Strong or Weak a-fairiest? Which am I?
J J Hahn
see many weak atheists defending their position in the same way I do.
Could I be merely a weak atheist? There are other things that make me a
somewhat strong atheist, but the weak atheist's defense is the only thing
I'm really confident about.
Here it is:
P1) There is no evidence to support the existence of gods.
P2) It is irrational to believe in things without evidence.
C) Therefore, I do not believe in gods.
Weak atheist right? But does it make sense to replace P2 with P2b:
P2b) It is rational to disbelieve in things that are not supported by
evidence.
This would lead to strong atheism, but I'm not sure it is allowed.
Actually, I'm beginning to lose track of the difference between lack of
belief and disbelief. Keep in mind though that I consider belief to be
mutable. My position has been: I disbelieve in gods because there is no
evidence to support them, but I would believe in them if compelling
evidence was produced.
The thing is, I think I disbelieve in fairies. Is this an irrational
position? Should I only lack belief in fairies?
Please help. Or is this nothing but a semantic difficulty?
Sincerely,
JJ
Mats Andtbacka
[...]
>Please help. Or is this nothing but a semantic difficulty?
But I thought the strong/weak distinction WAS semantic.
--
" Heaven's just a rumour she'll dispel /
As she walks me through the nicest parts of hell " - NIN
Mark McCullough
J J Hahn <hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu> wrote:
>OK, now I'm a bit confused. I consider myself a strong atheist, but I
>see many weak atheists defending their position in the same way I do.
>Could I be merely a weak atheist? There are other things that make me a
>somewhat strong atheist, but the weak atheist's defense is the only thing
>I'm really confident about.
>
>Here it is:
>P1) There is no evidence to support the existence of gods.
>P2) It is irrational to believe in things without evidence.
>
>C) Therefore, I do not believe in gods.
>
>Weak atheist right? But does it make sense to replace P2 with P2b:
How about we force ourselves to be a bit more precise. This can help
clear up the confusion at times. Instead, lets say:
C) Therefore, I lack belief in the existence of gods.
That is obviously weak atheism. Now, to me, this conclusion clearly
follows from P1 and P2. However, the strong atheist would want:
Cb) Therefore, I believe in the lack of existence of gods.
That this follows is not as clear given the premises as stated. It
may follow, but it is not as clear a statement (IMNSHO).
>P2b) It is rational to disbelieve in things that are not supported by
>evidence.
Okay, lets use a rephrasing of this one:
P2c) It is rational to believe in the lack of existence of things that
are not supported by evidence.
Now, this statement appears to be self evident. From this and P1
however, you can now conclude Cb above. Because from P2c and P1, does
not Cb clearly follow?
>This would lead to strong atheism, but I'm not sure it is allowed.
When you do it like this, you might see the difference between P2 and
P2c a bit better. P2 makes a statement about it being irrational to
beleive something. P2c makes a statement about it being rational to
believe something.
>Actually, I'm beginning to lose track of the difference between lack of
>belief and disbelief. Keep in mind though that I consider belief to be
>mutable. My position has been: I disbelieve in gods because there is no
>evidence to support them, but I would believe in them if compelling
>evidence was produced.
The way I explain it to people is that the strong atheist makes a
statement of wha they do believe. The weak atheist on the other hand,
merely denies a particular belief, and may or may not have a stronger
belief. One can IMO easily lack belief in the existence of gods, yet
not believe that they do not exist. One could merely have never
thought on the issue, or one may not be limited by two valued logic on
the question. (Whether that last is justified is another question
entirely).
>The thing is, I think I disbelieve in fairies. Is this an irrational
>position? Should I only lack belief in fairies?
Well, given the way I've rephrased things above, I think you could
hold either position, but this is of course, IMNSHO.
>Please help. Or is this nothing but a semantic difficulty?
Well, I hope that clears it up some.
--
Mark McCullough Real programmers don't document. If it was hard
ad...@yar.cs.wisc.edu to write, it should be hard to understand.
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~upluse/upl.adept.html
jle...@utdallas.edu
[In response when began with this syllogism:]
> >>P1) There is no evidence to support the existence of gods.
> >>P2) It is irrational to believe in things without evidence.
> >>
[which was followed by various rephrasings:]
> >>P2b) It is rational to disbelieve in things that are not supported by
> >>evidence.
> >
> >P2c) It is rational to believe in the lack of existence of things that
> >are not supported by evidence.
> >
> >Cb) Therefore, I believe in the lack of existence of gods.
> >
> >>This would lead to strong atheism, but I'm not sure it is allowed.
>
> Well, I have been working under the understanding that P2c is a
> justifiable statement. However, if it is, there is no real difference
> between strong and weak atheism. Both are justified in the same way.
> One is stated positively, the other is stated negatively.
>
> But P2c is what is beginning to trouble me. Is it really acceptable to
> treat lack of evidence for as evidence against?
That depends on what is meant by "acceptable". However, it is fatally
flawed both epistemologically and scientifically. What I understand
as the difference between strong and well atheism does not turn upon
a question of logic, but on what we might call "degree of resolve."
> >The way I explain it to people is that the strong atheist makes a
> >statement of wha they do believe. The weak atheist on the other hand,
> >merely denies a particular belief, and may or may not have a stronger
> >belief. One can IMO easily lack belief in the existence of gods, yet
> >not believe that they do not exist. One could merely have never
> >thought on the issue, or one may not be limited by two valued logic on
> >the question. (Whether that last is justified is another question
> >entirely).
> But I think if you have a stronger belief, then you are a strong (or at
> least moderate) atheist. Having not thought about it would probably not
> count as weak atheism, although it could be construed to. I think the
> term used around here is apatheist. As for leaving two-valued logic,
> that might come up, but I think most weak atheists here assume that gods
> either do or do not exist. They just claim not to believe that they do.
> But doesn't this leave you with either believing that they don't or
> having no opinion in the matter?
>
> It looks to me like either the two positions are the same, or strong
> atheism is untenable based on this argument. Actual evidence against
> would be needed. Maybe I'm just confusing myself.
I think that a distinction can be made between strong and weak atheism.
But is a distinction that hinges upon strength of belief. The logical
underpinning are the same: lack of evidence/incoherence/etc. The
differences lies in how this is interpretated. This is also pointed out
by the fact that a-theism is direct opposition to theism. This belies
the non-intellectual components of atheism (I didn't use the term
"irrational" on purpose this it is pejorative and its usage entails
dubious assumptions.)
One can be a strong atheist without making any sort of appeal to
logic. Nietzsche on one instant justified his vehement atheism on
the grounds that "if they are gods, my pride would demand that I am one,
therefore, there are no gods." In a more sober comment, he also remarks
that someone who leaves the faith to become atheist had not become a
believer on purely intellectual grounds.
Moreover, arguments for atheism based upon the notion of evidence move
away from the notion of belief which is central to the atheism/theism
polarity. It moves toward the polarity which focuses upon evidence:
gnosticism/agnosticm (a polarity which strangely enough theology
does not seem to be aware of, or, at least, doesn't discuss.)
--
============================================================================
James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
Kimberly Lyle-Wilson
>
>OK, now I'm a bit confused. I consider myself a strong atheist, but I
>see many weak atheists defending their position in the same way I do.
>Could I be merely a weak atheist? There are other things that make me a
>somewhat strong atheist, but the weak atheist's defense is the only thing
>I'm really confident about.
>
>Sincerely,
>JJ
>
My personal opinion is that it is IRRELEVANT. I am an atheist for LOTS of
reasons, including, but not limited to, the arguments and conclusions of
BOTH the strong and weak atheist.
More compelling still, to me, is that position that I am an atheist because
I am repulsed and abhorrent of all religious concepts of a god, and
therefore I reject religion and gods. It does not matter to me in the
slightest whether my assertions that "god does not exist" or "I don't
believe that god exists" are not provable.
Conclusion: Don't worry about it. You think you're an atheist?
Congratulations on a smart decision.
-Kimberly
(Lurker No More)
Kimberly Lyle-Wilson
>
>The whole strong / weak seperation is only semantic on
>one level, since seperating atheists based on their actions
>is impossible. However, there is an important difference
>in the way strong and weak atheists think, which is
>vital for understanding their arguments and logic.
>
Really, Jay, you think so? In what way? To me, your assertion is like
saying it is important to understand the differences in the thinking and
theology of Catholics and Baptists in order to understand their
different arguments (a valid statement, I think), but I don't see how
the differences between strong and weak atheists are so pronounced in
most of their arguments.
This is not a flame -- it's an honest question.
-Kimberly
(Lurker No More)
J J Hahn
Mark McCullough <ad...@yar.cs.wisc.edu> wrote:
>In article <D1yzu...@news.cis.umn.edu>,
>J J Hahn <hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu> wrote:
>>P1) There is no evidence to support the existence of gods.
>>P2) It is irrational to believe in things without evidence.
>>
>C) Therefore, I lack belief in the existence of gods.
>
>That is obviously weak atheism. Now, to me, this conclusion clearly
>follows from P1 and P2. However, the strong atheist would want:
>
>Cb) Therefore, I believe in the lack of existence of gods.
>
>That this follows is not as clear given the premises as stated. It
>may follow, but it is not as clear a statement (IMNSHO).
>
>>P2b) It is rational to disbelieve in things that are not supported by
>>evidence.
>
>Okay, lets use a rephrasing of this one:
>
>P2c) It is rational to believe in the lack of existence of things that
>are not supported by evidence.
>
>Now, this statement appears to be self evident. From this and P1
>however, you can now conclude Cb above. Because from P2c and P1, does
>not Cb clearly follow?
>
>>This would lead to strong atheism, but I'm not sure it is allowed.
>
>When you do it like this, you might see the difference between P2 and
>P2c a bit better. P2 makes a statement about it being irrational to
>beleive something. P2c makes a statement about it being rational to
>believe something.
Well, I have been working under the understanding that P2c is a
justifiable statement. However, if it is, there is no real difference
between strong and weak atheism. Both are justified in the same way.
One is stated positively, the other is stated negatively.
But P2c is what is beginning to trouble me. Is it really acceptable to
treat lack of evidence for as evidence against? That's the question I think.
>The way I explain it to people is that the strong atheist makes a
>statement of wha they do believe. The weak atheist on the other hand,
>merely denies a particular belief, and may or may not have a stronger
>belief. One can IMO easily lack belief in the existence of gods, yet
>not believe that they do not exist. One could merely have never
>thought on the issue, or one may not be limited by two valued logic on
>the question. (Whether that last is justified is another question
>entirely).
But I think if you have a stronger belief, then you are a strong (or at
least moderate) atheist. Having not thought about it would probably not
count as weak atheism, although it could be construed to. I think the
term used around here is apatheist. As for leaving two-valued logic,
that might come up, but I think most weak atheists here assume that gods
either do or do not exist. They just claim not to believe that they do.
But doesn't this leave you with either believing that they don't or
having no opinion in the matter?
>>The thing is, I think I disbelieve in fairies. Is this an irrational
>>position? Should I only lack belief in fairies?
>
>Well, given the way I've rephrased things above, I think you could
>hold either position, but this is of course, IMNSHO.
It looks to me like either the two positions are the same, or strong
atheism is untenable based on this argument. Actual evidence against
would be needed. Maybe I'm just confusing myself.
Sincerely,
JJ
JayMeh
>In <3el6t5$2...@newsbf02.news.aol.com> jay...@aol.com (JayMeh) writes:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
[whack]
>>Generally to get to strong atheism you have to believe that
>>you have evidence against the existance of god(s). Logically
>>if you have no evidence against their existance than it's
.>better to lack belief than disbelieve.
> Let's propose P2c) It is logical to disbelieve in things that
>have been proposed arbitrarily and in a contradictory manner that have
>been investigated thoroughly without any evidence being found where it is
>further the case that one cannot even conceive of what such evidence
>might be like.
There is no need for a seperate rule here. The things you list
are evidence against (though not really disproof of) the thing
you are refering to.
Did you have something in particular in mind? :)
>>>The thing is, I think I disbelieve in fairies. Is this an irrational
>>>position? Should I only lack belief in fairies?
>>Depends, do you have evidence against the existance of
>>fairies? If you don't than it is irrational to disbelieve in them.
>>Note that there is no difference in general between the
>>actions of a person that disbelieves and one the lacks
>>belief.
> What would count as evidence against invisible fairies?
Until somebody points to evidence of their existance that
you can reduce or negate you have none. That's alot
of the problem with being an atheist, it's impossible to
disprove the existance of a completly intangable and
invisible object. It is however absurd to believe in it's
existance.
>>>Please help. Or is this nothing but a semantic difficulty?
>>The whole strong / weak seperation is only semantic on
>>one level, since seperating atheists based on their actions
>>is impossible. However, there is an important difference
>>in the way strong and weak atheists think, which is
>>vital for understanding their arguments and logic.
> I agree with the second half of your comment.
The point I was making is that you couldn't seperate
a room of twenty atheists into a group of strong and
a group of weak atheists based on how they acted,
their attitudes or their dress.
Seperating Jews, Christians and Muslems tends to
be a lot easier.
>--
>S. Joel Katz Information on Objectivism, Linux, 8031s, and
atheism
>Stim...@Panix.COM is available at http://www.panix.com/~stimpson/
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>
>Generally to get to strong atheism you have to believe that
>you have evidence against the existance of god(s). Logically
>if you have no evidence against their existance than it's
Yes, I understand this much. But, as a matter of scientific
epistemology, is it justifiable to disbelieve in everything that is not
supported by evidence of some sort? I'm not all that sure. At the very
least, you can get to strong atheism from weak atheism with the premise
that gods, if they existed, would leave some evidence. Thus, you have
grounds for disbelief. This might be a justifiable premise at least for
purposes of provisional belief. If you must stop at lacking belief, what
do you think? Must you have no opinion? I think so.
Actually, Occam's Razor seems to me to be the needed scientific
principle. It does, in effect, instruct us to believe the simplest
explanation. So, if a godless Universe was the simplest, we would
believe in it and thus be forced to disbelieve in a god-encumbered one.
I think this is why I consider myself a strong (at least moderately
so) atheist.
>>The thing is, I think I disbelieve in fairies. Is this an irrational
>>position? Should I only lack belief in fairies?
>
>Depends, do you have evidence against the existance of
>fairies? If you don't than it is irrational to disbelieve in them.
>Note that there is no difference in general between the
>actions of a person that disbelieves and one the lacks
>belief.
Well, I don't have any evidence against, other than stated above. In
fact, I rate fairies as a more viable possibility than gods, since
fairies could be expected to be fairly subtle, while one could hardly
miss gods stomping about.
>The whole strong / weak seperation is only semantic on
>one level, since seperating atheists based on their actions
>is impossible. However, there is an important difference
>in the way strong and weak atheists think, which is
>vital for understanding their arguments and logic.
Yes, but I'm beginning to question the usefulness of this separation.
What is the difference in the way weak and strong atheists think? Could
you not get to the two positions from almost the same reasoning and
thought process?
Is the weak atheist required to hold the existence and non-existence of
gods as equal (or very nearly so) possibilities? That doesn't seem to be
what weak atheists say, yet that is what lacking belief (and disbelief)
implies to me. Essentially, holding no opinion in the matter. If this
is not the case, I can't see this difference between disbelieving and
lacking belief (except prehaps as a matter of degree).
Please note that this is a recent difficulty for me. I've been using the
strong/weak distinction for years. But recently it has just falled to
pieces whenever I try to think about it. Perhaps it's just a phase. :)
Sincerely,
JJ
JayMeh
>In <D1yzu...@news.cis.umn.edu> hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn)
writes:
>>OK, now I'm a bit confused. I consider myself a strong atheist, but I
>>see many weak atheists defending their position in the same way I do.
>>Could I be merely a weak atheist? There are other things that make me a
>>somewhat strong atheist, but the weak atheist's defense is the only
thing
>>I'm really confident about.
>>Sincerely,
>>JJ
>My personal opinion is that it is IRRELEVANT. I am an atheist for LOTS
of
>reasons, including, but not limited to, the arguments and conclusions of
>BOTH the strong and weak atheist.
You can't really accept both the strong and weak atheist posistion at the
same time. The weak atheist posistion can be summed up (badly :) as
gods might exist but I've never met one while the strong atheist says gods
do not exist.
>More compelling still, to me, is that position that I am an atheist
because
>I am repulsed and abhorrent of all religious concepts of a god, and
>therefore I reject religion and gods. It does not matter to me in the
>slightest whether my assertions that "god does not exist" or "I don't
>believe that god exists" are not provable.
A person that rejects religions and gods because they are morally
wrong would be better termed an antitheist. Antitheists may or
may not be atheists also but are oppossed to all religion because
it is religion.
>Conclusion: Don't worry about it. You think you're an atheist?
>Congratulations on a smart decision.
>-Kimberly
>(Lurker No More)
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
JayMeh
Well, actually they (or we or me depending) often use the same
arguments. But the logic and goal behind them are different.
A weak atheist only has to disbelieve the evidence provides
by theists (not too hard), a strong atheists has to provide
evidence that their posistion is correct (which is much harder).
Only strong atheists are actually taking a positive stance
on what they believe, which they then must protect from
theists, agnostics and the occasional fanatic weak
atheist. Weak atheists have only a negative belief,
which forces their opponents to justfy their own beliefs.
Another thing to keep in mind is that very few people
cleanly fall into one group or another. In general I am
a weak atheist, but I am a strong atheist in relation
to certain religions (actually limited to christianity
among the religions that one might really encounter).
But my personal beliefs are of a stronger posistion,
I just don't think I have the evidence to support
taking a purely strong atheist posistion.
>This is not a flame -- it's an honest question.
Don't worry, I've posted here long enough
to develope a very thick skin. :)
J J Hahn
>
>That depends on what is meant by "acceptable". However, it is fatally
>flawed both epistemologically and scientifically. What I understand
>as the difference between strong and well atheism does not turn upon
>a question of logic, but on what we might call "degree of resolve."
"acceptable" from a scientific point of view. The statement (lack of
evidence for is evidence against) is not by itself evident. But I think
it does end up coming out of Occam's Razor. Yes? Is it really just a
degree of resolve? I always interpreted it as a qualitative difference.
We all know that even strong atheists don't necessarily claim the degree
of certainty that religions require. And I think that the weak atheists
are just as certain of their "weak" position as the strong ones are of
their "strong" one.
>I think that a distinction can be made between strong and weak atheism.
>But is a distinction that hinges upon strength of belief. The logical
>underpinning are the same: lack of evidence/incoherence/etc. The
>differences lies in how this is interpretated. This is also pointed out
>by the fact that a-theism is direct opposition to theism. This belies
>the non-intellectual components of atheism (I didn't use the term
>"irrational" on purpose this it is pejorative and its usage entails
>dubious assumptions.)
I think there's a qualitative difference (at least a claimed one). The
name has nothing to do with whether it's non-intellectual or not. The
weak atheist position at least can be come about entirely rationally.
Perhaps strong atheism can be as well.
>One can be a strong atheist without making any sort of appeal to
>logic. Nietzsche on one instant justified his vehement atheism on
>the grounds that "if they are gods, my pride would demand that I am one,
>therefore, there are no gods." In a more sober comment, he also remarks
>that someone who leaves the faith to become atheist had not become a
>believer on purely intellectual grounds.
Of course, you can be an atheist for irrational reasons, but I'm not
concerned with that here.
>Moreover, arguments for atheism based upon the notion of evidence move
>away from the notion of belief which is central to the atheism/theism
>polarity. It moves toward the polarity which focuses upon evidence:
>gnosticism/agnosticm (a polarity which strangely enough theology
>does not seem to be aware of, or, at least, doesn't discuss.)
