Sankara and Eckhart - By TMP Mahadevan
Divya Shivashankar
সপ্ত Rishi
There is a bit of conceptual problem in the above essay, eckhart is known to have derived his leanings from neo pagan thoughts, unlike that our bhagavan bhashyakara from Upanishad.
But the whole Non-dual thing has a different meaning there too, since they see their "God" as the "only" divinity.
Therefore Non-dual in status of that deity.
Where here the very fabric of reality itself is Non- Dual and that can only be known through a Pramana like Vedam.
And nothing else.
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সপ্ত Rishi
A summar of Godhead by miester ehkart,
"Summarizing the above: for the Ground to be realized by the soul, both man and god must die to their relative existence. God, as the creator or as the good or the sovereign, or as the bearer of any qualities be it love, grace, etc., is equally a hinderance to ultimate spiritual realization and unity as a man’s ego is. Speaking in psychoanalytical terms, god as portrayed in outward religion is as good or as evil as a man’s ego. God is nothing but the ego’s projection of a perfect image of itself outside of itself and onto a transcendent plane. Insofar as god exists for man, man is kept hidden from the true God, the Ground, which is beyond good and evil, beyond Being.
Very interesting to see this.
Divya Shivashankar
সপ্ত Rishi
One way of thinking about how the various vertices of Eckhart’s thought are connected to each other is to explore his nuanced approach to and use of language in the pursuit of what his student, Heinrich Seuse (Henry Suso), would later characterize in his widely read Horologium Sapientiae as the highest form of philosophy, a philosophia spiritualis (one which Seuse took Eckhart to embody). Not only does the Meister engage in a kind of “serious play” with words and language in both his Latin and German writings, much of his work ultimately revolves around the ways in which words, especially understood as “signs” or “images”, can both reveal and obscure. This tension is played out in a dynamic, distinctly Eckhartian dialectic that moves back and forth between saying and “unsaying” (Sells 1994), univocity and equivocity (Mojsisch 1983 [2001]; Wendlinder 2014), speech and silence (Duclow 1984)—between the limits of finite human language and the self-communication of the Divine Intellect in the “Eternal Word” (i.e., Christ). In fact, despite his strong apophatic tendencies, the speculative aspect of Eckhart’s mystagogy might best be characterized as a philosophy of the Word, according to which the second person of the Christian Trinity (understood as the divine logos or scholastic ratio) represents the metaphysical threshold between the human and the divine, as well as the medium by which the timeless, singular Godhead (the “One” of Neoplatonist philosophy) is “translated”—linguistically, epistemically, and even ontologically—into the discursivity and multiplicity characteristic of the grammar, thought, and very existence of creatures.
On Ekchart
Sankara and Eckhart - By TMP MahadevanPart 2What is true of Shankara's doctrine of God is true of Eckhart's also. The view of both is super-theism and not anti-theism. Even when he mounts up high on the towers of mysticism, the German. Dominican monk keeps close to the Christian belief in God. Clinging to God, having intimate communion with Him, according to Eckhart, is the very meaning of the life of man. God, here, is conceived as the power of life, as light and life, as truth, knowledge, essential holiness and justice, rather than as King, Father, Judge - a person in relation to persons. What Eckhart is not in favour of is the external view of God. God is not to be looked upon as an "objectum". To possess God is to live God, or rather "to be lived by God." The meaning of Eckhart's statement that man must get rid of God is that man must get rid of the conceived and apprehended God. What man should realize is that God is the inward power and the health of his spiritual life. In Eckhart's "talks of Instruction" the following occurs:"Man should not have merely a God intellectually conceived. For when thought passes them God (intellectually conceived) also passes. Rather, man must have an essential God, who is high above the thoughts of men (because He is inwardly possessed and lived). This God does not pass away unless man turns from Him of his own free will. Whoever has God thus in his being conceives Him divinely. For him God shines in all things. In him God has His eyes open at all times. In him there is a quiet turning from outward things and a penetrating into the ever-present