'Satyasya Satyam..' of the Upanishad explained in the Bhagavatam

[V Subrahmanian]

In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2.3.6 is the famous mantra, a part of which reads:

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्त्यथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

 Now therefore the description (of Brahman): 'Not this, not this.' Because there is no other and more appropriate description than this 'Not this.' Now Its name: "The Truth of truth.' The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.

The gist of the mantra is: the term 'prāṇā:' signifies the entire creation, both at the individual level and the cosmic level. At the individual level we have the subtle body, the sense organs, that illumine the creation outside the body. The world outside, being insentient, get illumined by the subtle body/organs. This two-fold categorization can be compared to the 'kṣetram' (field) of the 13th chapter of the Bh.Gita. There too in the 5th and the 6th verses the entire kṣetram is presented as consisting of the subtle body of the individual and the outside world. This is termed 'satyam', in its primary sense, vācyārtha. And the 'satyam' of that ('prāṇā:' - kṣetram) is Brahman, the absolute Satyam.  

From the above study of the mantra, we derive the meaning: the first 'satyam' (satyasya) is the created world. This has only a dependent/relative reality. It derives its reality from Brahman, the Absolute Satyam. 

It is interesting to note that we have a verse in the Bhagavatam that brings out the above two levels of reality:

आत्मानमेव आत्मतया अविजानतां

तेनैव जातं निखिलं प्रपञ्चितम् ।

ज्ञानेन भूयोऽपि च तत्प्रलीयते

रज्ज्वां अहेर्भोगभवाभवौ यथा ।। 10.14.25

A person who mistakes a rope for a snake becomes fearful, but he then
gives up his fear upon realizing that the so-called snake does not exist.

Similarly, for those who fail to recognize You, Brahman, as the Supreme Soul of all
souls, the expansive illusory material existence arises, but knowledge
(realization) of You (Your True Nature) at once causes it  (the variegated
world of plurality) to subside.

In the above verse we see the expression of relative reality, the world, and the Absolute Reality, Brahman. This is exactly the teaching of the Upanishad through the pithy statement: satyasya satyam.  The rope is the Satyam and the snake is the satyam, in the analogy of the Bhagavatam. There itself, the relatively real, the world, is contrasted with the Absolutely Real, Brahman. The state of ignorance is signified by the world and the state of realization is conveyed by the term Brahman. One can recall the verse 2.69:

या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी । 

यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥ ६९ ॥ 

2.69 The self-restrained man keeps awake during that which is night for all creatures. That during which creatures keep awake, it is night to the seeing sage.  

Here the waking and sleep are symbolic of real and unreal: For the Jnani, the waking means the Absolute Truth. For the ajnanis waking is to the relative world. 

The relatively real has no reality of its own and hence is only dependently real, paratantra satyam. On the other hand, Brahman, the Absolute Reality, does not need to acquire reality from any other source. The world needs reality from Brahman. All this is implied by the Upanishadic statement: satyasya satyam. 

Why does the Upanishad call the vyavaharika, the world, 'satyam'?  The Upanishad is alluding to, doing anuvāda of, the uninformed person holding the world to be real, untaught.  This has to be corrected. Hence the Upanishad as though holds the world to be satyam and goes on to teach, in the manner of 'from the known to the unknown', and the adhyāropa-apavāda nyāya, the truth that Brahman is indeed the absolute Satyam.  

There are many such verses in the Bhagavatam that carry the Upanishadic purport.

Om Tat Sat 

    

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

"Relative reality" is misleading and oxymoronic. Reality cannot be partial or not real - the law of excluded middle - either something exists or does not exist. Snake is not a relative reality - it is rope misperceived.  The fear of snake is a reaction to the misperception of rope but not a reaction caused by the 'relative reality' of an imagined snake. To impose reality upon error or misperception whether 'borrowed' or 'relative' or 'temporary' etc. is a misguided teaching.  In that way we need to view vyavaharika. It is only a perception taken to be real. 
, 
Here are 5 pages of citations from SSSS's The Method of the Vedanta/MOV and elsewhere that correct this misunderstanding of Bhasya. 

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[Krishna Kashyap]

namaste Michael Ji,

where are the 5 pages of citations from SSSS?

Best Regards,

Krishna Kashyap

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nRVRxzyvj0GR3PH19DdL1dj5_wIreq5a/view?usp=sharing

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[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Michael ji,

Shankara and Sureshwara have accepted three levels of Reality in the Taittiriyopanishad.  Here is the blog detailing that:

https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/paramarthika-vyavaharika-satyam/

warm regards

subbu

On Wed, Sep 24, 2025 at 5:36 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

<< Reality cannot be partial or not real - the law of excluded middle - either something exists or does not exist. >>

In a simplified way, the "Law of excluded middle" - a very common stance taken up by Advaita siddhanta's purvapaksha - is applicable for mutually exclusive and exhaustive events within the same plane of reference.
When an ajnani perceives a snake, all they see is just the snake; and the snake is real. For them the rope is non-existent. Law of excluded middle holds good.
When a jnani perceives a rope, all they see is just the rope; and the rope is real. For them the snake is non-existent. Law of excluded middle holds good.
In both these cases, per-se, the "law of excluded middle" is honored. However, the situation is different when an ajnani gains jnana drishti. The plane of reference changes, and the previously seen snake is now declared as mithya. The law of excluded middle is inapplicable in this case with respect to the earlier perception.

<< It is only a perception taken to be real. >>

Do you agree to the definition of real being unsublated by any other knowledge at any point in time? If so, flipping your question back to you, "taken to be real" - does it mean real or not (law of excluded middle)? If real, it has to continue remaining real and unsublated by a different prama. Is that the case?

prostrations,

Vikram

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

Sir, with all respect, your linked paper is a fine piece of scholarship, no doubt, but does it reflect Bhasyakara's true intention in his teaching? Not when weighed against the citations and remarks of SSSS in my link but that is my own humble opinion. Let the reader of bhasya study bhasya  alone, free from later influences and decide the intended teaching on their own - I think that is the position SSSS assumes. Of course, without the pipsqueak voice of the few who have studied SSSS, students will only have exposure to Bhavarupa Vedanta. 🙏🙏🙏 -michael

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Vikram, 

thoughtful response - much appreciated.

//However, the situation is different when an ajnani gains jnana drishti. The plane of reference changes, and the previously seen snake is now declared as mithya. The law of excluded middle is inapplicable in this case with respect to the earlier perception.//
-- what do you mean 'when an ajnani gains jnana drshti'? Is there an individual who now possesses a special vision? 

--'the snake is now 'declared' mithya' - is this an act of voilition? Does there continue to exist mithya and the one who perceives mithya -- avidya lesha? 

//"taken to be real" - does it mean real or not (law of excluded middle)? If real, it has to continue remaining real and unsublated by a different prama. Is that the case?//

--The rope remains unsublated while the snake is a mistaken notion that was never real. An error can appear but never really be there. 

These are core issues that need the entirety of bhasya darshan to prove consistency and intention. 🙏🙏🙏

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

<<
-- what do you mean 'when an ajnani gains jnana drshti'? Is there an individual who now possesses a special vision?
-- 'the snake is now 'declared' mithya' - is this an act of voilition? Does there continue to exist mithya and the one who perceives mithya -- avidya lesha?
>>

Yes sir. From my perspective there is a positive affirmation to all 3 of your questions. Details below, please stay with me through this.

I do get your point; it is actually quite simple - either the universe exists (sat) or doesn't exist (asat). There cannot be anything in between (law of excluded middle). This is true; and Advaita's clear direct response is that this universe doesn't exist (asat). Now, if we leave it at that, then there is no further question / confusion at all. However, if someone were to ask in response - "hey, but I experience the world! What does Advaita mean by saying the universe doesn't exist? How can Advaita say the universe doesn't exist when my experience is real?" - then Advaita's response is that "the universe that is currently being experienced as real is actually not real, but only appears as if real and is termed mithya".

So, Michael ji, do you experience the universe? If yes, then the experienced universe is mithya - which is distinct from both sat and asat. People in ignorance consider this mithya universe to be real. If you do not experience the universe, then there is no question about the mithyatva of the universe. Universe is asat.

Let's then ask this fundamental question - for whom is something mithya? From Chaitanya's perspective the universe is asat. But for a common ignorant's perspective the universe is sat. Only from the perspective of a tattva-darshi jnani guru is the universe said to be mithya.

