Judgement example on examples.akomantoso.org

Ashok Hariharan

unread,

Mar 10, 2009, 4:05:45 AM3/10/09

to akomantoso-dev

In the judgement examples there is some markup which looks like this :

line 131-135 - Judgement_SudAfrica_2008-11-26.xml :

JUDGMENT
<judge refersTo="Brand" as="#Editor">BRAND</judge> JA (
<judge refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Scott</judge>, <judge
refersTo="Farlam" as="#Co-Editor">Farlam</judge>,
<judge refersTo="Lewis" as="#Co-Editor">Lewis </judge>et <judge
refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Jafta </judge>JJA concurring)

In the display rendering it appears like this :

JUDGMENTBRANDJA (Scott,Farlam,LewisetJaftaJJA concurring)

-- What does the above markup mean / what is it trying to convey ?
-- Is there a reason why Judges have been marked as "Editors" and
"Co-Editors" since "Editing" is purely a workflow function... and the
judges passing the ruling are an entirely different entity ?

Ashok Hariharan

unread,

Mar 10, 2009, 4:44:01 AM3/10/09

to akomantoso-dev

Also this one on line 110-112 :

HEARD: 5 November 2008

This is represented as a <lifecycle> event in the medata line 48-51 :

I think this should be represented using the <TLCEvent> element rather
than a workflow "amendment" type action.

I have attached the xml file for reference.

Judgement_SudAfrica_2008-11-26.xml

Luca Cervone

unread,

Mar 11, 2009, 10:45:41 AM3/11/09

to akomant...@googlegroups.com

Dear Ashok,

Sorry but my email client put this email into the spam folder .. I don't know why.

However

JUDGMENT
 <judge refersTo="Brand" as="#Editor">BRAND</judge> JA (
 <judge refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Scott</judge>, <judge
refersTo="Farlam" as="#Co-Editor">Farlam</judge>,
 <judge refersTo="Lewis" as="#Co-Editor">Lewis </judge>et <judge
refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Jafta </judge>JJA concurring)
 

In the display rendering it appears like this :

JUDGMENTBRANDJA (Scott,Farlam,LewisetJaftaJJA concurring)

-- What does the above markup mean / what is it trying to convey ?

Actually here i see

CORAM:SCOTT,FARLAM,BRAND,LEWISETJAFTAJJA

That is wrong because it must be

CORAM:SCOTT,FARLAM,BRAND,LEWIS ET JAFTA JJA

I'll correct it.

It simply means the list of the judges involved into the judgment.

-- Is there a reason why Judges have been marked as "Editors" and
"Co-Editors" since "Editing" is purely a workflow function... and the
judges passing the ruling are an entirely different entity ?

Usually we indicate that the creator of the work is also the editor.

But ... the "indentification" section of the metadata of the judgments is not yet "perfect" :-)

So we can discuss on how to improve it.

Ciao

Luca

Luca Cervone

Web and XML solutions designer

e-mail: cervo...@gmail.com

luca.c...@unibo.it

lcer...@cs.unibo.it

mobile phone: 0039 348 26 27 545

home phone: 0039 051 199 82 854

skype: cervoneluca

Luca Cervone

unread,

Mar 11, 2009, 10:48:55 AM3/11/09

to akomant...@googlegroups.com

Dear Ashok,

Absolutely not.

The workflow describes the various event in the legal life of the document.

The hearing date is a date that has an important legal meaning so it is correct to put it into the workflow of the document.

