The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

[V Subrahmanian]

In the Panchadashi, Swami Vidyaranya makes this mind boggling statement about the Atman transcending time:

मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गतागम्येष्वनेकधा । 

नोदेति नास्तमेत्येका संविदेषा स्वयंप्रभा || 1.7

Through the many months, years, ages and world cycles, past and future, consciousness is the same; it neither rises nor sets (unlike the sun); it is self-revealing.

When we contemplate on the above, we are reminded of the famous statement in the Purusha Suktam:

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम् ।  

All this observed creation is Brahman, and all the past and the future. 

The Veda says that the creation is Brahman alone, appearing so. All that has gone by, all that is experienced in the present and all that is to come by, is Brahman.  The observed does not stay but the observer Consciousness is eternal. 

We are also reminded of the famous statement in the Vishnu Sahasra Nama mangala:

सहस्रनाम्ने पुरुषाय शाश्वते सहस्रकोटियुगधारिणे नमः ॥

 Salutations to thee, oh Lord, Who runs the immeasurable time of thousand crore yugas.. 

Thus, the Atman is the substratum, adhishThAnam, for the creation that has been appearing all the time.  

This contemplation frees one from the fear of death, the fear of losing existence.  One can experience here and now that one is eternal.    

See also this article: 

https://www.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2014-March/036856.html

The BG 2.16 and The Three States (avasthAtraya)

Om Tat Sat

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Subbu ji.

Indeed. 

Everything is Brahman, means everything is not, only Brahman is. BAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya.

The snake is rope, means snake is not, only rope is.

The crunch line is - if something is seen, it is illusory. It does not exist, it just appears to exist. असत् एव, सद् इव अवभासते - says भाष्यकार।

So, if something is seen/known, it is illusory, useless and downright unimportant. No need to pay any attention to that.

A remarkable takeaway of this, in my understanding, is illusoriness of causation. Causation is seen, and is hence illusory. And is hence non-existent, just appears to exist. Just as the causation seen in dream.

In dream, I saw the Potter making pot from clay. And I said - this pot is made from this clay. That this clay is cause of this pot. However, there was neither any clay, not any pot and certainly no causal connection between the seen clay and seen pot. Both were two distinct mental fluctuations. And there was an illusory pratyabhijnA.

This waking world is same. The seen clay is not the cause of seen pot. Nor is there any causal connection between the two. These two are just two mental fluctuations devoid of causal connection.

The result of understanding of illusoriness of causation is the following:

1. A "why" becomes unaskable. "Why" means acceptance of causation. Why does the wind blow -- there is no answer. Why is fire hot -- there is no answer. We cannot say - wind blows because there is pressure difference. The dream-wind did not have pressure difference. Similarly the waking-wind. The dream-fire was hot not because there were hot gases constituting it. Similarly the waking-fire.

2. There is no answer to - why I am happy, why I am sad.

3. There is cessation of "should". I should meditate- is a meaningless assertion as it seeks to causally connect meditation with the result of meditation.

4. Desire is a cause of suffering - is a meaningless assertion as it causally connects desire and suffering. 

So, why, when, should, what will happen etc are all useless.

There is a perception of suffering. I see it. And I ignore it.

I don't ignore it "as a result of my knowledge of its illusoriness". I don't investigate why I ignore. There is perception of suffering, and there is non-attention thereto.

At times, I pay attention to suffering despite there being the knowledge "seen is illusory".

So be it. Paying attention, not paying attention are both illusory. And it is useless to investigate.

I see ignorance. And I ignore it. I don't seek its cause. It is an illusory appearance.

So, complete indifference to seen is the key.

Cessation of why, should, when, what will happen is coupled with this knowledge - seen is illusion. How and why it is coupled -- is not required to be investigated. 

And that is same as situating as what we are. As purusha, as Brahman, as AtmA.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

I’m bound to point out that what you are saying is an attempt to say how things are from a pAramArthika perspective and, strictly speaking, it is not actually possible to do that. Gaudapada and Śaṅkara effectively state in kArikA 2.4 that the waking world is not real because it is perceived. But the ‘not real’ does not mean ‘illusory’, it means mithyA – name and form of Brahman (or vaitathya, as they call it in the kArikA-s). We – the body-minds – are also part of this. And we continue to live out our lives until, as j~nAnI-s, we use up our prArabdha karma. These empirical lives are not illusory! As far as we, as aj~nAnI-s, are concerned, it is all very much real. And the world functions according to the laws of Ishvara. Yes, from the pAramArthika perspective, there is no causation. Since there are not two things, that idea makes no sense at that level. But, at the vyAvahArika level, when you make these sort of statements, it causes me to make this sort of response! 😉

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

//I’m bound to point out that what you are saying is an attempt to say how things are from a pAramArthika perspective and, strictly speaking, it is not actually possible to do that.//

I would differ here. My statements are from the frame of reference of avidyA only and not from the frame of reference of shuddha chaitanya. From the pAramArthika perspective, that is, from the frame of reference of Brahman, there is neither any existence of seen nor is there any perception of seen. The way I had put up, there is perception of seen but no existence of seen. My statements are basically in drishTi-srishTi-vAda framework, which is not a pAramArthika-viewpoint. The pAramArthika-viewpoint is ajAti-vAda. 

//Gaudapada and Śaṅkara effectively state in kArikA 2.4 that the waking world is not real because it is perceived. But the ‘not real’ does not mean ‘illusory’, it means mithyA – name and form of Brahman (or vaitathya, as they call it in the kArikA-s).//

You mean mithyA does not mean illusory? MithyA, vaitathya, asatya, unreal, illusory.. these are one and the same. They appear to exist while the do not exist. As BhAshyakAra says -- क्षेत्रं च मायानिर्मितहस्तिस्वप्नदृष्टवस्तुगन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ‘असदेव सदिव अवभासते’. It is non-existent, just that it appears as existent. This is what is mithyA, vitatha, illusion, unreal, asatya etc.

//We – the body-minds – are also part of this. And we continue to live out our lives until, as j~nAnI-s, we use up our prArabdha karma. These empirical lives are not illusory! As far as we, as aj~nAnI-s, are concerned, it is all very much real.//

It certainly appears to be real. But it is not, as is proved by the logic adduced in MANDUkya 2.4. It is seen, and is hence illusory. Whatever is seen, is illusory, on account of being seen, like a dream, like the illusory silver.

//And the world functions according to the laws of Ishvara.//

Certainly it appears to be so.

//Yes, from the pAramArthika perspective, there is no causation. Since there are not two things, that idea makes no sense at that level. But, at the vyAvahArika level, when you make these sort of statements, it causes me to make this sort of response!//

From the pAramArthika perspective, there is neither a second thing, nor is there a perception of second thing. My statements were not from pAramArthika perspective. They were from vyAvahArika/prAtibhAsika perspective only i.e. from the frame of reference of avidyA only wherein causation is seen.

"Seen is illusory" is not from the pAramArthika perspective. It is from the frame of reference of seen. 

"Seen is illusory" implies traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitvam on account of defintion of illusion. This nishedha-pratiyogitA can be pAramArthikatva-avachchhinna or swarUpa-avachchhinna. While the former is valid is satt-traividhya-vAda, the latter is valid in eka-sattA-vAda. 

My statements were made in eka-sattA-vAda wherein the nishedha is by swarUpa. Causation is negated by its very swarUpa within the frame of reference wherein it is seen.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

‘MithyA’ certainly does NOT mean ‘illusory’. Sarvam khalvidam BrahmA.

 

If your statements are “basically in drishTi-srishTi-vAda framework”, I don’t know why I am replying at all, since I obviously do not exist. (Or is it that, since I AM replying, then you do not exist?)

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Sunday, October 27, 2024 10:13 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com; A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

MithyA’ certainly does NOT mean ‘illusory’. Sarvam khalvidam BrahmA.

The statement "sarvam khalu idam Brahman" means "sarvam is not" and "only Brahman is". This is like "this snake is rope", which implies " this snake is not", "only rope is". This is is called BAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. So, this statement "sarvam khalu idam Brahman" proves illusoriness of sarvam. This is the siddhAnta. World is mithyA and world is certainly illusory. 

You say that mithyA is not illusoriness. Let us then understand what is mithyA and what is illusoriness. For me both are same. And mithyA-tva is either of the following:

1. सदसदनधिकरणत्वं मिथ्यात्वम्

2. प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वम्

3. ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं मिथ्यात्वम्

4. स्वाश्रयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वम्

5. सद्विविक्तत्वं मिथ्यात्वम् 

In simple terms, mithyA-tva is being non-existent and yet appearing as existent. असत् but appearing as सत्.

What as per you is mithyA and what is illusoriness? You hold them as different, so please define both of them. And also, give examples of both.

Is snake-in-the-rope mithyA? Is it illusory?

Is silver-in-shell mithyA? Is it illusory?

 If your statements are “basically in drishTi-srishTi-vAda framework”, I don’t know why I am replying at all, since I obviously do not exist. (Or is it that, since I AM replying, then you do not exist?)

Just as you replied in your dream to the e-mail from me in the advaitin group in your dream, same way you can do now. There is no logical incoherence.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

Yes – I reacted a bit too strongly there! I agree that pedantically, you could say that mithyA means ‘illusory’ but this certainly can (and does) lead to confusion. There is a tendency to equate illusory with unreal. You yourself said “MithyA, vaitathya, asatya, unreal, illusory.. these are one and the same” and this is certainly not the case. This is one of the topics relating to ‘ignorance’ and therefore I cover it in depth in my next book ‘Confusions in Advaita Vedanta: Ignorance and its Removal”. Very briefly, I say:

 

“Thus, while it is true that something that is mithyā is not real, it is not true to say that it is unreal. It is not in itself real, since it is dependent on something more fundamental. It is transactionally real. We can wear a ring on our finger. We can use a mug, which is only name and form of clay, to drink out of. Mithyā means ‘neither real nor unreal’ — sat-asat-vilakṣaṇa [vilakṣaṇa means ‘differing from’; ‘not admitting of exact definition’].

 

Another way of differentiating the terms is that what is real or unreal cannot be sublated, whereas what is mithyā can. The ring is sublated into gold; the jīva is sublated into Brahman. (What is unreal cannot be sublated because it does not exist at all.)

 

Unfortunately, there is a tendency for some writers to translate mithyā as ‘unreal’. This is not correct. Anyone who claims this should have a mithyā jug of water poured over their head. Mithyā things are real within their own frame of reference but are Brahman from a pāramārthika standpoint. On enlightenment, it is this fact that is realized; the transactional, mithyā reality continues as before.”

 

As regards, the translation of सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मा in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14.1, you state:

 

<< The statement "sarvam khalu idam Brahman" means "sarvam is not" and "only Brahman is". This is like "this snake is rope", which implies " this snake is not", "only rope is". This is is called BAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. So, this statement "sarvam khalu idam Brahman" proves illusoriness of sarvam. This is the siddhAnta. World is mithyA and world is certainly illusory. >>

 

I freely confess that my Sanskrit knowledge is far inferior to your own but I cannot understand why everyone else seems to agree with my interpretation, including Shankara:

 

“All this verily is Brahman” – Raja Rajendralal Mitra and Prof. E. B. Cowell (Nag Publishers)

 

“All this indeed is Brahman”

Bhāṣya: “ All, - the whole of this – this, indeed, - this last term is an indeclinable particle introduced as an ornament of speech, - i.e. the whole of this world, differentiated in name and form, as apprehended by sense-perception and other means of cognition, is Brahman… etc.” – Dr. Sir Ganganathan Jha

 

“All this is verily Brahman” – Swami Krishnananda

 

“All this is Brahman” – Swami Gambhirananda

 

“Verily, all this is Brahman” – Som Raj Gupta

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya: “…Verily, all this is Brahman. ‘Verily’ is a poetic embellishment. ‘All this’ means this world of names and forms, a modification, knowable through perception, inference and other means of knowledge. This world is Brahman itself, Brahman its cause, its origin.”

 

“Verily, all this universe is Brahman” – Swāmi Swāhānanda

 

“All this is Brahman” – Sarvam idam, all this; khalu; no doubt; brahma, is Brahman; - Swami Lokeswarananda

 

Chāndogya 6.2.3, Śaṅkara Bhāṣya: “Just as the rope appears to be born in the form of volitional snake, so is the creation born… Then is the creation non-existent like the non-existent rope-snake? It is not so. Even as the rope-snake is non-different from the rope, the creation is not other than Brahman.”

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Sunday, October 27, 2024 12:33 PM
To: Advaitin <adva...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

> I agree that pedantically, you could say that mithyA means ‘illusory’ but this certainly can (and does) lead to confusion. There is a tendency to equate illusory with unreal. You yourself said “MithyA, vaitathya, asatya, unreal, illusory.. these are one and the same” and this is certainly not the case.

One needs to be clear with their definitions. Then there will be no confusion. The words used frequently are mithyA, sat, asat, asatya, anrita, viatatha. The words mithyA, asatya, anrita, vitatha are same. If an entity is mithyA, it is astaya, anrita as well as vitatha. If an entity is asatya, it is mithyA, anrita and vitatha. If an entity is vitatha, it is mithyA, anrita and asatya.

I translated asatya as unreal. And hence, I said mithyA and asatya are the same.

Definition-wise, these words have different connotations. But entity-wise, they are the same.

asat and asatya are different. asat is defined as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वम् । In simple terms, it means inability to appear as existing in any locus. Example is, horns of hare.

sat is Brahman.

So, if you translate asat as unreal, then obviously mithyA and unreal are different.

However, I translated asatya as unreal. Hence, there is nothing wrong in identifying unreal with mithyA i.e. illusion. Waking world, dream world and deep sleep are all illusory. All three are dream, mithyA, changeable and illusory.  त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः ।

>  “Thus, while it is true that something that is mithyā is not real, it is not true to say that it is unreal. It is not in itself real, since it is dependent on something more fundamental. It is transactionally real. We can wear a ring on our finger. We can use a mug, which is only name and form of clay, to drink out of. Mithyā means ‘neither real nor unreal’ — sat-asat-vilakṣaṇa [vilakṣaṇa means ‘differing from’; ‘not admitting of exact definition’].

You have translated asat as unreal. So, you are right in saying that mithyA is different from unreal.

This is an issue of translation. And not of conceptual difference.

>  Another way of differentiating the terms is that what is real or unreal cannot be sublated, whereas what is mithyā can. The ring is sublated into gold; the jīva is sublated into Brahman. (What is unreal cannot be sublated because it does not exist at all.)

Here, there needs to be caution. The idea of mithyA is not mere sublatability. It is sublatability-by-knowledge. Neither sat not asat are sublatable-by-knowledge whereas mithyA is sublatable-by-knowledge. In case of prAtibhAsika-entities, they are sublatable by a knowledge which is different from Brahma-jnAna, whereas for vyAvahArika-vastu, they are sublatable by Brahma-jnAna. Both have sublatability-by-knowledge.

>  Unfortunately, there is a tendency for some writers to translate mithyā as ‘unreal’. This is not correct. Anyone who claims this should have a mithyā jug of water poured over their head. Mithyā things are real within their own frame of reference but are Brahman from a pāramārthika standpoint. On enlightenment, it is this fact that is realized; the transactional, mithyā reality continues as before.”

You are describing within sattA-traividhya-vAda wherein pAramArthika, vyAvahArika and prAtibhAsika-sattA are accepted. What I described was in eka-sattA-vAda. That is the primary siddhAnta of VedAnta. Here, the existence is only of Brahman. No vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika-sattA is accepted. MithyA-vastu have absolute absence by their very swarUpa i.e. from their own standpoint and not merely from pAramArthika standpoint.

From pAramArthika-standpoint, there is neither any existence of mithyA-vastu nor there is a perception thereof.

From the frame of reference of mithyA-vastu, there is a perception of mithyA-vastu but no corresponding existence. (Eka-sattA-vAda)

From the frame of reference of mithYA-vastu. there is a perception of mithyA-vastu and there is vyAvakArika-sattA or prAtibhAsika-sattA. Their atyanta-abhAva is from pAramArthika-stand-point. (sattA-traividhya-vAda).   

> but I cannot understand why everyone else seems to agree with my interpretation, including Shankara:

They have said that everything is Brahman. And they have explained this to mean that world is not, only Brahman is.‘सर्वं ब्रह्म’ इति तु सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थम्, says BhAshyakAra.

All this "confusion" would not have been attributed by you if basic terms are clearly defined and understood:

1. MithyA, asatya, vitatha indicate same entity. MithyA basically means illusory. asatya basically means changeable. 

प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् ।
यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरति, तदनृतमित्युच्यते । (anrita and asatya are same)
वितथस्य भावो वैतथ्यम् ; असत्यत्वमित्यर्थः ।

2. Anything which is seen, is mithyA i.e. asatya i.e. vitatha. World is seen, hence it is illusory, changeable etc. It is not asat, as it appears as existent. An asat entity, horns of hare, cannot appear as existent.

3. Non-existence is common to asat and mithyA. Their distinction lies in ability to appear as existent.  सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वाच्ययोः साधारणम् ; तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः । asat and tuchchha are same.

4. Whatever is seen, be it a jug of water, or ring made of gold or snake-in-the-rope, they are all mithyA, asatya, vitatha, illusory. They are absent in the very locus where they are seen. And their absence is by their very swarUpa and not merely  delimited by pAramArthikatva. And they are not asat. It is up to you as to how you translate asat and asatya.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

As I may have said before, I despair of many of the post-Śaṅkara authors whose academic analysis of words and postulation of ‘what Śaṅkara really meant’ usually just confuse rather than clarify anything. I would not dream of disputing your Sanskrit knowledge and ability to use this to break down words into their classical meaning. What I would dispute is the need for doing this. The very simple analysis that I provided is, I believe, all that is needed and is easy to follow. The books that I have read over the past 30 years (my library is well over 1000 books – see https://www.advaita.org.uk/library/library.html, which is now over 10 years out of date) mostly do not see any need to complicate the issue further.

 

It would take me some time to work out exactly what you are saying here but, on the face of it, it does not seem to stand up to reason and it does seem to conflict with all of the published swamis, as I indicated. I guess you would maintain that the world literally disappears when you gain enlightenment, and that the rest of the imaginary persons would disappear with it. I.e., you are an eka-jIva-vAdin. My ‘Confusions’ book on ignorance devotes many pages to the disappearing world view and shows that it does not stack up with shruti or Śaṅkara. I have no intention of revisiting it here.

 

One point which I would be interested in having you further explain is how your Śaṅkara quote “सर्वं ब्रह्म’ इति तु सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थम्” shows that “the world is not”. Could you also indicate where it occurs. Of course the world is not ‘real in itself’. Its sat-existence is that of Brahman. The world is mithyA – jaganmithyA – meaning just that. If it were the case that it literally is unreal, why do none of the translators/commentators mention this in connection with sarvaM khalvidaM brahmA?

