Power Struggles and Corruption : Deconsolidating Democracy in Nigeria by Okoi Obono-Obla & Glory Okoi Uyouyo

[Bar. Obla]

Electoral Violence and

Rigged Elections

:The importance of free and fair elections to democratic consolidation cannot be overemphasised. Free and fair elections are recognised globally, as the fulcrum of democracy and cardinal pillar of democratic governance. But in Nigeria, elections since 1999 after a devastating phase of military rule have neither been free nor fair. The 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections were all marred by widespread rigging and violence. According to the 2008 Elections Reform Committee Report, the politicians over the years have “become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining power; more reckless and greedy in their use and abuse of power; and more intolerant of opposition, criticism and efforts at replacing them”.1 

In the build up to the 2007 general elections, for President Olusegun Obasanjo advised his party members to see the elections as a “do or die affair”. This probably explains why the April 2007 elections, which was viewed as a critical building block in the country’s democratic process turned out “a democratic step backwards, even when measured against the dismal standard set by the 2003 elections”.2

The April 2007 elections were supposed to move the country to a higher rung on the democratisation ladder, create a more conducive environment to resolve its many internal conflicts and strengthen its credentials as a leading peacemaker, but instead generated serious new problems that almost pushed it towards a failed state. The country is yet to recover and may never fully recover from the tragedy that was the April 2007 elections. The declared winner, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, assumed the presidency on May 29, 2007, with less legitimacy than any previously elected president and so with less capacity to resolve the country’s violent domestic conflict, which even with his death and continuation by President Goodluck Jonathan and the 2011 elections still remain unresolved, pushing the country to the precipice with multiple internal insurgences.3 The elections in the view of many Nigerians and international observers alike, were the most poorly organised and massively rigged in the country’s history. This was without doubt fuelled by the “do or die” battle declared by Obasanjo, which resulted in the PDP acting with unbridled desperation to ensure sweeping, winner-take-all victories, not only in the presidency and federal legislature but also in state governorship and house of assemblies. The campaigns and elections witnessed extensive violence, resulting in the death of over 200 people.4 

Electoral Violence in Nigeria (1999 – 2006)

Electoral violence is any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral processes, or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with the electoral process.5

Violence has been a feature of the country’s electoral process since the colonial era. But during colonial rule, it was easily curtailed due to the nature and scope of participation, characteristics of the politicians and electorates, and the nature of colonial domination. However, after independence, electoral violence became intense as struggle for power among politicians intensified.6 In the case of the treason trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Justice George Sodeinde Sowemimo observed that:

... out of the evidence before me, it would appear that politics generally in Nigeria has been conducted with a certain amount of bitterness. It appears that a person belonging to a party becomes an enemy of another who belongs to a rival political party. Political parties are equivalent to, warring camps – elections are conducted with party thugs protecting the campaigners and this state of affairs has been described to have assumed a pitch no method would be spared, however vindictive or extreme by any rival political party as against another in order to score over one or another.7

Character and Causes of Electoral Violence

Electoral violence in the country can be attributed can be attributed to the actions and inactions of several actors who are determined to secure or retain power without adhering to the rules of democratic competitive elections and/or consideration for the long-term negative effects of electoral fraud and violence on national integration, security and development.8     

  Violence has become so entrenched in the political culture of Nigeria that all elections are virtually violence ridden. Violence is manifested in all the three stages of the election process – pre-election, during election, and post election.9 The main actors and actions that precipitate electoral violence in the country are:10

Lawmakers who are unwilling to make laws that will promote credible elections because they are beneficiaries of legal loopholes and the weaknesses of the legal system and undemocratic control and command of the security and law enforcement agencies.

Elected politicians in the executive organs of government who manipulate the electoral laws, election management bodies and security agencies to subvert free and fair elections.

Politicians and executives of the state who induce and coerce the legislators to prevent them from making laws for credible elections.

Politicians who coerce and corrupt delegates to party primaries to forestall free choice of candidates.

State executives – presidents, governors and local council chairmen who abuse their power and incumbency privilege by threatening the opposition with arrest and prosecution for treason and “threats” to national security and sovereignty.

Politicians who fan ethnic, religious and regional sentiments as well as organising and arming political thugs.

Politicians and incumbent executives who propagate the idea of politics and electoral victory as a “do or die” affair.

 Incompetent and partial electoral officials and umpires.

Security agencies and personnel who see themselves as properties of the ruling political parties, and incumbent president and governors.

Selected Cases of Electoral Violence11 and Case Studies of Oyo, Anambra, Rivers and Gombe States 12

1999

September 9, Sunday Ugwu was killed by gunmen who mistook him for his elder brother, Nwabueze Ugwu, a member of the Enugu State House of Assembly.

2000

In December, Dr. Layi Balogun, a frontline politician and renowned architect was killed by hired assassins at 26, Oluwole Street, Akoka, Lagos. The police warned against politicising the assassination.

2001

On December 18, Hon. Monday Taurbari Ndor, a member of the Rivers State House of Assembly was dragged out of his car and shot dead by unknown assailants.

On December 28, Dan Kemebigha, a lawyer and counsel to Odi youths in Bayelsa State was murdered after he and two others had taken the state government and House of Assembly to court over the House’s self-accounting law, which he sought to nullify.

2002

On August 13, Janet Olapade, a PDP leader in Odigbo Local Government Area of Ondo State was murdered.

In November, Dele Arojo, a PDP governorship candidate was murdered in Lagos; in December, Alhaji Isyaku Mohammed, a United Nigeria People’s Party (UNPP) chieftain in Kano State was assassinated in Kano.

On December 12, Chief John Mononia Agbatutu, a PDP Delta Central Senatorial District aspirant was murdered by his driver in the pretext of a road accident.

On December 19, Odunayo Olagbaju, a member of the Osun State House of Assembly was murdered by a mob at More, Ile-Ife.

On December 23, Chief Bola Ige, the Minister for Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation was shot dead at his Bodija residence in Ibadan by hired assassins. One of the prime suspects in his murder, “Fryo” reportedly died in detention due to diarrhoea.

2003:

On February 8, Chief Ogbonna Uche Ogbonnaya, Orlu Senatorial District candidate of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) was killed, three suspects were later paraded in connection with his death.

On February 22, Theodore Agwatu, the Principal Secretary to the Imo State governor was murdered.

In March, Yemi Oni, an Alliance for Democracy (AD) stalwart in Ekiti State was shot dead by gunmen in his Ado-Ekiti residence.

On March 5, the South-South Vice Chairman of ANPP, Chief Marshall Sokari Harry was murdered in his Abuja residence by yet to be identified assassins.

On March 21, Anthony Nwodo, ANPP’s Secretary in Eza North Local Government Area of Ebonyi State was murdered. Five persons were arrested by the police in connection with the incidence.

On April 20, five persons were killed when former President Obasanjo’s daughter, Iyabo Obasanjo (later elected senator in 2007), was attacked by unknown gunmen at Ibogun road, Ifo Ogun State. The alleged leader of the gang, identified as Musa Babatunde was arrested by the police.

In May, Otunba Dare Kolade, a PDP chieftain was shot dead by the police in Owo, along with his two cousins, on his way to Akure to attend a party meeting. The victims were reportedly mistaken for armed robbers.

On May 3, Joyce Maimuna Katai, the Commissioner for Women Affairs and Special Development in Nassarawa State was murdered by suspected party loyalists in the electoral violence that erupted in Toto Local Government Area. Forty persons were arrested.

In October, Professor Chimere Ikoku, a PDP chieftain and former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was assassinated by gunmen.

2004

On February 6, Chief Aminasoari Dikibo, the PDP National Vice-Chairman (South-South) was assassinated by unknown gunmen at Ishiagwu on Kwale/Ogwashi Uku/Asaba Road in Delta State. President Obasanjo said he was killed by armed robbers, but the police denied they arrested some suspects in Asaba who were flown to Abuja.

On March 6, the convoy of the Lagos State governor, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu was attacked on its way to Enugu. The governor was not in the convoy. In the ensuing exchange of gunfire, one of the governor’s aides was hit.

On March 2, the convoy of George Akume, governor of Benue State was attacked by a gang of armed militants. While he escaped, a PDP chieftain and his close confidant, Andrew Agon, erstwhile Managing Director of Nigeria Airways and a police sergeant, Joseph Nyam were murdered in cold blood.

On March 3, the Caretaker Committee Chairman of Bassa Local Government Area of Kogi State, Luke Shigaba was murdered by gunmen suspected to be assassins. The Chairman of the Kogi State Independent Electoral Commission (KSIEC) was also killed by assassins.

On March 4, armed robbers in Ekpoma, Edo State killed three people, while several others sustained injuries. One of the critically injured persons was Daniel Asekhame, a chairmanship candidate for Owan West Local Government Area, while a policeman was one of the three persons killed.   

Case Study of Oyo State

The 2007 elections in Oyo State were described by the Human Rights Watch, as “A victory for corruption and impunity”. The elections saw open vote rigging and intimidation of voters that derailed the exercise throughout Nigeria. Polling stations were attacked by thugs who stole ballot boxes and several voters were reportedly shot or stabbed while trying to cast their ballots in Ogbomosho and Ibadan. Especially in Ibadan, Lamidi Adedibu’s proxy thugs from the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) and elsewhere were implicated in much of this violence.

Case Study of Anambra State

For the 2007 elections in Anambra State, cult groups were massively mobilised. Andy Uba who had served as an influential Special Adviser to Obasanjo in his eight years as president was the PDP candidate for the governorship elections. Before his emergence as the PDP candidate, he took over the reins of the party in the state with the installation of Tony Nwoye as the state party chairman. Chris Uba, his brother and before now the de facto leader of the party and member of the PDP Board of Trustees described Nwoye’s installation as a “coup”. In interviews with Human Rights Watch by several sources including police officials, a spokesman for Governor Peter Obi and opposition politicians and cult members, Nwoye was identified as a prominent member of the Black Axe cult.

Nwoye was said to have set out immediately to mobilise funds to recruit thugs to ensure Andy Uba’s victory in the PDP primaries in December 2006. During the primaries, the recruited cult members rigged the primaries in favour of Andy Uba, stuffing ballot boxes and chasing off legitimate voters. Uba won the PDP nomination after being awarded 97 percent of all votes cast. By the time the election day arrived, cult violence and intimidation of opponents along with the elimination of Governor Peter Obi and Chris Ngige, two of Uba’s most prominent opponents by INEC presented Uba with only a weak and fragmented opposition. Nonetheless, the elections were meticulously rigged in his favour before the Supreme Court declared his election null and void.

Case Study of Rivers State

From the advent of the present democratic dispensation in the country in 1999, the PDP has maintained a virtual monopoly of elective office in Rivers State and throughout the Niger Delta through rigged elections. The 2003 elections in Rivers were both more violent and more brazenly rigged than in most parts of the country. The elections were more or less a “low-intensity armed struggle”. Despite a widespread lack of voting, massive voter turnout was reported and the PDP swept elective offices across the state in landslide victories.

The PDP’s primary instruments in using violence to rig the 2003 polls were two gangs that have since been at the forefront of violent crimes and “militant” activity throughout the state: the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dukobo, and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom. Although state government officials have vehemently denied their sponsorship of these groups, documentations by Human Rights Watch, civil societies and journalists all point to the active involvement. Ateke Tom himself acknowledged the role he played in the 2003 elections, telling Human Rights Watch that then Governor Peter Odili had promised cash and jobs in great quantities for himself and his ‘boys’ and that in return, “Any place Odili sent me, I conquer[ed]for him. I conquer[ed] everywhere.” However, Odili has consistently denied any relationship with Ateke, Asari, or any other gang leader.

Much of the compensation that the PDP politicians promised to the groups they helped finance and arm during the 2003 elections never materialised. The result was a feeling of betrayal by the armed groups, particularly the youths. The result of these broken promises was a rapid deterioration of relations between many armed groups and their former sponsors. Many groups subsequently moved using the weapons that were provided by the politicians for the 2003 polls to commit crimes, providing protection for or asserting control over oil bunkering operations and other criminal activities to make up for the loss of lucrative political sponsors. Militias and gangs proliferated, maintaining camps of fighters in the creeks that engage in oil bunkering and stage bank robberies and street battles in Port Harcourt, the state capital. Some of these groups turned kidnappings for ransom of expatriate oil workers, wealthy Nigerians and their family members into a profitable business.

The spiral of violence that followed the 2003 elections repeated itself after the 2007 polls. In May 2007 gang members linked to another prominent militant, Soboma George, murdered armed group leader Price Igodo and as many as a dozen others. Numerous sources indicated told Human Rights Watch that Soboma was paid to carry out the attack by supporters of former Governor Celestine Omehia partly in response to concerns that Igodo was planning to disrupt Omehia’s inauguration on May 29, 2007.

Soboma and his “Outlaws” gang were reportedly hired by the PDP to help rig the 2007 elections in Rivers State. One cult member described a meeting in Government House in Port Harcourt just prior to the April 14, 2007 polls during which he saw government officials hand out between N5 million and N10 million to several different cult groups in return for their assisting or simply accepting the PDP’s plans to rig the polls.

Case Study of Gombe State

In Gombe State, loosely organised armed gangs formed by youths and employed by politicians generally referred to as Kalare or “Kalare Boys” by residents have since 2003 being used to commit politically related crimes. The activities of the Kalare gangs have from politically motivated attacks in 2003, degenerated into assault, rape, harassment, and extortion of ordinary civilians alongside their continuing political role, most notably during the election period of 2007. Many Kalare youths are armed, most commonly with machetes, clubs and similar weaponry.

Prior to the elections of 2003, PDP officials in Gombe recruited unemployed young men, paid them and armed them to intimidate their opponents, chase away voters from polling stations and disrupt voting. They played a significant role in rigging the outcome to oust the incumbent All Peoples’ Party (APP) Governor Abubakar Hashidu and pave way for the installation of Danjuma Goje of the PDP.

During the 2007 election campaign and on the election days, Kalare thugs played a significant role committing violence and intimidation on behalf of all the major political parties. But a clear majority of Kalare thugs active during the electoral period were working for the PDP. The party’s edge in terms of Kalare recruitment was due largely to the fact that the ruling party had more resources to spend on hiring them.

On Election Day, Kalare thugs played an integral role in the efforts of the PDP to rig the polls. They snatched ballot boxes from polling stations, chased away voters, and in some instance forced INEC officials to declare results they wanted.

Many of those who attempted to stand up for free and fair elections in Gombe suffered reprisals, meted out by alleged Kalare thugs, sometimes in the presence of the police. Abubakar Yunus, the ANPP senatorial candidate for Gombe Central Senatorial District said that when he witnessed Kalare thugs stealing ballot boxes in Kumo town, he and his supporters surrounded the vehicle carrying the stolen materials and called the police. The police escorted the car to Kumo police station, but a senior police officer on duty then allowed PDP party agents to take the ballot papers away. Yunus told Human Rights Watch that when he protested, the PDP supporters beat and kicked him, “in full view of the police who did nothing, they simply watched.” He alleged that, among other Kalare thugs, his assailants included Ismail Muazu Hassan, the Gombe State Commissioner of Rural Development.

The results of Gombe’s elections were predictably one-sided. PDP candidate and incumbent Governor Muhammed Danjuma Goje (now a senator) was awarded more than 985,000 out of 1,083,862 votes reportedly cast (about 91 percent), according to INEC. His nearest competitor, Abubakar Hashidu of the DPP, won just 3.5 percent of the vote. Goje reportedly urged his disgruntled opponents to “understand that they cannot go against the will of God” and accept the results of the elections.  

 

       

A Gale of Impeachments

B

etween December 2005 and November 2006, the country witnessed the impeachment of five state governors for corruption: Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State in December 2005; Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State on January 12, 2006; Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State on October 16, 2006; Peter Obi of Anambra State on November 2, 2006 and Joshua Dariye of Plateau State on November 13, 2006. None of these impeachments followed due process and were all carried out with the active collaboration of the presidency and EFCC in controversial circumstances.1 Justice Kumai Bayang Akaahs of the Court of Appeal in Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke, Hon. Titilayo Ademola Dauda & Senator Rasheed Ladoja v. Oyo State House of Assembly & Hon. Muyideen Inakoju and 17 Ors described the spate of impeachments as:

...Hav[ing] assumed a frightening dimension which if not properly handled will throw the entire country into a state of anarchy.