Ciao

Luca

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<akomaNtoso xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.akomantoso.org/1.0 ../akomantoso10.xsd"
 xmlns="http://www.akomantoso.org/1.0">
 <judgement>
 <meta>
 <identification source="#bungeni">
 <FRBRWork>
 <this value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07/main"/>
 <uri value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07"/>
 <date date="2008-11-05" name="Hearing"/>
 <author href="#Scoa" as="#Author"/>
 </FRBRWork>
 <FRBRExpression>
 <this value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07/eng@/main"/>
 <uri value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07/eng@"/>
 <date date="2008-11-26" name="Delivery"/>
 <author href="#Cervone" as="#Editor"/>
 </FRBRExpression>
 <FRBRManifestation>
 <this value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07/eng@/main.xml"/>
 <uri value="/za/judgement/2008-11-26/653-07/eng@.akn"/>
 <date date="2009-01-09" name="XMLConversion"/>
 <author href="#Cervone" as="#Editor"/>
 </FRBRManifestation>
 </identification>
 <publication date="2008-11-30"
 name="Law Report"
 showAs="Law Report Office Journal"/>
 <classification source="#bungeni">
 <keyword id="delict" value="Delict" showAs="Delict" dictionary=""/>
 <keyword id="pel" value="pure economic loss" showAs="pure economic loss"
 dictionary=""/>
 <keyword id="mo" value="meaning of" showAs="meaning of" dictionary=""/>
 <keyword id="pcrdw"
 value="policy considerations relevant in determining wrongfulness"
 showAs="policy considerations relevant in determining wrongfulness"
 dictionary=""/>
 <keyword id="rd" value="remoteness of damage" showAs="remoteness of damage"
 dictionary=""/>
 <keyword id="aft" value="application of flexible test"
 showAs="application of flexible test" dictionary=""/>
 </classification>

 <lifecycle source="#bungeni">
<event date="2008-11-26" id="e1" source="" type="generation"></event>
</lifecycle>

<workflow source="#bungeni">
<action date="2007-08-23" id="a1" source="#Hcp" type="amendment"/>
<action date="2008-11-05" id="a2" source="#Scoa" type="amendment"/>
</workflow>

<references source="#bungeni">
 <TLCOrganization id="bungeni" href="/ontology/organization/kn/kn.bungeni"
 showAs="Bungeni"/>
 <TLCOrganization id="Scoa" href="/ontology/organization/za.SoupremeCourt"
 showAs="THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA"/>
 <TLCOrganization id="Hcp" href="/ontology/organization/za.HighCourtPretoria"
 showAs="High Court, Pretoria"/>
 <TLCOrganization id="fhs" href="/ontology/organization/za.FourwayHaulage"
 showAs="FOURWAY HAULAGE SA (PTY) LTD"/>
 <TLCOrganization id="snra" href="/ontology/organization/za.NationalRoadAgency"
 showAs="SA NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY LTD"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Cervone" href="/ontology/person/editors/it.cervone"
 showAs="Luca Cervone"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Scott" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.scott" showAs="SCOTT"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Farlam" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.farlam" showAs="FARLAM"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Brand" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.brand" showAs="BRAND"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Lewis" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.lewis" showAs="LEWIS"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Jafta" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.jafta" showAs="JAFTA"/>
 <TLCPerson id="Rabie" href="/ontology/person/judges/za.rabie" showAs="Rabie J"/>
 <TLCRole id="Author" href="/ontology/role/Author" showAs="Author of Document"/>
 <TLCRole id="Editor" href="/ontology/role/Editor" showAs="Editor of Document"/>
 <TLCRole id="CoEditor" href="/ontology/role/CoEditor" showAs="Co-Editor of Document"/>
 <TLCRole id="Appellant" href="/ontology/role/Editor" showAs="Appellant"/>
 <TLCRole id="Respondant" href="/ontology/role/Editor" showAs="Respondant"/>
 </references>
 <notes source="#bungeni">
 <note id="not1">
 
 Sections starting from [16] and ending to [35] was deleted in order to simplify
 the reading of the example.
 
