A Theistic Escape
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is either above the moral law
or below it. That is, God loves moral property x because x is moral; or
conversely: moral property x is moral because God created it. An
offshoot of the latter is Divine Command Theory (DCT): simply defined,
God creates moral commands. However, this seems to require a level of
moral arbitration. God would thus be entirely arbitrary in what moral
edicts He creates - hence rendering morality contingent.
However, the other side of the Euthyphro coin squares no better. It
places God below moral law -- so to speak; God acts morally because He
is committed to the moral law. And from this dilemma, the argument
could implicate, we are at an impasse, thus Euthyphro wins the day.
This enigma also rears its head in the realm of Platonic logic. Is God
above the laws of logic or does God function under the logical
apparatus? The upshot from such a dilemma raises questions like, "Can
God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?"
This dilemma seems prima facie a serious problem to theistic morality.
However, as I will comment, I believe the horn can be avoided. The
dilemma fails, I believe, because it rests on a questionable premise.
First let me state, and not argue that there seems to be strong support
for moral realism. Moral realism, generally explained, is the belief
that there are moral concepts that exist independent of the human mind;
for brevity's dear sake, if there were no human minds moral
properties would still exist. An instance would be, say, in every case
where x is a moral property, it would follow that x is moral; the
converse would be: if x were an immoral property, then in every case x
would be immoral. So:
(A) if x is conceptually moral, then x is moral in every case.
Those who maintain moral realism maintain it necessarily. That is,
moral facts are necessarily true and do not involve any level of
contingency. An example would be that it is always necessarily wrong to
kill an innocent man or to harm animals for the sake of torture. Again,
this is generally explained as there are several colors of moral
realism.
[A further note: The theist, I should also add, is committed to
Anselmian theology]
Now, one might agree and insist that this does not resurrect the
problem, for we still have moral properties that are *independent* of
God. Here, I will insist, is where the questionable assumption rests.
Is the only recourse for a moral theist DCT? Hardly. A reproach that
can be taken is what is known as conceptualism. That is, conceptual
abstracta like propositions, numbers, et cetera are conceptually part
of the Divine mind. The theist can simply adhere to Conceptual Moral
Realism and view moral properties, like abstract entities, as dependent
upon a Divine Mind, i.e. God's. I invoke Alvin Plantinga here:
"Theists ... may find attractive a view among popular medieval
theologians from Augustine on: the view that abstract objects are
really divine thoughts. More exactly, propositions are divine
thoughts, properties divine concepts, and sets divine collections. But
then these objects can enter into the sort of causal relation that
holds between a thought and a thinker, and we can enter into causal
relation with them by virtue of our causal relation to God." -- Alvin
Plantinga, "Warrant and Proper Function", (Oxford University Press:
1993), p. 121.
Thus, for the conceptual moral realist it is easy to hold that God
exists through no other reality and exists necessarily, while affirming
moral properties necessarily, since they are part of God's essence.
This is a position, also, held by Thomas Aquinas in reference to
abstracta. Contrary to the Platonic view, moral properties - like
abstracta - are not independent of God, but are part of the Divine
mind. Thus, the Euthyphro Dilemma collapses. In this picture, God
cannot "torture an innocent being for fun" because it would insist
that God can transcend beyond His essence.
Conceptualism, Moral Realism, and Anselmian theology are all
assumptions I have made here, so this is hardly an argument. I am
interested in hearing comments. [Note: I do not necessarily endorse the
above]
best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
Woden
@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> Hello all...
>
(snip more meaningless religious drivel)
> Conceptualism, Moral Realism, and Anselmian theology are all
> assumptions I have made here, so this is hardly an argument. I am
> interested in hearing comments.
To put it simply, it's all a bunch of bullshit about an imaginary
character.
--
Woden
"religion is a socio-political system for controlling people's thoughts,
lives and actions based on ancient myths and superstitions, perpetrated
through generations of subtle yet pervasive brainwashing."
Ron Baker, Pluralitas!
<derrick_a...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1154566101....@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> Hello all...
>
> According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is either above the moral law
> or below it.
It is a false dilemma. It excludes the (more likely) possibility
that God doesn't exist.
<snip>
>
> First let me state, and not argue that there seems to be strong support
> for moral realism.
Ludicrous. Ludicrous to think that we would accept
such a ridiculous, unsupported assertion.
<snip>
--
rb
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
> Hello all...
>
> According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is either above the moral law
> or below it. That is, God loves moral property x because x is moral; or
> conversely: moral property x is moral because God created it. An
> offshoot of the latter is Divine Command Theory (DCT): simply defined,
> God creates moral commands. However, this seems to require a level of
> moral arbitration. God would thus be entirely arbitrary in what moral
> edicts He creates - hence rendering morality contingent.
>
> However, the other side of the Euthyphro coin squares no better. It
> places God below moral law -- so to speak; God acts morally because He
> is committed to the moral law.
Why do you say this "squares no better". You appear to have
misunderstood something fundamental about the Euthypro argument,
especially if you think that he wins the day. First off, the argument
specifically addressed piety, though we could extend it to other moral
issues. Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good. Therefore, to
speak meaningfully about god being "good", we must assume that we are
talking about a moral system independent of ad hoc definition by God.
>And from this dilemma,
You haven't shown that it's a dilemma. You have shown that there is a
major problem for command theory. However, it is not necessarily a
problem for god to be beholden to moral facts which are independent of
him. Now, I will grant you that this raises the question of "where these
moral standards come from", but they may arise epiphenomenally, as
descriptions of the functioning of complex systems of autonomous beings.
> the argument
> could implicate, we are at an impasse, thus Euthyphro wins the day.
What impasse? Euthyphro thinks he wins, only because he doesn't
understand what socrates is explaining to him. But there is no impasse.
Something does not become right merely because a person labels it as
such. That would be like saying that we can solve an equation by picking
a number at random and labelling it the "answer". In order for it to be
the right answer, it has to satisfy requisite properties of the system.
Similarly, ethical claims have to actually produce some sort of optimal
solution within the value system upon which they are based.
> This enigma also rears its head in the realm of Platonic logic. Is God
> above the laws of logic or does God function under the logical
> apparatus? The upshot from such a dilemma raises questions like, "Can
> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?"
