Does the Vivarana argument lead to an existent avidya? SSSS's comment

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Prakasatman in the Vivarana:

“But we know through presumption (arthapatti) that that which is beginningless, and false, and the material cause of false superimposition, and related to the Self, cannot he anything other than Ignorance. The point being made is that the existence of false superimposition forces us to presume the existence of false Ignorance as its material cause, since false superimposition could not arise from any other source. (cited in SSSS, The Method of Vedanta p759)

--Sri Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati’s comment:

If Ignorance is known, directly through immediate experience, then it ought not to be a matter of dispute amongst argumentative philosophers. The sustained attempt (by Prakasatman) to explain Ignorance with the help of the various means of cognition (perception at M. V. 239, 1-2, inference at 23S, 3, presumption a+ 233,4,5, revelation at 239,6) appears to be misguided, as it can only end in representing it as existent. There is no dispute amongst mankind in general that they are subject to ignorance, nor are they concerned whether such ignorance should be labelled existent or non-existent. Nor are all the philosophers in contention agreed that they experience positive, indeterminable Ignorance, conceived as something over and above individual illusion (and as its cause). Ordinary people of the world have such experiences as 'I do not know', 'I am in doubt' and 'I am confused’ and experience non-perception, doubt and wrong perception as varieties of (ordinary everyday) ignorance, sometimes positive, sometimes negative, while con tending philosophers, and reflective observers generally who do not happen to agree with Prakasatman and his school, openly deny the existence of indeterminable positive Ignorance as taught in his system. Nor is there any mention, direct or indirect, anywhere in Sri Sankara's commentaries, of any posi tive Ignorance other than the triad of non-perception, doubt and wrong perception. This is a point that must be carefully considered.”

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om Michael ji.

Prakasatman in the Vivarana:

“But we know through presumption (arthapatti) that that which is beginningless, and false, and the material cause of false superimposition, and related to the Self, cannot he anything other than Ignorance. The point being made is that the existence of false superimposition forces us to presume the existence of false Ignorance as its material cause, since false superimposition could not arise from any other source. (cited in SSSS, The Method of Vedanta p759)

Everything is perfect. Just one point for clarification -- the "existence" of superimposition and the "existence" of ignorance are not their own. The existence is (of) substratum which appears coupled with superimposition and ignorance.

--Sri Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati’s comment:

If Ignorance is known, directly through immediate experience, then it ought not to be a matter of dispute amongst argumentative philosophers.

The appearance of ignorance is  not a matter of dispute between anyone, much less between argumentative philosophers. Even an eight years old cowherd boy on Alps mountain says without any doubt "I am ignorant. I don't know what you told." So, appearance of ignorance is not a matter of dispute. The adjectives of ignorance are subject matter of dispute because they are not known through immediate experience (pratyaksha).

The sustained attempt (by Prakasatman) to explain Ignorance with the help of the various means of cognition (perception at M. V. 239, 1-2, inference at 23S, 3, presumption a+ 233,4,5, revelation at 239,6) appears to be misguided, as it can only end in representing it as existent.

SSSS ji failed to understand the teaching of VivaraNa on account of misguided fundamentals. VivaraNa uses the various means of cognitions to demonstrate the ignorance-qualified-with-specific-adjectives and not ignorance per se. Further, the very fact that existence belongs not to ignorance but to the substratum shows the hollowness of SSSS ji's statement.

There is no dispute amongst mankind in general that they are subject to ignorance, nor are they concerned whether such ignorance should be labelled existent or non-existent. Nor are all the philosophers in contention agreed that they experience positive, indeterminable Ignorance, conceived as something over and above individual illusion (and as its cause). Ordinary people of the world have such experiences as 'I do not know', 'I am in doubt' and 'I am confused’ and experience non-perception, doubt and wrong perception as varieties of (ordinary everyday) ignorance, sometimes positive, sometimes negative, while con tending philosophers, and reflective observers generally who do not happen to agree with Prakasatman and his school, openly deny the existence of indeterminable positive Ignorance as taught in his system.

The so-called philosophers of the world and ordinary people of the world have no idea that there is an ignorance by which this entire world is born. They cannot fathom it in any stretch of their imagination that some ignorance can give birth to this entire world (अनात्मनः च अज्ञानप्रसूतत्वात्, Naishkarmya Siddhi) . So, we are not concerned with their denial or acceptance. We are mumukshu and seek to attain jnAna which is covered by ajnAna. In order to do that, we need to understand the nature of ajnAna. Without knowing the problem, you cannot solve it. So, knowing the nature of ignorance is crucial in VedAnta.

