Part one of reply to Ron
Mathemagician
article so I am breaking it up into parts.
Sorry.
Newsgroups: soc.men,alt.atheism
Subject: Re: MY LAST POST CONCERNING THESE (I swear!) --> (Re: Bandwidth conservation (was Re: [psychopathic BS deleted])x
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In article <house.694656565@helios> ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
>bev...@carina.unm.edu (Mathemagician) writes:
>>No, the last time I posted this, you gave some lame excuse that didn't
>>mean anything. I didn't reply because there was no use in replying.
>Major cop out.
No, not major cop out. Simply me being realistic. The last time this
happened, the conversation deteriorated drastically to the point where
I saw no reason to continue. If you don't like the fact that I've
given up on you, fine.
>>Before we can make any comment about anything, we need to know just
>>what it is that we are talking about. Some basic definitions are
>>needed.
>And we have them, thank you. You have posited a brand new definition
>for one word (universe) and built some gumbo around it.
Yes, but we don't apply them consistently. And inconsistent
definitions lead to inconsistent conclusions, wouldn't you say?
>>Dopey? You mean all the mathematicians in the world are following a
>>dopey definition of "universe"? Well, I can believe that a lot of
>>people do dopey things, but you're going to have to give a reason why
>>it's dopey.
>It's dopey because it ISN'T the definition of 'universe' the majority
>of the world uses!! Fer Gawd's sake man! Your 'proof' hinges
>_entirely_ on a linguistic confusion! Can't you get that through you
>head?
Yes, I know that. That's still doesn't change anything.
Inconsistent definitions lead to inconsistent conclusions.
Take, for example, the concept of speed. Given the "local space-time
continuum" of the Newtonian era, as it was known, infinite speed was
possible. Einstein came along and "changed the words" by changing
what "speed" meant. And a whole new physics came about.
Now, I can hear your complaint already. How can I compare the
difference between Einsteinian and Newtonian physics with the
existence of god. Simple. The reason why I don't get any new
"formulas" or anything is because I'm dealing with metaphysics, not
physics.
When you deal with Einsteinian physics, you have to change your entire
view of the world. Just because it works for this little area in this
specific instance (Newtonian physics is a very good approximation of
mass and speed at small velocities) does *not* mean that it is
correct.
>>And, you still haven't explained what's wrong.
>OK. Just for the supremely thick-headed amongst us, I'll try again.
>Was the space-time continuum in which we live created by a purposeful
>intelligence, or is it the result of some mindless process, or random,
>or something else entirely? - These are the real questions of FACT
>under discussion. You claim that the English language uses the
>words 'universe', 'natural' and 'god' in certain ways. (Your claim is
>wrong, but let that pass.)
No, Ron, I never said that the English language uses the words
"universe," "natural," and "god" in certain ways...and you have said
so yourself! Your entire "argument" is based on the fact that I have
"redefined the words." My proof starts out with definitions that
people aren't going to like.
Yes, they are questions of fact under discussion. However, it does us
no good to talk about the solar system when we are concerned about the
universe, correct? It does us no good to talk about "our part" of the
universe when we are concerned about how *everything* came into
existence? Putting god into "otherspace" simply pushes the question
back one level: If god created us, who created god? How did he get
here? The "is, was, and always will be" answer doesn't cut it.
> Now you claim that, because, and _only_
>because, of the way you allege people use certain words, the first
>of the above list of possibilities has been disproven. Surely even
>_you_ can see that there is simply no connection between word usage
>and the grand facts of things.
You appear to be ignorant of linguistics. I am not simply
"redefining" words. I am trying to talk about concepts and things.
If I am going to explain my thoughts to others, I need language. And,
I am going to have to define my words explicitly.
And to make things easy for myself, I am going to use words that are
pretty close to what I mean in the first place. Words like "universe"
have a tendency to mean "all there is." Yes, people use them in
different ways. That's why I define my terms before I go anywhere
with them! I want people to understand what it is I mean when I say
"universe."
--
Brian Evans | "Bad mood, bad mood...Sure I'm in a bad mood!
bev...@carina.unm.edu | I haven't had sex...*EVER!*" -- Virgin Mary
William Bradley Knight
Let me make sure I completely understand you Brian.
Universe - everything that exists
Nature - how things in the universe interact with one another
So your point is that if something exists, it must be natural. God
being supernatural, cannot exist. Right?
This seems to make sense, but doesn't say much, does it? Using your
definitions, a theist could just say that God is natural. What have you
really proven?
--
Brad Knight
kni...@abulafia.b21.ingr.com
Tom Gorski
(Not that it's already been proved, mind you, which would be just
as hard.)
This I have to see!!!
Are you there, Brian?
>--
>Brad Knight
>kni...@abulafia.b21.ingr.com
--Tom Gorski
Mark Peters
I don't know if Mr. Evans would agree, but:
A "natural" God would be subject to the same limitations and laws
that every other natural entity is subject to, and be open to study
and understanding via science. A "natural" God could not be
infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, or immortal; it could not be
imperceivable, non-material, or unknowable. In short, a "natural"
God would not be God at all, but merely another entity in a
universe filled with billions upon billions of other entities.
The method of this particular type of non-existence proof
is to show that the concept "God" contradicts the concept
"universe," and since contradictions can't exist in reality,
there can be no entity corresponding to that concept.
Since the universe *is* everything that exists, the only way
to avoid the contradiction is to remove from the concept "God"
the very attributes that give it its meaning. In other words,
the only way to avoid the contradiction is to deny the
existence of God.
--
Mark A. Peters ****** ======================
Control Data Corporation ****** == "What a save!!!" ==
Internet: m...@svl.cdc.com ****** == "What an idea!!" ==
Ken Arromdee
>No, Ron, I never said that the English language uses the words
>"universe," "natural," and "god" in certain ways...and you have said
>so yourself! Your entire "argument" is based on the fact that I have
>"redefined the words." My proof starts out with definitions that
>people aren't going to like.
But then it's not clear why I should care about anything proven using those
definitions. I can define the universe as well-done french fries and then
prove the universe is crunchy and tastes good with ketchup, but nobody else,
when talking about the more usual sort of universe, has reason to apply that
proof.
--
"In the end, one or the other will triumph--a funeral dirge will be sung over
the Soviet republic or over world capitalism."
-- V.I. Lenin, 1920
Kenneth Arromdee (UUCP: ....!jhunix!arromdee; BITNET: arromdee@jhuvm;
INTERNET: arro...@cs.jhu.edu)
Joe Francis
m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
[summary of Brian's definitions:]
>>Universe - everything that exists
>>Nature - how things in the universe interact with one another
> A "natural" God would be subject to the same limitations and laws
> that every other natural entity is subject to, and be open to study
> and understanding via science. A "natural" God could not be
> infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, or immortal; it could not be
> imperceivable, non-material, or unknowable. [Mark Peters]
Although I agree with many that Brian's "proof" is unconvincing, I
don't see your response as being on target. Why does it follow from
Brian's definitions that a god is not "infinite, omnipotent,
omniscient, immortal, imperceivable, non-material, or unknowable"?
Consider the position of a theist who believes there is a god who is
all of these things. If you ask the theist to temporarily work with a
new definition of universe, on which is "everything that exists",
the theist will understand you to mean that the infinite, omnipotent,
etc god should now be thought of as part of that universe. When you
ask the theist to then work with the meaning of nature described
above, the theist will now understand that the natural laws now
include how a god interacts with the rest of the "universe", and vice
versa. Any "normal" laws (such as, say, Newtonian mechanics) are
then fair game to be tossed out, or modified to except a god from
their effects.
> Since the universe *is* everything that exists, the only way
> to avoid the contradiction is to remove from the concept "God"
> the very attributes that give it its meaning. In other words,
> the only way to avoid the contradiction is to deny the
> existence of God.
You have not demonstrated a contradiction. Instead, you have
begged the question by presuming that the described attributes are
impossible.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Read My Lips: No Nude Texans!" - George Bush clearing up a misunderstanding
ron house
>In article <house.694656565@helios> ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
>>bev...@carina.unm.edu (Mathemagician) writes:
>>>No, the last time I posted this, you gave some lame excuse that didn't
>>>mean anything. I didn't reply because there was no use in replying.
>>Major cop out.
>No, not major cop out. Simply me being realistic. The last time this
>happened, the conversation deteriorated drastically to the point where
>I saw no reason to continue. If you don't like the fact that I've
>given up on you, fine.
OK, you claim that happened. Prove it. Dig out my last post and show
where it 'deteriorated'. The fact is, you can't because that post was
simply an incisive analysis of the problem which left you no 'out'.
>>>Before we can make any comment about anything, we need to know just
>>>what it is that we are talking about. Some basic definitions are
>>>needed.
>>And we have them, thank you. You have posited a brand new definition
>>for one word (universe) and built some gumbo around it.
>Yes, but we don't apply them consistently. And inconsistent
>definitions lead to inconsistent conclusions, wouldn't you say?
Yes I would say. That's why I keep telling you not to call god
'supernatural' given your definition of 'universe'. Religious
people call him that under the assumption that natural and unnatural
things together are included in reality, and therefore in your 'universe';
thus you must translate their word before using it. Of course your
argument then falls totally flat, so perhaps that explains your
continued perversity.
>>Fer Gawd's sake man! Your 'proof' hinges
>>_entirely_ on a linguistic confusion! Can't you get that through you
>>head?
>Yes, I know that. That's still doesn't change anything.
Let's see: proofs which hinge on a confusion are valid. Interesting.
>Inconsistent definitions lead to inconsistent conclusions.
>Take, for example, the concept of speed. Given the "local space-time
>...
I am not interested in your physics arguments. Let someone else
answer them. All I am saying is that your 'proof' purely from the
linguistic meanings of words is not valid. If you want to produce some
facts to buttress it, please do so, but _don't_ put forward your
linguistic "argument" unsubstantiated as _proof_ of god's nonexistence.
>>>And, you still haven't explained what's wrong.
>>OK. Just for the supremely thick-headed amongst us, I'll try again.
>>Was the space-time continuum in which we live created by a purposeful
>>intelligence, or is it the result of some mindless process, or random,
>>or something else entirely? - These are the real questions of FACT
>>under discussion. You claim that the English language uses the
>>words 'universe', 'natural' and 'god' in certain ways. (Your claim is
>>wrong, but let that pass.)
>No, Ron, I never said that the English language uses the words
>"universe," "natural," and "god" in certain ways...and you have said
>so yourself! Your entire "argument" is based on the fact that I have
>"redefined the words." My proof starts out with definitions that
>people aren't going to like.
But look, if you define 'universe', 'natural', 'supernatural', you must
then ask _theists_ how 'god' should be defined in your terminology.
Just because, in _some different_ terminology, they call god
'supernatural' doesn't mean they will under your definitions. With
yours, 'supernatural' basically means 'non-existent'; no theist would
_define_ god to be nonexistent.
>Yes, they are questions of fact under discussion. However, it does us
>no good to talk about the solar system when we are concerned about the
>universe, correct? It does us no good to talk about "our part" of the
>universe when we are concerned about how *everything* came into
>existence? Putting god into "otherspace" simply pushes the question
>back one level: If god created us, who created god? How did he get
>here? The "is, was, and always will be" answer doesn't cut it.
That's fine. I am _not_ saying there are no good arguments for
atheism, just that your original one isn't one of them. Please
stick to the one and only point I am arguing with. Until you do
so I refuse to discuss any other issue.