Three of the state governors: Rasheed Ladoja, Peter Obi and Joshua Dariye later had their impeachments nullified by the Court of Appeal, Anambra State High Court and Supreme Court respectively.

Diepreye Alamieseigha

In May 2008, Diepreye Alamieseigha was convicted by Justice Mohammed Shuaibu of the Federal High Court Abuja for diverting a total sum of £1.7 million and $250,000. He was also made to forfeit properties in Nigeria and London after pleading guilty to a six count charge of money laundering. He was subsequently jailed two years on each count, with the sentences scheduled to run concurrently. Few days later, he was released based on the terms of a plea-bargaining deal he struck with the EFCC.2

Before Alamieseigha’s conviction, he was the governor of Bayelsa State. He soon ran into trouble waters because of his close ties with the vice president, Atiku Abubakar, who never hid his ambition to succeed Obasanjo at the expiration of his second term. With Obasanjo nursing a “third term”, he naturally fell into his “bad books”. This was also fuelled by the stories that Abubakar had pencilled him as his running mate for the 2007 polls.3

Alamieseigha was convicted based on an earlier arrest in London by the Metropolitan police for money laundering. The arrest had the federal government’s hand all over it, for it was its agents who gave the information that led to his arrest to the Metropolitan police. Later he was alleged by the federal government to have “jumped bail”, escaping from Britain “dressed like a woman”, to the country where he was eventually impeached. Alamieseigha later denied the federal government’s version of how he left Britain, in an affidavit sworn to, in connection with his application for bail before a Federal High Court, Lagos. No counter-affidavit invalidating Alamieseigha’s affidavit ever emerged, which establishes that the federal government was privy to his return, and that the story it has earlier issued that he escaped “dressed like a woman” was fabricated to smear his personality and set the stage for his impeachment by the Bayelsa State House of Assembly:4 

One day he was in his house at 247, Watergardens in London when men of the London Metropolitan Police visited him, and entered without warning, as they usually do. They asked him to follow them into a waiting vehicle. He had no option as the police officers were fully armed. From there, he was driven to the “Nigerian House” on Northumberland Avenue where two black men joined them in the vehicle and he was finally taken to an airstrip; the vehicle drove straight to the door of a light aircraft and he was ordered to board the plane. When he asked where he was being taken to, one of the Metropolitan policemen told him that he was being taken back to his country because according to the police officers, Britain would not want to be involved in Nigeria’s political problems.

He had no travel documents and none was given to him. The plane went straight to Cote d’Ivoire. He was told to alight on the tarmac, and since he had no travel papers, he could not go through immigration, so he begged somebody at the departure hall to call one of his friends to arrange to take him back to Nigeria.

The Metropolitan police gave him $3000 at the airport in Cote d’Ivoire before they left, to help him get home.

It was the British police aided by Nigerian operatives that forced him to come back to Nigeria, so as to avert crisis in the Niger Delta oil region. As such, he did not jump bail having not returned on his own volition but due to his expulsion by the British police.

Even when he was within the custody of the EFCC and the EFCC procured a new international passport for him with which he applied for a travel visa to enable him appear for his trial, the British High Commission, Lagos turned down the request which confirms that the British government was not desirous of his return to face trial.5

The impeachment of Alamieseigha was made possible by the EFCC. The Commission took members of the Bayelsa House of Assembly to its office in Lagos where they signed an impeachment notice the Commission prepared. Some of the members of the House of Assembly later alleged that, their signatures were obtained under duress.6 They were afterwards shepherded back to Yenagoa under intimidating police guard, where they summarily passed the impeachment resolutions required of them. Worse still, the impeachment process was highly militarised, with armoured personnel carriers stationed where the assembly members were sitting to act. Scant regards was paid to due process as provided for in the law.7

Before Alamieseigha’s impeachment, members of the Bayelsa State House of Assembly were under investigation by the EFCC over the embezzlement of N100 million given to each of them by the state government for projects in their constituencies. After he was impeached, nothing was ever heard of the outcome of the investigation into the embezzlement of the N100 million given to them.8

Rasheed Ladoja

On December 12, 2005, while the House of Assembly of Oyo State was in session and sitting in its chambers at the House of Assembly Complex, Ibadan, 18 of its 32 members held a meeting at D’Rovans Hotel, Ibadan. They issued a notice of allegation of misconduct against the governor, Senator Rasheed Ladoja and commenced impeachment proceedings against him. Eventually, the process initiated by the 18 members culminated in the impeachment of Ladoja, the Speaker, Abraham Adeolu Adeleke and Deputy Speaker, Titilayo Ademola Dauda, as well as 12 other members of the House of Assembly who were not involved in the proceedings.9

The removal of Ladoja had the indirect approval of President Olusegun Obasanjo. He actually advised Ladoja to resign or be impeached,10 after Ladoja fell out with his godfather, Lamidi Adedibu, who Ahmadu Ali, a retired colonel and then PDP National Chairman referred to as “garrison commander”. Adedibu had complained that Ladoja was “too greedy” after allegedly reneging on giving him N15 million from the N65 million security vote for the governor, which Ladoja like other governors, do not account for11 [for more on Lamidi Adedibu v. Rasheed Ladoja, see Chapter 2].

However, Ladoja returned to complete his tenure when the Court of Appeal, sitting in Ibadan on November 1, 2006 and presided over by Justice James Ogenyi Ogebe nullified his impeachment. Justice Ogebe on proper conduct of legislative sitting of State House of Assembly held that:

By virtue of sections 90 – 105 of the 1999 Constitution, which provide for the establishment of a State House of Assembly, membership of a State House of Assembly, offices of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Clerk of the House and sitting in an official capacity in its designated chambers as the House of Assembly of the State with the Speaker or Deputy Speaker presiding. Its legislative functions including the impeachment of a governor or of a speaker must be carried out in its plenary session open to all members in an atmosphere that is free from fear, intimidation and violence. It follows therefore that a faction of the House of Assembly of a state, even if it is the majority, sitting in an unauthorised location without the principal officers of the House cannot amount to a sitting of the House of Assembly of the State. In the instant case, the factional meeting of the 18 members of the Oyo State House of Assembly held in an hotel room did not amount to a constitutional meeting of the House of Assembly of Oyo State for the purpose of any valid business of the House. Consequently, all steps taken at the meeting purporting to initiate impeachment of [Rasheed Ladoja] from the office of the Governor of Oyo State were not actions of the House of Assembly of Oyo State.

No factional meeting of any members of a State House of Assembly can amount to a constitutional meeting of the whole House of Assembly as envisaged and provided for in the Constitution.

And on impropriety of conducting legislative meetings of the State House of Assembly in a hotel, Christopher Mitchell Chukwuma-Eneh (JCA) as he then was, at page 701, paragraph C – F of the judgement averred that:

The proceedings hav[ing] been conducted at the D’Rovan Hotel, Ring Road, Ibadan outside the official designated House Chamber, is an act by itself infra dig and a show of shame as trivializing the purported impeachment proceedings by the said eighteen – member 'House'. Even though section 188 is silent as to the venue of impeachment proceedings; it this regard it would be inconceivable to contemplate such serious business holding in an hotel when the official House Chambers where legislative business ordinarily holds is available for use.

Ayodele Fayose

After many twists and turns, intrigues, manipulations, blackmails and threats, the Ekiti State House of Assembly on October 16, 2006 impeached the governor, Ayodele Fayose and his deputy, Biodun Olujimi on corruption charges, amidst palpable tension and tight security.12 Before Fayose’s impeachment he had also like Ladoja, counselled by Obasanjo to resign following a report on his corrupt practices by EFCC but he [Fayose] decided to see the impeachment process through. He was then informed he had to face EFCC’s follow-up actions.13

Friday Aderemi, the speaker of the State House of Assembly, who is constitutionally the next in hierarchy after the governor and his deputy thereafter ascended as governor. However, this did not go down well with the presidency, which felt he overstepped the directions given to him to impeach on Fayose. The resulting chaos arising from three claimants to the governorship position: Ayodele Fayose, Biodun Olujimi and Friday Aderemi led to a declaration of a six months state of emergency in Ekiti State by the federal government and the appointment of Tunji Olorun, a retired brigadier general and long time ally of Obasanjo as administrator of the state. 

Fayose’s impeachment was made possible by an EFCC investigation and report on his corrupt practices forwarded to Obasanjo, which gave rise to Obasanjo calling for his resignation or face impeachment. The report was also forwarded to the Ekiti State House of Assembly for the purpose of impeaching the governor. The EFCC went further to coerce the Ekiti State House of Assembly members, by blackmail and intimidation, to carry out its investigations and directions. It invited them for interrogation more than six times. The speaker and deputy speaker were detained once while the first set of five members arrested spent five nights in EFCC custody. Finally, on September 27, 2006 all the twenty six House of Assembly members were picked up by EFCC operatives and taken to an unknown destination where, after their spirit of resistance was broken, they were forced to sign an EFCC-prepared impeachment notice against Fayose. Incredible as it may sound, the members were still being kept at this unknown address in Lagos during the impeachment proceedings, from where they were driven in EFCC vans to Ado Ekiti, the state capital, to attend meetings of the House.14

Peter Obi

While Ayo Fayose was being sacked, members of the Anambra State House of Assembly began impeachment proceedings against the governor, Peter Obi. Having being sworn in as governor on March 15, 2006 after a protracted legal battle with Chris Ngige who was governor from May 29, 2003, Obi had barely settled down to work when the House of Assembly made up of PDP members [Obi was elected on the platform of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)] moved against him.

The impeachment of Obi was not about corruption. It was more about rival politicians (with fingers pointing at Andy Uba, one of Obasanjo’s aidea) trying to take charge of the state so that they can control the April 2007 elections in the state.15

On the day Obi was impeached, the faction of the House of Assembly which impeached him met a day earlier with representatives of President Obasanjo in Asaba, Delta State. They were afterwards accompanied by heavy security provided by the police mobile unit the next day to Awka, the state capital, arriving at 5.00 a.m. to begin sittings immediately, receiving the report of a panel of investigation set up to investigate the governor and after an hour of deliberation, impeached him.16 

However, Obi was eventually returned when on December 28, 2006 an Awka High Court presided over by Justice Umegbolu Nri–Ezedi declared the purported impeachment of Obi null and void as the process was faulty and not in compliance with section 188 (1 – 9) of the 1999 Constitution, when 12 of the 30 members sat at 5 a.m. to remove Obi. The faulty manner the impeachment was carried out led to the removal of the state’s chief judge, Chuka Okoli, who was retired by the National Judicial Commission after his initial suspension. 

Joshua Dariye

After the expiration of a six–month state of emergency in Plateau State, after it was engulfed sectarian crisis, Joshua Dariye was impeached. Some observers have declared that the state of emergency earlier proclaimed in the state was to serve as a prologue to Dariye’s removal.17

On November 13, 2006 Dariye was impeached at about 4.30 a.m. by eight members of the Plateau State House of Assembly based on an interim report of a panel set up to investigate allegations of corruption against him. The panel was expected to complete its report on November 15, but in a rather disturbing haste, he was impeached before the panel submitted its report.

The Plateau State House of Assembly constitute of twenty four members. Between 25th and 26th July, 2006, fourteen members of the twenty four members of the House, including the Speaker and Deputy Speaker decamped from the PDP on which they were elected to the Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD), as a result of which the said fourteen members vacated their seats by operation of law leaving only ten members.18

 On October 5, 2006, Dariye was allegedly served with a notice of gross misconduct, thereby initiating a process of impeachment by the remaining ten members. The notice of allegations of gross misconduct was signed by eight of the existing ten members. Throughout the processes and proceedings leading to and including the impeachment of Dariye, the House had only ten members, eight of who supported and voted in favour of his removal.19 A former governor of the state, Solomon Lar recounted the impeachment of Dariye as follows:

In the early hours of the day, the police in Jos surrounded the Plateau State House of Assembly and blocked all roads leading to it. Later in the day, the EFCC arrived with seven of the legislators in its custody at Abuja under heavy police guard. They were marched into the House of Assembly where they were ordered to rehearse some actions, which the public was told [later] was the removal of the Speaker of the State House of Assembly by six of the members. The two who disagreed and attempted to move out were ordered back into the hall at gunpoint. The legislators were later herded into a bus and driven back to Abuja from whence they came – all under the supervision of the EFCC accompanied by well armed policemen.20

Dariye disappeared from the public scene immediately after his impeachment. A N5 million reward was also placed on his head for information that could lead to his arrest by the police. He later resurfaced to resume duty after the Supreme Court, on April 27, 2007 reaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal nullifying his impeachment.21

The court gave interpretation to section 188 of the Constitution, which deals with the impeachment of a governor or deputy, in relation to the actions of the eight members of the Plateau State House of Assembly in the impeachment of Dariye. Subsection 9 of section 188 provides thus:

Where the report of the panel is that the allegation against the holder of the office has been proved, then within fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the House of Assembly shall consider the report, and if by a resolution of the House of Assembly supported by not less than two – third majority of ALL its MEMBERS, the report is adopted, then the holder of the office shall stand removed from office as from the date of the adoption of the report.

Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen (JSC) in his lead judgement on the interpretation of section 188 of the Constitution held that:

... the expression "all the members" refers to the members present and voting at the House of Assembly on any particular day after forming the required quorum for the transaction of legislative business which is 1/3 of all the members as provided for in section 96(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The same expression is used in section 9(2) & (3) in relation to creation of state; section 143(4) and (9) in relation to the removal of the President or Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; section 188 (9) in relation to motion to investigate the allegation; and section 305 dealing with the procedure for declaration of state of emergency, all under the 1999 Constitution. In all the above situations it appears that the intention of the framers of the Constitution is that the number of the members required to transact the particular business of the legislature is a percentage or proportion of the total number or the totality of the assigned membership of the House under the Constitution. In the instant case it is two – thirds of ALL the members of the Plateau State House of Assembly which is made up of 24 members; that is 16 members. 

Onnoghen also held that:

... the Court of Appeal was right in coming to the conclusion that the said impeachment was not in conformity with the Constitutional provisions and consequently invalid. [He therefore affirmed] the judgement of the Court of Appeal restoring and restating Joshua Chibi Dariye to his office as the Governor of Plateau State of Nigeria with all rights, privileges and perquisites of the said office.   

Executive/Legislative Faceoffs and the Challenges of Democratic Governance

A

fter his swearing in on May 29, 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo on June 3, 1999 proclaimed the new National Assembly. The inauguration of the National Assembly, which as the legislature, together with the executive and the judiciary forms the triune in the doctrine of separation of power, signalled the effective kickoff of democratic governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.

The legislature may be defined as a body of persons in a country or state vested with powers to make, alter and repeal laws. Although the nature and composition of the legislature may vary from one country to another, the primary function is to make laws “for peace, order and good governance.” This function embraces deliberation on matters of general and/or particular interest, law making, debating, amending and enacting government proposals for the use of public money or appropriation and checking the executive branch through oversight functions. Other functions of the legislature, especially in a presidential democracy, would include checkmating the excesses of the executive, the performance of judicial functions, providing political education for the public, as well as leadership selection.1 How did the National Assembly coped amidst executive face-offs and power struggles? And how did all of these affect democratic development? Are questions this chapter tends to answer.

One of the major challenges faced by the National Assembly was the overbearing power of the executive. It is against this backdrop one could appreciate the significance of curtailing the excesses of the executive, fighting the corruption scourge and encouraging the devolution of power and resources, which is vital to building enduring democratic institutions. In this regards, the legislature is best suited to handle these challenges.