Please stay with me here -
A. Chaitanya's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
B. Ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika ajnana perspective - universe is sat
C. Jnani's perspective = there are 2 sub-perspectives - C1. and C2.
C1. Jnani's perspective from the jnani's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
C2. Jnani's perspective from the ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika jnana perspective - universe is mithya

Our (ajnani's) understanding of a jnani as an individual personality who has gained the knowledge of realization, entails the concept of avidya-lesa attributed to that jnani as the reason for our observation of that individualized personality.
In other words, if / when we consider the guru as a distinct entity, distinct and separate from us, we by this mere distinction bring in the concept of avidya-lesa and attribute it as the reason for the distinction between the guru and us.
The concept of mithyatva / avidya-lesa / jivanmukta etc. is merely a teaching technique for the ignorant who still has some belief in the reality of the experienced universe of duality. This entire teaching technique is merely from within our ajnana's perspective only.

Back to the example of the rope-snake,
For the owner of the rope, who is well aware of the presence of the rope in that place, rope is sat and snake is asat.
For the friend who sees the object for the first time and has perceived it as a snake, the snake is sat and rope is asat.
For the same friend, when the owner has clarified that it is only a rope, then after the dawn of rope knowledge, the rope is sat and the previous experience of the snake is mithya.

Let's take another example - that of the red-colored transparent crystal: There is a transparent colorless crystal in proximity to a red flower. Due to the proximity the crystal appears red in color.
For the person who does not realize the nearby red flower and does not know the true nature of the crystal as transparent, the redness of the crystal is real.
For the person who realizes the red flower and knows the true nature of the crystal as transparent, the redness of the crystal is mithtya. The crystal merely appears red and not really red.

Similarly, only for a tattva-darshi jnani guru, who is seen to engage with the world, the world is known to be mithya. For the rest of us, it is mere upadesha vakya / teaching.

So, to answer your 3 questions,

1. Is there an individual who now possesses a special vision? - yes, if we consider a guru as a distinct individual, then the guru possesses a special vision (more of a knowledge / understanding) that the experienced universe is mithya; which we in ignorance take as satya.

2. 'the snake is now 'declared' mithya' - is this an act of voilition? - yes, after the dawn of knowledge of the object as the rope, my previous experience of having perceived the object as a snake is now declared by me as mithya. If and when I back-reference my earlier experience of the snake, that snake is categorized as mithya. I cannot call it as real, since it was an error. Similarly, I cannot call it as unreal, since I did experience it. Hence my only valid expression is as mithya.
3. Does there continue to exist mithya and the one who perceives mithya -- avidya lesha? - yes, as long as we perceive the distinct guru, the mithyatva of universe continues to exist and the guru too is explained to possess avidya-lesa, that enables the guru to engage with the plurality of the universe. This is all our perception and perspective only!

<< An error can appear but never really be there. >>

100% agreed! In your own statement, you implied the 3rd option as well. Here are the 3 options:
Something can really be there - Sat - Chaitanya
Something can never appear and never really be there - Asat - Hare's horns
Something can appear but never really be there - your statement - Mithya entity
Mithya is called vyavaharika satya (transactional reality), since prior to the realization that it is mithya, the entity is erroneously mistaken to be real. Furthermore, the mithya name-form does have a limited place value in the day-to-day empirical life.

prostrations,

Vikram

[V Subrahmanian]

On Thu, Sep 25, 2025 at 12:49 AM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

Sir, with all respect, your linked paper is a fine piece of scholarship, no doubt, but does it reflect Bhasyakara's true intention in his teaching? Not when weighed against the citations and remarks of SSSS in my link but that is my own humble opinion.

Namaste Michael ji,

When something from the Bhashya and Sureshwara does not go well with SSSS, that is dismissed as 'not intended by Shankara'. But nothing in unequivocal support of the thesis of SSSS is shown from the Bhashya, etc. 

warm regards

subbu

 

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Vikram, 

WOW, a big response. I can't promise a reply in kind nor a point to point response though deserved. 

// "the universe that is currently being experienced as real is actually not real, but only appears as if real and is termed mithya".//

--The bhavarupa avidya position is that the empirically 'experienced' mithya world is 'something' that is indescribably neither real nor unreal but nonetheless has a positive existence. That is quite different from Bhasya that attributes mithya to misperceived reality. Here's Hacker on the issue of what constitutes the 'experienced' by referring back to mulavidya as the cause of what is experienced. 

"Nevertheless, this m uch can be af.
firmed with regard to the differentiation of the interpretation of S. from
that of all other Advaitins-that in his case avidyA is never designated as
material cause of the physical world. It is never referred to as upddana•
karana or prakriti," Philo & Conf, p64 

//Our (ajnani's) understanding of a jnani as an individual personality //
--There is no doubt we view the appearance of body and karma. The issue however concerns the view from Jnana itself - if pramatr, pramana, prameya are dependent on avidya, where is there 'a' jnani, 'the' jnani or the instruments to recognize duality or duality itself?  Are there many jnani-s or just one Jnanatvam? 

//The concept of mithyatva / avidya-lesa / jivanmukta etc. is merely a teaching technique for the ignorant who still has some belief in the reality of the experienced universe of duality. This entire teaching technique is merely from within our ajnana's perspective only.//
--Agreed but only if the teaching of avidya-lesa etc. is confirmed by bhasya, reason and universal experience. Brahman, moksa, avidya are all the adhyaropita teachings of sastra. I don't see the upaya of adhyaropa/apavada fundamentally presented by post-Sankara authors. 

//Similarly, only for a tattva-darshi jnani guru, who is seen to engage with the world, the world is known to be mithya. For the rest of us, it is mere upadesha vakya / teaching.//
--tattva-darshi jnani - is this person knowable to the ignorant? Do you just assume this of our guru? I've had the blessing of sitting at the feet of several teachers who I believe were tattva-darshi jnani-s. However, not one claimed such status yet they taught in a manner that convinced me they were full blown jnani-'s. So how are we to determine whether this charismatic guy is a jnani engaging in the world or still, despite a pure personality and pristine teachings may still be afflicted with empirical attachments? It is not an uncommon phenomena to learn of the scandalous demise of one of the spiritual heroes. Let us not assume by personality but determine by challenging the teaching to resolve doubt what is authentic Vedanta.  

// the entity is erroneously mistaken to be real. //
"the entity' you are giving entity status to snake where indeed the only entity is rope. 

//  Furthermore, the mithya name-form does have a limited place value in the day-to-day empirical life.//

mithya name-form is empirical life just as dream name-form is dream. The one who gives mithya a value is no less mithya. 

Addendum citations and notes:

I searched SSSS's The Heart of Sri Samkara/HOSS and found 11 references for mithya - an education but most not on point.  The definition 

Gbh 13.26
“‘conjunction’ with a snake is superimpoased on a rope or where silver is superimposed on nacre through failure to discriminate
the two. This ‘conjunction’ of the Knower of the Body and the body is essentially superimposition, and may be spoken of as
wrong knowledge (mithya-jnana).” You don’t have to remove wave to find water nor destroy pot space to find overall space. Dvaitam does not have to disappear for Advaita. Advaita is svata siddham, svatantra. Advaita does not have to arise. There is no wave only water – wave is mithya

 

“When satya is not clear, mithya becomes satya” swami dayanandaji karika1.1

• Nanu: The pramanas must be invalid since they give knowledge about objects that are unreal. Thus instruction itself loses its point in that it cannot lead to truth or liberation.
Sankara’s reply: yes, it is quite true the pramanas are no less mithya than are the objects they propose to reveal however they may “produce” something real no less than death from a fancied snakebite. But, it is further argued, death is as unreal as its cause and we are looking for a real effect out of an unreal cause.  BS bh 2.1.14

Does annihilation mean literal physical annihilation, or does it mean

cancellation and revelation as illusory through knowledge of the real substratum? It cannot mean
literal physical annihilation, since (in our school) we all admit that objects are illusory (mithya,
so that there is nothing that could be destroyed). But on the second view, how can a person (like
the exponent of positive Ignorance) just admit that all objects have purely phenomenal existence
only (i.e. have their existence limited to their manifestation), and then speak without
contradiction of their unmanifest (causal) state (avastha)? HOSS p42

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

//When something from the Bhashya and Sureshwara does not go well with SSSS, that is dismissed as 'not intended by Shankara'. But nothing in unequivocal support of the thesis of SSSS is shown from the Bhashya, etc. //

Sir, you in turn did not respond to my link and argument but, I get your frustration though my error should not be equated with SSSS. please. My remark 'not intended by Shankara' alludes to the nature of these discussions. They are piecemeal and often hinge on subtle logical maneuvering, hermeneutical nuance and isolated references. I believe it is necessary to take these individual issues and contextualize them against a wholistic consistent metaphysic. And that is not easily done through these forums. 

That said, I do not suppose to interpret Sureswara's Vartikas - for that same reason. THe texts are enormous and cherry picked verses cannot stand alone to voice the acharya's intended teaching. I am not familiar enough with Sayana to comment.  🙏🙏🙏

[Bandaru Viswanath]

Bhasya that attributes mithya to misperceived reality. 

