Different models of eka-jIva-vAda
Sudhanshu Shekhar
Michael Chandra Cohen
Thank you for the chart summarizing the different models of eka-jIva-vAda.. I have been working with Siddhanta Bindu and it's helpful to make these distinctions. I have one observation and one strong objection to methodology. I hope you will not mind taking the time to respond. .
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The chart treats eka-jīva-vāda in Siddhānta-bindu as a fixed doctrinal position, but this does not accurately reflect SB §§75–78 (Sastri tr.). In these sections Madhusūdana surveys multiple eka-jīva / dṛṣṭi–sṛṣṭi formulations and, in §78, explicitly licenses them as context-dependent explanatory options rather than as a single settled view. Read in isolation, the chart gives the impression that SB decisively endorses one column, whereas the text itself presents these accounts pedagogically.
At the same time, SB does not consistently keep these distinctions at a purely pedagogical level. A clear example occurs in SB §92, where Madhusūdana contrasts brahma-upādāna and jīva-upādāna views and assigns different functional roles to vṛtti in each case:
Here the adopted “view” governs the mechanics of ignorance and its removal, indicating a shift from pedagogical permissibility (§§75–78) to operative explanatory machinery. The chart does not capture this internal tension in SB between licensed upāyas and their later functional hardening..“अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवाज्ञानविषयतया आवृतम् इति व्यपदेशात् … जीवोपादानत्वपक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैव।” (SB §92)
§75 अज्ञानविषयीभूतं चैतन्यम् ईश्वरः, अज्ञानाश्रयीभूतं च जीव इति वाचस्पतिमिश्राः । अस्मिंश् च पक्षे अज्ञाननानात्वाज् जीवनानात्वम् । प्रतिजीवं च प्रपञ्चभेदः, जीवस्यैव स्वाज्ञानोपहिततया जगदुपादानत्वात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञा च अतिसादृश्यात् । ईश्वरस्य च सप्रपञ्चजीवाविद्याधिष्ठानत्वेन कारणत्वोपचाराद् इति । अयम् एव चावच्छेदवादः ।
According to Vachaspatimisra, pure consciousness which is the content (object) of nescience is Isvara. The locus of nescience is the jiva. In this view multiplicity of jivas is due to multiplicity of nescience. Thus the universe is different for each jiva, because the jiva is the material cause of the universe since it has nescience as limiting adjunct. The recognition of the universe as the same by all is due to extreme similarity. Isvara is metaphorically described as the cause of the universe because of being the substratum of the jivas, nescience and the universe. This is the limitation theory.
§76 अज्ञानोपहितं बिम्बचैतन्यम् ईश्वरः, अज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यं जीव इति वा, अज्ञानानुपहितं शुद्धचैतन्यम् ईश्वरः, अज्ञानोपहितं जीव इति वा, मुख्यो वेदान्तसिद्धान्त एकजीववादाख्यः । इमम् एव च दृष्टिसृष्टिवादम् आचक्षते । अस्मिंश् च पक्षे जीव एव स्वाज्ञानवशाज् जगदुपादानं निमित्तं च, दृश्यं च सर्वं प्रातीतिकम् । देहभेदाच् च जीवभेदभ्रान्तिः । एकस्यैव च स्वकल्पितगुरुशास्त्राद्युपबृंहितश्रवणमननादिदार्ढ्याद् आत्मसाक्षात्कारे सति मोक्षः । शुकादीनां मोक्षश्रवणं चार्थवाद एव । महावाक्ये च तत्पदम् अनन्तसत्यादिपदवद् अज्ञानानुपहितचैतन्यस्य लक्षणयोपस्थापकम् इत्याद्या अवान्तरभेदाः स्वयम् ऊहनीयाः ।
Pure consciousness which is the original (which is what is reflected), with nescience as its limiting adjunct is Isvara. The reflection of consciousness in nescience is the jiva. Or, pure consciousness not limited by nescience is Isvara. Consciousness limited by nescience is the jiva. This is the main Vedanta theory, known as the theory of a single jiva. This itself is called ‘drishtisrishtivaada’. In this view the jiva himself is the material and efficient cause of the universe through his own nescience. All the objects perceived are illusory (like things seen in dream). The delusion that there are many jivas is only due to there being many bodies. Liberation is attained by the single jiva on realization of the self as a result of the perfection of hearing, reflection, etc., with the help of the Guru and the scriptures which are all conjured up by him. The statements about Suka and others having attained liberation are only by way of eulogy. In the Mahavakya the term ‘That’ signifies by implication consciousness not limited by nescience, like the terms ‘infinite’, ‘reality’, etc. Such differences in views within the main framework should be known by inference.