 </note>
 </notes>
 </meta>
 <header>
 
 THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
 
 Case number: <judgementNumber>653/07</judgementNumber>
 In the matter beetwen
 
 <party id="p1" refersTo="fhs" as="#Appellant">FOURWAY HAULAGE SA (PTY) LTD</party>
 APPELLANT
 <eol/>
 and
 <eol/>
 <party id="p2" refersTo="snra" as="#Respondant">SA NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY LTD</party>
 RESPONDENT
 <eol/>
 
 Neutral citation: <judgementTitle>Fourway Haulage v SA
 National Roads Agency (653/07)</judgementTitle>
 <neutralCitation> [2008] ZASCA 134</neutralCitation> (26 November 2008) 
 
 CORAM:
<judge refersTo="Scott" >SCOTT</judge>, <judge refersTo="Farlam">FARLAM</judge>,
 <judge refersTo="Brand">BRAND</judge>, <judge refersTo="Lewis">LEWIS</judge> ET
 <judge refersTo="Jafta">JAFTA</judge> JJA

HEARD: 5 November 2008

DELIVERED:
 <judgementDate date="2008-11-26" name="delivery">26 November 2008</judgementDate>
 
 
 CORRECTED:
 
 
 SUMMARY:
 Delict – pure economic
 loss – meaning of – – remoteness of damage – application of
 flexible test
 
 ORDER
 On appeal from: High Court, Pretoria (Rabie J sitting as court of first
 instance)<eol/> The appeal is dismissed with costs

JUDGMENT
 <judge refersTo="Brand" as="#Editor">BRAND</judge> JA (
 <judge refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Scott</judge>, <judge refersTo="Farlam" as="#Co-Editor">Farlam</judge>,
 <judge refersTo="Lewis" as="#Co-Editor">Lewis </judge>et <judge refersTo="Scott" as="#Co-Editor">Jafta </judge>JJA concurring)

</header>
 <judgementBody>
 <background>
 <list id="bac-lis1">
 <item id="bac-lis1-ite1">
 <num>[1]</num>
 The appellant ('Fourway') is a long distance haulier. The respondent
 ('the Agency') owes its existence to the <ref
 href="/za/act/1998-03-31/7">South African National Roads Agency
 Limited and National Roads Act 7 of 1998</ref> ('the Act'). The
 dispute between them originates from an accident which occurred in the
 early evening of 26 September 2003 on the N1 national road between
 Polokwane and Mokopane in the Limpopo province. The two vehicles
 involved were an articulated truck and a light delivery van. The
 articulated truck was driven at the time by an employee of Fourway who
 was acting in the course and scope of his employment. 
 </item>
 <item id="bac-lis1-ite2">
 <num>[2]</num>
 The articulated truck was on its way from an asbestos mine in Zimbabwe
 to Durban harbour carrying about 34 tonnes of chrysolite asbestos,
 destined for export. As a result of the collision, the truck overturned
 and spilled its cargo onto practically the entire surface of a portion
 of the national road and its surroundings. Because of the hazardous
 nature of asbestos powder, the spillage required an extensive
 cleaning-up and decontamination operation. 
 </item>
 <item id="bac-lis1-ite3">
 <num>[3]</num>
 To facilitate the cleaning-up and decontamination process, the traffic
 authorities closed the section of the national road involved and
 diverted the traffic in both directions onto an alternative road. This
 lasted for about 24 hours. The section of the national road which was
 closed forms part of a toll road. The alternative route was not subject
 to toll. As a result of the closure, two toll plazas – as defined in the
 Act – could not collect toll fees. Based on these facts, the agency as
 the entity authorised by <ref
 href="/za/act/1998-03-31/7/eng@/main.xml#sec27">s 27</ref> of the
 Act to levy and collect toll fees on toll roads, instituted an action in
 delict against Fourway for the damages it allegedly suffered in the form
 of loss of toll revenue in an amount of R105 996.67. 
 </item>
 </list>
 </background>
 <introduction>
 <list id="int-lis1">
 <item id="int-lis1-ite1">
 <num>[4]</num>
 At the commencement of the trial, the parties asked the court a quo
 (Rabie J) to order a separation of
 issues. In terms of the separation order, the issues relating to the
 liability of Fourway were to be decided first, while the quantum of the
 Agency's alleged damages stood over for later determination. The
 preliminary issues were decided in favour of the agency. Hence the court
 declared Fourway liable for such damages as the Agency may prove in
 respect of the lost revenue it would have collected at the two toll
 plazas involved, but for the closure of the road. It also ordered
 Fourway to pay the costs of the preliminary proceedings. Fourway's
 appeal against that judgment is with the leave of the court a quo. 
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite2">
 <num>[5]</num>
 Part of the controversy on appeal was brought about by a shift in the
 focus of the defence advanced by Fourway and the resulting mutation of
 the issues involved. A convenient starting point for an account of the
 mutation is the opening address by counsel for the Agency, as plaintiff,
 at the beginning of the trial. With reference to the pleadings, counsel
 at that stage defined the issues between the parties as follows:
 