Do you have a Bhashya reference for this one ?

Vissu

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[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Michael ji,

Just one observation about the 5-page document is enough to prove that he is completely off-track:

He says: p. 2 of the document:

//“Or again, we may argue as follows. Reality is of three kinds. There is the supreme reality
of the Absolute. There is practical reality possessed by the objects of the world, beginning
with the element ether, which has Māyā for its adjunct. And there is that (different and
lesser) form of reality that is possessed by illusions like shell-silver, which has Ignorance for
its attribute and is of indeterminable reality-grade when compared with supreme reality.
Here there is no contradiction; for we must accept that different things have different
degrees of reality according to what is actually found in experience.” (V. pp.164-5)
This is not correct. Since no distinctions of degree are experienced in reality, there cannot
be three different kinds of reality. //

The above clearly shows that he has not considered the Taittiriya Upanishad Bhashyam where Shankara expounds in detail, with analogies, the three types/levels of Realities. We can easily see that Alston's above statement is directly contradicted by Shankara and Sureshwara.  In fact SSS has made a faithful translation of the passage on the three degrees of reality.  Pl. see the following image, though you may not be able to read it. He has added a footnote to it where he says: The water that quenches the thirst is 'real' and compared to this, the mirage water is false/unreal. 

Shankara gives the real water as an analogy for vyavaharika satya. And the mirage water to mean 'pratibhasika satya'. Having given the translation along with the footnote, he is denying that in that Paper. Shankara cites the water example out of our experience. But SSS, despite having given a footnote exactly bringing out the experience, denies that in the Paper saying // Since no distinctions of degree are experienced in reality,//

regards

subbu

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

Will keep it shorter this time :)

<< There is no doubt we view the appearance of body and karma. The issue however concerns the view from Jnana itself - if pramatr, pramana, prameya are dependent on avidya, where is there 'a' jnani, 'the' jnani or the instruments to recognize duality or duality itself?  Are there many jnani-s or just one Jnanatvam?  >>

Actually, this triputi is from our perspective too, and not from Jnana's perspective. From Jnana's perspective, it is the homogenous Chaitanya alone and nothing else whatsoever; no triputi. We view the continued appearance of the jnani's body and karma (BMI-V) due to our ignorance. This continued appearance of the jnani's BMI-V recognizes duality and interacts with it; again from our perspective alone and for our own benefit. There are as many jnani-s as we perceive as many jnani's functioning BMI-V. Jnana, all-through, is one and non-dual.
As a recap:
1. Chaitanya's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
2. Ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika ajnana perspective - universe is sat
3. Jnani's perspective = there are 2 sub-perspectives - 3a. and 3b.
3a. Jnani's perspective from the jnani's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
3b. Jnani's perspective from the ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika jnana perspective - universe is mithya

We at times blur the difference between 3a and 3b; this causes confusion.

<< Agreed but only if the teaching of avidya-lesa etc. is confirmed by bhasya, reason and universal experience. Brahman, moksa, avidya are all the adhyaropita teachings of sastra. I don't see the upaya of adhyaropa/apavada fundamentally presented by post-Sankara authors. >>

Avidya-lesa indeed aligns with adhyaropa-apavada principle. The attribution of avidya-lesa to the jnani is indeed adhyaropa. We perceive a tattva-darshi jnani guru imparting jnana upadesha. We can either
a) explain that this is due to avidya-lesa, due to our own avidya or
b) the tattva-darshi jnani guru is actually not a tattva-darshi jnani guru or
c) Advaita is no longer advaita but becomes dvaita, with plurality becoming eternally unsublatable.

With a) the Advaita siddhanta remains completely self-consistent as the perception of this avidya-lesa is only due to our own avidya. When we overcome our avidya, then all avidya and avidya-lesa is completely removed and it is Chaitanya alone.
With b) the teachings of the so-called tattva-darshi jnani guru (including Bhagavan Krishna) becomes falsified
With c) Advaita siddhanta is utterly destroyed

Both b) and c) are not conducive to Advaita siddhanta and are stances taken up by several purvapakshas.

<< --tattva-darshi jnani - is this person knowable to the ignorant? Do you just assume this of our guru? I've had the blessing of sitting at the feet of several teachers who I believe were tattva-darshi jnani-s. However, not one claimed such status yet they taught in a manner that convinced me they were full blown jnani-'s. So how are we to determine whether this charismatic guy is a jnani engaging in the world or still, despite a pure personality and pristine teachings may still be afflicted with empirical attachments? It is not an uncommon phenomena to learn of the scandalous demise of one of the spiritual heroes. Let us not assume by personality but determine by challenging the teaching to resolve doubt what is authentic Vedanta. >>

True. One has to first become a jnani to recognize another jnani. Important to note that Jnana is one non-dual, but from our current perspective (ajnani perspective) the BMI-Vs of the jnanis are several and distinct. Therefore, from our current perspective it is appropriate to say that one BMI-V which has gained the Brahmakara-vritti-jnana (aka jnani) is capable of recognizing another BMI-V which has also gained this Brahmakara-vritti-jnana. All the while the absolute Jnana (Chaitanya) is one and non-dual. However, there are some clues in the scriptures including the stithaprajna-lakshna and shraddha / maha-viswasam (absolute trust and faith) is quite essential. Beyond this, it is actually not the student approaching a teacher's feet, but in actuality it is the teacher coming to a prepared student.

<< "the entity' you are giving entity status to snake where indeed the only entity is rope. >>

Correct, but I do not know this until the dawn of rope knowledge. Until then, the entity is the snake as it is my current experience taken to be real. And any back-reference to this prior experience will also have to term the entity as a snake only.

<< Addendum citations and notes: >>

I don't see any contradictions from any of your quoted references (except the last one - HOSS p42). Do you feel any of them contradicts what we have discussed so far?

For the last reference (HOSS p42), I personally consider it a futile exercise to talk definitively about the state of a jnani when I am yet an ajnani. Let me first gain the jnana to then realize for myself what is annihilated and what remains. One person says Brahman alone exists, another says the universe will continue to be perceived; I do not wish to definitively judge one or the other as I am yet to understand the distinction and nature of my Self versus my antahkarana. Maybe they are both right but from these two distinct perspectives - Self versus functioning antahkarana.

prostrations,

Vikram

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

Will keep it shorter this time :)

<< There is no doubt we view the appearance of body and karma. The issue however concerns the view from Jnana itself - if pramatr, pramana, prameya are dependent on avidya, where is there 'a' jnani, 'the' jnani or the instruments to recognize duality or duality itself?  Are there many jnani-s or just one Jnanatvam?  >>

Actually, this triputi is from our perspective too, and not from Jnana's perspective. From Jnana's perspective, it is the homogenous Chaitanya alone and nothing else whatsoever; no triputi. We view the continued appearance of the jnani's body and karma (BMI-V) due to our ignorance. This continued appearance of the jnani's BMI-V recognizes duality and interacts with it; again from our perspective alone and for our own benefit. There are as many jnani-s as we perceive as many jnani's functioning BMI-V. Jnana, all-through, is one and non-dual.
As a recap:
1. Chaitanya's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
2. Ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika ajnana perspective - universe is sat
3. Jnani's perspective = there are 2 sub-perspectives - 3a. and 3b.
3a. Jnani's perspective from the jnani's perspective = paramarthika perspective - universe is asat
3b. Jnani's perspective from the ajnani's perspective = vyavaharika jnana perspective - universe is mithya

We at times blur the difference between 3a and 3b; this causes confusion.

<< Agreed but only if the teaching of avidya-lesa etc. is confirmed by bhasya, reason and universal experience. Brahman, moksa, avidya are all the adhyaropita teachings of sastra. I don't see the upaya of adhyaropa/apavada fundamentally presented by post-Sankara authors. >>

Avidya-lesa indeed aligns with adhyaropa-apavada principle. The attribution of avidya-lesa to the jnani is indeed adhyaropa. We perceive a tattva-darshi jnani guru imparting jnana upadesha. We can either
a) explain that this is due to avidya-lesa, due to our own avidya or
b) the tattva-darshi jnani guru is actually not a tattva-darshi jnani guru or
c) Advaita is no longer advaita but becomes dvaita, with plurality becoming eternally unsublatable.

With a) the Advaita siddhanta remains completely self-consistent as the perception of this avidya-lesa is only due to our own avidya. When we overcome our avidya, then all avidya and avidya-lesa is completely removed and it is Chaitanya alone.
With b) the teachings of the so-called tattva-darshi jnani guru (including Bhagavan Krishna) becomes falsified
With c) Advaita siddhanta is utterly destroyed

Both b) and c) are not conducive to Advaita siddhanta and are stances taken up by several purvapakshas.