>> Now you claim that, because, and _only_
>>because, of the way you allege people use certain words, the first
>>of the above list of possibilities has been disproven. Surely even
>>_you_ can see that there is simply no connection between word usage
>>and the grand facts of things.
>You appear to be ignorant of linguistics. I am not simply
>"redefining" words. I am trying to talk about concepts and things.
>If I am going to explain my thoughts to others, I need language. And,
>I am going to have to define my words explicitly.
OK. So let's give you the right to define _all_ the words, including 'god'.
HMM, I see you have proved 'god' doesn't exist. But we theists don't
believe in god, we believe in some other being who is natural, but
outside the time-space continuum in which we live. Thus we will never
see him through our telescopes, and He doesn't obey the laws of physics.
He does obey natural laws, of course, but the laws natural outside time
and space. PS: If you now wish to arrigate to yourself the right to define
'theist' as one who believes in 'god', then I hereby cease to be one
of them. I shall be a everybody's-english-except-mathemagician's-theist
instead. PPS: I am not interested in any rebuttal you may have to the
above explanation unless it disproves it using purely linguistic
terms. As I said before, I have no problem with arguments from facts,
only with your linguistic confusions. If you introduce any facts,
I cease to object. But I continue to call for your admission that
your original argument, _unsubstantiated by facts_, is invalid.
--
Ron House. USQ
(ho...@helios.usq.edu.au) Toowoomba, Australia.
ron house
>Are you there, Brian?
Don't waste your keystrokes. If you pin him down, he'll just insult
your arguments and refuse to respond.
en font terrible
If God is natural, he is bound by natural laws. And he's a very different
God from the supernatural God which Brian has shown is incompatible with
the straightforward definitions of "universe" and "nature" above.
The point is that you can have a do-anything omnipotent omniscient supernatural
God, but only if he doesn't exist within our universe. Or you can have
a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
Or to put it even more concisely, if God can play with our universe, there
must be limits to the scope of his playing. There are several analogies
which can be drawn to reinforce this point.
This may or may not conflict with a Christian's beliefs. Many Christians
believe that when we speak of an omnipotent God, we're being inaccurate,
and that God can't do things which are logically nonsense or meaningless (like
"creating square circles" or "initiating why a mouse when it spins" or
"building rocks so big he can't lift them"). Such Christians will probably
agree with Brian's point; they're generally careful when talking about
omnipotence. I think of people like Jim Brown and Charley Wingate.
The only people who are really disconcerted by Brian's point are (a) those
who are suffering cognitive dissonance when confronted with the fact that
their basic definitions and beliefs are incompatible -- that is, those who
believe in a supernatural God who influences all that is and is omnipotent;
and (b) those who think he's saying something very strong and profound when
he's really saying something rather obvious.
mathew
--
Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
John A. Johnson
says:
>
>
>The point is that you can have a do-anything omnipotent omniscient
>supernatural
>God, but only if he doesn't exist within our universe. Or you can have
>a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
>supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
How about a do-nothing god who does not exist in our universe? ;-)
>Or to put it even more concisely, if God can play with our universe, there
>must be limits to the scope of his playing. There are several analogies
>which can be drawn to reinforce this point.
>
Are you speaking only of logical limits? If not, could explain what
constrains God's playing?
>The only people who are really disconcerted by Brian's point are (a) those
>who are suffering cognitive dissonance when confronted with the fact that
>their basic definitions and beliefs are incompatible -- that is, those who
>believe in a supernatural God who influences all that is and is omnipotent;
>and (b) those who think he's saying something very strong and profound when
>he's really saying something rather obvious.
>
I'm not disconcerted. Just irritated that so much space is devoted to
arguing what is trivially true.
-----------------------------------
John A. Johnson (J...@psuvm.psu.edu)
Department of Psychology Penn State DuBois Campus 15801
Penn State is not responsible for my behavior.
"A ruthless, doctrinaire avoidance of degeneracy is a degeneracy of
another sort. Getting drunk and picking up bar-ladies and writing
metaphysics is a part of life." - from _Lila_ by R. Pirsig
Ken Arromdee
>The point is that you can have a do-anything omnipotent omniscient supernatural
>God, but only if he doesn't exist within our universe. Or you can have
>a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
>supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
What about an omnipotent omniscient non-supernatural God? (This means, of
course, that the laws describing the universe are of a special type: "things
cannot travel faster than light unless pushed by God", etc.)
>The only people who are really disconcerted by Brian's point are (a) those
>who are suffering cognitive dissonance when confronted with the fact that
>their basic definitions and beliefs are incompatible -- that is, those who
>believe in a supernatural God who influences all that is and is omnipotent;
>and (b) those who think he's saying something very strong and profound when
>he's really saying something rather obvious.
He's saying something rather obvious, and neither strong nor profound. It
seems to me, though, that he _thinks_ he is saying something strong and
profound, and that's where my disagreement lies.
Given the definition of "supernatural" in a), the category seems to be empty;
nobody believes in a supernatural God under that definition. Brian seems to
be implying that a) not only has people believing inconsistent things (true),
but that there are many such people (false).
Mark Peters
>In article <38...@shamash.cdc.com>
>m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>[summary of Brian's definitions:]
>>>Universe - everything that exists
>>>Nature - how things in the universe interact with one another
>> A "natural" God would be subject to the same limitations and laws
>> that every other natural entity is subject to, and be open to study
>> and understanding via science. A "natural" God could not be
>> infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, or immortal; it could not be
>> imperceivable, non-material, or unknowable. [Mark Peters]
>Although I agree with many that Brian's "proof" is unconvincing, I
>don't see your response as being on target. Why does it follow from
>Brian's definitions that a god is not "infinite, omnipotent,
>omniscient, immortal, imperceivable, non-material, or unknowable"?
Well, I did start by saying that Brian might not agree with me.
A "natural" God cannot be infinite, etc. because no natural entity
can have those attributes. This is due to the principle of
metaphysics known as the "law of identity" (first identified by
Aristotle).
The law of identity says that to be is to be *something*, i.e.,
to be something specific and definite. A thing can't be round and
square at the same time, it can't freeze and burn at the same time,
it can't be all black and all white at the same time, etc. If you can
say of some entity, attribute or action "It _is_," then it is also true
that "_It_ is." The concepts of existence and identity are two
different perspectives on the same indivisible fact - to be _is_
to be _something_.
To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
>> Since the universe *is* everything that exists, the only way
>> to avoid the contradiction is to remove from the concept "God"
>> the very attributes that give it its meaning. In other words,
>> the only way to avoid the contradiction is to deny the
>> existence of God.
>You have not demonstrated a contradiction. Instead, you have
>begged the question by presuming that the described attributes are
>impossible.
I wasn't trying to demonstrate the contradiction - Brian did that
quite well in his original posting, and I took that for granted.
Let me put it in my own words. It is claimed that God existed prior
to the existence of the universe and brought the universe into
existence. The "supernatural" is the place where God exists, while
the "natural" is the place where the universe and everything in it
exists. The supernatural is imperceivable and unknowable to man,
while the natural is the opposite.
But the concept "universe" denotes everything that exists, not just
some subset of it. If the universe is the place where everything
_is_, and God is not in the universe, then the only place left for
him to exist is the place where everything _isn't_, i.e., he must
exist noplace, which is to say he doesn't exist. The concept
of God contradicts the concept of universe, and since contradictions
can't exist (by the law of identity), we can state with certitude
that God does not exist.
And this contradiction cannot be escaped by claiming that "universe"
denotes only the natural world. If everything requires a cause,
and God is the cause of the natural world, then his existence
explains nothing, since we are then left with no explanation
for his existence, leading to an infinite regress (again, a
violation of the law of identity). If it is claimed that God
doesn't require a cause since he has always existed, then the
claimant is saying about God exactly what non-believers say
about the universe, but he does so by leaping without justification
from the perceivable/knowable to the imperceivable/unknowable.
Lastly, it won't due to claim that this proof doesn't really
prove the non-existence of God, but merely the non-existence
of a particular God. The reason for this is that the concept
of the supernatural is essential to the concept of God. If
we remove the supernatural from the meaning of the concept
of God, then what is left would no longer denote God, but merely
another entity in the natural world, and therefore an entity
incapable of the things God is supposed to be able to do.
en font terrible
> In article <qca9DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
> >a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
> >supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
>
> What about an omnipotent omniscient non-supernatural God? (This means, of
> course, that the laws describing the universe are of a special type: "things
> cannot travel faster than light unless pushed by God", etc.)
I don't in principle have any objections to this possibility. However,
it seems unlikely that all the laws of physics we have so far established
are incorrect in this way.
Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
him.
en font terrible
J...@psuvm.psu.edu (John A. Johnson) writes:
> In article <qca9DB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible
> says:
> >Or to put it even more concisely, if God can play with our universe, there
> >must be limits to the scope of his playing. There are several analogies
> >which can be drawn to reinforce this point.
>
> Are you speaking only of logical limits? If not, could explain what
> constrains God's playing?
I'm not sure exactly what the constraints are, because it's hard to think
about what an environment might be like in which they were lifted. Thinking
of analogous situations is much easier.
For example, consider our position with respect to the Game of Life. We
have Godlike powers in the life universe; we can create and destroy life,
build complicated replicating structures, and so on. However, we aren't
omnipotent. We can't, for example, turn the life cells into tessalating
octagons instead of squares. We can't make cells which can live on their
own indefinitely. We are limited to what is allowed by the logic of the
life universe, and by other more subtle limits.
Similarly, if God exists I don't think he can make a square circle in our
universe. It is logically self-contradictory and makes no sense. Similarly,
I don't think God can answer *any* question, even if he is omniscient;
rather, he can only answer questions which have a well-defined answer.
en font terrible
> The law of identity says that to be is to be *something*, i.e.,
> to be something specific and definite. A thing can't be round and
> square at the same time, it can't freeze and burn at the same time,
> it can't be all black and all white at the same time, etc. If you can
> say of some entity, attribute or action "It _is_," then it is also true
> that "_It_ is." The concepts of existence and identity are two
> different perspectives on the same indivisible fact - to be _is_
> to be _something_.
>
> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
I see. Well, that about wraps it up for quantum mechanics, which
tells us that particles can have a wave function which is infinite in extent.
Out go real numbers, because there are an infinite number of them between 0
and 1.
Anything else you'd like to throw away whilst you're at it?
Jeffrey Neal Weiss
Something that wildly improbable could only come about through the actions of
God, thereby eliminating the need for faith. But God says, "Without faith I am
nothing", and promptly dissappears in a puff of logic.
--loosely paraphrased from the Hitchhiker's Guide
Bryan Neil O'Sullivan
>Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
>worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
>him.
I hope the qualifier "eventually" was left out accidentally, Matthew.
I'd hate to think that you think we could detect him (assuming he
existed) now, when we haven't discovered other sentient life yet.
-- Bryan
--
"Hell must be isothermal; for | "Either you are part of the solution or
otherwise the resident engineers and | you are part of the precipitate."
physical chemists (of which there must | "Consumer-grade religion does not
be some) could set up a heat engine to | encourage logical thinking." -- K.Jones
run a refrigerator to cool off a +----------------------------------------
portion of their surroundings to any | Bryan O'Sullivan (Tetragrammaton) :-)
desired temperature." | Internet: bosu...@maths.tcd.ie
-- Henry Albert Ben, _The Second Law_ | This mind intentionally left blank.
Mark Peters
>m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
>> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
>> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
>> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
>I see. Well, that about wraps it up for quantum mechanics, which
>tells us that particles can have a wave function which is infinite in extent.