That might have been more of a problem for the ancient and medieval
thinkers, but, outside of theology, which still seems very much stuck in
the middle ages in many respects, much progress has been made. Logic is
s description of certain types of mathematical requirements. Now you
might say that god could change the requirements, but, if he did, it's
not clear that the system resulting would still be a logical one. It's
kind of like saying that god could change the requirement of a circle to
be a square. But it's still possible to describe what we classically
call a circle, so his redefinition wouldn't really cause a circle to
cease to exist as a concept.
>
> This dilemma seems prima facie a serious problem to theistic morality.
Actually, the dilemma doesn't seem to be a dilemma at all, though there
are serious problems with theism and its moral approach, in general.
> However, as I will comment, I believe the horn can be avoided. The
> dilemma fails, I believe, because it rests on a questionable premise.
Like the notion that there is a dilemma to begin with.
>
> First let me state, and not argue that there seems to be strong support
> for moral realism. Moral realism, generally explained, is the belief
> that there are moral concepts that exist independent of the human mind;
Perhaps, but the axiological criteria may be the part which is more
arbitrary. Since moral systems are founded upon value system, the
variant value systems can still result in a morally relative, or at least
consequentialist position.
> for brevity's dear sake, if there were no human minds moral
> properties would still exist.
The shortcomings of Idealism are well understood.
> An instance would be, say, in every case
> where x is a moral property, it would follow that x is moral
No it wouldn't because you're using the word in two different ways. A
moral property x can either be morally correct or morally incorrect. By
saying something like "a moral property x is moral (i.e. morally
correct)" you end up equivocating.
; the
> converse would be: if x were an immoral property
The opposite of moral is not necessarily "immoral", but "amoral". This
might include things which are neither "right" nor "wrong".
>, then in every case x
> would be immoral.
You need to show that entity x actually exists which is immoral in every
case or moral in every case. So far, nobody in history has ever produced
a single example of something that is moral in every case or immoral in
every case. You're free to consult any favorite philosopher you want,
but this far, no absolute moral system can actually justify a single one
of its absolutist claims. It's just that the simple-mindedness of these
absolutist systems naturally appeals to ignorant people, often of the
theist persuasion, who greatly long for easy answers and over-
simplications of the mysteries of the world.
> So:
>
> (A) if x is conceptually moral, then x is moral in every case.
>
> Those who maintain moral realism maintain it necessarily. That is,
> moral facts are necessarily true and do not involve any level of
> contingency.
Yes, you can maintain that. Showing that one actually exists, despite
any conceivable contingency must eventually be done, for at least one
example, if you want to persuade people of the plausibility of your
premise.
> An example would be that it is always necessarily wrong to
> kill an innocent man or to harm animals for the sake of torture.
Oh please. These aren't even close absolutely moral principles. Every
day, around the world people justify killing other innocent people for
the greater good of some cause. Look at the Iraq war, where we justify
the death of over 100,000 Iraqi civilians, many innocent of an offense
against their attacker, because it achieved some greater objective. Now,
I don't pretend that the type of means rationalizations used here are
necessarily the height of morality. But, in order to convince people of
the correctness of your view you will have to do more than merely assert
that it's never moral to kill an innocent person. As to the torture
issue, on can certainly make a case based upon certain values. However,
it is possible that a universe populated exclusively by sadists would
disagree, among many other scenarios.
> Again,
> this is generally explained as there are several colors of moral
> realism.
Are you talking about something that is "Absolute", only "to an extent"?
That's a fun one, isn't it?
>
> [A further note: The theist, I should also add, is committed to
> Anselmian theology]
That's not a good sign, especially for a modern argument.
>
> Now, one might agree and insist that this does not resurrect the
> problem, for we still have moral properties that are *independent* of
> God. Here, I will insist, is where the questionable assumption rests.
Yes, I will insist that you failed to show that any moral properties
involve god in any fashion whatsoever.
>
> Is the only recourse for a moral theist DCT?
Eh?
> Hardly.
Oh-kay....
> A reproach that can be taken
A "reproach"?
> is what is known as conceptualism. That is, conceptual
> abstracta like propositions, numbers, et cetera are conceptually part
> of the Divine mind.
Why can't these exist independently. God's mind, assuming it exists,
might describe the idea of what we call a number, but that hardly means
the it exists because he thinks it.
Concepts exist not because they are conceived, but *conceivable* in
principle. Bishop Berkeley is hardly the pinnacle of modern thought.
> The theist can simply adhere to Conceptual Moral
> Realism and view moral properties, like abstract entities, as dependent
> upon a Divine Mind
And that wouldn't resolve the problem, because it would still make them
effectively arbitrary. Thus, god's mind could change and torturing
puppies could be a good thing, your assertions of moral absolutes
notwithstanding.
> i.e. God's. I invoke Alvin Plantinga here:
Why bother. He had so little of value to say.
>
> "Theists ... may find attractive a view among popular medieval
> theologians from Augustine on:
There's some modern "back to the middle ages" theology for ya.
> the view that abstract objects are
> really divine thoughts.
And what are those. Are they abstract or concrete? Why are god's
thoughts any different from our thoughts in their ability to abstract.
When we abstract something like a "chair" we just generalize things, like
the function being to sit and there being supports that tend to elevate
one's posterior off the ground. It's not necessary to say that the
concept of a chair (in itself) has to exist in the mind of some higher
being. We're just saying that there are lots of varieties of chairs, and
by that we mean that they have certain functions and forms, while other
details are essentially arbitrary.
> More exactly, propositions are divine
> thoughts, properties divine concepts, and sets divine collections. But
> then these objects can enter into the sort of causal relation that
> holds between a thought and a thinker, and we can enter into causal
> relation with them by virtue of our causal relation to God."
That and $4 bucks should buy you a cup of coffee. There's no reason to
think that our minds cannot form abstractions independent of the
extraneous proposal of some additional deity's mind in the equation.
-- Alvin
> Plantinga, "Warrant and Proper Function", (Oxford University Press:
> 1993), p. 121.
>
> Thus, for the conceptual moral realist it is easy to hold that God
> exists through no other reality
How is that?
> and exists necessarily,
Not really, since you haven't shown that concepts can't exist without
god.
> while affirming
> moral properties necessarily
No, because it still doesn't justify why we should regard it as moral
simple because god pronounces it so.
>, since they are part of God's essence.
Who cares?
> This is a position, also, held by Thomas Aquinas in reference to
> abstracta. Contrary to the Platonic view, moral properties - like
> abstracta - are not independent of God, but are part of the Divine
> mind.
BFD.
> Thus, the Euthyphro Dilemma collapses.
No, it was never addressed in the first place.