<< --tattva-darshi jnani - is this person knowable to the ignorant? Do you just assume this of our guru? I've had the blessing of sitting at the feet of several teachers who I believe were tattva-darshi jnani-s. However, not one claimed such status yet they taught in a manner that convinced me they were full blown jnani-'s. So how are we to determine whether this charismatic guy is a jnani engaging in the world or still, despite a pure personality and pristine teachings may still be afflicted with empirical attachments? It is not an uncommon phenomena to learn of the scandalous demise of one of the spiritual heroes. Let us not assume by personality but determine by challenging the teaching to resolve doubt what is authentic Vedanta. >>

True. One has to first become a jnani to recognize another jnani. Important to note that Jnana is one non-dual, but from our current perspective (ajnani perspective) the BMI-Vs of the jnanis are several and distinct. Therefore, from our current perspective it is appropriate to say that one BMI-V which has gained the Brahmakara-vritti-jnana (aka jnani) is capable of recognizing another BMI-V which has also gained this Brahmakara-vritti-jnana. All the while the absolute Jnana (Chaitanya) is one and non-dual. However, there are some clues in the scriptures including the stithaprajna-lakshna and shraddha / maha-viswasam (absolute trust and faith) is quite essential. Beyond this, it is actually not the student approaching a teacher's feet, but in actuality it is the teacher coming to a prepared student.

<< "the entity' you are giving entity status to snake where indeed the only entity is rope. >>

Correct, but I do not know this until the dawn of rope knowledge. Until then, the entity is the snake as it is my current experience taken to be real. And any back-reference to this prior experience will also have to term the entity as a snake only.

<< Addendum citations and notes: >>

I don't see any contradictions from any of your quoted references (except the last one - HOSS p42). Do you feel any of them contradicts what we have discussed so far?

For the last reference (HOSS p42), I personally consider it a futile exercise to talk definitively about the state of a jnani when I am yet an ajnani. Let me first gain the jnana to then realize for myself what is annihilated and what remains. One person says Brahman alone exists, another says the universe will continue to be perceived; I do not wish to definitively judge one or the other as I am yet to understand the distinction and nature of my Self versus my antahkarana. Maybe they are both right but from these two distinct perspectives - Self versus functioning antahkarana.

prostrations,

Vikram

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

namaste Subbuji

Chatgpt 5 translation - accurate? I don't see the problem

Satya and Anṛta
Satya is one, anṛta is another. Satya is the truth. Anṛta is untruth. Satya is permanent, unchanging, that which does not perish. Anṛta is that which is perishable, transient. Satya is Brahman, the supreme Self, imperishable, eternal, immortal, fearless. Anṛta is everything other than Brahman, all the names and forms. Therefore, Brahman alone is satya, the rest is anṛta. In this manner, satya and anṛta are opposed.
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya 2-1-20)

---

Footnote

The difference between satya and anṛta; the meaning of satya in different places; how the meaning of satya has been used in this context — (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya p. 59).

(Here) the word satya means the Vedic sentences (śruti-vākyas).
(There) the word satya means Brahman, Paramātman.

How can there be two different meanings for the same word satya? The difference is as follows: where the subject matter (viṣaya) is Brahman, there satya means Brahman; but where the subject matter is Vedic sentences (śruti-vākya), there satya means Vedic sentences.

Therefore here satya means śruti-vākya. Accordingly, in the first place (ṛg-veda) the word satya is taken as referring to the Vedic words. Later on, the word satya is to be understood as Brahman.

So the satya of one context (i.e., śruti) is different from the satya of another context (i.e., Brahman).

---

Questions

1. What is meant by satya and anṛta in this passage? Explain separately.

2. Why is satya used in two different senses? Clarify with reasoning.

3. How is the connection between satya and Brahman explained here?

4. Explain with examples the way the same word (satya) conveys different meanings in different contexts.

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[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Michael ji,

The Chatgpt material you share is completely off the topic. 

Regards 

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

namaste subbji, 

that was supposed to be a translation of the Kannada passage you sent. 

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Fri, Sep 26, 2025 at 12:12 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

namaste subbji, 

that was supposed to be a translation of the Kannada passage you sent. 

But there is nothing literally from the original Kannada I shared.  No mention about drinking water and mirage water analogies. Nothing about Taittiriya Up. It makes an analysis of what we have not asked for. 

regards

subbu 

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

I appreciate your patience. I have read through your link and the Tait bhasya 2.6.1 but find it extremely weak evidence to accept three states of existence. The text is saying nothing about three states but simply distinguishing an object from a non-object. Repeatedly the text calls all creation namarupa including true and not-true. Thus, water that quenches is true whereas mirage water is not-true. These are relative values within vyavaraharika but not distinct states along with Paramarthika. 

Alternatively, here is a quick but pointed selection of teachings declaring the sameness of waking and dream, object and thought of object, jiva and the world. I don't see how you can justify your peripheral example against such categoric declarations as below. 🙏🙏🙏

The (supposed) distinction between the two kinds of experience
is itself imagined' (G.K. 2.14).

Mental objects are verily extern~ and external objects are verily mental' (Chand. Sh.
8.5.4).

'Because of the well-known reason
that the characteristic distinctions (into subjective and objective factors) are common to both
states, the wise have called the waking and dream states one' (G.K. 2.5)

The idea and its object are in mutual dependence. The idea is dependent on the soul or its other
objects for its existence. And the soul and other objects of the idea are dependent on the latter
for their existence. (In the case of the soul at least,) soul and idea are each objects for the other.
Therefore, when the question is raised, '\vhat is the idea and \vhat is the object of the idea?"
people of insight say, "They are neither of them anything". In a dream, there is neither a real
elephant nor the real idea of an elephant, and people of insight see that the same is the case here
in the waking state. Why is this so? Because neither idea nor object is capable of being either
defined or proved. Each is apprehended in dependence on the other. The pot cannot be
apprehended without the idea of the pot, and the idea of the pot cannot be apprehended \vithout
the pot The meaning is, "There is no distinction benveen idea and pot \vhereby one could be
established as the proof of the other"' GK4.67

On Fri, Sep 26, 2025 at 5:14 AM Hari R via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

Tameva bhantamanubhati sarvam
tasya bhaasa sarvidam vibhaati

Explains the same idea beautifully.


On Wednesday, September 24, 2025, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l <

> souls, the *expansive illusory material existence arises,* but knowledge

> Upanishad *as though* holds the world to be satyam and goes on to teach, in

> the manner of 'from the known to the unknown', and the adhyāropa-apavāda
> nyāya, the truth that Brahman is indeed the absolute Satyam.
>
> There are many such verses in the Bhagavatam that carry the Upanishadic
> purport.
>
> Om Tat Sat

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Vikram, 

Sorry for the delay in responding. I abbreviate the brevity but fear I've missed some of your points. 

//When a jnani perceives a rope, all they see is just the rope; and the rope is real. For them the snake is non-existent. Law of excluded middle holds good.
In both these cases, per-se, the "law of excluded middle" is honored. However, the situation is different when an ajnani gains jnana drishti. The plane of reference changes, and the previously seen snake is now declared as mithya. The law of excluded middle is inapplicable in this case with respect to the earlier perception.//

--why are you distinguishing the jnani from an ajnani gaining jnana?? How will you reconcile teachings such as these...

·        In the same way, one who was ignorant of the Self and who is awakened from this ignorance by the Vedic text (sruti) sees nothing other than his own Self. The Teacher (guru), the texts and he himself as deluded individual soul have all disappeared. (Nais Siddhi 4.37)

·        'There is no plurality here' (Brhad. 4.4.19)

·        'He goes from death to death who sees the appearance of plurality here' (Brhad 4.4.19)

·        'When, however, this soul makes in this one the smallest interval (difference), then, for him, there is fear' (Taitt. 2.7),

//Do you agree to the definition of real being unsublated by any other knowledge at any point in time? If so, flipping your question back to you, "taken to be real" - does it mean real or not (law of excluded middle)? If real, it has to continue remaining real and unsublated by a different prama. Is that the case?//

Good question that is handled in bhasya to Gita 2.16, which notes that existence and non-existence belong to ignorance/vyavaharika only. So, the notion of an object 'taken to be real' is itself an error/superimposition. The snake is taken to be real; the rope is what remains unchanged. Excluded middle maintained

[V Subrahmanian]

On Fri, Sep 26, 2025 at 7:46 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

I appreciate your patience. I have read through your link and the Tait bhasya 2.6.1 but find it extremely weak evidence to accept three states of existence.