 <list id="int-list1-ite2-lis1">
 <item id="int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite1">
 <num>(a)</num>
 Whether or not the respondent had the necessary authority to
 collect toll fees on that portion of the toll road which was
 closed as a result of the collision. 
 </item>
 <item id="int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite2">
 <num>(b)</num>
 Whether the collision occurred as a result of the negligence of
 the driver employed by Fourway. 
 </item>
 <item id="int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite3">
 <num>(c)</num>
 Whether the occurrence of the collision necessitated the
 decontamination operation and the closure of the road. 
 </item>
 </list>
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite3">
 <num>[6]</num>
 
 Counsel for Fourway did not react to this definition of the issues.
 During the trial, Fourway formally conceded the issue referred to in
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite1">(a)</a> and the evidence led by the parties therefore
 dealt exclusively with the issues in <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite2">(b)</a> and
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite3">(c)</a>.
 But in argument at the end of the trial, Fourway's counsel, for the first time, raised two
 further contentions. First he submitted that the Agency's claim was for the recovery of
 pure economic loss which required the existence of a legal duty on the part of Fourway and
 that the Agency had failed to plead or establish the existence of such a legal duty.
 Secondly he submitted that the Agency had failed to establish the requirement of legal
 causation with reference to the loss which formed the basis of its claim.
 
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite4">
 <num>[7]</num>
 
 As we know from the result, the court a quo dismissed all defences relied on by
 Fourway, including those originally raised under what I categorised as
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite2">(b)</a> and
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite3">(c)</a>,
 as well as the two new ones advanced for the first time in argument at the end of
 the trial. As to <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite2">(b)</a> and
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite3">(c)</a> the court found on the evidence
 presented that the negligence of Fourway's employee was the cause of the collision
 which necessitated both the decontamination process and the closure of the road.
 With regard to the defence based on the concept of pure economic loss, the court
 essentially held that the damage suffered by the agency did not amount to pure
 economic loss and that the question regarding the existence of a legal duty
 therefore did not arise. Finally the court held that the damages claimed could not
 be classified as too remote and that the requirement of legal causation had thus
 been satisfied.
 
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite5">
 <num>[8]</num>
 
 On appeal, it was conceded on behalf of Fourway that the court a quo was correct
 in deciding the issues under <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite2">(b)</a> and
 <a href="#int-list1-ite2-lis1-ite3">(c)</a> against it. In consequence, the only
 issues on appeal turned on the contentions that were raised for the first time in
 argument at the end of the trial. They can be summarised thus:
 
 <list id="int-lis1-ite5-lis1">
 <item id="int-lis1-ite5-lis1-ite1">
 <num>(a)</num>
 
 Whether the court a quo correctly came to the conclusion that the Agency's
 claim is not a claim for pure economic loss.
 
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite5-lis1-ite2">
 <num>(b)</num>
 
 If not, how the issue of wrongfulness should have been dealt with in the
 light of the fact that it was not pertinently raised in the pleadings.
 
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite5-lis1-ite3">
 <num>(c)</num>
 
 Whether the court a quo correctly came to the conclusion that the damages
 claim by the Agency cannot be regarded as too remote.
 