 

And where do your quotations in 1 and 3 below come from? Supposed quotations cannot carry any weight if you do not give the source! Since your Sanskrit knowledge is so good, you might have made them up for all I know. 😉 Surely, when you are having a discussion such as this with someone, you have to adjust what you say so that the other person can understand it. I could simply give up, since I can’t follow what you are saying, thus giving any readers the impression that you have carried your argument.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2024 6:28 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Dennis prabhuji

Hare Krishna

And where do your quotations in 1

 

• First one is more or less similar  from taittireeya up. bhAshya where bhAshyakAra gives definitions of sat and asat.  In 2.1.1 he explains which once determined will remain as such always is satyaM and that which does not remain the same as once determined is asatyaM.  Jagat is in this sense is asatyaM not mithya like serpent on the rope.  It is in this sense only jagat is Ishwara srushti and Svapna is jeeva srushti, bhAshyakAra explains somewhere.  Here by contrasting the waking world’s objectives from that of dream world, he clarifies creation of Ishwara universally perceived in the waking world such as AkAsha etc. are objective but OTOH dream creation is not objective and it is not universally accessible.  The dream world is kevala jeeva  maanasa pratyaya and it is unreal there is not even an iota of reality in it. 

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

 It would take me some time to work out exactly what you are saying here but, on the face of it, it does not seem to stand up to reason and it does seem to conflict with all of the published swamis, as I indicated.

It does not conflict. Rather, all AchAryAs are unanimous in so far as "sarvam khalu idam Brahm" is concerned. All have explained it to be bAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. Meaning thereby, the statement is identical to "this snake is rope". In case of "aham Brahma asmi", there are two explanations - mukhya sAmAnAdhikaraNya and bAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. But in the case under discussion, i.e. "sarvam khalu idam Brahm", all prakriyAs are unanimous that it is bAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. So, the statement "sarvam khalu idam Brahma" proves the mithyA-tva of sarvam.

 

I guess you would maintain that the world literally disappears when you gain enlightenment, and that the rest of the imaginary persons would disappear with it. I.e., you are an eka-jIva-vAdin.

True. However, I will add that this is not the ultimate siddhAnta. Whether it is DSV (eka-jIva-vAda) or SDV, they are all within the framework of avidyA. Both are within vivarta-vAda.The true siddhAnta is ajAti-vAda which is from the frame of reference of Brahman, wherein no avidyA is accepted ever. No creation, no jIva, nothing. So, creation appears-- and on enlightenment, it will disapper --- is as much meant for children as is srishTi-drishTi-vAda. As Yoga VAsistha says and VedANta SiddhAnta MuktAvalI quotes -- बालान्प्रति विवर्तोऽयं ब्रह्मणः सकलं जगत् । अविवर्तितमानन्दमास्थिताः कृतिनः सदा ॥  ६।१२७।२८॥ 

My ‘Confusions’ book on ignorance devotes many pages to the disappearing world view and shows that it does not stack up with shruti or Śaṅkara. I have no intention of revisiting it here.

There is no confusion here sir. DSV and SDV are prescribed for different aspirants. Wherever dream and waking are equated by Shankaracharya, that is DSV. Wherever they are distinguished, that is SDV. Both DSV and SDV are within vivarta-vAda. The ultimate truth is ajAti-vAda. If you read one into the other, it will appear as confusion. These are explained to be sequential prakriyA in siddhAnta meant for different aspirants. So, there is no room for "confusions".

 

One point which I would be interested in having you further explain is how your Śaṅkara quote “सर्वं ब्रह्म’ इति तु सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थम्” shows that “the world is not”. Could you also indicate where it occurs. Of course the world is not ‘real in itself’. Its sat-existence is that of Brahman. The world is mithyA – jaganmithyA – meaning just that. If it were the case that it literally is unreal, why do none of the translators/commentators mention this in connection with sarvaM khalvidaM brahmA?

The sentence “सर्वं ब्रह्म’ इति तु सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थम्” is from BSB 1.3.1. The statement is self-explanatory. You can choose to read any commentary thereupon. They are all unanimous that it is for bAdhAyAm-sAmAnAdhikaraNya. I cite for e.g. RatnaprabhA-

कथं तर्हि सामानाधिकरण्यम् , तत्राह सर्वं ब्रह्मेति । यश्चोरः स स्थाणुरितिवत्यत्सर्वं तद्ब्रह्मेति सर्वोद्देशेन ब्रह्मत्वविधानाद्बाधनार्थम् , न तु यद्ब्रह्म तत्सर्वमिति नानारसत्वार्थमित्यर्थः । (How exactly is then the sAmAndhikaraNya? There it is stated - sarvam Brahm. "That which is a thief, is nothing but the stump" - likewise  -"everything is Brahman". The statement of Brahman-hood to sarva is for negation of sarva. It is not for multi-farious-ness of Brahman.

Anandagiri Swami says - ब्रह्मैकरस्यं सामानाधिकरण्यश्रुतिविरुद्धमित्याशङ्क्य पुरुषः स्थाणुरितिवज्जाड्यादिना विरुद्धस्य द्वैतस्य ब्रह्मणा सामानाधिकरण्यं बाधार्थमित्याह.

All AchAryAs are unanimous in the way "sarvam khalu idam Brahma" is to be understood. It is like "the ghost is the post", "the snake is the rope". This statement proves the illusoriness of sarvam. It is a pramANa for that.

 And where do your quotations in 1 and 3 below come from? Supposed quotations cannot carry any weight if you do not give the source! 

I apologize. I thought that these quotations being very famous may not need citation. The citations are as under:

तथाह्यत्र त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेको नासत्त्वम् , किन्तु क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वम् । [Advaita Siddhi: Pratham MithyAtva VichArah]

त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः । [Aitareya BhAshya 1.3.12]

प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् । [Advaita Siddhi: Second MithyAtva VichArah]

यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरति, तदनृतमित्युच्यते । [ TaittirIya BhAshya 2.1.1]

वितथस्य भावो वैतथ्यम् ; असत्यत्वमित्यर्थः । [MANDUkya BhAshya: 2.1]

सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वाच्ययोः साधारणम् ; तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः [Advaita Siddhi: Second MithyAtva VichArah]

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Bhaskar prabhu ji.

 

• Jagat is in this sense is asatyaM not mithya like serpent on the rope. 
  

I present you an anumAna. जगत् मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, रज्जुसर्पवत्. 

This anumAna proves without any doubt that world is mithyA like snake-in-the-rope. Here, paksha is world, hetu is drishyatva, and sAdhya is mithyA-tva.

Please refute this anumAna. If you cannot, then explain as to why despite being unable to refute, you choose to reject it. Please note that the anumAna is based verbatim on MANDUkya 2.4 anumAna presented by BhAshyakAra.

मायाहस्तिरज्जुसर्पमृगतृष्णिकास्वप्नादिवदुत्पद्यमानस्य वियदादिप्रपञ्चस्य यथा मायाव्यादयः, एवं हि प्रणवमात्मानं मायाव्यादिस्थानीयं ज्ञात्वा तत्क्षणादेव तदात्मभावं व्यश्नुत इत्यर्थः ॥

जाग्रद्दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यमिति प्रतिज्ञा । दृश्यत्वादिति हेतुः । स्वप्नदृश्यभाववदिति दृष्टान्तः । यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यम् , तथा जागरितेऽपि दृश्यत्वमविशिष्टमिति हेतूपनयः । तस्माज्जागरितेऽपि वैतथ्यं स्मृतमिति निगमनम् ।

BhAshyakAra equates magical elephant, snake-in-the-rope, mirage, swapna etc. And uses them as drishTAnta to prove the vaitathya of waking world. It is inconceivable as to how despite these clear evidences, one can hold that waking world is not illusory as per BhAshya.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste.

Some people hold that vaitathya does not mean mithyAtva. However, such view is rejected by BhAshyakAra in MANDUkya 2.6. The central feature of a mithyA vastu such as illusory snake or mirage-water is that it has no existence. It merely appears to exist. asatyatva, as per some people, does not mean non-existence. As per them, it is existent, just that it is changeable.

BhAshyakAra says in MK 2.6-

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।
वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥ ६ ॥

इतश्च वैतथ्यं जाग्रद्दृश्यानां भेदानाम् आद्यन्तयोरभावात् , यदादावन्ते च नास्ति वस्तु मृगतृष्णिकादि, तन्मध्येऽपि नास्तीति निश्चितं लोके ; तथेमे जाग्रद्दृश्या भेदाः आद्यन्तयोरभावात् वितथैरेव मृगतृष्णिकादिभिः सदृशत्वाद्वितथा एव ; तथापि अवितथा इव लक्षिता मूढैरनात्मविद्भिः ॥

Here, clearly BhAshyakAra explains as to why waking world has vaitathya. He explains that since it has non-existence before and after, it has no existence even in the middle. He gives as an example mirage-water etc. They appear as satya (avitatha) to un-intelligent. But they have vaitathya, on account of their non-existence.

One may note:

1. vitatha is stated by B to have no existence. Neither before, nor after nor in between. At another instance, B says - इतश्च स्वप्नदृश्या भावा वितथाः, यतः अभावश्च रथादीनां स्वप्नदृश्यानां. abhAva-in-the-locus-appearance is a central feature of vitatha. And that is how mithyA is defined.

2. An example is mirage-water etc which is accepted by everyone as illusion. 

3. vitatha is stated by B as asatya.

These clearly imply that vitatha = asatya = mithyA = illusion.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

aum and pranam Sudhanshuji, 

Please, where does mulAvidyA sit in your description of mithya as vaitathya? Do you claim there is some existential ignorance that accounts for non-existence? And if so, how might this logical entity relate to the ashraya of Brahman as the ground of all illusion? 

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

Please, where does mulAvidyA sit in your description of mithya as vaitathya?

MUlAvidyA is also a drishya. It is also mithyA/vitatha/asatya/illusory. All mithyA-vastu other than mUlAvidyA are either avidyA-kArya or avidyA-prayukta.

 

Do you claim there is some existential ignorance that accounts for non-existence?

There is no existential ignorance. There is an ignorance which appears to exist. The appearance of existence-in-ignorance is the existence-of-its-locus.

 

And if so, how might this logical entity relate to the ashraya of Brahman as the ground of all illusion? 

Any mithyA entity needs a substratum. That is by definition. The definition of mithyA-tva has locus in-built. Brahman is the locus and object of this ignorance. Just as darkness resides in a room and has that room itself as its object, similarly ignorance. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

I think that all that is happening here is that we are each of us being pedantic in a different way. And I have to suggest that your way of being pedantic is not helpful to the seeker, because it contradicts both reason and experience (and I believe these criteria are supported by Śaṅkara in BGB 18.66).

 

I reason according to the clay pot example. The pot did not exist in the past, before it was made, and will not exist in the future after it is broken. Therefore, according to you (and Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara in this example), it does not exist even now. But we all know that it does have functional value now, when we drink out of it, whereas the lump of clay (which it ‘really’ is) cannot be used in this way.

 

The simple explanation is that the ‘reality’ (‘is-ness) of the pot always belong to the clay. The pot itself is not real. But neither is it unreal, since we are using it in this empirical reality. Therefore we call it ‘mithyā’.

 

Similarly, no one (not even you!) can deny the empirical reality of the world. Clearly if we are reasoning in terms of big bangs and some ultimate big crunch or whatever, the world is not ‘really real’ in a trikālātīta sense. But, to my mind at least, it makes far more sense to say that it is analogous to the pot, with Brahman being analogous to the clay. The world is mithyā and not ‘unreal’!

 

It is not helpful to start talking about ‘pāramārthika’ explanations. Yes we all accept ajāti vāda in the final analysis, but all of the teaching is in vyavahāra and the seeker is firmly situated here. We have to provide adhyāropa explanations to point towards the ultimate reality.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2024 10:55 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

Take for example your dream. You used a pot for your empirical transactions in dream. You drank dream-water by your dream-pot. You could not use dream-lump-of-clay to drink dream-water. You requested the dream-potter to make a dream-pot so that you could drink the dream-water.

And what more, you argued with me and tried to prove that the reality (is-ness) of dream-pot was actually not of dream-pot but of dream-lump-of-clay! 🙂

Now, tell me. Is the reality of dream-pot the reality of dream-lump-of-clay?

Sir, there was neither any pot nor any lump-of-clay nor any potter nor any drinking. You imagined it up. BhAshyakAra says in BU 4.3.10 - न तत्र विषयाः स्वप्ने रथादिलक्षणाः ; तथा न रथयोगाः, रथेषु युज्यन्त इति रथयोगाः अश्वादयः तत्र न विद्यन्ते ; न च पन्थानः रथमार्गाः भवन्ति ।

BhAshyakAra proves, on account of drishyatva-hetu, that your waking-pot is equally illusory. There is utter non-existence thereof. There is mere perception. Perception does not imply existence of perceived. It implies its non-asattva.

Please note that non-existence is common to mithyA (illusory) and asat (horns of hare). The difference is on account of ability as being identified with sat.

> The pot itself is not real. But neither is it unreal, since we are using it in this empirical reality. Therefore we call it ‘mithyā’.

Empirical-transactability is common to waking and dream. It does not prove non-illusoriness of seen-object. It merely proves their non-asattva. Now, it is up to you how you translate asat and mithyA. For me, mithyA is same as illusory as BhAshyakAra says in GItA 13.26 -- this world is like elephant-conjured-up-by-magic.  क्षेत्रं च मायानिर्मितहस्तिस्वप्नदृष्टवस्तुगन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ‘असदेव सदिव अवभासते’

My take is simple -- world is mithyA. It is illusory. It does not exist. It appears to exist. Its non-existence in Brahman is delimited by swarUpa-dharma in eka-sattA-vAda, its non-existence in Brahman is delimited by pAramArthika-tva in sattA-traividhya-vAda. These two vAda are for sequential aspirant. Choose your prakriyA. But please, don't term either of them as "confusion"!!

>  Similarly, no one (not even you!) can deny the empirical reality of the world.

Empirical-ity only shows non-asattva. It does not prove existence. It does not deny illusoriness.

> We have to provide adhyāropa explanations to point towards the ultimate reality.

Yes. Both SDV and DSV are within the framework of adhyAropa. Because both are within vivarta-vAda. They are rescinded by situating in the frame of reference of Brahman.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara effectively acknowledge the difference between waking and dream, even while arguing that both are ‘illusory’ because objects are perceived. G. uses the terms dvaya kāla and citta kāla in K2.14. In K4.87, he says: “Vedanta recognizes the empirical state of waking in which plurality made up of the contacts with the objects and ideas is known. It further recognizes another subtle state in which is experienced a plurality wherein the ideas come in contact with objects which do not really exist.”

 

And Śaṅkara (if he is the commentator) says “that the waking state is “admitted to be worldly [laukika] duality characterized by subject-object relationship. ‘Worldly’ because it is not away from the world, is accessible to all people.”

 

And (certainly) Śaṅkara says in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.29:

 

…it cannot be asserted by a man… that the perception of the waking state is false, merely on the ground that it is a perception like the perception in a dream. (And it is not logical for those who consider themselves intelligent to deny their own experience.)

 

We have the later differentiation into vyavahāra and pratibhāsa for the same, very good, experiential reason.

 

How can you say that teaching such as this is invalid because it is rescinded in the final analysis?? ALL of the teaching of Advaita has to be rescinded, including the concepts of paramārtha, Brahman and ajāti vāda. I am interested in which concepts ‘work’ and tally with the teaching of Śaṅkara to provide a seeker with Self-knowledge. Distilling everything down to the ultimate (as if) ‘truth’ is no better than the ‘non-teaching’ of the neo-Advaitins, who just repeat ‘This is It’. And I suggest that it has the same effect, namely that of confusing the seeker, who is just trying to establish a straightforward and reasonable progression of understanding from the apparently obvious, suffering duality to a realization of the already free, non-dual reality.

 

I think this will probably be my last post on this topic but thank you for a stimulating discussion!

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

> Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara effectively acknowledge the difference between waking and dream, even while arguing that both are ‘illusory’ because objects are perceived.

 > We have the later differentiation into vyavahāra and pratibhāsa for the same, very good, experiential reason.

>  How can you say that teaching such as this is invalid because it is rescinded in the final analysis??

I have never said that this teaching, which maintains waking-dream differentiation or prAtibhAsika-vyAvahArika-pAramArthika differentiation is invalid. I have never said that. 

It is an extremely valid teaching. This is called sattA-traividhya-vAda which operates within srishTi-drishTi-vAda which is a subset of vivarta-vAda.

What I said is that there is another model, a subset of vivarta-vAda, which is called drishT-srishTi-vAda and uses eka-sattA-vAda as an alternative to sattA-traividhya-vAda or sattA-dvaividhya-vAda. In this model, there is no differentiation between waking and dream.

So, we have two models, within vivarta-vAda, namely srishTi-drishTi-vAda and drishTi-srishTi-vAda i.e. nAnA-jIva-vAda and eka-jIva-vAda. In one, dream is differentiated from waking and in the other, they are equated. They are applicable for sequential adhikArIs.

Neither of the two models are "confusions". There are evidence for both in bhAshya which caters to both types of aspirants. BhAshya would say - वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्, advocating SDV and would also say - त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः advocating DSV.

So, neither of the two are "confusions". 

This is not my own theory. This is in accordance with the teachings of ancient AchAryAs. You may choose to go through Samkshepa ShArIraka by Bhagvan SarvajnAtmA, 2.82 onwards and the commentary thereupon by Madhusudan Saraswati Swamiji- 

आरोपदृष्टि: उदिता परिणामदृष्टि: द्वैत-उपशान्तिः अपवादकदृष्टि: अन्त्या। मध्ये विवर्तविषया द्वयमिश्रदृष्टि: व्यामिश्रदृष्टि: अधरोत्तर-भूमि-भावात्।2.82। 

तत्त्व-आवेदक-मान-दृष्टि: अधमा तत्त्व-क्षति: मध्यमा। तत्त्व-प्रच्युति-विभ्रम-क्षति-करी तत्र अन्त्य-दृष्टि: मता ।। 

जीवैकत्व-मुमुक्षु-भेद-गतितः व्यामिश्र-दृष्टि: द्विधा। भिन्ना तत्र च पूर्वपूर्वविलयात्-ऊर्ध्व-उर्ध्व-लब्धिः भवेत्।2.83।

परिणामबुद्धिमुपमृद्यपुमान् विनिवर्तयत्यथ विवर्तमतिम्। उपमृद्य तामपि पदार्थधिया परिपूर्णदृष्टिमुपसर्पति सः.।2.84।  

 
pariNama-drishTi is called Aropa-drishTi. The drishTi which pacifies the duality is called apavAdaka-drishTi and that is the final drishTi. In between the two, there is a mixed drishTi which has vivarta as the content. 

While the Aropa-drishTi is at the lowest pedestal and antyA-drishTi at the highest, in between comes the vivarta-drishTi.

This mixed-drishTi known as vivarta is two-fold based on eka-jIva and nAnA-jIva. Sublating the earlier drishTi, one situates in higher drishTi.

After dissolving the pariNAma-buddhi, one produces vivarta-buddhi after specifically determining the nature of the reality. However, it is only after dissolving even that vivarta-buddhi through the determination of pure reality that one achieves the paripUrNa-drishTi i.e. fulfilled vision.

These three drishTis are sequential. Neither the pariNama-drishTi nor the vivarta-drishTi are capable of leading to Moksha. (SAra-sangraha-tIkA on Samkshepa-shArIraka 2.83) Vivarta-drishTi is a mixture of pariNama-drishTi and paramArtha-drishTi. However, it is only the paramArtha-drishTi which is the direct means to Moksha.

So, if one studies the bhAshya in accordance with sampradAya, he comes to understand that वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् and त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः are stated within which model. And how neither of them is a "confusion".

> And I suggest that it has the same effect, namely that of confusing the seeker, who is just trying to establish a straightforward and reasonable progression of understanding from the apparently obvious, suffering duality to a realization of the already free, non-dual reality.

