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Searle argues that a good way to test a theory of mind, say a theorythat holds that understanding can be created by doing such and such,is to imagine what it would be like to actually do what the theorysays will create understanding. Searle (1999) summarized his ChineseRoom Argument (herinafter, CRA) concisely:
By mid-century Turing was optimistic that the newly developedelectronic computers themselves would soon be able to exhibitapparently intelligent behavior, answering questions posed in Englishand carrying on conversations. Turing (1950) proposed what is nowknown as the Turing Test: if a computer could pass for human inon-line chat, it should be counted as intelligent.
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Shaffer 2009 examines modal aspects of the logic of the CRA and arguesthat familiar versions of the System Reply are question-begging. But,Shaffer claims, a modalized version of the System Reply succeedsbecause there are possible worlds in which understanding is anemergent property of complex syntax manipulation. Nute 2011 is a replyto Shaffer.
Critics hold that if the evidence we have that humans understand isthe same as the evidence we might have that a visitingextra-terrestrial alien understands, which is the same as the evidencethat a robot understands, the presuppositions we may make in the caseof our own species are not relevant, for presuppositions are sometimesfalse. For similar reasons, Turing, in proposing the Turing Test, isspecifically worried about our presuppositions and chauvinism. If thereasons for the presuppositions regarding humans are pragmatic, inthat they enable us to predict the behavior of humans and to interacteffectively with them, perhaps the presupposition could apply equallyto computers (similar considerations are pressed by Dennett, in hisdiscussions of what he calls the Intentional Stance).
As we have seen, the reason that Searle thinks we can disregard theevidence in the case of robots and computers is that we know thattheir processing is syntactic, and this fact trumps all otherconsiderations. Indeed, Searle believes this is the larger point thatthe Chinese Room merely illustrates. This larger point is addressed inthe Syntax and Semantics section below.
Thus several in this group of critics argue that speed affects ourwillingness to attribute intelligence and understanding to a slowsystem, such as that in the Chinese Room. The result may simply bethat our intuitions regarding the Chinese Room are unreliable, andthus the man in the room, in implementing the program, may understandChinese despite intuitions to the contrary (Maudlin and Pinker). Or itmay be that the slowness marks a crucial difference between thesimulation in the room and what a fast computer does, such that theman is not intelligent while the computer system is (Dennett).
Functionalists accuse identity theorists of substance chauvinism.However, functionalism remains controversial: functionalism isvulnerable to the Chinese Nation type objections discussed above, andfunctionalists notoriously have trouble explaining qualia, a problemhighlighted by the apparent possibility of an inverted spectrum, wherequalitatively different states might have the same functional role(e.g. Block 1978, Maudlin 1989, Cole 1990).
These controversial biological and metaphysical issues bear on thecentral inference in the Chinese Room argument. From the intuitionthat in the CR thought experiment he would not understand Chinese byrunning a program, Searle infers that there is no understandingcreated by running a program. Clearly, whether that inference is validor not turns on a metaphysical question about the identity of personsand minds. If the person understanding is not identical with the roomoperator, then the inference is unsound.
In discussing the CRA, Searle argues that there is an importantdistinction between simulation and duplication. No one would mistake acomputer simulation of the weather for weather, or a computersimulation of digestion for real digestion. Searle concludes that itis just as serious a mistake to confuse a computer simulation ofunderstanding with understanding.
On the face of it, there is generally an important distinction betweena simulation and the real thing. But two problems emerge. It is notclear that the distinction can always be made. Hearts are biologicalif anything is. Are artificial hearts simulations of hearts? Or arethey functional duplicates of hearts, hearts made from differentmaterials? Walking is normally a biological phenomenon performed usinglimbs. Do those with artificial limbs walk? Or do they simulatewalking? Do robots walk? If the properties that are needed to becertain kind of thing are high-level properties, anything sharingthose properties will be a thing of that kind, even if it differs inits lower level properties. Chalmers (1996) offers a principlegoverning when simulation is replication. Chalmers suggests that,contra Searle and Harnad (1989), a simulation of X can be anX, namely when the property of being an X is anorganizational invariant, a property that depends only on thefunctional organization of the underlying system, and not on any otherdetails.