>Out go real numbers, because there are an infinite number of them between 0
>and 1.
>Anything else you'd like to throw away whilst you're at it?
Yes - I'd like to throw away *every* conclusion which rests on the
error you have just made.
As usual, in the middle of a discussion in *metaphysics* you have
switched to *epistemology* - and that error invalidates your claim.
"Wave function" is a concept of *method* (i.e., it is epistemological),
and so is "real number." Since metaphysics is logically prior to
epistemology, every concept of method implicitly presupposes and relies
upon the principles of metaphysics (e.g., the law of identity), and
could not be arrived at otherwise.
Steven White
This article is a perfect example of what I was refering to in my article,
"Logical arguments are crap!". Yuck!!
-Steve White
Ken Arromdee
>To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
>because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
>i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
>without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
This argument only works when you use an extremely peculiar definition of
"infinity". Infinity is not (under normal definitions) something greater
than any specific quantity. Rather, it's something greater than any specific
non-infinite quantity, which isn't the same thing.
>But the concept "universe" denotes everything that exists, not just
>some subset of it.
Says who? You?
Ken Arromdee
>> >The point is that you can have a do-anything omnipotent omniscient supernatu
>> >God, but only if he doesn't exist within our universe. Or you can have
>> >a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
>> >supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
>> What about an omnipotent omniscient non-supernatural God? (This means, of
>> course, that the laws describing the universe are of a special type: "things
>> cannot travel faster than light unless pushed by God", etc.)
>I don't in principle have any objections to this possibility. However,
>it seems unlikely that all the laws of physics we have so far established
>are incorrect in this way.
Since our experiments with physics have not involved asking God to push things
faster than light, all of our experiments with physics are just as consistent
with the above "laws of physics" as with our current ones.
>Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
>worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
>him.
The universe, in Brian's argument, is not defined as "everything which is
detectable", but "everything which exists". At any rate, theists (at least
here) tend not to claim that God is absolutely undetectable--the people who
saw Jesus rise from the dead certainly could detect him....
Daniel B. Holzman
> being supernatural, cannot exist. Right?
>
> This seems to make sense, but doesn't say much, does it? Using your
> definitions, a theist could just say that God is natural. What have you
> really proven?
And, in point of fact, exactly this claimis made by most, if not all,
Neopagans.
--
Daniel B. Holzman | Eight Words the Witch's Rede Fufill:
HOL...@FNAL.BITNET | An It Harm None, Do What You Will
HOL...@FNALC.FNAL.GOV.INTERNET |
| All Acts of Love and Pleasure are
Love doesn't subtract, it multiplies. | Her Rituals
- Heinlein |
TEAM STAR Charter Member |
Disclaimer: Fermilab's far too large to have an opinion, let alone mine.
David Canzi
>In article <39...@shamash.cdc.com>, m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>
>This article is a perfect example of what I was refering to in my article,
>"Logical arguments are crap!". Yuck!!
Actually, I would call it a *verbal* argument, not a *logical* one.
--
David Canzi
en font terrible
> In <Xy80DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
> >Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
> >worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
> >him.
>
> I hope the qualifier "eventually" was left out accidentally, Matthew.
> I'd hate to think that you think we could detect him (assuming he
> existed) now, when we haven't discovered other sentient life yet.
Well, I was rather assuming that he wouldn't be hiding.
en font terrible
> In <Hk90DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
> >m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
> >> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
> >> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
> >> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
> >> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
>
> >I see. Well, that about wraps it up for quantum mechanics, which
> >tells us that particles can have a wave function which is infinite in extent
> >and 1.
>
> >Anything else you'd like to throw away whilst you're at it?
>
> Yes - I'd like to throw away *every* conclusion which rests on the
> error you have just made.
>
> As usual, in the middle of a discussion in *metaphysics* you have
> switched to *epistemology* - and that error invalidates your claim.
Forget the big words. Are you claiming that "nothing could ever actually be
infinite" or not?
Bryan Neil O'Sullivan
>>I hope the qualifier "eventually" was left out accidentally, Matthew.
>>I'd hate to think that you think we could detect him (assuming he
>>existed) now, when we haven't discovered other sentient life yet.
>Well, I was rather assuming that he wouldn't be hiding.
You never know... If he behaves in any way near as irrationally as some
of his purported followers, anything is possible.
-- Bryan
--
"Hell must be isothermal; for | "Either you are part of the solution or
otherwise the resident engineers and | you are part of the precipitate."
physical chemists (of which there must | "Consumer-grade religion does not
be some) could set up a heat engine to | encourage logical thinking." -- K.Jones
run a refrigerator to cool off a +----------------------------------------
portion of their surroundings to any | Bryan O'Sullivan (Tetragrammaton) :-)
desired temperature." | Internet: bosu...@maths.tcd.ie
-- Henry Albert Ben, _The Second Law_ | This mind intentionally left blank.
>> "Know Jesus, no peace. No Jesus, Know Peace." -- someone intelligent <<
brad knight
|> arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
|> > In article <qca9DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
|> > >The point is that you can have a do-anything omnipotent omniscient supernatu
|> > >God, but only if he doesn't exist within our universe. Or you can have
|> > >a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
|> > >supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
How about the possibiltiy that this omni-omni god can be perceived by us
by some means other than the physical? Spirit is not precluded by Brian's
definition of natural.
|> > What about an omnipotent omniscient non-supernatural God? (This means, of
|> > course, that the laws describing the universe are of a special type: "things
|> > cannot travel faster than light unless pushed by God", etc.)
|>
|> I don't in principle have any objections to this possibility. However,
|> it seems unlikely that all the laws of physics we have so far established
|> are incorrect in this way.
They wouldn't have to be incorrect, just incomplete.
|> Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
|> worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
|> him.
Again this depends on which definition of supernatural you are using. If God is
non-supernatural by Brian's definition, then God can still be omnipotent, omniscient,
etc. Sounds like this type of God would be worthy of worship.
A non-supernatural (Brian's def) God might (must?) be detectable, but must
this detection be physical (using Brian's def.)?
Steven White
Sorry, I misquoted myself. The article was "Logical proofs are crap!"
I like arguments. But a logical proof that nothing can be infinite,
because that violates the law of identity!?!
|> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
|> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
|> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
|> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
Give me a break!
Steve White
en font terrible
> In article <Xy80DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
> >> >a God who can be perceived by us and who can affect us, but who isn't
> >> >supernatural. But you can't have it both ways.
> >> What about an omnipotent omniscient non-supernatural God? (This means, of
> >> course, that the laws describing the universe are of a special type: "thin
> >I don't in principle have any objections to this possibility. However,
> >it seems unlikely that all the laws of physics we have so far established
> >are incorrect in this way.
>
> Since our experiments with physics have not involved asking God to push thing
> with the above "laws of physics" as with our current ones.
Indeed. However, they are also consistent with laws of Physics such as
"Nothing can travel faster than light except Father Christmas", "Causes
precede effects except when the effects are caused by Leprechauns", "Light
cannot be measured without affecting it, except by fairies" and so on.
The mere compatibility of God-physics with existing physics does not mean
that it is worth considering. For it to be worth serious thought, you need
to demonstrate a result which cannot be explained by physics but which
can be explained by God-physics. This is the case for all other possible
variants of existing physical laws; they don't just have to fit the data
as well as existing laws, they have to fit better than existing laws or
be radically simpler or more compatible with other laws.
> >Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
> >worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
> >him.
>
> The universe, in Brian's argument, is not defined as "everything which is
> detectable", but "everything which exists". At any rate, theists (at least
> here) tend not to claim that God is absolutely undetectable--the people who
> saw Jesus rise from the dead certainly could detect him...
Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
Mark Peters
>m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>> In <Hk90DB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
>> >m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>> >> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
>> >> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
>> >> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
>> >> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
>>
>> >I see. Well, that about wraps it up for quantum mechanics, which
>> >tells us that particles can have a wave function which is infinite in extent
>> >Out go real numbers, because there are an infinite number of them between 0
>> >and 1.
>>
>> >Anything else you'd like to throw away whilst you're at it?
>>
>> Yes - I'd like to throw away *every* conclusion which rests on the
>> error you have just made.
>>
>> As usual, in the middle of a discussion in *metaphysics* you have
>> switched to *epistemology* - and that error invalidates your claim.
>Forget the big words. Are you claiming that "nothing could ever actually be
>infinite" or not?
I meant exactly what I said - but to fully understand it, the "big words" are
necessary.
In this context "metaphysical" means "pertaining to existence," while
"epistemological" means "pertaining to consciousness." A concept like
"planet," for example, denotes entities whose existence is not at all
dependent on consciousness, while a concept like "real number" denotes
entities whose existence *is* dependent on consciousness (although facts
drawn from existence are also required to form the concept).
"Planet" is a concept denoting balls of matter of a certain size and shape
in space. "Real number" is a concept which permits us to take measurements
of a certain kind, and to make calculations based on such measurements, i.e.,
it has to do with methodology (aka epistemology). "Planet" is a metaphysical
concept, while "real number" is an epistemological concept.
Were all consciousness to vanish from the universe, entities denoted
by concepts like "planet" would remain in existence. But the entities
denoted by concepts like "real number" would go out of existence (even
though the facts of existence needed to reach such concepts would
remain). In short, epistemological concepts are the result of a
particular perspective on existence, namely the perspective given
by consciousness.
"Infinity" is an epistemological concept, specifically, a concept of
method - it represents the potential for adding one more. The concept
of infinity permits us to carry out calculations that would otherwise be
impossible, but it represents a *potential* not an *actual*. Infinity
denotes not a specific quantity (like 5 or 5 billion) but a quantity
greater than any specific quantity. Whatever quantity you care to specify,
no matter how large, infinity is even larger.
By the law of identity, everything that exists is something specific, but
we must be very careful to keep in mind whether the "thing" in question
is metaphysical or epistemological. Metaphysically, a planet *is*
something specific, namely, a ball of matter of some composition in
space. Epistemologically, "planet" is also something specific, namely,
a word standing for the mental unit denoting such a ball of matter.
Infinity, however, is *not* something specific metaphysically, so it
cannot exist in that sense (by the law of identity) - thus my statement
"... nothing could ever actually be infinite." But epistemologically,
infinity *is* something specific, namely, a word standing for the
mental unit denoting the potential for adding one more.
egar...@ac.dal.ca
It kind of makes sense to me that no "thing" could ever be infinite.
Definition depends on being able to say where something begins and ends.
If something never ends, than it must be everywhere, because if it WEREN'T
somewhere, you could point to that place and say, "There's a boundary."
That is, if something is infinitely big, it would have to be infinitely
big in infinite dimensions. There has to be nowhere it isn't. Is this true?
I'm not so sure anymore... or can you have infinite infinitely large beings
in infinite space? You know, I think there's something wrong with my thinking
here, but I'm not sure what. Fudge! This is so deep, I'm getting the bends.
I don't know if it makes sense to play with the word infinite the way I'm doing
here. Any philosophers want to correct a poor English student in over his head?
egar0006
Well here again that don't apply
But I gotta use words when I talk to you.
- Sweeney
Tom Bruno
> detectable", but "everything which exists". At any rate, theists (at least
> here) tend not to claim that God is absolutely undetectable--the people who
> saw Jesus rise from the dead certainly could detect him...
Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
mathew
--- end of quoted text ---
Don't you hate it when omnipotent beings play hide and seek?