God."It is surprising that even for the concept of maayaa there is a parallel provided by Eckhart's conception of the "creature". In so far as creature is regarded by the German Mystic as what God is not, as vain, unreal and non-essential, his thought comes very close to the Advaita view of the world of maayaa-avidyaa. Adopting the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian way of thinking, Eckhart characterises the world as a copy, an expression of the eternal God, falling far short of the prototype. "All that is created" he declares, "has no truth in itself. All creatures in so far as they are creatures, as they "are in themselves" are not even illusion, they are "pure nothing". All that is created is nothing". This declaration, however, does not mean that the creatures have no empirical existence. They do exist; but, as for Shankara, they exist through avidyaa. The two Masters are not interested in the "how" and "why" of avidyaa so much as in the way to its transcendence. How creatureliness is to be overcome is what they are primarily concerned with.Close as is the parallel between Shankara and Eckhart in reagard to their metaphysical doctrines, closer still is their agreement over the practical disciplines. Salvation or release and the means to it occupy the centre of attention in the teaching of the two Masters. Like Shankara, Eckhart considers, not equality with God, but identity with Him as the goal. "God is the same one that I am" says Eckhart. This is almost the same as the Upanishadic teaching, "That thou art" (tat tvam asi). The direct way to the realization of transcendent unity lies not through occult practices or ecstatic yoga but through divine knowledge or jnana. The soul has to come to its true nature by discarding the assumed limitations, by renouncing all "me and mine." It is by withdrawing inwards through knowledge that the soul discovers its infinitude and divine glory.After explaining the similarities between Shankara and Eckhart in his penetrating comparative study entitled Mysticism East and West, Rudolf Otto speaks about the differences also. One of the points of difference, according to Otto, is that while Shankara's Brahman is static Being, Eckhart's God is a living process. Another great distinction is that while the goal for Shankara is the stilling of all karmas, all works, all activity of will, for Eckhart the goal is never a static rest and the "oneness" which the soul strives to gain is never closed as boundary, but is continually opening afresh like a vault with an over-rising roof. Stating the differences in other words, Otto observes: "Shankara knows the atman in us but this Atman is not the soul in the Christina and Eckartian sense; it is not "soul" as identical with 'Gomut', infinitely rich in life and depth... Least of all is his Atman, "soul" in the sense of religious conscience, which "hungers and thirsts after righteousness".... Sankara's mysticism is certainly mysticism of the Atman but it is not mysticism as Gomuts-mystik. Least of all is it a mystical form of justification and sanctification as Eckhart's is through and through. And Shankara's mysticism is none of those things because it springs not from the soul of Palestine, but from the soul of India."We are ready to acknowledge with Otto that there are differences. But we do not agree with him when he says that Brahman is static Being, that moksha is a state of passivity and that Shankara has no ethic because the background of His teaching is not Palestine but India. Otto is evidently wrong in several of the statements he has made about Shankara, as for instance when he observes that "salvation in Brahman is for Sankara realized only after death". The main difference between Eckhart and Sankara, according to us, is that while the former is influenced by dogma, the latter is not. Shorn of the elements of dogma, Eckhart should as universal as Shankara is.From the Series - The Philosophy of the East and the West by TMP Mahadevan.On Sun, Mar 9, 2025 at 8:33 AM Divya Shivashankar <divya...