Nor is there any mention, direct or indirect, anywhere in Sri Sankara's commentaries, of any positive Ignorance other than the triad of non-perception, doubt and wrong perception. This is a point that must be carefully considered.”

First of all, SSSS ji has not understood VivaraNa and hence his usage of the word "positive" is itself misleading. It has been explained that ignorance is neither bhAva nor abhAva because of bAdhaka-sattva for both. It is different from bhAva as well as abhAva. It is called bhAvarUpa so as to distinguish it from abhAva. I am not at all sure whether SSSS ji knows this. If he knew it, then he should have said so in his writings. If he did not know this, his understanding of VivaraNa is flawed and hence not worthy of analysis and response. Further, a bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa avidyA is present at every step of ShAnkara BhAshya.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

//SSSS ji failed to understand the teaching of VivaraNa on account of misguided fundamentals. VivaraNa uses the various means of cognitions to demonstrate the ignorance-qualified-with-specific-adjectives and not ignorance per se. //

--Any ignorance that is demonstrated by pramāṇas inevitably acquires the status of an object (prameya) and therefore existence (sattā). Ignorance as a cause of the world cannot be a prameya, for the cause of superimposition cannot itself be accepted as superimposed. If you try to “know” avidyā by any pramāṇa you have already converted it into an ontological entity (bhāva), which is precisely what Śaṅkara never does. Whether you call it “ignorance per se” or “qualified ignorance,” the moment you invoke arthāpatti, anumāna, pratyakṣa, etc., you have left Śaṅkara and entered the Vivaraṇa’s post-Śaṅkara construction

//First of all, SSSS ji has not understood VivaraNa and hence his usage of the word "positive" is itself misleading. It has been explained that ignorance is neither bhAva nor abhAva because of bAdhaka-sattva for both. It is different from bhAva as well as abhAva. It is called bhAvarUpa so as to distinguish it from abhAva. I am not at all sure whether SSSS ji knows this. //

--Śaṅkara nowhere teaches a third ontological category apart from satya and asatya. The term ‘anirvacanīya’ applies only to the superimposed object, not to the supposed ‘ignorance’ behind it. Śaṅkara uses ‘avidyā’ only as a name for the fact of adhyāsa, not for a substantive principle having real ontological status.

Regards, Michael

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om Michael ji.

--Any ignorance that is demonstrated by pramāṇas inevitably acquires the status of an object (prameya) and therefore existence (sattā).

How have you arrived at this conclusion that being prameya implies sattA? Entire pramANa-prameya-vyavahAra is within the domain of ignorance, says BhAshyakAra. Being within the domain of ignorance means, they are non-existent appearances. So, just because ignorance-coupled-with-adjectives is prameya does not imply that it has a sattA.  

Ignorance as a cause of the world cannot be a prameya, for the cause of superimposition cannot itself be accepted as superimposed.

The cause-effect-relationship is itself a product of ignorance. In a dream, we see an illusory clay giving rise to an illusory pot through an illusory cause-effect-relationship. Extending the same experiential analogy, an illusory ignorance gives rise to an illusory world through an illusory cause-effect-relationship. There is nothing incongruent here. Just as illusory clay and illusory pot were prameya in the dream along with absence of sattA, similarly ignorance-coupled-with-adjective-of-world-causehood is prameya along with absence of sattA.

If you try to “know” avidyā by any pramāṇa you have already converted it into an ontological entity (bhāva), which is precisely what Śaṅkara never does.

What is known through pramANa is ignorance coupled with adjectives. These adjectives are not sAkshi-bhAsya.

Sir, please analyse. Why are we both discussing the nature of ignorance, but not the fact of ignorance? It is because we both agree on perception of ignorance but we disagree on the nature of ignorance i.e. its adjectives. Whether it is bhAvarUpa or abhAvarUpa, we disagree. But we agree on its appearance. This itself clearly shows that avidyA is sAkshi-bhAsya but its adjectives are not.

Now, abhAva is never sAkshi-bhAsya. It is always pramAtri-vedya. This shows that sAkshi-bhAsya avidyA is not abhAva. 

 

Whether you call it “ignorance per se” or “qualified ignorance,” the moment you invoke arthāpatti, anumāna, pratyakṣa, etc., you have left Śaṅkara and entered the Vivaraṇa’s post-Śaṅkara construction.