Talk about unfair...
tom bruno
tcb...@athena.mit.edu
Ken Arromdee
>> Since our experiments with physics have not involved asking God to push thing
>> faster than light, all of our experiments with physics are just as consistent
>> with the above "laws of physics" as with our current ones.
>Indeed. However, they are also consistent with laws of Physics such as
Of course. But the question here is whether an impossibilty proof works, not
an unlikelihood proof.
>> >Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
>> >worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
>> >him.
>> The universe, in Brian's argument, is not defined as "everything which is
>> detectable", but "everything which exists". At any rate, theists (at least
>> here) tend not to claim that God is absolutely undetectable--the people who
>> saw Jesus rise from the dead certainly could detect him...
>Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
If not everything in the universe is detectible, "God can't be detected, ergo
he doesn't exist" isn't valid. It doesn't matter _why_ God is indetectible;
this has no effect on the invalidity of that argument.
Ken Arromdee
>method - it represents the potential for adding one more.
Says who? You?
_I_ certainly don't mean "the potential for adding one more" in all the
contexts I use the word "infinity". If you do, this is another redefinition
argument....
Ken Arromdee
>Definition depends on being able to say where something begins and ends.
>If something never ends, than it must be everywhere, because if it WEREN'T
>somewhere, you could point to that place and say, "There's a boundary."
>That is, if something is infinitely big, it would have to be infinitely
>big in infinite dimensions. There has to be nowhere it isn't. Is this true?
No, this is not true. (Or at least, not unless you're severely redefining
infinity.)
You are equivocating on the phrase "never end". When "never end" is used as
another phrase meaning infinite, it means that _one_particular_ characteristic
of it never ends. When you say "something that never ends doesn't have a
boundary", you mean that something, _all_ of whose characteristics do not
end, has no boundaries.
Jarek Dabrowski
-mathew:
>> >Of course, if God is non-supernatural, then (a) he doesn't really deserve
>> >worship, as Brian Evans points out, and (b) we should be able to detect
>> >him.
-Bryan Neil O'Sullivan:
>> I hope the qualifier "eventually" was left out accidentally, Matthew.
>> I'd hate to think that you think we could detect him (assuming he
>> existed) now, when we haven't discovered other sentient life yet.
-mathew:
> Well, I was rather assuming that he wouldn't be hiding.
>
And assuming that we should be able to detect all existing things.
(Brian's "natural" is the same as "existing", by definition).
Best wishes,
Jarek
------------------------------------------------------
.-----. dabr...@fhi-berlin.mpg.dbp.de
`-> <-' (Jarek Dabrowski)
I WANT DAN BREDY BACK TO THE NET
ron house
>In article <k53BeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
>> Forget the big words. Are you claiming that "nothing could ever actually be
>> infinite" or not?
>>
>>
>> mathew
>>
> It kind of makes sense to me that no "thing" could ever be infinite.
>Definition depends on being able to say where something begins and ends.
>If something never ends, than it must be everywhere, because if it WEREN'T
>somewhere, you could point to that place and say, "There's a boundary."
>That is, if something is infinitely big, it would have to be infinitely
>big in infinite dimensions. There has to be nowhere it isn't. Is this true?
>I'm not so sure anymore... or can you have infinite infinitely large beings
>in infinite space? You know, I think there's something wrong with my thinking
>here, but I'm not sure what. Fudge! This is so deep, I'm getting the bends.
>
>I don't know if it makes sense to play with the word infinite the way I'm doing
>here. Any philosophers want to correct a poor English student in over his head?
Well since you ask.... :-)
Your clain about infinity is clearly false to anyone versed in some knowledge
of mathematics. For example, a line can be infinitely long, without being
everywhere (off the line, for example). A surface can have an infinite area,
yet points off the surface are not in it. 3-D space might be infinite
and yet there could be space not included (by being offset in a fourth
dimension). Even 4-D space-time might be infinite, and yet not cover
all places, if there were other 4-D continuums offset by a separation in
a higher dimension. In fact, a space (of any dimension) can be FINITE
and yet have no boundaries, by being curved in some higher dimension.
(Please, those in the know, don't quibble about whether the higher
dimension is necessary.) For example, the surface of a ball is finite,
yet has no boundaries - you can walk as far as you like on the earth,
but the surface has finite area.
To me, the 'nothing could be infinite' argument is nothing more than a
highly obscure word-play, trying to deal with a very subtle reality using
sledge-hammer techniques. (Is that a china shop? Send the bull in to
check it out.) Such arguments are very popular in philosophy, but mainly
because few philosophers know any maths or physics - as B Russell points
out.
--
Ron House. USQ
(ho...@helios.usq.edu.au) Toowoomba, Australia.
en font terrible
> In <k53BeB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
> >Forget the big words. Are you claiming that "nothing could ever actually be
> >infinite" or not?
>
> I meant exactly what I said - but to fully understand it, the "big words" are
> necessary.
>
> In this context "metaphysical" means "pertaining to existence," while
> "epistemological" means "pertaining to consciousness." A concept like
> "planet," for example, denotes entities whose existence is not at all
> dependent on consciousness, while a concept like "real number" denotes
> entities whose existence *is* dependent on consciousness (although facts
> drawn from existence are also required to form the concept).
OK. So are you claiming that nothing pertaining to physical existence could
ever actually be infinite, or are you claiming that nothing pertaining to
consciousness could ever actually be infinite?
en font terrible
> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
>
> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
there aren't.
en font terrible
> In <ao3BeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes
>
> And assuming that we should be able to detect all existing things.
What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
Eileen F. Keeney
>
>Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>there aren't.
>
there aren't undetectable things in the universe.
I can't think of any reason to assume that there are or are not such things.
However I am almost sure (never 100% sure) that there are things which are
undetectable by man.
James J. Lippard
>arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
>> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
>> >Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
>>
>> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
>
>Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>there aren't.
Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*? There are
certainly very good reasons to assume that there are things which are
undetectible in practice (e.g., we've discovered many things which were
previously undetectible). Christopher Cherniak's arguments against
ideal rationality (in _Minimal Rationality_) may also imply that we
will never be able to discover many things about the universe, in which
case there may well be in principle limitations on what we can detect
as well.
>
>mathew
>
>--
>Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
>you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
>me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
>available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
Jim Lippard Lip...@RVAX.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
Dept. of Philosophy Lip...@ARIZRVAX.BITNET
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
JONES, PAUL DAVID
If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the most
subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
______
\ /___ Illithid (Paul D. Jones) Texas A&M, especially the Corps
\ / / of Cadets, stands staunchly behind
\/\ / PDJ...@zeus.tamu.edu each and every one of my opinions.
\/
David Canzi
>In article <1992Jan10.0...@watserv1.waterloo.edu>, dmc...@watserv1.waterloo.edu (David Canzi) writes:
>|> In article <296CA43...@orion.oac.uci.edu> s...@horus.ps.uci.edu (Steven White) writes:
>|> >In article <39...@shamash.cdc.com>, m...@svl.cdc.com (Mark Peters) writes:
>|> [Long-winded Randroid nattering deleted]
>|> >
>|> >This article is a perfect example of what I was refering to in my article,
>|> >"Logical" arguments are crap!". Yuck!!
>|>
>|> Actually, I would call it a *verbal* argument, not a *logical* one.
>
>I like arguments. But a logical proof that nothing can be infinite,
>because that violates the law of identity!?!
Actually, I didn't notice that you had put quotes around the word
"logical", otherwise I wouldn't have "corrected" you.
I do not consider what Mark Peters posted to be either logical or
proof, though I will agree with you that it's crap.
The law of identity he refers to is only this: "A is A". Without
additional assumptions, it is not possible to prove from this even that
black is not white. "A is A", the law of non-contradiction, and
"existence exists" are vacuities that Randroids can insert into any
argument for any belief, enabling them to ignore the possibility of
rational disagreement with their beliefs by interpreting any
disagreement as a denial of one or more of these Holy Nullities, which
Randroids call "axioms".
--
David Canzi
Kent Sandvik
> And assuming that we should be able to detect all existing things.
> (Brian's "natural" is the same as "existing", by definition).
..which we do, indeed! Even in the case of memes, like concepts
and symbols, we could detect them, or what. Just read this newsgroup :-).
Kent
---
private comments
Eileen F. Keeney
>
>If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the most
>subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
>in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
>
can not effect us. I can't detect god, yet I am not sure he has no effect
on me. (actually the idea of god has a major effect on me, but that is a
different issue, because the idea is somewhat detectable).
Weather or not something is detectable, has little to do with it being able to
effect you.
Bryan Neil O'Sullivan
>What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
Consider this: did the fact that nobody discovered Pluto until the 1930s
mean that it didn't exist until then? It was undetectable in the 16th
century, but I'm pretty sure that it existed then too.
-- Bryan
--
"Hell must be isothermal; for | "Either you are part of the solution or
otherwise the resident engineers and | you are part of the precipitate."
physical chemists (of which there must | "Consumer-grade religion does not
be some) could set up a heat engine to | encourage logical thinking." -- K.Jones
run a refrigerator to cool off a +----------------------------------------
portion of their surroundings to any | Bryan O'Sullivan (Tetragrammaton) :-)
desired temperature." | Internet: bosu...@maths.tcd.ie
-- Henry Albert Bent, _The Second Law_ | This mind intentionally left blank.
Michael Polen
|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
|>
|> >What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
|>
|> Consider this: did the fact that nobody discovered Pluto until the 1930s
|> mean that it didn't exist until then? It was undetectable in the 16th
|> century, but I'm pretty sure that it existed then too.
|>
2. No astronomer would have his/her belief set shaken if a new, previously
undetected planet was found.
3. Most new discoveries (as opposed to inventions) are driven by looking
for the cause of an observed effect. In Pluto's case, the solar system
wasn't acting properly for an 8 planet system based upon the then
accepted view of mechanics.
4. An open mind requires looking at multiple solutions to a problem. Pluto
was one possibility to the solar systems movements. Theism and Atheism
are two possibilities to "what makes the world go round." Most (flame
time?) Atheists have evaluated the possibility that there is a God, and
tried to fit that option to the known data and to perform experiments
that would support the belief.
By my experience, and by reading the postings here, Theists do not tend
to consider the possiblity that there is no God, and try to verify that
option.
mike
Andrew Pearlman
>>> To take just one example, nothing could ever actually be infinite
>>> because infinity is a quantity greater than any specific quantity,
>>> i.e., a quantity with no specific value, i.e., a quantity
>>> without identity - a direct violation of the law of identity.
Excuse me. You just defined yourself like Brian does. Infinity is a set of
values, not a specific value. Time is quite possibly infinite in length.
You can however give it a specific value on that length.
Andy Pearlman
Andrew Pearlman
>subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
>in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
Let's say quarks are made up of some kind of smaller particle and this smaller
particle is made up of yet another smaller particle, which we will call
Quirks. We can not detect quirks. Remove quirks and the universe changes
drastically. Now say the existance of God exists on the quirk level and is
responsible for the orderly maintenance of quirks. Remove God, and again
the universe changes drastically.
You may be able to say that you can infer this, but then you allow theists to
infer God.
Andy Pearlman
JONES, PAUL DAVID
Not so. It is true that if you simply happen not to detect X, it can still
affect you. However, I'm talking about something that is theoretically
_impossible_ to detect. For this condition to prevail, X would have to effect
_no_change_ in the theoretically observable universe. That is, as far as we
will ever be able to determine, the universe with X is the same as the universe
without X.