@gmail.com> wrote:Sankara and Eckhart - By TMP MahadevanPart 1Time and territory make no difference to the teachings of the Masterminds. The distinction of East and West has no relevance to "Perennial Philosophy". Great thoughts consitute the legacy of the entire mankind. No matter when a sage or saint lived, or where, his message has universal import. This truth may be exemplified by comparing two of the world's greatest teachers - Acharya Shankara and Meister Eckhart. Sankara lived in India, belonged to the Upanishadic tradition, and taught Advaita which, he was convinced, was the culmination of all philosophical thought and spiritual aspiration. Eckhart was born in Germany in the thirteenth century, belonged to the Dominican Order of monks, taught and wrote his sermons and works as a Prior or Provincial of the Catholic Church. Although the Indian Acharya, Sankara, and the German Meister, Eckhart, lived and flourished in different ages and hemispheres, they are "contemporaries" to use Rudolf Otto's expression;for, as he explains, "contemporaries in the deeper sense are not those who happen to be born in the same decade, bu those who stand at corresponding points in the parallel development of their environments."There is close similarity between the two teachers in their metaphysical teachings. According to both, the Ultimate Reality is the non-dual Spirit. Brahman, for the Advaita of Shankara, is one only, without a second, ekameva adviteeyam; without parts and without multiplicity, without any distinctions and differences, nirgunam, nirvisesham. For Eckhart also, the pure "Godhead" is Being though and through and nothing other than Being, without any addition and qualification. Reality, in fact, is beyond the reach of words, for the normal use of words is to distinguish and to differentiate. "Wouldst thou be perfecct, do not yelp about, God" says Eckhart. Citing an Upanishadic text, Sankara declares, "This Atman is peaceful, quiet", santo yam atma.Both the Masters contrast the Godhead with God, Brahman with Ishvara. The supra-personal Godhead is above God and is the round thereof. In the pure Godhead, there is transcendence of subject and object, knower and known. Referring to the conception of the Godhead, the One, the Absolute, in Eckhart, the American Philosopher, Josiah Royce, says that it is a old conception, much older than the Neo-Platonic. "It is almost identical", he goes on to observe, with the conception of the Absolute Self or Atman of the earliest Hindu speculation. But Eckhart, Knowing nothing, of course, of the remoter sources or counterparts of his conception, and himself learning it in the main from Dionysius discovers the everlastingly fresh and convincing verification of it in his own religious life."Just as the two Masters agree in their conception of the Godhead, they agree also in regard to the idea of God. Critics of Shankara wrongly make him on to be a non-theist, it not an atheist, even as the Churchmen branded Eckhart as a pantheist. The truth, however, is that both are theists. Simply because, according to Shankara, the knowledge of the personal Ishvara is lower knowledge, aparaa vidyaa, it does not mean that this knowledge belongs to the region of error, avidyaa. Saguna brahman is not a brahman different from the nirgunaa. Ishvara is brahman as the world ground. He is the efficient as "well as the material cause of the world. Shankara allows of no second beside God as the world cause. As Otto correctly understands, "The nirguna Brahman is not exclusive opposite of the saguna brahman, but it is superlative and a development of the tendencies which lead to the saguna brahman itself." Only, while Otto uses the term samucchaya (summing up) to describe Shankara's method of relating the saguna and the nirguna brahman, we would prefer the expression samanvaya (harmony).To be continued...
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সপ্ত Rishi
On ekchart continuing,
"For example, in the opening sentence to the “Prologue to the Book of Propositions” in the Opus tripartitum, Eckhart appears to follow his Dominican predecessor Thomas Aquinas in giving being place of priority—though he subtly reverses Thomas’s emphasis on the idea that God is being itself, asserting instead: Esse est deus (Prol. op. prop. n.11; LW I/2:29; PQP 93). Elsewhere, he speaks of God as “existence itself” (In Exod. n.21; LW II:28; TP 48), or as “the fullness of all existence [plenitudo omnis esse]”, which “can have nothing outside of it” (ibid. n.48; LW II:52; TP 58). However, in the first of the Parisian Questions, Eckhart boldly states that
it is not my present opinion that God understands because he exists, but rather that he exists because he understands. God is an intellect and understanding [intellectus et intelligere], and his understanding itself is the ground of his existence. (Qu. Par. 1 n.4; LW V:40; PQP 45)
In fact, not only does Eckhart claim here that “among [the] perfections intelligence comes first and then being or existence” (ibid. n.6; LW V:43; PQP 47), he claims that “everything in God transcends existence” (ibid. n.8; LW V:44; PQP 48) and that “nothing in him has the nature of being” (ibid. n.10; LW V:46; PQP 49).