The legislature is the real site of representation in a democracy. Modern democracies, especially the liberal democratic type is about the people exercising their powers through elected representatives. The diversity of interests and constituencies represented in the legislature, therefore, makes it an important structure in linking the people through the elected representatives. It also has a critical role to play in promoting checks and balances since the doctrine of separation of powers is at the heart of presidential democracy. In this regards, the legislature is expected to be the first line of defence, and the bulwark of resistance against executive excesses and the high possibility of descent into authoritarianism, which is a characteristic of presidentialism.2

One of the distinguishing traits of the National Assembly since 2007 is the relative stability its leadership enjoy both in the House of Representatives and Senate, when compared with their predecessors. Except for Patricia Olubunmi Eteh, Nigeria’s first speaker of the House of Representatives, who was removed on October 31, 2007, barely five months after she assumed office, for soiling her hands in the award of N628 million contracts for the renovation of her official residence without following due process,3 the House did not witness executive attempts to change its leadership as was the case between 1999 to 2007. Eteh’s successor, Dimeji Bankole served out his term, before the election of Aminu Tambuwal when he lost his re-election bid to come back to the House. The Senate on its own part has elected only one president since 2007, Senator David Mark.

Shortly after its inauguration in 1999 and the election of the executive-backed candidates of Salisu Buhari, as Speaker and Evan(s) Enwerem, as Senate President over Chuba Okadigbo who later succeeded Enwerem and was himself afterwards impeached, the National Assembly was dogged by scandalous controversies. 

The first victim of the controversies that dogged the National Assembly shortly after it was inaugurated was Salisu Buhari. Buhari was removed when his claims of graduating from the University of Toronto, Canada was found to be false, as well as being under-aged, contrary to the claims he made in his age declaration. He was later convicted for perjury and forgery, but was given a presidential pardon a year later.

Succeeding Buhari was Ghali Umar Na’abba, often called the ‘Little Rascal’ by the executive arm due to his uncompromising attitude to President Obasanjo. This was largely responsible for his failure to return to the House in 2003.4 Aminu Bello Masari, Speaker of the House between 2003 and 2007 largely survived after an initial certificate scandal, for largely kowtowing to the executive.

The senate under Obasanjo was not as lucky as the House of Representatives. Frequent impeachment of its leadership and power struggles both influenced by the executive was its bane. The first president of the senate under Obasanjo, Chief Evans Enwerem was removed barely six months after he was elected presiding officer on the allegations he compromised the independence and integrity of the senate.5 Possibly, the frequent impeachments of senate presidents between 1999 to 2003 contributed to the House resolving not to impeach Na’abba.

The desire of the executive to control the legislature was the key factor to the instability in the National Assembly. This desire tend to be encouraged by the uncontrolled access of the executive to money for inducement and for patronage politics.6

Enwerem’s successor, Chuba Okadigbo did not also last long (1999 to 2000). In June 2000, Senator Arthur Nzeribe, elected on the platform of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), compiled a litany of impeachable offences supposedly committed by President Obasanjo, which he circulated in the senate. The alleged involvement of Senator Chuba Okadigbo in the impeachment saga orchestrated by Arthur Nzeribe is presumed to have laid the grounds for his ultimate removal. 

Okadigbo’s removal did not come without drama. On June 2, 2000, armed police surrounded the home of the Senate President Chuba Okadigbo. They only withdrew after Okadigbo refused to hand over the mace, which symbolises the authority of the senate. The decision to retrieve the mace followed Okadigbo’s decision to adjourn the senate for one month to douse tensions for his impeachment that were brewing from senators suspected to have government backing. The government later said the police had been sent to Okadigbo’s home in Abuja because he was suspected of stealing the mace.7 Okadigbo while narrating the incident said that:

The police arrived at 5.55 a.m. in six SUVs fully loaded with armed officers, and told me they had come to collect the mace and that they were acting on orders from the Inspector-General of Police. I said I would never give them the mace ... This is executive lawlessness and is unprecedented in Nigeria’s history.8

Okadigbo was eventually impeached in July 2010, after he resisted calls for his resignation. His deputy, Haruna Abubakar and majority leader, Samaila Mamman had earlier resigned after a probe panel headed by Senator Idris Kuta found them guilty of gross abuse of office. However, there were criticisms in some quarters that the report was influenced by the executive to smear the image of Chuba Okadigbo and that of the senate leadership. Okadigbo’s successor, Anyim Pius Anyim quashed the Kuta Report and granted pardon to all the senators indicted in it. Anyim who sought not to return to the senate at the end of his tenure in 2003 was not removed out of lack of attempts. He had to develop his own survival strategies when they propped up, much to the detriment of governance.

The genesis of Anyim’s travails arose when he was understood to have supported calls for Obasanjo’s impeachment, sponsored by Senator Idris Abubakar of the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (ANPP), over non-implementation of the federal budgets by the executive. To survive the numerous attempts at his job, he had to devise several survival strategies of his own. With survival taking priority over legislative duties, a deconsolidation of governance and democracy became the standard. For instance, Anyim increased the number of Standing Committees of the Senate from 31 to 63 to deal with the in-house power struggles and jostling for management positions with its additional pecuniary benefits. 

In November 2002, Anyim indefinitely suspended Senator Arthur Nzeribe due to an allegation of N22 million fraud. Nzeribe was said to be planning an impeachment motion against him.9 Anyim admitted to the power struggles and factionalisms in the senate in his valedictory speech:

... the senate was factionalised into various and the various groups were at one another’s throat; a senate whose leadership was at war with itself; a senate where the motivating reason for attending sittings was to forestall the chance of an opposing camp taking advantage against the other; in fact, a senate whose relationship with the executive was very very sour and therefore counter-productive.

Anyim Pius Anyim did not return to the senate and Adolphus Wabara was elected Senate President in June 2003. He had earlier been declared loser of the April 2003 election to D. C. Imo of the ANPP. However, a controversial court decision declared him the elected candidate in June 2003, on time for the inauguration of the senate and his subsequent election as Senate President.

In May 2004 senators moved to investigate Wabara over alleged financial misdeeds. President Olusegun Obasanjo supported the decision. The senators accused Wabara of exceeding his authority by handing out various contracts without the knowledge or approval of the responsible senate committee. An additional allegation was made by Senator Bode Olowoporoku, who denied receiving N3 million advance that the Senate President said had been paid to him for a tour of Europe and Latin America. Wabara said he was ready for the probe, and declared the allegations false, and raised by Igbo senators who wanted his position.10 The PDP had zoned the senate presidency to the South-East Igbo-speaking region.

In April 2005, Wabara resigned from his position following a N55 million “bribe for budget” scandal. He was accused of convincing Fabian Osuji, the Education Minister to part with the sum and equally pad the ministry’s budget by the same amount, to facilitate easy passage of its fiscal proposal. He was succeeded by Senator Ken Nnamani. Fabian Osuji was also fired by the president following the scandal.

After extended legal battles, on June 1, 2010, the charges against Wabara and other accused persons: Fabian Osuji, Senator Ibrahim Abdulazeez and late Senators Badamosi Maccido, son of the late Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Maccido and Emmanuel Okpede were dismissed. Justice Mary Odili who led other justices of the Court of Appeal,Abuja Division to pronounce them not guilty held that the allegations of giving and obtaining bribe, criminal breach of trust and abuse of office levelled against them by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) were not proved, could not be sustained, and unknown to the laws of the land. The appellate held that the criminal charges “were frivolous, baseless, bogus, failed to disclose prima facie cases against the accused persons and lacking in merit and, as such, could not be sustained by any prosecution.” The court also carpeted former President Olusegun Obasanjo for his “embarrassing, barbaric and uncivilised conduct” in the wake of the alleged scam with his infamous media broadcast trial and conviction of the accused persons in 2005, even when no statement had been made to security agents by any of the parties allegedly fingered in the scam. The court held in the judgement that if anybody had greatly wronged the accused persons, it was Obasanjo who, in his ignorance, combined the roles of security agents, prosecution and judge in his pre-court nationwide media broadcast trial to pronounce them guilty and cost them their jobs and integrity.11

Wabara’s successor, Nnamani served out his term. And this was not out of lack of moves to remove him for his handling of the controversial Constitution Amendment Bill, were he resisted attempts by the executive to influence proceedings; and the senate committees that probed mismanagement of funds from the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF). The PTDF was established with the principal aim of building capacity in the oil and gas sector of the economy and equipping Nigerians with the technical and managerial expertise that will enable them compete favourably in the petroleum industry through its various intervention activities as set out in the PTDF Act, but became more or less a slush fund under Obasanjo’s administration.12

The Senate Committee probing it revealed a lot of fraud perpetuated by the Obasanjo administration. Paradoxically, the first committee headed by Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba’s exonerated the president, but for the dissenting opinion of Senator Titus Olupitan, whose beauty of argument was not only convincing, but also indicted Obasanjo.13 

The Ndoma-Egba’s committee had recommended that Vice President be sanctioned for the way he managed PTDF while President Obasanjo be chided for approving projects outside the laws establishing the fund. This was after the vice president has personally appeared and put up a good defence unlike Obasanjo who did not appear. The review panel later exonerated the vice president while sanctioning Obasanjo. The senate leadership under Ken Nnamani had setup a review panel headed by Senator Ibrahim Tsauri to handle the Ndoma-Egba’s committee report, after the uproar that greeted its spurious recommendations.14 

Tsauri told The Guardian, March 21, 2007 that it was wrong for Vice President Atiku Abubakar to have been castigated for putting the PTDF money in the bank because the law gives power for its funds to be invested, recalling that $125 million was actually approved for some PTDF projects. “Where do you expect Atiku to keep the money if the projects were ongoing? What Atiku did was to put the money in the bank pending when the projects were for execution.”

The Tsauri Committee recommended that President Obasanjo face the Code of Conduct Tribunal for raising N20 billion for the Galaxy Backbone Project from the PTDF, which is outside the law establishing it. Atiku Abubakar has raised the issue in his response to the Senate Committee probing the PTDF. Tsauri also found it curiously coincidental that President Obasanjo requested for, and got an approval for N20 billion for the Galaxy Backbone Project at about the same time Atiku Abubakar alleged that money was released to prosecute an alleged “Third Term agenda” in May 2006. Other relevant cases of fraud alongside that of the Galaxy Backbone Project raised by Atiku Abubakar and providing annexure in his response include:15

Establishment of an Institute of Science and Technology in the FCT: In August 2006, the president approved the sum of $25 million from the Fund for the establishment of a so-called African Institute of Science and Technology, Gulf of Guinea Affiliate in Abuja. The money was released... there is no enabling law setting up the Institute and no money was appropriated by the National Assembly for it.

Registration of Galaxy Backbone PLC and Payment of Legal Fees: In September 2006, the president approved the payment of the sum of N250 million from the PTDF to his personal lawyer, Chief Afe Babalola of Emmanuel Chambers, for the mere act of registering a company, Galaxy Backbone, with the Corporate Affairs Commission... With a share capital of N1 billion, the actual amount paid to the Corporate Affairs Commission was N23 million... the establishment and funding of Galaxy Backbone [was not] within the mandate of the PTDF.

Note Purchase Agreement between UBA and Other Banks and the PTDF: ... [There was a] scandalous lending of billions of naira of PTDF money to the United Bank for Africa (UBA), which, strangely, the federal government then borrowed from, to buy vehicles... It is also interesting that the president went on to draw a personal loan of N200 million from the UBA, which according to his spokespersons, was used to purchase the 200 million shares in Transcorp.

Approval Limit for Expenditure of PTDF Funds: ... On April 4 2006, without recourse to the Federal Executive Council, the president raised the limit of the amount of money that the Executive Secretary of PTDF can approve from seven hundred thousand naira to ten million naira. This new approval limit seems to have provided an opportunity for a renewed assault on the resources of the Fund.

Contract Award to PDP National Working Committee Members: ... Contracts were awarded on July 17, 2006 to companies many of which [were] suspected to belong to members of the National Working Committee of the PDP to induce them to support the president’s total destruction of internal democracy within the PDP... some of the companies to which these contracts were awarded were not duly registered.

PTDF Contracts to the President’s Aides and Cronies: ... Companies linked to such aides of the president [like] his current political adviser, ministers such as that of the Federal Capital Territory and Science and Technology; and a long list of his close political associates, were favoured with mouth-watering contracts from the PTDF. Millions of naira [were] also doled out by the PTDF management for some phoney community relations consultancy. In order that he is not left out of the party, the ... National Security Adviser [was] processed as an external solicitor to the PTDF through his own legal firm, A. S. Mukhtar and Company.

DICON Rehabilitation Account: The PTDF in absolute and flagrant violation of its mandate was directed to dole out one billion naira to the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON)... This payment was made via a Prudent Bank cheque dated October 10, 2006. The one billion naira [was] spent for one of the president’s vanity projects: naming a gun after himself, the so-called OBJ 006.

Inflation of Contracts and Frivolous Rehabilitation of PTDF Headquarters: The management of PTDF spent a whopping N60 million on the purported rehabilitation of its headquarters in 2006. This includes a N36 million expenditure to procure a lift for the two storey building. The expenses also include the cost of putting a Jacuzzi in the PTDF headquarters.

...On May 10, 2006, at the height of the evil tenure elongation plot, the PTDF requested, under circumstances that were at best cloudy, for N20 billion for its projects as well as the immediate release of N10 billion. The request was made by the PTDF management and approved by the president on the same day. There is no evidence that the N20 billion was released to the PTDF and there is nothing to indicate that the approval of the Federal Executive Council was sought and obtained for both amounts... what happened to the N20 billion? Where was it placed, and what was it used for?

Vice President Atiku Abubakar’s revelations of corrupt practices in the PTDF were not sheer accusations. They were backed with documents, attached as appendices (thirty seven in all) signed by either the president or other relevant approving officials, thereby giving further credence to its authenticity and leaving nothing for denial.16

Nnamani’s survival was due to two factors. With the Obasanjo administration at its twilight, many senators did not support a regime change in the senate that would trigger instability in the senate and threaten the approaching 2007 elections. Obasanjo was perceived to be fomenting trouble so as not to hand over. Another factor was the overwhelming support of his colleagues which he enjoyed, unlike his predecessors.17 

Ethno-Nationalism and the 

Nation State

O

n October 21, 1996 the Marxist professor of economics, Professor Eskor Toyo wrote in The Guardian that “The Nigerian nation exists. What it lacks at the moment is a really patriotic, broad-minded, principled, enlightened, humane and honest leadership”.

Although the state unquestionably remains the most visible actor in world politics, nationalism and nationality are potent cultural factors defining the core loyalties and identities of many people that influence how states act. Many people pledge their primary allegiance not to the state and government that rules them, but to the politically active minority group with which they associate themselves. These groups are the ones they share a common nationality, language, cultural tradition, and kinship ties. In the process, they view themselves as members of their nationality first and of their state only secondary.1  

There have been arguments that Nigeria as a heterogeneous society has continually faced the problem of ethnicity in her national life.2 In reality, what has been going on in the country is the manipulation of ethnicity by the political elites who fan the embers of interethnic prejudices and hostility through the promotion of ethnic ideas and beliefs to further their own ends.3

In the First Republic, the three major political parties in the country: the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), Action Group (AG), and Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), were more or less associated with the three major ethnic groups – the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbos. What the political parties then achieved was the creation of a false notion that the political parties were the defenders of the ethnic groups they represented. In reality, they were just platforms for the struggle for power and positions.

The covert reasons for deploying ethnic propaganda to canvass for votes had always been the diversion of national resources to the elites in each region, and to increase its spheres of influence while weakening those of it opponents. A good example is the declaration of a state of emergency by the NCNC/NPC coalition in the AG controlled Western Region in 1962 whereas the violent crisis in the same Western Region in 1965 did not culminate in the declaration of a state of emergency because the party in power – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by Ladoke Akintola was in coalition with the NPC controlled Federal Government.4

Ethnic nationalism has historically been part and parcel of the political process, economy and statecraft of Nigeria. It gave rise to the colonial investigatory committee usually referred to as the Henry Willinck Commission, which became the precursor of the multiple creations of sub-system states in the country between 1963 and 1996. The Nigerian Civil War can be said to an extent to have also been a consequence of ethnic nationalism.5

Ethno-Nationalism in the Fourth Republic

The emergence of General Olusegun Obasanjo as president in 1999 was to a large extent meant to compensate his South-West zone. Moshood Abiola, the winner of the June 12, 1992 elections which was annulled by the military is from the South-West, and with strong agitations coming from the zone, the “militicians” who midwived the Fourth Republic went for “a leader that they can trust” in Obasanjo, who was brought from prison to contest the PDP ticket over the more established former vice president and founding member of the party, Alex Ekweme. The arrangements saw Obasanjo contesting with another candidate from the South-West, the AD/APP coalition candidate, Olu Falae, who trounced him in the South-West Zone.