§77 ननु, वस्तुनि विकल्पासम्भवात् कथं परस्परविरुद्धमतप्रामाण्यम्, तस्मात् किम् अत्र हेयं किम् उपादेयम् इति चेत् ।
Obj: Since there cannot be different opinions about a real thing, how can such mutually contradictory views be valid? So, what view is to be accepted and what is to be rejected?
§78 क एवम् आह वस्तुनि विकल्पो न सम्भवतीति । स्थाणुर् वा पुरुषो वा राक्षसो वा इत्यादिविकल्पस्य वस्तुन्य् अपि दर्शनात् । अतात्त्विकी सा कल्पना पुरुषबुद्धिमात्रप्रभवा, इयं तु शास्त्रीया जीवेश्वरविभागादिव्यवस्था इति चेत्, नूनम् अतिमेधावी भवान् ।
Who says that different opinions
are not possible about a real thing? It is seen that the same object is seen as
a pillar or a man or a demon, etc. If it is said that the views there are
not correct, because they arise only in a person’s mind, but this distinction
as jiva, Isvara, etc., is based on the scriptures, then (the answer is):— You
are indeed very clever.
§92 सत्यम्, स्वसम्बद्धसर्वभासकतया सर्वज्ञम् अपि अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवाज्ञानविषयतया आवृतम् इति व्यपदेशात् । तस्माद् ब्रह्म जगदुपादानम् इति पक्षे चिदुपरागार्था आवरणभङ्गार्था च वृत्तिः, जीवोपादानत्वपक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैवेति ।
Answer: It is true that Brahman is omniscient because it illumines everything that is connected with it. But it is described as covered because it is the content (object) of the ignorance of the jiva who is limited by the mind. Therefore, in the view that Brahman is the cause of the universe the purpose of the vritti is to connect the knower-consciousness and for removing the covering. In the view that the jiva is the cause of the universe, the vritti is only for removing the veil of ignorance.
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Sudhanshu Shekhar
I have been working with Siddhanta Bindu and it's helpful to make these distinctions. I have one observation and one strong objection to methodology. I hope you will not mind taking the time to respond. .
The chart treats eka-jīva-vāda in Siddhānta-bindu as a fixed doctrinal position, but this does not accurately reflect SB §§75–78 (Sastri tr.). In these sections Madhusūdana surveys multiple eka-jīva / dṛṣṭi–sṛṣṭi formulations and, in §78, explicitly licenses them as context-dependent explanatory options rather than as a single settled view. Read in isolation, the chart gives the impression that SB decisively endorses one column, whereas the text itself presents these accounts pedagogically.
At the same time, SB does not consistently keep these distinctions at a purely pedagogical level. A clear example occurs in SB §92, where Madhusūdana contrasts brahma-upādāna and jīva-upādāna views and assigns different functional roles to vṛtti in each case:
“अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवाज्ञानविषयतया आवृतम् इति व्यपदेशात् … जीवोपादानत्वपक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैव।” (SB §92)
Here the adopted “view” governs the mechanics of ignorance and its removal, indicating a shift from pedagogical permissibility (§§75–78) to operative explanatory machinery. The chart does not capture this internal tension in SB between licensed upāyas and their later functional hardening..
Michael Chandra Cohen
My concern, however, is methodological rather than classificatory. In Siddhānta-bindu §§75–78, multiple eka-jīva / dṛṣṭi–sṛṣṭi formulations are explicitly licensed as context-dependent explanatory options. Yet in later passages—most clearly in §92—those same “views” are made to govern concrete explanatory mechanics, such as the differing functional roles assigned to vṛtti depending on whether brahman or the jīva is taken as upādāna. At that point, the adopted view is no longer merely descriptive of eka-jīva-vāda features but becomes explanatorily operative.