সপ্ত Rishi
These seemingly inconsistent statements themselves correspond to two ways the Meister discusses God’s creation of the universe and the status of the creatures that emerge from God’s creative act. The first involves what Bernard McGinn (2001, 2005), following Alain de Libera (1990), has called a metaphysics of flow, involving a sort of “spilling over” of the divine plenitude of being into creation. The second—perhaps best described as a form of causative epistemology—maintains that the divine’s thinking or knowing all things is what both formally grounds and efficiently causes those things to come to be. The former account of creation, in which Eckhart commonly uses maternal metaphors to represent creation as a kind of ontological “emanation” from the “pregnant” Godhead (McGinn 2001: 84–85), is commonly cited in discussions of the Meister’s “mystical” Neoplatonism. The latter account, in contrast, is sometimes invoked by contemporary scholars to highlight the Dominican’s adherence to a form of Aristotelian intellectualism and his commitment to the doctrine of the primacy of intellect over will (or, for Eckhart, even over being itself)
সপ্ত Rishi
Moreover, like Avicenna, Aquinas, and most of his contemporaries, he affirms that God’s qualityless existence is identical with God’s essence. Adapting for his own purposes the metaphors of “boiling” employed by scholastic thinkers like Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiburg, and drawing heavily on the mystical imagery of birthing, metalworking, liquid, light, and mirrors reminiscent of contemplative authors like Bernard of Clairvaux and Marguerite Porete, Eckhart writes:
[…] the repetition [in I am who I am] indicates […] a “boiling” or giving birth to itself [bullitionem sive parturitionem sui]—glowing in itself, and melting and boiling in and into itself, light that totally forces its whole being in light and into light [lux in luce et in lucem se toto se totum penetrans] and that is everywhere totally turned back and reflected upon itself. (In Exod. n.16; LW II:21–22; EE 46)
He continues, citing John 1:4 (“In him was life”):
“Life” expresses a type of “pushing out” [exseritionem] by which something swells up in itself [in se intumescens] and first breaks out totally in itself [se profundit primo in se toto], each part into each part, before it pours itself forth and “boils over” on the outside [effundat et ebulliat extra]. (ibid.)
Eckhart’s use here and elsewhere of bullitio (“boiling”) and ebullitio (“boiling over”) is central to his metaphysics of flow. The former term refers to the timeless divine emanation of the Trinity within the Godhead. Put in terms of the transcendentals, the Father (here identified with “Oneness” or “Unity”) eternally begets the Son (“Truth” or “Wisdom”), and together they “breathe” or “spirate” the Holy Spirit (“Love”/“Goodness”) (cp. In Sap. n.28; LW II:348; TP, 150). This “inner boiling” or “swelling” is, for Eckhart, a purely formal emanation. It does not result in any new beings but rather merely represents the internal dynamism of the Godhead—i.e., the eternal “unfolding” of the divine perfections within Godself. The latter ebullitio, on the other hand—the “boiling over” or “outflowing” of God’s overabundant fullness of being into the world—represents God’s constant, wholly free act of creation ex nihilo that not only grounds the being of all creatures (as their formal cause) but also gives rise to their existence (as their efficient cause) and orders them to their proper ends (as their final cause). Put in more Neoplatonist terms, it represents the Eckhartian version of the ontological exitus—the “fall” or “departure” from divine unity into created multiplicity. On this view, only God has “true being”, and creatures are, strictly speaking, nothing. Since, for Eckhart, “whatever is outside of God, inasmuch as it is outside of being is not something else or [even] something at all” (In Ioh. n.215; LW III:181, quoted in Tobin 1986: 39), whatever being creatures might be said to have is derivative of the puritas essendi that is the Godhead and wholly dependent on their participation in it.
সপ্ত Rishi
"Whereas Eckhart’s metaphysics of flow characterizes God as a kind of fullness of being “boiling over” into creation, his account of creative divine intellection, while continuous with a long medieval tradition of theories of divine causal knowledge, rests on a somewhat surprising idea of God as non-being, a kind of nothingness, or better: no-thing-ness. This negative characterization of God is also reflected in the metaphors Eckhart employs in his vernacular sermons when he speaks of God variously as a “desert” (VeM n.25; DW V 119; EE 247), an “abyss” (Pr. 29; DW II:84 ; TP 289), a “wasteland” or “wilderness” (Pr. 10; DW I:171; TP 265), or simply “the divine nothing” (Pr. 71; DW III:228; TP 324).