 </item>
 </list>
 </item>
 <item id="int-lis1-ite6">
 <num>[9]</num>
 
 The court a quo's finding that the damages claimed did not result from pure
 economic loss clearly emanated from its understanding of that concept.
 That understanding appears from the following statements in the judgment:
 
 'The economic loss in this sense comprises patrimonial loss that does not
 result from a direct invasion of a subjective right of the person who
 suffered the loss.'
 <eol/>
 And that <eol/>
 
 'the aforesaid rights of the plaintiff. . .
 [ie the Agency's statutory rights to operate a toll road and to collect toll
 fees] were clearly subjective rights worthy of protection and which the
 plaintiff could enforce against other people.'
 <eol/>
 And that <eol/>
 
 '[c]onsequently, the loss suffered by the plaintiff is not a so-called
 pure economic loss, but the direct result of a direct infringement of
 subjective rights which was as such unlawful.'
 
 
 </item>
 </list>
 </introduction>
 <motivation>
 <list id="mot-lis1">
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite1">
 <num>[10]</num>
 
 I do not share the court a quo's understanding of what is meant by
 'pure economic loss' in the present context.
 I believe its meaning to be far less metaphysical. As explained by Harms JA in
 <ref href="/za/judgment/SA491/eng@/main.xml#" id="ref1">Telematrix (Pty) Ltd v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 (1) SA 461 (SCA) </ref>
 para 1, it means simply this:
 
 '"Pure economic loss" in this context connotes loss
 that does not arise directly from damage to the plaintiff's person or property
 but rather in consequence of the negligent act itself, such as loss of profit,
 being put to extra expenses or the diminution in the value of property.'
 
 (See also Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA)
 (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A) 497I-498H; Trustees,
 Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA) para 14;
 Wille's Principles of South African Law 9 ed, (General editor:
 Francois du Bois) sv 'Delict' by Daniel Visser, 1105;
 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser, Law of Delict, 5 ed 268 et seq).
 
 </item>
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite2">
 <num>[11]</num>
 
 Thus understood, the Agency's claim, in my view, falls squarely within the ambit of
 pure economic loss. As formulated, its claim was for loss of revenue in the form of
 toll fees resulting from the closure of the road. The Agency did not allege,
 nor did it set out to prove in evidence, that it was the owner of the road;
 that the road was physically damaged by the collision; or that the closure of the road
 resulted from any physical damage to the road. The Agency's argument on appeal,
 that in terms of <ref href="/za/act/1998-03-31/7/eng@/main.xml#sec27">s 7</ref> of
 the Act it was in fact the owner of the road on which the
 collision occurred, is of no consequence and misses the point. For present purposes
 the question is not whether the Agency is in fact the owner of the road.
 The point is that it did not rely on such ownership to support its claim.
 
 </item>
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite3">
 <num>[12]</num>
 
 Recognition that we are dealing with a claim for pure economic loss brings in its
 wake a different approach to the element of wrongfulness.
 This results from the principles which have been formulated by this court so many
 times in the recent past that I believe they can by now be regarded as trite.
 These principles proceed from the premise that negligent conduct which manifests
 itself in the form of a positive act causing physical damage to the property or
 person of another is prima facie wrongful. By contrast, negligent causation of
 pure economic loss is not regarded as prima facie wrongful.
 Its wrongfulness depends on the existence of a legal duty.
 The imposition of this legal duty is a matter for judicial determination involving
 criteria of public or legal policy consistent with constitutional norms.
 In the result, conduct causing pure economic loss will only be regarded as wrongful
 and therefore actionable if public or legal policy considerations require that such
 conduct, if negligent, should attract legal liability for the resulting damages
 (see eg Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA)
 paras 12 and 22; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 (5) SA 490 (SCA) para 12;
 Telematrix (supra) paras 13-14; Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust (supra)
 paras 10-12).
 
