's passion for a cause or a country
doesn't translate very well to an entire nation or group of nations
sending in their own to be in harms way to try and stop things. You
almost *have* to have a compelling interest to do so, something to
threaten stability in that country, either politically or
economically.
<snip>
> > The history if Afghanistan is rather different, though. Even when
> > they were united against the Soviet invasion, there was tribal
> > bickering and even warring at the same time they were fighting the
> > Soviets. Iraq *had* a fairly impressive record of education and so
> > forth before this mess. Mostly, contact with the outside world to a
> > degree significantly greater than the people of Afghanistan.
>
> But, they are just as tribal, divided, and can't even look back at a
> past golden age of national unity (Iraq is a recent creation). I can't
> see democracy self-creating from this, even less than in Afghanistan,
> which at least had the tradition of Loya Jirga to build on. (BTW,
> before the Soviets, Kabul was viewed by Pakistanis as a city of
> freedom, modernism and cosmopolitanism, where they could evade the
> mental cage of their homeland. Admittedly, Kabul is not Afghanistan.)
Perhaps I'm making the same mistake the world did with Yugoslavia,
which looked like the various groups had learned how to live together
under one oppressive ruler. Am I in error to think that the standard
of education in Iraq is far better than in Afghanistan overall?
> > To be honest, I'm ambivalent about nation building in that region,
> > too. We don't have a good record of success at it, to be perfectly
>
> I wonder what you mean. Germany, Japan, Somalia, perhaps South Korea:
> I can't see more US attempts at nation building, off the top of my
> head. You had 3:1 successes! (I count Bosnia as UN attempt, along with
> East Timor and Cambodia -- all half-successes so far.)
I should have stressed "in that region," and I fear I did the thing
you called me on long ago, and used "we" when I should have been more
specific. For instance:
Faisal in Iraq.
Hussein in Jordan.
The Saudi monarchy
The Shah in Iran
The CIA participation in the revolt against Kassim, and subsequent US
support of old Saddam himself during and just after the Cold War
And particularly, Israel.
All a direct result of western (often colonial) interventionism.
> > frank, and whatever government potentially emerges from this mess is
> > going to have to be both strong and credible -- and no one supported
> > by the US is going to be so.
>
> But no one coming after a US-led invasion will be non-US-supported, so
> one can't get around it by pulling out.
<sigh>
I haven't yet figured out whether it's either necessary or productive
to go *in*, for *any* reason.
Nobody from Washington's asking me, though.
> > One of the emotional motivations of
> > Qaeda et al is the presence of (I forget -- is it infidels, heathens,
> > something) in Saudi, an insult to Osama personally because outsiders
> > were brought in to protect against another Arab state, and an affront
> > to religious sensibilities, and more importantly, cultural ones.
>
> The question is, do we want to appease Osama and his followers, or the
> one billion ordinary Muslims and potential Osama followers? The former
> will bomb anyway, their reasons already exist. The latter, from what I
> read, don't care that much about "holy Muslim land", but they do about
> hypocrisy regarding their corrupt leader's democratic values, and
> about Palestine. What I'm saying is that a democratic Iraq prospering
> from American material 'sacrifice' would, in itself, positively
> impress the ordinary Muslim, but the "backward solution" (i.e., Iraq
> first and Palestine last) counteracts that.
Please don't be offended, but I'm wondering if that's putting the cart
before the horse. I always have to remember that most nations aren't
as short of memory as the US is, and I can't think of one reason for
anyone, or any group, in Iraq to trust anything that the US says as in
their best interest. Lacking that trust, I can't see how anything
positive can be accomplished. In other words, the US would have to
*do* something marvelous for the effect to be positive or null on your
ordinary Muslim, and that doing is going to depend on some measure of
cooperation with the people *in* Iraq — which I can't see, no
matter how much they don't like their leader.
> > > For the second, I'm even less optimistic. If al-Qaida ever gets hands
> > > on Saddam's WMD, then in the chaos during or after the war. The war
> > > will mean a massive new recruiting tool for them.
> >
> > My fear, too -- but from whom?
>
> From the desperates of the entire Muslim world -- what else could I
> have meant? I mean, al-Qaeda is *international* terrorism. If they
> get but 1/1000th of all Muslims to follow, that's already over a
> million.
I just wondered if you were thinking of some specific group. And I'm
not either sure that all of the al-Qaeda groupies are desperate
people, unless you and I are using the term differently. Osama
certainly isn't.