Certainly this gnosticism/agnosticism is an important polarity in these
questions (atheists tend to be agnostics in my experience). But this
doesn't take us away from the belief (justified or otherwise) polarity.
The two are integrally related and can only be separated by ignoring one
or the other. It is in the best interests of theology to sweep
agnosticism under the rug, since the possibility that nothing is knowable
might hinder the assertion that theology X is the true and eternal way of
the world.
Sincerely,
JJ
J J Hahn
Kimberly Lyle-Wilson <Wils...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>My personal opinion is that it is IRRELEVANT. I am an atheist for LOTS of
>reasons, including, but not limited to, the arguments and conclusions of
>BOTH the strong and weak atheist.
Well, it very well might be irrelevant to you, but I was interested in
the difference between them and their respective justifications. Perhaps
this is purely an intellectual endeavor, but it might help one to
understand what people mean when they call themselves one thing or another.
>More compelling still, to me, is that position that I am an atheist because
>I am repulsed and abhorrent of all religious concepts of a god, and
>therefore I reject religion and gods. It does not matter to me in the
>slightest whether my assertions that "god does not exist" or "I don't
>believe that god exists" are not provable.
Fine, if that works for you. But such a justification would not satisfy
me. Lots of things exist that I don't like. I can't just disbelieve in
gods because they offend me.
>Conclusion: Don't worry about it. You think you're an atheist?
>Congratulations on a smart decision.
I'm not that worried. Actually, I know I'm an atheist. I've known this
for 18 years. It wasn't really a decision, but thanks anyway. I also
know that I am at least a weak atheist. My question had to do with me
wondering whether or not I am actually a strong atheist. In the process,
I've begun to question whether or not there's a difference (in
philisophical justification).
Sincerely,
JJ
Charles Fiterman
but fun. I represent a third kind, differences still semantic
but fun.
I admit the existance of gods, I've seen them in people's homes.
Hopi Katchinas for example. They aren't mine (well I do own
a cute field mouse Katchina but I don't treat it as a god its
a decoration.)
When someone posted and said they were interested in people who
would admit a duty to God if he existed there were lots of replys.
Not one of those replys was what he was looking for. They were all
people telling him they would have no part of YHVH or whatever
he was selling even if he was real.
Stating atheism in this way avoids threads like "Atheism only by
faith" and "Atheists are illogical" People can't ask "With all the
f---ing gods in the world how do you know none of them are real."
It uses the most ordinary definition of the term god, a definition
that has no trouble with sentences like "Mars was the Roman god of war."
In fact if YHVH and or Kali showed up very few atheists would fall
on their knees and worship.
Atheists talk of gods in terms of the religions the grew up around.
They think the gods of very different religions are somehow not real
gods. I grew up around a lot of very different religions. When I
use the term "real gods" I mean things like Katchinas that I can
weigh and measure. Unreal gods are things like YHVH and Kali that
seem to live only in the imagination.
J J Hahn
in reply to me:
>
>> Of course, you can be an atheist for irrational reasons, but I'm not
>> concerned with that here.
>
>alone is rarely fully persuasive. Your use of the pejorative term
>"irrational" underscores this insistence. I've never yet met a theist or
>atheist who came to that position on purely intellectual grounds. I am
>suspicous of this positivist streak. There are severe epistemological
>difficulties with reason itself as a justificatory mechanism.
Well, I used the term "irrational" despite the fact that you shrank from
the act because it is an accurate term for things that aren't rational.
If you insist that this is perjorative, you might be the one emphasizing
reason too much. People have every right to hold irrational beliefs if
they want, but I would object to them calling them rational.
We can call reason into question if you want but not in this thread. I
started it in an attempt to understand the difference (if any) between
the rational justifications for strong and weak atheisms. I, for one,
will claim to have come to atheism on entirely rational grounds. The
only assumptions I have made are the usefulness of the scientific method
and commonsense reality. The theism question has not forced me to make
any assumptions that I did not already have to make in order to live a
sane life.
>In short, my challenge is that I think that anyone who claims to be an
>atheist on _strictly_ "rational" grounds is not being completely
>honest with him/herself. Or from another perspective, what advantage
>is there to believing that the position of atheism is best served
>by purely intellectual arguments? Does this belie a streak of
>reactionarism which combats the socialized attraction to the comforts
>of traditional theological dogma? Is reason being used as a hammer to
>pummel the traces of culturally inculcated yearnings for metaphysical
>comfort that still remain?
I beg to differ. What irrational step is needed to get to atheism that
any self-respecting scientist has not already made?
>The metaphysics of "scientific reason" suffer from problematics
>similar to the metaphyscis of theism. The point again, reason is
>not necessary for the defense of atheism. Atheism is a form of life
>that is valid in itself. Reason is only one component of that and
>any other form of human life.
Please elaborate. I'll be willing to bet that any assumptions scientific
rationalists must make must be made as well by theists in addition to
their special exceptions. Reason is not all there is, but it's the only
thing I'm really worried about in this thread. If you want to assault
reason, we can discuss it elsewhere.
Sincerely,
JJ
Jarmo Manninen
>>atheist. Weak atheists have only a negative belief,
>>which forces their opponents to justfy their own beliefs.
>>
>assertion, which is, after all, still a negative assertion:
> "There is NO god" (underline the NO)
I think that this is a belief that should in my opinion be
presented more correctly "I have a belief that there is NO God" or
I believe that there is NO god" both of which are positive
beliefs.
By the way, I have mixed up my thoughts badly when I started
to think about these things you have been writing about here. So
could you fellow atheists help me out of this trouble of mine.
In the FAQ weak atheism is characterized as "absence of
belief in existence of god(s)", "disbelieving in the existence
of god(s)" and "simple skepticism".
Now, I started to think about such kind of an agnostic that
holds this position that he takes no positions of both
atheism and theism and has no idea whether there are any
god(s) or not.
Then It started to think which of these characterizations of
weak atheism such kind of an agnostic could hold without
taking any atheistic positions.
1. "absence of belief in the existence of god(s)"
Well, I thought that such kind of an agnostic could
hold this position if he has this position
that he has no ideas whether god(s) exist or not. He can
have, IMHO, this "absence of belief" position because otherwise
he would take a theistic position.
2. "I don't believe in the existence of god(s)"
I think that such kind of an agnostic could also hold
this position without taking an atheistic
position, because he may have no idea whether these gods
exist or not. And if he believed then he would take
a theistic position.
3. "I disbelieve in the existence of god(s)"
Now this one is the trickiest one for me because
of limited understanding of the English language.
What you you think? Could such kind of an agnostic
also hold this position without taking any positions
of atheism? Or some other kind of an agnostic that takes
no atheistic positions? My word-book tells me this position
can be characterized by this "absence of belief" position
but maybe my word-book just isn't that good...
4. "Simple skepticism"
I think this is of no problem he could hold also this one, too.
Now, refute this confusion of mine, please. Tell me what is the
essence of distinction between weak atheism and such kind of
agnosticism I wrote above. Maybe I have understood this essence
of agnocticism wrongly. Is it because of atheism talks about
_believing_ and agnosticism about _knowing_ things or because
an agnostic takes no positions of beliefs on either sides?
And by the way, as an strong atheist towards certain theologies,
I would also like to ask you weak atheist towards..say for
example christianity that do you not accept this position
that you deep in your minds accept this positive belief that
"I believe that this christian god _probably_ doesn't exist"?
Thank you!
Sincerely,
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
J J Hahn
Charles Fiterman <c...@geodesic.com> wrote:
>The differences between the various kinds of atheist are semantic
>but fun. I represent a third kind, differences still semantic
>but fun.
This difference is far from semantic. Your third type of atheism is far
from being atheism at all.
>I admit the existance of gods, I've seen them in people's homes.
>Hopi Katchinas for example. They aren't mine (well I do own
>a cute field mouse Katchina but I don't treat it as a god its
>a decoration.)
If you admit that gods exist, worshipper or not, you are not an atheist.
We have to draw the line somewhere if our speech is to be meaningful, and
you're going to get left out. A Katchina is not gods. Some people may
think they are gods or contain a god's spirit, but they are mistaken.
>When someone posted and said they were interested in people who
>would admit a duty to God if he existed there were lots of replys.
>Not one of those replys was what he was looking for. They were all
>people telling him they would have no part of YHVH or whatever
>he was selling even if he was real.
That's understandable if the name "God" was used. Gods in general are
"gods".
>Stating atheism in this way avoids threads like "Atheism only by
>faith" and "Atheists are illogical" People can't ask "With all the
>f---ing gods in the world how do you know none of them are real."
Come on, you can't type "fucking" without deleting 3 (not one or two)
letters? Or did you mean "falling", "faining", "fearing", "flaming",
"fasting", "farming", etc.?
It does little to avoid those questions, but they are lame to begin
with. No one knows a damn thing. We just believe and can justify our
beliefs logically. Perhaps a better question is: "With all the fucking
gods in the world, where is the evidence?"
>It uses the most ordinary definition of the term god, a definition
>that has no trouble with sentences like "Mars was the Roman god of war."
Why define a term in a way that makes it useless?
>In fact if YHVH and or Kali showed up very few atheists would fall
>on their knees and worshp.
So what?
>Atheists talk of gods in terms of the religions the grew up around.
>They think the gods of very different religions are somehow not real
>gods. I grew up around a lot of very different religions. When I
>use the term "real gods" I mean things like Katchinas that I can
>weigh and measure. Unreal gods are things like YHVH and Kali that
>seem to live only in the imagination.
This is a figment of your imagination. Yahweh is an easy god to shoot
down, but we tend not to believe in any of them for justifiable reasons.
Katchinas are real dolls and real objects of worship. Yahweh is a real
figment of Christians' imaginations. None of these are real gods.
What's the difference between denying the deity in a Katchina and denying
the deity in a Christian's warped mind?
Sincerely,
JJ
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Well, I used the term "irrational" despite the fact that you shrank from
> the act because it is an accurate term for things that aren't rational.
> If you insist that this is perjorative, you might be the one emphasizing
> reason too much. People have every right to hold irrational beliefs if
> they want, but I would object to them calling them rational.
"Irrational" covers everything that is a reflection of _pure_ reason.
For most, if not all, "rational" people, "irrationality" is a major
component of their lives. BTW, the human body is not "rational".
> We can call reason into question if you want but not in this thread. I
> started it in an attempt to understand the difference (if any) between
> the rational justifications for strong and weak atheisms. I, for one,
> will claim to have come to atheism on entirely rational grounds. The
> only assumptions I have made are the usefulness of the scientific method
> and commonsense reality. The theism question has not forced me to make
> any assumptions that I did not already have to make in order to live a
> sane life.
I was under the impression that this was a post about the difference
between "strong" and "weak" atheism. To be direct (for once), I see
no need to justify atheism on any grounds, intellectual or otherwise.
Furthermore, I submit that one can be a "strong" atheist without
having become one on intellectual grounds. Nietzsche is one
example. illustration.
> >In short, my challenge is that I think that anyone who claims to be an
> >atheist on _strictly_ "rational" grounds is not being completely
> >honest with him/herself. Or from another perspective, what advantage
> >is there to believing that the position of atheism is best served
> >by purely intellectual arguments? Does this belie a streak of
> >reactionarism which combats the socialized attraction to the comforts
> >of traditional theological dogma? Is reason being used as a hammer to
> >pummel the traces of culturally inculcated yearnings for metaphysical
> >comfort that still remain?
> I beg to differ. What irrational step is needed to get to atheism that
> any self-respecting scientist has not already made?
Frankly, I've known a fair number of self-respecting scientists who
are theists. Scientists are people before they don their lab coats.
I suspect the problem here relates to definitions. You seem to include
under the umbrella "rational" all sorts of considerations that are
tangential to reason, such as considerations that are intellectually
justifiable. (Another may be that I'm being unnecessary controversial.)
One of getting to my point is to consider a major problem for
philosophy of science which has developed two notions in the attempt
to deal with the problem: the context of discovery and the context
of justification. This arose because the practice of scientific
research is partly "irrational". The concepts/notions/hypotheses
involved do not arise by _purely_ intellectual means. The classic
example is the hypothesis of the structure of benzene: came from
a dream. Thus the separation of contexts since they differ in
that conclusions are justified on _purely_ logical grounds. Yet this
leads to a number of problems. (But, as you say, this thread is not
the place to discuss them.)
> >The metaphysics of "scientific reason" suffer from problematics
> >similar to the metaphyscis of theism. The point again, reason is
> >not necessary for the defense of atheism. Atheism is a form of life
> >that is valid in itself. Reason is only one component of that and
> >any other form of human life.
> Please elaborate. I'll be willing to bet that any assumptions scientific
> rationalists must make must be made as well by theists in addition to
> their special exceptions. Reason is not all there is, but it's the only
> thing I'm really worried about in this thread. If you want to assault
> reason, we can discuss it elsewhere.
You would win your bet. (Also, there are degrees of dubiousness;
it is extremely less dubious that the sun will rise tommorrow than
that there's some sort of after-life. I can't "prove" the sun will
rise tommorrow but I'd bet on it since I wouldn't care about paying
if lost. However, I wouldn't take Pascal's wager.)
Another way of putting the issue would be saying that it doesn't
really matter how well I can intellectually defend the postion of
atheism. It's more of a question of why I should adopt a theistic
position. It's the less creditable hypothesis that has to be
justified, not the more creditable one. What I'm taking exception
to is the notion that atheism needs any intellectual justification
at all.
jle...@utdallas.edu
> >atheist on _strictly_ "rational" grounds is not being completely
> >honest with him/herself. Or from another perspective, what advantage
> >is there to believing that the position of atheism is best served
> >comfort that still remain?
> I beg to differ. What irrational step is needed to get to atheism that
> any self-respecting scientist has not already made?
This occurred after posting my previous reply. Allow me to pursue
this from another angle. Consider Charles Taylor, an accomplished
philosopher who happens to be an unorthox theist: admits in print
that he can't think of any argument for his theology that would
be capable of withstanding rigorous intellectual scrunity. He makes
the comment that Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_, if true,
would be devastating for theism. Why? Nietzsche does not argue
that notions of divinity are spurious. Instead he attempts to
show the purposes and functions that morality has played throughout
the course of human history.
On _purely_ intellectual grounds, if N.'s analysis is true, it would
not necessarily effect theistic premises. However, that essay is
extremely disturbing to theists and appears to engender doubts about
their faith. Moreover, it could be said that it encourages atheism as
well as strengthens the atheistic position more any argument on the
ontological/epistemological status of the theistic premises.
If you've read it and feel that it did not strengthen your atheism, just
say so and I'll agree to disagree with you on this issue. If it did
strengthen your atheism on what you consider to be "purely rational"
grounds, then we have a semantic disagreement that we could discuss in
another thread if you so desire. Either way, I've enjoyed the discussion.
Agent J
>You are right that I cannot hold the positions of strong and weak atheist
>at the same time, and therefore I cannot draw the conclusions of both the
>strong and the weak atheists. However, I can respect and agree with
>specific arguments from both camps.
Why not just say "Well, those gods over there might exist I suppose, even
though they're pretty silly, but this particular god certainly doesn't cuz
it's ridiculous and impossible." ? Why do you have to deal with all gods
at once?
--
<*> J <*>
"This baby can handle anything but a three headed drago.. Aah son-of-a..!"
"Joel, do human beings really act like this?" -- Tom Servo
Jarmo Manninen
>are right though, you can justify belief based on probabilites.
>It then becomes a question of judgment call, what is your
>tolerance for uncertanty, 90%, 99%, 99.99%? It just so
>happens that I have a very low tolerance for probabilities, and
>have to go well over 99.9999% before accepting something
>as a belief.
I would hold that the problem with the "lack of belief" and this
"positive belief" positions could be characterized partly like
this example.
1. Think about the existence of the god of christianity
2. If you have this opinion that the probability for this god
not to exist is more (over 50%) than it is the case that
it does exist,
3. I would hold that you almost must have, at least in your heart,
this positive opinion that
"I believe that this god of christiany _probably_ doesn't exist"
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
Jarmo Manninen
>THere is no contradiction. One can be an agnostic - or not -
>and an atheist - or not - at the same time.
Ok, thanks.
Some sort of agnosticism (and some sort of skepticism too)
can be linked with both atheism and theism..Agnosticism might
be understanded in some situation like this "I can't prove that
this god doesn't exist so I don't know for sure that this god
doesn't exist".
But I just can't see the difference between this "pure" agnosticism
and weak skepticism. If you are only a weak atheist towards every
theology of (supernatural) gods at least then I think it is hard to see
the difference..
Possibly, this concept of "weak" atheism is _handy_, in a sense
that you are a strong atheist towards at least one theology,
in a sense that you want to call yourself an atheist and by
this concept of "weak" atheism you can then call yourself an atheist
towards every theology, even those of them you haven't even heard
about.
But I think atheism in general could also be characterized as
"believing in the non-existence of gods" taken as a
default-belief, but what doesn't have to be understood as a
position that you claim that it is impossible for gods to exist.
(more about this in my previous posting on the same subject..)
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
JayMeh
I don't see what your trying to get at here. Your example
is true, but irrevelent. From a logical point of view you must
fit into one of these three categories (in respect to god
existance), 1: you believe that god exists 2: you believe
god does not exits 3: you don't believe either of the previous
posistions. The third category doesn't say anything about
the probabilty that you assign to gods existance.
>--
>Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>J J Hahn (hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu) wrote:
>
>"Irrational" covers everything that is a reflection of _pure_ reason.
>For most, if not all, "rational" people, "irrationality" is a major
>component of their lives. BTW, the human body is not "rational".
Fair enough and yes, the human body is irrational (most of it anyway),
but I was talking about beliefs. So rocks are irrational. As long as my
beliefs about rocks are rational, I'm happy.
>I was under the impression that this was a post about the difference
>between "strong" and "weak" atheism. To be direct (for once), I see
>no need to justify atheism on any grounds, intellectual or otherwise.
>Furthermore, I submit that one can be a "strong" atheist without
>having become one on intellectual grounds. Nietzsche is one
>example. illustration.
Yes, it is, but I understand what strong and weak atheism are. I just
want to know why someone would pick one over the other, especially since
the justification for the two is usually not far different. I think I
agreed already that one can be a stong atheist without an intellectual
basis. So what? That doesn't interest me too much, because it is a
religious position. I want scientifically justifiable positions.
>> I beg to differ. What irrational step is needed to get to atheism that
>> any self-respecting scientist has not already made?
>
>Frankly, I've known a fair number of self-respecting scientists who
>are theists. Scientists are people before they don their lab coats.
Yes, you've got me there. Perhaps I should have said scientists qua
scientists. Are you implying that scientists aren't people? Odd
methinks. Actually, it has always bothered me that a scientist could
talk about faith and all that. I don't know how one can maintain such a
separation between personal and professional attitudes. Of course, it is
possible to get to theism scientifically. But this requires strange
interpretations of the evidence. Such a person is merely wrong, but I'll
take that over the faith non-argument any day.
>I suspect the problem here relates to definitions. You seem to include
>under the umbrella "rational" all sorts of considerations that are
>tangential to reason, such as considerations that are intellectually
>justifiable. (Another may be that I'm being unnecessary controversial.)
Could be either (or both). "Rational" is not a clear term. Anything
that can be obtained by deduction or induction (scientifically) from
evidence I would consider rational.
>One of getting to my point is to consider a major problem for
>philosophy of science which has developed two notions in the attempt
>to deal with the problem: the context of discovery and the context
>of justification. This arose because the practice of scientific
>research is partly "irrational". The concepts/notions/hypotheses
>involved do not arise by _purely_ intellectual means. The classic
>example is the hypothesis of the structure of benzene: came from
>a dream. Thus the separation of contexts since they differ in
>that conclusions are justified on _purely_ logical grounds. Yet this
>leads to a number of problems. (But, as you say, this thread is not
>the place to discuss them.)