 </item>
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite4">
 <num>[13]</num>
 
 In this light, so Fourway contended on appeal, the Agency was obliged to allege
 in its pleadings not only that the negligent conduct relied upon was wrongful,
 but that it also had to allege and prove the facts relied upon to substantiate
 the considerations of policy giving rise to a legal duty on the part of Fourway's
 employee. As a result of the Agency's failure to adhere to these rules of
 litigation, so the argument went, neither the policy considerations relevant
 to the question of wrongfulness, nor the factual basis underlying such policy
 considerations, were identified and investigated during the trial.
 In consequence, so the argument concluded, it would be prejudiced if the issue of
 wrongfulness were to be summarily disposed of at the appeal.
 Fourway therefore suggested that, unless this court upholds its contention that
 the damages claimed are too remote – to which I shall presently return – the
 issue of wrongfulness should be postponed and decided with the rest of the issues
 concerning the quantum of the Agency's damages, which are standing over in any
 event.
 
 </item>
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite5">
 <num>[14]</num>
 
 The proposition that a plaintiff claiming pure economic loss must allege
 wrongfulness, and plead the facts relied upon to support that essential allegation,
 is in principle well founded. In fact, the absence of such allegations may render
 the particulars of claim exipiable on the basis that no cause of action had been
 disclosed (see eg Trope v SA Reserve Bank 1992 (3) SA 208 (T) at 214A-G;
 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) 797E;
 Telematrix (supra) para 2). But, as we know, Fourway did not file an
 exception. The trial proceeded without any objection on its part.
 In the circumstances it would be futile to investigate whether an exception,
 if properly and timeously taken, would have been successful.
 As I see it, the question is rather whether, despite the lack of necessary
 allegations in the Agency's pleadings, Fourway had sufficient opportunity
 to produce the facts it would seek to rely on for the determination of the policy
 considerations pertaining to wrongfulness in its favour. Conversely stated,
 the question is whether Fourway has shown prejudice, in the sense that it would
 have conducted its case in a materially different way if the Agency's claim for
 pure economic loss had been properly pleaded.
 (See eg Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101 at 105;
 Robinson v Randfontein Estates GM Co Ltd 1925 AD 173 at 198;
 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) at 433;
 Stead v Conradie 1995 (2) SA 111 (A) at 122A-H.)
 
 </item>
 <item id="mot-lis1-ite6">
 <num>[15]</num>
 
 As I see it, the proposal by Fourway that the issue of wrongfulness be referred back
 for determination by the trial court therefore depends on the outcome of two discrete
 enquiries. First, can this court, on the basis of the facts available, decide that,
 as a matter of policy, Fourway should be held liable for the loss of revenue claimed
 by the Agency? If not, that would be the end of the matter.
 The Agency would have failed to make out a case. A decision on the other hand that
 the issue of wrongfulness should on the facts available be determined in favour of
 the Agency will lead to the next enquiry. The question is: can it be said that,
 if the issue of wrongfulness had been properly pleaded by the Agency,
 Fourway would have conducted its case any differently? If not, the Agency is entitled
 to succeed. It is therefore only a finding of potential prejudice on the part of
 Fourway that can justify a referral back to the trial court.
 
 </item>
 </list>
 
 <noteRef href="#not1" num="1"/>
 <omissis>...</omissis>
 
 </motivation>
 <decision>
 <list id="dec-lis1">
 <item id="dec-lis1-ite1">
 <num>[36]</num>
 
 For these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs,
 including the costs of two counsel.
 
 </item>
 </list>
 </decision>
 </judgementBody>
 <conclusions>
 
 <judge refersTo="Brand">F D J BRAND</judge><eol/>
 JUDGE OF APPEAL
 
 
 APPEARANCES:<eol/>
 FOR APPELLANT: J H DREYER SC <eol />
 J A DU PLESSIS <eol/>
 INSTRUCTED BY: MACGREGOR STANFORD KRUGER INC, PRETORIA <eol/>
 CORRESPONDENTS: E G COOPER ATTORNEYS, BLOEMFONTEIN <eol/>
 FOR RESPONDENT: A C FERREIRA SC<eol/>
 I ELLIS<eol/>
 INSTRUCTED BY: FRIEDLAND HART INC, PRETORIA<eol/>
 CORRESPONDENTS: ISRAEL SACKSTEIN MATSEPES INC, BLOEMFONTEIN
 
 </conclusions>
 </judgement>
</akomaNtoso>

Reply all

Reply to author

Forward