Sir, Shankara is not a prophet whose words are to be believed on account of having been spoken by Shankara. We are supposed to be seekers of truth and not fanatic followers of a prophet. I do not distinguish between Shankara and PrakAshatmA because the words of both are true. They are to be followed on account of being true, and not on account of merely having been spoken by them.

I explained to you that your inference of "prameyatva implies sattA" is violated by dream-analogy. So, qualified-ignorance being prameya does not mean that either ignorance or qualified-ignorance has any sattA.

We have no ignorance about ignorance. But we have ignorance about qualified-ignorance. The ignorance about qualified-ignorance is removed through pramANa. It however does not imply its sattA. 

--Śaṅkara nowhere teaches a third ontological category apart from satya and asatya.

It has been explained a number of times that there is no third ontological category. It has been categorically stated, even in this thread, that ignorance is non-existent. So, your statement is putting words in the mouth of the opponent. This is because of an incorrect understanding of the opponent's views. When avidyA is stated to be sat-asat-vilakshaNa or bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa, then its ontological status is not a matter of discussion. Existence wise, it has been clearly said to be non-existent. The existence which appears coupled to it is of the substratum. 

 

The term ‘anirvacanīya’ applies only to the superimposed object, not to the supposed ‘ignorance’ behind it. 

Sir, is ignorance itself superimposed or not? If yes, then you yourself admit that it will also be anirvachanIya. If not, then ignorance becomes non-superimposed reality. Thus, you tie yourself in उभयतः पाशा रज्जु. 

Śaṅkara uses ‘avidyā’ only as a name for the fact of adhyāsa, not for a substantive principle having real ontological status.

Enough has been said on it. And if despite having discussed it a number of times, you think that VivaraNa holds ignorance as a substantive principle having real ontological status, then there is some serious lack of capacity to understand what the opponent is saying.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

Thank you, as always for a thoughtful and challenging response. Here are 7 topics you raised and what I believe are corrective responses to each as per Sankara in Prasthanatraya as pointed out by SSSS.  

---

1. On “prameyatva implies sattā”

You ask:

How have you arrived at this conclusion that being prameya implies sattā? Entire pramāṇa–prameya–vyavahāra is within the domain of ignorance… Being within the domain of ignorance means, they are non-existent appearances.

I’m not saying “prameya implies paramārthika sattā.” I’m saying: to treat something as a distinct prameya, accessible to a distinct pramāṇa, is already to confer on it the status of an object with at least vyāvahārika / pratītika existence in that domain.

Your own dream analogy actually shows this. In the dream, pot and clay are indeed objects of dream-perception; they enjoy dream-sattā while the dream lasts. Only on waking do we retrospectively call them asat relative to waking reality. But as long as the relevant pramāṇa is operating, the object cannot be treated as utterly non-existent; it has the type of “existence” appropriate to that level.

So if you say:

• “Ignorance-qualified-with-adjectives is prameya,”
• “It is demonstrated by various pramāṇas (arthāpatti, anumāna, etc.),”

then within that cognitive framework you have already made it a distinct, determinate item of knowledge: a bhāva-padārtha of some order, even if you later say “its existence really belongs to the substratum”. This is precisely what SSSS is objecting to: Śaṅkara never feels the need to posit such a knowable “ignorance qualified by world-causehood.”

 

2. On “fact of ignorance” vs “nature of ignorance”

You say:

Why are we both discussing the nature of ignorance, but not the fact of ignorance? … This itself clearly shows that avidyā is sākṣi-bhāsya but its adjectives are not.

From the SSSS / Śaṅkara side, I would phrase that differently:

• What is common and undisputed is the fact of misapprehension—the adhyāsa that Śaṅkara defines as “satyanṛte mithunī-kṛtya…” and “tattvanyathā-pratipattiḥ” (wrong apprehension of reality).
• Once you start speaking of “ignorance qualified by world-causehood” as something discerned via distinct pramāṇas, you’ve moved beyond that minimal, bhāṣya-based “fact” and into a post-Śaṅkara theoretical superstructure.

So I do not grant the premise that “we both agree on perception of ignorance as a positive veil experienced by the sākṣin”. What we both agree on is:

“I take the non-self as self; I don’t know the ātman as it really is; I say ‘I do not know this object’.”

Śaṅkara consistently treats this as wrong knowledge / non-knowledge of the real, not as direct experience of some ‘veil-substance’ behind it.