I'll accept this (although it's not entirely irrational as well), but I
fail to see how it causes a problem for hypothesis testing.
>> Please elaborate. I'll be willing to bet that any assumptions scientific
>> rationalists must make must be made as well by theists in addition to
>> their special exceptions. Reason is not all there is, but it's the only
>> thing I'm really worried about in this thread. If you want to assault
>> reason, we can discuss it elsewhere.
>
>You would win your bet. (Also, there are degrees of dubiousness;
>it is extremely less dubious that the sun will rise tommorrow than
>that there's some sort of after-life. I can't "prove" the sun will
>rise tommorrow but I'd bet on it since I wouldn't care about paying
>if lost. However, I wouldn't take Pascal's wager.)
Yea! Yes, there is this dubiousness, but why do you think that is? I
think that the future sunrise is predicted on the basis of induction from
evidence that accumulates each and every day in recorded history. What
basis do we have for projecting an afterlife beyond our hopes and fears?
Since there is no evidence in favor, it is at least rational to refuse to
have an opinion, and I think you can go further and assume that there is
none until you see some evidence.
>Another way of putting the issue would be saying that it doesn't
>really matter how well I can intellectually defend the postion of
>atheism. It's more of a question of why I should adopt a theistic
>position. It's the less creditable hypothesis that has to be
>justified, not the more creditable one. What I'm taking exception
>to is the notion that atheism needs any intellectual justification
>at all.
What is the difference between "why" and "rational justification"? "Why"
might include a bit more such as "because I would like that to be so" and
"because I dreamed it" and "because the Minister told me." Weak at
best. Sentence #3 is nonsense unless you are substituting a popular
definition of "justification" for a philosophical one. If you
intellectual honesty means anything to you at all, you must justify
your position to yourself at least.
Sincerely,
JJ
Jarmo Manninen
>Partially. The real problem is that you're assuming that
>agnosicism and atheism are contradictory, they aren't
>in any way. It is very possible to be both an agnostic and
>an atheist. Strong agnosticism and strong atheism can not
>be held at the same time, but the weak versions can but
>held at the same time.
Probably I just aren't logical with those "argumentations" of mine and
I just don't notice it so easily.
Yes, I know that agnosticism can be linked with both atheism and
theism. For example, for me as an atheist my agnosticism means that
I just cannot prove it for sure that there aren't any gods lurking
around there. But the problem is that I just have now started
question of these basics of my atheism and hold that maybe
there can be found some essence of distinction between atheism
and some "pure" kind of agnosticism after all and because of that
process of thinking I have mixed up my beliefs..
>>And by the way, as an strong atheist towards certain theologies,
>>I would also like to ask you weak atheist towards..say for
>>example christianity that do you not accept this position
>>that you deep in your minds accept this positive belief that
>>"I believe that this christian god _probably_ doesn't exist"?
>Actually I believe that the christian god doesn't exist at all.
>There is nothing wrong with weak atheists disbelieving in some,
>most, or all specific gods. The strong atheist disbelieves in
>all gods, even the ones he's never heard of.
I think you can be a strong atheist towards one particular
god some theism argues to exist, too.
And you admitted you believe that this christian god doesn't exist
at all. Yes, I think because of that you probably call yourself
a strong atheist towards that god of christianity.
But can you for sure prove that god doesn't exist?
If not, I think that you have probably made some kind of a choice of
belief that you *by default* believe that this god of christianity
doesn't exist at all and maybe you might think that this is the
case at least until proven/justificated otherwise.
I would hold that this kind of "having made this choice of belief"
could be characterized as "a person has chosen by default to
believe in the non-existence of one particular god or gods" and
that this doesn't have to mean that a person holds this that
it is impossible for that god or gods to exist.
I'm sorry about arguing here openly about what I believe
you have been thinking, though.
But I would like to second this that if there is somebody only a
weak atheist (but who thinks he is not a strong atheist towards
christianity (or the god of islam, for example)) in his heart towards
christianity, couldn't you really accept this proposition
that you think in your heart this positive belief that
"I believe that this god of christianity (islam) _probably_
doesn't exist"?
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
J J Hahn
>> >J J Hahn [in response to my previous response) wrote:
>
>I don't agree with the idea that the lack of an intellectual position
>necessarily means that one must have a religous position. It seems
>that you do.
Well, I don't necessarily think that. I can't think of any other
possibilities right now though. I'm open to this; please elaborate.
>It's not a problem for hypothesis testing per se, but it does indicate
>problems in the notions/assumptions which underpin the notion of
>hypothesis testing: there's some questions about the 'stability' of
>the "foundations."
The fact that there are assumptions does not mean the foundations are
necessarily unstable. The value of science is that it produces useful
results in a systematic (therefore repeatable) way. The truth will never
be known (you're arguing as if I'm some sort of objectivist, but I'm as
big a skeptic as you could hope to find) because there are always
assumptions. But what other epistemology works as well as scientific
rationality? Science doesn't tell you what is ultimately true. It tells
you what you should believe (accept as provisional truth).
>This points to my objection to putting all my eggs in the "basket of
>reason." I was once a very hard-nosed "realist" who believed in
>the ability of the intellect to discern "objective reality." After
>learning at the bench to question the assumptions I was making when
>devising experiments, it slowly occured to me that this would lead
>to questioning the foundations of the notions of "objective reality"
>and so forth. I did find problems. (I'll continue by addressing your
>comment which followed.)
Well, you can't know anything about objective reality, but you really
don't need to. Question the assumptions; this is very healthy. But
where are you if you choose not to make any of the assumptions science
makes? Talk about unstable situations.
>> I think that the future sunrise is predicted on the basis of
>> induction from evidence that accumulates each and every day in
>> recorded history. What basis do we have for projecting an afterlife
>> beyond our hopes and fears? Since there is no evidence in favor,
>> it is at least rational to refuse to have an opinion, and I think
>> you can go further and assume that there is none until you see
>> some evidence.
>
>Will the sun rise tommorrow? I can say that it _will_, but I can
>say that the probability of that happening is very close to 1.0.
>To say that "it _will_" entails absolute certainity. This is not
>possible. Can we say we have accounted for all possiblities? Have
>we included all possible factors? Can we be sure that we have?
>Moreover, can we certain that the theories and notions that we
>are employing to make these sorts of conclusion are absolutely
>correct?
I don't agree that saying "it will" entails absolute certainty. I say
things like this all the time and mean it in the scientific sense: "all
the available evidence points in the direction that this will occur, but
there is always some uncertainty." But that's a bit too cumbersome. I
am certainly aware that we are not absolutely certain that the sun will
rise, but I still maintain that such a prediction has a much sounder
basis that the prediction of an afterlife. My point was that your
"dubiousness" is based on a rational examination of evidence.
>If not, why do we tend to believe so, or act as if we did? This is
>where other factors besides the _strictly epistemological_ enter
>the picture. If you will, you could say that they seep through
>the cracks. This is why I saw "rationalism" shares some of
>the same errors as "theism." Rationalism ignores the cracks while
>theism ignores the chasms. Nonetheless, there's still gaps.
Well, I can accept this. But I would have to be something other than a
pure rationalist. My position is that rationalism is the best we can do
when we are unable to achieve perfection. (it has the fewest cracks we
are able to achieve)
> [Jim Elson said:]
>> >Another way of putting the issue would be saying that it doesn't
>> >really matter how well I can intellectually defend the postion of
>> >atheism. It's more of a question of why I should adopt a theistic
>> >position. It's the less creditable hypothesis that has to be
>> >justified, not the more creditable one. What I'm taking exception
>> >to is the notion that atheism needs any intellectual justification
>> >at all.
>
> [JJ Hahn responded:]
>> What is the difference between "why" and "rational justification"? "Why"
>> might include a bit more such as "because I would like that to be so" and
>> "because I dreamed it" and "because the Minister told me." Weak at
>> best. ....
>
>The difference between "why should I adopt" and "what is the 'rational'
>justification for" position X may not seem obvious. The latter entails
>the assumption that no position/form of life is "legitimate"/worthy of
>respect unless it can be logically demonstrating to be superior
>to another. This assumes that that one particular position/form
>of life is superior to all others. This assumption is intrinsic
>to all forms of monotheism as well as tradtional "rationalism."
>For monotheisms, the foundation/highest value is God/Allah/Vishnu/etc.
>while for "rationalism" it is "Truth"/"Reality."
Well, OK. I think I accept this. However, I do think rationality is
superior to theism. Part of why I think this is that it can be
universally applied successfully. Theists can spout their doctrines of
gods and faith and all of that as much as they want, but like it or not,
if he wants to build a bridge, he either becomes a rationalist really fast
or he gets wet.
>(This is the root of all those arguments by theists that atheism
>is some sort of religion/belief system: some of them intuit
>the analogy between "God" and "Truth" as guarantor.)
Perhaps. But atheism qua science needs no "Truth" only scientific fact.
The two differ by a great deal.
>On the other hand, asking "why should I adopt ....." acknowledges
>the roles that other aspects of the human creature play in our lives.
>Reason is an important and vital part of human life, but it is
>influenced by the rest just as it influences them. To ignore this
>runs the risk of compartmentalizing oneself as well as painting
>oneself into corners. (Something I've done many times before and
>regretted.)
Well, I can accept this intellectually. I can accept that one can live a
happy and fulfilling life without thinking much about why one believes
what one believes and how one can justify belief. But at the same time,
I know that I could not be satisfied with believing something without reason.
So, I don't know where that leaves us.
> [Referring to my statement that atheism needs no
> intellectual justification at all. JJ Hahn said:]
>
>> Sentence #3 is nonsense unless you are substituting a popular
>> definition of "justification" for a philosophical one. If you
>> intellectual honesty means anything to you at all, you must justify
>> your position to yourself at least.
>
>(I don't find you firing your crossbow at me in this discussion,
>but there's no need to smear the bolts with poison.)
My apologies. On rereading it, I think I misinterpreted your words. I
took the statement "the weaker position is the one that needs
justification" as akin to "the person insecure with his beliefs is
constantly justifying them to others." Now I think you were saying that
given two choices, the weakest needs justification and the stronger
doesn't. But what makes one stronger than the other? Justification I think.
>I'm not making that sort of subsitution. What I am doing is
>challenging what we have traditionally considered as the domain
>of philosophical thought. I believe you will see this implied
>in my preceeding remarks. I submit that all aspects of human life
>are germane to philosophical inquiry, even those which have been
>previously dismissed/ignored/marginalized as "irrational."
>Needless to say, it's rather difficult to address all the questions
>that this position poses in a short post.
I agree with this.
>From another perspective, were someone to challenge an atheist
>to intellectually justify his/her position. I think the best reply
>would be, "Why would you imagine it has to be justified at all?
>That's like asking me to justify why I love my children. Both are
>intrinsic to my form of life. Besides, go mind your business.
>It's not my job to cosset your ego and soothe your insecurities."
>I think that gets to the heart of the matter much quicker.
Well, if this is satisfying enough to you, then I suppose there's no
problem. But, as I mentioned above, I would not be happy unless I could
justify it intellectually to myself at least (justifying it to others is
icing).
>How can an atheist postion be any stronger than this since I
>think it's a matter of resolve and steadfastness?
I thought it was about belief?
JJ Hahn
----------------------------------------------------------------
Philosophy is questions that may never be answered.
Religion is answers that may never be questioned.
Jarmo Manninen
>The atheists that populate this area prefer the wording,
>a person that lacks belief in the existance of god. However
>you seem to have grasped the underlying distincion between
>weak and strong atheists.
(snip)
>At the weak end of the belief spectrum it's impossible
>for atheism and agnosticim not to overlap. I wouldn't
>worry about it though, neat little lables never work in
>real life. No matter how you phase it somebody
>will come along that doesn't fit neatly into any
>category
Yes, I should have remembered what Wittgenstein held about
using words! But, in one sense, I'm glad I didn't!
I think that from the point of view of a particular human
being,
how strong is one's private personal response
to theistic claims, could be partly due to the fact
how challenging the claim is felt in one's private,
personal emotional-existential-world of thinking and
having emotions. _I THINK_ that for the essence of atheism of
a particular person, it is much more of a _fundamental question_
what this particular person thinks/has emotions about it herself,
not that what she's claiming she believes or not, to other
people...so this whether she calls her private beliefs to be
of positive or negative kind, I think, does not matter so much,
AFTER ALL THIS DISCUSSION I think I have found it. I believe
I was almost at the limit where I doubted whether words just
might be enough or not, in my thinking and having emotions when
I thought about this issue.
Emotional responses to theisms and the existence of god could be:
For example,
0. one has heard about a religion but hasn't studied it's
theology (nor justifications for that theology)
1. one laughs at it because it sounds stupid and one doesn't
care about it at all...
2. ....?
3. one feels sick because religion causes mental problems
to one's friends or other people
one feels sick because religion is mixed so strongly with
the politics of that country one is living one's life.
7. ....?
8. ....?
.......
?. Theism is felt as a very strong challenge to a particular
person emotionally personally. "you're going to get yourself
in the horrors of hell because of not being a believer of our
religion" -> and a person starting to get paranoid about it..
...problems might occur....
etc...
-
The response might be in the emotional dimension. And in there
one could found the answer when being honest with oneself..
I think, but doubt still, too....
Purely from this rational/scientific/logical point of view one
can be at least a skeptic (weak atheist), yes. When discussing
with theists you often defend your atheism from this viewpoint.
But, if a theistic claim of a theology is felt very challenging
in the private emotions AND one is starting to get paranoid about
it, the real answer might be found in one's emotional dimension
and by following that approach one might get oneself out of those
stupid fears etc..thinking about it when being honest with his/her
emotions/feelings/morals/private opinions. But, I found out too that
one should not think too much about these issues. I was getting to be
quite deep in my emotions (and was starting to have those fears back
I had when I was still a christian, about my "sins" etc...) when
thinking about these issues (especially when writing the
"justification" for that ""moral" "argument"" (nonsense) of mine).
But, this is my total subjective view of these matters.
This is not any kind general "truth", of course.
For me, my atheism means, for example:
"I cannot know for sure nor prove it for sure, but there just
aren't any kinds of hells lurking around and waiting for me,
in reality" "The world, as *I* see it, does not give me justifications
to believe in the existence of supernatural beings"
"I believe in non-existence of gods by default"
"I do not believe in the existence of gods"
"I believe that the believers of religions often mean by the word
"god" love, empathy and the disapperance of fears and bad feelings.
_I don't deny these feelings/emotions_, only take the whole thing
in a secular way. I talk about love and empathy, not about "god".
And fears disappear when you find love, you love yourself, the world..
life etc..and you find you're loved, you find somebody really cares
about you..regardsless whatever you have done past about which you
have bad feelings/memories...etc.."
"to be a secular humanist"
etc...
But these words only refer to those feelings I have in myself.
To you, other readers they are probably understood differently.
-
Also, all my posting here on this subject could be characterized
like this fundamental philosophical problem of Wittgenstein.
"Ich kenne mich nich aus".
and the sentence:
"You can get out from your problems when following the same path you got
yourself into those problems of yours"
-
That's one reason why I'll end up this thinking about these issues.
I am happy with those FAQ-definitions of atheism again.
-
I could now answer to him:
"Jetzt kenne ich mich besser aus als gestern.
Ein bisschen."
-
and Wittgenstein was a believer, I've heard.
-
Love and empathy!
-
Thanks for discussion,
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
Jarmo Manninen
>: Eh,...only a weak atheist? Well, are you only a weak atheist also
>: emotionally towards this theistic theology I here try to invent
>: (or maybe it wasn't me but some supernatural god who has put these
>: words into my thinking without that I ever knew it?)?
Eh,... maybe it could be possible to invent 1000^1000 theologies or
more how that god(s) put those ideas into my thinking so that I did
not notice it..... However, by using this Occam's razor as a philosophical
justification I choose not to believe in them, because it is the
possible that I invented this theology just to challenge you to think
and that is why I think I wrote it....but..I don't know...for sure.
But, if I wanted to take all this on this article only intellectually,
it confuses me,...does this Occam's razor justify a positive belief
about probabilies? Could I possibly be allowed to hold that
"I believe that this theology I invented _probably_ is not true"...?
Maybe you could help me out....I am a bit confused and haven't
studied that much philosophy...?
>: 0. The is no evidence for this theology to be true.
>: 1. You don't believe in the thruthness of this theology
>: 2. You disbelieve in the thruthness of this theology
>: 3. You believe that the position this theology
>: holds _probably_ is not true. (remember, you were
>: just a skeptic (weak atheist?)
>: 4. You believe the position this theology holds is not true
>: at all (weak atheist here? Intellectually justificated,
>: could it be, how? tell-me-now?)
>: 5. Some other, what? (it is true, perhaps?)
>Definitely 3. The religion sounds ridiculous, but what evidence do I
>have that it's untrue? I'll probably never think about it again, but
>I don't have any justification for rejecting it as a possibility.
You believe that this theology _probably_ is not true. Well, I think
it implies that you believe that the probability that it is not
true is >50% ....Now, when speaking purely intellectually,
what kind of a justification do you have for this position?
"It sounds ridiculous" is not, at least IMHO, an purely intellectual
argument against that religion...I think.
>There's a difference between the portable beliefs you carry around
>with you all day and the core philosophy that you hold as truth (whatever
I think but doubt...that it is a much more important for me
existentially what I believe inside my brain than what I hold
for other people...it much more like a more fundamental question
what I think I am for myself than...
>that is). I think it would be closed-minded to reject something, whether
>it's the rantings of some guy who thinks he's from Mars or the rantings of
>some guy who thinks he's talking to god, just because it sounds like
>childish, mind-dulling wish fulfillment. Because who's to say there
>isn't some pouting, petty God out there who desires human sheep to fawn
>over him?
>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>Adam Clark One of these days, I'm going
>rub...@leland.stanford.edu to cut you into little pieces...
>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--
Jarmo.M...@hut.fi
JayMeh
>In article <3f7nh1$c...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>> Jarmo.M...@hut.fi (Jarmo Manninen) writes
>>
>>>"I believe that this god of christianity (islam) _probably_
>>> doesn't exist"?
>>
>>I think I see what your getting at here. In that logical
>>sense of the word I don't think that it is a statement
>>of belief. Any posistion can be restated in a sentence
>>like that, that doesn't make it a statement of belief.
>>To be a statement of belief it has to assert something
>>without condition.
>Yes, Jarmo's is the position I have been holding. But I don't see why
you
>think belief must be unconditional. I seriously doubt that (most of) the
>strong atheists here would say "I believe gods definitely do not exist."
>Sorry to harp on this, but why is "belief" for you so much stronger than
>"opinion" or "position". I don't make any such distinction between them.
Opinion: A conclusion held with confidence but falling short of positive
knowledge.
Belief: Acceptance of the truth or actuality of anything. That which
is believed.
Opinion and belief both indicate an acceptance of something as
true, but to different degrees. Something held as an opinion is
held with less level of confidance then something that is a belief.
Opinion covers acceptance of more than 50% but stops somewhere
short of 100%. A belief covers 100% acceptance and runs down
to some indeterminate point. The two overlap by a large margin
but do cover distinct ideas. Sorta like weak/strong atheist
seperation. :)
>Am I wrong to believe (opine) that this strong/weak atheist distinction
>is looking like a debate over the meaning of the word "believe"?