This shift is already prepared earlier in the text. In §§39–41, while vṛtti is not yet thematized, Madhusūdana stabilizes a functional differentiation between sākṣī, cid-ābhāsa, and antaḥkaraṇa that establishes an internal cognitive architecture. In §§52–55, and especially §55, ignorance is said to be experienced by the sākṣī in the determinate form “I do not know.” Even though vṛtti is not named there, such determinate experiential presentation presupposes a content-bearing cognitive episode and thus an ignorance that persists long enough to be presented and recognized.
By the time we reach §92, this implicit commitment becomes explicit: ignorance and its removal are explained through differentiated vṛtti-functions tied to competing “views.” At that stage, bhāvarūpa avidyā is no longer merely pedagogical but functions as a persisting explanatory substrate required to account for error, cognition, and correction.
My point, then, is not that the chart is wrong on its own terms, but that it does not register this internal movement in Siddhānta-bindu—from permissively licensed upāyas to selective explanatory reliance. When an upāya begins to carry explanatory responsibility in this way, ignorance is no longer treated as something exhausted by negation alone, but as something that must be explained and managed. Whether this represents a legitimate post-Bhāṣya systematization or a methodological departure from Śaṅkara’s restraint is precisely the substantive issue I hoped to bring into view.
§39 ननु नीरूपस्य निरवयवस्यात्मनः कथं प्रतिबिम्ब इति चेत् ।
Obj: How can an object without form and without parts have a reflection?
§40 कात्रानुपपत्तिः, विभ्रमहेतूनां विचित्रत्वात्, जपाकुसुमरूपस्य नीरूपस्य निरवयवस्यापि स्फटिकादौ प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनाच् छब्दस्यापि प्रतिशब्दाख्यप्रतिबिम्बोपलम्भात् तयोः सम्प्रतिपन्नप्रतिबिम्बवैलक्षण्यनिरूपणात् ।
Ans: What is the incongruity in that? The causes of illusion are strange. The red colour of the Japa flower (China rose) is seen to be reflected in crystal, etc., even though the colour has no form. Sound is seen to have a reflection in the form of the echo. By common consent their reflections are not considered as different from the originals.
§41 तथापीन्द्रियग्राह्यस्यैव प्रतिबिम्ब इति चेत् ।
Obj: Even then, there can be a reflection only for an object that can be known by any of the sense-organs.
§52 अत्रोच्यते — अहं मनुष्यः कर्ता भोक्तेत्यादिप्रतीतिस् तावत् सर्वजनसिद्धा । सा च न स्मृतिर् अपरोक्षावभासत्वाद् भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वाच् च ।
Answer: Now we say: It is well known that every one has the knowledge in the form, “I am a man, I am an agent and experiencer, etc.”. That is not a mere remembrance because it is directly experienced and is devoid of the cognition of difference (between himself and his body).
§53 नापि प्रमा श्रुतियुक्तिबाधितत्वात् । तथा च श्रुतयः “यो ऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः” (बृ.उ. ४.३.७), “अयम् आत्मा ब्रह्म” (बृ.उ. २.५.१९), “सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म” (तै.उ. २.१), “विज्ञानम् आनन्दं ब्रह्म” (बृ.उ. ३.९.२८), “य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा” (छा.उ. ६.७.१), “यत् साक्षाद् अपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः” (बृ.उ. ३.४.१), “यो ऽशनायापिपासे शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युम् अत्येति” (बृ.उ. ३.५.१), “स यत् तत्र किञ्चित् पश्यति अनन्वागतस् तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्य् अयं पुरुषः” (बृ.उ. ४.३.१५) इत्याद्या अकर्तृभोक्तृपरमानन्दरूपताम् आत्मनो दर्शयन्ति ।
Nor is it right knowledge, because it is contradicted by Sruti and reasoning. “The infinite entity that is identified with the intellect and is amid the organs” (Br. Up. 4.3.7
), “This self is Brahman” (Br. Up. 2.5.19), “Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and Infinitude” (Tai. 2.1.1), “Brahman is Consciousness and Bliss” (Br. Up. 3.9.28), “The self that is free from sin” (Cha. 8.7.1), “The Brahman that is immediate and direct; the self that is within all” (Br. Up. 3.4.1), “That which transcends hunger and thirst, grief, delusion, decay and death” (Br. Up. 3.5.1), “He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state (of dream), for this infinite being is free from all attachment” (Br. Up. 4.3.15)—Sruti statements such as these declare that the self is not an agent nor an experiencer, and is itself Brahman which is of the nature of supreme bliss.