<snip>
> > > simplicist demonising way -- "politicians from oil business serve oil
> > > companies" --, but along these considerations: 1) Saddam can influence
> > > oil price by regulating output, 2) Saddam could attack neighbouring
> > > countries' oil fields, 3) The Saudi regime could topple and victorious
> > > fundies stop exporting oil, 4) the Bush administration is not willing
> > > to do anything on the demand side (i.e., reduce it massively). These
> > > are part of Dick Cheney's future energy report, leaked in 2001.
> >
> > Dick Cheney, or James Baker? If you're talking about Baker, I don't
> > know that it was leaked. My impression is that it's open record. If
> > it's Cheney, I've not seen it. Do you have it?
>
> The problems of working from memory... (excuses, excuses...)
It's a good one, and I plan on using it myself :-)
>I indeed
> messed up more things, and most of them were public -- the Cheney
> Report, an interview with Cheney, a speech by Cheney (all three in
> 2001), the CFR's "Strategic Energy Policy” [is this the Baker report
> you mean?],
Yes.
> and truly 'leaked' bits about Middle Eastern Grand Plans.
I'm unable to access what you're talking about here. Who leaked, and
who wrote it down?
<snip>
> > Perhaps I'm naive, but I simply can't credit this as a push for Bush
> > to "control" Iraqi oil. To diminish threat to other oil sources, I
> > can see. To overthrow a regime which we, the UN, the world, has said
> > must do X before the oil can be freely sold on the open market, I can
> > even see. Direct control of that oil is sort of beyond what I can
> > envision.
>
> I didn't wrote "direct" :) It's enough if a friendly or puppet
> government cooperates perfectly and busts the OPEC with an output
> resulting in 15-18 dollars per barrel oil prices (and Iraqi National
> Congress's Chalabi brothers already made such promises in public).
> It's enough if this government secures an oil output equaling that of
> another country whose oil sources are threatened more by the
> instability within than by Iraq, and already regulates output as main
> member of the OPEC. And given that regulation, the current two-thirds
> share of the Middle East in global oil reserves is bound to increase,
> just when the imports percentage of US oil consumption is bound to
> increase too (from 50% in 2000 to 65% in 2020, according to the Cheney
> Report). If one doesn't seriously consider reducing consumption (and
> the Cheney Report's projections of 33% increase until 2020 attest to
> that), and already has to secure more than a quarter of the world's
> consumption, one has *no*other*choice*but* to look at the Middle East.
> If the Bush admin's connections with oil business have any
> significance here, then it is that they surely are all fully aware of
> these points.
That's fair, and fits with the push to expand oil production into
Alaska.
> <snip>
> > You know what? When the Gulf War ended, and Saddam was still in
> > power, and there was no opportunity for any sort of Marshall kind of
> > program, I said then that the thing wasn't over. It isn't fun to be
> > right.
>
> Welcome to the Cassandra Club :) :(
You rejected Apollo, too?
> <snip>
> > > My main boggle is with the inspectors. I think (but could
> > > be wrong like about fundies attacking the West from within) it is hot
> > > rhetoric that they can't disarm Saddam -- as I said a few times here,
> > > they were so good at cat-and-mouse play that they already destroyed
> > > most of Saddam's WMD, they destroyed more than Gulf War bombs, they
> > > destroyed more than western intelligence *knew about* during the war.
> >
> > There is that, but if memory serves, the entire nuclear program was
> > conducted right under the nose of inspectors, both before the Gulf War
> > and afterward, and it was only the accidental finding of some black
> > book that uncovered it (I'm dim on this, but I'll look it up if you
> > like).
>
> Hm, hardly under the inspector's noses *before* the Gulf War,
Here I invoke that old memory demon. Yes, inspectors, but not UN
inspectors — IAEA inspectors.
>and IIRC
> the nuclear program was already discovered in 1991 (i.e., if it was
> accidental finding, it was one bound to come), but I would be thankful
> for your reference.
I believe this is what I was referencing. First, Hassan's son in law
bolted in ‘94 or ‘95, and talked about heading a massive
push to build nuclear ability, up to and much past ‘91, and then
(IIRC) and only then did some documents come forward. I can't
remember if they were discovered, as here, or if someone official
actually coughed them up.
http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/1997/11/20/us/us.3.html
There are a couple of things that seem obvious, at least to me.
The US/west is reaping the results of years of not so savory behavior,
which was in part directed by the unfortunate reality of the Cold War,
and in part by pure self serving ignorance.