This one is, because we seem to disagree with what the word means. :)
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
Adam Heath Clark <rub...@leland.Stanford.EDU> wrote:
>
>I guess it depends on whether you're talking about philosophy or everyday
>beliefs. Science does not look for gods or use them in its workings, but
>if YHWH showed up tomorrow you can bet your ass that science would start
>including him. A philosophy should remain flexible to new ideas and
>be able to cope with paradigm shifts. Everyday beliefs are the
>assumptions, drawn from this philosophy, that we use to deal with the
>world, and we should recognize that they are approximations and guesses
>and most of them are wrong. My everyday beliefs say that there's no
>God sitting in heaven watching me, but (I hope) my philosophy is not so
>rigid that it wouldn't have room for such a creature.
Of course, science deals with evidence. There is no evidence for gods,
thus science does not deal with gods. If God showed up tomorrow, that
would be quite an important data point.
This flexibility is one of the strong points of science. My everyday
beliefs and my philosophy say there is no God. Of course, my beliefs
would have to change if I saw some evidence.
JayMeh
>Anyway, we've gotten a bit beyond the definitions. What is the
>difference though? I was making the point that I say "belief" is the
>same as "opinion". While JayMeh claims that beliefs are much stronger
>and must be unconditional (by which definition I believe nothing since
>everything I believe is at least conditional on evidence (present or
>future)). So, I, who claim to be a strong atheist would be a weak
>atheist by his definitions.
That's not what I meant by unconditional (though it was a probably
a poor choice of words. What I meant was that a belief is something
you hold to be true beyond resonable doubt.
Words like opinion, belief, dogma, stance and posistion all make
assertions about what you hold to be true and how strongly you
hold those things to be true. That the sun will rise tomorrow is
as beyond doubt as almost anything can be and is therefor a
belief. That it will rain tomorrow is a far more questionable
statement and would therefor be mearly an opinion.
I understand how some confusion could arise over this, since
belief is a word used in many different ways and often used
badly in everyday conversations. However, when trying to
get your point across through writing you have to take more
care to use words in a more precise way.
>So, I repeat the question: Is there any difference between strong and
>weak atheists beyond this definition of "belief"?
By your definition (that something held to be more than 50% likely is
a belief) then the weak / strong distinction would break down to a
large extent. But not entirly, weak atheists do not believe that
gods are impossible (or they would already be strong atheists).
>JJ Hahn
>----------------------------------------------------------------
>Philosophy is questions that may never be answered.
>Religion is answers that may never be questioned.
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>
>>strong atheist. If I have the definitions right:
>
>>Strong atheism: believes that gods do not exist.
>>Stong agnostic: believes that the existence or non-existence of gods can
>>never be known for sure.
>
>>I don't see a conflict unless you hold strong atheism to be a claim of
>>absolute certainty or strong agnosticism to be prohibitive of having an
>>opinion in the matter. Well?
>
>Actually both. Stong atheism is generally a claim of absolute
>certainty, as most strong atheists believe (for one reason or
>another) that gods can not exist, let along don't exist. In
>general I think that strong agnostics shouldn't have a belief
>about gods existance or nonexistance either.
I hope not. Strong atheists give me an opinion here. I never thought
that strong atheism was a claim of absolute certainty. That would be a
very foolish claim, and I would have to be a weak atheist. Also, I don't
think that claiming you can never know one way or the other necessarily
means you can't have a belief. You just realize that it's just your
belief. Would you agree with this if I said "opinion" instead of "belief"?
>On the other hand, I'm sure that some people who claim to
>be both strong atheist and strong agnostics exists. If the
>two posistions are held for emotional rather than logical
>reasons they arn't even contradictory (agnostics often
>take either atheistic or theistic beliefs also for reasons
>even they admit they can never prove).
Yes, but I'm not really concerned with that.
>>I do think one can hold strong and weak atheistic positions at the same
>>time against different deities. Also, I don't think it irrational to
>>believe deities you've never heard of don't exist as you seem to imply.
>
>No, well ok, a conditional yes. A person that was a strong atheist
>and believed that no god can exist would naturally disbelieve all gods.
>I'm of the opinion that a truly universal disproof of gods existance
>doesn't exist, so holding such beliefs is irrational to some degree
>or another. There is nothing wrong with that though, every belief
>system I've ever seen contains some irrational elements.
No, such a disproof doesn't and cannot exist. How can you disprove the
existence of such a poorly defined thing? But I doubt that (m)any
atheists here would claim such a thing. Strong atheism is about belief
not proof. I still think Occam's Razor is a license to neglect things
without evidence (even if you've never heard of the thing). Why
complicate your worldview with such things?
Also, if you're talking about what you believe in terms of your view of
reality rather than in terms of which statements you can make, what
difference is there between disbelief and non-belief? If you look at
your best guess (call it belief or opinion; I don't care) of what the
Universe is made of, is there a god involved? If not, then you're just
as strong an atheist as I am, and all of this is just linguistic nonsense.
Mats Andtbacka
>In article <3fcvma$q...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com> wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>>I don't see a conflict unless you hold strong atheism to be a claim of
>>>absolute certainty or strong agnosticism to be prohibitive of having an
>>>opinion in the matter. Well?
>>
>>Actually both. Stong atheism is generally a claim of absolute
>>certainty,
The day I claim to be infallible - or omniscient - you can safely take
me away and lock me up.
I may be _certain_ no god(s) exist; in the same way I'm certain bricks
don't float. But if I'm ever proven wrong, that'll be another story
altogether.
--
" Heaven's just a rumour she'll dispel /
As she walks me through the nicest parts of hell " - NIN
JayMeh
As absolute as possible, as many (if not most or even all) atheist
posters here believe that true 100% certainty is impossible. As
for the agnostic point, what you say is pretty much what I say
in the next paragraph.
>>On the other hand, I'm sure that some people who claim to
>>be both strong atheist and strong agnostics exists. If the
>>two posistions are held for emotional rather than logical
>>reasons they arn't even contradictory (agnostics often
>>take either atheistic or theistic beliefs also for reasons
>>even they admit they can never prove).
>Yes, but I'm not really concerned with that.
>>>I do think one can hold strong and weak atheistic positions at the same
>>>time against different deities. Also, I don't think it irrational to
>>>believe deities you've never heard of don't exist as you seem to imply.
>>
>>No, well ok, a conditional yes. A person that was a strong atheist
>>and believed that no god can exist would naturally disbelieve all gods.
>>I'm of the opinion that a truly universal disproof of gods existance
>>doesn't exist, so holding such beliefs is irrational to some degree
>>or another. There is nothing wrong with that though, every belief
>>system I've ever seen contains some irrational elements.
>No, such a disproof doesn't and cannot exist. How can you disprove the
>existence of such a poorly defined thing? But I doubt that (m)any
>atheists here would claim such a thing. Strong atheism is about belief
>not proof.
I just said the same thing, what are you disagreeing with?. I have
the opinion from reading posts here that the majority of posters are
weak atheists.
> I still think Occam's Razor is a license to neglect things
>without evidence (even if you've never heard of the thing). Why
>complicate your worldview with such things?
As I said before, Occam's Razor leads only to lack of belief,
not disbelief.
>Also, if you're talking about what you believe in terms of your view of
>reality rather than in terms of which statements you can make, what
>difference is there between disbelief and non-belief? If you look at
>your best guess (call it belief or opinion; I don't care) of what the
>Universe is made of, is there a god involved? If not, then you're just
>as strong an atheist as I am, and all of this is just linguistic
nonsense.
If that's all you hold to then I am just as strong an atheist as you
are because your a weak atheist.:)
To be a strong atheist, best guess isn't good enough. You have
to hold very strongly that god does not exist. I don't think you'll
find any weak atheist here that thinks the existance of god is
likely, only that it is possible.
>JJ Hahn
>----------------------------------------------------------------
>Philosophy is questions that may never be answered.
>Religion is answers that may never be questioned.
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
JayMeh
>J J Hahn, in <D2L7C...@news.cis.umn.edu>:
>>In article <3fcvma$q...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>>>I don't see a conflict unless you hold strong atheism to be a claim of
>>>>absolute certainty or strong agnosticism to be prohibitive of having
an
>>>>opinion in the matter. Well?
>>>
>>>Actually both. Stong atheism is generally a claim of absolute
>>>certainty,
>The day I claim to be infallible - or omniscient - you can safely take
>me away and lock me up.
I didn't claim either of those things. What I meant is that you
are certain that no gods exist. Later evidence may prove you
wrong but right know you are convinced that no gods exists.
Weak atheists generally hold that god is unlikely but don't
go the whole way to god does not exist.
JJ Hahn is arguing that weak atheists believe that god
probably doesn't exists and that there is no real difference
between that and the belief that god does not exist.
Thats how the "absolute certainty" slipped in, when
extreme or >99% certaintly would have been better.
I've got to start thinking more clearly about how others
read this stuff. When talking about belief words become
very slippery.
>I may be _certain_ no god(s) exist; in the same way I'm certain bricks
>don't float. But if I'm ever proven wrong, that'll be another story
>altogether.
Actually, if placed in orbit almost any object can be made to float. :)
>--
>" Heaven's just a rumour she'll dispel /
> As she walks me through the nicest parts of hell " - NIN
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>
>>"opinion" or "position". I don't make any such distinction between them.
>
>Opinion: A conclusion held with confidence but falling short of positive
>knowledge.
>Belief: Acceptance of the truth or actuality of anything. That which
>is believed.
Where did you get these? I have no argument with "opinion". Your
definition of "belief" seems unlike anything in my dictionary. Granted,
in my dictionary there are several meanings concerning religious faith,
etc. But there are at least two regarding "believe" as synonymous with
"opine" or "think".
>Opinion and belief both indicate an acceptance of something as
>true, but to different degrees. Something held as an opinion is
>held with less level of confidance then something that is a belief.
>Opinion covers acceptance of more than 50% but stops somewhere
>short of 100%. A belief covers 100% acceptance and runs down
>to some indeterminate point. The two overlap by a large margin
>but do cover distinct ideas. Sorta like weak/strong atheist
>seperation. :)
OK, I accept that "opinion" is the weak end of "belief", but I think
"belief" covers the whole range (ie "opinion" is a subset of "belief"
that, if intensified, becomes a "position" then a "dogma" or "faith" and
eventually becomes a claim to "knowledge".) That's vague, but it's
something like that.
>>Am I wrong to believe (opine) that this strong/weak atheist distinction
>>is looking like a debate over the meaning of the word "believe"?
>
>This one is, because we seem to disagree with what the word means. :)
Yes, I have noticed that. I don't think I'm actually much stronger an
atheist than you are, despite the terminology. I was wondering if this
is generally true. Anyone else care to state their belief or opinion on
this matter?
Let's avoid the whole question. If we phrase it like this:
1) It is my opinion that god(s) exist.
2) It is not my opinion that god(s) exist.
3) It is my opinion that god(s) do not exist.
Which of these statements could you make? Is there a logical difference
between holding #2 and #3? Which statements if any represent theists
and weak and strong atheists? Would the answers to any of these
questions be any different if you replaced "It is (not) my opinion" with
"I (do not) think"?
Just curious.
jle...@utdallas.edu
> >> >J J Hahn [in response to my previous response) wrote:
> >
> >I don't agree with the idea that the lack of an intellectual position
> >necessarily means that one must have a religous position. It seems
> >that you do.
> Well, I don't necessarily think that. I can't think of any other
> possibilities right now though. I'm open to this; please elaborate.
I have qualms with setting up the issues in terms of reason vs. religion
or true vs. false. I think part of this is due to historic reasons:
Science vs the Church as providers of explainations. Too many other
aspects are pushed aside when the issue is polarized. But even in
polarized arguments there is a third position that is typically
overlooked by both camps: indifference. (+1 vs -1 ==> 0)
> >It's not a problem for hypothesis testing per se, but it does indicate
> >problems in the notions/assumptions which underpin the notion of
> >hypothesis testing: there's some questions about the 'stability' of
> >the "foundations."
> The fact that there are assumptions does not mean the foundations are
> necessarily unstable. The value of science is that it produces useful
> results in a systematic (therefore repeatable) way. The truth will never
> be known (you're arguing as if I'm some sort of objectivist, but I'm as
> big a skeptic as you could hope to find) because there are always
> assumptions. But what other epistemology works as well as scientific
> rationality? Science doesn't tell you what is ultimately true. It tells
> you what you should believe (accept as provisional truth).
Fair enough, we have a sort of consesus here even though we have
some significant dissagreements, particularly as concerns emphasis.
[Large amount of ensuing dissussion omitted since our disagreements
are essentially epistemological issues.]
> >On the other hand, asking "why should I adopt ....." acknowledges
> >the roles that other aspects of the human creature play in our lives.
> >Reason is an important and vital part of human life, but it is
> >influenced by the rest just as it influences them. To ignore this
> >runs the risk of compartmentalizing oneself as well as painting
> >oneself into corners. (Something I've done many times before and
> >regretted.)
> Well, I can accept this intellectually. I can accept that one can live a
> happy and fulfilling life without thinking much about why one believes
> what one believes and how one can justify belief. But at the same time,
> I know that I could not be satisfied with believing something without
> reason. So, I don't know where that leaves us.
In a place that's not well described by traditional philosophy: I'm
just pointing out something that the tradition has chosen to overlook.
That makes it difficult to categorize in terms of either/or, that's all.
> > [Referring to my statement that atheism needs no
> > intellectual justification at all. JJ Hahn said:]
> >
> >> Sentence #3 is nonsense unless you are substituting a popular
> >> definition of "justification" for a philosophical one. If you
> >> intellectual honesty means anything to you at all, you must justify
> >> your position to yourself at least.
> >
> >(I don't find you firing your crossbow at me in this discussion,
> >but there's no need to smear the bolts with poison.)
> My apologies. On rereading it, I think I misinterpreted your words. I
> took the statement "the weaker position is the one that needs
> justification" as akin to "the person insecure with his beliefs is
> constantly justifying them to others." ...
No problem, I can see how it could be easily misread. I do it too.
> Now I think you were saying that given two choices, the weakest needs
> justification and the stronger doesn't. But what makes one stronger
> than the other? Justification I think.
Not justification per se, that tends to lead to circularity. It's a
question of which position has the greatest congruence with our
experiences. Given a choice between two hypothesis, I'll have
few questions for the one that conforms with my experiences. While
I'll have severe questions about a hypothesis with has few
correspondances with my experience. You could characterize this
as qausi-reasoning, reason plays a part, but the emphasis is
upon experience and not abstraction.
[snip]
> >From another perspective, were someone to challenge an atheist
> >to intellectually justify his/her position. I think the best reply
> >would be, "Why would you imagine it has to be justified at all?
> >That's like asking me to justify why I love my children. Both are
> >intrinsic to my form of life. Besides, go mind your business.
> >It's not my job to cosset your ego and soothe your insecurities."
> >I think that gets to the heart of the matter much quicker.
> Well, if this is satisfying enough to you, then I suppose there's no
> problem. But, as I mentioned above, I would not be happy unless I could
> justify it intellectually to myself at least (justifying it to others is
> icing).
I can understand and respect that.
> >How can an atheist postion be any stronger than this since I
> >think it's a matter of resolve and steadfastness?
> I thought it was about belief?
Yes, I think atheism/theism is focused upon belief. However, the
difference between "strong" and "weak" atheism concerns the
steadfastness of that belief. In other words, for definitional
purposes, the destination is more important than how one gets there.
It's kinda like inviting my friends over for a picnic, there are
a number of ways to get there even though I'll probably give
them the directions that I think they'll have the easiest time
following. They might have other ideas, but that's okay. I just
want them to get there so I can enjoy their company.
dk...@cas.org
>In article <3fcvma$q...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com> wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>I hope not. Strong atheists give me an opinion here. I never thought
>that strong atheism was a claim of absolute certainty. That would be a
>very foolish claim, and I would have to be a weak atheist.
According to the FAQ of this newsgroup, that's exactly what strong atheism
is. I quote: "Strong atheism is a positive assertion that God does not
exist.". The FAQ of this group defines weak atheism as: "simple
scepticism; disbelief in the existence of God.".
This is why I don't think there should be 3 terms Atheism, Strong Atheism,
and Weak Atheism, just Atheism and Strong Atheism. In my experience, if
you use the FAQ definition of Strong Atheism a VERY small percent of
atheistic society would fall into that category making the VAST majority
of Atheists what the FAQ would call Weak Atheists. Therefore Weak Atheism
is the norm for atheists (by the faq) and doesn't need a special term.
There's atheism (people who don't believe in god(s)) and strong atheists
(people who claim god(s) don't exist).
(deletion)
>No, such a disproof doesn't and cannot exist. How can you disprove the
>existence of such a poorly defined thing?
Oh I don't know, how can YOU disprove the existance of such a poorly
defined thing. There just might exist a proof of the non-existance
of something (I don't know how to do it, but that doesn't meant it
can't be done). So please prove such a disproof doesn't and CANNOT
exist (paradox time).
>But I doubt that (m)any
>atheists here would claim such a thing. Strong atheism is about belief
>not proof.
Not according to the FAQ. Strong atheism is about a positive assertion
that God does not exist, not that it is unlikely, probably not, but DOES
not exist (like theism is about a postitive assertion that God does
exist).
>I still think Occam's Razor is a license to neglect things
>without evidence (even if you've never heard of the thing). Why
>complicate your worldview with such things?
You would be foolish to rely on it in such a manner. It can come up
with the wrong conclusion. It is only useful when a conclusion is
necessary and you have two equally competing sceneraios. It will
help you choose the simpler, but later you may find out that it
was the wrong one (once more data is in). Occam's Razor is a useful
tool, nothing more. It doesn't tell you which is definately right.
You see, in my opionion, you don't need to tell the theist that their
god(s) don't exist. It is enough to tell them that they have not shown
that they do exist.
>If you look at
>your best guess (call it belief or opinion; I don't care) of what the
>Universe is made of, is there a god involved? If not, then you're just
>as strong an atheist as I am, and all of this is just linguistic nonsense.
Maybe, but by the FAQ you are a weak atheist just the same. By the way
not all weak atheists, like yourself, state that gods probably don't
exist. Some just don't know, but don't say that it can't be known, for
if they did, by the FAQ they would then be agnostic.
As far as this being linguistic nonsense, you're right, so stop it. If
you are going to discuss things on this group and the group has taken
steps to stop linguistic nonensese (like posting a FAQ with definitions
for terms that are commonly used in this group) then please don't
propogate the problem by using your own non-group definitions in place
of the ones the group has layed out. If you have different definitions,
fine, then use them on your own time, but while here please use the ones
the group has layed out. When people don't it only causes problems.
Now if you want to ask/petition the group to change the definitions
in the FAQ, that's another matter entirely.
As always any opinions I may have written above are mine and mine alone.
Dave.
J J Hahn
>In article n...@news.cis.umn.edu, hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes:
>>I hope not. Strong atheists give me an opinion here. I never thought
>>that strong atheism was a claim of absolute certainty. That would be a
>>very foolish claim, and I would have to be a weak atheist.
>
>According to the FAQ of this newsgroup, that's exactly what strong atheism
>is. I quote: "Strong atheism is a positive assertion that God does not
>exist.". The FAQ of this group defines weak atheism as: "simple
>scepticism; disbelief in the existence of God.".
Yes, but that doesn't address my point unless you misinterpret the word
"positive". I believe the FAQ (and certainly Martin's book, which I
think must have had some influence here) uses "positive" as the opposite
of "negative". NOT as "certain". Strong atheism is a statement of what
you believe (a positive assertion). Weak atheism is a statement of what
you don't believe (a negative assertion). You may disagree with this
interpretation if you wish, but I'd like to see more support than
continuously quoting the FAQ.
>This is why I don't think there should be 3 terms Atheism, Strong Atheism,
>and Weak Atheism, just Atheism and Strong Atheism. In my experience, if
>you use the FAQ definition of Strong Atheism a VERY small percent of
>atheistic society would fall into that category making the VAST majority
>of Atheists what the FAQ would call Weak Atheists. Therefore Weak Atheism
>is the norm for atheists (by the faq) and doesn't need a special term.