> In this picture, God
> cannot "torture an innocent being for fun" because it would insist
> that God can transcend beyond His essence.
No, it just dodges the issue of why his essence would make a difference,
one way or the other, as to why something is moral or not. Maybe god
doesn't believe that torture for fun is moral (though his hell concept
might suggest otherwise) and maybe he won't change his mind (though we
aren't sure of this either), but it's still pointless to talk about god
being good. All we'd be saying is that god does and thinks whatever he
wants and we label that good. It could have been different and then that
would have been his essence. It could change and then that would be his
new essence. He doesn't have to transcend his "essence" because
presumably, part of his present essence is to think as he chooses, which
includes the ability to change his mind. Indeed, the bible claims that
god does change his mind on a number of occasions, for example.
>
> Conceptualism, Moral Realism, and Anselmian theology are all
> assumptions I have made here, so this is hardly an argument.
Agreed. It's not my intent to be overly confrontational, or hostile
about this, but I don't think you've dealt with some of the issues that
you think you have. It's not your fault, since Plantinga doesn't seem to
have done that either.
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
Robibnikoff
>
> According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is either above the moral law
> or below it. That is, God loves moral property x because x is moral; or
> conversely: moral property x is moral because God created it. An
> offshoot of the latter is Divine Command Theory (DCT): simply defined,
> God creates moral commands. However, this seems to require a level of
> moral arbitration. God would thus be entirely arbitrary in what moral
> edicts He creates - hence rendering morality contingent.
That's nice (WTF?)
--
Robyn
Resident Witchypoo
Atheist Bastard Extraordinaire
#1557
Josef Balluch
In a message sent 'round the world, derrick_a...@yahoo.com poured
fuel on the fire with the following:
> According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is either above the moral law
> or below it.
...
> Thus, for the conceptual moral realist it is easy to hold that God
> exists through no other reality and exists necessarily, while affirming
> moral properties necessarily, since they are part of God's essence.
> This is a position, also, held by Thomas Aquinas in reference to
> abstracta. Contrary to the Platonic view, moral properties - like
> abstracta - are not independent of God, but are part of the Divine
> mind.
So your solution is that the deity is neither above nor below the law,
but simply IS the law.
> Thus, the Euthyphro Dilemma collapses.
Perhaps so, but you now have a deity that is neither dependent on nor
independent of the law.
> In this picture, God
> cannot "torture an innocent being for fun" because it would insist
> that God can transcend beyond His essence.
Oddly enough, theists claim that they have an obligation to transcend
their (sinful) nature. Why can they transcend their nature and the deity
cannot?
...
Regards,
Josef
Socrates thought, and so do I, that the wisest theory about the gods is
no theory at all.
-- Michel Eyquem De Montaigne
Greywolf
exists. You never proved that he does. In fact, *no* one ever has -- despite
a senseless and baseless belief to the contrary. 'DCT' rests on a mound of
nothing. Tell us it doesn't. And then prove it.
Greywolf
Michael Gray
- Refer: <1154566101....@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>
>Hello all...
>
>According to the Euthyphro dilemma, God is
Which 'God', Einstein?
--
Michael Gray
<witc...@broomstick.com> wrote:
- Refer: <4jd8fdF...@individual.net>
They forgot to shut the doors on the asylum again...
(Thus the title of the thread.)
--
Robibnikoff
"Michael Gray" <fle...@newsguy.spam.com> wrote in message
news:lhn3d2h92hjkc6lok...@4ax.com...
Ha! I do believe you're correct :)
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Quibble states:
> Why do you say this "squares no better". You appear to have
> misunderstood something fundamental about the Euthypro argument,
> especially if you think that he wins the day. First off, the argument
> specifically addressed piety, though we could extend it to other moral
> issues. Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
> that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
> about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
> saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good. Therefore, to
> speak meaningfully about god being "good", we must assume that we are
> talking about a moral system independent of ad hoc definition by God.
His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past? Can
God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction? Here it would seem
that Euthyphro has a point. Not exactly. My paper - a thought
experiment - was to render a possible exit route a theist can take,
that is by endorsing conceptual moral realism. If conceptualism and
moral realism are true, then the theist can certainly claim to have
collapsed the dilemma; not to mention this theist would be an Anselmian
theist.
Quibbler states:
"Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good."
Exaclty. But, as I mention, if moral realism is true then it is
necessarily true, arbitration is out the window. To say that 'God is
good' is ambiguous if one accepts the Platonic realm. My thought
experiment rejects Platonism.
Quibbler states:
"You haven't shown that it's a dilemma. You have shown that there is a
major problem for command theory. However, it is not necessarily a
problem for god to be beholden to moral facts which are independent of
him. Now, I will grant you that this raises the question of "where
these
moral standards come from", but they may arise epiphenomenally, as
descriptions of the functioning of complex systems of autonomous
beings."
Read my comments above regarding the analogue of logic.
Quibbler states:
"What impasse? Euthyphro thinks he wins, only because he doesn't
understand what socrates is explaining to him."
You mean Plato?
Quibbler states:
"That might have been more of a problem for the ancient and medieval
thinkers, but, outside of theology, which still seems very much stuck
in
the middle ages in many respects, much progress has been made. Logic
is
s description of certain types of mathematical requirements. Now you
might say that god could change the requirements, but, if he did, it's
not clear that the system resulting would still be a logical one. It's
kind of like saying that god could change the requirement of a circle
to
be a square. But it's still possible to describe what we classically
call a circle, so his redefinition wouldn't really cause a circle to
cease to exist as a concept."
I don't quite understand what you mean. Remember, if the theist who
endorses the thought experiment is a moral realist, then he believes in
a type of realism; therefore abstracta are necessary. In his cosmology
2+2 always equals 4. Can God change that? Not according to
conceptualism. Would that imply that God is weak and unable to change a
mathematical deduction? Not according to conceptualism. Conceptualism
argues that abstracta like 2+2=4 is necessarily true in all possible
worlds as well as the Divine mind. The are no realms.
Quibbler states:
"No it wouldn't because you're using the word in two different ways. A
moral property x can either be morally correct or morally incorrect.
By
saying something like "a moral property x is moral (i.e. morally
correct)" you end up equivocating."
No, I say that if concept x is moral then it is moral in all cases.
This moral-x is not only true but conceptually true. There is no
equivocation therein. All this, of course, hinges on moral realism I
should add. Remember, if it is necessarily true then it is true in
every case and every possible world.