While many have believed that the emergence of democracy after long years of military rule would help in tackling the challenges posed by ethno-nationalism, the lack of purposeful leadership has turned the ethnic diversity of the country, which should had been an asset to a liability.

In a bid to create a “home-base” for himself in his native South-West after the 1999 elections, the 2003 and subsequent 2007 elections in the zone were marred by massive rigging which saw Obasanjo’s PDP sweeping the stakes in the zone except in Lagos State.

With many expectations that came with the restoration of democracy not met, the people resorted to venting their disappointments with violence. Between 1999 and 2005, over fifty ethno-religious conflicts were recorded in Nigeria in which more than twenty-five thousand lives were lost and property worth billions of Naira destroyed (The Guardian, October 22, 2005), portraying danger for Nigeria’s nascent democracy. Notable among the conflicts during this period are the Yoruba/Fulani conflict in Sagamu in 1999; the Kano retaliatory strike in October/November, 1999; the Jos ethnic crisis in 2001 and the Tiv-Jukun conflicts of 2001.6

The politicisation of the “Sharia question” in the implementation of the Islamic Law in some northern states; and the conflicts in the Niger Delta fuelled by long years of marginalisation and environmental degradation saw pressure groups in the South-South region metamorphosing into ethnic militias who took to sabotaging oil pipelines, kidnapping of oil workers and piracy. Among the groups of ethnic militias include: Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Bakassi Boys, Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Movement for the Survival of the Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality.

The explosion of ethno-nationalism conflicts in the Fourth Republic has almost threatened the existence of the Nigerian nation. This all lay credence to Professor Eskor Toyo’s assertion quoted earlier in the chapter that “The Nigerian nation exists. What it lacks at the moment is a really patriotic, broad-minded, principled, enlightened, humane and honest leadership”. The actions and leadership of Obasanjo did nothing to reduce the destabilising proportions of ethnic nationalism and building of a vibrant Nigerian state within the federation. Instead, the country has witnessed an increase in militant organisations and intensification of the competition to “capture power at the centre”, resulting in conflicts of significant magnitude.   

    

 

The Third Term Agenda: 

Behind the Veil

T

he controversy surrounding the attempt by former President Olusegun Obasanjo to elongate his tenure was reopened recently when for the first time since leaving office in 2007, he denied allegations he was behind it.

In an interview with Channels Television correspondent Olugbenga Ashiru aired on April 6, 2012, Obasanjo firmly stated that “I never toyed with the idea of third term,” insisting that he has always denied the allegations that he sought to extend his two-term tenure of eight years at its expiration in 2007. He further claimed that the bill was initiated by members of the National Assembly, and it was just one of the “over hundred clauses” in the proposed constitutional amendments. Obasanjo, who now owns a church in Abeokuta, after his graduation from the National Open University with a diploma in theology when he left office give details of how he could have achieved it if he so desired:

I am not a fool. If I wanted a third term, I know how to go about it and there is nothing I want that God hasn’t given me. If I had wanted a third term, I would have gone about it the way I should have gone about it and I would have gotten it.

After Obasanjo’s denials, Senator Ibrahim Mantu, who was the Deputy Senate President and Chairman of the Constitution Review Committee, corroborated Obasanjo’s position when he rose in his defence following the furore his statement generated:

I was not only the Deputy Senate President; I was the chairman of the Constitution Review Committee and therefore there is nothing that would have happened without me being at the centre of it. First and foremost, the whole thing about third term is much ado about nothing. Much ado about nothing because of the fact that, one, this is democracy and we are in the process of amending our constitution and some people felt that they should extend the two terms of four years to three terms of four years. So, that was the view of some people but this matter was brought up by a sub-committee headed by Senator Omar Hamgbada whereby during that time they went for public hearing, as you know, some people advocated that we should now have three terms of four years rather than two terms of four years. 

Nobody will tell you in this country that as chairman of the Constitution Review Committee, I actually made a case for any tenure elongation. Indeed, I was an umpire, a referee, and watched a lot of events at that time when the matter was being brought to the National Assembly for debate and for motion. So, if anybody has advocated that he wanted a term to be extended from two terms four years to three terms four years, he has the right in a democratic society to say so and somebody who doesn’t want it to be changed from two terms of four years, also has the right to say that it should remain two terms of four years.1

 

Mantu said the issue of third term came about during a public hearing in one of the geo-political zones in the country:

As chairman of constitutional review committee, if Obasanjo desired to extend his tenure, he never told me to use my position to bend the rules in order to accommodate tenure elongation. He never told me that. There was never a time that he told me that I should bend the rules to accommodate tenure elongation. It was a sub-committee of my committee that brought that idea of tenure elongation report in their own report from one zone they had public hearing in and it is the duty of the committee to report everything that happened at the public hearing in their reports to the committee. And that report was reflected in their report. But because people have interest in the matter, it became an issue. And there are 102 clauses that were actually slated for amendment; tenure elongation clause was just one out of the 102 clauses but the vested interest mobilised support against the process and it was killed on the floor of the National Assembly. There is something sinister about the whole thing.2 

The former Deputy Senate President said if former President Obasanjo had wanted a third term, he would have sent an executive bill to that effect but he never did:

If he wanted third term, he would have sent an executive bill to the National Assembly. By then we would have known where the agitation for a third term emanated from. Contrary to what somebody would have said to you, but as the chairman of the Constitution Review Committee, it was not an executive bill. As far as I am concerned, it was contained in the report of the sub-committee of the Constitution Review Committee.3

In reaction to the allegations by Mantu that the Senator Omar Hambagda’s sub-committee initiated the tenure elongation before his committee adopted it, Hambagda explained the circumstances:

The sub-committee on the executive which I chaired comprised 15 people. At that meeting, 12 of us were present. We had all the items under the executive section of the constitution on the agenda and we had to take decision on each one of them. The caveat was that we had to be unanimous on any recommendation before we would submit that recommendation.

When we came to the subject of tenure, one member suggested maintaining the status quo, that is two terms of four years and one person supported him. Another person suggested three terms of four years and six people supported him, making it 7. At a point I expressed shock and one member who supported the two terms of four years beckoned on me to take it easy, and I did. Then another member suggested two terms of five years, and one person supported him. So, what we had were three recommendations. One, two terms of four years with two supporters; two, three terms of four years with 7 supporters and two terms of five years with two supporters. That made 11.

I was the chairman so I didn't vote. So we decided that since we were not unanimous on anyone of it, our number was too small for us to go by majority, so we decided to submit all the three recommendations to the bigger committee that had 84 members. And also we eventually had to go to public hearing. So that's how the three terms came. Three terms was only one of three recommendations from the subcommittee to the main committee which was chaired by Senator Ibrahim Mantu.

When the matter reached the main committee, it ceased to be within the domain of my subcommittee and the main committee chaired by Mantu continued to deliberate on that.4

Though Obasanjo, Mantu and Hambagda are in unison that the third term originated somewhat from the National Assembly, it is nevertheless worthy to note that the facts on ground are at conflict with their positions, especially that of Obasanjo that, he had nothing to do with it.

Hardly had any other issue in the political history of Nigeria since independence in 1960 engaged the interest, anxious concern and attention of virtually the entire population of Nigeria as the third term plan. It permeated nearly every nook and cranny in the towns and villages throughout the country, and affected the lives of almost all segments of society. It was like a flu that descended and spread through the land, generating intense emotions of anger and bitterness, even among people outside the political and elite classes.6

Among the persons who have debunked Obasanjo’s claims are Ms. Temi Harriman and Usman Bugaje, who were members of the House of Representatives during the period the Bill was initiated.

Harriman who represented Warri Federal Constituency of Delta State between 2003 and 2007 on the platform of the PDP revealed that governors and key officials of the Obasanjo administration were not only mobilised and intimidated to coerce the lawmakers to adopt the proposal, N50 million was also distributed amongst members of the National Assembly to bribe them into supporting the third term, she was put under pressure for supposedly endangering the position of the Minister of State (Defence), Rowland Oritsejafor:7

They were phoning my mother in London, they were phoning my dad, they were using traditional rulers. All the ministers had to deliver [their constituencies] and they said that if I didn’t support it [third term], Oritsejafor was going to be sacked, and eventually he was removed.

... My governor at that time, James Ibori,when he learnt of my opposition and that I was rejecting N50 million sent to me, phoned me that there was no future for me in PDP if I didn’t support it and that I should collect the money. I now called the emissaries who were the leaders of the South-South caucus at that time and told them that “If anybody dared to collect any money on my behalf, I will call a press conference to expose them.”8

Usman Bugaje, who was the chairman of the 2007 Movement, a group that comprised members of the House of Representatives opposed to the third term described Obasanjo’s denials as actions of a “pathetic liar.”9 He also added that:

The whole world knows. How can he talk like this? Everybody knows that he did everything short of killing some of us. I know people who were pursued even in hospitals.

One of the times we were going to hold a meeting against third term, Victor Lar, who is now a senator had to hide for nearly three days because they wanted to arrest him. My private office was burgled and they picked an American intern who was in the office. The American embassy had to rescue him.10

On the N50 million bribe to members for them to support the third term and complicity of security agents:

Even the EFCC refused to follow our alert when they were distributing the N50 million. We followed them, we gave them the vehicle number-plates and yet they refused to acknowledge or follow-up our lead.

Who else would have been able to mobilise the SSS, EFCC, police and others for this other than the president? So, it is an outright lie and he should not add to the crimes he has already committed by lying to the people.11

Obasanjo’s attempt to claim ignorance of the third term was also considered “disingenuous,” considering the wide range of people and organisations he contacted for support to secure the bid.12 One of such persons is former United States president, George Bush. This has been recounted by former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice in her autobiography No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington:

In 2006 when President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria sidled up to President Bush and suggested that he [Obasanjo] might change the constitution so that he could serve a third term, President Bush told him not to do it. In Bush’s words “You have served your country well. Now turn over power and become a statesman.13

The shocking disclosure from Condoleeza Rice corroborates the account of Senator Daisy Danjuma, wife of Obasanjo’s first Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General T. Y. Danjuma. He was also Chief of Army Staff when Obasanjo was military Head of State. Senator Danjuma had told the US Consul General Brian L. Browne that Obasanjo lobbied her and her husband to support the third term bid and threatened to confiscate T. Y. Danjuma’s lucrative oil block if he did not support him. This was revealed by Wikileaks, the whistle blowing site:

According to Danjuma, Obasanjo first solicited her support for the measure. She responded that her husband had already voiced to Obasanjo his opposition. There was no way she could publicly oppose her strong-willed husband. "He would throw me out of the house," she told Obasanjo. Then, Obasanjo pleaded with her not to speak against the measure on the Senate floor. She refused this request as well, stating that her constituents expected to hear from her. Then, Obasanjo told her he did not want a third term but did not want to hand the party to his Vice President. If your husband wanted the job, I would be satisfied to retire to my chicken farm, Obasanjo purportedly said. She responded that Obasanjo knew darn well that General Danjuma had no interest in being President and that the President also had no interest in Danjuma succeeding him. Last, Obasanjo tried to convince her not to persuade other Senators to join the anti-third term camp. She stated that she refused that entreaty as well. In the end, Obasanjo muttered something about her being "troublesome," then ended the phone call.

General Danjuma, a long-time ally who practically forced Obasanjo to assume command in 1976 and who backed him in 1996, probably enjoys more respect inside the Nigerian military than any other retired general, including his former subordinates, Obasanjo and Babangida. The President must listen to him and he is one of the few people who can talk frankly to the President without fear, Senator Danjuma asserted. As early as last year her husband had warned Obasanjo to drop the third term shenanigans and begin to identify a suitable successor. During a more recent conversation, General Danjuma firmly iterated his opposition, stating he would fight to assure Obasanjo was defeated. Because of her husband's clear opposition, the presidency started threatening to confiscate his lucrative oil block, she asserted.

In the lead-up to the decisive vote, she claimed the Senate was a buzz of activity. Money changed hands. Senator Jubril Aminu from Adamawa State, VP Atiku's home state, tried to change her mind. Aminu told her Obasanjo had promised him the Vice Presidency in 2007. Senator Danjuma recounted telling Aminu that he was the fourth Senator who had come to her claiming Obasanjo had promised them Atiku's seat.14

Amidst all the storms it generated, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Amendment) Bill, which contained the proposed tenure elongation/third term clause was laid to rest when the senate on May 16, 2006, overwhelmingly threw out the bill when it came up for second reading. Other notable proposals for amendments to the constitution also went with the third term. It was akin to “throwing away the bathwater with the baby.” 

Although the third term was killed, it was not buried, hovering around and bedevilling political affairs in the country. Of the bitter disputes and vendettas it gave rise to, none is as bedevilling and destructive as the no-holds-barred feud waged by President Obasanjo against Vice-President Atiku Abubakar for opposing the tenure elongation plan. The April 2007 elections became a do-or-die affair because of the feud and Obasanjo’s avowed determination to stop Abubakar from succeeding him as president. Political relations of Obasanjo to other politicians became determined by whether they supported or opposed the third term plan.15 This was evident in his relationship with Peter Odili, then governor of Rivers State who had a very healthy relationship with Obasanjo, until it was leaked to him that Odili did not support the bid. This was revealed by Wikileaks, when they revealed a conversation between Professor Ukandi Damachi,a close ally of Odili and US Consul General Brian L. Browne:

During a December 7 conversation with the Consul General, Professor Ukandi Damachi, a close advisor to Governor Odili and former military president Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) said a senior police officer asked to meet Damachi urgently. The meeting occurred December 9. At the meeting, the officer advised Damachi to warn Odili to withdraw his preferred candidate, former Minister of Transport Dr. Abiye Sekibo, from the gubernatorial primary. If not, both would face aggressive EFCC investigation. To underscore the EFCC's seriousness, Rivers State's accounts were frozen that same day, Damachi declared. A cunning tactician himself, Odili did forsake Sekibo, forcing him to withdraw from contention. However, another Odili protégée, State House of AssemblyAssembly Speaker Amaechi, emerged as the winner. This sleight of hand evidently did not impress the EFCC. Amaechi was detained by the EFCC earlier this week and may be disqualified by the PDP national executive review commission. [He was eventually disqualified and replaced with Celestine Omehia. However, the Supreme Court later returned him as the lawful candidate after Omehia/PDP won the elections and had been sworn in.]

Damachi stressed that none of these actions against Odili could have been taken minus presidential imprimatur. Quashing Odili's selection for his successor also constituted a clear signal that Odili's presidential hopes had left the infirmary and were heading for the morgue. Damachi maintained that some of Odili's adversaries had slipped President Obasanjo a dossier containing evidence suggesting that Odili had helped bankroll the opposition to the third term constitutional amendment earlier this year. Opposition to the third term was not a scarlet sin in Obasanjo's political theology and no amount of ablutions nor could renewed pledging of loyalty remit this transgression, asserted Damachi. To reward Odili for this chicanery, Obasanjo released the EFCC to go after Odili, opined Damachi.

Odili was now in a bind, Damachi asserted. He had spent vast sums campaigning for the presidency and vice presidency, but these positions were quickly fading from reach. However, to continue in the quest might serve only to whet the President's ire ever more. Considering Obasanjo's penchant for larruping disloyal politicians, Damachi said he would advise Odili to stand down and pledge allegiance to President Obasanjo's candidate, presumably being Governor Yar'Adua. By returning to the flock, Odili would forego the presidency but save his skin and perhaps position himself for a ministerial appointment, a senatorial slot or appointment as a member of the PDP Board of Trustees. Damachi predicted Odili would be inclined to continue to fight for the nomination. If Odili did not become supportive of Obasanjo's decision, any future militant activity in Rivers State or the Niger Delta could be attributed to Odili's bitterness at having lost. If so, Odili could be further scapegoated by his detractors to the point where he would actually become an enemy of the President. Given Odili's already considerable roster of critics, that addition would be one he should actively eschew, Damachi calculated.16

Obasanjo – Atiku Faceoff

O

ne of the biggest challenges faced by Nigeria’s nascent democracy was the feud between President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar. In a resolve to settle scores, Obasanjo went all out to prevent Atiku (as he is popularly known) from standing for the presidency and posing a challenge to his handpicked successor, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.

