Blitzkrieg Edit
Nguyet Edmondson
This page contains a list of cheats, codes, Easter eggs, tips, and other secrets for Blitzkrieg II for PC. If you've discovered a cheat you'd like to add to the page, or have a correction, please click EDIT and add it.
Note: Back-up original file before alteration.
I found a cheat for blitzkrieg 2. It is a little complicated but I will try and make it as simple as possible to follow. First use WINRAR.exe to open the file data.pak in the folder blitzkrieg 2EXEdata
You do not need to unrar it. The file needs to remain in it's compressed form. We will just modify it and leave it compressed. Make a backup copy just in case a mistake is made.
Now open the Scenariocampaigns folder. In the campaigns folder are folders for all the different campaigns. Choose the one you want to cheat in. I will use the USA folder as an example.
In this folder there are addition folders for all the chapters of the campaign. Choose the chapter you want to cheat and open that folder. I will choose chapter 1.
In this folder is the file we want to modify. It is an .xdb file with the chapter name as the file name. In our example the file name is 1_Bataan_Chapter.xdb
Open this file with Notepad.exe from your System32 directory (you can access Notepad from the Classic Windows start menu and accessories). Now in this file search for any line that says:
"Blitzkrieg Bop" is a song by the American punk rock band Ramones. It was released as the band's debut single in February 1976 in the United States. It appeared as the opening track on the band's debut album, Ramones, also released that month.
"Blitzkrieg Bop" is number 92 on the Rolling Stone list of The 500 Greatest Songs of All Time. In March 2005, Q magazine placed it at number 31 in its list of the 100 Greatest Guitar Tracks, and in 2008 Rolling Stone placed it number 18 on top 100 of Best Guitar Songs of All Time. In 2009 it was named the 25th greatest hard rock song of all time by VH1.[3]
"Blitzkrieg Bop" was named after the German World War II tactic blitzkrieg, which means "lightning war". The song was mainly written by drummer Tommy Ramone, while bassist Dee Dee Ramone came up with the title (the song was originally called "Animal Hop"). Dee Dee also changed one line: the original third verse had the line "shouting in the back now", but Dee Dee changed it to "shoot 'em in the back now". The precise meaning and subject matter of the song are, unlike many of The Ramones' other early compositions, somewhat vague and obscure.
"Blitzkrieg Bop" is a 4/4 time song written in the key of A. It contains four chords; A major (I), B minor (II), D major (IV), and E major (V).[4][5] The song relies heavily on the I, IV, and V chords, most notably used in the intro and verses in the form of the I - IV - V chord progression. The II chord appears only briefly towards the end of therefrain.[4][5] The guitarist played the entire song with barre chord shapes, as these were signature to his playing style.[4][6][7][8] The bassist simply played the root note of whatever chord the guitarist was playing.[6] Both the rhythm guitar and bass parts, played using downstrokes exclusively,[6] utilize almost constant eighth notes to generate a "wall of sound". The singer's vocal melody relies on five of the seven notes found in the A major scale; A, B, C#, D, and E. The drummer maintains a steady backbeat on the kick and snare throughout the entire song. Constant eighth notes are played on the hi hat cymbals during the verses, and on the floor tom whilst the singer shouts "Hey, Ho, Let's Go!", whereas quarter notes are used on the ride cymbal during the refrain. Occasional crashes are used to accentuate certain beats.
The song was originally played at a very fast tempo (Allegrissimo), or roughly 177 bpm. When the band performed the song live, they started to play it at even faster tempos, gradually increasing the speed throughout their career. At the band's final show, they played the song at an extremely fast tempo (Prestissimo), well above 200 bpm.
Despite support from Winston Churchill, they were forced to work around an organizational system which abhorred change. In frustration, many went public with their arguments and, by doing so, incurred enmity among their superiors sufficient either to bring on their early retirement from the active ranks or to relegate them to some inconsequential posting.