The god of the bible does not qualify as undetectable. He has concrete effects
on the world, in the form of miracles. It is possible to postulate a god who
has no observable effect (answered prayers, for instance, should be detectable
by inference and statistics) except to create the universe and/or maintain its
existence (someone else mentioned god holding quarks together). However, from
a standpoint of trying to figure out how the universe works, this god has no
effect. We can directly observe that the universe exists and continues to
exist; given that, there is no real difference between a universe sustained
by god, and a universe that exists for some other reason.
This exchange could easily get into the question of why existence exists,
but let's avoid that, shall we?
en font terrible
> In article <5JoHeB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible
> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
> >there aren't.
>
> Why don't you give us those "good reasons" as to why you should assume that
> there aren't undetectable things in the universe.
OK.
Firstly, if I allow the existence of undetectable things to be assumed,
I have no way of limiting the number of undetectable things I am to believe
in the existence of. There is no way of evaluating, for a non-detectable
object X, whether that object exists. So in come elves, pixies, dragons,
square circles, Nazi flying saucers from the hollow earth, and so on.
Secondly, because nobody has ever been able to give me a way of
telling the difference between a non-existent object and a non-detectable
object which exists, I am forced to assume that there is no difference between
them. Yet at the same time I am expected to draw a distinction between
the two. How can I draw a distinction between two things which have no
difference?
Thirdly, I have no evidence for the existence of anything undetectable.
If I'm going to start believing in things for which there is no evidence
whatsoever, there'll be no end to it.
en font terrible
> In article <5JoHeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terribl
> >> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrib
> >>
> >> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
> >
> >Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
> >there aren't.
>
> Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*?
What's the difference?
> There are
> certainly very good reasons to assume that there are things which are
> undetectible in practice (e.g., we've discovered many things which were
> previously undetectible).
When such things were undetectable, they were undetectable in both principle
and practice, surely? What happened was that we discovered new physical
principles which allowed us to detect the things in practice, no?
Mikel Evins
>In article <13JAN199...@rigel.tamu.edu> pdj...@rigel.tamu.edu (JONES, PAUL DAVID) writes:
>>
>>If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the most
>>subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
>>in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
>>
>How can one assume, that just because something is undetectable by us, that it
>can not effect us. I can't detect god, yet I am not sure he has no effect
>on me. (actually the idea of god has a major effect on me, but that is a
>different issue, because the idea is somewhat detectable).
Remember, the question is whether there is a difference
between something being undetectable by *any* means, and
something being nonexistent. Any effect caused by
something would be a form of detection (detection by
*any* means). Thus, anything that cannot be detected
by *any* means cannot affect us.
Eileen F. Keeney
>
>Remember, the question is whether there is a difference
>between something being undetectable by *any* means, and
>something being nonexistent. Any effect caused by
>something would be a form of detection (detection by
>*any* means). Thus, anything that cannot be detected
>by *any* means cannot affect us.
>
It assumes nothing can be effecting us, without the effect being detectable.
So if all effects are detectable, then the argument holds.
I am not convinced that all effects are detectable.
Like most logic arguments it will eventually turn into a circular argument
that narrows down to definitions. Is the word effect exactly equal to the word
detectable effect ? If you say yes, than the above argument hold. If you say
no then the argument doesn't hold.
>
>
Eileen F. Keeney
>
(answer when asked to give reasons for believing undetectable things don't
exist )>
>Firstly, if I allow the existence of undetectable things to be assumed,
>I have no way of limiting the number of undetectable things I am to believe
>in the existence of. There is no way of evaluating, for a non-detectable
>object X, whether that object exists. So in come elves, pixies, dragons,
>square circles, Nazi flying saucers from the hollow earth, and so on.
>
>Secondly, because nobody has ever been able to give me a way of
>telling the difference between a non-existent object and a non-detectable
>object which exists, I am forced to assume that there is no difference between
>them. Yet at the same time I am expected to draw a distinction between
>the two. How can I draw a distinction between two things which have no
>difference?
>
>Thirdly, I have no evidence for the existence of anything undetectable.
>If I'm going to start believing in things for which there is no evidence
>whatsoever, there'll be no end to it.
>
trying to point out that it is possible (and even probable) that something which is undetectable can exist and even effect us. This doesn't mean we have to
ever be able to evaluate it. I certainly wouldn't base any scientific
conclusions on this undetectable thing, but I won't assume that it can't or
doesn't exist either.
Is there any one reading this net that is positive, beyond doubt that there
is no god (any god, not necessarily the christian god). By god I mean a
entity cabable of thought, that created this world and its lifeforms.
Is there any one reading this net who believes beyond doubt that there is
a God.
James J. Lippard
I can think of one exception: if that undetectable thing's only effect is
to instantly annihilate all observers. (Actually, another exception would
be if it was able to falsify observers' perceptions.)
James J. Lippard
>lip...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>> In article <5JoHeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terribl
>> >arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
>> >> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrib
>> >> >Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
>> >>
>> >> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
>> >
>> >Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>> >there aren't.
>>
>> Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*?
>
>What's the difference?
>
>> There are
>> certainly very good reasons to assume that there are things which are
>> undetectible in practice (e.g., we've discovered many things which were
>> previously undetectible).
>
>When such things were undetectable, they were undetectable in both principle
>and practice, surely? What happened was that we discovered new physical
>principles which allowed us to detect the things in practice, no?
By "undetectable in principle" I do not mean "undetectable on the basis
of known principles," but "undetectable on the basis of *actual* principles,
which may or may not be known." If it were possible to give electron
microscopes to people of the past, they too would have been able to
observe viruses and so forth. Such things were therefore undetectable
in practice but not in principle.
>
>mathew
>
>--
>Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
>you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
>me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
>available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
Jim Lippard Lip...@RVAX.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
ron house
>dabr...@rz-berlin.mpg.de (Jarek Dabrowski) writes:
>> In <ao3BeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes
>> > Well, I was rather assuming that he wouldn't be hiding.
>>
>> And assuming that we should be able to detect all existing things.
>What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
The undetectable thing exists but the nonexistent thing doesn't. :-)
Actually that shouldn't have a smiley. Your question is really a
rhetorical assertion that unless _we_ can find something, it isn't
there. In other words, it is a subjectivist philosophical theory
of knowledge. But a theory it is, not a fact established merely by
your asserting it. As for me, I am a realist. I believe the cosmos
(and lots of other stuff) is real, independent of my ability to see
or measure it. I am surprised that this is such an uncommon position
in alt.atheism.
ron house
>arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
>> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible)
>> >Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
>>
>> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
>Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>there aren't.
As it so happens... Beyond a certain distance, the expansion of space
is so great that anything out there would recede from us faster than the
speed of light. Relativity therefore precludes any information getting
from there to here, ever. Relativity __might__ be wrong, but then you
asked for a reason for assuming it, not a proof.
ron house
>lip...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>> In article <5JoHeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terribl
>> >arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
>> >> In article <BweceB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrib
>> >> >Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
>> >>
>> >> If not everything in the universe is detectible,
>> >
>> >Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>> >there aren't.
>>
>> Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*?
>What's the difference?
I never cease to be amazed by the lack of knowledge of science among
many atheists. The momentum and position of a particle can be known,
_in principle_, to within only a certain margin; this is the famous
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, simply stated. But in practice, we
can not usually make measurements to anywhere near the limits we theoretically
can obtain, nor are we ever likely to, although we can make improvements.
BTW, my "I never cease to be amazed..." comment above. Sorry to be
blunt, but people keep on posting utter rubbish here in the tone of
keyboard which implies "See, THAT put a few more idiot theists in their
place!"
ron house
>In <1992Jan14....@maths.tcd.ie>, Bryan Neil O'Sullivan writes:
>|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
>|>
>|> >What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
>|>
>|> Consider this: did the fact that nobody discovered Pluto until the 1930s
>|> mean that it didn't exist until then? It was undetectable in the 16th
>|> century, but I'm pretty sure that it existed then too.
>|>
>1. By definition, Pluto was not undetectable. It has been detected.
Alright, that;s one way to look at it. But please don't tell me God
is undetectable, because He might be detected tomorrow.
>2. No astronomer would have his/her belief set shaken if a new, previously
> undetected planet was found.
Is that so? In the sixteenth century, most astronomers believed there
was a very fundamental reason no more planets would be found: the
orbital distances had to match the gaps between the platonic solids
placed one inside the other. As there were no more platonic solids,
there could be no more planets. Ergo, by your logic, Pluto didn't
exist in the sixteenth century.
Just remember that if you take this sort of 'eternal' view (i.e. that
Pluto existed then because _now_ we realise it really was detectable
all along) then the whole purpose of the argument fails, because anyone
can say "yes, but you don't know that any conclusions you draw today
won't be invalidated tomorrow."
>3. Most new discoveries (as opposed to inventions) are driven by looking
> for the cause of an observed effect. In Pluto's case, the solar system
> wasn't acting properly for an 8 planet system based upon the then
> accepted view of mechanics.
And it still isn't. So Pluto hasn't solved anything, has it?
(I don't really mean that last sentence, but it makes the point that
this line of logic isn't really demonstrating anything.)
>4. An open mind requires looking at multiple solutions to a problem. Pluto
> was one possibility to the solar systems movements. Theism and Atheism
> are two possibilities to "what makes the world go round." Most (flame
> time?) Atheists have evaluated the possibility that there is a God, and
> tried to fit that option to the known data and to perform experiments
> that would support the belief.
> By my experience, and by reading the postings here, Theists do not tend
> to consider the possiblity that there is no God, and try to verify that
> option.
Yes, flame time. Why do you see these debates in terms of "We atheists
are such good guys, but those theist are such ________"? Occasionally
an idiot makes a dopey post, but that works both ways too. The theists
debating with you now obviously _do_ consider other possibilities, so
how about just sticking to the subject under discussion without personal
(if collective) attacks?
ron house
>If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the most
>subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
>in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
"Might as well not" and "don't" are not the same. Suppose there is a god,
who is deliberately lying low to see how we behave. When we die he will
judge us accordingly. In this world, he 'might as well' not exist, therefore
he 'doesn't exist'....For now.
(Note: I didn't say I believed this hypothetical scenario.)
ron house
>kee...@mist.CS.ORST.EDU (Eileen F. Keeney) writes:
>> In article <5JoHeB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible
>> >Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
>> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
>> >there aren't.
>>
>> Why don't you give us those "good reasons" as to why you should assume that
>> there aren't undetectable things in the universe.
>OK.
>Firstly, if I allow the existence of undetectable things to be assumed,
>I have no way of limiting the number of undetectable things I am to believe
>in the existence of. There is no way of evaluating, for a non-detectable
>object X, whether that object exists. So in come elves, pixies, dragons,
>square circles, Nazi flying saucers from the hollow earth, and so on.
Hmm. The 'inconvenience' theory of knowledge. You are off the track.
The question was why should we assume that there are undetectable things
in the universe, NOT why we should assume the existence of some particular
undetectable thing. Even if undetectable things were limited solely to
your list of absurd undetectables, the firm assertion that _none_ of them
exist seems to be as bad as the firm assertion that some particular ones
among them do exist.
As for a more believable undetectable, consider galaxies beyond
the light horizon.
>Secondly, because nobody has ever been able to give me a way of
>telling the difference between a non-existent object and a non-detectable
>object which exists, I am forced to assume that there is no difference between
>them.
The magalomania theory of knowledge: If __I__ can't tell the difference,
there isn't one.
>Yet at the same time I am expected to draw a distinction between
>the two. How can I draw a distinction between two things which have no
>difference?