As early as 2002, Atiku and most of his loyalists had expected Obasanjo would follow the Nelson Mandela example that would have paved the way for Atiku succeeding Obasanjo. Mandela had after his release from Robben Island prison for a life sentence which he served 18 years in 1990 by President F. W. De Clerk, gone ahead to win South Africa’s first multiracial elections in 1994. He had announced that he would not seek re-election in 1999 and in 1997 stepped down as the African National Congress (ANC) leader. He was succeeded by his deputy, Thambo Mbeki. 

It is not only Atiku and his loyalists who had expected Obasanjo to take the “Mandela option”. General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who handed over to Obasanjo in 1999 also thought alongside the same lines as revealed by Wikileaks in a meeting between him and then US ambassador to Nigeria, Howard Jeter on February 1, 2002. Abubakar’s position was due to what he felt were Obasanjo’s maladroit decisions that have alienated many supporters; his failure to guide the nation down the critical path to genuine democratisation by sinking into the thick of political mudslinging and intrigues instead of sacrificing his ambitions to build republican institutions and a democratic culture; the administrations’ lack of a domestic social and economic focus; and his not acting like a good “general” by operating on multiple fronts, dealing with so many issues simultaneously and many of these by himself in failing to delegate sufficiently, and in the process generating resentment among the political elite and frustrations among Nigerians in genera.1

In 1998 while Obasanjo was still recovering physically, financially and politically from his imprisonment by General Sani Abacha for allegedly plotting to overthrow him alongside Obasanjo’s former deputy and close business and political ally of Atiku, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua who later died in prison, the military-political class alongside Atiku who provided the Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) machinery, formed by the late YarAdua enabled Obasanjo to clinch the PDP presidential ticket against the backdrop of a strong challenge from former Vice President Alex Ekwueme, who was one of the founders and leading lights of the PDP while Obasanjo was still in prison. Atiku was also central to the formation of the PDP in 1998. His presence as the vice presidential candidate in 1999 after he resigned as the governor-elect of Adamawa State helped balance the PDP ticket and also in 2003, despite earlier attempts by Atiku to contest the PDP presidential nominations with Obasanjo. He is said to have back down after Obasanjo begged him to drop his ambition for 2007.  However, their relationship began to get worse steeply after.

In order to whittle down Atiku’s party influence, Obasanjo in January 2005, removed his ally Audu Ogbeh, as PDP chairman and replaced him with his own man, Ahmadu Ali, a retired army colonel who was Obasanjo’s minister for education under the military regime and mostly remembered for the “Ali Must Go” riots by university students during his tenure as education minister. Between April and December 2005, seven key aides of Vice President Atiku Abubakar: Onukaba Adenoyi-Ojo, Senior Special Assistant, Media and Publicity; Chris Mammah, Special Assistant for Special Duties; Garba Shehu, Special Assistant for Media; Adeolu Akande, Special Assistant, Media; Professor Sam Oyovbaire, Special Assistant, Political; Jafar Isa, Special Assistant, Political; and Abdul Yari, aide-de-camp were dismissed by presidential fiat, and at the December 14, 2005 PDP convention, Obasanjo completed the process of installing loyalists to administer the party.2

The Obasanjo–Atiku relationship spiralled downwards when Atiku publicly resisted Obasanjo’s scheming for a third term, resulting in the National Assembly discarding the controversial constitutional amendments. After the National Assembly threw out the third term, Obasanjo fought back through an EFCC report “indicting” him for abuse of office, particularly the management of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF); accusations and counter-accusations of corruption by both parties in the media; and several other actions to intimidate Atiku’s aides [see more on Chapter 6: Executive/Legislative Face-offs and the Challenges of Democratic Governance; and Chapter 7: The Third Term Agenda: Behind the Veil]. 

On 28 September 2006, presidency officials alleged moves by “elements sympathetic to the Vice President” to eliminate top government functionaries. On 30 September, Atiku’s security aide, Victor Okonkwo, was shot dead during a minor misunderstanding with the police in Keffi, Nassarrawa State, about 35 km from Abuja. In October 2006, Garba Shehu, spokesman of Atiku Campaign Organisation (ACO), was arrested and arraigned before a Federal High Court on four counts of obtaining classified information without authorisation. In January 2007, Obasanjo’s camp began to accuse Atiku again of planning to destabilise the country, specifically of sponsoring terrorism in the Niger Delta. On February 23, formal charges were filed to this effect at the Federal High Court Abuja against Dr. Iyorchia Ayu, director of Atiku Campaign Organisation. Ayu a former Senate President was also a two-time minister under Obasanjo. Also charged were Timi Frank and another Atiku aide, Paul Santus Ofana. Ayu was accused of providing N1.5 million to the other two persons to recruit, mobilise and sponsor armed persons to commit acts of terrorism in the Niger Delta. The charges were widely perceived as preparations for the eventual arrest of Atiku on “national security grounds”.3 

Despite initial all these challenges, Atiku not only retained strong support with legislators in the National Assembly, but also built outside the mainstream PDP, a loyal and effective political and legal machine that proved difficult for Obasanjo to crack. Although the balance of support within the PDP remained in Obasanjo’s favour, resulting in a disputed suspension order that barred Atiku from contesting the PDP presidential nomination in December 2006, Atiku left the party and secured the nomination of the Action Congress (AC), a party he had built as an alternative, where his ally and former PDP chairman, Audu Ogbeh was the national chairman.4

Following Atiku’s defection to the Action Congress, on the 23rd of December, 2006 Obasanjo through his Special Assistant on Public Affairs, Mallam Uba Sanni, declared the office of the vice president vacant, and the removal of the immunity conferred on him by the Constitution as well as the withdrawal of all privileges, entitlements, rights and benefits as the vice president. Subsequently, all the security details attached to Atiku were withdrawn, his official residence sealed off by a combined team of armed military and policemen, all official vehicles attached to him withdrawn and all staff attached to his office redeployed.

On February 20th 2007, the Court of Appeal ruled that Obasanjo had no power to declare the office of the vice president vacant. Atiku who had described Obasanjo’s actions as an unconstitutional coup had approached the court to clarify circumstances legally. In an unanimous decision, the Court of Appeal in a judgement delivered by Umaru Abdullahi (JCA) granted the reliefs sought by Atiku as follows:

That the term of office of [Atiku] as the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which commenced from 29th of May 2003 still subsists and does not terminate until 29th of May 2007.

That the President has no power under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other law to declare the office or seat of [Atiku] as Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vacant.

That the purported declaration by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of the office of [Atiku] as the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vacant is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

Following the appeal by the Attorney-General of the Federation, Inspector-General of Police and INEC of the Court of Appeal’s judgement, the Supreme Court on 20th April 2007 (10 NWLR (Pt.1041) 1.) reaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. In addition, Pius Olayiwola Aderemi (JSC) in his judgement berated the Inspector-General of Police and INEC for showing partisanship and partiality in appealing the judgement of the Court of Appeal:

... the most fundamental duty of the Nigeria Police Force is the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order within the country. In the performance of its duty, the Nigeria Police Force must manifestly demonstrate impartiality; it must not lean to one side against the other; it must be apolitical. It must not take part in any disputation, which has political coloration. These qualities are sine qua non to the enhancement of public responsibility to it. The appeal filed by the Inspector-General of Police does the Nigeria Police Force no credit; it paints a picture of partiality by the Force. 

Also, INEC by its statutory existence is an independent body with constitutional powers to conduct elections in Nigeria. It must not only be an umpire, it must be seen, in the eyes of reasonable men, to be an impartial umpire in the conduct of an election. INEC must never by act of omission or commission place itself in a position where imputations of partiality in favour of one party against another one will be levelled against it. Neutrality must be the watchword of the body – it must always remain fair and focused. Having regard to the nature of the function which the Nigeria Police Force also performs, that body must also insulate itself such that impartiality and fairness may at all times be ascribe to it. A situation where both of them (Inspector-General of Police and INEC) appeal in the instant case is very much in bad taste. They have both thrown the quality of impartiality and fairness, which they must possess to the winds. Their acts are capable of eroding the public confidence in them. Unknown to them, they may be said, by the public, to be biased and therefore not worthy to be regarded as impartial umpires. This trend must not repeat itself for the good of the nation.

The feud acquired a further twist for the worse following the disqualification of Atiku as the presidential candidate of the Action Congress by INEC on March 15, 2007. The Commission claimed it was merely applying the constitutional provisions that anyone indicted by an administrative panel or court was not qualified to stand for an election. Despite this excuse, another court has ruled that submission of an EFCC report as the basis of an administrative panel’s decision was illegal and unsupported by the law establishing the EFCC.

On April 16 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that INEC has no power to disqualify any candidate submitted to it by a political party. According to the court “INEC has no constitutional power to disqualify a candidate from contesting elections without a valid order of the court”. The judgement set aside the earlier judgement by the Court of Appeal that INEC has the power to disqualify candidates. The Supreme Court ruled that it is only courts and tribunals established by law that can determine civil rights and obligations of citizens including those vying for elective positions, and allowing INEC to disqualify candidates would amount to usurpation of the powers of the courts.5

Corruption and Governance

T

he major reason Nigeria’s democracy seems to be deconsolidating rather than consolidating in the Fourth Republic is attributable to the high level of corruption in the society and poor governance. 

Corruption is prevalent in the country. The reasons for these include years of military rule, political instability, high level of poverty, low and declining civil service salary and high level of dependants, which all help to create the right conditions/motivations for it to strive, and in the process, decreasing the conditions for good governance to thrive.

In the course of Obasanjo’s eight-year tenure, Nigeria earned $223 billion, two and a half times the amount earned over the previous eight years. But thanks to “kleptocracy” and rampant graft, much of the money has not gone where it should have. Of course, oil revenues had been misused long before Obasanjo’s administration, but the records of Obasanjo makes a lot of Nigerians wonder why, despite the country’s riches, so many of our lives continue to be so wretched.1

Corruption whether political, economic, judicial or bureaucratic impedes the progress of any society where it predominates and is tolerated in societal relationships;2 as it distorts competition, hinders economic growth, pulls down the moral foundation of society and endangers the stability of democratic institutions.3

Nigeria is also one of the most vibrant markets in Africa with an entrepreneurial business culture. Foreign investment, historically, has been dominated by oil and gas, but has broadened substantially in recent years into finance, private equity, power, telecoms, consumer products and mining.4 However, despite Nigeria’s size, and the energy and talents of its people, it has failed to achieve its full potential. The reason for this is predominantly poor leadership, poor infrastructure and a history of high levels of corruption.5 The political class has for decades systematically abused its oil wealth, with an apparent lack of will to face it, for the attendant good of the country due to the high level of their involvement.

As a matter of fact, the almost institutionalisation of corruption in the country has not been due to lack of a legal framework to curb it. There has never been lack of adequate legislation to fight corruption and entrench good governance in the country. What has been lacking is the political will to enforce them, amidst the country’s rapidly developing character of power politics, which tends to influence the outcomes of all corruption cases, even when attempts are made to enforce the anticorruption laws. Notable efforts by governments between 1975 and 2007 to fight corruption include the following measures:

The “Corrupt Practices Decree” of 1975 promulgated by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime.

The Public Complaints Commission and Probe Panel of Murtala/Obasanjo regime.

The Ethical Resolution of Shehu Shagari administration.

Code of Conduct Bureau, 1990 of the Ibrahim Babangida regime.

Advance Fee Fraud & Other Related Offences Decree of 1995 by the Sani Abacha regime, which was later re-enacted as the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006 by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration.

Other measures by Obasanjo administration include:

Corrupt Practices and Money Laundering Act, 2004.

The Procurement Act, 2007.

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

The Nigerian Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiative (NEITI)

The Technical Unit on Governance & Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR).

The Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU), which later became the Bureau for Public Procurement.

Cost of Corruption

Despite all the above mentioned efforts, corruption has continued to spiral, reaching disturbing levels that need to be tackled if good governance is to be achieved. Presently, most of the institutions created to tackle the scourge seem to be weighed down by it, with the seeming inability to fight it. With an apparent near entire collapse of the country’s “integrity systems”6 like elections, anti-corruption agencies and a continuous attempt to compromise the integrity of the judiciary, the attendant cost cannot be ignored.

The cost of corruption to society, government and the private sector is enormous. While it cannot be disputed that it benefits a few individuals, it must be eradicated for the overall interest of the society.7 Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2006) list the cost of corruption as follows:8

Misallocates Resources 

Resources that otherwise could be directed towards production of goods and services are often devoted to corruption. This includes direct resources involved in cash transfers and indirect ones, such as maintaining contacts with government officials or providing an operation or production license to a less efficient firm. Corruption also misallocates resources that could otherwise have been used for the provision of public services. Funds for licenses or tax income, instead of contributing to the budget, may simply end up in the pockets of corrupt government employees. Also, resources are not used most efficiently, as it is not the most efficient but, rather, the best-connected firm that gets a government contract.

Fosters Misguided and Unresponsive Policies and Regulations

In corrupt systems, lawmakers generate policies and regulations that are not intended to improve the overall economic or political well-being of the citizenry. Rather, they make policies that benefit a few who are close to the decision makers or those who are bribing government officials to pass a favourable regulation.

Lowers Investment Levels

Corruption has negative effect on foreign and domestic investments. Investors will certainly avoid environments where corruption is rampant because it increases the cost of doing business and undermines the rule of law. Corruption is also often associated with a high degree of uncertainty, something that always drives investors away.

Reduces Competition and Efficiency

Government officials [who are] demanding bribes for providing or denying services like licenses or permits, limit the number of firms able to enter the market, thereby creating a “rent-seeking” environment that forces companies that are unwilling or unable to pay bribes into the informal economy. Rent seeking sometimes leads to trade protectionism, and bad quality or inefficiently produced input results, which in turn lower effectiveness, productivity and competitiveness. Overall, the lack of competition hurts consumers, who receive fewer technologically advanced goods and goods of otherwise lower quality and pay higher prices for these goods.

Lowers Public Revenue for Essential Goods and Services

Tax evasion, one of the biggest threats to government revenue flow, is widespread in corrupt countries because firms that are informal do not report their profits, and subsequently do not pay taxes. Also, firms that operate in the formal economy will pay bribes instead of taxes when tax administration is corrupt or opportunities for abuse of the tax code are widespread. Moreover, corrupt government agents pilfer the monies they collect, thus depriving government of funds needed to provide essential goods and services.

Increases Public Spending

Public investment projects often offer opportunities for government officials to get bribes. Simply put, faced with the possibility of directly benefiting from awarding contracts to cronies, government officials will promote as many public investment projects as possible. In fact, these scandals erupt not only in corrupt developing countries, but also in more developed nations where corruption is less rampant. In many countries, projects awarded to cronies are never completed as funds simply get stolen. Corruption also causes mismanagement of public investment projects, thus contributing to fiscal deficits, and jeopardy of sound fiscal policies.

Lowers Productivity and Discourages Innovation

In corrupt systems, individuals and firms spend time and resources engaging in corruption (paying bribes, nurturing relationships with corrupt agents, etc.) rather than in growth-enhancing activities. Also, corruption discourages innovation, as corrupt systems lack rule of law, and institutions that protect property rights.

Increases Costs of Doing Business (Serves as a Tax on Business)

Time and money spent on bribing government officials and dealing with complex regulations increase the costs of doing business. These costs are either passed on to the consumers through increased prices or products of lower quality, or serve as barriers to market entry by firms. Also, corrupt judicial systems limit the ability of business to enforce contracts, hinder normal operations and block new business opportunities.

Lowers Growth Levels

Corruption hurts small enterprises because the high costs of corruption (time and money) are harder to sustain for smaller firms than for larger ones. Generally, small firms have less power to avoid corruption, and they tend to operate in highly competitive environments and, thus, cannot pass on the costs of corruption to customers. Thus, in corrupt environments, it is harder for small businesses to survive, and this hurts an economy’s growth rate because small firms are the engine of growth in most economies.

Lowers Private Sector Employment Levels

By forcing business into the informal sector, creating barriers of entry, and increasing the costs of doing business, corruption essentially reduces private sector employment because firms are less likely to grow and expand.

