Dr. Hegde: Key differences: SSS & PSA -- a fresh voice

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Key Differences in Interpretations: Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī and Traditional Post-Śaṅkarācārya Commentators

We present here the key differences between the interpretations of Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī and the traditional, post-Śaṅkarācārya commentators of Advaita Vedānta.

### 1. ADHYĀROPA-APAVĀDA-PRAKRIYĀ

Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī (henceforth, SSS) and the traditional commentators (Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, henceforth, PSA) agree on a fundamental point: the *śruti*'s purpose is not to communicate an unknown Brahman, but rather to eliminate our ignorance about it.

However, they differ significantly on how *śruti* accomplishes this task. SSS maintains that *adhyāropāpavāda* is the only method that *śruti* employs to eliminate ignorance. The traditional commentators, in contrast, argue that the *śruti* uses multiple methods—including *adhyāropāpavāda*, *lakṣaṇā*, *netivāda*, etc.—to 'indicate' Brahman. For them, it is ultimately the *mahāvākyas* that generate *akhaṇḍākāravṛttijñāna* which destroys ignorance.

*Adhyāropāpavāda* is a method that works in two steps:

1. First, it temporarily assigns certain deliberate (and false) attributes to the attributeless Brahman to counter specific unexamined false ideas about Brahman.

2. Second, it retracts these attributes to prevent them from being taken as ultimately real.

SSS emphasizes that this method is not meant to provide a temporary explanation of the empirical world; rather, it functions purely as a corrective instrument. The deliberately assigned attributes serve specifically to negate certain unexamined attributes that conflict with them. SSS explains, *"imaginary attributes [serve to] refute those attributes which are incompatible with them..."* (तत्र अध्यारोपितादन्यस्य प्रपतद्वन्द्वद्वनः प्रपतषेधः).

For SSS, the value of an *adhyāropa* lies not in what it positively asserts about Brahman (or the individual self/world), but in what it negates. When we read the Upaniṣads through the lens of *adhyāropa-apavāda*—at each level: words, sentences, and *prakriyas*—our focus shifts from their literal content to the false notions they help eliminate. Since these provisional teachings are themselves ultimately negated, they cannot be mistaken as final truths. However, when we interpret the Upaniṣads without this framework, we tend to treat their statements as positive assertions of truth. This approach not only risks treating conceptual constructs as independently real but also conflicts with scripture's fundamental nature as a means of knowledge that works through negation. SSS's primary criticism of the traditional commentators centers on their tendency to build doctrinal systems from what were meant to be provisional teachings, while losing sight of their main purpose: negating our innate misconceptions.

As an illustration of how the method works, consider the *pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta* in the *prasthānatraya* texts. The *pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta*—which presents Brahman as the *bimba* and the *jīva* as its reflection (*pratibimba*)—has generated extensive discussion both among traditional Advaita Vedānta commentators and modern scholars. Much of this discussion assumes that the reflection analogy is a model or metaphor meant to explain—either partially or fully—the nature of the individual self and its relationship with Brahman. When the *pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta* is interpreted as explaining the relationship between the *jīva* and Brahman, it leads to various theories about the nature of reflection, the reflecting medium, and the mechanics of reflection.

This has split the tradition into (at least) three schools:

* The *ābhāsavādins*

* The *pratibimbavādins*

* The *avacchedavādins*

Texts like the *Siddhantabindu* describe two types of *pratibimbavāda*, and the *Siddhantalesasamgraha* discusses three types of *pratibimbavāda*:

1. The *pratibimbavāda* of the *Prakathārthavivaraṇa*, *Tattvaviveka*, *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*

2. The *pratibimbavāda* of the *Citradīpa*, *Brahmānanda*, and *Dṛgdṛśyaviveka*

3. The *pratibimbavāda* of the *Vivaraṇa* of Prakāśātman

According to SSS, this approach has two problems: it turns the analogy into something concrete (although temporary), and it conflicts with the fundamental purpose of the Upaniṣads as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)—which is to negate or refute ignorance (*nivartaktva*). SSS argues that the reflection analogy must be understood through the method of *adhyāropāpavāda*.