Quibbler states:
"You're free to consult any favorite philosopher you want,
but this far, no absolute moral system can actually justify a single
one
of its absolutist claims. It's just that the simple-mindedness of
these
absolutist systems naturally appeals to ignorant people, often of the
theist persuasion, who greatly long for easy answers and over-
simplications of the mysteries of the world."
I know which is why I said (in the beginning) I am merely stating the
case for moral realism. Moreover, moral realism has a theistic branch
as well as a naturalistic branch. In both cases, moral properties are
mind-independent and may or may not be proven.
Quibbler states:
"Are you talking about something that is "Absolute", only "to an
extent"?
That's a fun one, isn't it?"
Read above in reference to theistic moral realism and naturalistic
moral realism.
Quibbler states:
"He doesn't have to transcend his "essence" because
presumably, part of his present essence is to think as he chooses,
which
includes the ability to change his mind. Indeed, the bible claims that
god does change his mind on a number of occasions, for example."
You're confusing the matter. My implication is that God cannot
transcend beyond what is conceptual because it would imply Him to
transcend beyond His essence. There is no limitation on His volition.
If God wanted to create a universe with n+ 1 humans, then there would
be no such limitation. However, God cannot create a married bachelor
because it would be conceptually absurd, i.e. for God to transcend His
own conceptual essence. Changing His mind would not violate my point
above, nor would it place God under some modal volitional limitation.
best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Quibble states:
> Why do you say this "squares no better". You appear to have
> misunderstood something fundamental about the Euthypro argument,
> especially if you think that he wins the day. First off, the argument
> specifically addressed piety, though we could extend it to other moral
> issues. Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
> that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
> about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
> saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good. Therefore, to
> speak meaningfully about god being "good", we must assume that we are
> talking about a moral system independent of ad hoc definition by God.
His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past? Can
God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction? Here it would seem
that Euthyphro has a point. Not exactly. My paper - a thought
experiment - was to render a possible exit route a theist can take,
that is by endorsing conceptual moral realism. If conceptualism and
moral realism are true, then the theist can certainly claim to have
collapsed the dilemma; not to mention this theist would be an Anselmian
theist.
Quibbler states:
"Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good."
Exaclty. But, as I mention, if moral realism is true then it is
necessarily true, arbitration is out the window. To say that 'God is
good' is ambiguous if one accepts the Platonic realm. My thought
experiment rejects Platonism.
Quibbler states:
"You haven't shown that it's a dilemma. You have shown that there is a
major problem for command theory. However, it is not necessarily a
problem for god to be beholden to moral facts which are independent of
him. Now, I will grant you that this raises the question of "where
these
moral standards come from", but they may arise epiphenomenally, as
descriptions of the functioning of complex systems of autonomous
beings."
Read my comments above regarding the analogue of logic.
Quibbler states:
"What impasse? Euthyphro thinks he wins, only because he doesn't
understand what socrates is explaining to him."
You mean Plato?
Quibbler states:
"That might have been more of a problem for the ancient and medieval
thinkers, but, outside of theology, which still seems very much stuck
in
the middle ages in many respects, much progress has been made. Logic
is
s description of certain types of mathematical requirements. Now you
might say that god could change the requirements, but, if he did, it's
not clear that the system resulting would still be a logical one. It's
kind of like saying that god could change the requirement of a circle
to
be a square. But it's still possible to describe what we classically
call a circle, so his redefinition wouldn't really cause a circle to
cease to exist as a concept."
I don't quite understand what you mean. Remember, if the theist who
endorses the thought experiment is a moral realist, then he believes in
a type of realism; therefore abstracta are necessary. In his cosmology
2+2 always equals 4. Can God change that? Not according to
conceptualism. Would that imply that God is weak and unable to change a
mathematical deduction? Not according to conceptualism. Conceptualism
argues that abstracta like 2+2=4 is necessarily true in all possible
worlds as well as the Divine mind. The are no realms.
Quibbler states:
"No it wouldn't because you're using the word in two different ways. A
moral property x can either be morally correct or morally incorrect.
By
saying something like "a moral property x is moral (i.e. morally
correct)" you end up equivocating."
No, I say that if concept x is moral then it is moral in all cases.
This moral-x is not only true but conceptually true. There is no
equivocation therein. All this, of course, hinges on moral realism I
should add. Remember, if it is necessarily true then it is true in
every case and every possible world.
Quibbler states:
"You're free to consult any favorite philosopher you want,
but this far, no absolute moral system can actually justify a single
one
of its absolutist claims. It's just that the simple-mindedness of
these
absolutist systems naturally appeals to ignorant people, often of the
theist persuasion, who greatly long for easy answers and over-
simplications of the mysteries of the world."
I know which is why I said (in the beginning) I am merely stating the
case for moral realism. Moreover, moral realism has a theistic branch
as well as a naturalistic branch. In both cases, moral properties are
mind-independent and may or may not be proven.
Quibbler states:
"Are you talking about something that is "Absolute", only "to an
extent"?
That's a fun one, isn't it?"
Read above in reference to theistic moral realism and naturalistic
moral realism.
Quibbler states:
"He doesn't have to transcend his "essence" because
presumably, part of his present essence is to think as he chooses,
which
includes the ability to change his mind. Indeed, the bible claims that
god does change his mind on a number of occasions, for example."
You're confusing the matter. My implication is that God cannot
Chris H. Fleming
Moral realism isn't about case independence. Moral realism is more
about opinion independence. It is about objectivity. A moral realism
can be set up such that the morality is both dependent upon x and the
case, but in an objective manner. You can imagine a function Morality(x
, case) that cannot be tampered with by man just like gravity or
electrodynamics.
What you are talking about is the lack of arbitrariness. Your examples
are all nice, but a lack of arbitrariness can often be seen oppositely
as a dogma. For counter example if a person says it is always wrong to
kill, then that is a rule that lacks much arbitrariness. But another
person might contradict that and say it is acceptable to kill a murder
(if that is the only choice) in order to save the lives of his
potential victims. Both persons could be moral realists. The
contingency is real.
You are talking about a morality that is both a realism and has an
aesthetically pleasing lack of arbitrariness. Those are two different
things. And just because a person is a realist and also believes that
morality can be reduced to something simple that lacks arbitrary
contingencies, that doesn't mean that person has been capable of
reducing their operating morality to that form. They might be a realist
and a believer in simplicity but are forced to operate in a highly
contingent manner.