Well, depending on the adhikAra, the teacher teaches the appropriate prakriyA to the student. Neither of the bhAshya-sammata-prakriyA is a "confusion". 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar. 

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

I’m afraid I share Satchidanandendra’s view that most of those post-Śaṅkara writers distorted the clear and efficacious teaching of Śaṅkara, as well as producing virtually incomprehensible material. And, as a result, their teaching causes much confusion. I have written about DSV/EJV elsewhere and do not accept that it was ever promoted by Śaṅkara. Since it is also totally unreasonable and contrary to experience, why even consider it? It is inevitable that it will cause confusion.

 

Please feel free to not reply further to this. I am definitely not embarking on a creation discussion!

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2024 7:32 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste Dennis ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

> I’m afraid I share Satchidanandendra’s view that most of those post-Śaṅkara writers distorted the clear and efficacious teaching of Śaṅkara, as well as producing virtually incomprehensible material. And, as a result, their teaching causes much confusion. I have written about DSV/EJV elsewhere and do not accept that it was ever promoted by Śaṅkara. Since it is also totally unreasonable and contrary to experience, why even consider it? It is inevitable that it will cause confusion.

Of course you are at liberty to accept anyone's opinion. However, that is at the expense of logic and evidence. To attribute "distortion" to revered AchAryAs of tradition implies gross misunderstanding of siddhAnta. And you would probably agree that imputing "incomprehensibility" speaks more about the reader and less about the material.

> I have written about DSV/EJV elsewhere and do not accept that it was ever promoted by Śaṅkara. Since it is also totally unreasonable and contrary to experience, why even consider it?

You are free to carry on with your belief that it is "unreasonable" and "contrary to experience" despite having been proved to the contrary by bhAshya, anumAna and experience. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Dennis prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

I’m afraid I share Satchidanandendra’s view that most of those post-Śaṅkara writers distorted the clear and efficacious teaching of Śaṅkara, as well as producing virtually incomprehensible material. And, as a result, their teaching causes much confusion.

 

Ø     Yes, those post shankara vyAkhyAna-s which are mostly influenced by mere logic would always be confusing and have the potency of dragging away from the mUla siddhAnta of bhAshyakAra.  They say Ishwara srushti is kevala bhrAnti even though it is equally perceivable to both jnAni and ajnAni ( for the former it is brahmAnanya and for the later it is independent from brahman due to avidyA) but at the same time vehemently argue and grant the status of material existence to a thing called mUlAvidyA which is only the property of kevala ajnAni 😊

 

• By the way I am first time hearing that jagat is bhrAnti even in vyavahAra but the point to be noted here even in vyavahAra though there is transaction in the qualified jnAna such as the ghata jnAna and pata jnAna etc. the sAmAnya  noun i.e. jnAna which is pervading in all of them is, vyavahArAteeta ( transactionless ) that is, unchanging. Similarly, though the clay lump (mrut pinda) changes to the clay pot (mrud ghata) the clay pervades in both of them equally and hence it is transactionless that is, unchanging. That is why it is the unchanging cause- vivartOpadAna of all clay’s articles (nAma rUpa). Because of that reason only shruti categorically stated mruttiketyeva satyaM–the clay is unchanging.  For the jagat brahman is the abhinna nimittOpadAna kAraNa and bhAshyakAra to drive home this point gives two different examples, one is mrud-ghata (for the upAdAna) and rajju-sarpa (for the nimitta).

[Raghav Kumar]

Dennis ji said that DSV is

1. Unreasonable 

2. Contrary to experience

3. Not promoted by Shankara

1. And 2. are interesting assertions since they can be debunked with proper use of reason. It beats me how even someone well-intentioned can get it so wrong. Is there any article showing the "unreasonableness" and "contrariness-to-experience" of the assertions of DSV/EJV.  

3. is of no interest since the quotations and counter-quotations just keep going in circles. 

(On a lighter note) - are the objections to DSV more like the GE Moore's argument for realism viz , "In his 1939 lecture "Proof of an External World," Moore presented a simple yet influential argument for realism. To demonstrate the existence of an external world, Moore:

1. Raised his hand.

2. Stated, "Here is one hand."

3. Raised his other hand.

4. Said, "And here is another."

Then, to emphasize the reality of the external world, Moore indeed banged his hand on the table." 

We may need to do better than that,  if we are to argue against DSV/EJV

Om

Raghav

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[V Subrahmanian]

In fact DSV/EJV is the default final position of Shankaracharya's Prasthana traya Bhashya. It's all over there and one can't afford missing that.  The very popular statement:  Brahman is Satyam, Jagat is mithyA can become true only, and only when the aspirant positions himself as the only sentient entity experiencing the world just like a dream is experienced.  He is also part of the dream but he is witnessing the dream that includes himself and the whole world. It reduces to just that one entity.

Gaudapadacharya and Bhagavatpada have brought this out unmistakably.   

regards

subbu 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/advaitin/150044681.158073.1730198872340%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

💖

Sudhanshu reacted via Gmail

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

My understanding is that the teaching of SDV (where jagatkAraNam Brahma is maintained) as a prakriyA *includes* the apavAda within its ambit.  But it will necessary converge/telescope in to DSV as maturity to appreciate nididhyAsanam arises,  where the words such as " म्ययेवोदेति चिद्व्योम्नि जगद्गन्धर्व - पत्तनम् " etc are directly appreciated and finally DSV too matures and lands the adhikArI upon AJV.

So two points here -

The *teaching* of SDV as per shruti, being a valid or sAdhvI prakriyA, is complete in itself and includes not only aropa-dRShTi, but even the apavAda upadesha. *Yet* as the adhikArI matures, his understanding or 'dRShTi' matures through SD, then DS, then AJ.

Sri Ramana Maharshi mentions this, incidentally.

I do see that while only the twofoldness of the vivartadRShTi is talked of it viz., jivaikatva and mumuxubheda ie EJV /DSV and NJV/SDV respectively in 

जीवैकत्व-मुमुक्षु-भेद-गतितः व्यामिश्र-दृष्टि: द्विधा। भिन्ना तत्र च पूर्वपूर्वविलयात्-ऊर्ध्व-उर्ध्व-लब्धिः भवेत्।2.83।

implying they (SDV and DSV) are on par (both being vivartadRShTis.

can we nevertheless say that the pUrva-pUrva-vilaya mention by the Acharya applies even within the two vivarta-dRShTis of SDV and DSV with the former telescoping in to the latter as the adhikAri matures?

Om

Raghav

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

Many thanks for pin-pointed discussion.

My understanding is that the teaching of SDV (where jagatkAraNam Brahma is maintained) as a prakriyA *includes* the apavAda within its ambit.  But it will necessary converge/telescope in to DSV as maturity to appreciate nididhyAsanam arises,  where the words such as " म्ययेवोदेति चिद्व्योम्नि जगद्गन्धर्व - पत्तनम् " etc are directly appreciated and finally DSV too matures and lands the adhikArI upon AJV.

As per my understanding, in case of both SDV and DSV, Avidyaka-kAraNatvam of Brahman with respect to the world is maintained. Because perception of the world is admitted in both DSV and SDV, one has to explain the kAraNatva. Brahman, through avidyA, is accepted to be kAraNa in both SDV and DSV.

The sequence pariNAma-SDV-DSV-ajAti is with respect to time as maturity of aspirant increases. This is the preferred view of Samkshepa ShArIraka, as concluded in TIkA by MS in 2.91 to 2.93.

I agree that when SDV encompasses apavAda within its ambit, it passes through DSV. Without that, it might talk of apavAda but one will not be able to situate therein. For the sake of completion of teaching, it might talk about apavAda, but for an aspirant it will need to pass through DSV.

So two points here -

The *teaching* of SDV as per shruti, being a valid or sAdhvI prakriyA, is complete in itself and includes not only aropa-dRShTi, but even the apavAda upadesha. *Yet* as the adhikArI matures, his understanding or 'dRShTi' matures through SD, then DS, then AJ.

I think just as pariNAma-drishTi is upakArI to vivarta-drishTi, similarly SDV is upakaArI to DSV. And DSV is upakArI to apavAda-drishTi. If we read SS 2.81 onwards along with TIkA, it appears clear that the aspirant, depending on purity of mind, passes through these several drishTi. He starts with pariNAma-drishTi, then comes to vivarta-drishTi wherein he first accepts that there are many other jIvAs and later comes to accept that he is the only jIva. And then he situates in apavAda-drishTi.

Now, I agree that SDV is presented as a complete teaching wherein apavAda is mentioned. However, in practice, as purity of mind increases, he will shift from nAnA-jIva to eka-jIva, imho. 

This is my view. I stand open for correction in this regard by learned members. One issue which I find is description of jnAnIs which are supposed to be situated in apavAda-drishTi. While SDV will talk eloquently of them, DSV will term it as arthavAda.

So, while it is true that both DSV and SDV encompass apavAda, as they need to present a complete teaching, their description of those who situate in apavAda may differ.

Sri Ramana Maharshi mentions this, incidentally.

Please share the reference. 

can we nevertheless say that the pUrva-pUrva-vilaya mention by the Acharya applies even within the two vivarta-dRShTis of SDV and DSV with the former telescoping in to the latter as the adhikAri matures?

Yes. Certainly. Reading SS along with TIkA appears to say the same.

A brief recollection of the three dirshTi (SS 2.86)

pariNAma-drishTi -- Brahman is the pariNAmI-upAdAna of the world just as clay is the pariNAmI-upAdAna of pot. To the seeker, this first appears to be propounded from srishTi-vAkya.

vivarta-drishTi -- Brahman is the vivarta-upAdAna-kAraNa of the world like snake-rope. This arises when one analyses the nishedha-vAkya and ArambhaNa-adhikaraNa etc. He appreciates that kUTastha Brahman can never be pariNAmI-upAdAna-kAraNa (2.84 TIkA). He comes to realise that Brahman cannot be pariNAmI-upAdAna and srishTi-vAkya have tAtparya in vivarta-kAraNatva of Brahman (and through that to non-duality of Brahman). 

apavAda-drishTi --  When all drishTi cease, then he situates as shuddha Brahman. (2.85)

pariNAma-drishTi upholds prapancha-satyatva. 

vivarta-drishTi is prapancha-satyatva-kshatikarI. It removes prapancha-satyatva.

vivarta-drishTi is incapable of dvaita-upashAnti. It has prapancha-bhrama-tva as the vishaya. It upholds the illusoriness-of-world. It prima facie appears to permit a little bit of something other than Brahman.

apavAda-drishTi is complete-dvaita-upashAnti. It sublimates even the vivarta-drishTi. It entertains no kArya-kAraNa.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, It's a matter of common sense. Perhaps Voodoo Islanders conceive of the fall of nighttime darkness as some kind of mysterious entity, otherwise it is a matter of common sense that darkness is the absence of light as night to day and that is all that is intended by the example. Any example is intended to simply,  to make an appeal to universal understanding what might be otherwise difficult to understand. It is not necessary to be a master of logic and argument, only adhicaritvam is required. 

AND .... as I understand the text, Ghata Bhasya 2.1.2 BrU, is intended to refute Sunyavada and concludes simply that there is no Absolute Non-Existence and not that there is some kind of non-existent entity like darkness. 

Regards, michael

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

The idea is just this. Two things, which are like chalk and cheese, two things which are 180 degrees apart, two things about which no sane person will confuse one for other, two things which have completely different nature ---- such two things are being confused for each other. This is not possible except due to ignorance.

AchArya gives an example, light and darkness. No sane person confuses light for darkness and darkness for light. Similarly, no sane person should confuse AtmA for anAtmA and vice versa. Why? Because, AtmA and anAtmA are just like light-darkness, two entities with mutual-anAtmatA.

AchArya says - viruddha-swabhAva-yoh. What is the swabhAva of an abhAva? What is the swabhAva of pot-abhAva? 

//Ghata Bhasya 2.1.2 BrU, is intended to refute Sunyavada and concludes simply that there is no Absolute Non-Existence and not that there is some kind of non-existent entity like darkness.//

In a discussion, when the opponent presents an anumAna, either you refute it or you accept it. There is no third option.

AchAryA's anumAna in ghaTa bhAshya proves the bhAvarUpatA of vishesha-abhAva. Now, there is no if and but here. Either you accept bhAvarUpatA of vishesha-abhAva or you contradict ShankarAchArya. You have no third option. Now, being a loyalist to AchArya, you do not contradict Him. But, you cannot accept it either because that would imply prakAsha-abhAva also as some bhAvarUpa vastu. And darkness, even if stated by you as prakAsha-abhAva, will become bhAvarUpa.

You have to find a way to come out of it yourself through some imaginary adventure.

On the other hand, a little bit of analysis based on our experience solves the issue. No need to be a master of logic and argument.

We see darkness in dreams, we see light in dreams. Neither of the two is an abhAva of each other. Dream-darkness is not dream-prakAsha-abhAva. Both are separate avidyA-kArya. Dream and waking being identical, waking-darkness is not waking-prakAsha-abhAva. It is a separate avidyA-kArya.

If only you choose to go through sAmpradAyika-teachings, you would appreciate that all doubts of advaita are resolvable by analysing our experience of dream. As SiddhAnta Lesha Sangraha says - अत्र च सम्भावितसकलशङ्कापङ्कप्रक्षालनं स्वप्नदृष्टान्तसलिलधारयैव कर्तव्यम्. Dream-example is like a stream of water. All possible doubts are like mud. One can wash all of them by the water-stream of the dream-example.

This big fuss over light-darkness is resolvable in one minute if one chooses to appreciate the dream example.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar. 

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji,   sorry sir, arguing that darkness, absence and ignorance or even dreams are material entities rather than epistemological mistakes is simply untenable to me. If indeed this is Bhasyakara's teaching, knowledge could not solve the existential problem - one would need a material solution: pranayama or sirshasana or a lifetime secluded in a cave. Hence, Vivarana's long mistaken interpretative tradition of jnana karma samucchaya - jnana coupled with meditation. 

Sankara's arguing  Bhāvarūpatā of Viśeṣa-abhāva does not prove mulavidya as a positive entity. It simply means objects have no absolute non-existence, no nihsvabhava as held by these Madhyamikas. It is wrong to over-extend this argument. 

It is so much cleaner, simple, more direct to understand waking as distinct but not at all different than dream - both are ever changing appearance that are nothing but Consciousness and that Consciousness is who we are. Mulavidya loses itself in non-parsimonious constructs to account for bhavarupa avdiya. In biological modeling, parsimony helps ensure that models reflect essential biological processes without unnecessary assumptions or complexities. Navya Nyaya, case in point.

regards, michael

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

arguing that darkness, absence and ignorance or even dreams are material entities rather than epistemological mistakes is simply untenable to me.

Epistemological mistakes require a mind. Can you make an epistemological mistake without a mind? No!!

Now, tell me, is mind an epistemological mistake? 

If no, then what is mind? A material entity? If so, then non-duality of Brahman is compromised. 

If yes, then there is an AtmAshraya-dosha because epistemological mistakes require mind and thus, mind will require mind.

So, even if you accept darkness, absence, ignorance, dream as mere epistemological mistakes and not material entities, you will not be able to go far. Because, you will need to accept a non-epistemological mind which gives rise to epistemological mistakes. 

Singular inactive reality Brahman cannot accommodate epistemological mistakes. This is basic.

If indeed this is Bhasyakara's teaching, knowledge could not solve the existential problem - one would need a material solution: pranayama or sirshasana or a lifetime secluded in a cave.

Sir, is knowledge material? What is the mechanism by which knowledge removes ignorance?

 

Hence, Vivarana's long mistaken interpretative tradition of jnana karma samucchaya - jnana coupled with meditation. 

Sorry sir. You have no idea of what VivaraNa says. That is clear from this statement of yours. If this statement of yours is based on the statement of someone else, then that person has zero understanding of VivaraNa.

There is no jnAna-karma-samuchchaya in VivaraNa. Meditation (nididhyAsana) is for different purpose, jnAna is for different purpose.

 

Sankara's arguing  Bhāvarūpatā of Viśeṣa-abhāva does not prove mulavidya as a positive entity. It simply means objects have no absolute non-existence, no nihsvabhava as held by these Madhyamikas. It is wrong to over-extend this argument. 

An anumAna is anumAna. It is not a drishTAnta that you decide on its over-extension. The anumAna of ghaTa-bhAshya proves any vishesha-abhAva to be bhAvarUpa. This is the advaita-siddhAnta. You are not aware of this because of non-sAmpradAyika understanding.

If you hold darkness as prakAsha-abhAva, you are within the ambit of the anumAna of ghaTa-bhAshya and you are bound to accept that it is bhAvarUpa. If you don't accept that, you are violating bhAshya.

 

It is so much cleaner, simple, more direct to understand waking as distinct but not at all different than dream - both are ever changing appearance that are nothing but Consciousness and that Consciousness is who we are.

"Waking as distinct but not at all different than dream" ----- it is a meaningless statement. 

"both are ever changing appearance that are nothing but Consciousness" - so, consciousness is changing itself? Come on!! Is it some new kind of advaita wherein consciousness is changing?

 

Mulavidya loses itself in non-parsimonious constructs to account for bhavarupa avdiya. In biological modeling, parsimony helps ensure that models reflect essential biological processes without unnecessary assumptions or complexities. Navya Nyaya, case in point.

There is nothing non-parsimonious about mUlAvidyA. You have not gone deep enough to understand epistemology. You are content in describing something as epistemological mistake without delving deeper.

Define knowledge. Describe how a vishesha-jnAna say pot-jnAna arises. How it removes pot-ignorance. Describe the process by which knowledge remvoes ignorance.

Without understanding these vital and central issues, it is mere adventure to enter bhAva-abhAva discussion. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

"arguing that darkness, absence and ignorance or even dreams are material entities rather than epistemological mistakes is simply untenable to me." is an important point. 

 

 This implies a rock-solid belief in something called "material entities." Thats a mistake, in my understanding. 

For Advaita, we believe in parsimony and so don't need to postulate any *non-epistemological* (ie independent) "material" to account for waking experience. The teaching of mithyAtvaM negates any such need. 

The idea of स्वाश्रयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं reveals the non-materiality of any object right there and then even as it is experienced. The dream analogy further helps us assimilate the truth of the purely epistemological character of all waking experiences. 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

👍

Sudhanshu reacted via Gmail

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji,

//Now, tell me, is mind an epistemological mistake? //

Please, countless vakyas depicting the mind as illusion. 

--Karika 3.32. When, following the instruction of scriptures and the teacher, the mind ceases to think as a consequence of the realisation of the Truth that is the Self, then the mind attains the state of not being the mind; in the absence of things to be perceived, it becomes a non-perceiver.

--Those things that caused the particular visions (of the waking and dream states), namely the mind, the eyes and forms, were all presented by Ignorance as something different from the Self.” (Brhad. Bh. 4.3.23)

--The senses, mind, and intellect are modifications of māyā (illusion)." Katha 1.3.12

//Singular inactive reality Brahman cannot accommodate epistemological mistakes. This is basic.//

It seems this is your favorite objection - you have repeated multiple times.at is this 'singular' and 'inactive' - you are defining the indefinable and bringing limits to the unlimited. Please check your logic circuits and curtail them - Vedanta is determined by experience not logic. 

//There is no jnAna-karma-samuchchaya in VivaraNa. Meditation (nididhyAsana) is for different purpose, jnAna is for different purpose.//

Correct, I misstated. My intention was to point to the fact that all well known Vedanta teachers with the sole exceptions of Sri Swami Dayanandaji and SSSSji, teach meditation and even samadhi as direct methods for Enlightenment. Kindly point out where this is not the case. 