A careful analysis using the method of *adhyāropa-apavāda* reveals that the *pratibimbadṛṣṭānta* is not meant to explain the relationship between the individual self and Brahman. In the *prasthānatraya* texts, this *dṛṣṭānta* serves a specific purpose: to counter the mistaken belief that Brahman suffers or undergoes transmigration. When the texts declare that Brahman is the universal Self, or that the individual self is identical with Brahman, this often leads to a natural misconception: that Brahman must experience the *jīva*'s sufferings or undergo transmigration. It is specifically to dispel this error that the texts employ the *pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta*.

For example, in the *aṃśādhikaraṇa*, the *pūrvapakṣin* raises this question: *If the individual soul (jīva) is an aṃśa of Brahman, does not Brahman experience the jīva's suffering?* Śaṅkarācārya answers using the reflection analogy—just as movement in reflection in water doesn't affect the actual sun, the *jīva*'s suffering doesn't touch Brahman. Finally, this *adhyāropa* is refuted in BSB 3.2.25. A detailed analysis of the *prasthānatraya* texts will show that the *dṛṣṭānta* consistently appears as a response to a single question: *Does Brahman experience suffering?* It is refuted after its purpose stands served.

This is one example to demonstrate the fundamental difference in SSS' and the PSA's approach to textual interpretation. The PSA attempts to extract positive metaphysical content from the text, while SSS sees it as purely negative, meant only to remove a specific misconception.

> **Further Reading:**

> *Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā*, *Śuddha-Śāṅkara-PrakriyāBhāskara*, *Essays on Vedānta*, *How to Recognize the Method of Vedānta*, *Misconceptions about Śaṅkara*, *Upaniṣadic Approach to Reality*.

>

### 2. AVIDYĀ, DṚṢṬI-DVAYA, ANUBHAVA, AVASTHĀTRAYA-PRAKRIYĀ

The method of *adhyāropāpavāda* rests on two key logical assumptions: first, ignorance (*avidyā*), and following from it, the two distinct epistemic standpoints—the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika*.

For SSS, *avidyā* is a logically necessary construct—a *śāstra-kṛta-adhyāropa*—introduced to explain our ordinary perception of reality. It has no actual existence, whether temporary or permanent, either ontologically or psychologically. SSS refers to *avidyā* as the 'primary superimposition' (*mūlādhyāropa*). It is the first and most fundamental teaching device, defined as the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self. Put differently, the description of *avidyā* as an "undeliberated superimposition" (*adhyāsa*) is itself a carefully deliberated *upāya*.

When we assume *avidyā* as our basic predicament, we must naturally propose knowledge (*vidyā*) as its cure. This pair—knowledge and ignorance—gives rise to two epistemic standpoints: the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika*. These two perspectives provide the structure for the teaching method of *adhyāropāpavāda*.

There is a notable difference in how SSS and the traditional commentators use the terms *vyāvahārikadṛṣṭi* and *pāramārthikadṛṣṭi*. SSS identifies the Witness stance as the *pāramārthikadṛṣṭi* / *śāstradṛṣṭi*, whereas the traditional commentators typically equate *paramārtha* and the *pāramārthikadṛṣṭi*. According to SSS, the *paramārtha* is not a *dṛṣṭi*; it is not an epistemic stance. The epistemic stances are relevant only to the seeker who is still bound by ignorance—they serve as practical tools that the seeker can actively use to investigate the nature of reality. The PSA's *paramārthadṛṣṭi*, on the other hand, is available only post-gnosis, not employable in the current state of ignorance.

The Witness-stance (*sākṣi-dṛṣṭi*) is a deliberate standpoint that seekers must adopt to critically examine and ultimately refute the *vyāvahārikadṛṣṭi*. This stance requires us to consciously step back from identifying as an individual being (*jīva*) and instead take up the meta-cognitive position of the Witness.