They only 'have no difference' because you just advanced unsupported a
certain philosophical position.
>Thirdly, I have no evidence for the existence of anything undetectable.
>If I'm going to start believing in things for which there is no evidence
>whatsoever, there'll be no end to it.
Many undetectable things have an effect in
quantum mechanics. I.e., the theory fits nicely and works properly
only because it postulates certain undetectable things.
ron house
>Remember, the question is whether there is a difference
>between something being undetectable by *any* means, and
>something being nonexistent. Any effect caused by
>something would be a form of detection (detection by
>*any* means). Thus, anything that cannot be detected
>by *any* means cannot affect us.
But that definition of 'detectable' is fairly useless. According to
that, the ancient greeks could 'detect' quarks and mesons, because
there is a difference between the universe with, and without, them.
Such a definition can _not_ be used to argue against god, as it
presupposes the unproven. After all, __if__ the universe exists
only because god's will somehow supports it, then the mere existence
of us qualifies as a 'detection'. To tell the difference requires
a theory in which a role is assigned to such a god. Then we have
to decide on the truth of said theory... It never produces a result.
You yourself pointed out the case of the virtual charges in the
vacuum, which are not detectable as particles in principle, yet
their existence explains something important.
John A. Johnson
>
[commenting on Mathew's views of undetectability and nonexistency]:
> . . . In other words, it is a subjectivist philosophical theory
>of knowledge. But a theory it is, not a fact established merely by
>your asserting it. As for me, I am a realist. I believe the cosmos
>(and lots of other stuff) is real, independent of my ability to see
>or measure it. I am surprised that this is such an uncommon position
>in alt.atheism.
>
Me too. Nonrealist claims, although admittedly possible, just seem
silly to me. I understand that realism is ultimately unjustifiable,
but seems less silly. I take it for granted that if a friend and I
are admiring a painting and he suddenly has a heart attack and dies,
the painting continues to exist even though he is not detecting it
any more. And when I die, the real world will go on without me.
-----------------------------------
John A. Johnson (J...@psuvm.psu.edu)
Department of Psychology Penn State DuBois Campus 15801
Penn State is not responsible for my behavior.
"A ruthless, doctrinaire avoidance of degeneracy is a degeneracy of
another sort. Getting drunk and picking up bar-ladies and writing
metaphysics is a part of life." - from _Lila_ by R. Pirsig
Michael Polen
|> mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
|>
|> >In <1992Jan14....@maths.tcd.ie>, Bryan Neil O'Sullivan writes:
|> >|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
|> >|>
|> >|> >What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
|> >|>
|> >|> Consider this: did the fact that nobody discovered Pluto until the 1930s
|> >|> mean that it didn't exist until then? It was undetectable in the 16th
|> >|> century, but I'm pretty sure that it existed then too.
|> >|>
|> >1. By definition, Pluto was not undetectable. It has been detected.
|>
|> Alright, that;s one way to look at it. But please don't tell me God
|> is undetectable, because He might be detected tomorrow.
|>
with point 4 below. As an Atheist, I am willing to accept you might be right.
All I am waiting for is some personally acceptable data that would support that
thesis. I still contend this is a fundamental difference between a Theist and
an Atheist.
|> >2. No astronomer would have his/her belief set shaken if a new, previously
|> > undetected planet was found.
|>
|> Is that so? In the sixteenth century, most astronomers believed there
|> was a very fundamental reason no more planets would be found: the
|> orbital distances had to match the gaps between the platonic solids
|> placed one inside the other. As there were no more platonic solids,
|> there could be no more planets. Ergo, by your logic, Pluto didn't
|> exist in the sixteenth century.
|>
|> Just remember that if you take this sort of 'eternal' view (i.e. that
|> Pluto existed then because _now_ we realise it really was detectable
|> all along) then the whole purpose of the argument fails, because anyone
|> can say "yes, but you don't know that any conclusions you draw today
|> won't be invalidated tomorrow."
|>
Scientists, like God, know more now than they did in the sixteenth century. The
great lesson of quantum mechanics has been that whatever we "know" today may
be a subset of reality, limited by our ability to measure. Science continues
to push the barrier of those limitations, and draws assumptions about possible
rule-sets to act as a basis for further experimentation.
|> >3. Most new discoveries (as opposed to inventions) are driven by looking
|> > for the cause of an observed effect. In Pluto's case, the solar system
|> > wasn't acting properly for an 8 planet system based upon the then
|> > accepted view of mechanics.
|>
|> And it still isn't. So Pluto hasn't solved anything, has it?
|> (I don't really mean that last sentence, but it makes the point that
|> this line of logic isn't really demonstrating anything.)
Pluto did solve something. It made the model "better." It proved that we
can learn more about the system by carefully investigating the anomalies.
|>
|> >4. An open mind requires looking at multiple solutions to a problem. Pluto
|> > was one possibility to the solar systems movements. Theism and Atheism
|> > are two possibilities to "what makes the world go round." Most (flame
|> > time?) Atheists have evaluated the possibility that there is a God, and
|> > tried to fit that option to the known data and to perform experiments
|> > that would support the belief.
|>
|> > By my experience, and by reading the postings here, Theists do not tend
|> > to consider the possiblity that there is no God, and try to verify that
|> > option.
|>
|> Yes, flame time. Why do you see these debates in terms of "We atheists
|> are such good guys, but those theist are such ________"? Occasionally
|> an idiot makes a dopey post, but that works both ways too. The theists
|> debating with you now obviously _do_ consider other possibilities, so
|> how about just sticking to the subject under discussion without personal
|> (if collective) attacks?
|>
I expected the flame over the term "Most Atheists." You are the one that puts
the term "good guys" into the discussion. As in my response to 1 above, I know
of no Theists that accepts that the Athiests might be right, while the converse
is normal. As long as there continue to be unanswered questions, the Theists
will continue to use a divine knowledge, being, etc. to be the answer to the
open issues. Some of us like having unanswered questions to spur us on.
Mikel Evins
>>
>That argument assumes that one would be able to detect the effect.
>It assumes nothing can be effecting us, without the effect being detectable.
>So if all effects are detectable, then the argument holds.
This is simply the original question recast. What is the difference
between an effect that cannot be detected by any means and
no effect at all?
>I am not convinced that all effects are detectable.
>Like most logic arguments it will eventually turn into a circular argument
>that narrows down to definitions. Is the word effect exactly equal to the word
>detectable effect ? If you say yes, than the above argument hold. If you say
>no then the argument doesn't hold.
If you answer the question I pose above, then we will be able to answer
the question that you pose here.
Mikel Evins
>In article <61...@apple.Apple.COM>, mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes...
>>
>>between something being undetectable by *any* means, and
>>something being nonexistent. Any effect caused by
>>something would be a form of detection (detection by
>>*any* means). Thus, anything that cannot be detected
>>by *any* means cannot affect us.
>
>I can think of one exception: if that undetectable thing's only effect is
>to instantly annihilate all observers. (Actually, another exception would
>be if it was able to falsify observers' perceptions.)
In the case of your second exception, do you mean
that the thing falsifies *all* perceptions for
*all* observers (including the case proposed by
some researchers in which an inanimate object
acts as an observer)? In this case, I still don't
see that there is a difference between such a
thing existing and not existing. 'Falsify' with
respect to what? The 'falsified' world would be
indistinguishable in principle from the 'real'
world that it 'conceals'.
Mikel Evins
>mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes:
>But that definition of 'detectable' is fairly useless. According to
>that, the ancient greeks could 'detect' quarks and mesons, because
>there is a difference between the universe with, and without, them.
>Such a definition can _not_ be used to argue against god, as it
>presupposes the unproven. After all, __if__ the universe exists
>only because god's will somehow supports it, then the mere existence
>of us qualifies as a 'detection'. To tell the difference requires
>a theory in which a role is assigned to such a god. Then we have
>to decide on the truth of said theory... It never produces a result.
I don't think that we have a disagreement, Ron. I
am not attempting to argue against the existence
of God or gods on the above basis. I arrogate to
myself that I am heading off a particular class
of erroneous arguments, just as, in other posts,
you appear to be attempting to head off a
complementary class of them.
My working theory of knowledge treats knowledge as
operational. I say that a know something when I
can describe an action on my part that corresponds
to some (claimed) consequences. By this
definition, saying that something is undetectable
removes it from the domain of knowledge, unless
we qualify the definition of undetectability.
Again: I'm not arguing against the existence
of god(s) on this basis. In fact, when I
think about it, I rarely, or never, argue
against the existence of god. Now arguments
about whether I should believe in a particular
god in a particular way, those I'll engage in.
James J. Lippard
Suppose this undetectable thing annihilates some person (say, me or you),
but then gives everyone else (including inanimate observers) perceptions
by which I appear to still exist, living, breathing, communicating, and
otherwise behaving as I did before. The falsified world would be
indistinguishable in principle from the real world, but there would be
a difference, wouldn't there? (Suppose that instead of being annihilated,
I am somehow incorporated into the undetectable thing, in which case both
it and I know the difference.)
One possible counterargument is that anything capable of simulating
me completely would in fact be me (at least as much as I am me).
en font terrible
> In article <13JAN199...@rigel.tamu.edu> pdj...@rigel.tamu.edu (JONES,
> >in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
>
> Let's say quarks are made up of some kind of smaller particle and this smalle
> Quirks. We can not detect quirks.
Last I heard, hypothetical fundamental particles were not said to exist
until they had been detected. For example, it is not the case that magnetic
monopoles exist. They're hypothesized, sure. And if they do exist, they'll
be very important. But we can't say that they exist.
You seem to be demanding implicitly that existence be time-invariant. I
don't think it is.
en font terrible
> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes
> >What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
>
> Consider this: did the fact that nobody discovered Pluto until the 1930s
> mean that it didn't exist until then? It was undetectable in the 16th
> century, but I'm pretty sure that it existed then too.
Really? So if you had asked someone in the sixteenth century how many planets
existed, he would have said "nine, but some of them are undetectable"?
en font terrible
> In article <iaeJeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible
> >> Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*?
> >
> >What's the difference?
> >When such things were undetectable, they were undetectable in both principle
> >and practice, surely? What happened was that we discovered new physical
> >principles which allowed us to detect the things in practice, no?
>
> By "undetectable in principle" I do not mean "undetectable on the basis
> of known principles," but "undetectable on the basis of *actual* principles,
> which may or may not be known."
I see. So how do I tell the difference between something which is
"undetectable on the basis of known principles" and something which is
"undetectable on the basis of *actual* principles"?
jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com
> In article <house.695442947@helios>, ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
> |> mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
> |>
> |> >In <1992Jan14....@maths.tcd.ie>, Bryan Neil O'Sullivan writes:
> |> >|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
...much other stuff deleted....
Michael Polen writes:
> |> > By my experience, and by reading the postings here, Theists do not tend
> |> > to consider the possiblity that there is no God, and try to verify that
> |> > option.
> |>
Ron House writes:
> |> Yes, flame time. Why do you see these debates in terms of "We atheists
> |> are such good guys, but those theist are such ________"? Occasionally
> |> an idiot makes a dopey post, but that works both ways too. The theists
> |> debating with you now obviously _do_ consider other possibilities, so
> |> how about just sticking to the subject under discussion without personal
> |> (if collective) attacks?
> |>
Mike responds:
> I expected the flame over the term "Most Atheists." You are the one that
> puts the term "good guys" into the discussion. As in my response to 1 above,
> I know of no Theists that accepts that the Athiests might be right, while
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> the converse is normal. As long as there continue to be unanswered
> questions, the Theists will continue to use a divine knowledge, being, etc.