//"both (waking & dream) are ever changing appearance that are nothing but Consciousness" - so, consciousness is changing itself? Come on!! Is it some new kind of advaita wherein consciousness is changing?//

Adhyasa, pure and simple ... unless we are here just to argue and win points.

Sir, I will rest here not because I think I have made my points thoroughly but because I do not believe these discussions, after a certain point, yield worthwhile fruit. Instead they seem to play upon vanities and further entrench positions. Vedanta is not for a barristers game - it takes a guru to dissuade us of existential wrong notions - not debate. And though I honor your textual knowledge, dedication and even affection and though I have learned much due to the study your nuanced reasoning demands, there is a point where argument must end and understanding freely stands on its own. That said, I may pop in now and then just because something presented irks me to react. 

Best Regards, Michael

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[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

This point which you had made before as well, is perhaps not being understood by others viz., 

"Please note that non-existence is common to mithyA (illusory *rope-snake* ) and asat (horns of hare). The difference is on account of ability as being identified with sat."

In other words, it is agreed that,  mithyA (rope-snake) and asat (horns of a hare) are not synonyms because the first viz , a mithyA entity is experienced in a locus (mithyA has sat-tAdAtmya) while asat (horns of a hare) is nevee never experienced.

Om

Raghav

Yahoo Mail: Search, organise, conquer

On Mon, 28 Oct 2024 at 5:48 pm, Sudhanshu Shekhar

<sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Dennis ji.

Take for example your dream. You used a pot for your empirical transactions in dream. You drank dream-water by your dream-pot. You could not use dream-lump-of-clay to drink dream-water. You requested the dream-potter to make a dream-pot so that you could drink the dream-water.

And what more, you argued with me and tried to prove that the reality (is-ness) of dream-pot was actually not of dream-pot but of dream-lump-of-clay! 🙂

Now, tell me. Is the reality of dream-pot the reality of dream-lump-of-clay?

Sir, there was neither any pot nor any lump-of-clay nor any potter nor any drinking. You imagined it up. BhAshyakAra says in BU 4.3.10 - न तत्र विषयाः स्वप्ने रथादिलक्षणाः ; तथा न रथयोगाः, रथेषु युज्यन्त इति रथयोगाः अश्वादयः तत्र न विद्यन्ते ; न च पन्थानः रथमार्गाः भवन्ति ।

BhAshyakAra proves, on account of drishyatva-hetu, that your waking-pot is equally illusory. There is utter non-existence thereof. There is mere perception. Perception does not imply existence of perceived. It implies its non-asattva.

> The pot itself is not real. But neither is it unreal, since we are using it in this empirical reality. Therefore we call it ‘mithyā’.

Empirical-transactability is common to waking and dream. It does not prove non-illusoriness of seen-object. It merely proves their non-asattva. Now, it is up to you how you translate asat and mithyA. For me, mithyA is same as illusory as BhAshyakAra says in GItA 13.26 -- this world is like elephant-conjured-up-by-magic.  क्षेत्रं च मायानिर्मितहस्तिस्वप्नदृष्टवस्तुगन्धर्वनगरादिवत् ‘असदेव सदिव अवभासते’

My take is simple -- world is mithyA. It is illusory. It does not exist. It appears to exist. Its non-existence in Brahman is delimited by swarUpa-dharma in eka-sattA-vAda, its non-existence in Brahman is delimited by pAramArthika-tva in sattA-traividhya-vAda. These two vAda are for sequential aspirant. Choose your prakriyA. But please, don't term either of them as "confusion"!!

>  Similarly, no one (not even you!) can deny the empirical reality of the world.

Empirical-ity only shows non-asattva. It does not prove existence. It does not deny illusoriness.

> We have to provide adhyāropa explanations to point towards the ultimate reality.

Yes. Both SDV and DSV are within the framework of adhyAropa. Because both are within vivarta-vAda. They are rescinded by situating in the frame of reference of Brahman.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

Thank you for highlighting this important point.

This point which you had made before as well, is perhaps not being understood by others viz., 

"Please note that non-existence is common to mithyA (illusory *rope-snake* ) and asat (horns of hare). The difference is on account of ability as being identified with sat."

In other words, it is agreed that,  mithyA (rope-snake) and asat (horns of a hare) are not synonyms because the first viz , a mithyA entity is experienced in a locus (mithyA has sat-tAdAtmya) while asat (horns of a hare) is nevee never experienced.

Indeed. It is a very important point, which is not appreciated. It is stated categorically in Advaita Siddhi - सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वाच्ययोः साधारणम् ; तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः ।

Basically, we say that mithyA vastu has atyanta-abhAva (traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA) in the adhikaraNa ( =locus = upAdhi) where it is being perceived. प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् । 

Now, when we say, nishedha-pratiyogitA, immediately the question comes up -- what is the pratiyOgitA-avachchhedaka? For e.g. when we say, pot is the kAraNa, immediately the question comes up - what is the kAraNatA-avachchhedaka? Is it pot-ness, or is it vishaya-tva or is it pratiyogi-tva?

So, VedAnta gives two answers -- the pratiyOgitA-avachchhedaka of atyanta-abhAva of mithyA vastu in the pratipanna-upAdhi is (a) swarUpa-dharma (ii) pAramArthika-tva.

Now, swarUpa-dharma is like pot-ness in case of pot. It is always present. So, in case of mithyA-rajata, it will be rajata-tva.

So, there are two answers for pratiyOgitA-avachchhedaka, rajata-tva and pAramArthika-tva. 

The definition of mithyAtva in case of swarUpa-dharma-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitA remains same as before i.e. प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् । 

The definition of mithyAtva in case of pAramArthikatva-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitA changes. It is redefined as - प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ पारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम्.

The former is eka-sattA-vAda while the latter is sattA-traividhya-vAda. This is described in last portion of anumAna-parichchheda in VedAnta ParibhAshA.

The sum and substance is this -- in ESV, no existence whatsoever of mithyA vastu is admitted because the atyanta-abhAva-pratiyOgitA of mithyA-vastu is delimited by swarUpa-dharma itself. There is no rajata ever, qualified by rajata-tva. Means, rajata, as such is not there. Nothing to do with prAtibhAsika or vyAvahArika. No rajata of any sort is there. And this is our experience also.

In STV, we would say -- well, there was prAtibhAsika-rajata, and the atyanta-abhAva of rajata is not delimited by rajata-tva. Because that cannot explain rajata-pratIti. So, prAtibhAsika-rajata qualified with rajata-tva was not absent. But prAtibhAsika-rajata qualified with pAramArthika-tva was absent. Like, a pot with pot-ness was present, but a pot with cloth-ness was absent. This pAramArthika-tva is not some swarUpa-dharma of rajata. This dharma is not present in it at all. So, this is called vyadhikaraNa-dharma-avachchhinna-pratiyogitAka-atyanta-abhAva. It basically means, there was no pAramArthika-rajata over there. This is obviously true.

STV is more popular because it is in line with our prima facie experiences. It would say that world has vyAvahArika-sattA, illusory silver has prAtbhAsika-sattA and Brahman has pAramarthika-sattA. And mithyAtva is atyanta-abhAva with pArmArthika-tva as the qualifier. This becomes obvious then. Like pot is present qualified with pot-ness but is absent qualified with cloth-ness.

However, when we start asking -- what is this vyAvahArika-sattA and prAtibhAsika-sattA? What is its relationship with pAramArthika-sattA? How are they progressively lower in order -- then we will come to ESV only. But, prima facie, they appear to be different.

However, if we analyze our experience - it is crystal clear. There has never been any silver over there. There has always been only and only shell over there. Even when silver was being perceived, there was no silver there -- of whatever sort. Nothing to do with prAtibhAsika or vyAvahArika. No silver was there. Silver might be appearing, but there was no silver there. There was only shell. This is what is ESV. Despite perception of silver, there was absolute absence of silver qualified with silver-ness. This is what is magical about mithyA. It is not there at all, and is yet perceived. A magician conjures up Taj Mahal before my eyes in say Chennai. There is no existence of Taj Mahal over there, of whatever sort, and yet it is perceived. That is what is magic. Creation of mithyA-x does not imply existence of mithyA-x. Just as there is creation of mithyA-x, there is creation of mithyA tAdaTmya-with-existence. When mithyA x is created, mithyA sat-tAdAtmya is also created which gives rise to appearance of existence to mithyA-vastu. 

आरोप्योत्पत्तिकालोत्पन्नतादात्म्यापन्नं सत् सन्घट इति प्रत्यये अपरोक्षतया भाति.....तत्रैव हि सत्तादात्म्याध्यासो यस्य तत्समानकालमध्यास:, शुक्तिरूप्यादिरूपेण परिणममानाविद्याया एव तन्निष्ठेन सत्तादात्म्यरूपेण परिणममानत्वात्. The avidyA which modifies in the form of illusory silver, that very same avidyA transforms as sat-tAdAtmya also.

Those who cannot appreciate this, are alternatively, through tushyatu-durjana-nyAyA, offered STV. As Laghuch ChandrikA puts up -- येन हि रूपेण संबन्धेन च यत्र यत् संबध्यते । न च तेन रूपेण तत्संबन्धेन च तत्र तदभावे विरोधादिति – मन्वानं वादिनं प्रति तुष्यतु दुर्जन इति न्यायेन तन्मतमनुसृत्य साध्यान्तरमाह – पारमार्थिकेत्यादि । पारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्नं यदुक्तप्रतियोगित्वं तद्वन्न वेत्यर्थः ।

It is a crucial concept and I wish some more discussion takes place on this and learned members focus their attention on this.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

❤️

Sudhanshu Shekhar reacted via Gmail

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sudhanshushekhar.wordpress.com

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

> Please, countless vakyas depicting the mind as illusion.

Fine. So, how do you refute the AtmAshraya-dosha?

I had said //If yes, then there is an AtmAshraya-dosha because epistemological mistakes require mind and thus, mind will require mind.//. There is no response to this.

No epistemological mistake is possible without mind. If mind itself is epistemological mistake, then mind will require mind. That is AtmAshraya-dosha. And hence, your understanding is incorrect.

> It seems this is your favorite objection - you have repeated multiple times.at is this 'singular' and 'inactive' - you are defining the indefinable and bringing limits to the unlimited. Please check your logic circuits and curtail them - Vedanta is determined by experience not logic.

Sir, inactive means not-active and singular means non-dual. Both duality and activity are within experience. The words singular and inactive are "neti, neti" in other words. It still remains indefinable. When I say Brahman as ekam in - ekam, eva, advitIyam - I am not violating the indefinability of Brahman.

It is simple. If Brahman is the only entity which is nishkriya, there cannot be your "epistemological mistake". A non-existent perceptible entity other than Brahman has to be brought in for any meaningful discussion. You can call it mind, I can call it mUlAvidyA -- hardly matters. But without that, you cannot explain your "epistemological mistake".

 
> Correct, I misstated. My intention was to point to the fact that all well known Vedanta teachers with the sole exceptions of Sri Swami Dayanandaji and SSSSji, teach meditation and even samadhi as direct methods for Enlightenment. Kindly point out where this is not the case.

That is a different issue. None of the teachers prescribe jnAna-karma-samuchchaya. Regarding meditation being direct means, there is a difference of opinion. We can discuss it some other time.

> Adhyasa, pure and simple ... unless we are here just to argue and win points.

I think neither of us should be discussing for winning points. That will be a saddening thing. You are elder to me, and I seek your blessings in my journey of self-knowledge.

Regards.
Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

I regret to say that I scanned this and realized immediately that I would have to spend days trying to understand it. It would be interesting to poll the group to find out how many members actually did understand it (or even read it). Why is there this compulsion to analyze everything in ever-increasing depth beyond the point at which it is actually comprehensible to any but a few similarly-minded intellectuals? Do you believe that only a few advanced academics are qualified to study Advaita or capable of gaining Self-knowledge?

 

The statement that triggered this analysis was:

 

<<"Please note that non-existence is common to mithyA (illusory *rope-snake* ) and asat (horns of hare). The difference is on account of ability as being identified with sat.

 

“In other words, it is agreed that,  mithyA (rope-snake) and asat (horns of a hare) are not synonyms because the first viz , a mithyA entity is experienced in a locus (mithyA has sat-tAdAtmya) while asat (horns of a hare) is nevee never experienced.”>>

 

I would ‘analyze’ this simply as follows. I agree in essence with what Raghav-ji has said. I would just pedantically qualify the first sentence. The rope-snake is not non-existent. But its existence belongs to the rope, and not to the snake. It is the snake element that is non-existent. That is why we call it ‘rope-snake’. And it is because of this ‘combination’ that we are obliged to coin a new word – mithyA – to explain its ontological status. We see it but it does not exist in itself. The horns-of-a-hare, on the other hand has no existent element at all and we do not see it  – hence tuccha.

 

Is this not sufficient explanation? (And no Devanagari at all!)

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Sudhanshu Shekhar
Sent: Friday, November 1, 2024 4:43 AM
To: Raghav Kumar <raghav...@yahoo.com>
Cc: adva...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Namaste Raghav ji.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

> It would be interesting to poll the group to find out how many members actually did understand it (or even read it).

That will be interesting. I too did not understand these things earlier. But with due efforts put in, one can understand it. It is not that difficult a thing.

> Why is there this compulsion to analyze everything in ever-increasing depth beyond the point at which it is actually comprehensible to any but a few similarly-minded intellectuals? Do you believe that only a few advanced academics are qualified to study Advaita or capable of gaining Self-knowledge?

This discussion is for pratibandhaka-nivritti. That depends on the eligibility of the aspirant. If someone has no pratibandhaka, these discussions are not required for him. Advaita is for everyone. But if there is pratibandhaka, one cannot progress without logical discussion. That is why AchArya says in BrihadAraNyaka - दर्शनविषयमापादयितव्यः ; श्रोतव्यः पूर्वम् आचार्यत आगमतश्च ; पश्चान्मन्तव्यः तर्कतः ; ततो निदिध्यासितव्यः निश्चयेन ध्यातव्यः. After listening from the AchArya, one has to analyse logically.

 
> The rope-snake is not non-existent. But its existence belongs to the rope, and not to the snake. It is the snake element that is non-existent. That is why we call it ‘rope-snake’. And it is because of this ‘combination’ that we are obliged to coin a new word – mithyA – to explain its ontological status. We see it but it does not exist in itself. The horns-of-a-hare, on the other hand has no existent element at all and we do not see it  – hence tuccha.

This is fine, Dennis ji. This is what is Eka-sattA-vAda. Here, we distinguish mithyA and asat (tuchchha). MithyA and asat, both are non-existent. While mithyA is perceptible, asat is non-perceptible.

However, some can argue that it is impossible for a non-existent entity to be perceived. If non-existent entity can be perceived, then what stops horns of hare to be perceived.

Therefore, they would hold that, logically, it is incorrect to say that illusory-snake has no existence. Let it have something called "prAtibhAsika-sattA". And let mithyAtva be defined as pAramArthikatva-avachchhinna-pratiyogitA-nirUpita-abhAva.

There is merit in their view. While the objection can be responded to in eka-sattA-vAda (what is the response btw!!), an alternative prakriyA called sattA-traividhya-vAda is postulated. Neither of the two is "confusion". They are just different models. Goal is non-dual Brahman.

>   Is this not sufficient explanation? (And no Devanagari at all!)

As discussed above. Regarding Devanagari, I don't know what to respond. I love it. Those who don't know it will be in a better position if they know it. So, they should put in effort to learn it. That is my view.  

Regards.
Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Raghav and Sudhanshuji, 

"Material entities' = accepting jagat as 'relative realties' or dependent realities or transient reality - all distinctions concocted in Reality. Please show where these terms appear in Bhasya or Karika yet they are commonly used in mulavidya teachings. Material entity is that bhavarupa avidya that is said to be mithya ajnana nimittah/false ignorance (as opposed to 'correct ignorance"?). Any of thee will suffice for material entity as well:. Sadasatbhyam anirvacaniyam, trigunatmikam, jnanavirodhi, or Yat kinchit,

You may say DSV sufficiently overcomes these objections but then you will say that AVIDYA precedes DSV and mind. Avidya, of course, you maintain is synonymous with maya which itself is a material shakti  

And no reasonable person will agree Navya Nyaya etc. is simple and clear. Hari AUM

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

I think the notion of sAkshi is sufficient to logically validate 'epistemological error,' Vedanta is based on Experience not inference. Epistemology, ontology and mind are all namarupa (commonly used in bhasya, rare in later Vedanta). That they exist at all is accountable only due to the reality of sAkshi. SAkshi is not mere witness of something but the very existence of that which it witnesses. Like what? Like dream. Is dream bhavarupa or kalpita? What is our experience?  

Also, this idea of two non-existences, rope/snake and hare's horn, is the Vivarana's justification for positing a third existential, pratibhasika or mithya, independent of Bhasyakara's atma/anatma, asmat/yusmad, vishaya/vishayi/satya/anrta, light/darkness - it is a perversion of Advaita. A third existential is a logical creation based on the need to account for creation. Historically, SSSS suggests, it was in reaction to Ramanuja's anupapatti-s.  Snake is an imagination, a kalpita. What else is hare's horn but an imagination? 'But one appears, the other, not,' you will say. And there is creation, appearance. What is appearance - bhavarupa or imagination? I read Sankara as the latter rather than a thing that borrows, is transient, or relatively Bhava, 

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[suresh srinivasamurthy]

Namaste Sudhamshu-ji,

<<

“In other words, it is agreed that,  mithyA (rope-snake) and asat (horns of a hare) are not synonyms because the first viz , a mithyA entity is experienced in a locus (mithyA has sat-tAdAtmya) while asat (horns of a hare) is never experienced.”

>>

Even asat entities (like the horns of a hare) that are imagined in the mind or experienced in a dream could result in the experience of joy or sorrow, right? There could also be cases where an Acharya appears in the dream and provides upadesha to a shishya and this cannot be taken as asat.  So, when it comes to experience there is no difference at all between mithyA and asat. As Atman is the ground of all name/forms/experiences, everything including asat has sat-tAdAtmya, right? 

Also, should we not accept the embodied self which is the prasiddha brahman as a dependent reality? If atman is dependent on the body/jagat which is its own grandeur/glory, its independence is still not lost right? This also helps to support the tradition of guru-shishya parampara of Advaita. If this is not accepted, then Brahman will never be known. There is support for this in the Bhashya. 

Look forward to your clarification.

Namaste

Suresh

Regards,
Suresh

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From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhans...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, November 1, 2024 9:01 AM
To: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com>

Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

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[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Michael ji,

You say:  Also, this idea of two non-existences, rope/snake and hare's horn, is the Vivarana's justification for positing a third existential, pratibhasika or mithya, independent of Bhasyakara's atma/anatma, asmat/yusmad, vishaya/vishayi/satya/anrta, light/darkness - it is a perversion of Advaita. A third existential is a logical creation based on the need to account for creation. Historically, SSSS suggests, it was in reaction to Ramanuja's anupapatti-s. 