Reduces the Number of Quality Public Sector Jobs

Corrupt governments often offer many low-paying jobs to patronise key constituents. Also, the quality of public jobs suffers in corrupt systems because government officials spend resources on extorting bribes rather than providing services. For example, in many cases, within licensing agencies, public officials will simply stall the licensing process if they do not receive additional payments or gifts.

Exacerbates Poverty and Inequality

Corruption lowers the income-earning potential of the poor because there are fewer private sector opportunities. Also, by limiting spending on public sector services, corruption facilitates inequality – it limits access to such essential resources as healthcare and education.

Undermines the Rule of Law

Corruption creates a culture where government officials are not held accountable for their actions. Also, in corrupt systems, laws and regulations on paper are not enforced consistently and fairly. Therefore, what matters is not the law but whom you know and how much you are willing to pay.

Hinders Democratic, Market-Oriented Reforms

In order to be successful in building market economies and democratic societies, countries have to build and develop institutions that provide the enforcement of laws and ensure a transparent and inclusive policy-making process. In corrupt systems, developing such sound and well-designed institutions is an arduous task. Corrupt government officials responsible for reforms are less likely to take measures that will directly limit their ability to personally benefit from bribes and kickbacks. Corruption also undermines the legitimacy of public office and hurts the democratic process by discouraging people from participating.

Increases Political Instability

Widespread Corruption contributes to political instability because citizens are encouraged to oust leaders who are corrupt and who cannot represent the interest of the people.

Contributes to High Crime Rates

Corruption disregards the rule of law and creates a society where legal, judicial, and enforcement institutions are ineffective. In corrupt systems, it is easy for crooks to buy their way out of punishment. Corruption not only leads to political and corporate crime, but it is also responsible for fostering organised crime.

Impact of Corruption on Development and Governance

“Corruption” and “good governance” sit at the opposite ends of a spectrum. While good governance represents the ideal for governments, corporations and nations globally, corruption is a scourge that decent people, organisations and governments seek to eradicate.9

Corruption poses a serious challenge to development.10 When viewed against the backdrop of governance, corruption goes beyond being a moral issue to become a development/poverty issue. Poor governance and corruption is a cancer in the development process, and a cancer that is unfortunately the cause of a good deal of the poverty we have seen.11

Even though enhancing good governance is much more than fighting corruption, it still has fighting corruption as its core. It is corruption that fuels the widespread logic in Nigeria that government institutions at every level serve the personal interest of office holders rather than the national interest or the good of the wider community. This behaviour stems from decades of military rule, and even dates back to colonialism. Since government officials and political leaders are themselves perceived to be ‘on the make’, there is little shame in cheating officialdom, or in offering incentives to bureaucrats in return for personal favours.12

However, governance is much more than fighting corruption. It is about having transparent and accountable governments. This is why parliaments are so important as checks to the executive; a free press as a vehicle for conveying information to the society; and civil society and the private sector to increase governments’ response to the pressure that comes from their own people. It is also about improving the competence of government.13 The impact of corruption on development and governance in Nigeria can also be assessed from its role in democratic deconsolidation and economic underdevelopment.

Democratic Deconsolidation

The concept of democratic deconsolidation says the opposite to the well-known concept of democratic consolidation. 

Democratic consolidation is an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic systems that are critical to the establishment of a stable, institutional and lasting democracy. All discussions of democratic consolidation carry an explicit or implicit definition of what democracy is, and analysts are not predisposed to assigning the “consolidated democracy” label to a political system that does not meet all of their criteria for what a democracy shouldbe.14

Democratic deconsolidation on the other hand are factors which when present, threatens the existence or long-term security of new democracies. They are those factors that breed reasonable fear that the democracy will not continue in the long-run due to their presence. These factors are those to be blamed for political instability, and are mainly influenced by the failure of the political class to abide by the doctrines of democracy and constitutionalism.  

The above scenario gives rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process and weakening of institutions.15 This contradicts the tenets of governance, which presupposes the process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community.16 Nothing contributes more to deconsolidation of democracy like power struggles and corruption. Successive military regimes have always given corruption, as reasons for regime changes. So, after long years of military rule, the lack of political will to curb this hydra-headed problem has often led to the question “Is the political class ready for democracy?” with their self-serving attitudes.

Democratic consolidation is also compromised when the rule of law is not adhered to. The law plays an important role in the sustenance of democracy. The worst sickness any society could be afflicted with is a corrupt judiciary, as it compromises the rule of law and endangers the entire polity.

The success of democracy as well as its consolidation is hinged on the law. For the ideals of any democratic state to be strengthened and subsequently consolidated, there is need to go along with the laws governing it.17

Corruption in the country’s political process attacks the basic democratic principles, notably: the supremacy of the law; the openness of decision making (accountability and transparency); the independence of the judiciary as well as the electoral body and; genuine popular participation in the selection of political office holders as well as governance. Any act that affects these principles has a direct bearing on the consolidation of democracy.

Economic Underdevelopment

Corruption undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions in the private sector, and increases the cost of doing business [see cost of corruption earlier in the chapter].19 On the occasion of the launching of the EFCC’s “Fix Nigeria Initiative” in 2006, then EFCC chairman Nuhu Ribadu told a bewildered audience that about $220billion (about N65 trillion at the exchange rate then) has been stolen by past Nigerian leaders within the first 46 years of independence.20 Luke Onyekekeyah commenting on the disclosure and its impact on development in The Guardian wrote that:21

What else could have brazenly subjugated and enslaved Nigeria and its people? The slave trade did not bring ruin to the entire Africa in such a magnitude. The Nigerian Civil War did not cost the country such whopping material fortune. Nothing indeed has inflicted such grave injury that has bled this nation and pauperised its people. [What's more], the stolen N65 trillion quoted by Ribadu was only part of $500 billion official development assistance (ODA) granted to Nigeria during the four decades... Add N65 trillion to Nigeria’s total earnings from crude oil during the same period, which is put at $600 billion (about N84 trillion) by the African Development Bank (ADB), that will be N149 trillion! That is to say our past leaders corruptly stole our collective patrimony, which could have recreated the beauty and glory of Western Europe fourteen times.

Retrospectively, every road accident resulting from a badly constructed road; every death in a government hospital from unavailability of vital drugs and equipments; every distorted dream taking a child who would have made some beneficial invention into the backwaters of thuggery, hooliganism, ‘area boyism’, kidnapping, armed robbery, etc can all be traced to corruption and bad governance.22

In the Fourth Republic, through the damage wreaked on the credibility of its public institutions in both access to power and accountability by Olusegun Obasanjo, more lasting damage has been done to the fight against corruption, and the [entrenchment of good governance] in the country than arguably all the regimes before him, including the regime that succeeded him. By manifestly politicising and instrumenting anticorruption, he brought the necessary effort to reign in corruption in Nigeria into disrepute and will, for several more years yet, continue to afflict Nigeria’s public institutions with an unspeakable credibility crisis.23

Anticorruption Crusades: 

The Politics of Failed Initiatives

W

hen Obasanjo assumed the presidency of the country on May 29, 1999, he started a war against corruption, with the immediate revocation of contracts awarded between January to April 1999 by his immediate predecessor, General Abdusalami Abubakar on the allegations that the contracts were hurriedly and dubiously awarded.1 Considering the role Abduslalam Abubakar played in releasing Obasanjo from prison, granting him a presidential pardon and making his election as president possible, many considered his move a very brave one.2 While in power, Obasanjo conceived and executed a number of measures to combat corruption. Prominent among them is the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) on September 29, 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in April 2004.

The creation of both agencies was primarily to placate growing domestic and international pressures, and secondarily, to reflect Obasanjo’s supposed political commitment, as a founding member of Transparency International. Even though it was not the first time anticorruption agencies would be created in Nigeria, the coming of the duo, especially ICPC, raised a lot of controversies, mainly because of the extent of their powers.3

While the Supreme Court in its decision on Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors [2002] 9 NWLR (Pt 722) 222 and reaffirmed in Olafisoye v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 864) 580 sustained the constitutional validity of the Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Act 20004 (the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission Act was the first bill sent to the National Assembly by Obasanjo in 1999 when he assumed office), the Supreme Court decision did not stop the criticism of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2002 when it was enacted. One of the country’s foremost constitutional lawyers, Professor Ben Nwabueze described the EFCC as an unconstitutional and illegal organisation:5

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is one of the monstrous instruments of personal power employed by President Obasanjo in the service of his lawless state. The lawlessness of the Commission has two aspects – the illegality (i.e. the unconstitutionality) of its powers or many of them under its constituent statute, the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, and the illegality of its actions taken purportedly pursuant to, but which are not within its illegal powers; that is to say, of double illegality, of illegality upon illegality. An act done within power is illegal if it is outside the enabling power but we are talking about an act illegal because its enabling power is illegal and because it is done outside its illegal enabling power.

And took sides with then Attorney-General of the Federation, Michael Andoakaa, during his faceoff with then EFCC Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu over powers of prosecution of the EFCC:

The constitution in Section 174 vests in the attorney-general, the power to oversee all prosecutions including financial and economic crimes. If you read the section together with section 6 of the EFCC Act 2004 which says that the EFCC shall be responsible for the enforcement of economic and financial crimes, it means the power of the EFCC excludes the power of the police and the attorney-general... The constitution is supreme over the EFCC Act and the constitution vests the power in the attorney-general. You cannot go by ordinary law to say that the EFCC should coordinate all enforcement functions, responsibility activities, etc connected with all economic and financial crimes. You are merely subverting the constitution.

The EFCC Act is unconstitutional and void. I support the attorney-general in asserting the authority of the constitution. That is what he is doing.6

However, Jiti Ogunye, a lawyer, in reply to Nwabueze’s position and relevance of the EFCC posited that:

The ICPC and the EFCC might have been conceived in the womb of complex, local and international politics (for instance, the EFCC, following the global pressure to freeze rogue money worldwide after September 11), but it can no longer be doubted that their birth, growth and current existence have given fillip to the fight against official graft in Nigeria. The ICPC, EFCC and the CCB [Code of Conduct Bureau] function specifically within the framework of their respective enabling statutes and generally pursuant to the dictates of the constitution (the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act; and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act).

They are vested with broad investigation and prosecutorial powers. The fact that the ICPC and the EFCC are not listed in the constitution and the police, army, navy and air force are, does not imply that the anti-graft bodies do not have and that they cannot exercise coercive, law enforcement powers. The State Security Service, the National Intelligence Agency, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Customs and Excise, and the Immigration and Prison Services are either not named in or vested with powers under the constitution. Yet, no person can seriously argue that they lack coercive, law enforcement powers.7

Obasanjo also led an international campaign to recover funds looted from the country by past leaders. This action was buoyed by the efforts of his predecessor, General Abdusalami Abubakar who between the time of General Sani Abacha’s death and May 1999, is said to have recovered $825 million from Abacha’s family members, leaving a total of $1.3 billion frozen in several banks in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein (all the funds recovered by Abubakar were within Nigeria).8 

Although Obasanjo’s efforts produced moderate results – the recovery of an additional $1.175 billion, his campaign was however undermined by his own undue focus on Abacha, limited cooperation received from some foreign countries (UK, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein), and protracted litigation by accused persons. More importantly, the illegal transfer of funds by public officials did not abate, pointing to the shortcomings in the campaigns against corruption being waged back home.9 Even with the EFCC which was perceived to have gained some successes back home, the politicisation of corruption severely blighted its efforts.

Politicising Corruption

With just some few weeks to the 2007 general elections, the polity became overheated with the introduction of new dimensions into the country’s democratic process. New “twist and turns” were witnessed, which almost derailed the entire process.10

The EFCC came out with a list of allegedly corrupt persons seeking elective offices, who in its judgement should not be presented as candidates by their parties.11

The listing of politicians, in such a manner that suggest their incapacitation to continue with the political process, is not new in the country’s political process. In those days of military interventions in the political administration of the country, the first set of people, who [were] declared politically unfit after a successful takeover, were politicians. The political parties were normally disbanded, while the constitution that empowers democratic rule was sent on suspension. In fact, some politicians have lost their lives as soldiers attempted to put them out of business.12

There was widespread condemnation of the EFCC’s action. Auwalu Yadudu, a law professor at the Bayero University Kano, who was the legal adviser to the late General Sani Abacha held that it operated beyond its limit:

I find it very curious why an agency established for the purpose of fighting economic crimes and also whose mandate is clear cut should choose to adopt or assume a mandate that you can hardly find under the law establishing it... The timing is wrong and the motive is difficult to explain... There are people that are being suspected of one malpractice or another and they are so conspicuously absent from that list... These people appear to be either too close to Mr. President or somehow they are too powerful to be put on that list... What the EFCC is doing is precisely the kind of gimmick that the military have used in the screening process of which “we know who would succeed us” and therefore if you happen not to be one of those in their good books, they would find a way of frustrating your efforts or making sure you don’t even stand for an election.13

And Odia Ofeimum, who condemned the Commission’s arrogation of itself  the role of investigator, prosecutor and judge, by allowing its own report to be used for the disqualification of candidates at an election, which brought its integrity and professional nous under questioning, as it made itself vulnerable to manipulations from higher quarters:

Once the EFCC defines its role as that of excluding the corrupt from the process of governance, it places itself squarely within the bracket of seeds that higher powers could manipulate to win pyrrhic victories on the electoral draughtsboard. There is a clear conflation of roles involved here because fighting corruption is not in the same line of business as excluding the corrupt from the process of governance. Fighting corruption can yield exclusion from governance but excluding people from governance without proving corruption is itself a very corrupt and fraudulent act.14

[Also see Chapters 3, 6 and 8].

Between Nuhu Ribadu and Farida Waziri

On April 17, 2012, a London court convicted James Ibori, a former governor of Delta State to a 13-year prison term for money laundering. Before Ibori’s conviction by the London court, Justice Marcel Awokulehin had in December 2009, dismissed all the 170 counts against Ibori in a case brought against him by the EFCC for money laundering and attempt to bribe Nuhu Ribadu with $15 million case. Awokulehin dismissed the charges without hearing evidence, in the least at the trial.

Two weeks after Ibori was arrested and subsequently charged before his acquittal by Awokulehin, Ribadu was removed from office. Many Nigerians had assumed that Ibori was untouchable prior to his arrest because he was a close ally of Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua, who was president at the time. Ibori was widely believed to have financially backed the president’s election campaign.15

In April 2003, then President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Nuhu Ribadu, a lawyer and an Assistant Commissioner of Police as the first chairman of the EFCC. Ribadu’s tenure was of mixed feelings and results. While some hailed him for his charismatic and media-friendly nature, which also aided the growth of his public profile; others yet like former Commissioner of Police,Abubakar Tsav considered the EFCC under Ribadu’s leadership to be “Lacking in supervision and therefore embedded in all forms of illegality [also adding that], Ribadu and other officers in the EFCC [were] living far above their legitimate earnings, [with] their lifestyles depicting corruption.16

Ribadu also bought his official residence, located in the highbrow Asokoro District of Abuja. The house which is worth over N200 million was meant to be the official residence of a deputy inspector-general of police. It was allocated to Ribadu, who was then only a deputy commissioner of police. Ribadu claimed his father in-law, Professor Iya Abubakar, a former senator bought the house. On the other hand, he failed to explain why no residence of all the deputy inspector-generals were sold; and why a serving senator, who is not a policeman will be allowed to buy the official residence of a deputy inspector-general of police.17

With all its shortcomings and challenges, the EFCC recorded strings of successes, as the arrowhead of the country’s fight against corruption during the Obasanjo administration. Part of the current high level of consciousness by the citizenry to the dangers and effect of corruption is not unconnected with the activities of the EFCC during this period.18

Ribadu was succeeded by Farida Waziri, a lawyer and retired Assistant-Inspector General of Police. Her appointment generated more controversy than the activities of the Commission during the reign of her predecessor. Many questioned the manner she was brought in just as some even went to court to challenge President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua for choosing her for the position.19

In November 2011, Waziri was also removed from her position by Yar’ Adua’s successor and former deputy, Goodluck Jonathan with just seven months to the end of her tenure. Her removal was announced by presidential spokesman, Rueben Abati who said that “The removal of the EFCC chair is part of President Jonathan’s determination to revitalise the fight against corruption”. Waziri’s tenure was at best mixed. While some critics claim EFCC lost its energy and vigour under her tenure, and that instead of using the courts she resorted to “trial by headlines”; 20 she also earned commendation in recovering assets that were proceeds of crime. From its inception in 2003, the EFCC has recovered over $11 billion of which some $6.5 billion was recovered during her tenure. She was also at the forefront for the creation of special courts for the trial of corruption suspects since the conventional courts were too busy with other cases. Her advocacy for special courts as well as frustrations on the issue of delay in courts received attention when the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Dahiru Mustapha ordered high court judges to dispense with corruption cases within 6 months. Before she could savour the priceless solidarity, she was booted out.21

Impediments to Success in the Anticorruption Crusades

It is clear that the fight against corruption has received much attention. However, the implementation have proved extremely difficult due to the weak capacity of the anticorruption agencies, political interference,22 and other impediments Human Rights Watch listed in one of its report as obstacles to success.23

Weak Capacity/Incompetence

One of the tragedies of the anticorruption crusades is that the major institutions created to perform the functions (ICPC and EFCC), lack the capacity to do so. Their problems include: inadequate human and material resources, constitutional loopholes, ineffective criminal justice system and lack of autonomy.24

The EFCC for instance has also managed to damage some of its own prosecutions through errors and incompetence. Under Ribadu, the EFCC was sometimes criticised for its penchants for high-profile arrests and public “invitations” of prominent suspects to come in for questioning before criminal investigations were complete. While these tactics earned headlines and may have struck fear into the hearts of some corrupt public officials, they also undermined the underlying investigations. As one official told Human Rights Watch “The day you make an announcement to the media should be the day you have filed a case – otherwise you are just saying ‘hide your tracks we are coming’”.25 Waziri was not spared from this criticism either with her “trial by headlines”.