3 terms? I thought there was just weak and stong? You're right by you
(erroneous) interpretation of the FAQ, but by my (correct) interpretation
probably most or at least half are "strong atheists".
>There's atheism (people who don't believe in god(s)) and strong atheists
>(people who claim god(s) don't exist).
This type of strong atheist is not as rare as you suggest. The rare type
of atheist is the one who claims absolute certainty that gods don't exist.
>>No, such a disproof doesn't and cannot exist. How can you disprove the
>>existence of such a poorly defined thing?
>
>Oh I don't know, how can YOU disprove the existance of such a poorly
>defined thing. There just might exist a proof of the non-existance
>of something (I don't know how to do it, but that doesn't meant it
>can't be done). So please prove such a disproof doesn't and CANNOT
>exist (paradox time).
Fair enough. But, since the word "god" is not defined sufficiently
narrowly, I think any disproof could be (and often is) gotten around by
altering the working definition a bit. I would not make the claim that
the Christian God cannot be disproven (although it would be very
difficult to do since even Jehovah is not well-defined). Specificity is
needed. You can't disprove something when you're not sure what exactly
you're disproving.
>Not according to the FAQ. Strong atheism is about a positive assertion
>that God does not exist, not that it is unlikely, probably not, but DOES
>not exist (like theism is about a postitive assertion that God does
>exist).
Already addressed the "positive" part. Are you saying that someone who
believes no gods exists but does not assert such to others is a weak
rather than strong atheist?
>>I still think Occam's Razor is a license to neglect things
>>without evidence (even if you've never heard of the thing). Why
>>complicate your worldview with such things?
>
>You would be foolish to rely on it in such a manner. It can come up
>with the wrong conclusion. It is only useful when a conclusion is
>necessary and you have two equally competing sceneraios. It will
>help you choose the simpler, but later you may find out that it
>was the wrong one (once more data is in). Occam's Razor is a useful
>tool, nothing more. It doesn't tell you which is definately right.
NOTHING tells you what is definitely right. Occam's Razor is an
essential part of the scientific method. It tells you what it is
rational to believe and disbelieve. Yes, you can be wrong this way, but
wait for the evidence before you complicate things. There's nothing
wrong with being wrong as long as you do not insist on remaining wrong in
the fact of new evidence.
>You see, in my opionion, you don't need to tell the theist that their
>god(s) don't exist. It is enough to tell them that they have not shown
>that they do exist.
That may very well be true, but that's beside the point. Do you believe
there are no gods or do you not believe there are gods and what is the
difference (in you belief not in your statements)? That's the question.
Maybe you want to use the weak atheist position against theists. I can
see the usefulness in that. But I want to know about what atheists
actually believe and why rather than how they argue with theists.
>>If you look at
>>your best guess (call it belief or opinion; I don't care) of what the
>>Universe is made of, is there a god involved? If not, then you're just
>>as strong an atheist as I am, and all of this is just linguistic nonsense.
>
>Maybe, but by the FAQ you are a weak atheist just the same. By the way
>not all weak atheists, like yourself, state that gods probably don't
>exist. Some just don't know, but don't say that it can't be known, for
>if they did, by the FAQ they would then be agnostic.
They're agnostic as well. Weak atheism and agnosticism are not mutually
exclusive. But I believe there are no gods. I interpret the FAQ as
saying that this is strong atheism. If you add in the certainty bit,
then I'm a weak atheist, but I don't think that's what the FAQ says.
>As far as this being linguistic nonsense, you're right, so stop it. If
>you are going to discuss things on this group and the group has taken
>steps to stop linguistic nonensese (like posting a FAQ with definitions
>for terms that are commonly used in this group) then please don't
>propogate the problem by using your own non-group definitions in place
>of the ones the group has layed out. If you have different definitions,
>fine, then use them on your own time, but while here please use the ones
>the group has layed out. When people don't it only causes problems.
Oh, who are you now? I meant that the strong/weak distinction was
linguistic nonsense not my assertions. If your worldview contains no
gods, you believe none exist. There's little difference beyond what
statements you are comfortable making, but that's misleading. You
believe what you believe not what you say you believe.
The FAQ asserts a qualitative difference between strong and weak
atheism. Your misinterpretation takes this for a difference in
certainty, which is quite beside the point. I am using no non-group
definitions. I'm reading the FAQ. I have my doubts about whether or not
this qualitative difference exists, but that is what strong and weak
atheism are about (like it or not).
>Now if you want to ask/petition the group to change the definitions
>in the FAQ, that's another matter entirely.
Perhaps I will. The FAQ is at best unclear (since we disagree about what
it means).
Dan Johnson
>In article 9...@news.cis.umn.edu, hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes:
>>>>I hope not. Strong atheists give me an opinion here. I never thought
>>>>that strong atheism was a claim of absolute certainty. That would be a
>>>>very foolish claim, and I would have to be a weak atheist.
>>>
>>>According to the FAQ of this newsgroup, that's exactly what strong atheism
>>>is. I quote: "Strong atheism is a positive assertion that God does not
>>>exist.". The FAQ of this group defines weak atheism as: "simple
>>>scepticism; disbelief in the existence of God.".
>>
>>Yes, but that doesn't address my point unless you misinterpret the word
>>"positive".
>
>is that a misinerpretation? This group constantly claims that theists
>make "positive assertions" that their god exists and fail to back them
>up. Likewise (by the FAQ), strong atheists make "positive assertions"
>that god(s) don't exist and fail to back them up (how could they, there
>has not been a valid proof for the non-existance of something, yet).
Now, being a strong atheist, I think I ought to step in and put in
a word in favor of positive assertions.
There has never been a proof that there are no elephants in your bedroom.
The fact that you can't see them doesn't prove it; they might be invisible,
even intangible elephants.
There has never been a proof that there is a such a thing as the internet.
Yet no doubt you would assert that there are no elephants in your bedroom,
and there is an internet.
There *are* proofs that no God exists, but they aren't 'perfect'- they
don't cover every conceivable God, except for some rather vague
inducitve arguments.
>>I believe the FAQ (and certainly Martin's book, which I
>>think must have had some influence here) uses "positive" as the opposite
>>of "negative". NOT as "certain".
>
>On this group (at least for the last 3-4 years) it has been used as
>establishing a proposition. If you can't support it (to date I have
>not seen a supporting argument for the non existance of anything), then
>drop it.
Then you shall have one.
Indeed, you shall have more than one. I'm generous.
Here's a simple one:
1) If there were a God, then it would be obvious.
2) If it were obvious, I would believe it.
3) I do not believe it.
4) I don't believe it, so it's not obvious.
5) So there is no God. QED.
That's a weak one, but very broad. "obvious" is intended to mean
"there would just be lots and lots and lots of evidence"; not
"self-evident" or anything like that.
The easiest way to established assumption #1 is to examine all the
Gods we can lay our hands on. If they are all the obvious sort,
we can induce that most likely *all* Gods are pretty obvious. That
doesn't *prove* it, but it sure suggests that it ought to be so.
(I can give a more complex argument for that assumption,
but it's more trouble than its worth)
The real weakness of course is the presumption that if it were obvious,
I would believe it (#2). I would like to think so, but I don't see how
to prove it.
Here's an purely inductive argument. Curiously, it doesn't cover
all Gods- just all Gods humans worship. It's your basic "graveyard
of the Gods" argument.
Consider the Gods we worship; at some point, their worship begins.
For *some* of them, at least, it ends later on.
Now, assume (as I do) that no extant God would ever allow his worship
to lapse, once it had started. There are many Gods whose worship has
lapsed. These are not real. In other words, if a the worship of a God
ever ends, then the God is not real.
There are other Gods whose worship has begun, or at least will begin sometimes,
but has not yet ceased. These might be real. They might not be real.
So we have a large number of Gods whose worship has ended; we have others
which may or may not end, we don't know.
We can induce from this that *all* Gods eventually fall out of favor. And
deduce from that that *all* Gods are non-real. That is, there are no Gods.
QEsortaD. It's inductive- it's *not* rigorus proof. But it is an argument
you can base an assertion on, as long as you don't claim certainty.
I know many, many more. I can give you a specific proof for a particular
God, if you will describe the God to me- and that can usually be made
really, really watertight.
But all this is good enough to justify saying that there are no Gods, even
though its not perfectly certain.
>>Strong atheism is a statement of what you believe (a positive assertion).
>
>What anyone believes is unimportant and needs no proof/truth.
I disagree. One should support ones beliefs, or they are valueless.
This is why the "oh, I know nobody can show there's no God, but I'm
a weak atheist" excuse always gets my goat.
> However,
>what you can support, that's another matter. Strong atheism is a statement
>of certain belief.
Strong atheism is no such thing. It is a statement of belief; but that belief
is not certain, no more than any other belief is.
It is a *positive* assertion- it claims that some proposition is true, rather
than merely refusing to affirm its complement.
But that's not the same thing.
Just because you assert something, doesn't mean you are *certain*
that it is true.
[snip- silly argument about FAQ definitions. Do we really care this much?]
---
- Dan "No Nickname" Johnson
And God said "Jeeze, this is dull"... and it *was* dull. Genesis 0:0
These opinions probably show what I know.
J J Hahn
>: 1) It is my opinion that god(s) exist.
>: 2) It is not my opinion that god(s) exist.
>: 3) It is my opinion that god(s) do not exist.
>
>: Which of these statements could you make? Is there a logical difference
>: between holding #2 and #3? Which statements if any represent theists
>: and weak and strong atheists? Would the answers to any of these
>: questions be any different if you replaced "It is (not) my opinion" with
>: "I (do not) think"?
>
>
>4) I do not have an opinion about something I do not know exists
>
>I think this sums up what I believe. Though I find the wording difficult
>to come to grips with. You seem to suggest atheists will form an opinion
>about whether god(s) do or do not exist. I personally do not care either
>way. I have formed no opinion about whether god(s) existence. I do not
>believe in god(s) for this reason. Simple right?
Hm. Somehow I feel like I've already answered this. Did I? Or did I
maybe respond to a response to your response? Oh, well. I have this to say:
Your #4 is equivalent (I think) to #2 with the additional #2b:
2b) It is not my opinion that gods do not exist.
I didn't explicitly say that I expect atheists to form an opinion.
Surely strong atheists must, but by definition I think weak atheists
probably wouldn't. Since I suspected that you had to have an opinion (I
originally thought you had to have a belief until it was pointed out that
many people treat the word "belief" more seriously than I do. So, I
revised it to opinion and stated the above.), I started this thread and
questioned whether weak atheists could have an opinion and, if so, what
was the real difference between strong and weak atheists.
At this point, I'm still not sure. No one has shown me how you can avoid
having an opinion (maybe you can). After all, it seems that there are
either gods in your worldview or there aren't. But I have come to
several conclusions:
1) Strong/weak identification is clouded by definitions of words such as
"believe".
2) There is a common (I think misconception) that the difference is about
a quantitative rather than qualitative difference.
3) Some people (unlike me) consider working hypotheses to be different
than opinions (or beliefs). I treat them the same, since there's no way
to tell anything for sure about reality, so scientific (rational) beliefs
are the best you can do. When I say "I believe" or "In my opinion" I
mean that I will behave as if this were true and that I expect that my
perceptions will continue to support this belief. However, I cannot hope
to make a certain statement about reality and reserve the right to alter
my beliefs as new evidence is perceived.
4) Either strong atheists are rarer than I have previously perceived in
this group (was I dreaming?) or only weak atheists are interested in this
sort of topic.
Probably more, but I can only count to 4.
dk...@cas.org
>In article <1995Jan17.2...@chemabs.uucp>, <dk...@cas.org> wrote:
>>In article M...@news.cis.umn.edu, hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes:
J J Hahn, please read all the way through before replying, I believe some
real progress was made towards the end of this post. I have marked the
beginning of this with a bunch of "====".
I would prefere to delete the sections above it as I feel they are getting
us nowhere, however I have included them (and commented on them), in case
you feel otherwise.
If you agree with me then please delete them in your reply, this will greatly
cut down on the length of this thread.
(deletion)
>>>If asked the question "do you believe that one or more gods exist?" pick
>>>one:
>>>
>>>1) I believe that god(s) exist.
>>>2) I believe that there is insufficient evidence to believe one way or the
>>>other.
>>>3) I believe that no gods exist.
>>>
>>>I think that anyone who answers #1 is by definition a theist.
>>>I think that anyone who answers #2 is by definition a weak atheist.
>>>I think that anyone who answers #3 is by definition a strong atheist.
>>
>>I pretty much agree with the above, I would however change 2 to read:
>>
>> 2) I don't think that there is sufficient evidence to believe in said
>>god(s).
>
>OK, but what yu've picked is obviously closer to my #2 since you denounce
>disbelief as well.
>
>>You see I don't see why you need the "one way or the other", there is no
>>"other".
>>They have put forth a proposition outlining their evidence, if we find it
>>lacking then we don't believe it. It doesn't mean that what they are trying
>>to describe/prove doesn't exist, just that they haven't proven/shown it.
>
>Fine, but what would you say to someone who asserts that #3 is the best
>view?
I would say that they had every right to believe that, but unless they
have some evidence that I don't, that belief is unjustified.
>What if the question had been "How many gods do you believe to
>be in existence?"
My answer would be "I don't know.".
>>Now what you call the "other" I call a whole seperate case. In the "other"
>>Strong atheists lay forth their claim for why said god(s) don't exist
>>and it is lacking, so therefore I don't believe it either. They, of course,
>>have the harder road to hoe since it might be impossible to prove the non-
>>existance of something.
>
>Actually, it's a completely silly distinction. Imagine the world as you
>understand it. How many gods are there in you best interpretation of what
>reality looks like?
I don' know.
>If you come up with a number greater than zero,
>you're a theist. If it's zero, you're an atheist and you believe (or
>equivalently opine or think) that no gods exist.
My answer was non-zero and non-greater-than-zero, this makes me a weak
atheist (by the FAQ, although some people would call this agnostic, but
the FAQ defines agnostic in a different way).
>Simple. The difference
>between disbelief and not believing is imaginary outside of lingustics.
>You're creating this difference by clouding it with degrees of certainty,
>which is a whole different question.
No, you are failing to see the 3rd option.
>>If a strong atheist would say "God(s) don't exist.", then they are making
>>a statement of certainty. If on the other hand they simply say that it's
>>possible that they exist, but that they haven't seen any compelling
>>evidence to date to believe in them, then they are (by the FAQ) weak
>>atheists.
>
>Nonsense. I would say gods don't exist if someone asked. I would also
>say that the sun will rise tomorrow. Neither is a claim of certainty.
They are both claims of certainty for they leave no room for other
possibilities.
>Both are rational opinions (beliefs).
"The sun will rise tomorrow" is a rational belief (there is MUCH evidence to
support this), but "God(s) don't exist" is irrational because their is no
evidence to support this.
>Yours is clearly a strawman strong
>atheist. (Incidentally, I call that position "omnipotent atheism")
Maybe, but it's not mine, it's the FAQs.
>>>>>>I for one disbelieve in things that I think are very very very
>>>>>>unlikely.
>>>>
>>>>By this you should disbelieve that people actually win the lottery because
>>>>winning is very very very unlikely.
>>>
>>>Wrong. Think about this some more. It is not at all unlikely that
>>>someone (not a specified someone) will win a given lottery. However, I do
>>>disbelieve that I (a specific someone) will win the lottery by buying one
>>>ticket.
>>
>>This, in my opinion, is an unnecessary position to take and is obviously
>>a false one, so why take it? You know it's false yet you believe it,
>>this is strange to me. Now I can understand not believing that you will
>>win, but not disbelieving that you will.
>
>What are you talking about? What do I know is false and believe?
>Winning the lottery is not at all unlikely. Lotteries are won all the
>time, so I need not disbelieve that lotteries are won. What is very very
>very very unlikely and deserving of disbelief is that I or any specific
>person I name in advance will win it. So what's your problem?
My problem is that you acknowledge that you have a chance to win, therefore
it is not logical for you to believe that you won't, just that you probably
won't.
>>>>To ME, there is a big difference between saying the following 2 statements:
>>>>
>>>> 1) I don't believe in faries.
>>>> 2) Faries don't exist.
>>>
>>>Yes, there is a difference, but you have painted it unfairly. #1 is a
>>>weak a-fairiest position. #2 is a purported statement of fact (not of
>>>belief) unless you accept that it included an implied "I believe that..."
>>>
>>>I say:
>>>3) I believe that fairies don't exist.
>>>
>>>I'm a strong a-fairiest.
Fine, but if you say "I believe that God(s) don't exist.", by the FAQ this
makes you a weak atheist, to be a strong atheist you need to take off the
"I believe that". One is a statement of certainty the other a statement
of belief/uncertainty.
>>Statement 3 has no meaning for me. What someone believes is personal and
>>does not require proof/truth. On the other hand when they want to convince
>>me of their claim, they better have proof/evidence to back it up. I would
>>say you are logically wrong to believe 3, but it will alter your world
>>view little to do so.
>
>So? I repeat (since you failed to answer properly last time): atheism is
>about what you believe (or disbelieve); is it not?
No it is not. It can be, but it is also the position with no beliefs one
way or the other.
>I believe X, and that's fine and needs justification only to myself. If
>I endeavor to show you that my belief is a good one, then I need to back
>it up. Either way, it need not be a claim to fact but only to be the
>best interpretation of the evidence.
Yes, but to date no one has shown that the non-existance of God(s) is the
best interpretation of the evidence. In fact at best they have shown that
the evidence is inconclusive.
>>>That's not the issue. Anything is possible. What do you believe? Isn't
>>>#3 acceptable?
>>
>>It is not even remotely acceptable. Our society is arrogant to think that
>>we have almost all the answers, there is so much that we don't know and
>>can't explain. The fact that faries have VOLUMES written about them
>>throughout history is reason for me to suspect that their was some
>>physical/political/medical/societal/etc. phenomena present. I would
>>answer 1 (what you don't believe has meaning), but not 3 (what you do
>>believe, but can provide no proof/evidence for has no meaning, unless
>>you can prove the contrary, in which case you should no longer believe
>>it).
>
>You need not think you have all the answers to have a worldview! What's
>the point in suspending disbelief in things that you have no evidence
>for? Must we clutter our worldview with things that have no basis?
>When we have evidence, we'll believe differently. We're only arrogant if
>we refuse to change in the face of evidence or if we claim that beliefs
>are knowledge.
It is your view that clutters your world view by adding a lot of beliefs
like faries don't exist and waiting to be proved wrong. My world view
holds no such beliefs, therefore mine is less cluttered.
>>>>>If you can show that fairies probably do not exist than you can
>>>>>disbelieve in them.
>>
>>You can, but shouldn't, you should only not believe in them.
>
>Why? If you can manage to get a probably not, surely that can support a
>disbelief!
It will only support a non-belief.
>>>No, no, no, no.... You can't choose to believe that you know ain't
>>>true! You can deceive yourself into not knowing that there are fairies
>>>under your bed, but as long as you know they are there, you automatically
>>>believe in them whether you want to or not.
>>
>>I disagree, the mind can do funny things. I have seen people make elephants
>>disappear, so by your logic I should believe some people can make elephants
>>disapear, I don't. I could very well see faeries under my bed, yet still not
>>believe in them.
>
>You might as well stop trying to interpret my logic. You're terribly bad
>at it.
I am not surprised that you think so, when you are more enlightned you will
change your mind.
>The lotteries weren't enough?
No, the lottery logic was completly flawed.