---

3. On sākṣi-bhāsya and abhāva

You argue:

We agree on its appearance. This itself clearly shows that avidyā is sākṣi-bhāsya… Now, abhāva is never sākṣi-bhāsya. It is always pramātṛ-vedya. This shows that sākṣi-bhāsya avidyā is not abhāva.

Two issues from an SSSS / Śaṅkara angle:

1. Where does Śaṅkara say that “avidyā as such” is sākṣi-bhāsya apart from the erroneous cognitions themselves?
   In the adhyāsa-bhāṣya he defines ignorance precisely as tattvanyathāpratipatti and mithyājñāna-nimitta of karma & saṃsāra. These are all vṛttis, erroneous modes of knowing, not a separate “experienced stuff.”
2. The “abhāva is never sākṣi-bhāsya” premise is your technical framework, not Śaṅkara’s explicit doctrine. Śaṅkara happily includes agrahaṇa (non-apprehension) under ajñāna (e.g., “agrahaṇa, anyathāgrahaṇa, saṃśaya” as varieties of ignorance), but he never turns that into a sophisticated pramāṇa-theory about abhāva vs sākṣi-bhāsya the way later schools do.

From SSSS’s perspective, you are importing post-Śaṅkara pramāṇa-śāstra distinctions back into Śaṅkara and then reading his simple use of “ajñāna” through that lens. SSSS’s whole project is to resist exactly that.

---

4. On “Shankara vs Prakāśātma” and authority

You write:

Sir, Śaṅkara is not a prophet… I do not distinguish between Śaṅkara and Prakāśātman because the words of both are true.

I completely agree that we’re seekers of truth, not sectarian followers. But the specific question under discussion was:

• What is Śaṅkara’s own doctrine of avidyā, as seen in his prasthāna-traya-bhāṣyas?

SSSS’s point is not, “Prakāśātman is wrong because he’s not Śaṅkara,” but:

• “If we are expounding Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya, we should not silently import a later technical construction (bhāva-abhāva-vilakṣaṇa avidyā, pramāṇa-based proofs of world-causehood etc.) which Śaṅkara himself never articulates.”

You are free to accept Prakāśātman’s system as “true” in a broader sense. But then it should be called Vivaraṇa-siddhānta, not “Śaṅkara’s own view,” and that is precisely SSSS’s complaint.

---

5. On “bhāva-abhāva-vilakṣaṇa” and ontological status

You say:

It has been categorically stated… that ignorance is non-existent. So, your statement is putting words in the mouth of the opponent. When avidyā is stated to be sat-asat-vilakṣaṇa or bhāva-abhāva-vilakṣaṇa… Existence-wise, it has been clearly said to be non-existent. The existence which appears coupled to it is of the substratum.

From SSSS’s standpoint:

• The very need to meticulously classify avidyā as bhāva-abhāva-vilakṣaṇa, “not bhāva, not abhāva, but called bhāvarūpa to distinguish it from abhāva,” etc., is already a post-Śaṅkara development.
• Śaṅkara never undertakes such an ontological hair-splitting about avidyā. He simply calls it mithyājñāna, tattvanyathāgrahaṇa, ātmāna-ātmā adhyāsa, and says it is bādhyam by jñāna.

SSSS’s point is: if you truly hold it to be non-existent, then there is no need to treat it as a prameya with determinate qualifications (world-causehood, locus, etc.) obtainable by various pramāṇas. That whole structure is what he calls “representing it as existent” in practice, however much you verbally deny its sattā.

---

6. “Is ignorance superimposed or not?”

You ask:

Sir, is ignorance itself superimposed or not? If yes, then you yourself admit that it will also be anirvacanīya. If not, then ignorance becomes non-superimposed reality.

From the SSSS angle this is a false dilemma created by reification.

• For Śaṅkara, avidyā = adhyāsa itself—the fact that the real is taken as other than it is.
• To then ask “Is ignorance itself superimposed?” is like asking “Is misapprehension itself misapprehended?” You’ve taken a name for a cognitive error and turned it into a separate object to be classified as superimposed / non-superimposed.

Once you drop that reification and let “avidyā” mean simply tattvanyathā-pratipattiḥ, there is no independent “veil-entity” left to label as anirvacanīya. The term anirvacanīya Śaṅkara uses for the superimposed object (rajju-sarpa, svapna-viśva), not for a separate “ignorance-stuff” behind it.