What does this involve? From the Witness perspective, as pure awareness alone, we must conduct a completely impersonal analysis of whatever appears as contents of direct, immediate awareness. SSS describes this as an examination of '*anubhava*'. The term '*anubhava*' is synonymous with *sākṣin*.

From our everyday perspective (*vyāvahārika*), considering the three states of consciousness, the waking state (*jāgrat*) is understood as a shared, public realm, while dream (*svapna*) and deep sleep (*suṣupti*) are seen as private experiences occurring within the individual, within the broader context of the waking world. This is our ordinary viewpoint.

The Witness (*sākṣin*), on the other hand, precedes the three states. To this Witness, these states appear simply as contents of awareness, without labels like 'waking', 'dream', or 'deep sleep'. They aren't seen as following each other in time or causing one another, nor as one state happening "inside" another. Instead, they appear as equally primary experiences. From this Witness perspective, then, there are only two types of contents of perception:

* **Duality:** which is seen in both waking and dream states

* **Non-duality:** which is witnessed in deep sleep

To omit the *sākṣin*-stance is to rely on a post-gnosis, post-mortem non-duality for refuting the *vyāvahārika*-stance, which, in turn, is to rely solely on *śabdapramāṇa*; there is no place for reason grounded in experience here. According to SSS, the PSA effectively reduce Vedānta to a pursuit entirely based on scriptural authority; the Upaniṣads' promise of *mokṣa* becomes analogous to the *karmakāṇḍa*'s promise of *svarga*.

The debate about *mūlāvidyā* can only be properly understood if SSS' *vyāvahārika-pāramārthika* stances are properly understood.

> **Further Reading:**

> *Mūlāvidyānirāsa*, *Sugamā*, *Avasthātrayachandrika*, *Paramārthacintāmaṇi*, *Avasthatraya or The Unique Method of Vedānta*, *Śankara's Sūtrabhāṣya Self-Explained*, *The Unique Teaching of Sankara*, *The Basic Tenets of Śāṅkara Vedānta*.

>

### 3. ĪŚVARA, SAGUṆA-NIRGUṆA BRAHMAN, KĀRYA-KĀRAṆA-PRAKRIYĀ

In contemporary academic discourse, *aparabrahman* is considered synonymous with *īśvara* (ruler) who through *māyāśakti* (cosmic causal power) manifests as, and governs, the multitudinous universe. According to SSS, on the other hand, the *apara-para* distinction is solely a distinction between *upāsya* and *jñeyabrahman*.

While attributes like *īśvaratva*, *sarvajñatva*, *sarvaśaktimattva*, and *kāraṇatva* are undoubtedly temporary attributes ascribed to *parabrahman*, they serve to refute other unconsciously attributed qualities, and are eventually retracted at the end of the *kārya-kāraṇa-prakriyā*. Since these deliberately assigned attributes aim to remove ignorance and are ultimately negated, SSS argues that these Upaniṣadic sections actually communicate the attributeless Brahman (*parabrahman*) through the method of *adhyāropa-apavāda*.

In contrast, the Upaniṣadic sections that ascribe attributes to Brahman specifically for meditation reinforce ignorance rather than remove it. Crucially, these attributes are not withdrawn at the end of these sections. According to SSS, only these latter sections—which properly belong to the realm of ignorance (*avidyākṣetra*)—teach *aparabrahman*, or 'Brahman with attributes.'

Consider, for example, the Bhṛgu-Varuṇa dialogue. When Bhṛgu asks Varuṇa to teach him about Brahman, Varuṇa provides two key elements:

1. The six "*dvāras*" for realizing Brahman: body, vital force, eye, ear, mind, and speech.

2. A *lakṣaṇa* (defining characteristic) of Brahman: that from which beings arise, live, and ultimately dissolve.

The PSA debate how causality can be a *lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. Padmapāda argues it is an *upalakṣaṇa* (incidental characteristic) rather than an essential one—it is like identifying a house by the crows perching on it, where the crows are not intrinsic to the house. Vācaspati Miśra sees causality as an inferential marker—just as the sun's changing positions let us infer its motion, the world's origin, sustenance, and dissolution allow us to infer Brahman. This allows Brahman to be defined circumstantially through causality, while its essential nature remains reality, knowledge, and infinity.