> to be the answer to the open issues. Some of us like having unanswered
> questions to spur us on.
Mike, now you know of one....me. Sure, atheists "might be right". In fact,
I would say that most theists would agree that atheists "might be right".
But in so stating, I/we reserve the right to qualify the term "might". A lot
of things "might happen" or "might be true" for which the possibilities are
small. For me, the chance that the atheistic worldview "might be right" is
on the same order of probability that I will win the Reader's Digest
Sweepstakes.
Regards,
Jim
Kent Sandvik
>
> arro...@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
> > >Fine. So why can't I detect him now?
> >
> > If not everything in the universe is detectible,
>
> universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
> there aren't.
I actually do think that abstract concepts, such as OOPS :-), God,
love, hate, iteration, and other similar concepts could be defined
as semi-real. They exist, mutate, change, suddenly disappear, or
are merged into other memes. They are not directly detectable,
however we get 'shadowing effects'. For instance, God as an old
man sitting somewhere up on a pile of clouds, creating thunder,
is a very crude and simple methaphor. However, the meme of God
creates 20k of alt.atheist traffic daily :-).
Kent
---
private commentse
Jarek Dabrowski
>> > Well, I was rather assuming that he wouldn't be hiding.
>
Jarek Dabrowski <1992Jan15....@rz-berlin.mpg.de>
Best wishes,
Jarek
------------------------------------------------------
.-----. dabr...@fhi-berlin.mpg.dbp.de
`-> <-' (Jarek Dabrowski)
I WANT DAN BREDY BACK TO THE NET
Jarek Dabrowski
>> And assuming that we should be able to detect all existing things.
-Kent Sandvik <19...@goofy.Apple.COM>:
> ..which we do, indeed! Even in the case of memes, like concepts
> and symbols, we could detect them, or what. Just read this newsgroup :-).
>
???? From "in the case of" to a general rule? The conversed fallacy
of accident? Moreover, can't you imagine that there are things you
can't imagine, Horatio?
James J. Lippard
>lip...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>> In article <iaeJeB...@mantis.co.uk>, mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible
>> >lip...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>> >> Undetectible in *practice*, or undetectible in *principle*?
>> >
>> >What's the difference?
>[...]
>> >When such things were undetectable, they were undetectable in both principle
>> >and practice, surely? What happened was that we discovered new physical
>> >principles which allowed us to detect the things in practice, no?
>>
>> By "undetectable in principle" I do not mean "undetectable on the basis
>> of known principles," but "undetectable on the basis of *actual* principles,
>> which may or may not be known."
>
>I see. So how do I tell the difference between something which is
>"undetectable on the basis of known principles" and something which is
>"undetectable on the basis of *actual* principles"?
Usually with hindsight.
>mathew
>
>--
>Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
>you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
>me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
>available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
Jim Lippard Lip...@RVAX.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
James J. Lippard
>Last I heard, hypothetical fundamental particles were not said to exist
>until they had been detected. For example, it is not the case that magnetic
>monopoles exist. They're hypothesized, sure. And if they do exist, they'll
>be very important. But we can't say that they exist.
>
>You seem to be demanding implicitly that existence be time-invariant. I
>don't think it is.
You, on the other hand, seem to be claiming that existence is
observer-dependent. Are you? Were there no internal organs until
the first study of anatomy was done?
>
>mathew
>
>--
>Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
>you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
>me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
>available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
Jim Lippard Lip...@RVAX.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
Andrew Pearlman
>apea...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Andrew Pearlman) writes:
>> particle is made up of yet another smaller particle, which we will call
>> Quirks. We can not detect quirks.
>
>Last I heard, hypothetical fundamental particles were not said to exist
>until they had been detected. For example, it is not the case that magnetic
>monopoles exist. They're hypothesized, sure. And if they do exist, they'll
>be very important. But we can't say that they exist.
We can however make reasonably good guesses as to whether or not such a
particle exists. As an example, 'quirks' are quite likely to exist. The
odds of humanity finding this out or not is probably not good.
Also, if we discover a new fundamental particle and had predicted its
existance well in advance, the discovery did not bring them into existance,
rather they always existed. There are probably particles small enough,
that we will never actually discover them, simply because they are too
small for detection. Do such particles exist? Probably.
Andy Pearlman
Eileen F. Keeney
>I WANT DAN BREDY BACK TO THE NET
(or maybe give him the password to your account)
I've been wanting to say this for a long time. I happen to agree with Kodak,
am I the only one. If you owned a company would you want someone else saying
they spoke for your company when expressing their opinions. Yes, It was
obvious to most of us that he was speaking for himself, but someone might
really have believed he was speaking for kodak. He should have followed his
companies policies.
WERLING
> What's the difference between an undetectable thing and a nonexistent thing?
Hmmm. Ya can't detect either, so the difference cannot be known...
--
Andrew Werling awer...@nmsu.edu Happily buzzing in a new land.
Mikel Evins
>
>Also, if we discover a new fundamental particle and had predicted its
>existance well in advance, the discovery did not bring them into existance,
>rather they always existed. There are probably particles small enough,
>that we will never actually discover them, simply because they are too
>small for detection. Do such particles exist? Probably.
Weeeelllll....maybe not. Take, for example, the strange
case of the proton spin experiments in the late 1970s.
Spin is a bit counterintuitive, and someone mused that
physicists might be making up 'fundamental' properties and
devising experiments that created them. This idea
is quite counterintuitive as well, but someone devised
a means of testing it. It turns out that if you assume
that spin exists regardless of whether you measure it
you get a certain predicted distribution of spin states
in a population of protons. If you assume that the act
of measuring it creates the property then you get a
different predicted distribution. It just so happened
that the distribution observed in experiment agreed
closely with the assumption that measurement creates
the property.
Some physicists, notably Wheeler, are presently arguing
that fundamental properties of space, time, energy, and
matter are in fact properties of operations, and of the
same character as proton spin in the above experiments.
If this turns out to be a good model, it may be that
physics adopts the attitude that discovering a particle
creates it. (It wouldn't be the first time
that physics violently clashed with common sense).
WERLING
If someone was naive and stupid enough to assume that Dan Bredy or
anyone else was speaking for the company they worked for in obviously
opinionated posts then their concerns should be considered irrelevant
anyway.
Mikel Evins
>In article <61...@apple.Apple.COM>, mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes...
>>In article <14JAN199...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu> lip...@uavax0.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes:
>>>In article <61...@apple.Apple.COM>, mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes...
>>>>
>
>but then gives everyone else (including inanimate observers) perceptions
>by which I appear to still exist, living, breathing, communicating, and
>otherwise behaving as I did before. The falsified world would be
>indistinguishable in principle from the real world, but there would be
>a difference, wouldn't there? (Suppose that instead of being annihilated,
>I am somehow incorporated into the undetectable thing, in which case both
>it and I know the difference.)
> One possible counterargument is that anything capable of simulating
>me completely would in fact be me (at least as much as I am me).
You've already identified one of my objections: if this thing
can simulate you completely, down to every detail, then
what is the difference between the 'simulated' you and
the 'real' you? My other objection is this: if the thing
'incorporated' you into itself and you knew about it
then you would have detected it; therefore it is not
undetectable in principle. The 'falsified' world is
not wholly undetectable; someone (you) can tell the difference.
Michael Polen
|> In article <14...@spim.mips.COM>, mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
|> > In article <house.695442947@helios>, ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
|> > |> mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
|> > |>
|> > |> >In <1992Jan14....@maths.tcd.ie>, Bryan Neil O'Sullivan writes:
|> > |> >|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
|>
|> ...much other stuff deleted....
|>
|> > I know of no Theists that accepts that the Athiests might be right, while
|> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|> > the converse is normal. As long as there continue to be unanswered
|> > questions, the Theists will continue to use a divine knowledge, being, etc.
|> > to be the answer to the open issues. Some of us like having unanswered
|> > questions to spur us on.
|>
|> Mike, now you know of one....me. Sure, atheists "might be right". In fact,
|> I would say that most theists would agree that atheists "might be right".
|> But in so stating, I/we reserve the right to qualify the term "might". A lot
|> of things "might happen" or "might be true" for which the possibilities are
|> small. For me, the chance that the atheistic worldview "might be right" is
|> on the same order of probability that I will win the Reader's Digest
|> Sweepstakes.
|>
Do you send in the Reader's Digest entries? If you do, what do you do that
would be comparable to support the same probability that there is not God?
If you do not send in Reader's Digest entries, then you are saying that the
probability of winning is *zero*, implying that there is *zero* probability
that there is no GOD.
Kurt Ludwick
-|> > I know of no Theists that accepts that the Athiests might be right, while
-|> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-|>
-|> Mike, now you know of one....me. Sure, atheists "might be right". In
*fact,
-|> I would say that most theists would agree that atheists "might be right".
-|> But in so stating, I/we reserve the right to qualify the term "might". A t
-|> of things "might happen" or "might be true" for which the possibilities are
-|> small. For me, the chance that the atheistic worldview "might be right" is
-|> on the same order of probability that I will win the Reader's Digest
-|> Sweepstakes.
That about sums up how I feel about it. It seems clear, *to me*, based on my
experiences, that there is a God. I am also aware of the possibility that it
could be some sort of delusion, or that we're all being mind-controlled by
evil aliens from Alpha Centauri, etc, etc.
I think of the probability of there being no God, from my perspective, as
being on the same order of such other possibilities as 'the earth is the
center of the universe,' or 'the earth is 6,000 years old and evolution is
a farce from Satan,' etc.
You always hear things such as evolution (which I do believe in) discredited
as 'theories;' ie, it should not be taught in school because it's only a
theory. The problem with that reasoning is, the probability that it is
wrong is so incredibly low, it can be regarded as a relative certainity.
Just like the possibility that I am just a computer glitch (you still haven't
convinced me otherwise, by the way :-) is so low, it's safe to assume that I
exist.
And, I believe that the probability of something as complex as human life
coming about by pure chance is so low, I ignore it, like I ignore the
probability that the sun and other planets are just taking really mental
orbits around the earth (Hey, nobody's ever gone out perpendicular to the
earth-sun plane and watched the earth orbit the sun... so, how can we know
for sure?). I believe the probability that my own experiences with God's
presence are psychological delusions or evil alien plots are also very low;
not *as* low, but still pretty darned low. Multiply those two probabilities,
and that's my idea of the chance that God does not exist. Lower than too low
to worry about; but still possible. A 'non-zero probability' as physicists
like to say about the probability of my atoms all suddenly exploding, or
something like that. (OK, I'm not a physics expert, so shoot me! Or bombard
me with gamma rays! :-)
-Do you send in the Reader's Digest entries? If you do, what do you do that
-would be comparable to support the same probability that there is not God?
-If you do not send in Reader's Digest entries, then you are saying that the
-probability of winning is *zero*, implying that there is *zero* probability
-that there is no GOD.
Yep, the chance of winning the sweepstakes is also too low to really worry
about. Not that it would *be* something to worry about...
Kurt Ludwick
------------
Oh, no, he's *back*...
cj...@minster.york.ac.uk
> your asserting it. As for me, I am a realist. I believe the cosmos
> (and lots of other stuff) is real, independent of my ability to see
> or measure it. I am surprised that this is such an uncommon position
> in alt.atheism.
