Ihave been playing RedAlert on the CnC portal for years now, and learning strategies for fast build speeds as well as understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of all units and buildings. I would consider myself to have improvede to a level of 'good average' but I am still beaten by excellent players.
There are, however, some players whose ability to churn out buildings and units seems to defy possibility. I know that many MCV's let you build other structures faster, and many war factories let you build tanks faster etc., but some players are seemingly achieving the impossible. Am I imagining this, or are there cheats that enable this unfair gameplay? In a recent conversation, one player seemed to alude to the possibility of lower resolution settings resulting in faster build times. Does this make any sense, and is it possible?
C&C games are peer to peer games which means, the same exact simulation of the game is happening on both computers, and no computer could tell the other how the game should run without causing and internal or reconnection error. A build speed cheat would cause an 'unsync' (don't know if this is the exact word but I'm sure you understand) between both game simulations on each computer and the game would crash.
Some players do other kind of cheatings without using trainers throught INI editing that could give them a free radar or unblock some units without causing crash but CnCNet clients actually detect when someone has edited INI files or simply if their setup files in game folder are different as they should be.
On the other hand think that C&C is an old game and there's players who have been there for years and have sick micro skills hard to understand and execute for a beginner but, if I could give you some tips...
This article is a guide to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) testing for application security professionals. This cheat sheet was originally based on RSnake's seminal XSS Cheat Sheet previously at: Now, the OWASP Cheat Sheet Series provides users with an updated and maintained version of the document. The very first OWASP Cheat Sheet, Cross Site Scripting Prevention, was inspired by RSnake's work and we thank RSnake for the inspiration!
This XSS method uses the relaxed rendering engine to create an XSS vector within an IMG tag (which needs to be encapsulated within quotes). We believe this approach was originally meant to correct sloppy coding and it would also make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse HTML tags:
This attack will bypass most SRC domain filters. Inserting JavaScript in an event handler also applies to any HTML tag type injection using elements like Form, Iframe, Input, Embed, etc. This also allows the substitution of any relevant event for the tag type, such as onblur or onclick, providing extensive variations of the injections listed here:
While some defenders claim that any of the chars 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack, this is incorrect. Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work. Examine the ASCII table for reference. The next four XSS attack examples illustrate this vector:
(Note: with the above I am making these strings longer than they have to be because the zeros could be omitted. Often I've seen filters that assume the hex and dec encoding has to be two or three characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters.):
Null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using something like Burp Proxy or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to write your own injection tool you can either use vim (^V^@ will produce a null) or the following program to generate it into a text file. The null char %00 is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world filters with a variation on this example:
This is useful if a filter's pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word javascript:, which is correct since that won't render, but makes the false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the javascript: keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in decimal:
The Firefox HTML parser assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefore considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. For example \
Based on the same idea as above, however, expanded on it, using Rsnake's fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, etc) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this also applies to the grave accent char as seen here:
Yair Amit noted that there is a slightly different behavior between the Trident (IE) and Gecko (Firefox) rendering engines that allows just a slash between the tag and the parameter with no spaces. This could be useful in a attack if the system does not allow spaces:
This XSS vector could defeat certain detection engines that work by checking matching pairs of open and close angle brackets then comparing the tag inside, instead of a more efficient algorithm like Boyer-Moore that looks for entire string matches of the open angle bracket and associated tag (post de-obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments out the ending extraneous bracket to suppress a JavaScript error:
With Firefox, you don't actually need the \> portion of this XSS vector, because Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and adds closing tags for you. Unlike the next attack, which doesn't affect Firefox, this method does not require any additional HTML below it. You can add quotes if you need to, but they're normally not needed:
This particular variant is partially based on Ozh's protocol resolution bypass below, and it works in IE and Edge in compatibility mode. However, this is especially useful where space is an issue, and of course, the shorter your domain, the better. The .j is valid, regardless of the encoding type because the browser knows it in context of a SCRIPT tag:
Unlike Firefox, the IE rendering engine (Trident) doesn't add extra data to your page, but it does allow the javascript: directive in images. This is useful as a vector because it doesn't require a close angle bracket. This assumes there is any HTML tag below where you are injecting this XSS vector. Even though there is no close \> tag the tags below it will close it. A note: this does mess up the HTML, depending on what HTML is beneath it. It gets around the following network intrusion detection system (NIDS) regex: /((\\%3D)(=))\[^\\n\]\*((\\%3C)\)/ because it doesn't require the end \>. As a side note, this was also affective against a real world XSS filter using an open ended
If an application is written to output some user information inside of a JavaScript (like the following: var a="$ENVQUERY\_STRING";) and you want to inject your own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain quotes, you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When this gets injected it will read var a="\\\\";alert('XSS');//"; which ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing the XSS vector to fire. The XSS locator uses this method:
The attack with the BODY tag can be modified for use in similar XSS attacks to the one above (this is the most comprehensive list on the net, at the time of this writing). Thanks to Rene Ledosquet for the HTML+TIME updates.
Using something as simple as a remote style sheet you can include your XSS as the style parameter can be redefined using an embedded expression. This only works in IE. Notice that there is nothing on the page to show that there is included JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won't work unless there is some content on the page other than the vector itself, so you'll need to add a single letter to the page to make it work if it's an otherwise blank page:
This works the same as above, but uses a tag instead of a tag). A slight variation on this vector was usedto hack Google Desktop. As a side note, you can remove the end tag if there is HTML immediately after the vector to close it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equals sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack, which has come up at least once in the real world:
This is a little different than the last two XSS vectors because it uses an .htc file that must be on the same server as the XSS vector. This example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and running it as part of the style attribute:
This attack uses malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS method may bypass many content filters but it only works if the host transmits in US-ASCII encoding or if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall (WAF) XSS evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache Tomcat is the only known server that by default still transmits in US-ASCII encoding.
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