SSS offers a different interpretation of the *Bhṛguvalli*, focusing on Bhṛgu's methodological approach to realizing Brahman. After receiving instructions from Varuṇa, Bhṛgu performs *tapas*, systematically examining various faculties as potential Brahman—starting with *anna*, then progressing to more subtle elements like vital force, mind, and consciousness. His method uses the causal definition of Brahman (that from which things arise, exist, and dissolve) as a test criterion, which leads him to understand that Brahman must be that which has no origination, sustenance, or dissolution.

When examining each sheath (*kośa*), he temporarily posits it as Brahman, only to reject it upon seeing its originated nature. Crucially, SSS notes that Varuṇa provides both a definition of Brahman and specific "doors" (*dvāras*) for investigation. This suggests the definition isn't meant for mere inference of Brahman, but rather as a practical criterion for the *anvaya-vyatireka* method within the *kārya-kāraṇa-prakriyā*. Sureśvarācārya also explicitly clarifies this as the *anvaya-vyatireka* method in his *Taittirīyabhāṣyavārttikā*. According to SSS, the attribute of *kāraṇatva* is useful only for the *anvaya-vyatireka* method within the *kārya-kāraṇa-prakriyā*, not outside of it.

The traditional commentators, however, take the attribute of causality out of its original context. This shifts the entire focus of inquiry: instead of negating false ideas, the task becomes trying to understand how Brahman could be a cause. This leads them to develop *vyāvahārika* explanations about creation—such as how Brahman, as *īśvara*, creates through *māyā*, and what the exact nature and workings of *māyā* are. According to SSS, these explanations do little more than satisfy intellectual curiosity.

SSS offers a distinctive interpretation: when the scriptures speak of Brahman as the cause (*kāraṇatva*) or the lord (*īśvaratva*) of creation, this is a deliberate but temporary *adhyāropa*. Its purpose is not to establish the reality of creation or a creator, but rather to negate the idea that Brahman itself could be subject to birth and death. It points us toward *"that which remains unborn and undecaying through the originations and dissolutions of the universe."* Eventually, this *adhyāropa* is withdrawn—the Upaniṣads ultimately reveal that Brahman is not really a cause at all, and that there is no actual creation.

To rewrite this in a step-by-step sequence:

* **(a) (Adhyāropa):** Brahman is *īśvara* / the cause of the origination, sustenance, and the dissolution of the world.

* **(b) (The specific erroneous ideas negated through (a)):** The (erroneous) idea that the Brahman is subject to origination/dissolution; that the world exists independent of Brahman.

* **(c) (Apavāda):** There is no cause/creation.

According to SSS, both statement (a) and (c) work in tandem: the first removes our instinctive misconceptions about Brahman, while the second refutes the attributes that the Upaniṣads themselves introduce. Together, they form a single coherent method for eliminating all false ideas about Brahman.

Thus, *Īśvara* is not a separate entity—not even in the *vyāvahārika* realm. In SSS' words:

> "Śankara's concept of Para Brahman, Apara Brahman and Iśvara is that the same Brahman is called Higher Brahman when it is made the subject of enquiry as Reality, Lower Brahman when it is recommended in the Srutis as an object of meditation, and Iśvara or the omniscient and omnipotent when it is thought of as the cause and ruler of the phenomenal world containing individual souls."

>

> **Further Reading:**

> *Viśuddha-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, *Viśuddha-Vedānta-Sāra*, *Śaṅkara's clarification of certain vedāntic concepts*, *Sūtrabhāṣyārthatattvavivecanī*, *Brahmavidyārahasyavivṛtti*, *Intuition of Reality*.