I don't think it is uncommon. I'm with with you on this one. I'd make a
hopeless philosopher: these subtle points on being and detection and so
on make my head spin.
Cheers -- Chris
Keeney Eileen Frances
above mentioned traits belong to people that buy kodak products. Since Kodak
owned the equipment, and paid for the net access, They had the right to
do what they did.
No I do not work for or have any connection with kodak. I am still upset with
them for the way they handled the call back of their automatic cameras.
I own a polaroid.
en font terrible
> >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
> >there aren't.
>
> is so great that anything out there would recede from us faster than the
> speed of light. Relativity therefore precludes any information getting
> from there to here, ever.
Indeed. But we can still detect the stuff that's out there by its
gravitational attraction, surely? (Is it known whether gravity is FTL
or not?)
en font terrible
>
>
> Actually that shouldn't have a smiley. Your question is really a
> rhetorical assertion that unless _we_ can find something, it isn't
> there. In other words, it is a subjectivist philosophical theory
> of knowledge. But a theory it is, not a fact established merely by
> your asserting it. As for me, I am a realist.
I was trying to be pragmatic and realistic. If I can't tell the difference
between two things, it makes sense to call them the same. You seem to be
arguing that I should instead assume that they're different. I find it
extremely unlikely that you really do so outside the context of the current
discussion, or you'd never be allowed in a supermarket.
"Is this also a tin of baked beans? It looks identical to the one I bought
last week which turned out to have beans in, but I'd better assume it isn't.
Let's open it and check..."
No, I think the only sensible rule to follow is that when you're faced with
two things which you can't tell apart, you assume they're the same.
> I believe the cosmos
> (and lots of other stuff) is real, independent of my ability to see
> or measure it. I am surprised that this is such an uncommon position
> in alt.atheism.
I'm not. As we all know, many if not most atheists come to be atheists
as a result of carefully examining their beliefs. Under careful examination,
I would expect most people to realise that the belief in an independent
external physical universe is as unnecessary and unjustified as the belief
in God. I think the reason people keep their belief in the universe is
that they don't like the thought that things might not really be as we see
them. The naive realist view is so straightforward and comforting and so
deeply entrenched in most people that it's hard to discard.
en font terrible
> >What's the difference?
>
> many atheists. The momentum and position of a particle can be known,
> _in principle_, to within only a certain margin; this is the famous
> Heisenberg uncertainty principle, simply stated. But in practice, we
> can not usually make measurements to anywhere near the limits we theoreticall
> can obtain, nor are we ever likely to, although we can make improvements.
OK. Well, we now have definitions of what "in practice" and "in principle"
are supposed to be referring to. We now have four possible meanings of
the original statement that I should 'assume that things exist which are
undetectable'. Let's go through the four possibilities in turn.
#1: If you mean "You should assume that there are things which exist in
principle but are undetectable in principle" then that's silly. It
means the theory is more complicated than it needs to be. Note that in
QM, the absolute position and momentum of the particle do not exist in
principle; the particle really does have uncertain position and
momentum. So QM doesn't assume the existence in principle of things
which are undetectable in principle.
#2: If you mean "You should assume that there are things which exist in
practice but are undetectable in practice" then that's a contradiction.
In practice, existence of things in science is determined by whether they
can be detected and measured.
#3: If you mean "You should assume that there are things which exist in
practice but are undetectable in principle" then that's pretty odd. If
something is undetectable in principle, then it must be undetectable in
practice, or else the appropriate physical law (principle) is wrong. This is
how laws of physics are shown to be wrong. If the law is not wrong, then the
statement reduces to #2, and is therefore a contradiction.
#4: If you mean "You should assume that there are things which exist in
principle but are undetectable in practice" then that's a pretty vacuous
statement. Anything can exist *in principle*, theoretically and
hypothetically. I'm entirely willing to believe that God hypothetically
exists. It's whether he exists in practice which is the interesting
question.
en font terrible
> pdj...@rigel.tamu.edu (JONES, PAUL DAVID) writes:
> >If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the mos
> >subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
> >in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
>
> who is deliberately lying low to see how we behave. When we die he will
> judge us accordingly.
In that case he's detectable. Sure, you have to die to do the experiment,
but he's still detectable.
Steven White
|> ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
|> > mat...@mantis.co.uk (en font terrible) writes:
|> > >Any reason why I should assume that there exist undetectable things in the
|> > >universe? I can think of several good reasons why I should assume that
|> > >there aren't.
|> >
|> > As it so happens... Beyond a certain distance, the expansion of space
|> > is so great that anything out there would recede from us faster than the
|> > speed of light. Relativity therefore precludes any information getting
|> > from there to here, ever.
|>
|> Indeed. But we can still detect the stuff that's out there by its
|> gravitational attraction, surely? (Is it known whether gravity is FTL
|> or not?)
|>
|>
|> mathew
|>
|> --
No. Gravity travels at the speed of light. The stuff would be completely
undetectable.
Steve White
(Dept. of Physics, UCI)
James J. Lippard
>I was trying to be pragmatic and realistic. If I can't tell the difference
>between two things, it makes sense to call them the same. You seem to be
>arguing that I should instead assume that they're different. I find it
>extremely unlikely that you really do so outside the context of the current
>discussion, or you'd never be allowed in a supermarket.
>
>"Is this also a tin of baked beans? It looks identical to the one I bought
>last week which turned out to have beans in, but I'd better assume it isn't.
>Let's open it and check..."
>
>No, I think the only sensible rule to follow is that when you're faced with
>two things which you can't tell apart, you assume they're the same.
Hey, I've got some diamonds here to sell you. Yeah, there could be
some cubic zirconium mixed in, but what the heck--*you* can't tell
them apart, so what's the difference?
>mathew
>
>--
>Just another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices / If
>you know where I can buy the CD "In Mysterious Ways" by John Foxx, please send
>me email / Message for Kodak: Bring back Dan Bredy! / My PGP RSA public key is
>available on request / Desperately seeking CD of "U2" by Negativland / 4 lines
Jim Lippard Lip...@RVAX.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com
> In article <2370.2...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com>, jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com writes:
> |> In article <14...@spim.mips.COM>, mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
> |> > In article <house.695442947@helios>, ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
> |> > |> mpo...@suntory.mips.com (Michael Polen) writes:
> |> > |>
> |> > |> >In <1992Jan14....@maths.tcd.ie>, Bryan Neil O'Sullivan writes:
> |> > |> >|> In <61PHeB...@mantis.co.uk> en font terrible writes:
> |>
> |> ...much other stuff deleted....
> |>
> |> Mike Polen responds:
> |> > I know of no Theists that accepts that the Athiests might be right, while
> |> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> |> > the converse is normal. As long as there continue to be unanswered
> |> > questions, the Theists will continue to use a divine knowledge, being, etc.
> |> > to be the answer to the open issues. Some of us like having unanswered
> |> > questions to spur us on.
> |>
> |> Mike, now you know of one....me. Sure, atheists "might be right". In fact,
> |> I would say that most theists would agree that atheists "might be right".
> |> But in so stating, I/we reserve the right to qualify the term "might". A lot
> |> of things "might happen" or "might be true" for which the possibilities are
> |> small. For me, the chance that the atheistic worldview "might be right" is
> |> on the same order of probability that I will win the Reader's Digest
> |> Sweepstakes.
> |>
> Thank you. Could you please expand on your comparison?
>
Certainly.
> Do you send in the Reader's Digest entries?
Yes.
> If you do, what do you do that
> would be comparable to support the same probability that there is not God?
Why, I read atheists' posts here on the net, of course! :)
> If you do not send in Reader's Digest entries, then you are saying that the
> probability of winning is *zero*, implying that there is *zero* probability
> that there is no GOD.
But I'm smart enough to say "I might just win" so I send it in. And
I'm also smart enough to say "I might just be wrong" so I listen (in person)
and read (the net and books).
OK?
Jim B.
ron house
>Is there any one reading this net who believes beyond doubt that there is
>a God.
I am sure with p>=299,999/300,000 (roughly) that god exists, because a
private experience with 1 - that_probability in an atheistic word happened.
I can't prove it to anyone else, so I don't go around saying "BELIEVE,
SINNER!" If god wants to make such a demonstration to anyone else, He
is welcome to do so (and I can't influence it one way or the other).
--
Ron House. USQ
(ho...@helios.usq.edu.au) Toowoomba, Australia.
ron house
>In article <house.695450232@helios> ho...@helios.usq.EDU.AU (ron house) writes:
>>mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes:
>>But that definition of 'detectable' is fairly useless. According to
>>that, the ancient greeks could 'detect' quarks and mesons, because
>>there is a difference between the universe with, and without, them.
>>Such a definition can _not_ be used to argue against god, as it
>>presupposes the unproven. After all, __if__ the universe exists
>>only because god's will somehow supports it, then the mere existence
>>of us qualifies as a 'detection'. To tell the difference requires
>>a theory in which a role is assigned to such a god. Then we have
>>to decide on the truth of said theory... It never produces a result.
>I don't think that we have a disagreement, Ron. I
>am not attempting to argue against the existence
>of God or gods on the above basis. I arrogate to
>myself that I am heading off a particular class
>of erroneous arguments, just as, in other posts,
>you appear to be attempting to head off a
>complementary class of them.
Yes, Mikel, I see your point. I think the thing that I am trying to
focus on is the widespread assertion that something's being undetectable
__IS__ the same as the something's nonexistence. This has also been
raised in one of the philosophy groups in a discussion of the existence
of a private language, wher it is asserted that the unprovability of
an assertion about our internal state _is_ the same as that assertion
having no meaning.
I claim that existence and knowledge of it are two different things.
Whether anyone agrees with that, I do assert that the mere assertion
that they are not is and can never be an argument that something I
might say is false, nor can it be part of a proof of anything.
>My working theory of knowledge treats knowledge as
>operational. I say that a know something when I
>can describe an action on my part that corresponds
>to some (claimed) consequences. By this
>definition, saying that something is undetectable
>removes it from the domain of knowledge, unless
>we qualify the definition of undetectability.
I agree. But my realism prevents me from equating what I might or might
not know with what is or isn't true.
ron house
>apea...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Andrew Pearlman) writes:
>> In article <13JAN199...@rigel.tamu.edu> pdj...@rigel.tamu.edu (JONES,
>> >If such things do exist, undetectable by us by any means, including the mos
>> >subtle inference, then they might as well not exist. They cannot effect us
>> >in any way, so the universe is the same to us whether they exist or not.
>>
>> Let's say quarks are made up of some kind of smaller particle and this smalle
>> particle is made up of yet another smaller particle, which we will call
>> Quirks. We can not detect quirks.
>Last I heard, hypothetical fundamental particles were not said to exist
>until they had been detected. For example, it is not the case that magnetic
>monopoles exist. They're hypothesized, sure. And if they do exist, they'll
>be very important. But we can't say that they exist.
I feel that this is the sort of confusion we get into by believing in
materialism. Fundamental particles 'exist' in one sense whether we look or
not, because if we verify that one exists, it or its descendants will
have certain predictable effects according to our theory, and we can verify
them whenever we please. But in another sense they don't exist, because
we can choose to set up an experiment which produces a crazy answer if we
assume the particle is a little hard ball of stuff. The nearest I can
come to understanding this is that the 'real' thing is the wave function,
which effectively gives us a way of assessing probabilities of obtaining
certain perceptions if we perform certain experiments. Implicit in the
reality of the wave function is the reality of the particle as a concept.
Therefore I would have to agree with Andrew insofar as his speculation
is logically possible.