Dear Michael ji,

This is rather an audacious commentary of Shankara's intellect. When he has explicitly enumerated the three types/levels of reality drawing that from the text of the Taittiriya Up. 'Satyam (Brahman) (A) became satyam (vyavaharika) (B) and anRtam (the errors/delusions that happen in day-to-day life, the solution of which does not require Brahman realization) (C).  Thus, the Upanishad has covered the entire creation - which has two components: 1. the objects that we use for fulfilment of our needs and 2. those situations where we are deluded, err, with reference to taking object A for B. Shankara has commented upon this statement of the Upanishad by so clearly giving a one-to-one correspondence with the three things, levels of reality the Upanishad is also practically enumerating, three in number.  SSS has also translated the Bhashya of Shankara exactly the way it is stated and also adds a footnote to explain the 'relative reality' and gives the analogy of real water (vyavaharika) and mirage water (error). 

But in that article SSS either forgets what he has said in the translation of the Tai.Up. Bhashya, or consciously rejects that statement of the Upanishad and Shankara since it is not fitting his own thesis.

warm regards

subbu   

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 
Please help me understand, the Tait bhasya is referring to how Brahman created the world, as it were, 'entered into' it as well, and now answers, what Brahman does after it enters ."It became the formed and the formless" which nonetheless "still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space." Then, from this premise follows the notions of vyavarhara vishaya and paramartha satta,  Then peripheral to the main discussion comes this notion of water as the vishaya of vyavarhara and mirage water as anrta. And you are saying It is by virtue of this last sentence ALONE in the whole bhasya, that you wish to establish pratibhasika satta as a distinct state from vyavaharika. Please, do I have that right?  Are there other references you can easily share? Regards, 🙏🙏🙏, 

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Sat, Sep 27, 2025 at 4:57 AM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

Please help me understand, the Tait bhasya is referring to how Brahman created the world, as it were, 'entered into' it as well, and now answers, what Brahman does after it enters ."It became the formed and the formless" which nonetheless "still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space." Then, from this premise follows the notions of vyavarhara vishaya and paramartha satta,  Then peripheral to the main discussion comes this notion of water as the vishaya of vyavarhara and mirage water as anrta. And you are saying It is by virtue of this last sentence ALONE in the whole bhasya, that you wish to establish pratibhasika satta as a distinct state from vyavaharika. Please, do I have that right?  Are there other references you can easily share? Regards, 🙏🙏🙏, 

Namaste Michael ji,

Please do not conclude that the statement of different levels of reality is a peripheral matter.  In truth, this idea is crucial to the Shankara Advaita.  It is the seminal point of Advaita.  Its pervasion throughout the prasthana traya bhashya is something to be seen, realized, to be appreciated. I shall mention a few out of the countless instances where this concept is repeatedly highlighted by Shankara.

In the Brahma sutras is a section to determine the state of dream.  There in 3.2.4, Shankara says:  Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real. We have eminently established in BSB 2.1.14 that the entire world (including the dream and sleep) is illusory: māyāmātra. Prior to the realization of Brahman, the waking world remains in an orderly fashion. The world of dream, though, is negated everyday upon waking. 

At the beginning of the very long bhashya for BSB 2.1.14, Shankara recalls what was said in the earlier portion: The distinction between the Enjoyer and the experienced inert world was stated as a matter of vyāvahārika. But this distinction does not exist in the pāramārthika since the cause and effect are non-different from each other.  Thus Shankara holds the world of experience to be unreal from the absolute standpoint.  

In the commentary to the last verse of the 13th chapter of the Bh.Gita, Shankara says, following the Gita teaching there: There are two requirements mandatory for liberation: 1. the knowledge that one is distinct from the inert prakriti and 2. that this prakriti is non-existent. 

In fact this verse is a mirror-verse of the 2.16 where too this teaching is contained, though in different words: That which is existent, Brahman, the Paramartha Satyam, will never go out of existence.  And that which is not there, will never gain existence. This corresponds to the Self and the not-self of the 13th ch.last verse.

In the Mundaka Bhashya Shankara says: the entire creation is a figment of imagination of the mind. 

One can give examples endlessly from the Bhashya, the Vartika and Gaudapada for the idea of two types/levels of reality.

There are innumerable such instances where Shankara has pointed to the two types of reality.  It's this feature of Shankaran Advaita that sets it apart from the other schools of Dvaita, etc.

warm regards

subbu

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

Sir, somehow, somewhere, I thought you implied through the Tait reference support for introducing pratibhasika satta as distinct from vyavaharika. Otherwise, I agree with what you are saying - there is a necessity to accept the existential status of vyavahara - how else to explain our conversation. That is clear. The issue between us and perhaps off topic, is defining what is meant by existential status. Is it other than or different from the illusory nature of pratibhasika satta. You say, yes because of the difference Sankara is drawing between waking water and dream water,  I am saying, weak defense, anything better? Just to be clear. 

Regardless, I found your citations interesting: 

//(In BS) 3.2.4, Shankara says:  Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real. We have eminently established in BSB 2.1.14 that the entire world (including the dream and sleep) is illusory: māyāmātra. Prior to the realization of Brahman, the waking world remains in an orderly fashion. The world of dream, though, is negated everyday upon waking. //

--This IS a fair defense of pratibhasika satta but I read it as two different drsti-s rather than states.

--What does Shankara mean where he says the waking world should be taken as 'absolutely real'? This might make sense if avidya is simply non-recognition. 

Then in BSB 2.1.14, //: The distinction between the Enjoyer and the experienced inert world was stated as a matter of vyāvahārika//

--mustn't that be taken as refuting any kind of avidya-lesa? Even sAkshi/sAkshya distinction is avidya and subject to change and all the other limits of duality. 

--off topic and needn't require a reply

Lastly, your comment on Gita bhasya 13.2 saying, //There are two requirements mandatory for liberation: 1. the knowledge that one is distinct from the inert prakriti and 2. that this prakriti is non-existent. //

--'prakriti is non-existent'  as a requirement? please discuss though also off topic 

🙏🙏🙏 

Yes sir, I recognize that on occasion Bhasyakara will acknowledge vyavarharika as provisionally real FOR THE IGNORANT MIND. And indeed, who could deny the fears, hopes and desires that motivate us. But this is the common empirical view whereas sastra employs its own view intended to rid us of this misconception and instill the teaching that portrays the paramarthika view. The issue between us, between post-Sankara Advaita and the strict reliance on Bhasya alone is   

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Sun, Sep 28, 2025 at 5:49 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

Sir, somehow, somewhere, I thought you implied through the Tait reference support for introducing pratibhasika satta as distinct from vyavaharika. Otherwise, I agree with what you are saying - there is a necessity to accept the existential status of vyavahara - how else to explain our conversation. That is clear. The issue between us and perhaps off topic, is defining what is meant by existential status. Is it other than or different from the illusory nature of pratibhasika satta. You say, yes because of the difference Sankara is drawing between waking water and dream water,  I am saying, weak defense, anything better? Just to be clear. 

Namaste Michael ji,

Yes, Shankara does, on the basis of the Tai.Up. passage, accepts three states of Reality.  The distinction between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is also specifically stated by him with that analogy. It is certainly a case of 'existential status'. This is because the three 'existences' differ from each other on the basis of their 'status'. I had clarified earlier that the prātibhasika satya is called so because the imagined snake is 'existing' for that person under the sway of that error. Till the correction happens, for him, the snake exists.  Hence it is called so: apparent existence.  That is its status.  The vyavaharika is also held to be existent to the one under the sway of the avidya pertaining to his true svarupa, Brahman. Hence it is named so.  Till Brahma jnana dispels that avidya, the existence of this is having that status.  And Paramarthika Satya is for Brahman which is signified by the term Satyam in the Tai.Up. 'satyam jnanam anantam' and the Brihadaranyaka 'Satyam' as opposed to the other 'satyasya' which is actually vyavaharika.  

    

Regardless, I found your citations interesting: 

//(In BS) 3.2.4, Shankara says:  Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real. We have eminently established in BSB 2.1.14 that the entire world (including the dream and sleep) is illusory: māyāmātra. Prior to the realization of Brahman, the waking world remains in an orderly fashion. The world of dream, though, is negated everyday upon waking. //

--This IS a fair defense of pratibhasika satta but I read it as two different drsti-s rather than states.

You may choose to do so, but Shankara calls it Paramartha satyam and vyavaharika satyam.

 

--What does Shankara mean where he says the waking world should be taken as 'absolutely real'? This might make sense if avidya is simply non-recognition. 

It's actually 'waking world should NOT be taken as 'absolutely real'. He says this because this reality ascribed to the waking world is subject to annulment when Brahma jnana arises. In other words, Shankara means to say that it is only relatively real, āpekṣika satyam, as he calls that in the Tai.Up.  