My response:  The Bhashyakara has explicitly mentioned three 'realities' in his Taittiriyopanishad bhashya.  One can read it in all detail, along with Sureshwara's Vartika on the Taittiriya Upanishad bhashya here:

https://wordpress.com/posts/adbhutam.wordpress.com?s=paramarthika

//While commenting on the mantra सत्यं च अनृतं च सत्यमभवत् ”satyam cha anRtam cha Satyam abhavat’ (Taittiriya Up. II.6) Sri Shankaracharya says: satyam = vyavaharavishayam since this is being mentioned in the context of ‘sRishti’ of the world. He adds: this is not paramArthasatyam (absolute reality) since Brahman alone indeed is paramArtha satyam. This vyavaharavishayam satyam is only Apekshikam, relative, empirical.

He explains: when compared to the water in a mirage, the water (that we actually use for drinking, etc.) is real. This is what is meant by ‘vyavaharika satyam’. That which is not thus real is anRtam, unreal.

Thus Shankara accepts three types of reality: 1. Absolute reality, Paramarthika satyam, Brahman. 2. Relative reality. vyavaharika satyam, the created world and 3. the unreal, the appearances in an error and the analogy he gives is the mirage water. He calls this unreal. (This is what is called praatibhasika satyam). Even though Shankara has not used this term 'prAtibhAsika', it's meaning is 'unreal' 'mithyaa'

Also, Shankara does accept that the mithyA object is distinct from the absolutely non-existent hare-horn type:

Mandukya upanishad mantra 7 bhashyam:  शून्यमेव तर्हि ; तन्न, मिथ्याविकल्पस्य निर्निमित्तत्वानुपपत्तेः ; न हि रजतसर्पपुरुषमृगतृष्णिकादिविकल्पाः शुक्तिकारज्जुस्थाणूषरादिव्यतिरेकेण अवस्त्वास्पदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुम्  

He says: the mithyA projection such as the silver, snake, man (in pillar-man error), mirage water, etc, has to be necessarily on the real substratum such as shell, rope, pillar,etc. and not on any 'shUnya' (non-existent). He calls this 'avastu'. Thus Shankara does accept the category called 'absolutely non-existent' such as hare-horn. This he has stated multiple times in the bhashyas. He distinguishes the mithyA object category (rope-snake, etc.) from this hare-horn type category. This distinction alone is the basis for the post-Shankara statement: 'If it is real, it would not be negated/sublated. If it is non-existent (hare-horn), it would not even be perceived/experienced. Hence it (the rope-snake type) is the third category: anirvachaniya.' So, it can't be said that this anirvachaniya category is a post-Shankara development.

असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते । वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते ॥ २८ ॥   This is Gaudapada's verse. It means: That which is absolutely unreal, like a barren woman's son, can't come into existence either in real terms (like a woman giving birth to a child) OR by magical/error means.  Shankara has commented on this.  So, this part of the earlier stated maxim ' If it is non-existent (hare-horn), it would not even be perceived/experienced. ' is what is stated by Gaudapada and Shankara.   

regards

subbu

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, Thank you for your response but the link does not seem to work. Regardless, I am reluctant to accept Sureswara's Vartikka as evidence - the text is just too vast to determine Suresvara's intent by a simple citation or even a collection of verses.. The text needs serious study to divine his thinking. Perhaps you are qualified, I am not. SSSS, I believe, is so qualified, and he commonly quotes the Vartikas in support of his position.  

Here are two references from SSSS's The Method of Vedanta, on pratibhasika citing Gaudapada, Sankara and himself

Page 865:

"For there is no sound evidence to show that empirical (vyava- harika) reality and purely phenomenal (pratibhasika) reality constitute distinct forms of reality. For we find in £rl Sankara's Commentary:

 And just as the cause, the Absolute, never deviates from reality in past, present or future, so the effect, too, the world, never deviates from reality in pact, present and future. Ana reality is one. Hence this is another reason for the non- difference cf the effect from the cause. (B.S.Bh.2.1.16)"

Page 666:

"It Is not worth Investigating, as it would be totally unproductive to do so. They are not even claimed to be existent entities, that their investigation could have any meaning or purpose.
What is worth trying to discover is their true nature as shell, or whatever the case might be. For that would remove attach¬ ment, aversion, fear and or passions. As a true expert has said:
(k) This Self is imagined both as associated with unreal entities and also as non-dual. But even the entities imagined only exist as the non-dual principle; therefore supreme value resides only in non-duality. (G.K. 11.33)
Sankara's Commentary: We have the familiar example in worldly experience that a rope may be imagined as a snake or streamlet of water which do not exist in the rope, in the form of "This is a snake, this is a streamlet of water, this is a stick'; or it may he correctly conceived in its nature as a rope, with no second thing added. In the same way the Self, though itself ever one by nature, is imagined in an infinity of unreal forms, beginning with the cosmic vital eney, that do not really exist... and also in its ultimately true nature as non-dual, the substratum of all the false imaginations, like the rope.
And these imaginary beings„ such as the cosmic vital energy and the rest, are only imagined as forms of the real Self. For there cannot be a transient false imagination without a sub¬ stratum. Therefore, even at the time of the imaginations, supreme value lies only in the non-dual principle, since that is the substratum of all illusions, and it never departs from its own true nature as the non-dual Self. The imaginations themselves are pernicious. They stir up unwelcome emotions, as the rope-snake and the like stir up fear and so on. Because the non-dual principle is without fear or danger, it alone is the repository of supreme value. (G.K.Bh.II.33)

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[V Subrahmanian]

Namaste Michael ji,

This is the relevant part of my earlier article that I had cited:given the link:

https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/paramarthika-vyavaharika-satyam/

While commenting on the mantra सत्यं च अनृतं च सत्यमभवत् ”satyam cha anRtam cha Satyam abhavat’ (Taittiriya Up. II.6) Sri Shankaracharya says: satyam = vyavaharavishayam since this is being mentioned in the context of ‘sRishti’ of the world. He adds: this is not paramArthasatyam (absolute reality) since Brahman alone indeed is paramArtha satyam. This vyavaharavishayam satyam is only Apekshikam, relative, empirical.

He explains: when compared to the water in a mirage, the water (that we actually use for drinking, etc.) is real. This is what is meant by ‘vyavaharika satyam’.

That which is not thus real is anRtam, unreal.

सत्यं च व्यवहारविषयम्, अधिकारात्, न परमार्थसत्यम्; एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म । इह पुनः व्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं मृगतृष्णिकाद्यनृतापेक्षया उदकादि सत्यमित्युच्यते । अनृतं च तद्विपरीतम् । किं पुनरेतत् सर्वं सत्यमभवत् परमार्थसत्यम् ।//satyam cha vyavahaaraviShayam, adhikArAt, na paramaarthasatyam; ekameva hi paramaarthasatyam Brahma. iha punaH vyavahaaraviShayamaapekShikam mRgatRShNikAdyanRtaapekShayA udakAdi satyamucyate. anRutam cha tadvipareetam. kim punaretat sarvam satyamabhavat paramArthasatyam…//

The above bhashyam brings to the fore that three types of ‘reality’ are admitted in the Shruti. Commonly these are known as: 1.PAramArthika Satyam which is Brahman alone, 2. vyAvahArika satyam which constitutes the common world experience of samsara and 3. prAtibhAsika satyam which is a seeming reality, actually within the samsaaric experience. This seeming reality of say, the mirage-water or rope-snake, is corrected in the vyavahara itself and does not

require Brahma jnanam for this. The vyvahaarika satyam, of course, gets corrected upon the rise of Brahma jnAnam. The Shruti vakyams for this are: Ekameva adviteeyam, neha naanaa asti kinchana, sarvam khalu idam brahma, etc.

What is worthy of noting in the above bhashyam is the Shruti pramaanam for the existence of the three types of reality or sattAtraividhyam. The Taittiriya shruti we took up above is the pramanam for the three types of reality. It is not the concoction of the advaitins/Bhagavatpada/later Acharyas. Nor is this an adaptation from Buddhism. The Bhashyam uses the two specific names and the third is only implied.

Unquote

When such explicit mention is there in the Bhashya of three types of realities, it is only surprising that Sri SSSS has denied it. 

And in the BGB 2.16 Shankara specifies the message to Arjuna:  You too, on the lines of the Knowers, regard the dualities as 'those non-existing but only appearing to be there' and forbear them.  Shankara uses the word 'mithyA avabhAsante.' = the are falsely appearing. 

Shankara has used the word 'pratibhaanam' to connote 'falsely appearing' multiple times in the Bhashyas. The term 'prAtibhAsika' is derived from that term that Shankara has used, for the same purpose. 

warm regards

subbu  
 

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

So, you have still not replied to AtmAshraya-dosha in case of "epistemological error". Mind being "epistemological error", how it is possible without requiring a mind -- remains unanswered. And makes your theory i.e. the theory of SSSS ji defective. 

I think the notion of sAkshi is sufficient to logically validate 'epistemological error,'

Define sAkshI. And explain how it logically validates "epistemological error".

Vedanta is based on Experience not inference. Epistemology, ontology and mind are all namarupa (commonly used in bhasya, rare in later Vedanta).

It is you who are making distinctions such as epistemology-ontology. For us, this distinction is not there. Both are dependent on each other in sattA-traividhya-vAda. It is not rare in "later VedAnta". You say this because of lack of exposure to "later VedAnta".

That they exist at all is accountable only due to the reality of sAkshi. SAkshi is not mere witness of something but the very existence of that which it witnesses.

Sir, define sAkshI.

 

Like what? Like dream. Is dream bhavarupa or kalpita? What is our experience?  

Sir, bhAvarUpa and kalpita are identical. 

 

Also, this idea of two non-existences, rope/snake and hare's horn, is the Vivarana's justification for positing a third existential, pratibhasika or mithya, independent of Bhasyakara's atma/anatma, asmat/yusmad, vishaya/vishayi/satya/anrta, light/darkness - it is a perversion of Advaita. A third existential is a logical creation based on the need to account for creation. Historically, SSSS suggests, it was in reaction to Ramanuja's anupapatti-s.  Snake is an imagination, a kalpita. What else is hare's horn but an imagination? 'But one appears, the other, not,' you will say. And there is creation, appearance. What is appearance - bhavarupa or imagination? I read Sankara as the latter rather than a thing that borrows, is transient, or relatively Bhava, 

Subbu ji has responded already in detail.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Suresh ji.

Even asat entities (like the horns of a hare) that are imagined in the mind or experienced in a dream could result in the experience of joy or sorrow, right? There could also be cases where an Acharya appears in the dream and provides upadesha to a shishya and this cannot be taken as asat.  So, when it comes to experience there is no difference at all between mithyA and asat. As Atman is the ground of all name/forms/experiences, everything including asat has sat-tAdAtmya, right? 

asat entities like horns of hare are never experienced because they don't have the eligibility to appear as identified with existence. MithyA entities have this ability to appear as identified with existence. So, one never experiences asat. There is no sat-tAdAtmya in case of asat. 

Whatever is seen is mithyA. asat is never seen. So, the shishya-AchArya seen in dream are mithyA and not asat.

 

Also, should we not accept the embodied self which is the prasiddha brahman as a dependent reality?

It depends as to how you choose to look at the embodied self, i.e. jIva. If you take it as pratibimba, then it is satya. If you look at it as AbhAsa, it is mithyA. Being mithyA, it will be a dependent reality. Being satya, it will be an independent reality. 

 

If atman is dependent on the body/jagat which is its own grandeur/glory, its independence is still not lost right? 

Atman is not dependent on body/jagat. It is the other way round.

 

This also helps to support the tradition of guru-shishya parampara of Advaita. If this is not accepted, then Brahman will never be known. There is support for this in the Bhashya. 

Guru-shishya-paramparA is valid in vyavahAra. There is no objection to that. In sattA-traividhya-vAda, it will be valid as it would have vyAvahArika-sattA. In eka-sattA-vAda, it is as valid as the AchArya-shishya-paramparA of dream.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji and all,

Drawing on my background in science, Sanskrit, Madhyamaka, and Vedanta, I’d like to share an insight regarding sat and asat.

> Whatever is seen is mithyA. asat is never seen. So, the shishya-AchArya seen in dream are mithyA and not asat.

1. I don’t think this distinction between mithyā and asat is necessary. In fact, it seems to complicate an otherwise straightforward analysis. Asat simply means "non-existent," irrespective of perception through the eyes, ears, mind, etc.

Something can either be sat (existent) or asat (non-existent).

Both a vandhyāputra (a barren woman’s son) and a marīcikā (mirage) are asat. The fact that one is perceivable while the other is not does not imply a difference in types of non-existence.

2. Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat)—there is no middle ground or gradation in existence itself. While it’s true that a thing may appear to be existent from one perspective and non-existent from another, this does not imply degrees of existence. Existence is not something that varies in intensity or scale; rather, it is a binary characteristic.

To avoid confusion, it is essential to clearly identify the perspective from which we are evaluating something’s existence. For example, a mirage appears to be water to an observer in a desert, making it “existent” from the perspective of immediate perception. However, upon closer examination, it is understood to be asat (non-existent) because there is no real water. Similarly, objects like tables, chairs, or the individual self (I, me, mine) are regarded as sat (existent) from a conventional, everyday perspective, but from an absolute standpoint, they are considered asat (non-existent), as they lack ultimate, independent reality. Only Brahman, which is understood to be the foundation of all existence, is sat from the absolute perspective.

3. There is no need to introduce a third category alongside sat and asat, such as anirvacanīya or mithyā. Anirvacanīya simply means "indescribable," in contrast to nirvacanīya, which means "describable." Using anirvacanīya as a separate category alongside sat and asat leads to confusion. Similarly, mithyā simply refers to something that appears but is ultimately asat. It is a subset of asat, not an entirely separate category.

Kind Regards

[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Lokeshh-ji,

 

So how do you differentiate the rope-snake example from that of mirage or bent ruler? In the former type, once the mistake is realized, you are no longer deceived. But in the latter type, you still perceive the ‘error’ even though you now know that it is an error. We may know that the true situation is the same (there is only Brahman) but the experience remains. Traditionally, this is explained by differentiating the jIva’s adhyAsa from Ishvara’s laws. How do you explain it?

 

And surely chairs and computers etc. cannot be asat ‘ultimately’. Certainly they lack independent reality but where would your communication be without them? Surely this is why we have the term ‘mithyA’? It has clear value in the adhyAropa teaching of Advaita.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

From: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of ?????
Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 8:50 AM
To: advaitin <adva...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

 

Dear Sudhanshu Ji and all,

Drawing on my background in science, Sanskrit, Madhyamaka, and Vedanta, I’d like to share an insight regarding sat and asat.

> Whatever is seen is mithyA. asat is never seen. So, the shishya-AchArya seen in dream are mithyA and not asat.

1. I don’t think this distinction between mithyā and asat is necessary. In fact, it seems to complicate an otherwise straightforward analysis. Asat simply means "non-existent," irrespective of perception through the eyes, ears, mind, etc.

Something can either be sat (existent) or asat (non-existent).

Both a vandhyāputra (a barren woman’s son) and a marīcikā (mirage) are asat. The fact that one is perceivable while the other is not does not imply a difference in types of non-existence.

2. Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat)—there is no middle ground or gradation in existence itself. While it’s true that a thing may appear to be existent from one perspective and non-existent from another, this does not imply degrees of existence. Existence is not something that varies in intensity or scale; rather, it is a binary characteristic.

To avoid confusion, it is essential to clearly identify the perspective from which we are evaluating something’s existence. For example, a mirage appears to be water to an observer in a desert, making it “existent” from the perspective of immediate perception. However, upon closer examination, it is understood to be asat (non-existent) because there is no real water. Similarly, objects like tables, chairs, or the individual self (I, me, mine) are regarded as sat (existent) from a conventional, everyday perspective, but from an absolute standpoint, they are considered asat (non-existent), as they lack ultimate, independent reality. Only Brahman, which is understood to be the foundation of all existence, is sat from the absolute perspective.

 

3. There is no need to introduce a third category alongside sat and asat, such as anirvacanīya or mithyā. Anirvacanīya simply means "indescribable," in contrast to nirvacanīya, which means "describable." Using anirvacanīya as a separate category alongside sat and asat leads to confusion. Similarly, mithyā simply refers to something that appears but is ultimately asat. It is a subset of asat, not an entirely separate category.

.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

I don’t think this distinction between mithyā and asat is necessary. In fact, it seems to complicate an otherwise straightforward analysis. Asat simply means "non-existent," irrespective of perception through the eyes, ears, mind, etc.

This is the view of MAdhvAs who hold mithyA also as asat. That has been rejected in detail in advaita vedAnta. There is no complication. 

Asat is not defined as non-existence in advaita. It is defined as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्. asat is non-existent. That is fine. But that is its feature, not its definition.

Something can either be sat (existent) or asat (non-existent). 

True, if you define asat as non-existent. However, advaita does not define asat like that. It is defined as described above - क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्. 

Hence, there can be something other than sat as well as asat. For e.g. illusory snake, because it is neither sat nor asat.

Key thing is to get the definition right. For those with a background in law, I mean section 2. One must understand section 2 so as to understand the law.  

Both a vandhyāputra (a barren woman’s son) and a marīcikā (mirage) are asat. The fact that one is perceivable while the other is not does not imply a difference in types of non-existence.

No one is proclaiming a difference in non-existence. So, your charge is incorrect. The fact of eligibility-of-perception differentiates the entities as per the definition.

Advaita defines mithyAtva as प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वम् and asattva as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्. There is no error in these definitions. And as per these, horns of hare is not mithyA and snake-in-the-rope is not asat. 

You have not demonstrated any error in these definitions. We have to play the game as per the rules of the game. We have defined terms and we discuss within that framework. And there is no error therein. 

2. Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat)—there is no middle ground or gradation in existence itself. While it’s true that a thing may appear to be existent from one perspective and non-existent from another, this does not imply degrees of existence. Existence is not something that varies in intensity or scale; rather, it is a binary characteristic.

It depends on how you define existence. I, in accordance with sampradAya, choose to define existence in several ways. While existence per se can be retained as existence-1, existence delimited by qualifiers can be stated to be existence-2 and existence-3. There is no error possible to be imputed therein.

So, I would defined existence per se as pAramArthika-sattA, existence-delimited-by-mUlAvidyA-kArya as vyAvahArika-sattA and existence-delimited-by-pallava-avidyA-kArya as prAtibhAsika-sattA. 

You cannot find out any fault therein. There is no gradation in existence. The appearance of gradation of existence is on account of delimiting agent. So, one should not wrongly assume gradations of existence per se. 

To avoid confusion, it is essential to clearly identify the perspective from which we are evaluating something’s existence. For example, a mirage appears to be water to an observer in a desert, making it “existent” from the perspective of immediate perception. However, upon closer examination, it is understood to be asat (non-existent) because there is no real water. Similarly, objects like tables, chairs, or the individual self (I, me, mine) are regarded as sat (existent) from a conventional, everyday perspective, but from an absolute standpoint, they are considered asat (non-existent), as they lack ultimate, independent reality. Only Brahman, which is understood to be the foundation of all existence, is sat from the absolute perspective.

If something is seen, it is mithyA. It is this simple. No need to complicate. Confusion arises only when section 2 of a piece of legislature is not clear. 

3. There is no need to introduce a third category alongside sat and asat, such as anirvacanīya or mithyā.

The need is obvious. It is to explain your experience. You don't see horns of hare, you see a table. These are both from the same frame of reference. So, a difference between horns of hare and table is obvious. The entities and definitions must account for both. To equate them is contradictory to experience.   

Anirvacanīya simply means "indescribable," in contrast to nirvacanīya, which means "describable." 

AnirvachanIya means inability to describe as either sat or asat, and not mere indescribability.

 

Using anirvacanīya as a separate category alongside sat and asat leads to confusion.