Political Interference and Lack of Autonomy

In a purely structural sense, the EFCC is deeply vulnerable to the whims of the president, as the Commission’s chairman enjoys no tenure of office and can be removed by the president at will, without any form of consultation with the National Assembly. Section 3 (2) of the EFCC Act provides that:

A member of the Commission may at any time be removed by the President... if the President is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Commission or the interest of the public that the member should continue in office.

The has never recovered from its politically selective prosecutions of the Obasanjo era, especially during the run-up to the 2007 general elections when it was used as a tool by Obsanjo to undermine political rivals and weaken opposition. Also, two former EFCC chairmen, Nuhu Ribadu and Farida Waziri had running battles with Attorney-General and Ministers of Justice – Nuhu Ribadu with Michael Aondoakaa and Farida Waziri with Aondoakaa and his successor, Mohammed Adoke. In January 2011, Adoke took over a rare high-profile ICPC corruption case against Minister of State for Health, Suleiman Bello without offering explanations for the move. “We brought the case and the attorney-general just told us to drop it”, an ICPC official told Human Rights Watch.27

A System that Rewards Corruption28

The broadest obstacle any effort to tackle corruption in Nigeria faces is this: the country’s political system is built to reward corruption, not punish it. Too often, corruption is a prerequisite for success in Nigeria’s warped political process. Since 1999, elections have been stolen more often than won, and many politicians owe their illicitly-obtained offices to political sponsors who demand financial “returns” that can only be raised through corruption. Put simply, the day-to-day functioning of Nigeria’s political system constantly and directly undermines the EFCC’s work.

Powerful ruling party power-broker and former Nigerian Ports Authority chairman Olabode “Bode” George was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for contract-related offenses in 2009. His conviction after a swift and efficient trial was in many ways a landmark success for the EFCC. But his case is also an example of the willingness of Nigeria’s political establishment to embrace convicted criminals.

Bode George was released from prison in February 2011. Far from being treated as a pariah because of his misdeeds, he was whisked from his jail cell to a lavish welcome ceremony attended by prominent ruling party politicians including former President Obasanjo, then Ogun State governor Gbenga Daniel, and then-minister of defense Ademola Adetokunbo. According to media reports, a former transportation minister even declared that George’s conviction had been unfair because all government officials engage in the same illegal practices he had been convicted of. Nigeria watched the ruling party establishment, including a sitting cabinet minister from the same administration that supposedly backs the EFCC’s anti-corruption agenda, welcome Bode George back into its arms as though he were a conquering hero rather than

a convicted criminal. Meanwhile, the Lagos State judge who sent Bode George to prison was removed from criminal matters and sent to work in family court. While there is no proof that the move was connected to George’s conviction, many Nigerian activists and commentators found it hard to believe it was a coincidence.

Bode George’s story is not an anomaly. Ten months after former Bayelsa State governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was convicted on corruption charges, Goodluck Jonathan, who was vice president at the time, and late president Yar’Adua openly campaigned alongside Alamieyeseigha in May 2008 at a political rally in Bayelsa State. These images of senior government officials embracing convicted criminals only served to reinforce the broader trend of impunity that these convictions were meant to push back against.

Nigeria’s political establishment, both the ruling party and leading opposition parties, openly welcome into their ranks politicians accused of corruption. Joshua Dariye and Abdullahi Adamu, former state governors of Plateau and Nasarawa, respectively, have both been arraigned by the EFCC on corruption charges but won elections to the Senate in the April 2011 elections. Two of the legislators awaiting trial on corruption charges – Igwe Paulinus and Ndudi Elumelu – also won their elections to seats in the House of Representatives. Eight other former governors arraigned on corruption charges by the EFCC won party nominations to stand in the 2011 elections, either for governor or senator. 

Unreliability of ICPC and CCB29

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) – the two other federal institutions specifically tasked with fighting corruption – have been widely criticised as ineffectual. Their shortcomings are important – both institutions have powers and resources that in some ways outstrip those of the EFCC and could be very potent weapons in the fight against corruption. If both were functioning properly and had the right leadership in place, they could greatly bolster the EFCC’s anticorruption work and perhaps even taken the leading role.

The ICPC – not the EFCC – was originally meant to be Nigeria’s primary institution to address corruption in the public sector. The ICPC has broader powers than the EFCC to fight public sector corruption and is more insulated from the dictates of the presidency. For example, the ICPC has broader powers than the EFCC to seize the assets of allegedly corrupt public officials and compel production of financial information. The ICPC can even compel public officials to explain how they acquired property that its investigators deem “excessive” in relation to their salaries – a power that has no parallel in the EFCC Act. However,  the institution is widely regarded as ineffective in spite of its broad powers and has shown little appetite for high-level corruption cases. Since 2000, the agency has arraigned 520 people on various corruption charges and secured 25 convictions, but only 10 of the defendants were nationally prominent political figures. Out of those cases, seven defendants – charged in 2005 – died or had their case dismissed; two of the trials, at this writing, had not yet begun; and only one case had resulted in a conviction. 

In June 2010, former chairman of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Bello Lafiaji was sentenced to four years in prison on seven counts of financial crimes, including taking €164,300 to release a suspect arrested on drug charges.

Senator Sola Akinyede, chairman of the Senate committee that oversees both the ICPC and EFCC, told Human Rights Watch that the institution makes no use of its broad asset seizure powers and wastes enormous resources on ineffectual “public education” efforts on the evils of corruption. In 2010 the ICPC published a front-page interview with controversial Ogun State governor, Gbenga Daniel in its glossy promotional magazine which uncritically examined the governor’s claims to fight corruption by “monitoring performance” of government agencies and remaining in close contact with his constituents. Meanwhile, in 2011 the EFCC announced that it was probing allegations of corruption against the same governor.

In the view of many ICPC critics, the institution has been consistently hobbled by lethargic and deeply conservative leadership. “The major problem of the ICPC is leadership,” Senator Akinyede told Human Rights Watch. “It has been run by geriatrics right from the day it was created because of problems with the interpretation of [the ICPC Act].” Specifically, the law requires the ICPC chairman to have the same experience as would be required for appointment to the High Court or above. While Nigeria’s Constitution only requires that High Court judges be qualified to practice law in Nigeria for at least 10 years prior to their appointment, past presidents have only nominated ICPC chairmen who have actually served on the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. This has produced a very narrow pool of candidates for the job, many of whom have already retired from public service. In February 2011 the Senate rejected President Jonathan’s nominee for the post, 72-year-old retired Supreme Court justice Pius Olayiwola Aderemi, expressing “serious concerns about the capacity and ability of the nominee to meet the demands of the job.”

The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal

The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the Code of Conduct Tribunal – are constitutionally mandated bodies, first established in 1990. They have a far narrower and specific mandates than the EFCC and ICPC: to enforce a code of conduct for public officials. The primary role of the CCB is to collect asset declarations from every one of Nigeria’s approximately 2.1 million public officials and verify their accuracy. Analyzing so many declarations in a meaningful way would be a logistical impossibility, and the bureau doesn’t try to do so. CCB chairman Sam Saba says that the bureau focuses its attention on the asset declarations of high-level officials and officials who are the subject of public petitions alleging financial misconduct. That focus is a sensible one, but

Saba acknowledges that even there his bureau makes little progress. “On the investigation side we have received a lot of petitions [alleging wrongdoing],” he complained, “but our staffs do not have the capacity to properly investigate and prosecute these cases.”

The government’s failure to empower the CCB to realize its mandate is another glaring problem. Nigeria’s constitution provides that the bureau will make all asset declarations available for public inspection, but Nigeria’s legislature has failed to enact the legislation necessary to operationalize that provision. Saba told Human Rights Watch he visited the speaker of the House of Representatives in late 2010 or early 2011 to urge passage of this legislation. “But the way he laughed, I knew nothing would come of it,” he said. “We have raised this issue with the National Assembly since 1999 with no success.”

On the other hand, Senator Akinyede told Human Rights Watch that, “I believe the CCB likes to use the lack of legislation as an excuse for non-performance.” He pointed out that the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act allows the institution to discipline any public officer who cannot account for the sources of his or her wealth – a power he says the CCB has used sparingly and perhaps never at all. In May 2011 the National Assembly passed, and President Jonathan signed into law, the Freedom of Information Act that guarantees

the public the right to access public records. This new law could provide an alternative – albeit indirect and potentially complicated—way to force disclosure of this information.

There are other very important powers at the CCB’s disposal that it appears to make inadequate use of. The Code of Conduct Tribunal can remove public officials from office and bar them from holding office for a period of up to 10 years for violating any provision of the code of conduct for public officials set down in Nigeria’s constitution – several provisions of which deal with financial probity and transparency. It forbids, for example high-level officials including state governors from maintaining any bank account outside of Nigeria, yet never pursues it or sanction erring individuals. The CCB has also displayed similar lethargy in finding innovative ways to cooperate with other arms of government. In the end, it has had little impact in keeping corrupt politicians out of public office.

The Way Forward

Delivering Nigeria from the corrupt from the corruption malaise requires a sustained and coordinated effort by all the actors involved. As it has been observed, the problem is not in the lack of a legal framework, but that of an effective implementation and proficient management system. To achieve this, a number of measures have to be put in place.

Making the EFCC autonomous and providing a security of tenure for its chairmen, and appointing the right leadership for the different anticorruption agencies, and improving the courts would go a long way in achieving great results. Others includes: fighting corruption through education, NGOs and civil societies playing active roles and involving the media.

Autonomy of EFCC

For the EFCC to effectively ‘bark and bite’, the first thing to do is to decouple it from the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation. It must be totally independent to the extent that its chairman should no longer be a presidential appointee. The chairman of such an important organ must in addition, enjoy the security of tenure, not to be hired and fired at will.30 At a minimum, the position should enjoy the same tenure security as the ICPC chairman, who the president cannot remove from office without the assent of two-thirds majority of the senate – and even then only on the grounds of incapacity or misconduct. The EFCC Act should also be amended to explicitly bar the removal or redeployment of an EFCC chairman that is a serving police officer, until the tenure of the person elapse.31

Appointing the Right Leadership

The EFCC Act requires that the Commission’s chairman be “a serving or retired member of any government security or law enforcement agency not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police or equivalent”. This requirement should be eliminated and replaced with objective criteria focused solely on a prospective chairman’s integrity, experience and ability. The ICPC chairman, for example, need only be “qualified to hold office as a judge of a superior court of record in Nigeria”, but he or she need not have actually held that position.32

The ICPC also needs the purposeful leadership. Critics of the organisation have long complained that the institution has been hobbled by leadership that is too conservative and unwilling to deploy its full range of powers to fight high-level corruption. Regardless of whether those critiques are fair, the time to get the right leadership is now. ICPC chairmen should not only have sufficient independence with proven record of integrity, competence, and efficiency; it should also be someone who can articulate a clear vision of how he or she would put the ICPC where it belongs – at the front lines of Nigeria’s fight against corruption.33

Working to Improve the Courts34

The country’s weak and overburdened court system is an obstacle to effective anticorruption prosecutions – and is responsible for considerable injustice in other arenas as well. Wholesale reform of the courts would be a long-term process of enormous complexity. But in the short term there are steps that should be taken to improve the courts and also impact on their handling of corruption cases:

Improving the basic infrastructure of the court system.

The government should consider reforms to federal criminal procedure and evidence rules, which have remained largely unmodified since the colonial period.

The government should explore the idea of designating special corruption courts within the existing federal court system – these would receive additional resources, enjoy lighter caseloads.

Provision of both financial incentives and additional security to judges working on high-profile corruption cases 

Equipping judges with the necessary background to understand complex financial crimes. This is not a new idea – it would largely mean expanding existing programs that designate certain judges as focal points for EFCC cases.

Fighting Corruption through Education

Many people have come to the conclusion that our system compromises people more than it deters them. The EFCC and other anti-corruption/security agencies are not the whole answers at all. “The rot that has gripped the nation is massive and requires appropriate social reengineering at all levels, especially in public institutions. The EFCC is an enforcement agency. This means its prosecutorial activities are characteristically post facto, largely interventionist and reactionary.”36 No matter how effective the Commission may be, we should not mistake its role/activity for the social reengineering the country must embark on.37

The nation has witnessed a social reengineering before. The War Against Indiscipline (WAI) that was introduced by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime re-orientated Nigerians on how to behave in public places. Within a short while, queuing in public places became a regular feature coupled with a renewed vigour for nationalism. The Nigerian national flag started adorning homes and offices. If the campaign was institutionalised, the country could have been the best for it, but it rather died with the demise of the regime.38

Public education and reorientation should be a necessary part of the institutional campaign. We have seen how Britain, France and Germany stamped out corruption to a large extent from their public life. After various legislations especially in the 19th century did not stop the situation from growing worse, education was found to be an effective antidote.39

The Role of NGOs/Civil Societies in Curbing Corruption

One of the greatest influences on governments and international politics since the middle of the 19th century are NGOs. Their effectiveness and ability to garner wide supports, contacts and information across borders have contributed to making them highly instrumental parts of international relations, thereby helping in influencing policy making.40

Civil society playing a key role in fighting corruption is a widely accepted paradigm, which has become a cliché of anti-corruption dissertations. Civil societies that are well-developed represent a wide-range of interests. With their diverse organisational cultures, it gives them the opportunity to see the corruption problem from dissimilar viewpoints. This help in bringing about different opinions, which can be used in designing strategies with a higher chance of success.41

The political will to fight corruption based on a broad-based support from various sources in civil society guarantees the measures taken are not politically biased. The variety of interests make certain, the anti-corruption drive responds, in the end, to the public interest.42

As the main stakeholders in national governance and ultimate victims of corruption, civil society is a key sector in the fight against corruption. Civil society can help to create awareness, deepen appreciation of deleterious consequences, and generate demand for effective measures to reduce corruption. This is important for getting political leaders and policy makers to initiate reforms against corruption. Civil society is also crucial for fostering public support and ownership of reforms, thereby enhancing their legitimacy and sustainability.43

Indeed, civil society organisations, NGOs, trade unions and anti-corruption advocacy groups can help to make corruption a major issue in national and local elections and transform the electoral system into a veritable facility for throwing out corrupt public officials and motivating elected officials to keep to an anticorruption agenda. The energy, dynamism, and single-mindedness of civil society deployed in this mobilisation exercise is the only way to counteract the strong tendency for national leaders and the international community to pay only lip service to combating corruption.44

The Role of the Media in Fighting Corruption

One of the most vibrant of Africa’s media is the Nigerian media. The press has a great role to play in governance the world over. One of its sacred responsibilities is to expose those deeds or misdeeds that the government of the day would rather have hushed up.45

The role of the media is in its capacity to covering or covering up information on corruption. By providing the public accurate information on time, it tends to serve as the conscience of the society. Public opinion is virtually shaped mostly in the media, which is the utmost explainer connecting the government and the people.46

However, in all democratic societies, some form of difficult relationships exists between the press and the government. This is because of the tendencies to influence news and shape agendas for public debate that are always in existence. These tendencies when backed by restrictions on the media are likely to be damaging to such public debates and put journalists who have gone great lengths to reveal corrupt practices at risk .47 Despite this handicap, its role as a whistle blower is of great importance to the fight against corruption.