§54 युक्तश् च — विकारी परिच्छिन्नत्वेनानात्मत्वापत्तेः स्वेनैव स्वस्य ग्रहणे कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् दृग्दृश्ययोश् च सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः भेदेनाभेदेन वा धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तेश् च । ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्षे तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदध्वंसप्रागभावसमवायज्ञानत्वजात्यादयभ्युपगमे गौरवात्, एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चातिलाघवात्, घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानम् इत्य् उपाधिभेदपुरस्करेणैव ज्ञानभेदप्रतीतेः । स्वतस् तु ज्ञानं ज्ञानम् इति एकस्वरूपावगमात्, तदुत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतीत्योश् चावश्यकल्प्यविषयसम्बन्धविषयतयाप्य् उपपत्तेः, उपाधिपरामर्शम् अन्तरेण स्वत एव घटाद् घटान्तरस्य भेदप्रतीतेस् तत्प्रतिबन्दीग्रहासम्भवाद् आकाशकालदिशाम् अपि नानात्वापत्तेश् च । कर्तृत्वादेर् वास्तवत्वे ऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । स्वप्रकाशानभ्युपगमे च जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्, परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन च तस्यानन्दरूपत्वात्, निर्धर्मकनित्यस्वप्रकाशसुखात्मक एवात्मा इत्यादयः ।
The knowledge common to every one in the form “I am a man, etc.”, cannot be right knowledge (prama) because of the following reasons. Things which undergo change (such as the body) have necessarily to be limited in time, space and with respect to other objects and so they cannot be the self. The body cannot know itself, because the same entity cannot be both subject and object at the same time and so the relationship of seer and seen is not possible. The relationship of quality and its possessor is not possible between knowledge and the body, whether they are considered as different from each other or as non-different. In the view that knowledge is not eternal the difference between various knowledges, their non-existence after destruction and prior to origination, the relationship of inherence, and a genus ‘knowledgeness’ which is the common quality of all different knowledges (just as cowness is the common quality of all cows) will have to be admitted, and that is cumbersome. If knowledge is accepted as only one (though the objects of knowledge are many) there will be simplicity. Differences in knowledge, such as ‘knowledge of pot’, ‘knowledge of cloth’ are only due to the different limiting adjuncts (pot and cloth). By itself knowledge is only one. The notion of origination and destruction of knowledge is only due to the necessity of relating the knowledge to the object of knowledge. The difference between one pot and another is known by itself without the need of referring to any adjunct, and there can be no difference of opinion on this matter. If knowledge which is only one is split up and considered as ‘many knowledges’, then space, time and the directions will also have to be considered as many. Moreover, if agency, etc., are real, then there can be no liberation at all, because that which is the real nature of a thing can never be removed from it. If the self is not self-luminous, the universe will be blind (insentient). Being the object of supreme love of all, the self is of the nature of bliss. Therefore the self is devoid of qualities, eternal, self-luminous and of the nature of bliss.
§55 तस्मात् परिशेषाद् भ्रान्तिर् इयम् इति स्थिते तत्कारणम् अपि योग्यं किञ्चित् कल्पनीयम् । कल्प्यमानं च तदात्मन्य् अध्यस्ततयैव धर्मिग्राहकमानेन सिध्यतीति न जानामीति साक्षिप्रतीतिसिद्धम् अनिर्वाच्यम् अज्ञानम् एव तत् । न चेदम् अभावरूपम्, ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेर् उक्तत्वात् ।
Thus, since the only course left is to conclude that this (the cognition ‘I am a man, etc.,’) is only a delusion, it is necessary to postulate a proper cause for this delusion. That cause is found to be something whose existence is established as superimposed on the non-dual self, from the fact of the appearance of the dharmi (the entity who describes himself as ‘I am a man, etc.’). That cause is the indescribable ignorance which is experienced by the witness-consciousness in the form ‘I do not know’. This is not of the nature of non-existence (in the form of mere absence of knowledge). Since it has been said that knowledge is eternal, there can never be absence of knowledge.