Saddam himself has a history of intransigence and belligerence which
is beyond question.
It's clear he's violated the UN resolutions regarding development of
chemical, biological, and particularly nuclear weapons (I mean, he has
— the last hard information anyone has on the nuclear program is
dated long after the end of the Kuwaiti conflict)
Does he want them? Yes.
Does he have them? I don't know, but probably chemical and biological
at least.
If he had them, would he use them? Probably.
How would he use them? I don't know.
Is there anything that can be done that won't be ultimately *worse*
than risking him using them, or even giving them to other groups to
use?
I don't know.
Is there anything that can be done that will actually help the Iraqi
people?
I don't know.
Will all of this blow up in the face of the Kurds?
Probably.
Is the US willing to sacrifice the Kurds to gain the cooperation of
Turkey?
I don't know. I hope not.
Sunny
from Google
Apostate
>Sunny
>from Google
And c&p'ing in from your word processor?
Just guessing.— :-)
--
/Apostate
atheist #1931 I've found it!
BAAWA Knife AND SMASHer
EAC Supernumerary Deputy Director, Department of Redundancy Department
plonked by vernon; NEW! IMPROVED! plonked by Lani_girl
I doubt, therefore I might be.
infonow
> dan...@freemail.hu (Daneel) wrote in message news:<55eacbac.03012...@posting.google.com>...
> > [some massive snippage -- only for brewity]
> >
> > stillsunny wrote:
> > > Daneel wrote:
> > > >Do you read OpenDemocracy.org?
> > > >
> > > >Lot of good essays there, for example, these lot on the coming war:
> > > >
> http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=88&articleId=882
> > > >
> > > >I note le Carré's one, for its (to me surprising) blistering tone, and
> > > >Rushdie's one, because I again find myself in almost perfect agreement
> > > >with him.
> > >
> > > Do you?
> > >
> > > That's interesting to me. It's a much more balanced approach than
> > > many of the others.
> >
> > Surprised? I'm a humanitarian interventionist of long standing :)
>
> Do you mind an outline of how you differentiate between situations
> where intervention will actually increase suffering, and when
> intervention will have a net gain, despite a period of yuckiness?
>
> That's not a dare. I'm still trying to muddle things out.
Troll or not, Sunny Fry (aka stillsunny) of Myrtle Beach, SC is a
liar, fraud, and clearly a couple cans short of a six pack.
- It has claimed that women do not like porn, even though there are
women like Catherine Millet, Susie Bright, Carol Queen, Annalee
Newitz, etc, who come right out and say they LOVE IT, INCLUDING THE
HARDCORE VARIETIES.
- It has claimed that women are naturally monogamous, even though I
know many women personally who are into group sex, and women authors
like Catherine Millet (author of the Gangbang Aesthete) clearly love
being gang banged.
- It has claimed that conservatives are correct in that human nature
is unchangable. Similar arguments were used by the Nazis to justify
their racism. Speaking of which, Sunny has campaigned a great deal
against interracial sex.
- It has never presented evidence that it is actually female.
Apostate
Oh, fuck. Another brandumb sock.
<plonk>
stillsunny
> On 28 Jan 2003 14:43:16 -0800, sun...@sccoast.net (stillsunny) wrote in
> alt.atheism:
>
> >Sunny
> >from Google
>
> And c&p'ing in from your word processor?
> Just guessing.— :-)
Good guess&((^&*& :)
Sunny
who doesn't understand why that happens
Apostate
Quite simply, because it's a Law Of Nature that you can't compose Usenet postings
in your word processor.
(At least, not without turning off "smart quotes" first; don't ask, I don't know.)
A plain text editor is a better option, if'n you don't like the compose window Google
gives you.
Psymaster
posted in message:
news:15dc1724.03012...@posting.google.com the
following:
> - It has never presented evidence that it is actually female.
>
What could that be?
--
"I believe in nothing, I fear nothing, I am free."
-Nikos Kazantzakis
Psymaster
<Apostate...@yeehaw.org> posted in message:
news:ei7h3voharacljgi8...@4ax.com the
following:
> Quite simply, because it's a Law Of Nature that you can't
> compose Usenet postings
> in your word processor.
>
> (At least, not without turning off "smart quotes"
> first; don't ask, I don't know.) A plain text editor
> is a better option, if'n you don't like the compose
> window Google gives you.
>
Notepad would do. Or she can save the file as a plain txt one
without any formatting. I think every word processor has an
option like that.