This really doesn't explain anything. Instead of saying that god is
bound by the rules, you are saying that the rules are a property of
god. You are just defining away the problem; sweeping it under the rug.
I would call this Moral Pantheism, because it's very analagous to
regular physical pantheism. It is more logical I suppose, but it leads
to nothing.
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
> His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
> erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past?
If time travel is possible, then in principle, such a thing could
happen. That's at least one interpretation of a single time-line
history scheme.
> Can
> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?
Perhaps by reframing the context?
> Here it would seem
> that Euthyphro has a point.
How does the issue of turning a non-contradiction into a contradiction
have any bearing on morality?
> Not exactly. My paper - a thought
> experiment - was to render a possible exit route a theist can take,
> that is by endorsing conceptual moral realism. If conceptualism and
> moral realism are true, then the theist can certainly claim to have
> collapsed the dilemma;
That's not so certain at all. If moral realism is true, whether there
is a god or not, then Euthyphro and Socrates have nothing to talk about.
Unfortunately, we don't know that moral realism is true, nor do we know
that thoughts in the mind of god count as moral obligations. Just
because god thinks it, doesn't make it moral. That is the issue of the
Euthyphro, and one that you seem to have largely ignored.
> not to mention this theist would be an Anselmian
> theist.
>
> Quibbler states:
>
> "Secondly, the problem with the arbitrary nature of morality is
> that, among other things, it becomes impossible to meaningfully talk
> about whether god is "good". To say that god is god would reduce to
> saying that god does as he pleases and defines it as good."
>
> Exaclty. But, as I mention, if moral realism is true then it is
> necessarily true,
If moral realism is true, then there's still the problem of how we
determine what the moral facts are. Whether god declares something to
be moral or not, does not make it so. I suppose you could add the
requirement that god is unable to lie, in which case, his moral
pronouncements could not be knowingly false. But, given the limitation
of free will, even omniscience may not be able to say what the best
moral course of action would be, given the indeterminacy of free will.
> arbitration is out the window. To say that 'God is
> good' is ambiguous if one accepts the Platonic realm.
How is it meaningful to say that god is good in your scheme. If
goodness is still defined as God doing what is in his nature to do, then
this still just reduces to saying that god acts as he acts.
> My thought
> experiment rejects Platonism.
>
> Quibbler states:
>
> "You haven't shown that it's a dilemma. You have shown that there is a
>
> major problem for command theory. However, it is not necessarily a
> problem for god to be beholden to moral facts which are independent of
> him. Now, I will grant you that this raises the question of "where
> these
> moral standards come from", but they may arise epiphenomenally, as
> descriptions of the functioning of complex systems of autonomous
> beings."
>
> Read my comments above regarding the analogue of logic.
>
> Quibbler states:
>
> "What impasse? Euthyphro thinks he wins, only because he doesn't
> understand what socrates is explaining to him."
>
> You mean Plato?
No, Plato wrote the dialogues down, but the characters in the dialogue
were his teacher Socrates and Euthyphro.
>
> Quibbler states:
>
> "That might have been more of a problem for the ancient and medieval
> thinkers, but, outside of theology, which still seems very much stuck
> in
> the middle ages in many respects, much progress has been made. Logic
> is
> s description of certain types of mathematical requirements. Now you
> might say that god could change the requirements, but, if he did, it's
> not clear that the system resulting would still be a logical one. It's
>
> kind of like saying that god could change the requirement of a circle
> to
> be a square. But it's still possible to describe what we classically
> call a circle, so his redefinition wouldn't really cause a circle to
> cease to exist as a concept."
>
> I don't quite understand what you mean. Remember, if the theist who
> endorses the thought experiment is a moral realist, then he believes in
> a type of realism; therefore abstracta are necessary. In his cosmology
> 2+2 always equals 4.
That has nothing to do with cosmology, actually. We can conceive of
logically consistent systems in a variety of strange cosmologies. You
seem to assume that logic is an inherent feature of the world, but if it
is abstract, then you are saying it's *abstracted* from the universe in
which it happens to be embedded.
> Can God change that?
Actually yes, depending on what you mean by change. He could change it
such that 2+2=5 in all cases. All he has to do is add one to the right
side consistently.
> Not according to
> conceptualism.
It wouldn't violate conceptualism for him to redefine the concept.
You'd never know the difference, if god snapped his fingers and made a
world where 2+2=5, so long as he made sure to modify all the evidence
consistently. It would just be a standard rule of math that you always
made the right hand side one bigger. Everybody would know that. It
would be as easy as 2+2.
> Would that imply that God is weak and unable to change a
> mathematical deduction?
A deduction is a description about what the rules of a system imply. If
he changes the rules, it just makes a new system.
> Not according to conceptualism. Conceptualism
> argues that abstracta like 2+2=4 is necessarily true in all possible
> worlds
2+2=4 is not even true in all mathematical worlds, much less all
possible worlds.
> as well as the Divine mind.
The divine mind has nothing to do with it. The system is, in principle
conceivable, whether it exists in god's mind or not.
> The are no realms.
Good for it.
>
> Quibbler states:
>
> "No it wouldn't because you're using the word in two different ways. A
>
> moral property x can either be morally correct or morally incorrect.
> By
> saying something like "a moral property x is moral (i.e. morally
> correct)" you end up equivocating."
>
> No, I say that if concept x is moral then it is moral in all cases.
But that simply follows from the fact that if it were false in some
cases, then we couldn't say that it was true in general.
> This moral-x is not only true but conceptually true.
You're saying it's true for all X, as in the universal quantifier.
What's the big deal.
> There is no
> equivocation therein. All this, of course, hinges on moral realism
Actually, the issue of its moral content is superfluous, at least in the
abstract. You're saying it's true in all cases and that's how you're
defining realism. It only hinges tautologically.
> I
> should add. Remember, if it is necessarily true then it is true in
> every case and every possible world.
Again, only by definition. You haven't shown that such a condition
actually obtains. That you choose to believe in a system which requires
things to be the case in all possible universes is a tall order for you
to demonstrate. Now show that there is such a thing.
> Quibbler states:
>
> "He doesn't have to transcend his "essence" because
> presumably, part of his present essence is to think as he chooses,
> which
> includes the ability to change his mind. Indeed, the bible claims that
>
> god does change his mind on a number of occasions, for example."
>
> You're confusing the matter. My implication is that God cannot
> transcend beyond what is conceptual because it would imply Him to
> transcend beyond His essence.