Then in BSB 2.1.14, //: The distinction between the Enjoyer and the experienced inert world was stated as a matter of vyāvahārika//

--mustn't that be taken as refuting any kind of avidya-lesa? Even sAkshi/sAkshya distinction is avidya and subject to change and all the other limits of duality. 

No, it's not a refutation of 'avidya leśa', called by the name 'samskāra' by Shankara. The distinction between enjoyer and the experienced world persists in the state of avidya. But in truth there is no such distinction as established in 2.1.14 where the effect is established to be non-diff from the cause.   

 

--off topic and needn't require a reply

Lastly, your comment on Gita bhasya 13.2 saying, //There are two requirements mandatory for liberation: 1. the knowledge that one is distinct from the inert prakriti and 2. that this prakriti is non-existent. //

--'prakriti is non-existent'  as a requirement? please discuss though also off topic 

Yes, that the knowledge required for liberation is two-fold: 1. that the kshetrajna consciousness is distinct from the kshetram, inert. This, the non-Advaitins, even Sankhya, Nyaya, Yoga, endorse. But the 2. the non-existence of prakriti - is a must in advaita, otherwise it won't be Advaita. That is the difference.  

warm regards

🙏🙏🙏 

Yes sir, I recognize that on occasion Bhasyakara will acknowledge vyavarharika as provisionally real FOR THE IGNORANT MIND. And indeed, who could deny the fears, hopes and desires that motivate us. But this is the common empirical view whereas sastra employs its own view intended to rid us of this misconception and instill the teaching that portrays the paramarthika view. The issue between us, between post-Sankara Advaita and the strict reliance on Bhasya alone is   

On Sat, Sep 27, 2025 at 6:52 AM V Subrahmanian <v.subra...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Sat, Sep 27, 2025 at 4:57 AM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 
Please help me understand, the Tait bhasya is referring to how Brahman created the world, as it were, 'entered into' it as well, and now answers, what Brahman does after it enters ."It became the formed and the formless" which nonetheless "still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space." Then, from this premise follows the notions of vyavarhara vishaya and paramartha satta,  Then peripheral to the main discussion comes this notion of water as the vishaya of vyavarhara and mirage water as anrta. And you are saying It is by virtue of this last sentence ALONE in the whole bhasya, that you wish to establish pratibhasika satta as a distinct state from vyavaharika. Please, do I have that right?  Are there other references you can easily share? Regards, 🙏🙏🙏, 

Namaste Michael ji,

Please do not conclude that the statement of different levels of reality is a peripheral matter.  In truth, this idea is crucial to the Shankara Advaita.  It is the seminal point of Advaita.  Its pervasion throughout the prasthana traya bhashya is something to be seen, realized, to be appreciated. I shall mention a few out of the countless instances where this concept is repeatedly highlighted by Shankara.

In the Brahma sutras is a section to determine the state of dream.  There in 3.2.4, Shankara says:  Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real. We have eminently established in BSB 2.1.14 that the entire world (including the dream and sleep) is illusory: māyāmātra. Prior to the realization of Brahman, the waking world remains in an orderly fashion. The world of dream, though, is negated everyday upon waking. 

At the beginning of the very long bhashya for BSB 2.1.14, Shankara recalls what was said in the earlier portion: The distinction between the Enjoyer and the experienced inert world was stated as a matter of vyāvahārika. But this distinction does not exist in the pāramārthika since the cause and effect are non-different from each other.  Thus Shankara holds the world of experience to be unreal from the absolute standpoint.  

In the commentary to the last verse of the 13th chapter of the Bh.Gita, Shankara says, following the Gita teaching there: There are two requirements mandatory for liberation: 1. the knowledge that one is distinct from the inert prakriti and 2. that this prakriti is non-existent. 

In fact this verse is a mirror-verse of the 2.16 where too this teaching is contained, though in different words: That which is existent, Brahman, the Paramartha Satyam, will never go out of existence.  And that which is not there, will never gain existence. This corresponds to the Self and the not-self of the 13th ch.last verse.

In the Mundaka Bhashya Shankara says: the entire creation is a figment of imagination of the mind. 

One can give examples endlessly from the Bhashya, the Vartika and Gaudapada for the idea of two types/levels of reality.

There are innumerable such instances where Shankara has pointed to the two types of reality.  It's this feature of Shankaran Advaita that sets it apart from the other schools of Dvaita, etc.

warm regards

subbu

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji,

//Yes, Shankara does, on the basis of the Tai.Up. passage, accepts three states of Reality.  The distinction between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is also specifically stated by him with that analogy. It is certainly a case of 'existential status'. This is because the three 'existences' differ from each other on the basis of their 'status'. I had clarified earlier that the prātibhasika satya is called so because the imagined snake is 'existing' for that person under the sway of that error. Till the correction happens, for him, the snake exists.  Hence it is called so: apparent existence.  That is its status.  The vyavaharika is also held to be existent to the one under the sway of the avidya pertaining to his true svarupa, Brahman. Hence it is named so.  Till Brahma jnana dispels that avidya, the existence of this is having that status.  And Paramarthika Satya is for Brahman which is signified by the term Satyam in the Tai.Up. 'satyam jnanam anantam' and the Brihadaranyaka 'Satyam' as opposed to the other 'satyasya' which is actually vyavaharika.  //

//Yes, Shankara does, on the basis of the Tai.Up. passage, accepts three states of Reality.//

You will have to show me exactly how this passage can be interpreted as 3 states of reality. I repeat my earlier understanding:

"It became the formed and the formless" which nonetheless "still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space." Then, from this premise follows the notions of vyavarhara vishaya and paramartha satta,  Then peripheral to the main discussion comes this notion of water as the vishaya of vyavarhara and mirage water as anrta.

//The distinction between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is also specifically stated by him with that analogy. //

yes, I can see how that might follow Post-Sankara/PS bias but  it is that sentence that I call weak evidence

 

//the prātibhasika satya is called so because the imagined snake is 'existing' for that person under the sway of that error. Till the correction happens, for him, the snake exists. //

personhood/seer and the snake/seen belong to the same order of reality.  Personhood is just as imagined as the illusory snake. But you are saying the person holding the illusion is different enough from the illusion to seek and gain moksa. I believe that concurs with Madhusudhana's jiva as one of the 6 anadi-s. 

Bhasya's teaching however, as pointed out by SSSSji, is that jiva/jagat, bondage/liberation must be understood as sastra's superimposition. Jivatvam is an error of understanding - there ever was a jiva who was bound. All in line with Karika 2.32

//Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real.//

double negatives confuse meaning

I'll stop here - keep it simple 🙏🙏🙏 

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Mon, Sep 29, 2025 at 5:33 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji,

//Yes, Shankara does, on the basis of the Tai.Up. passage, accepts three states of Reality.  The distinction between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is also specifically stated by him with that analogy. It is certainly a case of 'existential status'. This is because the three 'existences' differ from each other on the basis of their 'status'. I had clarified earlier that the prātibhasika satya is called so because the imagined snake is 'existing' for that person under the sway of that error. Till the correction happens, for him, the snake exists.  Hence it is called so: apparent existence.  That is its status.  The vyavaharika is also held to be existent to the one under the sway of the avidya pertaining to his true svarupa, Brahman. Hence it is named so.  Till Brahma jnana dispels that avidya, the existence of this is having that status.  And Paramarthika Satya is for Brahman which is signified by the term Satyam in the Tai.Up. 'satyam jnanam anantam' and the Brihadaranyaka 'Satyam' as opposed to the other 'satyasya' which is actually vyavaharika.  //

//Yes, Shankara does, on the basis of the Tai.Up. passage, accepts three states of Reality.//

You will have to show me exactly how this passage can be interpreted as 3 states of reality. I repeat my earlier understanding:

"It became the formed and the formless" which nonetheless "still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space." Then, from this premise follows the notions of vyavarhara vishaya and paramartha satta,  Then peripheral to the main discussion comes this notion of water as the vishaya of vyavarhara and mirage water as anrta.

I am surprised you still have doubts about this.  Those passages are about creation, how Brahman creates the world. So, the Upanishad says: Brahman became the entire universe and gave the break up from several angles. This includes the three types of Reality.  

//The distinction between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is also specifically stated by him with that analogy. //

yes, I can see how that might follow Post-Sankara/PS bias but  it is that sentence that I call weak evidence

I think it's an art to somehow deny the meaning of innocent passages of Shankara and attribute them to Post-Shankara.  

 

//the prātibhasika satya is called so because the imagined snake is 'existing' for that person under the sway of that error. Till the correction happens, for him, the snake exists. //

personhood/seer and the snake/seen belong to the same order of reality.  Personhood is just as imagined as the illusory snake. But you are saying the person holding the illusion is different enough from the illusion to seek and gain moksa. I believe that concurs with Madhusudhana's jiva as one of the 6 anadi-s. 