---

7. On “substantive principle with real status”

You conclude:

If … you think that Vivaraṇa holds ignorance as a substantive principle having real ontological status, then there is some serious lack of capacity to understand what the opponent is saying.

From the SSSS reading, the issue is less about what Vivaraṇa verbally denies and more about what its method logically entails:

• It treats avidyā as a material cause (upādāna) of adhyāsa / world.
• It seeks to establish this avidyā-as-cause via multiple pramāṇas (pratyakṣa, anumāna, arthāpatti, śabda).
• It further gives it detailed qualifications (locus, object, etc.) beyond the simple “fact of misapprehension” admitted by Śaṅkara.

All this, in SSSS’s eyes, is precisely what makes avidyā function as a quasi-ontological principle, a “thing-like non-thing” that Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya never needs. His whole program is to show that Śaṅkara can be understood consistently by taking avidyā as nothing more than beginningless error (adhyāsa) about the already self-luminous ātman, without postulating a distinct, pramāṇa-established world-cause called “bhāva-abhāva-vilakṣaṇa avidyā.”

---

So the core difference, as I see it, remains:

• You wish to preserve the full Vivaraṇa framework and then reinterpret its avidyā as “really non-existent but conceptually special,”
• Whereas SSSS, staying strictly within Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya vocabulary, sees no warrant to posit a pramāṇa-established, qualifier-laden, upādāna-kāraṇa avidyā at all. For him, avidyā is simply tattvanyathāpratipatti—the very adhyāsa Śaṅkara defines at the outset—and nothing more.

Regards,
Michael

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

Fine. I don't have anything to say further. It is clear that the discussion is not between two humans, but between a human and an AI. So, it is not possible for me to engage any further.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, How else might I present an argument qualified to meet your own status of scholarship and intelligence? I take ownership of everything said here and only wish I could say it as clearly and precisely as my tool does. These are strong arguments based on our stipulated textual criteria. Ignoring them doesn't refute them and should cause doubt about one's ability to refute them. 

Please, I invite others more comfortable with A.I. to respond. 

regards, michael. 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

These are strong arguments based on our stipulated textual criteria. Ignoring them doesn't refute them and should cause doubt about one's ability to refute them. 

I agree that ignoring them does not refute them. But there is an alternative method to get the response since I am not interested in responding to cut and paste of AI response, even if you take ownership of that. 

The alternative method is this - you ask AI to present a refutation of your response as per VivaraNa. You may get enough material to counter question that. And then, if you like, you can ask for a refutation of that as per SSSS ji. And thereafter, you can ask for refutation as per VivaraNa. This can go on ad infinitum.

It is disrespectful to cut and paste an AI response to a human response which has been provided out of love, respect and concern. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Bhaskar YR]

Vivaraṇa does not teach a third ultimate category. It teaches that within the empirical reality of vyavahāra, which Śaṅkara himself utilizes, avidyā functions as if it were a positive entity—a necessary postulate to make sense of the journey from ignorance to knowledge, from bondage to liberation,

praNAms
Hare Krishna

The missing point here from vivaraNa perspective is that they advocate that avidyA is a jada vastu (like chair etc.) hence arguments go like avidyA is like darkness and it is not mere prakAsha abhAva but it is a solid entity. More importantly, it is there in brahman itself even before the creation, which is the root cause for the jeevabhAva in brahman and upAdAna kAraNa for the adhyAsa. Hence nAma rUpa prakruti as per them is mUlAvidyA and for seeing it differently (adhyAsa) this nAma rUpa mUlAvidyA is material cause. So, as per vivaraNa well before saying anything in vyavahAra, the very cause of vyavahAra is mUlAvidyA which is NOT jeevaashrita / antaHkaraNa dOsha but it is having the shelter in brahman itself. But at some place they also say : there is nothing wrong that nAmarUpAtmaka prakruti is said to be concocted by adhyAsa!! even though the word avidyA in its mukhya artha 'mAya', there is no problem in saying this mAya is adhyAsa kruta. So IMO, it is wrong to think that vivaraNa introduces mUlAvidyA ONLY in vyavahAra...it is an ontological entity that is having the ashraya in brahman itself well before any talks about duality / creation / jeeva.

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Bhaskarji, 

That too is how I understand the Vivarana position as well. It is important to state the opponent's position in these discussions. Too often SSSS is misrepresented and in turn he has been said to misrepresent post-Sankara acharyas.  

Regards, MIchael Chandra

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