There is no confusion if section 2 is clear.  

 

Similarly, mithyā simply refers to something that appears but is ultimately asat. It is a subset of asat, not an entirely separate category.

It is a clumsy way to express. The definitions mentioned above are fault-less and there is no need of any adventure to modify that.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> That has been rejected in detail in advaita vedAnta. There is no complication. 

I don't think so. See for example गीताभाष्य 2.16

न असतः अविद्यमानस्य शीतोष्णादेः सकारणस्य न विद्यते नास्ति भावो भवनम् अस्तिता।। न हि शीतोष्णादि सकारणं प्रमाणैर्निरूप्यमाणं वस्तु सम्भवति।

The word असत् has been directly defined as अविद्यमान which means not existent. Even an example is given of feeling of cold, heat, etc, and these certainly are felt unlike hare's horn.

Kind regards

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

One word can be used in different senses depending on the delimiting feature. 

One such usage of asat is "avidyamAna" which BhAshyakAra has made in 2.16 wherein delimiting feature is avidyamAnatva. 

There is another usage in the sense of "false", which has been used in several places. For e.g. in BGB 13.19 - यदि पुनः प्रकृतिपुरुषावेव नित्यौ स्यातां तत्कृतमेव जगत् न ईश्वरस्य जगतः कर्तृत्वम् । तत् असत्. Here, the word "asat" does not connote avidyamAna-tva. Here, the delimiting feature is mrishAtva.

In GItA 17.28, every thing which takes one away from the path of Ishwara is stated as asat - तथा अश्रद्धयैव कृतं यत् स्तुतिनमस्कारादि, तत् सर्वम् असत् इति उच्यते, मत्प्राप्तिसाधनमार्गबाह्यत्वात् पार्थ । Here, asat does not mean avidyamAna. 

In Channdogya 3.19.1. - असत् अव्याकृतनामरूपम् इदं जगत् अशेषमग्रे प्रागवस्थायामुत्पत्तेः आसीत् , न त्वसदेव ; ‘कथमसतः सज्जायेत’ (छा. उ. ६ । २ । २) इति असत्कार्यत्वस्य प्रतिषेधात् । Here, asat is used as avyAkrita-nAma-rUpa and stated as not to be asat per se.

In Prashna 2.5 -  सत् मूर्तम् असत् अमूर्तं च अमृतं च यत् देवानां स्थितिकारणम् ॥ Here, asat is used as amUrta.

In GitA 9.19, a difference between asat and atyanta-asat is brought out- सत् यस्य यत् सम्बन्धितया विद्यमानं तत् , तद्विपरीतम् असच्च एव अहम् अर्जुन । न पुनः अत्यन्तमेव असत् भगवान् , स्वयं कार्यकारणे वा सदसती ये पूर्वोक्तैः निवृत्तिप्रकारैः एकत्वपृथक्त्वादिविज्ञानैः यज्ञैः मां पूजयन्तः उपासते ज्ञानविदः, ते यथाविज्ञानं मामेव प्राप्नुवन्ति ॥ १९ ॥

Sum and substance of these references is to point out that one word can be used in several ways. They are not the definition of the word. 

Non-existence, avidyamAnatva is a feature of asat. So, obviously wherever there is non-existence, one can use the word asat. However, the word asat is used delimited by अत्यन्ताभावत्व and not by असत्त्व.

So, the reference of word asat in GItA 2.16 is अत्यन्ताभावत्व-अवच्छिन्न-असत्-शब्द-प्रयोगः whereas in case of तथाह्यत्र त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेको नासत्त्वम् , किन्तुक्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वम्, the usage of word asat is असत्त्व-अवच्छिन्न-असत्-शब्द-प्रयोगः.

//The word असत् has been directly defined as अविद्यमान which means not existent. Even an example is given of feeling of cold, heat, etc, and these certainly are felt unlike hare's horn.//

As stated, non-existence being a feature of asat, the usage of asat can be made while being delimited by that particular feature. It does not mean that word asat is defined in that fashion.

So, you have to find out the delimiting feature. Just because the word asat is used, it does not imply that delimiting feature is asattva. Otherwise, you will see contradiction in the usage.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar. 

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

I'm confused as to what you are trying to say. For clarity, kindly clear my following doubts, before I can make my point -

> क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्

This definition that you gave defines अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् while you claim it defines असत्त्वम् I'm confused

> So, the reference of word asat in GItA 2.16 is अत्यन्ताभावत्व-अवच्छिन्न-असत्-शब्द-प्रयोगः

If the reference of 2.16 is that of अत्यन्ताभाव which I suppose you define as unavailable in all three times, then how come, Adi Shankara gave the example of feeling of heat, cold etc if he meant अत्यन्ताभाव ?

> Asat is not defined as non-existence in advaita.

What is the word of non-existent in Advaita according to you? If I want to say something is non-existent irrespective of whether it appears or not, what is the word to convey that in Advaita according to you?

Kind regards

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[dwa...@advaita.org.uk]

Dear Sudhanshu-ji,

 

Apologies for interrupting but I am particularly interested in confusions caused by (mis-)use of language. I wonder if you could possibly rewrite your response to Lokesh-ji, using English and ‘everyday’ examples. It looks as though you could probably explain using Venn diagrams or something, for example (although I accept that it might be difficult to present this by a post to the group).

 

My first reaction, not fully understanding what you were saying, was that it did not make sense. Your last sentence, for example, “Just because the word asat is used, it does not imply that delimiting feature is asattva. Otherwise, you will see contradiction in the usage” seems to be saying that, because I say that an object is red, it does not mean that ‘redness’ is an essential aspect of it. Thus, for example, I might say that the apple on the table is red. But it could have been green and yet still be an apple. Is that what you mean? Even so, if this apple is indeed red, then surely it is actually red, even though it might have been green? But I appreciate that we are not talking about incidental attributes here but about ‘defining’ characteristics. I presume you are saying that that is different? Perhaps you could start by defining what you mean by ‘delimiting feature’?

 

Please be assured that I am not being provocative or sarcastic in any way here. I think it is a very important topic and I think you have some very valid points to make. I believe it merits bringing your presentation ‘down a level’ so that we (non-Sanskrit scholars!) can all appreciate it.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Dear Lokesh ji.

You need to read carefully what is written.

I had also written तथाह्यत्र त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेको नासत्त्वम् , किन्तुक्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वम्.

And also,

> क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्

This shows what is referred as asat is same thing as atyant asat. Why did you ignore that? 

To emphasise the tuchchhatva of asat, one can refer to asat as atyant asat as well. There is no incongruity.

This definition that you gave defines अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् while you claim it defines असत्त्वम् I'm confused

Hope, the confusion is clear. Also, if you want greater clarity, you can check Advaita Siddhi from where the reference is taken.

If the reference of 2.16 is that of अत्यन्ताभाव which I suppose you define as unavailable in all three times, then how come, Adi Shankara gave the example of feeling of heat, cold etc if he meant अत्यन्ताभाव ?

Why not? Heat, cold are also avidyamAna in the locus where they are perceived. They are mithyA and hence there is atyanta-abhAva thereof in the locus of their perception. So, what's wrong in Adi Shankara's statement.

What is the word of non-existent in Advaita according to you? If I want to say something is non-existent irrespective of whether it appears or not, what is the word to convey that in Advaita according to you?

TraikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam is the word.

Regards.

[suresh srinivasamurthy]

Namaste Sudhamshu-ji,

//Atman is not dependent on body/jagat. It is the other way round.//

That is true, but this "dependence" on the body is just like a bird depending on the branch or like a spider depending on its web. Are we not depending on our BMI to express ourselves and even to engage in dharma. But going by the definition this vyAvahArika satta still comes under mithya I guess. Appreciate if you could clarify.

Namaste,
Suresh

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Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 12:05 PM

To: adva...@googlegroups.com <adva...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [advaitin] The Grandeur of the Atman transcending time

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Suresh ji.

//Atman is not dependent on body/jagat. It is the other way round.//

That is true, but this "dependence" on the body is just like a bird depending on the branch or like a spider depending on its web. Are we not depending on our BMI to express ourselves and even to engage in dharma. But going by the definition this vyAvahArika satta still comes under mithya I guess. Appreciate if you could clarify.

We should be clear with the terminology. There is shuddha chaitanya, which is indicated by the word Atman. There is also a pratibimbita-chaitanya, which is denoted by the word Atman.

My statement was with respect to shuddha chaitanya. Body/jagat are dependent on shuddha-chaitanya whereas shuddha chaitanya is not dependent on body/jagat.

Now, your usage of spider-web, bird-branch seems to be with respect to pratibimbita-chaitanya. Please clarify if it is not your intention. This pratibimbita-chaitanya certainly needs BMI to express itself and to engage in dharma. 

How do you define vyAvahArika-sattA is key to understand whether it is mithyA or not. And if mithyA, then in which amsha.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> I had also written तथाह्यत्र त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेको नासत्त्वम् , किन्तुक्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वम्.

Thank you for the clarification.

What you say is justified in the context of अद्वैतसिद्धि from where I believe you take this definition.

However I do not think that this definition is followed throughout Vedanta and specially Adi Shankara do not seem to follow this definition, but rather he choses to follow normal usages of this word like you have already shown by quoting various usages of the word असत् and hence I do not think that it is reasonable to claim that असत् is a पारिभाषिक word defined differently in Advaita.

The word is defined as you say in अद्वैतसिद्धि, however it doesn't seem to be the case that the definition is follow by Adi Shankara and Advaita Vedanta.

Adi Shankara clearly uses the word असत् in its normal usage that is "non-existent" in most cases as it evident in the following passage -

> शीतोष्णादीनि नियतानियतरूपाणि द्वन्द्वानि विकारोऽयमसन्नेव मरीचिजलवन्मिथ्यावभासते

dualities, heat, cold, etc. some of which are definite in their nature, and others inconstant , mentally being convinced that this (phenomenal world) is changeful, verily unreal (असत्) and appears falsely (मिथ्या) like water in a mirage.

- गीताभाष्यम् २.१६

Here both the words असत् and मिथ्या have been used, and मिथ्यात्वं of an object has been shown inspite of it being asat, which conveys quite clearly that it is not the intent of the author to differentiate असत् and मिथ्या on the same level.

Kind regards

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

However I do not think that this definition is followed throughout Vedanta and specially Adi Shankara do not seem to follow this definition, but rather he choses to follow normal usages of this word like you have already shown by quoting various usages of the word असत् and hence I do not think that it is reasonable to claim that असत् is a पारिभाषिक word defined differently in Advaita.

You are entitled to your thinking. However, the same is incorrect.

Leave aside Adi Shankara and VedAnta, the same idea of asat is present in the mother of this universe, the Rigveda. You can check NAsadIya SUkta. न सत् आसीत्, न असत् आसीत्...... तम आसीत्. The Veda clearly specifies ignorance as something which is neither sat nor asat. The SAyaNa BhAshya clarifies - 

तदानीं प्रलयदशायामवस्थितं यदस्य जगतो मूलकारणं तत् असत् शशविषाणवनिरुपाख्यं न आसीत् । कुतस्तयोः तादात्म्यमिति उभयविलक्षणमनिर्वाच्यमेवासीदित्यर्थः ।

आत्मतत्वस्यावरकरवान्मायापरसंज्ञं भावरूपाज्ञानमत्र तम इत्युच्यते ।

It clearly demonstrates that anirvachanIya that is mithyA i.e. bhAvarUpa is ubhaya-vilakshaNa i.e. different from sat as well as asat. If mithyA and asat are defined to be same, it is violative of Rigveda.

That is what BhAshyakAra also means when he uses the term anirvachanIya for nAma-rUpa. 

I have already demonstrated several usage of words asat. And explained the mechanism of their respective usage.

The meaning which is followed in Advaita wherein mithyA is defined as sat-asat-vilakshaNa, the meaning of asat is as I mentioned -- क्वचिदपि उपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीति अनाधिकरणत्वम्. There is neither any logical challenge to this nor any scriptural challenge as shown by Rigveda.

Its usage for avidyamAnatva is nothing wrong because asat is verily non-existent.

The word is defined as you say in अद्वैतसिद्धि, however it doesn't seem to be the case that the definition is follow by Adi Shankara and Advaita Vedanta.

As explained above. Check SAyaNa BhAshya regarding the meaning of word asat taken there. If you don't accept SAyaNa BhAshya, then you are requested to explain NAsadIya Sukta.

Adi Shankara clearly uses the word असत् in its normal usage that is "non-existent" in most cases as it evident in the following passage -

Your so-called "normal usage" is not contradictory to definition because definition contains non-existence within its ambit. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

One of the five definitions of mithyA is

सदसदनधिकरणत्वं मिथ्यात्वम्

(That which has no locus in either sat or asat)

In other words, mithyA dies not have it's locus in either sat-brahma nor in asat-horns-of-a-hare

In the above the word asat is used synonymously with tucchaM

Again, asat is used for mithyA itself in the 
Bhagavad Gita bhAShya for the shloka नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः where the sad-buddhi and sad-buddhi are both present in each cognition.

Om

Raghav

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

In the above the word asat is used synonymously with tucchaM

True. That is the primary meaning of asat. As is evident from NAsadIya SUktam also.

Again, asat is used for mithyA itself in the  Bhagavad Gita bhAShya for the shloka नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः where the sad-buddhi and sad-buddhi are both present in each cognition.

MithyA shares the feature of non-existence with asat. So, delimited by अविद्यमानत्व, there is no incongruity if asat word is used to denote mithyA. However, asat delimited by asat-tva cannot be used for mithyA. That is my point. 

If asat delimited by asat-tva is stated to be identical to mithyA, as is being argued, it would violate NAsadIya SUktam, bhAshya, smriti etc. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste and thank you ji for the response 

I noticed that the  उपाधौ प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम्  phrase for tucchatvaM in contrast to  प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ अत्यन्ताभाव प्रतियोगित्वम् (where the use of the clause pratipannopadhau implies, "In the given upAdhi" where it is/was experienced). This implies mithyA viShaya is experienced ie, mithyA necessarily has pratItI. 

And I understand your use of the word अविद्यमानत्वम् as synonymous with प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् i.e., non-availability for experience as an (external) object which is necessarily true of the tucchaM sub-category of asat-objects.

Om

Raghav

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On Mon, 4 Nov 2024 at 2:37 pm, Sudhanshu Shekhar

<sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Raghav ji.

In the above the word asat is used synonymously with tucchaM

True. That is the primary meaning of asat. As is evident from NAsadIya SUktam also.

Again, asat is used for mithyA itself in the  Bhagavad Gita bhAShya for the shloka नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः where the sad-buddhi and asad-buddhi are both present in each cognition.

MithyA shares the feature of non-existence with asat. So, delimited by अविद्यमानत्व, there is no incongruity if asat word is used to denote mithyA. However, asat delimited by asat-tva cannot be used for mithyA. That is my point. 

If asat delimited by asat-tva is stated to be identical to mithyA, as is being argued, it would violate NAsadIya SUktam, bhAshya, smriti etc. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[Raghav Kumar]

The nAsadIya sUkta with sAyana bhAShya laying out tamas/avidyA as the primeval veil of AtmA, was a remarkable reference.

But I am afraid Michael ji has already averred that all such PSA including shrI sAyana is a "perversion" of Advaita - something which struck me as an amusingly "strong" condemnation of vivaraNa etc. So sAyanAcharya may not count for those who say that the word anirvacanIya as a category which is neither sat nor asat is superfluous.

I heard a variation of this argument as follows -

At any given time a person can talk of only two (or less) categories of objects,  sat and asat. If something has been sublated then it moves from being sat to asat. In such a scheme, a person either experiences a rope or a snake. Never both. Either he experiences water (which he takes as real) or heated-air-over-sand-forming-a-reflecting-surface, after the water knowledge is sublated. Never both.

But what is missed out in the above is that, there is still, this category of "appearances" viz.,  "I had experienced water which later I realised to be non-existent." - such appearances are a fact necessitating the word mithyA.  

Om

Raghav

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On Mon, 4 Nov 2024 at 2:37 pm, Sudhanshu Shekhar

<sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji.

This implies mithyA viShaya is experienced ie, mithyA necessarily has pratItI. 

I don't see how it has to be necessarily true. I mean there can be a mithyA vastu which is not being experienced. For e.g. I am not experiencing an undiscovered planet right now. No one is. And yet, it is mithyA.

But when it is perceived, it has atyanta-abhAva in its locus.

Pratipanna-upAdhi means स्व-प्रकारक-धी-विशेष्य-अभिन्न-अधिकरण. So, in the cognition "this is silver", this is visheshya and silver is visheshaNa.

That locus which is abhinna with this. That is shukti.

atyanta-abhAva of silver in such locus.

So, when there is pratIti, there is atyanta-abhAva.

However, in DSV, what you are saying is completely correct. There is no ajnAta-sattA. But in case of SDV, there is ajnAta-sattA.

So, in SDV, mithyA is not necessarily perceived. However, in DSV, it is necessarily perceived.

And I understand your use of the word अविद्यमानत्वम् as synonymous with प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् i.e., non-availability for experience as an (external) object which is necessarily true of the tucchaM sub-category of asat-objects.

अविद्यमानत्वम् is synonymous with त्रैकालिक निषेध प्रतियोगित्वम्. तुच्छ is not sub-category of asat. Rather, it is synonymous of asat.

Both mithyA and asat have traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam i.e. avidyamAnatvam.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste 

But I am afraid Michael ji has already averred that all such PSA including shrI sAyana is a "perversion" of Advaita - something which struck me as an amusingly "strong" condemnation of vivaraNa etc. So sAyanAcharya may not count for those who say that the word anirvacanIya as a category which is neither sat nor asat is superfluous.

It is a view which is worthless on account of rooted in complete absence of understanding of bhAshya as well as texts by other subsequent AchAryAs.

It relies on the fertile imagination of some persons and not on knowledge received through paramparA as Bhagvan Krishna states in Gita chapter 4. It is outside sampradAya and is hence liable to be ignored as utterances of people incapable to comprehend.

To use words such as "perversion" and "distortion" implies a combination of abject ignorance, consequent arrogance and reckless impudence. Such view has accordingly been shredded to pieces in this very forum.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

Repeating here your reply to my initial response concerning atmashraya dosha followed by Chatgpt's support of saksi as a valid refutation of the dosha you suggest: 

//So, you have still not replied to AtmAshraya-dosha in case of "epistemological error". Mind being "epistemological error", how it is possible without requiring a mind -- remains unanswered. And makes your theory i.e. the theory of SSSS ji defective//. 

//I think the notion of sAkshi is sufficient to logically validate 'epistemological error,'//

CHATGPT: 

1. **Introduce the Witness (Sākṣin)**:
   - In Advaita Vedanta, the mind and all phenomena, including epistemological errors, are ultimately part of **Māyā**—the realm of illusion and relative reality. These phenomena exist only in relation to each other and are observed by a witness consciousness (Sākṣin), which is beyond both mind and mistake.
   - The witness, pure awareness or **ātman**, is untouched by the fluctuations of the mind. It merely illuminates them without itself being involved in or affected by epistemological processes, correct or mistaken.

2. **Distinguish Māyā from the Witness**:
   - From the standpoint of nonduality, **Māyā** encompasses all dualistic experiences, including knowledge and ignorance, truth and error. The epistemological realm—where errors and perceptions occur—is confined within Māyā. The witness (Sākṣin), however, exists beyond Māyā and is free from its inherent errors.
   - By this understanding, epistemological errors pertain to the mind as a phenomenon within Māyā, and they do not touch the witness. Therefore, to assert that the mind itself is an epistemological mistake is a claim relevant only within Māyā, not from the standpoint of absolute reality (paramārtha).