>Your elephants are beyond the
>point. (To address it: you have more evidence against the proposition
>that you have in favor of it, so you may disbelieve.) The point was, you
>can't directly choose your beliefs. You believe what you believe. If
>you don't like this, you can deceive yourself (ie an amplified version of
>suspending disbelief in a movie or magic show) into believeing
>otherwise. I'm sorry, this is a bit too technical and only really of
>importance when confronted with those who assert that we should "have"
>some faith. I hope you understand what I am saying, but if you can't
>grasp the difference between someone winning the lottery and someone
>specific winning the lottery, I'm not too optimistic.
I fully understand the difference between someone specific winning the lottery
and someone in general winning the lottery, but that wasn't what the lottery
question was about. The fact that you haven't seen that leads me to believe
that further discussion on this matter will have to wait until your mind
is a little more open.
>>>Surely you believe something?
>>
>>Nope, I accept that certain models of reality have worked for me so far, so
>>I use them, but I don't believe in them. Some of these models would be:
>>
>> 1) I exist.
>> 2) Others exist.
>> 3) Gravity exists as explained (at least the explanation is good enough
>> to be useful, even if it's not right yet).
>
>Great. A bigger skeptic than me. Well, not really, you just don't have
>the same definition of "believe". I look at it about the same way in
>fact. (note: "believe in" is stronger than "believe")
>
>>>I disbelieve in gods. I am a strong atheist. I think the
>>>chances of gods existing are very small but non-zero. To be a weak
>>>atheist you need to think that the possibilities of existence and
>>>non-existence are close to equal (say 40-60% but the exact percentages
>>>are irrelevant).
>>
>>As you can say the percentages are not relevant, but let's use yours. How
>>can you say with 40-60% certainty that a creator doesn't exist. I don't
>>BELIEVE :) you can.
>
>OK. There is no evidence that one does exist. That gets me immediately
>to 50%. The assumption that things, especially big important things,
>leave evidence in their wake gives me some extra (5%).
You haven't shown a lack of evidence so take back that 5%.
>All supposed
>evidence that one exists can easily be disposed of and explained in terms
>of human psychology, sociology, etc. That's worth 5% or so.
This is no evidence against, it only eliminates some evidence for. In fact
what can't be explained in such a manner (very small) could be evidence
for.
>MOst concepts of gods are incoherent and more or less meaningless (10%).
This is not relevant to its existance only its description. As I have said
it's easy to show that descriptions are lacking, showing that the being
trying to be described doesn't exist is another matter.
>OK, I've got to 70%. But this is silly.
In my opinion your only budge off 50 is in the wrong way, granted it only
took you to about 49, but still the wrong way.
>Given that there is no reason to believe in gods, what reason is there to
>seriously entertain the possibility? Can't we just dismiss them as
>fiction until we have real evidence?
No need, just don't accept them as non-fiction and wait for more evidence.
>>>thing. I generally use Believe 3 and Opinion 1a or 2a.
>>> I don't see much difference.
>>
>>I disagree, people have tried to weaken it to be that, but as you can
>>see that hasn't happened yet. If you mean it be opinion that use the
>>word opinion, people use the word believe as a substitute to opinion
>>to try to add weight/conviction to their opinions. The following statements
>>"It is my opinion, god(s) don't exist." or "It is my belief, that god(s)
>>don't exist." mean different things to me. The second one means (to me)
>>that the person is willing to argue their point against a theist, but the
>>first means (to me), that they aren't sure, but just think they don't,
>>and probably wouldn't argue it, they might not even know why they believe
>>it. In the second case they probably know why, they most likely have
>>thought it through.
>
>OK, I'll accept this partly. But I don't see "believe" as a claim to
>certainty. That's what "know" is for.
EXACTLY, but strong atheists don't use believe they, by the faq, claim that
"God(s) don't exist.", their is no believe stated or implied.
>But I can see where "beliefs" imply more defensibility than "opinions".
Yes.
>I think it is rational to believe that no gods exist.
I do not.
>I don't think it is rational to claim to be certain that they don't. I also
>think it is only borderline rational to give gods an even chance of existing.
This puts us both in the weak atheist category, but at opposite ends (you are
almost a strong atheist). If we had a scale for this ranging from 0 to 100
where <= 10 was a strong atheist and >= 90 was a theist I would put you at
about an 11 or 12 and myself at a 50.
>>>>I think my tolerance level is about as close to 100% as you can get. The
>>>>only thing I would even CONSIDER saying with a certainty is that I exist.
>>>>Although I doubt I would even go that far. I believe that I exist, but
>>>>I might only think that I do.
>>>
>>>He said belief. For certainty, you need 100%. For belief you need
>>>~60%. What do you need for opinion?
>>
>>What you call belief, I call opinion. Opinion is only 60+%, belief is
>>99.99..+% proof, and 100% usefulness, to me. So not necessarily a 100%
>>chance of being correct, but 100% chance of said belief being useful.
>>It is useful for me to believe that I, others, and gravity exist and reality
>>(as I know it) behaves as if they do, so therefore I believe it. It is not
>>useful or necessary for me to believe that god(s) don't exist, therefore I
>>don't believe that they don't.
>
==========================================================================
>Are there gods in your worldview?
No.
>I ask now because a "no" answer would seem to imply that you disbelieve
>in gods.
I am not surprised that it seems that way to you, but in fact it isn't that
way.
>Believeing in gods is a
>needless waste of time when they don't explain any evidence, so you might
>as well toss them.
It hasn't been shown that they don't explain the evidence. Some definitions
of god are simply that he/she/it started the universe and has simply sat
back and watched.
>That's why it's useful (but not necessary) to disbelieve in gods.
It's not useful at all, as you admit I get the same world view by simply
not believing, I don't need to disbelieve. Disbelieving gets me no more
usefulness than I already have.
>It's seeming a bit dangerous to claim your beliefs
>on the basis of which statements you can make rather than on the basis of
>what you actually see in the world.
No, because what you can actually see in the world enables you to make
statements.
>>If you can justify it (for others, not just for you), then you should do
>>so. I have yet to see any justification for your position which would
>>hold up in a "court of logic", so to speak. Not that it has to hold up
>>for your personal belief (heck you can believe you are Napoleon for all
>>I care).
>
>Thanks. I think I'll decline. I think I can justify it, but I also
>think it's all a matter of your definitions. I think Occam's Razor
>works, but this might be just because I don't really see any difference
>between non-belief and disbelief.
Yes, I know this. This is the understanding that you need to aquire to
understand my position.
>Gods either exist or don't exist in
>your view of the world. So, is there any difference aside from the
>linguistics of the matter (the definition of "believe" aside)?
Not in your simplification above. God(s) don't exist in either of our world
views. But in mine they are just as likely as any other explaination,
in yours they are almost ruled out.
By this I maintain a more open mind than you. You claim that your belief
would change if the evidence demands it, but by your belief you are biased
against the evidence (however slightly). I'm not saying that you wouldn't
change you view, just that you would need slightly more than what would be
"fair evidence".
>>So in short, I only hold personal beliefs that I find useful and discard
>>ones with no use. Believing that god(s) don't exist has no use, since
>>not believing in any serves the same purpose and is logically more
>>correct.
>
>Perhaps.
YES! Some light shines through.
>Somehow I can't work non-belief into my partition.
I know this and I wonder why, did you have a bad experience with religion?
JayMeh
>In article <3fvgjo$4...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
[snip]
>OK, I know what you mean, but apparently I can't be sure what someone
>I'm talking to for the first time means by "believe". Sure does confuse
>things.
Thats one of the fun thing about talking to new people, finding new
and intersting defintions of words. :)
>>>OK. But what's the difference between #2 and #3 in terms of what your
>>>view of the Universe looks like? Isn't that what's important?
>>
>>People that hold 2 but not 3 allow for the possibility that gods do
>>exist, which is a large difference. It would not have any bearing
>>on how you lived your life though, since 2 and 3 lead to almost
>>exactly the same logical reactions. What difference that makes
>>in the view of the universe is harder to say, my view of the
>>universe is so complex even I can't grasp it's sum, only deal
>>with peices. All I know is that I'm sure of posistion 2 but
>>not 3.
>I'm not asking how you will live your life differently. I'm asking how
>you see the world differently. If there are no gods in your worldview,
>what's the difference between strong and weak atheism in terms of what
>the Universe looks like to you? Is there nothing more (as you seem to
>indicate in your last sentence) to it than your confidence in "No gods
>exist"? If that's all there is, fine (although demanding certainty for
>strong atheism is to construct a stawman). But I interpret the
>definitions as asserting a qualitative difference in what you believe.
>Aside from being in a position very nearly neutral (no opinion, belief,
>whatever one way or the other), I don't see what the weak atheist could
>possibly be.
After some serious thought I don't think that there is a significant
difference in the world views of weak and strong atheists. Both
interperet the world in almost exactly the same way. But as I
explain further below, that doesn't mean that the difference is
insignificant.
>>>but that's not so important. Since there is no evidence for gods, it
>>>makes sense to disregard them and believe that none exist until we are
>>>shown evidence to the contrary. It only makes sense to suspend
disbelief
>>>if there is mixed evidence in favor and against
>>
>>Or when there is insufficent evidence for either side, which is where
>>most weak atheists are trapped as far as I can tell.
>Yes, but a complete lack of evidence in favor is enough to exclude
>something from your model. If it doesn't demand inclusion (by means of
>evidence), there is no reason to keep it. You don't need to complicate
>your model until there is evidence that forces you to do so. There are
>no gods. There is no evidence that forces me to include them in my model
>of reality. To include them is to commit a most irrational act, which is
>to complicate things needlessly. Yes, I may very well be wrong (in
>relation to Truth) about there being no gods. But that's not my problem
>until someone comes up with some evidence.
The problem here seems to be that your world view is positive only.
That is to say only things that you believe to be true or existing are
part of it, all other things are not part of it, nothing further need be
said. However, most people think that excluding something from
your worldview is just as much a belief as including it. There are
unexplained things in my worldview, events for which no rational
explination has been found yet. A strong atheist has excluded
gods from the set of possible solutions, and will stay that way until
faced with direct evidence to the contrary. Weak atheists don't
exclude god from the set of possible explinations, though they
havn't yet found any use for god and most don't think they ever
will. You'll notice that there is no significant difference with the
way we look at the world and yet the difference does affect things.
>>We still seem to have a disagreement about lack of evidence though.
>>If I say an invisible, intangable monster is lurking behind you, your
>>logic leads you to disbelive it (no evidence -> doesn't exist). I
>>however claim that applying Occam's Razor to the monster reveils
>>that evidence for and against can not exist, so the concept is
>>meaningless. A meaningless statment is neither true nor false,
>>so you can only lack belief, not disbelieve.
>>That said, neither of us is going to worry about the monster.
>Applying Occam's Razor gets me to: monster? no evidence thus no need to
>include such monsters in my worldview until the evidence shows up. After
>all, any effect the monster can have on me is going to be evidence. And,
>as sad a thing as it is to be the first to be swallowed by an invisible
>monster, your demise will be evidence for others to evaluate. In any
>case, risking that monsters exist is better than worrying about them.
>And incidentally, I can't quite figure out how you would manage to avoid
>worrying about these critters unless you actually did disbelieve (maybe
>not strongly but to some extent).
To fear the monsters I would have to have some belief that they existed,
not disbelieve in their existance. Why should I worry about something
I don't believe in?
[snip]
>Yes, this is most likely the problem. However, I think many people
>realize that their beliefs are nothing more than models and should be
>treated as such (maybe I'm being too optimistic). But the thing is:
>models are all we have. "Truth" is a myth (at least our claims to have
>access to it are). We have nothing but our perceptions from which we
>build a worldview (model). We like to think that this is in some way
>real (and it benefits us to do so) but this is a dangerous position if we
>take it too seriously. These "Truths" you mention (if any exist) are
>parts of the model as well (since the concept of proof is a part as
>well). Truth is what is real, but how can you know for sure what that
>looks like?
Truths are those rare things that can be so firmly shown to be true
that their being false would invalidate the concept of truth and falshood.
At least thats how they fit into my model. I get the sneaking suspicion
that our world models are structured differently. Mine is best viewed
as a set of statements that are either true or false. At the top are
a set of beliefs held as "Truth", things I can or that can be justified
so well that to think them false is absurd. Below that are various
theories, opinions and working rules, they are held to be true to
various degrees. Well actually this is rather condensed but you
should get the idea.
>Assuming a lack of evidence in favor of gods (which I think we agree to
>be the case), strong atheism is as justifiable as the belief that the sun
>will rise tomorrow. After all, the justification is almost identical:
>1) The sun has risen every morning in my whole life, so I think it
>reasonable to believe that it will rise tomorrow.
>2) Evidence for gods has been lacking every day of my life, so I think it
>reasonable to believe that it will be lacking tomorrow.
It is unreasonable to believe that the sun could rise and not be
detected, while a god could change your life and you would
never know.
>What's the difference?
>JJ Hahn
>----------------------------------------------------------------
>Philosophy is questions that may never be answered.
>Religion is answers that may never be questioned.
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>
>wrote:
>>>Strong agnostics reject the use of evidence and most logic when
>>>applied to god, leaving only emtional basis. That said, I can't
>>>really disagree with our point either.
>
>>OK, I NEVER got that idea about strong and weak agnosticism. Strong
>>agnostics say the existence of God is unknowable; weak agnostics say that
>>the existence of Gods is unknown (unknowable based on present evidence
>>but will not necessarily always be so). I thought that the strong
>>atheist accepted evidence, etc. but thought that it was insufficient for
> ^^^^^^^^
>I hope you meant agnostic, cause I can't parse this any other way.
Um...yeah, sorry.
>>knowledge one way or the other and (by the nature of the entity in
>>question) destined to always be insufficient. The emotional basis don't
>>come into it (at least not ontologically).
>
>It was derived from my own thinking on the matter. Strong agnostics
>claim that the existance of god can not be known, that statement
>makes sense to me only if evidence and logic are precluded, how
>else could it be rationally held? If no amount of evidence could be
>adequate then evidence is irrevelent to the argument, see?
OK, I accept that. But I think the emotional basis is out as well.
They're saying that this is a point that can never be "known". So, yes,
in that sense evidence is not going to help. You can still form a belief
(opinion) on the basis of what evidence (or emotion) you have.
>The problem is that not all people can go from no evidence of
>god to god does not exist. I can imagine gods for which no
>evidence would be apparent under normal curcumstances, I'm
>not gonna believe in such a god until I have evidence but I can't
>disbelieve either. Needless to say, most strong atheists disagree
>with me on this.
In light of my recent state of opinion on the matter, I'll ask you this:
can you go from no evidence to excluding it from your model of the
world (until the evidence shows up)? I've come to the tentative
conclusion that my excluding things from the model is closer to
non-belief than to disbelief.
>>Yes, that's what I meant and that's pretty much my point about weak
>>atheism. You can't really have no belief (opinion) one way or the other
>>unless you consider the two options as nearly equally likely.
>
>But most people don't use the words belief and opinion interchangably.
>That's where your getting into troubly. Everybody has an opinion, not
>every body has a belief.
Is that all it is? Would you call yourself a strong atheist if you used
opinion and belief interchangeably?
>It's also vital to keep in mind that if you where haveing this discussion
>with another person you would get another view point. Unlike some
>other groups there simply is no central body for organizing atheistic
>thought. The whole strong/weak distinction is made by atheists
>themselves to show differences in view.
Actually, I am having a similar discussion with someone else and getting
a slightly different viewpoint.
Here is my declaration: I am an atheist. I hereby renounce the terms
strong atheist and weak atheist in describing myself since either one
would be applicable depending on how you view your beliefs and how you
define a few unclear terms.
Once again, I find myself in the radical middle.
>>In some ways, it seems as if this question is a comparision of atheists'
>>degree of agnosticism.
>
>That seems a good way to look at it.
Yes, it is now that I think more about it. Unless there is this
qualitative distinction, that's all it can be.
>>OK, I'm still not sure, but that's what it's beginning to look like more
>>and more. But (again) do you see that there is any real qualitative
>>difference? Do you agree that the FAQ definitions claim such a thing?
>
>The way you use the words opinion and belief I can't think of any
>distinction that couldn't be considered quantative. Every rational
>belief can be put on a sliding scale after all. Most people don't
>cast their arguments that way though, if only for simplicity.
Well, that's part of the problem. In my experience there seems to be a
fairly good correlation between people who use "opinion" and "belief"
almost interchangeably and those who are "strong" atheists. I believe
still that the FAQ definitions claim a qualitative difference and this
difference is still real using my definition of "believe". (ie saying
what you believe rather than what you don't believe) But the thing is
that this difference has no effect on how you actually think unless you
are very close to having no opinion on gods' existence.
JayMeh
>In article <3ga74r$c...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>
>>>In article <3ft3eh$i...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
>>wrote:
[snip]
>>It was derived from my own thinking on the matter. Strong agnostics
>>claim that the existance of god can not be known, that statement
>>makes sense to me only if evidence and logic are precluded, how
>>else could it be rationally held? If no amount of evidence could be
>>adequate then evidence is irrevelent to the argument, see?
>OK, I accept that. But I think the emotional basis is out as well.
>They're saying that this is a point that can never be "known". So, yes,
>in that sense evidence is not going to help. You can still form a belief
>(opinion) on the basis of what evidence (or emotion) you have.
Don't follow you here. We both apparently believe that no belief can
be rationally absolute. There is no perfect truth so all questions are
ones of belief in the end. As far as I can tell, saying that gods
existance
can never be known is equvilent to saying gods existance can never
be believed or disbelieved. If this is a serious question then we may
have to find an agnostic to query.
>>The problem is that not all people can go from no evidence of
>>god to god does not exist. I can imagine gods for which no
>>evidence would be apparent under normal curcumstances, I'm
>>not gonna believe in such a god until I have evidence but I can't
>>disbelieve either. Needless to say, most strong atheists disagree
>>with me on this.
>In light of my recent state of opinion on the matter, I'll ask you this:
>can you go from no evidence to excluding it from your model of the
>world (until the evidence shows up)? I've come to the tentative
>conclusion that my excluding things from the model is closer to
>non-belief than to disbelief.
That's what I do with items I lack belief in. If I disbelieve in them
there is a negative belief in my world system.
>>>Yes, that's what I meant and that's pretty much my point about weak
>>>atheism. You can't really have no belief (opinion) one way or the
other
>>>unless you consider the two options as nearly equally likely.
>>
>>But most people don't use the words belief and opinion interchangably.
>>That's where your getting into troubly. Everybody has an opinion, not
>>every body has a belief.
>Is that all it is? Would you call yourself a strong atheist if you used
>opinion and belief interchangeably?
Actually, after this dicussion, I've come to the conclusion that
if opinion and belief are treated equally then the whole strong/
weak distinction breaks down. Which is pretty much what you
say below.
[snip]
>Here is my declaration: I am an atheist. I hereby renounce the terms
>strong atheist and weak atheist in describing myself since either one
>would be applicable depending on how you view your beliefs and how you
>define a few unclear terms.
>>>In some ways, it seems as if this question is a comparision of
atheists'
>>>degree of agnosticism.
>>
>>That seems a good way to look at it.
>Yes, it is now that I think more about it. Unless there is this
>qualitative distinction, that's all it can be.
That would be a qualitative diference, wouldn't it?
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn)
>
>
>meaningless or internally inconsistant. Such a badly expressed
>concept is obviously not true, but often can't be said to be false
>either. Expressed is a key word here, if I'm shown a definition of
>god that's internally inconsistant it's not true, but also it's not
>false. It's not false because god (if it did exist) would not be
>internally inconsistant, so the definition is not an adequate
>definition of god.
Well, OK, but the god defined by an internally inconsistent definition
and the god that actually exists (and is not internally inconsistent) are
not the same things. The first one still does not exist.