It doesn't require him to transcend beyond his essence. It merely
requires him to change his essence. It is not beyond his essence to
change, presumably, unless you specifically define that as a feature of
god. Some definitions of god do require that he be changeless.
> There is no limitation on His volition.
> If God wanted to create a universe with n+ 1 humans, then there would
> be no such limitation. However, God cannot create a married bachelor
> because it would be conceptually absurd
Or in other words, god can't do what can't be done. Big deal. Anyway,
according to Catholicism, god can create a married bachelorette, in the
form of nuns. They're unmarried to men, but officially married to God.
>, i.e. for God to transcend His
> own conceptual essence.
He doesn't have to transcend his essence. He just has to alter the
requirements of the system. There are an infinite number of alternate
logical systems which can be created with different values of truth.
That's the basis of fields like fuzzy logic.
> Changing His mind would not violate my point
> above,
But changing his mind would alter the concept he has and thus would
alter your moral absolute, which is based upon god's concept.
> nor would it place God under some modal volitional limitation.
If you say so.
Bill M
No gods created man but quite the opposite; man created gods.
"Chris H. Fleming" <chris_h...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1154640338.1...@p79g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
wcb
>
> "Theists ... may find attractive a view among popular medieval
> theologians from Augustine on: the view that abstract objects are
> really divine thoughts. More exactly, propositions are divine
> thoughts, properties divine concepts, and sets divine collections. But
> then these objects can enter into the sort of causal relation that
> holds between a thought and a thinker, and we can enter into causal
> relation with them by virtue of our causal relation to God." -- Alvin
> Plantinga, "Warrant and Proper Function", (Oxford University Press:
> 1993), p. 121.
>
Which god? Allah or the Biblical god?
Is it damnable to deny Jesus is son of god?
Or damnable to claim god has a son?
Which propositions? Sell all thou hast?
Or slay the infidels where you find them?
Pray in your closet with the door shut?
Sloppy thinking here.
--
"The world holds two classes of men -- intelligent
men without religion, and religious men without
intelligence".
- Abu'l-Ala-Al-Ma'arri (973-1057; Syrian poet)
Cheerful Charlie
wcb
>
> You need to show that entity x actually exists which is immoral in every
> case or moral in every case. So far, nobody in history has ever produced
> a single example of something that is moral in every case or immoral in
> every case.
I am having a hard time imagining when
a violent rape is moral.
wcb
>
> His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
> erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past? Can
> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?
God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
The greatest thing we can imagine must have existance
or it is not the greatest thing we can imagine.
God is therefore the greatest thing we can imagine
and exists.
- Anslem
God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
A god that can make 2 + 2 = 5 , who changes logic
for his purposes is greater than a god who cannot.
Thus god is magic, he can do anything.
He can change the past even if it seems illogical,
and can create a rock so big he cannot lift it and
lift it simultaneously.
He can make married bachelors and can make
a non-contradiction contradictory.
He can destroy all evil. He can make man with free
will who freely choses to do only moral
good.
God is magic.
He has no logical limits he creates logic and reality
any way he wants to.
Theodicy is the theological game of explaining
how a omnipotent, all good god can allow evil.
With a magic god we don't need theodicy any more,
god takes care of all logical puzzles with magic.
There is no need to invoke hidden variables, "Maybe
god has a reason we cannot comprehend for evil".
Magic god makes all logical puzzles go away.
Evil cannot exist.
Magic god cannot exist
Because evil does exist.
Ontological proofs don't work.
God is not the most powerful thing that can be imagined,
as he can't make 2 + 2 = 5 or change logic.
That god that can be imagined to do so cannot exist.
Ignoring ontological claims of existance.
So what is god anyway, is there even a god?
What is logic? Is it one thing or many?
Why is god limited to logic?
If we cannot know anything about logic
except that it prevents the most powerful
god imaginable from existing, maybe it keeps
all possible gods from existing?
wcb
> Hmmmm. One problem, Professor. You started out with the premise that 'God'
> exists. You never proved that he does. In fact, no one ever has -- despite
> a senseless and baseless belief to the contrary. 'DCT' rests on a mound of
> nothing. Tell us it doesn't. And then prove it.
That is not the point in these things.
For sake of argument it is taken.
The Eurythro argument resolves into
two possibilities.
Things are good because god decides what is good.
Or the good has a source outside and beyond god
that god acknowledges.
Which? If god decides, he can decide that what to
us is evil. If it is painful and hurtful and unfair
to us, is it good because god says it is?
(Kill the Canaanites, kill the infidel and idolators).
Or does the fact that something is painful and
hurtful and unfair to the innocent decide logically
what is good and evil, and is god bound to accept
the logic of these things based on their effects?
In an Atheist world where nobody believed in god,
we would naturally base morals on our senses
of empathy and logic. The most god for the most people,
Kant's moral imperitive etc.
Tests have shown monkeys can sense being cheated and
resent it heavily. This is inbred, its instinct.
If you know god does not exist, you know where
morality as we know it comes from now by these things.
If you believe in god, god must have designed this
so god meant us to resent cheating et al.
How about logic?
To do evil and call it good, god must ignore logic.
Logic looks like a check on arbitrary commands.
Fairness and unfainess are based on logic.
Now we see it seems god cannot be arbitrary.
Gandalf Grey
"wcb" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
news:12d5inv...@corp.supernews.com...
> derrick_a...@yahoo.com wrote:
>
>>
>> His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
>> erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past? Can
>> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?
>
>
> God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
> The greatest thing we can imagine must have existance
> or it is not the greatest thing we can imagine.
> God is therefore the greatest thing we can imagine
> and exists.
> - Anslem
>
> God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
> A god that can make 2 + 2 = 5 , who changes logic
> for his purposes is greater than a god who cannot.
Non sequitur. A god who creates logic is greater than a god who needs to
change his own rules because he's too stupid to know how he wants reality to
be.
Therefore there is nothing that logically necessitates a god who would need
to violate logic.
Try again, Barwell.
Gandalf Grey
> Greywolf wrote:
>
>> Hmmmm. One problem, Professor. You started out with the premise that
>> 'God'
>> exists. You never proved that he does. In fact, no one ever has --
>> despite
>> a senseless and baseless belief to the contrary. 'DCT' rests on a mound
>> of
>> nothing. Tell us it doesn't. And then prove it.
>
> That is not the point in these things.
Of course it is. So long as there is no proof of god and no decent argument
for god, theists are the ones with the burden of proof. A burden they've
never been able to meet.