3. **Refute Atmāśraya-doṣa within Nondual Framework**:
   - The nondual perspective reveals that **Atmāśraya-doṣa** does not arise in this context because the mind does not rely on itself for its existence or nature. The mind, along with its errors, is merely an object observed by the witness.
   - Since the witness is fundamentally different from the mind and remains unaffected by it, there is no circularity problem. The mind’s epistemological errors are part of the play of Māyā and do not implicate the witness.

4. **Epistemological Errors as Part of Māyā**:
   - From the nondual viewpoint, what we call "epistemological" is only relevant within the realm of Māyā. The mind, with its capacity for both true and mistaken cognition, belongs entirely to the relative reality of Māyā and does not compromise the pure awareness of the witness.
   - Therefore, epistemological errors are neither essential to the witness nor defining of the mind itself. They are transient phenomena that the witness observes within the framework of duality.

In summary, the nondual view positions epistemological mistakes as experiences confined to the realm of Māyā, observed by the witness. This approach dismisses the need for Atmāśraya-doṣa, as the mind’s errors are not fundamental to the mind itself, and they do not affect the witness, which remains ever-aware and beyond dualistic categorization.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

I am not interested in the replies by Chatgpt. It shows a lack of proportionate effort to examine the issue and present one's views.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

Yes I stand corrected.  traikAlika niShedha pratiyogitvaM holds good for tucchaM as well as mithyA.

The distinction is pratIti-anarhatvaM which holds good for tucchaM alone and not for mithyA.

I meant to say mithyA necessarily has pratIti-arhatvaM. (it is "experience-able"). True that it may not have immediate pratIti in SDV. 

Om

Raghav

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

//I am not interested in the replies by Chatgpt. It shows a lack of proportionate effort to examine the issue and present one's views.//

It may be disproportionate effort but AI destroys your objection and the object of these dialogues is not personal view and effort but, the truth of Vedanta independent of personality and individuality. I have no objection if you do not wish to respond. 

Regards

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

💖

Sudhanshu reacted via Gmail

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Michael ji.

Present the views of Chatgpt in your words as your views and I will respond. I don't want to respond to views of AI but the views of a human.

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[Raghav Kumar]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji

Michael ji has attempted to address your question about AtmAshraya doSha (involved in saying mind is caused by mind), by saying, and i quote,  "I think the notion of sAkshi is sufficient to logically validate 'epistemological error'". 

I take that to mean that the sAxI is locus of the epistemological mistake due to which the mind arises. Generally the Acharyas would say "AyushmAn bhava" to that, whether it is AI or Michael ji.  

 

Kindly check! 

Om

P.S.This above idea of Michael ji and other SSSSji followers that "my mind has the problem"; all  avidyA is merely antaHkaraNa doSha, no doubt has a certain compelling appeal. This may work in the cases of mistaking a rope for a snake etc where I can informally say, I make a mistake at the 'mental level' and later I correct it - a simple case of epistemological error.

Alas, the problem of avidyA is more intractable than that. Because the arising of mind itself and even jIvatvaM (the status of being a limited individual being) is itself the fundamental error. So the mind which is an effect (kArya) of the fundamental epistemological error, cannot by itself be it's Ashraya or locus.

This time AI has come to the rescue and placed the locus of the error called the mind,  in the sAxI which is not bad at all. 

Usually the tack taken by SSSS ji followers is that mind is a material and it's not an epistemological error. And it does not contradict Advaita because, by kArya-kAraNa-ananyatvaM nyAya, it is not different from Brahman. So duality is not compromised. 

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[V Subrahmanian]

The term 'AnirvAchya' to mean "sad-asad-vilakshana" in Narada Purana:


Cited in the foreword to 'Panchapadika Vivaranam with two commentaries' by  Polagam Rama Sastri: (Published by GOML, 1958, Madras):

He cites this verse, in turn cited by Nagesha Bhatta, as from the Brihannaaradiya:

नासद्रूपा न सद्रूपा माया नैवोभयात्मिका । अनिर्वाच्या ततो ज्ञेया मिथ्याभूता सनातनी ||

  nAsadrUpA na sadrUpa naivobhayAtmikA. anirvAchyA tato jneyA mithyAbhUtA sanAtanI.   

Maya is neither sat, nor asat, nor sat-asat. It is anirvAchyA and hence to be known as mithya and anAdi.

This tallies with the Shankara bhashyam: BSB 2.1.14:

सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलप्येते ;  

This verse is found in Sourapurana  

https://www.transliteral.org/pages/z161205035011/view   with a variation only in the second half:

 सदसद्भ्यामन्यरूपा मिथ्याभूता सनातना  

warm regards

subrahmanian.v

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

💖

Sudhanshu reacted via Gmail

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> You are entitled to your thinking. However, the same is incorrect.

I am content with my interpretation of सत् and असत् as simply existence and non-existence, respectively. My definitions are broader and hence flexible. They easily apply to the contexts that you have highlighted. The same cannot be said for your case. There's a lot of language gymnastics you have to play for you to reach your intended meaning. And that too is not foolproof.

For example, you say that "क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्" is definition of असत्. However this defines अत्यन्तसत्त्वम् and not असत्. Later you claimed that असत् is same as अत्यन्तासत्. However this is hard to believe because in that case the qualifier अत्यन्त become simply useless. Further you brought a citation where Adi Shankara distinguished असत् and अत्यन्तासत्व -

> In GitA 9.19, a difference between asat and atyanta-asat is brought out- सत् यस्य यत् सम्बन्धितया विद्यमानं तत् , तद्विपरीतम् असच्च एव अहम् अर्जुन । न पुनः अत्यन्तमेव असत् भगवान् ,

This contradicts what you said earlier.

By quoting Adi Shankara in Gita 2.16, I've already shown that there's no fundamental difference between मिथ्या and असत्. In a single sentence I've showed you how असत् and मिथ्या have been used - "द्वन्द्वानि विकारोऽयमसन्नेव मरीचिजलवन्मिथ्यावभासते"

Further, your claim that असत् is a technical term and has a narrow meaning that you claim is different from मिथ्या stands refuted. If असत् is a technical term, it is expected that its defined meaning is followed throughout the Advaita Vedanta literature. However, this is not the case.  

> Leave aside Adi Shankara and VedAnta, the same idea of asat is present in the mother of this universe, the Rigveda. You can check NAsadIya SUkta. न सत् आसीत्, न असत् आसीत्...... तम आसीत्. The Veda clearly specifies ignorance as something which is neither sat nor asat.

The concerned part of the Veda does not define असत्, it merely uses this term, and its meaning is left for us to interpret.

> The Veda clearly specifies ignorance as something which is neither sat nor asat.

I'm not sure how you reached this conclusion. Where is it "clearly" specified?

> If mithyA and asat are defined to be same, it is violative of Rigveda.

Invalid charge.

> As explained above. Check SAyaNa BhAshya regarding the meaning of word asat taken there. If you don't accept SAyaNa BhAshya, then you are requested to explain NAsadIya Sukta.

Another ancient commentator of Nasadiya Sukta has defined the terms sat and asat as cause and effect, respectively. So, it is possible to interpret the sukta differently. See - https://archive.org/details/rig-veda-3/Rig%20Veda%207/page/n358/mode/1up

Kind regards

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

I am content with my interpretation of सत् and असत् as simply existence and non-existence, respectively.

Sir Ji. Then what is the meaning of sat-asat-vilakshaNa. 

Kindly elaborate something which is neither existence nor non-existence as per you. Also provide some examples of sat-asat-vilakshaNa.

My definitions are broader and hence flexible.

Broader is not a definition. Definition has to be precise. Otherwise, it is called ativyApti-dosha. If you define asat as non-existent, it has ativyApti dosha in mithyA.

It is like defining cow to be four-footed animal. Horse ko bhi chaar pair hote hain. You "broader" definition is defective.

They easily apply to the contexts that you have highlighted. The same cannot be said for your case.

Your definition does not allow room for sat-asat-vilakshaNa vastu and is hence violative of Advaita siddhAnta. 

There's a lot of language gymnastics you have to play for you to reach your intended meaning. And that too is not foolproof.

Bekaar ki baat. The definitions I gave are precise and are consistently followed in Advaita siddhAnta. That which you are calling "language gymnastics" are logical requirements which can be understood only when you discuss an issue systematically and not merely take one sentence here and one sentence there and start imagining a theory.

For example, you say that "क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम्" is definition of असत्. However this defines अत्यन्तसत्त्वम् and not असत्. Later you claimed that असत् is same as अत्यन्तासत्. However this is hard to believe because in that case the qualifier अत्यन्त become simply useless.

You have to read carefully what is written. I have told you already that to indicate tuchchhatvam, the word atyant is used. What is this "later you claimed"? Both citations are from Advaita Siddhi. Is your charge against Advaita Siddhi? If yes, then better check your credentials.

Further you brought a citation where Adi Shankara distinguished असत् and अत्यन्तासत्व -

So? I can use the word asat in hundred manners depending on delimiting factor. That does not mean that asat delimited by asat-tva is being discussed.

This contradicts what you said earlier.

I think you better revise the concept of avachchhedaka. 

By quoting Adi Shankara in Gita 2.16, I've already shown that there's no fundamental difference between मिथ्या and असत्. In a single sentence I've showed you how असत् and मिथ्या have been used - "द्वन्द्वानि विकारोऽयमसन्नेव मरीचिजलवन्मिथ्यावभासते"

As explained above. If you can appreciate what is said earlier, you will understand this.

Further, your claim that असत् is a technical term and has a narrow meaning that you claim is different from मिथ्या stands refuted. If असत् is a technical term, it is expected that its defined meaning is followed throughout the Advaita Vedanta literature. However, this is not the case. 

Again, it stems from ignorance of concept of avachchhedaka. 

The concerned part of the Veda does not define असत्, it merely uses this term, and its meaning is left for us to interpret.

It posits something which is neither sat nor asat. 

Are we supposed to use our fertile imagination to interpret or follow sampradAya which clearly holds asat here as I explained. SAyaNAchArya has explained that. He has clearly explained tamas as sat-asat-vilakshaNa. If mithyA and asat are identical, as erroneously claimed by you, the term sat-asat-vilakshaNa becomes meaningless.

There is no requirement of any adventure to tinker with that.

What motivates you to tinker with SAyaNa's sAmpradAyika explanation?

I'm not sure how you reached this conclusion. Where is it "clearly" specified?

Did you read SAyaNa BhAshya? Do you agree with it?

Invalid charge.

Sir, please enlighten me about the meaning of Rigveda as per Advaita.

Another ancient commentator of Nasadiya Sukta has defined the terms sat and asat as cause and effect, respectively. So, it is possible to interpret the sukta differently. 

The point is - do you agree with SAyaNAchArya or not? And if asat is used as effect -- then how is it not violative of your "broader definition" of non-existence. Pl explain.

You explain your position:

1. Do you agree with Shankara?

2. Do you agree with SAyaNa?

3. Do you agree with Advaita Siddhi?

4. Do you agree with Advaita?

I ask this so as to have clarity. As of now, I have no idea where you are coming from. What you think of Advaita. What are the texts acceptable to you, I have no idea. 

I don't know whether you are a Buddhist or grammarian or a dvaiti or a scientist. Or whether you are an atheist for whom even Vedas are not acceptable.

The way to understand is not to pick one sentence from here and one sentence from there and make some "broader definition". 

The definitions have to be precise and free from avyApti, ativyApti and asambhava dosha. Check your "broader definition" and get back.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> Sir Ji. Then what is the meaning of sat-asat-vilakshaNa. 

Where is sat-asat-vilakshaNa mentioned, in what we have discussed so far? Is this something said by Adi Shankara or another author?

I suppose you are referring to avidya as sat-asat-vilakaNa. If that is the case, then sat-asat-vilakaNa simply means that avidya is not-existent ultimately and exists conventionally. 

By no means sat-asat-vilaksana mean that there's a thing which is neither existent nor non-existent from the same point of reference. Such a thing is out of the scope of language.

> Broader is not a definition. Definition has to be precise. Otherwise, it is called ativyApti-dosha. If you define asat as non-existent, it has ativyApti dosha in mithyA.

I see no issue here. mithyA certainly is non-existent and hence asat.

Here's another citation from Mandukya Karika that proves this point - 

> यथा च स्वप्नमाये दृष्टे असद्रूपे, तथा विश्वम् इदं द्वैतं समस्तम् असद् दृष्टम् ...

The dream and maya is equated with asat. The complete dual world too is equated with asat. Swami Nikhilananda translates the word असद् as unreal which means non-existent.

Here's another citaion which says that माया doesn't exist - 

सा च माया न विद्यते॥ManKa.4.58॥

Here's Adi Shankara's commentary on the same - 

माया नाम वस्तु तर्हि;
(Opponent) – Then there must be a thing as Māyā ?

नैवम्, सा च माया न विद्यते। मायेत्यविद्यमानस्याख्येत्यभिप्रायः॥
(Reply) – It is not so. That Māyā or illusion is never existent. Māyā or illusion is the name we give to something which does not exist.

Here's yet another citation - 

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा।
वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः॥ManKa.2.6॥

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते।
तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः॥ManKa.2.7॥

Notice the first line which says, the objects which do not exist in the beginning and at the end (for example mirage etc) but exist in the middle, even in the middle they are non-existent. In the last line these objects are called मिथ्या.
Here too it is quite evident that non-existence and mithyatva has been equated.

Similarly, there are plenty of citations that show that Adi Shankara didn't difference between mithyA and asat as you do.

> Your definition does not allow room for sat-asat-vilakshaNa vastu and is hence violative of Advaita siddhAnta. 

Haha. I'm glad my definition doesn't allow for a thing called sat-asat-vilakshaNa for such a thing is out of scope of language, let alone any scripture.

> It posits something which is neither sat nor asat. 

What is that supposed to mean? You are effectively saying that the meaning of asat is neither sat nor asat.

> So? I can use the word asat in hundred manners depending on delimiting factor. That does not mean that asat delimited by asat-tva is being discussed.

I think you need to refresh your concept of avachchhedaka (delimiting factor). You can only delimit the meaning of a word that has a broader meaning. You cannot delimit a word you have already accepted with a narrow meaning that excludes mithyA. "asat delimited by asat-tva" makes no sense. Delimiting can only narrow down the original accepted meaning of a word, it can never expand its meaning to cover other areas. It's like after defining abc as cow, you are delimiting it to mean a horse. That's not how it works. A 4 legged animal can be delimited to mean a horse. A thing that you have already accepted as a cow cannot become a horse.

> I don't know whether you are a Buddhist or grammarian or a dvaiti or a scientist. Or whether you are an atheist for whom even Vedas are not acceptable.

I don't know how is this relevant to our current discussion. I hope you are asking this in good faith and not as an excuse to push me out of the discussion. Since you have asked I will answer. I appreciate all these disciplines. However, I do not follow any one of them blindly.

Kind regards

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

You have left a number of questions unanswered. And chosen to answer only some as per your convenience. I don't know why.

Where is sat-asat-vilakshaNa mentioned, in what we have discussed so far?

Sir, this is one of the definitions of mithyAtva in Advaita siddhAnta. Something which is different from both sat and asat. AnirvachanIya that is mithyA, is defined as something different from both sat and asat.

Is this something said by Adi Shankara or another author?

You need to search it to find who said it. This question displays a lack of study of Advaita siddhAnta.

I suppose you are referring to avidya as sat-asat-vilakaNa. If that is the case, then sat-asat-vilakaNa simply means that avidya is not-existent ultimately and exists conventionally. 

Now tell me, is horns of hare "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally"? 

If not, then you are yourself admitting that asat-horns-of-hare and asat-avidyA have a difference. While one is "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally", the other is merely non-existent.

So, non-existence is common to both. And "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally" is uncommon.

You have yourself thus accepted a difference between asat and sat-asat-vilakshaNa.

Thus, using same word asat for both asat and sat-asat-vilakshaNa is wrong. When there is one parameter which is uncommon between asat and sat-asat-vilakshaNa, it is incorrect to define them to be identical.

However, if only non-existence is to be indicated, one can use either word. 

By no means sat-asat-vilaksana mean that there's a thing which is neither existent nor non-existent from the same point of reference. Such a thing is out of the scope of language.

True. And that is why to indicate the difference between asat and sat-asat-vilakshaNa, you need to refer to them differently. Both asat and mithyA are non-existent. One does not appear while the other appears. If you define asat and mithyA to be identical, someone may confuse horns-of-hare to be "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally".

This is what you seem to suggest by non-existent "ultimately" and exists "conventionally". When such a difference is evident, what is the harm in using two words to signify this difference?

While those entities which are non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally as per you, can be called mithyA and those which are plain non-existent and no one takes them to exist conventionally are asat.

When non-existence is sought to be highlighted, either of the words can be used.

I see no issue here. mithyA certainly is non-existent and hence asat.

Yes. Why not? Horse certainly has four legs and hence it is cow. 

Jabardast understanding!!

Here's another citation from Mandukya Karika that proves this point - 

No point is proved by your citations. I have already stated that to highlight non-existence, either of the words namely asat and mithyA can be used.

However, as demonstrated, to highlight pratIti-arhatvam and traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam in the Pratipanna-upAdhi, one uses only mithyA.

The dream and maya is equated with asat. The complete dual world too is equated with asat. Swami Nikhilananda translates the word असद् as unreal which means non-existent.

As explained.

Here's another citaion which says that माया doesn't exist - 

You think that has been disputed here? Why are you giving evidence for something which is already accepted.

Listen. For us, both mAyA and asat are non-existent. 

Giving evidence for something which is not even being contested is called अकाण्ड-ताण्डव. 

सा च माया न विद्यते॥ManKa.4.58॥

Here's Adi Shankara's commentary on the same - 

माया नाम वस्तु तर्हि;
(Opponent) – Then there must be a thing as Māyā ?

नैवम्, सा च माया न विद्यते। मायेत्यविद्यमानस्याख्येत्यभिप्रायः॥
(Reply) – It is not so. That Māyā or illusion is never existent. Māyā or illusion is the name we give to something which does not exist.

Ji. MAyA, avidyA, avidyA-kArya are all non-existent. Just as horns of hare. While the former appears to exist, the latter does not appear. And hence, the former is mithyA and latter is asat.

Notice the first line which says, the objects which do not exist in the beginning and at the end (for example mirage etc) but exist in the middle, even in the middle they are non-existent. In the last line these objects are called मिथ्या.
Here too it is quite evident that non-existence and mithyatva has been equated.

Yes. Because it is non-existence that is being highlighted. traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam i.e. non-existence is common to asat and mithyA. 

Similarly, there are plenty of citations that show that Adi Shankara didn't difference between mithyA and asat as you do.

Whenever non-existence is to be highlighted, either of the words can be used. 

We follow sampradAya and there is enough evidence which differentiates asat and mithyA. What more? They are "defined" to be different.

MithyA and anirvachanIya are same. BhAshyakAra has used the words tattva-anyatva-AbhyAm anirvachanIya.

This anirvachanIya is different from both sat and asat. 

Your answer would be that anirvachanIya is "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally". 

You are already prescribing a differentiation thus. Then, it is illogical to "define" two entities by same term when there is at least one differentiating parameter.