There is another problem with the simulation-duplication distinction,arising from the process of evolution. Searle wishes to see originalintentionality and genuine understanding as properties only of certainbiological systems, presumably the product of evolution. Computersmerely simulate these properties. At the same time, in the ChineseRoom scenario, Searle maintains that a system can exhibit behaviorjust as complex as human behavior, simulating any degree ofintelligence and language comprehension that one can imagine, andsimulating any ability to deal with the world, yet not understand athing. He also says that such behaviorally complex systems might beimplemented with very ordinary materials, for example with tubes ofwater and valves.
computation: in physical systems consciousness: and intentionality consciousness: representational theories of emergent properties epiphenomenalism externalism about the mind functionalism information: biological information: semantic conceptions of intentionality mental content: causal theories of mental content: teleological theories of mental representation mind: computational theory of multiple realizability neuroscience, philosophy of other minds thought experiments Turing, Alan Turing test zombies
For some years I participated in the discussions on the mailing lists on ancient Egypt, and at that time there were three mysteries that caused a lot of discussion:
1. The reason behind slope-angle of the pyramids
2. The purpose of the shafts from the chambers upwards
3. The purpose of the holes in the wall of the Kings Chamber
For all three themes I came up with a theory that might explain them. I only put some calculation work in the first one, wrote it down, and tried to send it to mr Bauval (see part [1]). I remember that it was very hard to find his email address, and that I tried another path, but I forgot what I did exactly. So the email may not have reached mr. Bauval.
I planned to formulate the second one after I had heard from mr Bauval, but since I did not receive a reaction, that did not happen. So, just as a starter, I wrote down the few considerations that I still remember, while building this site, to make this section more complete (see Part [2]). I hope to find time to dig deeper into this soon, and do all proper calculations.
I am a Dutch engineer and in no way an Egyptologist. My interest in the Giza pyramids was born when I saw a very inspiring documentary about your theories. Since then I have been subscribed to Osirislist and Acelist, two mailing-lists about (a.o.) ancient Egypt.
Lately there have been two discussions on these lists that inspired me to develop new theories about the pyramids. One is about the reason for the 51.8 degree slope-angle of the sides of the great pyramid. The other one is about a possible use of the shafts, but that one was going on some time ago, so if you are interested we might discuss that later.
The issue of the slope-angle is discussed at the moment, but we are running short of information. I decided to write to you, hoping that you would be interested in my theory, and that you might want to help develop it into useful and conclusive material.
Some thought it would be kitsch, and a crime to do this to the pyramid right now, some agreed that the (top of the?) pyramid may have been gilded when it was built anyway.
I started to think about the implications of a gilded or otherwise reflective surface of the pyramid.
This turns the pyramid invisible, since it only reflects the sky. In some special occasions (with the right angle of the sun, combined with the right viewing angle) it would suddenly appear to distant viewers like a sun, lying on earth, almost as bright as the real sun!
I assume that this effect would have been extremely magic to the old Egyptians.
When marble-like polished stones were used, the truth is probably a mixture of both, making the pyramid well visible from all sides, but adding a (less strong) sun-reflection to the south at a certain moment. Electrum on a polished surface would make a perfect mirror of it.
Maybe only the top part was covered with electrum, because the lower part can only be seen from closer by, because of the curvature of the earth surface.
Tropic of cancer was at app. 24 degrees north, 4500 years ago, and Giza is at 30 degrees north. This causes a vertical angle of 6 degrees of the sun at midsummer day, and a bigger one on all other days. The 13,5 degree angle would occur app. 6 weeks before and after midsummer day.
So the sun would decend to earth in the beginning of May, and leave again in the beginning of August. In those three months, the light would be reflected to the plateau south of Giza. At the solstice, the focus of the light would be closest to the pyramid, probably at app one km.