>

> **Note:** A work entitled *"Introductions to Vedanta Texts"* serves as a valuable reference guide to SSS's complete works, providing concise summaries of both his English and Sanskrit writings. At 234 pages, it offers thorough book-by-book overviews that help understand the scope and content of each book before diving in. This makes it particularly useful to navigate SSS's extensive body of work on Vedānta philosophy.

>

**Authored by**

1 Dr.Manjushree Hegde

manjus...@gmail.com

## Key Differences in Interpretations: Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī and Traditional Post-Śaṅkarācārya Commentators

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Reg  //  SSS refers to *avidyā* as the 'primary superimposition' (*mūlādhyāropa*). It is the first and most fundamental teaching device, defined as the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self //,

Does this not involve or imply a relationship between the Self and the non-Self ?. What is its status then, ontological and epistemolgical.

Regards

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Reg  //  we try to connect these due to non-comprehension that leads to misapprehension //,

Do not the terms **connect** and ** leads to ** imply relationship / sambandha?

Regards

On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 6:43 PM Raja Krishnamurti <rajakris...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Absolutely no relationship. Avidya is absence of true knowledge. That doesn’t mean it has any relationship with Reality. The connection we try to establish does not exist and we try to connect these due to non-comprehension that leads to misapprehension.

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On Monday, June 29, 2026, 6:06 AM, H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 6:33 PM H S Chandramouli <hschand...@gmail.com>

wrote:

> Namaste.

>

> Reg  //  SSS refers to *avidyā* as the 'primary superimposition'

> (*mūlādhyāropa*). It is the first and most fundamental teaching device,

> defined as the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self //,

>

> Does this not involve or imply a relationship between the Self and the

> non-Self ?. What is its status then, ontological and epistemolgical.

>

> Regards

>

>

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste ChandramoulI haven't checked the reference but I imagine those terms need to be taken figuratively. It is clear relationship implies duality. Perhaps it is speaking from vyavaharika. 🙏🙏🙏

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[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

Since you posted such a detailed post, although authored by Dr Hegde, I felt I may get a satisfactory authoritative response for my query. You may recollect our recent brief discussion concerning the choice of  definition of adhyAsa by Sri SSS. Then also there was no satisfactory authoritative answer to my basic question. This time round, I was hoping  you may refer the question to the author of the article posted by you and get an answer from her at least since apparently she has undertaken a detailed study of his works. Anyway Hope to get the answers sometime in the near future.

Regards

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Please remind me the issue

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Chandramouli, forgive me, please. 

You asked, 

Reg // SSS refers to *avidyā* as the 'primary superimposition' > (*mūlādhyāropa*). It is the first and most fundamental teaching device, > defined as the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self //, > > Does this not involve or imply a relationship between the Self and the > non-Self ?. What is its status then, ontological and epistemolgical.

I was to say, suddha brahman is the only ontic and any relationship is epistemological only, and end it there. But, then I asked Claude, how would SSS respond: 

The objection assumes that "mutual superimposition of Self and non-Self" names a relation (saṃbandha) holding between two relata, and that a relation owes us an account of its terms and its ground. But notice what Śaṅkara actually does at the head of the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya, which is SSS's whole touchstone. He first establishes the impossibility of any real conjunction: yuṣmad-asmat-pratyaya-gocarayoḥ … tamaḥ-prakāśavad viruddha-svabhāvayoḥ itaretara-bhāvānupapattau — subject and object, contradictory as light and dark, cannot be mutually identified, nor a fortiori their attributes. And from that established impossibility he concludes the superimposition is mithyā iti bhavitum yuktam — and yet (tathāpi) it proceeds, satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya, real and unreal coupled by mithyā-jñāna, as the natural "I am this," "this is mine."

So the "relationship" is not a presupposition that adhyāsa requires; it is the very content of the false cognition. The apparent bond is mithyā-jñāna-nimitta — occasioned by error, not grounding it. To ask "what is the ontological status of the relation between Self and non-Self?" is therefore to take the explanandum (the false coupling) and demand for it the dignity of a real connection — which is precisely the demand SSS spends his corpus refusing. The impossibility of the relation is not a defect in the account that some entity must repair; it is the criterion of the thing's being superimposed. Śaṅkara front-loads the anupapatti so that you cannot later try to make the coupling respectable.