Actually the idea that jiva is anādi is in the Bhagavad gita itself:

प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्ध्यनादी उभावपि । विकारांश्च गुणांश्चैव विद्धि प्रकृतिसम्भवान् ॥ १९ ॥    13.19

13.20 Know both Nature and also the individual soul [Prakrti is sometimes translated as matter, and purusa as spirit.-Tr.] to be verily without beginning; know the modifications as also the qualities as born of Nature. 

Bhasya's teaching however, as pointed out by SSSSji, is that jiva/jagat, bondage/liberation must be understood as sastra's superimposition. Jivatvam is an error of understanding - there ever was a jiva who was bound. All in line with Karika 2.32

For that matter the entire shāstra is a superimposition.  

//Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is not absolutely real.//

double negatives confuse meaning

I think there was some mix up in the above. It should be ////Nor should it be concluded that the world of waking made of ether, etc. elements is  absolutely real.//

Best regards

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 
First,  Is Gita 13.2 the only best reference in PTB for anadi jiva?

//So, the Upanishad says: Brahman became the entire universe and gave the break up from several angles. This includes the three types of Reality.  //"

I asked Chatgpt 5, " post sankara advaita make a distinction between vyavahara satta and pratibhasika satta that isn't found in bhasya sankara. Both of course accept paramartika satta. Find citations from bhasya"

I found it interesting that Chat's answer referred specifically to our Tait terms with a distinctly different understanding than you have offered. I have not confirmed other citations. 

You’re right that the later “three-tier” labels—prātibhāsika–vyāvahārika–pāramārthika sattā—are not Śaṅkara’s own terminology. In the bhāṣyas, Śaṅkara explicitly contrasts paramārtha-satya with a vyavahāra/āpekṣika (contextual, comparative) “satya,” while illusory items are called anṛta / mithyā / bhrānti-jñāna / adhyāsa, not “prātibhāsika-sattā.” Here are clean places to cite from Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya:

1. Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.6 (on “satyam ca anṛtam ca satyam abhavat”) — Śaṅkara spells out the two levels in so many words:

   सत्यं च व्यवहारविषयम्, अधिकारात्, न परमार्थसत्यम्; एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म । इह पुनः व्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं मृगतृष्णिकाद्यनृतापेक्षया उदकादि सत्यमित्युछ्यते । अनृतं च तद्विपरीतम् । (Adbhutam's Blog)
   (“‘Satyam’ here is of the realm of vyavahāra, by context, not the paramārtha-satya; the one paramārtha-satya is Brahman. And in this world the vyavahāra-domain ‘truth’ is āpekṣika (comparative): water etc. are called ‘true’ only relative to illusions like mirage-water; anṛta is the opposite.”)

2. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4 (vācārambhaṇa) — Śruti’s “mṛttikety eva satyam” underwrites Śaṅkara’s paramārtha/ vyavahāra reading: the substratum alone is satyam; all “forms” are merely names in vyavahāra. (See text+commentary presentation.) (Shlokam)

3. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad bhāṣya (III.5.1 context) — Śaṅkara contrasts paramārtha and vyavahāra explicitly; the tradition often cites his line (at III.5.1) that worldly vyavahāra proceeds as conditioned by paramārtha—showing the two-level vocabulary in the bhāṣya itself. (Wisdom Library)

What you don’t find in Śaṅkara’s bhāṣyas is the formal noun “prātibhāsika-sattā.” Illusory cases (rope-snake, nacre-silver, mirage water) are treated as mithyā / anṛta / bhrānti / adhyāsa within vyavahāra, not as a separately named “level of sattā.” For the classic rope-snake/nacre-silver usage in Śaṅkara’s Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya, see standard editions and translations that quote these examples in the bhāṣya exegesis. (Wisdom Library)

If you want, I can pull page-exact Sanskrit from a specific edition (e.g., Anandagiri-ṭīkā ed. for BṛU, or a particular TU-bhāṣya printing) to match your citation style.

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Tue, Sep 30, 2025 at 4:24 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

First,  Is Gita 13.2 the only best reference in PTB for anadi jiva?

Namaste

There is this Brahma sutra itself 2.1.35 which says the samsāra is anādi. There is the BGB 15. 3 in this regard. Samsāra, bondage, can't be without the jiva. Hence jiva is anādi.   

//So, the Upanishad says: Brahman became the entire universe and gave the break up from several angles. This includes the three types of Reality.  //"

I asked Chatgpt 5, " post sankara advaita make a distinction between vyavahara satta and pratibhasika satta that isn't found in bhasya sankara. Both of course accept paramartika satta. Find citations from bhasya"

I found it interesting that Chat's answer referred specifically to our Tait terms with a distinctly different understanding than you have offered. I have not confirmed other citations. 

You’re right that the later “three-tier” labels—prātibhāsika–vyāvahārika–pāramārthika sattā—are not Śaṅkara’s own terminology. In the bhāṣyas, Śaṅkara explicitly contrasts paramārtha-satya with a vyavahāra/āpekṣika (contextual, comparative) “satya,” while illusory items are called anṛta / mithyā / bhrānti-jñāna / adhyāsa, not “prātibhāsika-sattā.” Here are clean places to cite from Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya:

1. Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.6 (on “satyam ca anṛtam ca satyam abhavat”) — Śaṅkara spells out the two levels in so many words:

   सत्यं च व्यवहारविषयम्, अधिकारात्, न परमार्थसत्यम्; एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म । इह पुनः व्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं मृगतृष्णिकाद्यनृतापेक्षया उदकादि सत्यमित्युछ्यते । अनृतं च तद्विपरीतम् । (Adbhutam's Blog)
   (“‘Satyam’ here is of the realm of vyavahāra, by context, not the paramārtha-satya; the one paramārtha-satya is Brahman. And in this world the vyavahāra-domain ‘truth’ is āpekṣika (comparative): water etc. are called ‘true’ only relative to illusions like mirage-water; anṛta is the opposite.”)

In that blog of mine, I have cited the Vanamālā commentary to the Tai.Up.Bhashya of Shankara where he says: the word 'anRtam' of the Upanishad denotes prātibhāsika object. 

Also, it is no defect if Shankara has not used the term 'prātibhasika' to denote 'apparent'.  It is enough if he has given an equivalent term/meaning.  For that matter the term 'adhyāsa, āropa, adhyāropa-apavāda' etc. are not there in the Upanishads that are popular to all. Non-advaitins would charge Shankara of using terms not found in the Upanishads.  

I am citing from that blog of mine:

Sri Sureshwaracharya concurs with the Acharya’s Bhashya!!

In his Taittiriya Upanishad Bhashya Vartika, while commenting, in verse form, the Bhashya of Bhagavatpada, for the mantra: ‘सत्यं च अनृतं च सत्यमभवत्’, the VArtikakAra says:

व्यावहारिकमेवात्र सत्यं स्यादधिकारतः ।     (सत्यं च व्यवहारविषयम्, अधिकारात्, Bhashya)

पारमार्थिकसत्यस्य वाक्यान्ते समुदीरणात् ॥ 407  (परमार्थसत्यम् bhashya)

[The word satyam which occurs at the beginning of the sentence means empirical truth because of the context and also because of the fact that the absolute truth is spoken of at the end of the sentence.]

It can be seen beyond doubt that Sri Sureshwaracharya unambiguously uses the words ‘pAramArthika satyam’ and ‘vyAvahArika satyam’ to comment upon Bhagavatpada’s words: ‘paramArthasatyam’ and ‘vyavahAra-vishayam’.

It becomes certain that Sri Sureshwaracharya has initiated the use of the two terms:  ‘pAramArthika satyam’ and ‘vyAvahArika satyam’ that have been popularly used by the Advaita Acharyas of the Sampradaya initiated by Shankara Bhagavatpada. 

Yes, 'anRta' of the Upanishad is given the meaning 'mithyā' by Shankara in the Chandogya instance: 8.3.2.  

warm regards

subbu

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji,

//There is this Brahma sutra itself 2.1.35 which says the samsāra is anādi. There is the BGB 15. 3 in this regard. Samsāra, bondage, can't be without the jiva. Hence jiva is anādi. //

Why single out jiva and the "other" 5  anadi when samsara and avidya themselves are anadi? 

//In that blog of mine, I have cited the Vanamālā commentary to the Tai.Up.Bhashya of Shankara where he says: the word 'anRtam' of the Upanishad denotes prātibhāsika object.//

Rather an obscure reference - show where three states of reality are stated explicitly.