Although field trials were held to demonstrate the new concepts, those who benefited most from the trials were the Germans. They spawned the blitzkrieg based largely on their own study as well as their study of the writings of the British reformers, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, and the record of the trials on the Salisbury Plain.
As war came to Europe in 1939, the British army found itself with an imperfectly developed concept of all-arms combat based on the tank, to include inadequate tactics, organizations, equipment and training to implement a state of warfare they themselves had invented.1
Heinz Guderian, reading reports of the armored force trials on the Salisbury Plain, demonstrated the concept with a small force for Adolf Hitler at Kummersdorf in 1934.3 Kenneth Macksey describes well how the German tank pioneers seized on and matured the preliminary British work on all-arms warfare built around the tank.
First, the Germans had a general staff element whose primary function was to examine the need for change and, when change was decided on, to draw up the necessary programs to make it happen. True, this capability became diffused as Hitler fragmented his army command into the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) and the OKH (Army High Command), an overshadowed army headquarters. Indeed, some of the bitter antagonisms that arose between those two organizations in World War II survived until recently even in the Bundeswehr. Nonetheless, for the critical developmental years, there existed an institutionalized framework for examining the need for changing doctrine-strategy, operational art, tactics; describing the equipment, organizational training and other changes needed; and producing the impetus for change through the office of the inspekteur.
Second, the German mavericks were all products of the enormously demanding and rigorous officer selection and training system characteristic of the German army to this day. Mavericks they may have been, but all had been taught to think logically about tough problems. They were all taught in the same way, in the same schools. Compelling logic to one was, therefore, equally compelling to all. This made arriving at a consensus much easier. And change simply cannot be effected without a consensus by some means.
This framework is necessary to bring to bear clearly focused intellectual activity in the matter of any change, whether in concepts for fighting, equipment, training or manning the force. Such a framework was recently institutionalized in the US Army. Let us briefly describe how this came about.
The Army reorganization of 1973 was aimed, in part at least, at the institutional side of the problem we are examining. In those years, the Army needed many changes. Some were purely managerial, reflecting our apprehension of a lot of structure and too little manpower. More importantly, however, the Army realized it needed to change its concepts of warfighting. It addressed the strategic problems of fighting outnumbered and winning; the matter of the operations of larger units, which units perforce would be fewer in number; and the revision of tactics, organizations, equipment and training to bring the Army out of the Vietnam trauma and to make it an effective fighting force in the last quarter of this century.
The Army found itself confronted by principle antagonists, who were almost always sure to outnumber it, and by a growing militarization and modernization of conflict in the Third World. The Soviets, impelled by their obsession with numbers, were obviously in possession of a maturing operational concept embracing mass, momentum and continuous land combat in a nuclear, chemical or conventional environment. Convinced by the realities of our then and impending resource constraints, we could not afford a like concept. We set about to look for ways to win even though fighting outnumbered. This was a crucial first step. (Russell F. Weigley might argue that that was more of a radical departure from our antecedents than others might agree.)
However well or not so well that work may have been done, it met with considerable criticism from within the Army and without. Some of this simply reflected institutional resistance to the notion of change. Some of the criticism, however, reflected unresolved intellectual and theoretical concerns. But the experience demonstrated that all too little consensus building had been done and that the concepts set forth in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 needed additional maturing. The results of that realization were severalfold.
The reformers then set about designing tactics, organizations, equipment and training systems to support the new concept. This resulted in, among other things, the division restructuring study and field trials of resulting organizations and tactics at Fort Hood, Texas. Because the concept was not yet mature, and because, in the trials, an attempt was made to measure performance differentials at the margin with an instrumentation system and a test scheme not adequate to that degree of precision, the trial outcomes were much too ambiguous to gain widespread acceptance.
At this point, it was apparent that the reformers had to begin anew. It became apparent that considerable internal consensus building would be necessary as organizational development proceeded. So, for two and one-half years, school commandants, representatives of the Army staff, major command, supporting organizations and other services were gathered at frequent intervals, and what we now know as Division 86 was hammered out at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.