Haha. I'm glad my definition doesn't allow for a thing called sat-asat-vilakshaNa for such a thing is out of scope of language, let alone any scripture.

NAsadIya SUktam has used it. SAyaNa has explained it. Further, wherever the word anirvachanIya is used in scriptures, they refer to sat-asat-vilakshaNa. 

Let me give you some work. Find all references of anirvachanIya in the scriptures you accept as correct. And explain what is anirvachanIya about them. Why cannot they be referred as either sat or asat? What is the problem?

As per you, jolly well they should be nirvachanIya. They are either sat or asat. What on earth is this anirvachanIya? And if there is indeed reason enough for them being called neither sat nor asat, what is that reason?

What is that supposed to mean? You are effectively saying that the meaning of asat is neither sat nor asat.

What is supposed to mean has been explained in great detail.

I will try again. Horse ko chaar pair hote hain, cow ko bhi chaar pair hote hain. However, cow has hanging neck which horse does not have. So, there is one parameter which cow has but horse does not have.

So, it is incorrect to define cow as four-footed animal. Because then this definition has ativyApti in horse.

But, if I want to highlight mere four-footed animal, I can use both cow and horse. 

I think you need to refresh your concept of avachchhedaka (delimiting factor).

Please illustrate.

You can only delimit the meaning of a word that has a broader meaning. You cannot delimit a word you have already accepted with a narrow meaning that excludes mithyA.

Deliming-agent is qualifier. A qualifier is present in more than one entities. Four-footed-ness is a qualifier. It is present in horse as well as cow.

So, one can say चतुष्पादत्व-अवच्छिन्न-अश्वः and अश्वत्व-अवच्छिन्न-अश्वः to highlight different aspects of horse. The former to highlight four-footed-ness, the latter to highlight horse-ness-qualified-horse. That is horse, per se.

There is something called vyadhikaraNa dharma as well. So, a horse is present in the room. But I can say गोत्व-अवच्छिन्न-अश्वः is absent.

If I ask you to bring a chatushpAda-animal, you can bring either cow or horse. Because there is identity of horse and cow in so far as four-footed-aninal-hood is concerned.

This is what is called the concept of avachchhedaka. 

Thus, traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam-avachchhinna-asat and asattva-avachchhinna-asat are different. Not different in respect of noun, but different in respect of adjective.

"asat delimited by asat-tva" makes no sense.

As described above.

Delimiting can only narrow down the original accepted meaning of a word, it can never expand its meaning to cover other areas.

Delimiting-agent is present in more than one places. LakshaNa (definition) is present in the lakshya only and nowhere else.

It's like after defining abc as cow, you are delimiting it to mean a horse. That's not how it works. A 4 legged animal can be delimited to mean a horse. A thing that you have already accepted as a cow cannot become a horse.

What is the terminology used sir? Suppose I asked you to bring a four-legged-aninal. A brought cow and B brought horse. Both are correct. So, both have brought same entity. Right? So, what are the entities brought which have identity. Write down. 

My take is:

चतुष्पादत्व-अवच्छिन्न-गो and चतुष्पादत्व- अवच्छिन्न-अश्व are same entities in so far as the assigned task is concerned. Because chatushpAdatva is present in both cow and horse and it is the chatushpAdatva that is the intended object.

Are you saying, गोत्व-अवच्छिन्न-चतुष्पाद-पशु and अश्वत्व-अवच्छिन्न-चतुष्पाद-पशु are same entities?

I don't know how is this relevant to our current discussion. I hope you are asking this in good faith and not as an excuse to push me out of the discussion.

It is relevant because I don't know which texts I can use as pramANa. You seem to quote Adi Shankara giving an impression that he is acceptable to you. You seem to dispute "another author", giving the impression that they are not acceptable to you. I want to have clarity.

Since you have asked I will answer.

You should have done it on your own. I take the persons present here as advaitins so that common texts are relied upon. If you are not an advaitin, I don't know your motivation of being here. 

I appreciate all these disciplines. However, I do not follow any one of them blindly.

Do you accept shabda-pramANa? Yes or No?

Regards,

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> Now tell me, is horns of hare "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally"? 

From the ultimate point of view, hare horns do not exist. From the conventional point of view, they do not exist. From a dream point of view, they may exist depending on the dream.

> If not, then you are yourself admitting that asat-horns-of-hare and asat-avidyA have a difference. While one is "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally", the other is merely non-existent.

From the ultimate point of view, avidya does not exist. From the conventional point of view, it exists. From a dream point of view, it exists.

The non-existence of avidya as well as hare horns from the ultimate point of view is the same. There's no difference. Neither I feel that there's a need to differentiate it.

> True. And that is why to indicate the difference between asat and sat-asat-vilakshaNa, you need to refer to them differently. Both asat and mithyA are non-existent. One does not appear while the other appears. If you define asat and mithyA to be identical, someone may confuse horns-of-hare to be "non-existent ultimately and exists conventionally".

I’m not arguing that mithyā and asat are identical. Mithyā refers to something false that may normally appear but has no existence, whereas asat simply means non-existent, irrespective of its appearance. Thus, both the hare’s horn and the snake in the rope-snake analogy are asat, meaning non-existent, however, only the snake is Mithyā. (It is also a valid usage if one calls hare's horn as Mithyā for the word Mithyā simply means false, however, this is not a common usage.)

> When non-existence is sought to be highlighted, either of the words can be used.

That depends on the point of reference you have in mind. A chair is mithyā, however, it is not asat (non-existent) from a conventional point of view. The chair is non-existent from an ultimate point of view.

> However, as demonstrated, to highlight pratIti-arhatvam and traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam in the Pratipanna-upAdhi, one uses only mithyA.

I don't think so. There is pratIti-arhatvam in heat, cold, mirage, dream, etc. and they have been called as asat as I've shown with ample citations. If what you say is correct, then why does Adi Shankara use the word asat to describe them? Also, heat, cold, etc do not qualify for "traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam" for they exist conventionally. Therefore it is incorrect to say that one uses only mithyā.

> Listen. For us, both mAyA and asat are non-existent.  Giving evidence for something which is not even being contested is called अकाण्ड-ताण्डव. 

The evidence is to show that even for entities that exist conventionally the word asat can be used, while you are claiming that only the word mithyā has to be used.

> Ji. MAyA, avidyA, avidyA-kArya are all non-existent. Just as horns of hare. While the former appears to exist, the latter does not appear. And hence, the former is mithyA and latter is asat.

I agree that māyā is mithya, however, māyā is non-existent from an ultimate point of view. Hence there's no harm in calling māyā as asat. And this is exactly what Adi Shankara does when he says "स्वप्नमाये दृष्टे असद्रूपे". Therefore when you say that only hare's horn is asat, it's a wrong statement.

> We follow sampradAya and there is enough evidence which differentiates asat and mithyA. What more? They are "defined" to be different.

I've shown clear evidence contrary to your claim. 

I do not see a need to answer the rest of your questions for lack of time and they add very less to the core discussion. 

> Jabardast understanding!!

> Let me give you some work.

Lastly, I request you to kindly not mock me and to keep the discussion decent.

> You need to search it to find who said it. This question displays a lack of study of Advaita siddhAnta.

I agree. There's a lot for me to learn.

Kind regards 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

From the ultimate point of view, hare horns do not exist. From the conventional point of view, they do not exist. From a dream point of view, they may exist depending on the dream.

Hare's horn is non-existent. Period.

Existence and non-existence are not contingent on frames of reference. 

To aver that hare's horns exist from dream point of view is incorrect. 

From the ultimate point of view, avidya does not exist. From the conventional point of view, it exists. From a dream point of view, it exists.

This is incorrect. If avidyA is mithyA i.e. asat as per you, what is this "existing from conventional point of view"?

Does it have both existence and non-existence? This is some new theory, I guess.

The non-existence of avidya as well as hare horns from the ultimate point of view is the same. There's no difference. Neither I feel that there's a need to differentiate it.

Let there be a FOR A, which is non-ultimate as per you. 

So, avidyA is existent in that FOR but horns of hare are non-existent in that very FOR. 

So, how can you "define" both asat and mithyA to be non-existent in FOR A?

Clearly, you will have to hold mithyA as non-asat in FOR A wherein you hold mithyA to be existent.

I’m not arguing that mithyā and asat are identical. Mithyā refers to something false that may normally appear but has no existence, whereas asat simply means non-existent, irrespective of its appearance.

This really surprised me. Are you keeping track of what you have said so far? Sir, this is my position. 

Let me repeat. MithyA and asat are non-identical. Both mithyA and asat are non-existent. MithyA has pratIti-arhatvam whereas asat has pratIti-anarhatvam.

If you are ok with this, as you stated, what are you arguing about?

Thus, both the hare’s horn and the snake in the rope-snake analogy are asat, meaning non-existent, however, only the snake is Mithyā. (It is also a valid usage if one calls hare's horn as Mithyā for the word Mithyā simply means false, however, this is not a common usage.)

Fine. If merely non-existence is required to be highlighted, you can use the word asat. However, in Advaita, when sat-asat-vilakshaNa is used as a definition of anirvachanIya, asat is not merely non-existence. It is kvachidapi-upAdhau-sattvena-pratIti-anadhijaraNatvam. That is the claim.

I have not seen any valid objection to this from you. 

You have also chosen not to explain anirvachanIya, among many other questions.

That depends on the point of reference you have in mind. A chair is mithyā, however, it is not asat (non-existent) from a conventional point of view. The chair is non-existent from an ultimate point of view.

Here, you will need to appreciate different models of Advaita vedAnta. The eka-sattA-vAda accepts non-existence of chair even in the conventional point of view. SattA-traividhya-vAda accepts non-existence of chair paramarthikatva-tvena. So, what you are saying is valid in only one model.

I don't think so. There is pratIti-arhatvam in heat, cold, mirage, dream, etc. and they have been called as asat as I've shown with ample citations.

And explained equal number of times that here mere non-existence is sought to be highlighted. Also, a significant number of statements of yours are asat. Not non-existent as per you sir, but false. MrishAtva-avachvhhinna-asat-shabda-prayoga.

If what you say is correct, then why does Adi Shankara use the word asat to describe them?

As explained. 

Also, heat, cold, etc do not qualify for "traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam" for they exist conventionally. Therefore it is incorrect to say that one uses only mithyā.

Bekaar ki baat. This shows you have no idea of eka-sattA-vAda wherein nishedha-pratiyogitA of atyanta-abhAva is swarUpa-dharma-avachchhinna and not pAramArthikatva-avachchhinna.

Heat, cold etc have absolute non-existence in that very framework in which they are experienced in the Pratipanna-upAdhi. If this is a news for you, then better peruse eka-sattA-vAda.

The evidence is to show that even for entities that exist conventionally the word asat can be used, while you are claiming that only the word mithyā has to be used.

You should go through the whole discussion again to appreciate what I said. You are just putting words in my mouth when the contrary has been said.

I agree that māyā is mithya, however, māyā is non-existent from an ultimate point of view.

Again. Lack of study of definition of mithyAtva. 

Hence there's no harm in calling māyā as asat. And this is exactly what Adi Shankara does when he says "स्वप्नमाये दृष्टे असद्रूपे". Therefore when you say that only hare's horn is asat, it's a wrong statement.

Tired of repeating now.

I've shown clear evidence contrary to your claim. 

You have not shown any evidence which shows that asat-tva-avachchhinna-asat is equated to mithyA. You have merely shown traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitva-avachchhinna-asat is used for mithyA, to which I agree.

I do not see a need to answer the rest of your questions for lack of time and they add very less to the core discussion. 

It does not take a whole lot of time. The opponent has the right to ask questions and you are obliged to answer. The questions are relevant. 

Lastly, I request you to kindly not mock me and to keep the discussion decent.

Be specific to the points raised. Don't ignore the questions. You have effectively raised questions on sAmpradAyika-understanding. Be ready for stern examination. You cannot simply say something as you please. Be ready for a dissection of each of your statements.

I agree. There's a lot for me to learn.

So prior thereto, desist from making conclusions. Framing conclusions without proper study is premature.

Regards,

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Dear Lokesh ji.

Here's where I disagree with you. Existence and non-existence for sure are contingent upon frame of reference. The truck that is coming your way when you are crossing the road exists, and the chair that you sit upon exists conventionally. The same truck and chair are non-existent when looked at from the ultimate point of view.

Define existence and non-existence. That is, define sattva and asattva.

Nishedha-pratiyOgitA can be swarUpa-dharma-avachchhinna or paaramArthikatva-avachchhinna. The former is siddhAnta while the latter is by tushaytu-durjana-nyAya.

Those who cannot understand that mithyA is non-existent in that very rUpa and by that very sambandha by which it appears to exist in the paratipanna-upAdhi, the delimitation by pAramArthikatva is postulated. 

That is the defintionnof mithyA.

In any case, you have already accepted that your are not arguing for identity of mithyA and asat. So, I don't know what you are arguing about.

I just quoted what you said immediately above - "to highlight pratIti-arhatvam and traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam in the Pratipanna-upAdhi, one uses only mithyA."

Certainly. 

Is that a rule of this forum that a person is obliged to answer all the questions asked by the opponent? 

I don't run this forum. It is my expectation that you should answer my questions, just as I am answering. Reason for non-answering should be informed as the points are relevant.

Sir, if my points against your sampradaya feel offensive to you, then perhaps it is best that we part ways. If this 'stern examination' involves mockery or personal attacks, then I am not interested. You are welcome to dissect, refute, and criticize my statements, but I am not here for personal attacks.

If you are ready to frame conclusions without study of siddhAnta, then it shows recklessness. And that needs to be informed to you. 

Since you drew upon your knowledge of "science, Sanskrit, madhyamaka and vedAnta", the infirmities in your arguments are required to be shown and they have been shown.

Again, see the following - 

1. Are asat and mithyA identical?

2. If yes, then your statement in previous post is contradicted which said - I’m not arguing that mithyā and asat are identical. Mithyā refers to something false that may normally appear but has no existence, whereas asat simply means non-existent, irrespective of its appearance.

3. If mithyA and asat are non-identical, then mithyA is asat-vilakshaNa.

4. Thus, mithyA is sat-asat-vilakshaNa.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[लोकेश]

Dear Sudhanshu Ji

> Hare's horn is non-existent. Period.

> Existence and non-existence are not contingent on frames of reference. 

Here's where I disagree with you. Existence and non-existence for sure are contingent upon frame of reference. The truck that is coming your way when you are crossing the road exists, and the chair that you sit upon exists conventionally. The same truck and chair are non-existent when looked at from the ultimate point of view.

> You should go through the whole discussion again to appreciate what I said. You are just putting words in my mouth when the contrary has been said.

I just quoted what you said immediately above - "to highlight pratIti-arhatvam and traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyOgitvam in the Pratipanna-upAdhi, one uses only mithyA."

> It does not take a whole lot of time. The opponent has the right to ask questions and you are obliged to answer.

Is that a rule of this forum that a person is obliged to answer all the questions asked by the opponent? 

> Be specific to the points raised. Don't ignore the questions. You have effectively raised questions on sAmpradAyika-understanding. Be ready for stern examination. You cannot simply say something as you please. Be ready for a dissection of each of your statements.

Sir, if my points against your sampradaya feel offensive to you, then perhaps it is best that we part ways. If this 'stern examination' involves mockery or personal attacks, then I am not interested. You are welcome to dissect, refute, and criticize my statements, but I am not here for personal attacks.

Kind regards

[लोकेश]

Sudhanshu Ji

> Define existence and non-existence. That is, define sattva and asattva.

To be is to exist. To not be is to not exist. It cannot be simplified more than this.

सत् comes from the root word असँ which means भुवि which means "to be" अस्ति / भवति / विद्यते all these are equivalent.

A healthy human has 2 eyes through which he sees. The eyes exist. This is existence.

A healthy human has no horn on his head. The horn does not exist. This is non-existence.

> So, I don't know what you are arguing about.

I'm saying that asat simply means non-existent. Both hare's horn and snake in rope are asat (non-existent) ultimately.

> If you are ready to frame conclusions without study of siddhAnta, then it shows recklessness. And that needs to be informed to you. 

This is an appeal to authority fallacy. Additionally, someone drawing conclusions different from your sampradaya does not give you the right to direct personal insults at them. My critiques are always focused on ideas, not individuals. I expect the same approach from you.

Kind regards

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

To be is to exist. To not be is to not exist. It cannot be simplified more than this.

सत् comes from the root word असँ which means भुवि which means "to be" अस्ति / भवति / विद्यते all these are equivalent.

What does it mean to be and not to be. Define. 

A healthy human has 2 eyes through which he sees. The eyes exist. This is existence.

A healthy human has no horn on his head. The horn does not exist. This is non-existence.

A healthy human sees with his two eyes a real snake. As per you, the snake exists. Same human confuses a rope for snake. He sees the snake just as he saw the real snake. The illusory snake also exists then??

I'm saying that asat simply means non-existent. Both hare's horn and snake in rope are asat (non-existent) ultimately.

So, both asat and mithyA are identical as per you??

This is an appeal to authority fallacy. Additionally, someone drawing conclusions different from your sampradaya does not give you the right to direct personal insults at them. My critiques are always focused on ideas, not individuals. I expect the same approach from you.

Bhai sahab. You please let me know whom do you take as correct. Do you agree that Advaita is right, Shankara is right, SAyaNa is right, Advaita Siddhi is right, Rigveda is right?

I should know where you are coming from so that I can quote appropriately. If it is an open discussion based on views arising out of your imagination, that also please let me know. 

If it focused on ideas and not individuals, then stop quoting Shankara. Discuss ideas. Why are you quoting anyone?

If you think Shankara got it right, everyone else got it wrong and you, after 1000 years have again got it right, that also let me know.

As of now, all that seems to come from you is self-contradictory statements. Sometimes you say that you are not arguing for identity of mithyA and asat and sometimes you equate them by definition. 

Lastly, you have again chosen to ignore vital questions for reasons best known to you.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Lokesh ji.

Again, you need to specify the frame of reference whenever you ask for existence of something.

Ok. Let me accept it for the time being. 

The first snake exists conventionally (vyavaharic).

Second snake exists from pratibhasika frame of reference. It doesn't exist conventionally.

Both type of snakes are non-existent from ultimate frame of reference.

So, from vyAvahArika and prAtibhAsika frame of reference, can you use the word asat for snake-in-the-rope?

From vyAvahArika and prAtibhAsika frame of reference, can you use the word asat for horns-of-hare?

Answer precisely and to the point.

In normal layman's language I've explained this phenomenon. I wonder why you do not appreciate this and instead resort to complicated set of definitions divorced from normal usage.

Is there being of sattva? That is, does sat have sattva? If yes, then sat is no longer nirdharmaka. 

That is why I asked you to define sattva.

Things are not that simple that one can get away by saying "to be" is sattva.

Define sattva and asattva.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[लोकेश]

> A healthy human sees with his two eyes a real snake. As per you, the snake exists. Same human confuses a rope for snake. He sees the snake just as he saw the real snake. The illusory snake also exists then??

Again, you need to specify the frame of reference whenever you ask for existence of something.

The first snake exists conventionally (vyavaharic).

Second snake exists from pratibhasika frame of reference. It doesn't exist conventionally.

Both type of snakes are non-existent from ultimate frame of reference.

In normal layman's language I've explained this phenomenon. I wonder why you do not appreciate this and instead resort to complicated set of definitions divorced from normal usage.

Kind regards