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Sudhanshu Shekhar
My concern, however, is methodological rather than classificatory. In Siddhānta-bindu §§75–78, multiple eka-jīva / dṛṣṭi–sṛṣṭi formulations are explicitly licensed as context-dependent explanatory options.
Yet in later passages—most clearly in §92—those same “views” are made to govern concrete explanatory mechanics, such as the differing functional roles assigned to vṛtti depending on whether brahman or the jīva is taken as upādāna. At that point, the adopted view is no longer merely descriptive of eka-jīva-vāda features but becomes explanatorily operative.
This shift is already prepared earlier in the text. In §§39–41, while vṛtti is not yet thematized, Madhusūdana stabilizes a functional differentiation between sākṣī, cid-ābhāsa, and antaḥkaraṇa that establishes an internal cognitive architecture. In §§52–55, and especially §55, ignorance is said to be experienced by the sākṣī in the determinate form “I do not know.” Even though vṛtti is not named there, such determinate experiential presentation presupposes a content-bearing cognitive episode and thus an ignorance that persists long enough to be presented and recognized.
By the time we reach §92, this implicit commitment becomes explicit: ignorance and its removal are explained through differentiated vṛtti-functions tied to competing “views.” At that stage, bhāvarūpa avidyā is no longer merely pedagogical but functions as a persisting explanatory substrate required to account for error, cognition, and correction.
My point, then, is not that the chart is wrong on its own terms, but that it does not register this internal movement in Siddhānta-bindu—from permissively licensed upāyas to selective explanatory reliance.
When an upāya begins to carry explanatory responsibility in this way, ignorance is no longer treated as something exhausted by negation alone, but as something that must be explained and managed. Whether this represents a legitimate post-Bhāṣya systematization or a methodological departure from Śaṅkara’s restraint is precisely the substantive issue I hoped to bring into view.
Michael Chandra Cohen
Thank you for the detailed response. Let me restate my point more carefully, using your own clarifications, since they actually bring the methodological issue into sharper focus.
I fully agree that the purpose of a prakriyā is to facilitate cognition and the removal of ignorance. The question is not whether a prakriyā enables cognition, but how far that role extends. In Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya usage, a prakriyā guides understanding while remaining replaceable; it does not permanently fix the mechanics of ignorance and its removal.
You note, quite rightly, that “jīva is upādāna in Bhāmatī because jīva is covered by avidyā, and brahman is upādāna in Vivaraṇa because brahman is covered by avidyā.” This makes my point: once a prakriyā determines who is covered by avidyā, it necessarily determines how cognition and āvaraṇa-bhaṅga must operate. At that stage, the prakriyā is no longer merely illustrative, but operative.
Likewise, your remark that “perception of avidyā is by avidyā-ākāra–avidyā-vṛtti” (as discussed in Advaita-siddhi) directly bears on SB §55, where ignorance is said to be experienced in the determinate form “I do not know.” Even if this is explained through later Siddhi-style machinery, the implication remains the same: ignorance is treated as something that persists long enough to be cognitively presented and recognized, not merely as a superposition exhausted by negation.
Finally, when you state that “be it sṛṣṭi–dṛṣṭi-vāda or dṛṣṭi–sṛṣṭi-vāda, bhāvarūpa avidyā is a must,” the methodological difference I am pointing to becomes explicit. Once bhāvarūpa avidyā is indispensable across prakriyās, it functions as a persisting explanatory factor. That is a coherent and sophisticated system, but it also marks a shift from a purely pedagogical use of explanatory devices to an operative one.
So my observation is not that Siddhānta-bindu misclassifies prakriyās, nor that §92 “belongs” to eka-jīva-vāda. It is that, across the text, prakriyā commitments come to govern the mechanics of ignorance and its removal. Whether this represents a legitimate post-Bhāṣya systematization or a departure from Śaṅkara’s methodological restraint is the substantive issue I am trying to isolate—not something resolved simply by noting that different prakriyās are being described.
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Namaste Sudhansuji,
el