It's only when megalomaniacs like you show up pretending they have a proof
of the non-existence of god that atheists start to look bad as the burden of
proof shifts to YOU.
wcb
>
>>
>> God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
>> The greatest thing we can imagine must have existance
>> or it is not the greatest thing we can imagine.
>> God is therefore the greatest thing we can imagine
>> and exists.
>> - Anslem
>>
>> God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
>> A god that can make 2 + 2 = 5 , who changes logic
>> for his purposes is greater than a god who cannot.
>
> Non sequitur. A god who creates logic is greater than a god who needs to
> change his own rules because he's too stupid to know how he wants reality
> to be.
>
You are stupid. If there is a contradiction,
creating logic does not and cannot resolve it.
Changing logic on the fly so its one way here,
another there, does, creating logic with built in
flexibility is the only way. God would build in
that flexibility to create a superlogic that removes
all limits.
Stupid. Creatinous pseudo-intellectual
Go away. Stop wasting MY time having to correct
your ignorant nonsense to prevent YOU from confusing
and misleading everybody else and diverting attention
from what is really happening here!
And STILL a god that can make 2 + 2 = 4 change
to 2 + 2 = 5 at will is more powerful than one
that cannot and the key words here are "THE
GREATEST GOD IMAGINABLE". Not my idea, I just follow
it to the logical conclusion to see where it all breaks.
Do you ever get tired of demonstrating your
ignorance and inability to think?
Again. A god that can make logic change to
meet his needs is a god where all supposed
hidden assumptions posited to account for
contradictions or problems wipes out all such
hidden variable specultaions from jerk
theologians incapable of admitting their idiot
god's contradictions prove said god cannot exist.
"Maybe god does some great and wonderful we don't
know of and cannot understand". No, magic god
makes all that god away with his ability to
make logic match his needs.
The theodicy problems remain.
Obviously magic god does not exist.
Which means GOD IF GOD EXISTS IS NOT
THE MOST POWERFUL GOD IMAGINABLE.
A conclusion that means, we cannot say now
how powerful god can be with assurance.
THAT is important and you would never get
it on your own.
AND, god can neither change logic on the fly,
that is does not create logic, but also
does not as you ignorantly suggest, create
a perfect logic.
The problms remain!
A few minutes careful thought, utterly foreign
to you, would have shown you that.
So if god is provably not the most powerful
thing imaginable, what would the maximally
powerful god be?
If logic limits god, where does it come from?
What is it?
Is it one thing or many?
Does logic rule out all possible gods
all together?
Can a god exist in a world of matter where
logically speaking, there is no disemboddied entities
who can think and act, not made of matter and energy?
Give up! You can't handle real thinking
or the questions left over after this
odd little question wreaks havoc among
theological claims not well examined for 2000
years.
And yes, ontological proofs of god are dead again
from another angle that prevents all resurrection
of these things despite the attempts of asshole
apologists to do exactly that.
Ontological proofs are dead.
Magic god proven impossible.
The most powerful god imaginable
disproven as impossible.
Logic shown not be under god's control
and thus a problem needing explaining.
You don't get ANY of this.
You can't handle it, go away.
Leave this to people who can think and stop
diverting threads from worthwhile logic
debunkings of theolological claims
to correcting goddamned, infantile Gandy
errors. You don't get this and you miss
all the interesting things careful
thought can get us.
Just what is logic anyway, so powerful
god must obey its rules?
Don't even try. You can't get it.
wcb
Morons like you never get that god EASILY is disprovable
and the ol' burden of proof gambit has been a truly abysmal
failure for the Atheist cause to date.
But you love failure.
I don't. Aggressive strong Atheism is a necessity.
Go away, loser.
Gandalf Grey
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
>>
>> "wcb" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>> news:12d5jln...@corp.supernews.com...
>>> Greywolf wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hmmmm. One problem, Professor. You started out with the premise that
>>>> 'God'
>>>> exists. You never proved that he does. In fact, no one ever has --
>>>> despite
>>>> a senseless and baseless belief to the contrary. 'DCT' rests on a mound
>>>> of
>>>> nothing. Tell us it doesn't. And then prove it.
>>>
>>> That is not the point in these things.
>>
>> Of course it is. So long as there is no proof of god and no decent
>> argument
>> for god, theists are the ones with the burden of proof. A burden they've
>> never been able to meet.
>>
>> It's only when megalomaniacs like you show up pretending they have a
>> proof
>> of the non-existence of god that atheists start to look bad as the burden
>> of proof shifts to YOU.
>
>
>
> Morons like you never get that god EASILY is disprovable
Especially since morons like you never disprove god, easily or otherwise.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Mr. Flemming posts:
"Moral realism isn't about case independence. Moral realism is more
about opinion independence. It is about objectivity. A moral realism
can be set up such that the morality is both dependent upon x and the
case, but in an objective manner. You can imagine a function Morality(x
, case) that cannot be tampered with by man just like gravity or
electrodynamics...
What you are talking about is the lack of arbitrariness. Your examples
are all nice, but a lack of arbitrariness can often be seen oppositely
as a dogma. For counter example if a person says it is always wrong to
kill, then that is a rule that lacks much arbitrariness. But another
person might contradict that and say it is acceptable to kill a murder
(if that is the only choice) in order to save the lives of his
potential victims. Both persons could be moral realists. The
contingency is real.
You are talking about a morality that is both a realism and has an
aesthetically pleasing lack of arbitrariness. Those are two different
things. And just because a person is a realist and also believes that
morality can be reduced to something simple that lacks arbitrary
contingencies, that doesn't mean that person has been capable of
reducing their operating morality to that form. They might be a realist
and a believer in simplicity but are forced to operate in a highly
contingent manner."
There is no level of arbitrariness is moral realism; again, emphasis
must be placed on realism. There is a conceptual sludge that binds
morality to the conceptual apparatus, as I indicated in my abstracta
examples. If two people disagree on the nature of killing, then we must
ascertain a source on how and where they differ: your example points in
the direction that the two individuals would disagree on the nature of
killing; one being in the realm of the meta-ethical. However, such is
an entirely normative matter and is vague from the example you cite. To
give you an example in the contrary, imagine that you have two
individuals who disagree on the nature of abortion. While the two both
agree that killing a human is wrong, what they disagree on is the
ontology of the fetus, not killing as such; i.e. human ontology.
Perhaps you can clarify just what those individuals would agree on,
since an action hitting my retina does not make the action arbitrary.