There's a sharper point hiding in the word "mutual." At its root the superimposition is tādātmya — false identity ("aham idam," I am this body) — not saṃsarga, relation. "Relation" is already the wrong category for an identity-error: there is no relation between A and A, only a collapse mistaken for unity. The relational register ("mama idam," this is mine) is the secondary, saṃsargādhyāsa layer, and it too is mithyā-jñāna-nimitta — a superimposed relating, not a real one. So insofar as the primary superimposition is identificatory, the request for "the status of the relation" is partly a category mistake: at the root there is no relation, there is a false identification.

This is also why SSS's chosen term is mūla-adhyāropa and not mūlāvidyā. Adhyāropa is a prakriyā word — a deliberate positing-upon, made in order to be withdrawn by apavāda. The name itself encodes the status: it is the first and most fundamental thing the teaching superimposes so as to rescind it, not a root-substance underlying the world. To read "primary superimposition" as naming a primal entity is to swap adhyāropa (an act/device) for avidyā-as-stuff (a bhāvarūpa material cause) — the exact substitution he attributes to PSA.

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

Reg // I was to say, suddha brahman is the only ontic and any relationship is epistemological only, and end it there //,

If the intention is to maintain no ontic other than Brahman, that would be incorrect even as per above statement. Remember epistemological is mental, and that needs mind/vrittis etc. All these are ontic only. True they do not need  ontic objects external to mind. But that does not mean no ontic entities at all other than Brahman. Mind/vrittis etc demand ontic status.

Reg  //  To ask "what is the ontological status of the relation between Self and non-Self?" is therefore to take the explanandum (the false coupling) and demand for it the dignity of a real connection — which is precisely the demand SSS spends his corpus refusing //,

I had mentioned about this in another post addressed to you recently which I am copying below for ready reference. You have again mentioned here about  ** dignity of a real connection ** . You did not respond to my earlier post copied below

//  Namaste Michael Ji,

You

//  SSS drops smṛtirūpaḥ and pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ from the essential definition only for the beginningless ātma–anātma adhyāsa, because those terms fit laukika/sādya adhyāsa such as rope-snake, shell-silver //

And

//  As per Sugama,  “The two adjectives, such as smṛtirūpaḥ and pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ are used here… to include the superimposition of the worldly instances, such as silver upon the sea-shell…” //,

//  As per Sugama,  “‘smṛtirūpaḥ pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ’ is only for clarifying the definition of adhyāsa having a beginning; it should not be forgotten that it does not enter into the body of the definition of the present adhyāsa.” //,

Me

I entirely agree. That is how Sri SSS characterizes  in Sugama. But it is his declaration. Where does such a declaration leave Sri Bhagavatpada who does not make such a distinction while defining adhyAsa in the context of his opening statement . The definition is preceded by ** आह — कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । (Aha — ko.ayamadhyAso nAmeti | ) **. What is this adhyAsa?. Sri SSS shifts the emphasis in this to read as ** What is this adhyAsa? ** and considers this as the general definition adhyAsa , and not as specifically addressing this adhyAsa. Sri SSS himself violates what he himself states above, namely  ** definition of the present adhyāsa **.  That not only defeats the intent of the definition, but also leaves Sri Bhagavatpada open to be shown up as being casual and irresponsible while defining such important terms. This is quite unacceptable. This is just my point. Every term used for the definition must be given full weightage considering the context in which it is defined. Curtailment as done in sugama is unacceptable.