>>>Truths are those rare things that can be so firmly shown to be true
>>>that their being false would invalidate the concept of truth and
>falshood.
>
>>I'm going to have to request an example.
>
>I think the best is that I consider not(solipsism) to be a Truth. Not
>because it can be shown to be true, but rather because if it where
>to be false then the logical system itself would break down, making
>truth and falsehood invalid concepts also.
I don't think solipism would invalidate logic. It would change the
nature of physical evidence, but your logic could still stand.
>Another good example is weak atheism. I hold as a truth that
>I don't belive any god exists. If this is false, then I don't know what
>I hold true and false. Again the whole system breaks down.
This and any other statement that begins with "I believe that..." or "I
perceive..." are statements of your subjective reality (your mental state).
They have nothing to do with objective reality (real reality :) ). I
wouldn't normally call this Truth. It's sort of trivial Truth.
>>Well, if you never know, how can it fit into the model. I think that
>>this is much of the problem. I tend to speak on the level of my model of
>>reality. There are no gods there, so I said I disbelieve in gods (so far
>>at least).
>
>That's a consequence of your world system. It's binary, concepts
>are either true or false. The system I use is trinary, statements
>are either true, false or unknown. In such a system there is a place
>for uncertain (and possibly unknowable, though I'm not agnostic)
>concepts.
Well, it's not that binary. Things either exist or don't exist. But on
questions that are not about existence, there is room for uncertainty.
There's also room for uncertainty regarding existence of specific things
in specific places that I haven't looked in yet. These uncertainties are
places in the model that are occupied by question marks. However, unless
I see the possibilities as being very nearly equal, there is some sort of
provisional belief put in its place. The various pieces of the model
have various degrees of certainty and depend on one another to a
significant degree. Any piece that is not supported by other pieces or
necessary for life gets tossed. If there's no evidence, there's no need
to worry about gods. On the other hand, if the evidence is mixed for and
against, then you get the shades of grey.
>> Most people seem to talk on the level of some mythical
>>Truth. But I seldom say much about what is ultimately Truth, since I
>>don't know anything about it. In terms of the model, these assertions
>>are analogous. In terms of Truth, I am beginning to see how they differ.
>
>Actual progress, Yes! Anyway, your system isn't based in Truth,
>so Truths are tangental to your world system at best. Since your
>not looking for them you rarely find them. People like me spend
>our time searching for Truth and yet rarely find much.
I don't think you can find any that are not definitins (including anything
derived from a formal logical system) and are not descriptions of your
own internal mental states (I believe...). Any other type of information
arises from perceptions. The senses and everything further away from you
introduce uncertainty, which makes Truth impossible to know for sure.
So, everything you know about any objective reality has to be a model
rather than Truth itself. I look for Truth all the time, but I realize
that all I will find is a reasonable belief to stick into my model.
dk...@cas.org
>In article <1995Jan24.1...@chemabs.uucp>, <dk...@cas.org> wrote:
>>In article M...@news.cis.umn.edu, hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes:
>>>In article <1995Jan17.2...@chemabs.uucp>, <dk...@cas.org> wrote:
>>>Nonsense. I would say gods don't exist if someone asked. I would also
>>>say that the sun will rise tomorrow. Neither is a claim of certainty.
>>
>>They are both claims of certainty for they leave no room for other
>>possibilities.
>
>parenthetical "I believe that..." or "In my opinion..." attached to it.
It doesn't matter what english rules you make up, if you don't say/write
"I believe that..." or "In my opinion..." then it's NOT there or implied.
>This is because I am skeptical enough to realized that nothing about
>reality can be known with absolute certainty (including this statement).
>What I say is my position. I expect anyone who disagrees will argue with
>me and perhaps change my mind.
I am like this as well, that's why I wouldn't say things like "The sun will
rise tomorrow", although I WOULD bet on it.
>>"The sun will rise tomorrow" is a rational belief (there is MUCH evidence to
>>support this), but "God(s) don't exist" is irrational because their is no
>>evidence to support this.
>
>There is no evidence to show that the sun will rise tomorrow either.
There is plenty of evidence that the sun will be in a relative position to
the earth to emit electromagnetic radiation that will strike my part of the
planet when the rotation presents itself. There is by no means proof that
this will happen, but plenty of evidence (planetary motion, age of the sun,
etc.).
>>>Yours is clearly a strawman strong
>>>atheist. (Incidentally, I call that position "omnipotent atheism")
>>
>>Maybe, but it's not mine, it's the FAQs.
>
>I honestly don't believe that it is the FAQ's. Mathew hasn't answered my
>e-mail question about it, but it doesn't make any sense unless the
>"positive" refers to the opposite of negative.
As I have shown before (sigh), if you're interpretation were correct, then
there would be little to no distinction between strong and weak atheists.
Almost everyone who would fall into what your interpretation of the FAQs
definition of strong atheism would ALSO fall into the FAQs definition of
weak atheism (making the terms almost useless). The only strong atheists
who wouldn't would be the ones who would claim that there is not a god
with certainty (we both agree, these are VERY few in number).
If we used your interpretation on this group and someone asked me or you
whether we were strong or weak atheists, we would have to answer both
(since we both acknowledge that it is possible (to varing degrees) that
god(s) exist). This makes the terms useless, since almost everyone would
have to answer both.
However with my interpretation you can definitely say which one you are,
this has use and is why I feel that my interpretation is the correct one
and that yours is wrong.
>The weak atheist says what he doesn't believe (negative assertion).
It depends on what you mean by doesn't believe (I have come to not be sure
what YOU mean when you say things like this). If you mean it to be that
they say that the theist is wrong, then this is not necessarily true.
If you mean it to be that they feel that the theist hasn't shown/proven
their case well enough, then you are correct.
>The strong atheist says what he believes (positive assertion).
>Strong atheism is an assertion
>(of belief methinks). As a 50% agnostic (weak atheist) you would
>probably say any assertion was irrational, but attaching the certainty
>bit to this definition seriously weakens it. I think you have done this
>not without precedent, but the FAQ doesn't do so.
The FAQ definitely does it (not me), for without it the two terms have
no meaning and would/should not be used (see above).
>>>>>>>>I for one disbelieve in things that I think are very very very
>>>>>>>>unlikely.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>By this you should disbelieve that people actually win the lottery because
>>>>>>winning is very very very unlikely.
>>>>>
>>>>>Wrong. Think about this some more. It is not at all unlikely that
>>>>>someone (not a specified someone) will win a given lottery. However, I do
>>>>>disbelieve that I (a specific someone) will win the lottery by buying one
>>>>>ticket.
>>>>
>>>>This, in my opinion, is an unnecessary position to take and is obviously
>>>>a false one, so why take it? You know it's false yet you believe it,
>>>>this is strange to me. Now I can understand not believing that you will
>>>>win, but not disbelieving that you will.
>>>
>>>What are you talking about? What do I know is false and believe?
>>>Winning the lottery is not at all unlikely. Lotteries are won all the
>>>time, so I need not disbelieve that lotteries are won. What is very very
>>>very very unlikely and deserving of disbelief is that I or any specific
>>>person I name in advance will win it. So what's your problem?
>>
>>My problem is that you acknowledge that you have a chance to win, therefore
>>it is not logical for you to believe that you won't, just that you probably
>>won't.
>
>Oh. Well, there is that. OK, I do believe I probably won't win, but I
>equate that with disbelief in winning.
Well, there's your problem, THEY ARE NOT EQUAL, so stop it.
>I'm working under the assumption
>that I have a choice between believing I will win, not holding an
>opinion, and believing that I will not win.
Hmm, that's too bad there are many other choices (like the correct one:
"I probably won't win, but I hope I do.") which you don't seem to even see.
>The last is the only one close to being rational.
Of your 3 limited choices, 2 is more rational than three. One and Three
can be wrong (1 more than 3), but 2 can't be.
>That's why I don't enter lotteries. But I
>think the problem is that you associate much more certainty with belief
>that I do. For me disbelief is just belief that something is probably
>not the case. I believe that I won't win. I don't know that I won't win.
Fine then don't say "I won't win", say something like "I probably won't win.".
>>>I don't think it is rational to claim to be certain that they don't. I also
>>>think it is only borderline rational to give gods an even chance of existing.
This is a pity and shows that your mind is closing. I for one don't know
how the universe (as I know it) started and I certainly don't know enough
to start ruling out possibilities.
>>This puts us both in the weak atheist category, but at opposite ends (you are
>>almost a strong atheist). If we had a scale for this ranging from 0 to 100
>>where <= 10 was a strong atheist and >= 90 was a theist I would put you at
>>about an 11 or 12 and myself at a 50.
>
>Well, I'd give myself a few more (20 or 25), but close enough. So,
>you're what they call an agnostic in the outside world? You have not
>even an opinion on the matter?
Hmm, this is tough to answer. It is true, that I hold no belief either way
on the matter (I look at all possibilities with equal weight), but I do
have opinions. I am of the opinions that the religions that I have studied
fail to show/prove their stance and many have serious problems, but this
doesn't mean that their god(s) might not exist. Just that they have
poorly described them/it, there is also the possibility that a god(s) exists
which no one has tried to explain, or that all deity explinations are about
the same god.
I short I just don't know how the universe started (yet) and I am not afraid
to admit this fact. While the world at large would call me an agnostic this
group (by the FAQ), would call me a weak atheist since I wouldn't say that
it can't be known if god(s) exist (and according to them you need to say
that to be agnostic).
In short, I am sceptical on the origins of the universe. I am sceptical that
god(s) exist AND I am sceptical of the Big Bang, Inflationary Universe, and
other secular versions of the origin.
>>==========================================================================
>>
>>>Are there gods in your worldview?
>>
>>No.
>
>I think you said above that you don't know. And in any case, this would
>cause me to rate you a 48 ot 49 at the most.
I rate it a 50 because I don't lean either way. I don't know, means exactly
that I don't know if their are, but I also don't know if there aren't.
>>>I ask now because a "no" answer would seem to imply that you disbelieve
>>>in gods.
>>
>>I am not surprised that it seems that way to you, but in fact it isn't that
>>way.
>
>Well, explain. If there are no gods in your worldview (by this I mean
>your current conception of what the Universe looks like), then you would
>seem at least to be on the no-god side of the fence.
This is in error, because their are also no no-gods in my view. You see
in my world view not everything is filled in (imagine that I don't know
or even think I know everything). One of the things not yet painted
in the painting is the section about god(s). To be more accurate, it
was once painted, but has since been removed. I was brainwashed as a
child to believe in God and it wasn't until my mid-twentys that I
decided to do a self investigation as to why I believed what I did.
I was really trying to justify my belief in God, but ended up doing
the opposite.
>OK, maybe we both
>lack belief. Fine. What am I saying when I add "I disbelieve in gods"?
The FAQ defines disbelief to be the same as non-belief, I disagree.
>>>Believeing in gods is a
>>>needless waste of time when they don't explain any evidence, so you might
>>>as well toss them.
>>
>>It hasn't been shown that they don't explain the evidence. Some definitions
>>of god are simply that he/she/it started the universe and has simply sat
>>back and watched.
>
>They don't explain the evidence. There is no evidence that can be
>explained more simply with gods than without. Gods add no explanatory
>power to your model. The deist god adds nothing to the explanation, so
>it is useless. The rest are worse. So, toss them out of the model.
It may not have a use, but it doesn't mean that it isn't there (this is
where you can get into trouble using Occams Razor).
>>>That's why it's useful (but not necessary) to disbelieve in gods.
>>
>>It's not useful at all, as you admit I get the same world view by simply
>>not believing, I don't need to disbelieve. Disbelieving gets me no more
>>usefulness than I already have.
>
>No, you missed the point. I'm not admitting that you get the same
>worldview by not believing. I'm saying that you can get disbelieving and
>non-believing from the same worldview.
It actually goes the other way, whether you non-believe or disbelieve
determines your world view and they give different ones.
>Thus, it seems only to be a
>difference in what you call your state of belief rather than a real
>difference in belief states.
No, we have different world views. You disbelieve and I non-believe,
because of this you would require "more than fair" evidence to change
your opinion and I would only require "fair" evidence to form an opinion.
>>>It's seeming a bit dangerous to claim your beliefs
>>>on the basis of which statements you can make rather than on the basis of
>>>what you actually see in the world.
>>
>>No, because what you can actually see in the world enables you to make
>>statements.
>
>Exactly. That's why I don't see how identical worldviews explained by
>different statements could be different in any real way.
They aren't the same world view, your view is that god(s) aren't there, mine
is that I don't know what's there.
>>>Thanks. I think I'll decline. I think I can justify it, but I also
>>>think it's all a matter of your definitions. I think Occam's Razor
>>>works, but this might be just because I don't really see any difference
>>>between non-belief and disbelief.
>>
>>Yes, I know this. This is the understanding that you need to aquire to
>>understand my position.
>
>True. Where I am now is that I think I've been calling disbelief
>something more similar to what you call non-belief (at least if you see
>your worldview as a model or unknowable reality it is functionally the
>same). SO, tell me now what is disbelief? What more does this add to
>one's position?
There is a fine line here, TO ME, non-belief is exactly that non-belief,
but disbelief is a LITTLE stronger. TO ME it says not only do I not believe
it, but I think what you claim isn't true. So in short, with non-belief
you claim that they haven't shown it to be true and with disbelief you
actually claim that it isn't true.
It's like High School math, some people just wrote down an answer without
showing the steps that they used to get there. The teacher would not
claim that the answer wasn't true, just that the student HADN'T SHOWN
IT TO BE TRUE, so even though it was true, they got it marked wrong.
So while I would claim that a theist hasn't shown it to be true, I wouldn't
claim that it wasn't true.
>>Not in your simplification above. God(s) don't exist in either of our world
>>views. But in mine they are just as likely as any other explaination,
>>in yours they are almost ruled out.
>>
>>By this I maintain a more open mind than you. You claim that your belief
>>would change if the evidence demands it, but by your belief you are biased
>>against the evidence (however slightly). I'm not saying that you wouldn't
>>change you view, just that you would need slightly more than what would be
>>"fair evidence".
>
>Well, I'm sorry you think this. I have found that my model of reality
>works better without gods. If this situation changes, I will have to
>alter my model. Yes, there is some inertia in these things, but I don't
>know how to avoid it.
You avoid it by not having unnecessary opinions, like "It's highly unlikely
god(s) exist.". There is not evidence to support the non-existence of
something yet, so don't take the position.
>What I fail to understand is what is contained in
>this open mind of yours unless your position is similar to mine and
>described differently. Surely you have some sort of working model?
But it doesn't include/exclude god(s).
>I don't know what you mean by "just as likely" above. On the level of
>unknowable reality, everything is just as likely as everything else
>because we have no way of affixing probabilities.
EXACTLY!
>The scientific method
>could very well have very little accuracy in describing reality. But, on
>the level of scientific methodology, evidence is lacking and including
>gods adds complexity without any benefit of explanatory power.
So, it doesn't mean that it/they aren't there.
>Gods, being of no utility, therefore do not exist as far as the model is
>concerned.
Wrong, god(s) may not help explain things (yet), but it doesn't mean that
they do not exist.
>If that is what you mean by "non-belief", then I am a
>non-believer, and we have very little disagreement outside of terminology.
>
>>>Somehow I can't work non-belief into my partition.
>>
>>I know this and I wonder why, did you have a bad experience with religion?
>
>No, it's not that at all. I've been rather fortunate. Maybe I can't
>actually work disbelief into my model. Look at the above and tell me
>which I am closer to describing.
I think you think god(s) don't exist. That to me is disbelief, I don't
know one way or the other, this to me is non-belief.
Since you don't have any evidence that god(s) don't exist, I think you
are wrong to believe that they don't.
dk...@cas.org
>In article <3g7jp0$8...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com> wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>with Dave. My worldview is a model...a curve fit. If you don't need an
>exponential term to fit the data, then throw it out and try a linear
>fit. I equate this with disbelieving that the data are exponentially
>distributed. Perhaps it is closer to not-believing this.
>
>Or, I'm painting a landscape. Seeking to be realistic, I paint only what
>I see. My picture will not contain purple flowers if I see none. I
>apparently lack belief in purple flowers here (I would previously have
>said I disbelieve there are purple flowers here).
Sorry, Dave jumping in here. You would also not paint the ant, you don't
detect, walking up a blade of grass 100 yards away, but that doesn't mean
that the ant doesn't exist. Maybe he doesn't exist in the painting, but
that only means your painting FAILS to duplicate the sceen.
(deletion)
>>>Assuming a lack of evidence in favor of gods (which I think we agree to
>>>be the case), strong atheism is as justifiable as the belief that the sun
>>>will rise tomorrow. After all, the justification is almost identical:
Not true.
>>>1) The sun has risen every morning in my whole life, so I think it
>>>reasonable to believe that it will rise tomorrow.
Well that and some understanding of planetary motion and the solar life
span is evidence that it will rise tomorrow (not proof).
>>>2) Evidence for gods has been lacking every day of my life, so I think it
>>>reasonable to believe that it will be lacking tomorrow.
Here's where you're wrong and they are different. You don't have ANY
evidence that god(s) don't exist, it has yet to be shown that you
can prove the non-existance of something. Lack of evidence for the
contrary claim is no evidence for your claim.
So you HAVE evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow and NO evidence that
there are no god(s). That's the difference.
J J Hahn
>
>>In article <3ga74r$c...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
>wrote:
>>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>>>In article <3ft3eh$i...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
>>>wrote:
>[snip]
>>OK, I accept that. But I think the emotional basis is out as well.
>>They're saying that this is a point that can never be "known". So, yes,
>>in that sense evidence is not going to help. You can still form a belief
>>(opinion) on the basis of what evidence (or emotion) you have.
>
>Don't follow you here. We both apparently believe that no belief can
>be rationally absolute. There is no perfect truth so all questions are
>ones of belief in the end. As far as I can tell, saying that gods
>existance
>can never be known is equvilent to saying gods existance can never
>be believed or disbelieved. If this is a serious question then we may
>have to find an agnostic to query.
Well, there might be enough evidence around for you to form an educated
guess. That's what a rational belief is. So, you can believe without
claiming to be able to know or even while claiming to be unable to
know. Then again, I suppose that if you're going to call youself an
agnostic you might be claiming that gods are especially uncertain (as
opposed to being a general skeptic, which would naturally make you an
agnostic as well).
>>can you go from no evidence to excluding it from your model of the
>>world (until the evidence shows up)? I've come to the tentative
>>conclusion that my excluding things from the model is closer to
>>non-belief than to disbelief.
>
>That's what I do with items I lack belief in. If I disbelieve in them
>there is a negative belief in my world system.
Hm. That's good. I think I have a problem now with figuring out what a
negative belief would look like. Well, not negative beliefs in general,
which are easily conceivable. But I can't understand what a disbelief in
the existence of something would be. As far as my way of thinking allows
me to go is lacking the belief and expecting that I will not be likely to
be forced to add it later. That's what I used to call disbelief and have
now decided to call lacking belief. But disbelief...?
>Actually, after this dicussion, I've come to the conclusion that
>if opinion and belief are treated equally then the whole strong/
>weak distinction breaks down. Which is pretty much what you
>say below.
Apparently. There is still a qualitative difference in how your position
is expressed, but it seems to amount to the same thing. Actually, I
really don't use "belief" and "opinion" interchangeably, but they seem to
be a lot closer for me than for you. But I still don't know what the
difference between a claim of belief and a claim of knowledge would be
for you.
>>>>In some ways, it seems as if this question is a comparision of
>>>>atheists' degree of agnosticism.
>>>
>>>That seems a good way to look at it.
>
>>Yes, it is now that I think more about it. Unless there is this
>>qualitative distinction, that's all it can be.