Quibbler states (the rest of the quotes are from quibbler):
"This really doesn't explain anything. Instead of saying that god is
bound by the rules, you are saying that the rules are a property of
god. You are just defining away the problem; sweeping it under the rug.
I would call this Moral Pantheism, because it's very analagous to
regular physical pantheism. It is more logical I suppose, but it leads
to nothing."
Yep, that is exactly what the post implies. If you define it as
"sweeping logic" under the rug, fair enough. Though I would hardly
call it moral pantheism
"How does the issue of turning a non-contradiction into a
contradiction
have any bearing on morality? "
Read my comments above discerning abstracta and concepts.
"If moral realism is true, then there's still the problem of how we
determine what the moral facts are. Whether god declares something to
be moral or not, does not make it so. I suppose you could add the
requirement that god is unable to lie, in which case, his moral
pronouncements could not be knowingly false. But, given the limitation
of free will, even omniscience may not be able to say what the best
moral course of action would be, given the indeterminacy of free will.
"
Yes, but that is not the extent of the post. Once we establish - if
we can -that moral realism is true then we may proceed to classify
what those moral facts are. And yes, I would say that God cannot lie if
the thought-experiment is valid.
"How is it meaningful to say that god is good in your scheme. If
goodness is still defined as God doing what is in his nature to do,
then
this still just reduces to saying that god acts as he acts."
Goodness, in this scheme, is synonymous with God's essence, hence the
reason He would not be able to lie; it would require God to endeavor
beyond God, which is nonsensical. Further, God acts according to His
essence, something He cannot go beyond.
"That has nothing to do with cosmology, actually. We can conceive of
logically consistent systems in a variety of strange cosmologies. You
seem to assume that logic is an inherent feature of the world, but if
it
is abstract, then you are saying it's *abstracted* from the universe in
which it happens to be embedded. "
Pardon, I wasn't talking about cosmology *per se*. And I do see logic
as "is". There is no realm of logic, pace the Platonist.
"It wouldn't violate conceptualism for him to redefine the concept.
You'd never know the difference, if god snapped his fingers and made a
world where 2+2=5, so long as he made sure to modify all the evidence
consistently. It would just be a standard rule of math that you always
made the right hand side one bigger. Everybody would know that. It
"
No, that is not correct. If 2+2=4 is conceptual, and is an abstraction,
then, if conceptualism is true as I am implying in my experiment, then
God cannot violate it, as it would imply, for the nth time, that it
would mean God can transcend beyond God.
"It doesn't require him to transcend beyond his essence.It merely
requires him to change his essence. It is not beyond his essence to
change, presumably, unless you specifically define that as a feature of
god. Some definitions of god do require that he be changeless. "
And how does one change one's essence? It would require one to go
from P to ~P, which is absurd. Saying God can transcend His essence is
like God creating Himself.
"He doesn't have to transcend his essence. He just has to alter the
requirements of the system. There are an infinite number of alternate
logical systems which can be created with different values of truth.
That's the basis of fields like fuzzy logic."
You seem to view logic as a realm. I am not. Logic is conceptual, that
is there is no violation of it. P and ~P is a violation of logic, but
the two propositions do not exist simultaneously; hence, as I said, if
God contains conceptual abstrata (and in my case, moral conceptualism),
then God cannot do what is conceptually absurd.
Pax vobis!
best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
Chris H. Fleming
Your post is a mess.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com wrote:
> Hello all...
>
> Mr. Flemming posts:
Fleming has 1 m
Try to define arbitrary in an objective manner.
Arbitrariness and it's opposite Regularity are both highly dependent on
perspective. Most realists (moral and physical) also believe in some
degree of regularity, basically because it is apparent and because it
is impossible to work from any other assumption.
But you talked about case independence, and you are a human with your
unique perspective deciding on what are the difference cases.
Regularity may or may not apply to the cases that you select. And
regularity is seperate from realism.
> Quibbler states (the rest of the quotes are from quibbler):
No this is still me.
> "This really doesn't explain anything. Instead of saying that god is
>
> bound by the rules, you are saying that the rules are a property of
> god. You are just defining away the problem; sweeping it under the rug.
>
> I would call this Moral Pantheism, because it's very analagous to
> regular physical pantheism. It is more logical I suppose, but it leads
> to nothing."
>
> Yep, that is exactly what the post implies. If you define it as
> "sweeping logic" under the rug, fair enough. Though I would hardly
> call it moral pantheism
Pantheism gets around the problem of physically illogical gods by
saying that god simply is the universe. You are doing the analagous
treatment. It is very much the same thing, but in a different context.
Chris H. Fleming
> God and his powers are what ever his followers want them to be.
>
> No gods created man but quite the opposite; man created gods.
Some are more logical than others. Plus I don't mind playing the
godmaking game.
George Dance
Gandalf Grey wrote:
> "wcb" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
> news:12d5inv...@corp.supernews.com...
> > derrick_a...@yahoo.com wrote:
> >> His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
> >> erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past? Can
> >> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?
> >
> >
> > - Anslem
> >
> > God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
> > A god that can make 2 + 2 = 5 , who changes logic
> > for his purposes is greater than a god who cannot.
>
> Non sequitur. A god who creates logic is greater than a god who needs to
> change his own rules because he's too stupid to know how he wants reality to
> be.
Even if "God" had to be a being that changed the laws of logic at will,
it's hard to see how the non-existence of such a being can be
demonstrated by showing a logical contradiction.
Gandalf Grey
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1155944977.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
>> "wcb" <wbar...@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
>> news:12d5inv...@corp.supernews.com...
>> > derrick_a...@yahoo.com wrote:
>> >> His argument is pretty strong. If we leave ethics aside the problem
>> >> erects in reference to logic. For example, can God change the past?
>> >> Can
>> >> God turn a non-contradiction into a contradiction?
>> >
>> >
>> > God is the greatest thing we can imagine.[...]
>> > - Anslem
>> >
>> > God is the greatest thing we can imagine.
>> > A god that can make 2 + 2 = 5 , who changes logic
>> > for his purposes is greater than a god who cannot.
>>
>> Non sequitur. A god who creates logic is greater than a god who needs to
>> change his own rules because he's too stupid to know how he wants reality
>> to
>> be.
>
> Even if "God" had to be a being that changed the laws of logic at will,
> it's hard to see how the non-existence of such a being can be
> demonstrated by showing a logical contradiction.
True.