The Cleen Foundation in a conference in Abuja in 2010 with the theme: Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings came forth with the following recommendations to stem the tide of corruption and bad governance in Nigeria:48

Curbing Public Sector Corruption:

Whistleblowers in public service should be encouraged and protected by legislation, policy and administrative practices.

The salary and benefit regimes in the public service should be enhanced so that people can live by their wages.

Public accountability mechanisms such as audit, monitoring and evaluation should be strengthened by making them truly independent and adequately resourced.

The appointment process of heads of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) should be advertised in the media and public hearings conducted on shortlisted persons so that people who have had dealings with them can come and testify about their integrity.

Need to review downwards the perks of public office so that people who have interests other than the good of the people would be discouraged from seeking office.

All public office holders especially those in leadership positions in education, health and power supply should be made to consume what they produce.

Need to institute clear performance indicators for public servants to ensure efficiency.

Need to implement fully the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the Public Procurement Act.

Curbing Private Sector Corruption:

Professional bodies within the financial sector should adopt and enforce effective code of ethics regulating their members and discipline those found guilty of misconduct and other financial malfeasance.

Shareholders and Boards of Directors of banks and other financial institutions should take seriously the issue of corporate governance in order to check corruption within the sector.

The organised private sector should adopt a code of business ethics to regulate the activities of their members and should sign up to the convention on business integrity.

The Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON) should step up mechanisms for checking the importation and production of substandard and fake goods.

Need to improve the effectiveness of the taxation regime to prevent abuse and control the influence of unearned income in the economy.

Need for the establishment of consumer pressure groups to liaise with the organised private sector to improve the quality of goods and services delivered to the Nigerian consumer.

The anticorruption crusades have been politicised and denuded of capacity, credibility and effectiveness. The capacity of the judiciary to offer any meaningful dispute resolution or remedies in the midst of such habitual corruption has compromised the country’s jurisprudence and made the society to become quite tolerant or complicit in corruption. Nigeria is one of the continent’s poster-territories for how not to address corruption or governance reform. To change this, the basics of state-building and anticorruption crusades must be taken out of the exotic.49 

 A thorough reform of the institutional skills, modernisation and independence of the institutions of the electoral umpire, public service police and judiciary must be taken seriously. As a matter of fact, until the independence of the Nigeria Police Force, Independent National Electoral Commission and judiciary is guaranteed and given a national priority the fight against corruption would remain an exercise in futility50

Notes

Electoral Violence and Rigged Elections

Electoral Reform Committee Report, 2008, Vol. 1:19

Human Rights Watch. Criminal Politics: Violenece, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria. Vol. 19. No 16 (A), October 2007. Page 15

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/westafrica/nigeria/126-nigeria-failed-elections-failingstate-aspx Accessed June 13, 2012

Ibid

M. T. Ladan. “Enforcement of Electoral Law and Combating Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Role of the Police, INEC and the Judiciary”. Paper presented at the International Conference on Assessing Democratic Development in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007, 13 – 14 February, 2007.

Etannibi E.O. Alemika. “Post Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trends and Lessons”. Accessed on June 13, 2012 from

http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/07/post-election-violence-in-nigeria.html

Quoted in Etannibi E.O. Alemika. “Post Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trends and Lessons”. Accessed on June 13, 2012 from http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/07/post-election-violence-in-nigeria.html

Etannibi E.O. Alemika. “Post Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trends and Lessons”. Accessed on June 13, 2012 from

http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/07/post-election-violence-in-nigeria.html

M. T. Ladan. “Enforcement of Electoral Law and Combating Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Role of the Police, INEC and the Judiciary”. Paper presented at the International Conference on Assessing Democratic Development in Nigeria, 1999 – 2007, 13 – 14 February, 2007.

Etannibi E.O. Alemika. “Post Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trends and Lessons”. Accessed on June 13, 2012 from http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/07/post-election-violence-in-nigeria.html

Sam O. Smah “Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria” in Victor A. O. Adetula (ed) Money and Politics in Nigeria. International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2008

All the case studies were culled from Human Rights Watch. Criminal Politics: Violenece, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria. Vol. 19. No 16 (A), October 2007.

 

Gales of Impeachments and Complicity of the Federal Government

Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis. Crisis Group Africa Report N0 123, 28 March 2007, Page 3

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 96

Ibid – 97

Ibid – 99

Quoted in Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Pages 99 – 100

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Pages 100 – 101 

Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis. Crisis Group Africa Report N0 123, 28 March 2007, Page 3

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page101

Quoted from facts of the case, 

Ademola Adegbamigbe. “Above the Law: The Story of Lamidi Adedibu.

http://mobile.sarahareporters.com/news-page/above-law-story-chief-lamidi-adedibu

Accessed June 18, 2012 

Ibid  

http://mobile.sarahareporters.com/news-page/breaking-news-fayoseand-deputy-impeached-hiswhereabouts-still-unknown

Accessed June 18, 2012

Quoted from President Olusegun Obasanjo’s letter to the National Assembly on why a state of emergency should be declared in Ekiti State, published in The Guardian, October 27, 2006.

Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. 

http:news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6215057.stm 

Accessed June 18, 2012 

http://sarahareporters.com/peter-obi-anambra-state-impeached

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page101

Dapianglong v. Dariye. SC.39/2007/27th April, 2007 (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 289

Ibid  

Solomon Lar was quoted in Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. Page

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page107

Executive/Legislative Face-offs and the Challenges of Democratic Governance

http://www.slideshare.net/kayodefayemi/nigerias-first-national-assembly-and-the-challenge-of-democratic-governance-in-the-fourth-republic. Accessed May 27, 2012

Ibid 

Newswatch, May 26, 2009

Ibid

http://www.slideshare.net/kayodefayemi/nigerias-first-national-assembly-and-the-challenge-of-democratic-governance-in-the-fourth-republic. Accessed May 27, 2012

Ibid

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/774549.stm Accessed May 22, 2019

Ibid 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anyim_Pius_Anyim. Accessed May 22, 2019

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolphus_Wabara. Accessed May 22, 2019

Lanre Adewole. “Bribe for Budget: Wabara’s Tortuous Journey to Vindication.” Nigeria Tribune, June 6, 2010

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Pages 73-74

Ibid – 74 

Ibid – 74

Ibid – 75

Ibid – 76

Duro Onabule. “The Vultures Target Senate President.” The Sun newspaper, October 27, 2006. 

Ethno-Nationalism and the Nation State

Kehinde Oloyode “Self-Determination, Ethno-Nationalism and Conflicts in Nigeria”. Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

Franca Attoh and Omololu Soyombo “The Politics of Ethnic Balancing in Nigeria” International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Vol. 3 (2) pp. 40 – 44, February 2011

Ibid

Ibid

General Ibrahim Babangida “Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigerian State”. Lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru,Jos. December, 2002

Kehinde Oloyode “Self-Determination, Ethno-Nationalism and Conflicts in Nigeria”. Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

The Third Term Agenda: Behind the Veil

National Mirror, April 9, 2012

Ibid

Ibid 

Daily Trust, April 11, 2012

Ibid 

Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. Page... 

Vanguard, April 9, 2012 

Ibid   

Ibid 

Ibid  

Ibid 

Daily Trust, April 27, 2012 

Condoleeza Rice. No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. ... 2012. Page 638

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06LAGOS714.html

Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. Page...

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06LAGOS1429.html

Obasanjo – Atiku Faceoff

http://thestreetjournal.org/2011/09/wikileaks-cable-abdulsalami-never-wanted-obasanjo-to-run-for-a-second-term Accessed June 11, 2012 

Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis. Crisis Group Africa Report N0 123, 28 March 2007, Pages 5 – 6

Ibid – 6

Ibid – 6

http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=75738 Accessed July 2, 2012 

Corruption and Governance

Herskovits, Jean. 2007. “Nigeria’s Rigged Democracy”,http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2007070/faessay86409-p40/jeanherskovits/nigeria-s- riggeddemocracy.html. Quoted in Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 34

Preye Kuro Inokoba and Weleayam Tina Ibegu. “Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Political Corruption: Implication for the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria”. Anthropologist 13 (4): 283 – 291 (2011). 

Nuhu Ribadu. Interview in Thisday newspaper, February 11, 2007. Quoted in Preye Kuro Inokoba and Weleayam Tina Ibegu. “Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Political Corruption: Implication for the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria”. Anthropologist 13 (4): 283 – 291 (2011).

Kristóf Gosztonyi, Alison Taylor and John Bay. Facing up to Corruption in Nigeria. London. Control Risks Group Limited. 2009. Page 1

Ibid – 1.

Cleen Foundation Monograph Series. No 7. Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings. Abuja. 2010. Page 63

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 26

Sullivan, John and Shkolnikov, Aleksandr. 2006. “The Costs of Corruption”. Quoted in Issues in Democracy/December, 2006. The text first appeared in the article “Combating Corruption: Private Sector Perspectives and Solutions” in the September 2004 issue of Economic Reform, a CIPE publication.

Thuli N. Madonsela. “Corruption and Governance Challenges: The South African Experience”. Cleen Foundation Monograph Series. No 7. Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings. Abuja. 2010. Page 43.

Olubunmi Oyewole. “Corruption: Challenge to Good Governance and Development in Nigeria”. Lecture delivered on August 7, 2010 at the National Convention of Charleans in Diaspora, held at Irving Convention Plaza, Irving, Texas, marking the 50th Anniversary Celebration of St. Charles’ Grammar School, Osogbo.

Paul Wolfowitz. Speech at the Conference on “Improving Governance and Fighting Corruption: New Frontiers in Public – Private Partnership”. Brussels. 2007.

Kristóf Gosztonyi, Alison Taylor and John Bay. Facing up to Corruption in Nigeria. London. Control Risks Group Limited. 2009. Page 1

 Paul Wolfowitz. Speech at the Conference on “Improving Governance and Fighting Corruption: New Frontiers in Public – Private Partnership”. Brussels. 2007.

Ademola Azeez. “Endangering Good Governance for Sustainable Democracy: The Continuing Struggle against Corruption in Nigeria”. Journal of research in Peace, Gender and Development. Vol. 1 (11) pages 307 – 314, 2011.

T. Harriman “Is There a Future for Democracy in Nigeria”. Lecture delivered at the Department of International Development on June 5, 2006.

S. Adejumobi. “Democracy, Good Governance and Constitutionalism in Africa” in Sylvester Odion-Akhaine. Governance: Nigeria in the World. Lagos. Centre for Constitutionalism and Development. Quoted in Ademola Azeez. “Endangering Good Governance for Sustainable Democracy: The Continuing Struggle against Corruption in Nigeria”. Journal of research in Peace, Gender and Development. Vol. 1 (11) pages 307 – 314, 2011.

Weleayam Tina Ibegu. “Political Corruption, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria”. Unpublished B.Sc project work submitted to Department of Political Science,Niger Delta University, Bayelsa Satate. 2007.

Preye Kuro Inokoba and Weleayam Tina Ibegu. “Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Political Corruption: Implication for the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria”. Anthropologist 13 (4): 283 – 291 (2011).

Olubunmi Oyewole. “Corruption: Challenge to Good Governance and Development in Nigeria”. Lecture delivered on August 7, 2010 at the National Convention of Charleans in Diaspora, held at Irving Convention Plaza, Irving, Texas, marking the 50th Anniversary Celebration of St. Charles’ Grammar School, Osogbo.

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 20

The Guardian, October 31, 2006. Quoted in Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008.

Olubunmi Oyewole. “Corruption: Challenge to Good Governance and Development in Nigeria”. Lecture delivered on August 7, 2010 at the National Convention of Charleans in Diaspora, held at Irving Convention Plaza, Irving, Texas, marking the 50th Anniversary Celebration of St. Charles’ Grammar School, Osogbo.

Chidi Anselm Odinkalu. “Corruption and Governance in Africa: How do we Break the Cycle in Nigeria” in Cleen Foundation Monograph Series. No 7. Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings. Abuja. 2010. Page 34 – 35.

Anticorruption Crusades: The Politics of Failed Initiatives

The Punch, July 16, 2008

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 2

David U. Enweremadu “Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Nigeria (1999 – 2007): The Politics of a Failed Reform”.www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/anticorruptioncampaignnigeria.ppt. Accessed June 11, 2012

Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. Page xxvii

Ben Nwabueze. How President Obasanjo Subverted the Rule of Law and Democracy. Ibadan. Gold Press Limited. 2007. Page...

The Guardian, October 5, 2007

The Guardian, October 10, 2007

David U. Enweremadu “Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Nigeria (1999 – 2007): The Politics of a Failed Reform”.www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/anticorruptioncampaignnigeria.ppt. Accessed June 11, 2012

Ibid 

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 84

Ibid  

Ibid

The Guardian, February 15, 2007

The Guardian, February 26, 2007

http://www.hrw.org/news/04/17/nigeria-uk-conviction-blow-against-corruption. Accessed June 17, 2012 

The Punch, July 16, 2008

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 132

Ibid – 111

Leadership, July 15, 2008

http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15855916. Accessed June 17, 2012

“Farida Waziri: How she Fell” Peoples Daily, November 26, 2011

David U. Enweremadu “Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Nigeria (1999 – 2007): The Politics of a Failed Reform”.www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/anticorruptioncampaignnigeria.ppt. Accessed June 11, 2012

Human Rights Watch. Corruption on trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 2011. Page 26.

David U. Enweremadu “Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Nigeria (1999 – 2007): The Politics of a Failed Reform”.www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/anticorruptioncampaignnigeria.ppt. Accessed June 11, 2012

Human Rights Watch. Corruption on trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 2011. Page 41.

Ibid – 28

Ibid – 31

Ibid – 26 – 27

Ibid – 46 – 51

Akpo Mudiagu Odje. “EFCC and the Challenges of Fighting Corruption”. Sunday Guardian, May 6, 2012

Human Rights Watch. Corruption on trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 2011. Page 56.

Ibid – 56

Ibid – 58

Ibid – 58 – 59

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 150

Nicholas Alozie. “EFCC then What?” The Guardian, October 02, 2006.

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 150

Ibid – 150

A. A. Wayh. “Anatomy of Corruption and other Economic Crimes”. 1991. Quoted in Erubami, Mashood and Young, Ian R. 2003. Nigeria’s Corruption and Related Economic Behaviour in their Global Context, Ibadan: Centre for Human Rights Research and Development.

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. “NGOs and Human Rights” in Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo (ed.) Issues in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. Calabar: Bookman Publishers. 2006. Page ---

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 153

Fighting Corruption: What Role for Civil Society? The Experience of the OECD. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2003

E. Gyimah-Boadi. “Towards an Enhanced Role for Civil Society in the Fight against Corruption in Africa.” http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/docs/efa

Ibid  

Human Rights Watch. Corruption on trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 2011. Page 31

Mathias Okoi-Uyouyo. EFCC and the New Imperialism: A Study of Corruption in the Obasanjo Years. Calabar. Bookman Publishers. 2008. Page 158

Ibid – 158

Cleen Foundation Monograph Series. No 7. Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings. Abuja. 2010. Pages 63 – 65 

Chidi Anselm Odinkalu. “Corruption and Governance in Africa: How do we Break the Cycle in Nigeria” in Cleen Foundation Monograph Series. No 7. Corruption and Governance Challenge: Conference Proceedings. Abuja. 2010. Page 40

Ibid – 40 – 41 

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