>
>That would be a qualitative diference, wouldn't it?
No, I don't think so. Unless you see agnosticism as a discrete (you have
it or you don't) type of thing. Well it is in some ways, but the way I
use it here, I am envisioning a continuum of atheists from those who
claim no gods exist with a religious-type certainty down to those who are
agnostic but not really atheist at all (sitting exactly on the fence
between belief and lack of belief). Although I don't think is is really
what the weak/strong distinction is all about, it seems that weak
atheists at least disagree with me. I think it has more to do with
negative vs positive beliefs than it does degree of disbelief. Oh, well.
I know I'm being stubborn about this, but that's what the definitions say.
J J Hahn
>In article 4...@news.cis.umn.edu, hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes:
>>In article <3g7jp0$8...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>Or, I'm painting a landscape. Seeking to be realistic, I paint only what
>>I see. My picture will not contain purple flowers if I see none. I
>>apparently lack belief in purple flowers here (I would previously have
>>said I disbelieve there are purple flowers here).
>
>Sorry, Dave jumping in here. You would also not paint the ant, you don't
>detect, walking up a blade of grass 100 yards away, but that doesn't mean
>that the ant doesn't exist. Maybe he doesn't exist in the painting, but
>that only means your painting FAILS to duplicate the sceen.
Fair enough, but that was sort of the point. The ant has no effect on me
and does not deserve to be in the picture. If I decided to include
things I couldn't see, I would be even farther from reality than by
excluding them. I've admitted that this excluding things without
evidence from my model is probably more similar to weak atheism than to
strong atheism (contrary to my previous impressions), but the problem I
had was that I don't see how you could meaningfully say that anything
doesn't exist in reality (as a weak atheist you probably can't either).
>(deletion)
>
>>>>Assuming a lack of evidence in favor of gods (which I think we agree to
>>>>be the case), strong atheism is as justifiable as the belief that the sun
>>>>will rise tomorrow. After all, the justification is almost identical:
>
>Not true.
>
>>>>1) The sun has risen every morning in my whole life, so I think it
>>>>reasonable to believe that it will rise tomorrow.
>
>Well that and some understanding of planetary motion and the solar life
>span is evidence that it will rise tomorrow (not proof).
>
>>>>2) Evidence for gods has been lacking every day of my life, so I
think it >>>>reasonable to believe that it will be lacking tomorrow.
>
>Here's where you're wrong and they are different. You don't have ANY
>evidence that god(s) don't exist, it has yet to be shown that you
>can prove the non-existance of something. Lack of evidence for the
>contrary claim is no evidence for your claim.
>
>So you HAVE evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow and NO evidence that
>there are no god(s). That's the difference.
Well, yes, but I was think of it more in terms of continuity. The only
evidence I have for the future sunrise is dependent upon the assumption
that the laws of nature will continue to operate as they have
previously. So, I have physics that seems to indicate that the sun will
rise tomorrow if they continue to hold. (But I have no direct evidence
that they will continue to hold).
On the God side, I have no evidence that one exists, so they can be
excluded from my model. I believe that I will not have to change my
model in the future based on the assumption that this evidence situation
will tend to remain unchanged. So, future sunrise and future godlessness
are equally supported in terms of the model. In terms of reality, you
can say much about non-existence, but then there's nothing really that
you can say about anything.
I have previously called this assumption
that my lack of belief will continue disbelief. But it seems that some
of you accept this within lack of belief and take disbelief as something
stronger. If this is the case, then, yes, there is a big difference.
JayMeh
>>>nature of physical evidence, but your logic could still stand.
>>
>>Currently in my system inductive logic is derived from observation
>>of the physical world and deductive logic is derived from inductive
>>logic. This means that if solipism is true then logic itself fails.
>How do you get deductive logic from inductive logic?
By noting that certain arguments always seem to be valid.
>>Sort of, but a Truth none the less. And in any case there are very
>>few (if any) deep Truths in my system because I'm rational enough
>>to realize the evidence of the senses can not be blindly accepted
>>as Truth. When that is accepted then it becomes clear that all
>>things are beliefs, the statement 2 + 2 = 4 is equivlent to saying
>>I believe 2 + 2 = 4.
>Actually, it's closer in this case to definition. Mathematical truths
>are parts of a formal system with defined axioms and manipulation rules.
>2+2=4 by definition forever and always (in this formal system). Now it's
>a different matter if you say "when I take two stones and another two
>stones and put them in a pile and count the result, I will find four
>stones." This statement depends upon induction (that reality seems to
>behave according to the rules of arithmetic). If you count five, then
>apparently your formal system is not in accord with reality, but 2+2=4 is
>still true within the system.
Even definitions are open to later changes. Definitions do behave
very different from other beliefs though.
>>Well, here is an important but subtle difference in the way we think. I
>>do my best to avoid provisional beliefs, under the belief that they will
>>influence later information. I want my input to be as unbiased as
>>possible, and beliefs bias input.
>I'm not sure how you can avoid provisional beliefs (you can call them
>opinions if you like). The evidence you see would seem to suggest
>something or other (unless as I said the evidence for and against
something is fairly well-balanced).
Not thinking about it is the best way.
>As long as you understand that your
>provisional belief is provisional and based on what little it happens to
>be based on, you need not be prejudiced in looking at new data.
We are huming beings, all opinions bias later information. You
almost have to have a significant personal belief disproven to
understand just how much it does influence things.
>In fact,
>if you're so afraid of provisional beliefs, I'd think you'd have to do
>away with all of your beliefs (and opinions, inklings, etc.). I think
>every belief should be provisional, since the weight of belief should be
>proportioned to the evidence and no evidence is perfectly conclusive.
Another belief / opinion word usage break here. Provisional implies
,to me, that you recognize that your basing your opinion on
insufficent information. That the weight of current evidence is
not sufficent to support any strongly held posistion.
[snip]
> Your Truths seem to correspond to what I might call model axioms.
>They too are beliefs, but they are the most basic (often needed for sane
>life) and affect all other beliefs. Sound similar?
The difference seems to be in what we think of as the core of the
system. You have a world model based on evidence with various
support tools such as model axioms. I consider the Truth to
be the core of the system with the my world view (model) an
necissary filter of evidence.
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>>
>
>By noting that certain arguments always seem to be valid.
Ah, well then that's not strictly deductive logic. That's applying
deductive logic to reality (an inherently inductive step). You can have
deductive logic with no reference to reality though.
>>>Sort of, but a Truth none the less. And in any case there are very
>>>few (if any) deep Truths in my system because I'm rational enough
>>>to realize the evidence of the senses can not be blindly accepted
>>>as Truth. When that is accepted then it becomes clear that all
>>>things are beliefs, the statement 2 + 2 = 4 is equivlent to saying
>>>I believe 2 + 2 = 4.
>
>>Actually, it's closer in this case to definition. Mathematical truths
>>are parts of a formal system with defined axioms and manipulation rules.
>>2+2=4 by definition forever and always (in this formal system). Now it's
>>a different matter if you say "when I take two stones and another two
>>stones and put them in a pile and count the result, I will find four
>>stones." This statement depends upon induction (that reality seems to
>>behave according to the rules of arithmetic). If you count five, then
>>apparently your formal system is not in accord with reality, but 2+2=4 is
>>still true within the system.
>
>Even definitions are open to later changes. Definitions do behave
>very different from other beliefs though.
Of course, but then you're talking about a different formal system.
That's why I was careful to put the parentheticals above "(in this formal
system)".
>>I'm not sure how you can avoid provisional beliefs (you can call them
>>opinions if you like). The evidence you see would seem to suggest
>>something or other (unless as I said the evidence for and against
>something is fairly well-balanced).
>
>Not thinking about it is the best way.
Ostrich philosophy?
>>As long as you understand that your
>>provisional belief is provisional and based on what little it happens to
>>be based on, you need not be prejudiced in looking at new data.
>
>We are huming beings, all opinions bias later information. You
>almost have to have a significant personal belief disproven to
>understand just how much it does influence things.
Yes, that's unavoidable. But you can't very well avoid opinions
altogether, and I don't see provisional beliefs as being any more
prejudicing than opinions.
>>In fact,
>>if you're so afraid of provisional beliefs, I'd think you'd have to do
>>away with all of your beliefs (and opinions, inklings, etc.). I think
>>every belief should be provisional, since the weight of belief should be
>>proportioned to the evidence and no evidence is perfectly conclusive.
>
>Another belief / opinion word usage break here. Provisional implies
>,to me, that you recognize that your basing your opinion on
>insufficent information. That the weight of current evidence is
>not sufficent to support any strongly held posistion.
Yes, that's why they're provisional. There's not enough to support a
strong belief.
BTW, I got e-mail back from mathew, and he said that strong/weak atheism
is orthagonal to degree of certainty. Also, he confirmed that my
interpretation of positive as "+" rather than "certain" is how the FAQ
was intended. I feel better. I'm not the one who doesn't know what he's
talking about. :)
JayMeh
>In article <3h9s56$d...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>>hahn...@gold.tc.umn.edu (J J Hahn) writes
>>>>
>>>How do you get deductive logic from inductive logic?
>>
>>By noting that certain arguments always seem to be valid.
>Ah, well then that's not strictly deductive logic. That's applying
>deductive logic to reality (an inherently inductive step). You can have
>deductive logic with no reference to reality though.
You can define your logic set any way you want. I prefer to
find the smallest set of axioms that produce the result I want
but there's no good reason to do so.
Incidently, this whole part of my system (fundamental axioms, theories
and beliefs) is very poorly defined. I really need to work on this part
more but it's difficult to be sufficently objective when looking at your
own axioms.
[snip, quite a bit actually]
>>>As long as you understand that your
>>>provisional belief is provisional and based on what little it happens
to
>>>be based on, you need not be prejudiced in looking at new data.
>>
>>We are huming beings, all opinions bias later information. You
>>almost have to have a significant personal belief disproven to
>>understand just how much it does influence things.
>Yes, that's unavoidable. But you can't very well avoid opinions
>altogether, and I don't see provisional beliefs as being any more
>prejudicing than opinions.
All beliefs (of any degree) interfere with information. That's why
I try to avoid having one until I have enough information to have
a fairly strong one. Of course, that is itself a belief that biases
input, hopefully it biases towards more unfiltered input.
>>>In fact,
>>>if you're so afraid of provisional beliefs, I'd think you'd have to do
>>>away with all of your beliefs (and opinions, inklings, etc.). I think
>>>every belief should be provisional, since the weight of belief should
be
>>>proportioned to the evidence and no evidence is perfectly conclusive.
>>
>>Another belief / opinion word usage break here. Provisional implies
>>,to me, that you recognize that your basing your opinion on
>>insufficent information. That the weight of current evidence is
>>not sufficent to support any strongly held posistion.
>Yes, that's why they're provisional. There's not enough to support a
>strong belief.
I got the impression from the previous post that you though all beliefs
are based in insufficent evidence. Let me try to make my beliefs
more clear here.
Provisional belief - a belief held on evidence that is inadequate
because some decision must be based on current beliefs now.
Belief - a strongly held belief, based on either weight of
evidence or logical extenstion of other beliefs or axioms.
Axiom - a strongly held belief that can not be prooven,
but must be accepted for the logical system to work.
Opinion - a belief held with a fair but not strong level
of belief. It can derive from evidence or be the
suspect logical extention of other beliefs or a logical
extension of another opinion.
I had a good though on where I draw the belief / opinion
line. If I was a juror in a trial I would only find the
defendent guilty if suffcient evidence to create the
belief that he was guilty was presented. An opinion
is not a belief held beyond a resonable doubt.
>BTW, I got e-mail back from mathew, and he said that strong/weak atheism
>is orthagonal to degree of certainty. Also, he confirmed that my
>interpretation of positive as "+" rather than "certain" is how the FAQ
>was intended. I feel better. I'm not the one who doesn't know what he's
>talking about. :)
Your the one arguing the beliefs are degrees of certainty, not
me. My only point was the degrees of certainty and + / -
beliefs can easily be interpreted either way.
This argument has done more to convince me that english
,as a system of information exchange, is a faliure though
than anything I've ever seen before. :)
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com
J J Hahn
>
>You can define your logic set any way you want. I prefer to
>find the smallest set of axioms that produce the result I want
>but there's no good reason to do so.
What result? The desire to minimize axioms is very reasonable, but
something of an axiom in its own right. But, what I was saying is that
deductive logic has nothing to do with reality. It's defined formal
system in which operations may be carried out according to specified
rules. You can map the results of deductive logic onto reality, but this
implies an inductive (previous observations have been consistent with the
implications of my logical system) step. You can set up the axioms in
many different ways, and these need have nothing to do with reality
(non-euclidian geometries for example (even if they later seem less
abstract)).
[snip]
>All beliefs (of any degree) interfere with information. That's why
>I try to avoid having one until I have enough information to have
>a fairly strong one. Of course, that is itself a belief that biases
>input, hopefully it biases towards more unfiltered input.
Yes, this is regrettably true. But I think in most cases you can't avoid
having a position unless you have absolutely no guess. If the phone
rings and I am expecting a call (or if the doorbell rings at a time when
someone has promised to arrive) there is an immediate and unavoidable
idea in my head that it is person X I was expecting (provisional belief,
opinion, inkling, whatever you will). I don't usually put too much on
the line for such beliefs lest I embarass myself in front of a Jehovah's
Witness I mistake for a good friend. The only way I (and you if your
mind is not wired much differently from mine) can avoid such positions is
if I have absolutely no guess (phone rings when I am expecting no call,
opening baffling xmas present, etc.). Yes, this forms a bit of a bias,
but the bias is weighted to the degree of confidence in the belief. You
can say that you avoid beliefs until you have sufficient information, but
I don't believe you (unless your mind is far different from mine). I
think it more likely that you are taking my provisional beliefs for
something much stronger than they usually are.
>I got the impression from the previous post that you though all beliefs
>are based in insufficent evidence. Let me try to make my beliefs
>more clear here.
Depends on what you mean by insufficient evidence. All beliefs about
reality are based on insufficient evidence to produce 100% certainty.
From there, the sufficiency of the evidence is dependent upon the degree
of belief. A belief of degree X% costs Y units of evidence. If you
believe without having enough evidence to pay for the belief, the
evidence is insufficient.
I'll match you:
>Provisional belief - a belief held on evidence that is inadequate
>because some decision must be based on current beliefs now.
A position held on the basis of a small amount of evidence insufficient
to support a strong belief. A name for the unavoidable affinity of the
mind for an answer to an unknown objective question. "I provisionally
believe that Bob is ringing my doorbell since he promised to come by this
afternoon."
>Belief - a strongly held belief, based on either weight of
>evidence or logical extenstion of other beliefs or axioms.
A position taken on an objective question. May have a large range of
degree of certainty ranging from provisional beliefs on the low end to
near certainty on the high end. "I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow."
>Axiom - a strongly held belief that can not be prooven,
>but must be accepted for the logical system to work.
A statement of objective reality that cannot be proven but must be
accepted in order to support the worldview of the believer. "An axiom of
my worldview is that an objective reality and other minds exist
independently of my own mind."
>Opinion - a belief held with a fair but not strong level
>of belief. It can derive from evidence or be the
>suspect logical extention of other beliefs or a logical
>extension of another opinion.
A position taken on a question acknowledged to be subjective in nature.
"In my opinion, Dali is a great artist."
>I had a good though on where I draw the belief / opinion
>line. If I was a juror in a trial I would only find the
>defendent guilty if suffcient evidence to create the
>belief that he was guilty was presented. An opinion
>is not a belief held beyond a resonable doubt.
Sounds reasonable from what I understand of your nomenclature, but as you
will notice above (and previously) I differ quite a lot.
>Your the one arguing the beliefs are degrees of certainty, not
>me. My only point was the degrees of certainty and + / -
>beliefs can easily be interpreted either way.
I'm not sure whay you would say that! I've been claiming that the FAQ
definitions assert a qualitative difference between strong and weak
atheism. You've been answering all of my questions in terms of degrees
of certainty as the only difference. I still have my doubts that this
qualitative difference exists outside of what people are comfortable with
saying in public (as opposed to believeing), but it is clearly the basis
of the definitions.
Degrees of certainty and the qualitative difference between positive and
negative beliefs are entirely different matters.
>This argument has done more to convince me that english
>,as a system of information exchange, is a faliure though
>than anything I've ever seen before. :)
Depends on what kind of information exchange. It wasn't designed for
metaphysics. It's not bad for ordering a hamburger though.
JayMeh
>In article <3hmtad$s...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, JayMeh <jay...@aol.com>
wrote:
>>
>>You can define your logic set any way you want. I prefer to
>>find the smallest set of axioms that produce the result I want
>>but there's no good reason to do so.
>What result? The desire to minimize axioms is very reasonable, but
>something of an axiom in its own right. But, what I was saying is that
>deductive logic has nothing to do with reality. It's defined formal
>system in which operations may be carried out according to specified
>rules. You can map the results of deductive logic onto reality, but this
>implies an inductive (previous observations have been consistent with the
>implications of my logical system) step. You can set up the axioms in
>many different ways, and these need have nothing to do with reality
>(non-euclidian geometries for example (even if they later seem less
>abstract)).
The result I want is to explain everything. Havn't gotten there yet. :)
[snip]
[and again]
Tis not the first time we used the same word differnt ways.
>>I got the impression from the previous post that you though all beliefs
>>are based in insufficent evidence. Let me try to make my beliefs
>>more clear here.
>Depends on what you mean by insufficient evidence. All beliefs about
>reality are based on insufficient evidence to produce 100% certainty.
>From there, the sufficiency of the evidence is dependent upon the degree
>of belief. A belief of degree X% costs Y units of evidence. If you
>believe without having enough evidence to pay for the belief, the
>evidence is insufficient.
Yes but my Y cost function is non-linear. Your's probably
is to, but the point is that our functions are obviously very
different.
[cut]
Our definitions disagree, but I don't think any are wrong.
>>Your the one arguing the beliefs are degrees of certainty, not
>>me. My only point was the degrees of certainty and + / -
>>beliefs can easily be interpreted either way.
>I'm not sure whay you would say that! I've been claiming that the FAQ
>definitions assert a qualitative difference between strong and weak
>atheism. You've been answering all of my questions in terms of degrees
>of certainty as the only difference. I still have my doubts that this
>qualitative difference exists outside of what people are comfortable with
>saying in public (as opposed to believeing), but it is clearly the basis
>of the definitions.
We went over qualitative differences previously. Remember the
discussion of negative pictures and positive beliefs. I though I
had already got across the qualitative difference between them.
Your point about publicly stating is partially true (and probably
fully true for some people) but is not the full grounds of the
seperation.
>Degrees of certainty and the qualitative difference between positive and
>negative beliefs are entirely different matters.
Not really. Ultimatly we all have some degree of certainty about our
beliefs. However we don't like to argue about them, rather we want
to argue about the justifications and logic behind them. For that
reason we take logical posistions that can be either true or false.
That gives us a greater ability to determine the truth or falsehood
of a statement, which then translates back into a change in our
degrees of certainty. The two ways of looking at it are seperate,
but can be mapped to each other without much difficulty, just
as Cartesian cordinates and Polar cordinates are described and
used in very different maners, yet ultimatly represent the same
thing.
>>This argument has done more to convince me that english
>>,as a system of information exchange, is a faliure though
>>than anything I've ever seen before. :)
>Depends on what kind of information exchange. It wasn't designed for
>metaphysics. It's not bad for ordering a hamburger though.
I don't know, the local Wendy's employes don't seem to
grasp what cheesebuger with mustard and onions only
means. Oh crud, a food chain. This discussion is now
doomed.
Jay Mehaffey
jay...@aol.com