You

//  So there are two different senses of tādātmya:

1. Real tādātmya-sambandha between ātman and anātman — SSS rejects this entirely.
2. Falsely cognized tādātmya, as in “I am this body/mind” — SSS makes this central

Me

Why restrict it to only two. Why not three. Third one being

3.       False (mithyA or AdhyAsika) tAdAtmya sambanda between Atman and anAtman.

This is exactly my point. I am not suggesting ** real tAdAtmya sambanda **. AdhyAsika only. The definition of adhyAsa given by Sri Bhagavatpada admits of such an interpretation. Just to pointout one reference from the bhAshya for such understanding, BSB 2-2-38 ** ब्रह्मवादिनः कथमिति चेत् , न; तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणसम्बन्धोपपत्तेः । ** (brahmavAdinaH kathamiti chet , na; tasya tAdAtmyalakShaNasambandhopapatteH |).

You

//  satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya, anyonyātmatā, and anyonya-dharma-adhyāsa—with the important proviso that this tādātmya is false appearance, not real relation //.

Me

Agreed. That holds good with three alternatives as well. //.     

Reg        // There's a sharper point hiding in the word "mutual." At its root the superimposition is tādātmya — false identity ("aham idam," I am this body) — not saṃsarga, relation. "Relation" is already the wrong category for an identity-error: there is no relation between A and A, only a collapse mistaken for unity.//,

Excuse me for asking. Is this from Claude or your statement? I will respond subsequently if needed.

Regards

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

I am copying below from another recent post addressed to you

//  You wrote

//  For SSS avidyā is adhyāsa — a false cognition, the taking of one thing for another — neither a positive cosmic entity nor a mere absence of knowledge //.

I am responding since you are repeatedly mentioning about mananam. Not for raising any controversy.

In my understanding of Sri SSS, an important point has been missed out when he states ** avidyā is adhyāsa — a false cognition, the taking of one thing for another **. And that is ** the relationship of tAdAtmya between the two - * one thing for another **. This requirement has been completely ignored. In my understanding of Sri SSS, that is the consequence of dropping the definition by Sri Bhagavatpada of adhyAsa as ** स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः । (smRRitirUpaH paratra pUrvadRRiShTAvabhAsaH | ) ** and preferring to use the other definition mentioned by Sri Bhagavatpada ** अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धि (adhyAso nAma atasmiMstadbuddhi ) ** which retains only the ** परत्र (paratra) ** part from the first definition. Sri SSS himself has  explained why he has dropped the other three terms from the first definition. In my understanding, this is the most fundamental  deviation from the Bhashya leading to consequential differences. //.

I think this is THE core issue.  Once this is resolved, namely which is the definition for adhyasa which Sri Bhagavatpada intended in the context of the preamble stated in the adhyasa bhashya just prior to ** कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । (ko.ayamadhyAso nAmeti |) **. Is it ** स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः । (smRRitirUpaH paratra pUrvadRRiShTAvabhAsaH | ) ** or ** अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धि (adhyAso nAma atasmiMstadbuddhi ) **. All other issues being addressed so often are consequential to this and can be deferred.

Regards

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Chandramouli, 

Sorry, I am lost. These comments are not in the present thread. However, your issue of sambandha seems to be handled by Sankara: 

//Remember epistemological is mental, and that needs mind/vrittis etc. All these are ontic only//

All is adhyasa even the idea of atma/anatma.  You reify by demanding an explanation of that status. It is like the various narratives Sankara proposes to explain avidya, "If the opponent were to say—“Who in that case, is the one, that is in ignorance i.e. in need of such realization ?”, we reply—It is you yourself, who are asking this question."BSbh4.1.3 also see, Gita 13.2, U.S. prose 2 & verse 18.44-6

You quote me, //  SSS drops smṛtirūpaḥ and pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ from the essential definition only for the beginningless ātma–anātma adhyāsa, because those terms fit laukika/sādya adhyāsa such as rope-snake, shell-silver //

And ...// ... etc. 

Where do I supposedly say these things? Not in Dr. Hegde's paper nor in my understanding of SSS

//tādātmya-sambandha //

Again, where do I say these things? I can imagine a reply but I need context

 

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Michael Ji,

Reg  // Again, where do I say these things? I can imagine a reply but I need context /,

Please refer the link  // https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#inbox/QgrcJHrhxnfLrlzWxzSXPQhPmshFRVdnKqL //

Regards