This identification of God with utter non-being, as opposed to total fullness of being, rests on Eckhart’s approach to intellectus more generally. In human beings, for example, the intellect, as a natural power of the soul, is a capacity to take on the representations or “cognitive forms” (species) of the objects that it cognizes and, ultimately, to become in some sense identical with them (an idea Eckhart takes over from Averroes: cf. Flasch 2006 [2015: 184ff.]). However, when considered apart from its objects, the created intellect is, strictly speaking, nothing. Its objects lend it form and content, but taken by itself it is “none of the things it knows” (Qu. Par. 2 n.2; LW V:50; PQP 51) and therefore, unlike the objects it cognizes, cannot be considered a determinate thing—a “this or that” (esse hoc et hoc). The intellect is, Eckhart maintains, “neither here, nor now, nor a definite thing […], [it] is not a being, nor does it have an existence” (Qu. Par. 2 n.7; LW V:52–3; PQP 53). It is more like an emptiness or void—one able to be cognitively (in)formed by its intentional objects. Indeed, given Eckhart’s commitment to the identity of the intellect and the intelligible, in order to come to know anything, the intellect must itself be nothing. It must be “‘unmixed’ with anything […] so that it might know everything” (Qu. Par. 2 n.2; LW V:50; PQP 51)."
The kind of similarity which was then showed by Otto in his work, by now many things have changed leading to many researches in the works of Ekchart, where we now know many of his works both in latin and in german,recently found, shows another picture completely different to that of a mystic.
The parallels we saw in the above essay of Mahadevan ji, comes from a time when there was less data, but by now we can see huge currents in researches, suggesting that eckhart was constantly employing neoplatonists and aquinas's works interchangebly.
His apophatic attitude is directly related to the kind of theology emerging out of dionysus's writings of Christianity.
Would like the greats in the group, to actually see my posts, and comment as to if there is any such resemblance of ekhart to that of Bhagavan Bhashyakara.🙏
Sri Krishnarpanamastu🙏
সপ্ত Rishi
"Further, on Eckhart’s view the “cognitive forms” that mediate the object to the intellect also lack existence. They may properly be said to “have” objects, but they themselves are not substances in which accidents inhere. Neither are they accidents because, although they are found in the soul or intellect, they do not inhere in it or ontologically depend on it, as an accident would in relation to its subject (Qu. Par. 2 n.5; LW V:51; PQP 52). And what is neither substance nor accident is, simply put, not a being. Instead, the species for Eckhart is much more like a relation of intentionality—a way of being directed toward entities—than an entity itself (Caputo 1975: 108), since on his view such relations are not themselves existents. Thus, while Eckhart appears to build on Aquinas’s distinction between the object (the “quod”) of knowledge and the means (the “quo”) by which the object is known, he goes beyond Thomas’s approach to knowledge by explicitly characterizing both as non-being (Caputo 1975: 104)."
This is the preview of the amazing end to this study.
সপ্ত Rishi
Interestingly, unlike many of his late medieval counterparts, it appears to be this “nothingness” of the human intellect in its sheer potentiality and indeterminateness that Eckhart sees as most closely mirroring the divine intellect. Indeed, in contrast to the Albertian tradition, it is the possible intellect, not the agent intellect, on which the Meister models the divine mind (Keenan 2013; Goris 2009; Mojsisch 1983 [2001]).
For Eckhart, in order to understand God as the true ground (fundamentum) of Being (and of all created beings), God cannot himself have being or otherwise be a being. Rather, God must first and foremost be a “nothing”—i.e., a no(n)-thing.
Since intellect in and of itself is fundamentally characterized by a kind of indeterminate nothingness (one capable, however, of conceiving everything), it is more properly said of God than of any other attribute, name, or perfection one might ascribe to him. It is in this sense that Eckhart can assert in the Parisian Questions that God’s understanding is prior to (and the foundation of) God’s existence.
সপ্ত Rishi
Here is another set of important points.
He claims that, while considering God under the aspect of being (in dem wesene) is not illegitimate, to do so is still to qualify God in some way—to make of him something determinate—and therefore merely to see God as he resides in the “antechamber” (vorbürge) of the temple in which “he shines as holy”. Likewise, approaching God under the aspect of will or love is to encounter a God still enshrouded (verborgen) in the “mantle of goodness” (kleide der güete). Considering God under the aspect of intellection (vernünfticheit), on the other hand, is to witness the wholly “naked” (blôz) Godhead in his true “temple”, unclothed and “stripped [entkleidit] of [all] goodness and being”.
Of course, the non-being of the intellect considered in itself is where the comparison between the human intellect and the divine mind ends:
Here the imagination fails. For our knowledge is different from God’s. His knowledge is the cause of things whereas our knowledge is caused by them. (Par. Qu. 1 n.8; LW V:44; PQP 48)
সপ্ত Rishi
Here is the point to ponder over on how the supposed "oneness" is attained by Ekchart.
"Eckhart’s idea here is that the divine intellect “pre-conceives” both being itself and the entirety of knowable forms within it, and in God’s knowing them (as their ratio), they come to exist. Considered merely as essences or forms that have their principle in the divine mind, they are said to be pre-contained “intellectually” like a house in the mind of an architect (In sap. n.21; LW, II:34; TP 148), which has no being until the architect herself “trans-forms” the idea into a real building. However, in the divine intellect they are neither individually distinct nor determinate, but are rather contained as a unity. Moreover, because of the utter Oneness of God, as well as Eckhart’s Aristotelian commitment to the identity of intellect and intelligible, the unity of the ratio of the forms in the divine intellect is nothing other than God himself, in the form of the eternal logos."
সপ্ত Rishi
So we can atleast grasp as to how Ekchart thinks that since the intellect and intelligible are identical ( postulate of Aristotle),and since the God is one in their religion, the forms of humans or even "beings" are the "intelligible" and the intellect is "divine intellect" aka "God", therefore the "oneness of beings and God" on this ground !!
Would like to know if it is at all same as ours 🙏
সপ্ত Rishi
In all of this there are some important stuff that we must acknowledge, before even trying to see similarity between the writings of Bhagavan Bhashyakara and Ekhart, how does Ekchart actuall conceive this unity of "being" of God and humans even,
" Eckhart’s verbal “onto-logos” not only reconciles the idea of God as absolute (plenitudinous) being and pure (intellectual) nothingness, it also shows how his views on analogy and univocity are related. On the one hand, insofar as the Word is the conduit or medium of divine speech, it can be understood as the pure intellect—the “no-thing” that is “beyond being”—through which the principial Godhead flows, thereby lending or communicating being to creatures as an essential (and final) cause. In this respect, the divine activity of ebullitio, in which all things are created through the Word, establishes an analogical relationship between God and creatures, since there are clear relationships of causal dependence and superiority in play. But insofar as the Word is the content of divine speech—the expression of God thinking Godself and containing all things as one in the divine mind—it grounds the essences of creatures and thus represents a univocal cause of the perfections in things, as well as the very ground of the human soul (McGinn 2001: 77; Mojsisch 1983 [2001: 33])."
Here the word being which in Mahadevan ji's writings is quoted as same as that of God, needs more explanation since many may forget, but let me remind, "Being" is meant by Eckhart same as that of Aquinas only,
"for Eckhart, “being” just is acting in the sense of communicating something intelligible: “To exist is to communicate” (Dobie 2010: 32). This is exemplified most perfectly in God, whose “inner boiling” is characterized by its wholly self-sufficient intellectual activity, in which the Father “speaks” (and thereby generates) the Son, and the Father and the Son together “breathe” out the Holy Spirit in their bond of divine love."
Being is simply "to communicate which exemplifies existence" and therefore the same God of ekhart is beyond being which is nothingness and so on !!
সপ্ত Rishi
As was clarified to me by my Guru, unlike Eckhart, our Bhagavan Bhashyakara has simply explained it all.
The very first sutra bhashya: athAto brahmajijnaasaa:
*सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न ‘नाहमस्मि’ इति । यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः* *स्यात् , सर्वो लोकः ‘नाहमस्मि’ इति प्रतीयात् । आत्मा च ब्रह्म* । यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्; न । तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः । देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः । इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे । मन इत्यन्ये । विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके । शून्यमित्यपरे । अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे । भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येके । अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित् । आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे । एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः । तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं चेयात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ॥ १ ॥
Divya Shivashankar
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সপ্ত Rishi
Thank you so much for sending the articles as well.🙏
Because of which I got the chance to clarify the positions from which the german monk comes and from where does Bhagavan Bhashyakara speak to us on Brahmavidya as well.😊🙏
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