It appears to me these discussions are endless the way we are engaging, word by word, example by example. Rather, I believe a systematic view of the entirety of PTB is necessary to determine what Sankara intends to teach. SSSS has certainly done that to ascertain clear difference with Post-Sankara Advaita. Hacker has done that with regard to Brahma Sutra bhasya by determining and analyzing every use of key terms. Others have followed Hacker's same technique with Brh, Tait, Chandogy Upanishads and Upadesha Sahasri. All have confirmed SSSS's findings.  These unbiased and exhaustive studies are powerful arguments for corrections to traditional understanding of PTB. Yet, I know of no systematic attack denying these studies. 🙏🙏🙏

  

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[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

Apologies from my end too.

<< why are you distinguishing the jnani from an ajnani gaining jnana?? How will you reconcile teachings such as these... >>

The difference posited between a "jnani" and "ajnani gaining jnana" herein is only an illustration to drive home the difference between Brahman ("jnani" herein) and a vyavaharika jnani ("ajnani gaining jnana" herein). The difference is that from Brahman the universe is asat whereas from jnani the universe is mithya. Within the illustration, from "jnani" perspective rope is sat and snake is asat, whereas from "ajnani gaining jnana" perspective rope is sat and snake is mithya. Outside the scope of this illustration, you are correct that both "jnani" and "ajnani gaining jnana" are the same in vyavaharika and is Chaitanya in paramarthika.

<< Good question that is handled in bhasya to Gita 2.16, which notes that existence and non-existence belong to ignorance/vyavaharika only. So, the notion of an object 'taken to be real' is itself an error/superimposition. The snake is taken to be real; the rope is what remains unchanged. Excluded middle maintained >>

Yes, excluded middle is maintained in this perspective but the definition of real is no longer applicable. Real is that which remains unsublated by any other knowledge at any point in time. This is not the case with the snake as it is sublated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Within your statement "The snake is taken to be real; the rope is what remains unchanged" the snake is only mistaken to be real whereas the rope is actually real. Hence there is a distinction between the two. Moreover neither are unreal; hence forming a triad of actually real, mistaken to be real, unreal.

My point is that the law of excluded middle is applicable for scenarios with 2 options that form a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set. The Advaitic definition of satya and asatya do not form such a pair in vyavahara, hence it is not illogical to accomodate a 3rd intermediate indeterminate mithya that completes the set. In paramarthika it is sat alone and the excluded middle is maintained.

prostrations,

Vikram

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:41 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji,

//There is this Brahma sutra itself 2.1.35 which says the samsāra is anādi. There is the BGB 15. 3 in this regard. Samsāra, bondage, can't be without the jiva. Hence jiva is anādi. //

Why single out jiva and the "other" 5  anadi when samsara and avidya themselves are anadi? 

All the other 5 are also anādi.  

//In that blog of mine, I have cited the Vanamālā commentary to the Tai.Up.Bhashya of Shankara where he says: the word 'anRtam' of the Upanishad denotes prātibhāsika object.//

Rather an obscure reference - show where three states of reality are stated explicitly.

Shankara has stated and Sureshwara also states.  Whether three or two, it makes no difference. The pratibhasika, even if not specified separately, can be subsumed into the vyāvahārika.  Shankara states the pratibhasika since the Upanishad itself says that. In the Brihadaranyaka satyasya satyam, only two are stated. The pratibhasika is within the vyavaharika.  In fact the Bh.Gita 2.16 has the clear divide: paramarthika and vyavaharika. Shankara has taken the  'asat' there to be vyavaharika.  And Shankara explicitly specifies the message to Arjuna:  You too, Arjuna, following the vision of the Jnani-s, look upon the transforming world to be mithya, that which is not there is only appearing to be there, and on this understanding practice forbearance. In an earlier verse in the Gita the changing/passing nature of the dualities, transformations like heat and cold, etc. was stated as the reason for forbearing. In 2.16, a higher level of reasoning is given: what transforms is mithya, does not exist at all.   

It appears to me these discussions are endless the way we are engaging, word by word, example by example. Rather, I believe a systematic view of the entirety of PTB is necessary to determine what Sankara intends to teach. SSSS has certainly done that to ascertain clear difference with Post-Sankara Advaita. Hacker has done that with regard to Brahma Sutra bhasya by determining and analyzing every use of key terms. Others have followed Hacker's same technique with Brh, Tait, Chandogy Upanishads and Upadesha Sahasri. All have confirmed SSSS's findings.  These unbiased and exhaustive studies are powerful arguments for corrections to traditional understanding of PTB. Yet, I know of no systematic attack denying these studies. 🙏🙏🙏

Hacker, etc. are not the final authority for the tradition.  It is the traditional Acharyas who have based everything that they have said on Shankara are alone the authority.

warm regards

subbu  

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Subbuji, 

//The pratibhasika is within the vyavaharika.  //

 Timalsina, Seeing and Appearance, commenting on Madhusudhana contrast of two orders of reality rather than distinguishing empirical and illusory found in other authors but NOT IN BHASYA. Three orders gives empirical a status of reality not explicitly found in Bhasya or Gaudapada. 

"Most remarkably, he places the statement of Śaṅkara between the statements of Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman, both of whom do not make a distinction between the empirical and the illusory. Thus, for Madhusūdana, the ‘superimposition’ (adhyāsa) of Śaṅkara corresponds to Sarvajñātman’s example of mirage. The point which aligns him with DS is his definition of reality. All in all, Madhusūdana gives nine definitions of empirical reality, demonstrating various positions that he defends. Some of these definitions cover both the empirical and illusory states within the domain of vyavahārika. This last point of Madhusūdana tallies with Ābhāsa and DSE, since in the doctrines of Padmapāda and Vācaspati, the empirical truth cannot be equated with an illusory truth, both bearing different degrees of reality.”

//Hacker, etc. are not the final authority for the tradition.  It is the traditional Acharyas who have based everything that they have said on Shankara are alone the authority.//

Is the personality of traditional acharyas or their reasoning and knowledge of sastra that contains authority? The former is sentimental, the latter arguable. Hacker etc. argue based on reason and textual exegesis - that alone has been traditional vedanta

"

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Thu, Oct 2, 2025 at 8:26 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelc...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Subbuji, 

//The pratibhasika is within the vyavaharika.  //

 Timalsina, Seeing and Appearance, commenting on Madhusudhana contrast of two orders of reality rather than distinguishing empirical and illusory found in other authors but NOT IN BHASYA. Three orders gives empirical a status of reality not explicitly found in Bhasya or Gaudapada. 

"Most remarkably, he places the statement of Śaṅkara between the statements of Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman, both of whom do not make a distinction between the empirical and the illusory. Thus, for Madhusūdana, the ‘superimposition’ (adhyāsa) of Śaṅkara corresponds to Sarvajñātman’s example of mirage. The point which aligns him with DS is his definition of reality. All in all, Madhusūdana gives nine definitions of empirical reality, demonstrating various positions that he defends. Some of these definitions cover both the empirical and illusory states within the domain of vyavahārika. This last point of Madhusūdana tallies with Ābhāsa and DSE, since in the doctrines of Padmapāda and Vācaspati, the empirical truth cannot be equated with an illusory truth, both bearing different degrees of reality.”

Dear Michael ji,

Shankara gives the analogy of the illusory to depict even the vyavaharika, empirical. That's exactly what he does in the BGB 2.16 while giving the mirage water analogy to the world that is experienced. He does that even in BSB 2.1.14 where he says just like the snake perception ceases when rope perception is had, the body identity ends (as a real one) when the Brahman perception is had.  In any case, we have the Taittiriya Upanishad as the authority for three types of reality which has been explained by Shankara.  

//Hacker, etc. are not the final authority for the tradition.  It is the traditional Acharyas who have based everything that they have said on Shankara are alone the authority.//

Is the personality of traditional acharyas or their reasoning and knowledge of sastra that contains authority?

It's the latter. It's the latter that identifies the personality.

warm regards

subbu

  

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Vikram, 

//The difference is that from Brahman the universe is asat whereas from jnani the universe is mithya.//

Do you find a difference between jnani and brahman? What is that difference? Can you show where that kind of distinction appears in Prasthanatraya bhasya?  You might find a couple of places where Sankara speaks of videha mukti or the continuation of prarabdha but that is a kind of gauna mukti as it contradicts so many other descriptions of mukta as bodiless, non-dual, free of pramata, pramana, prameya etc.

OR, are you claiming paroksha jnana leads to aparoksa jnana? In which case, either that's prasamkhyana vada or misguided to think the relative has access to the infinite. 

//My point is that the law of excluded middle is applicable for scenarios with 2 options that form a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set. The Advaitic definition of satya and asatya do not form such a pair in vyavahara, hence it is not illogical to accomodate a 3rd intermediate indeterminate mithya that completes the set. In paramarthika it is sat alone and the excluded middle is maintained.//

Sorry, I don't follow. Of course, there's satya and asatya in vyavahara. Why not? The law of excluded middle is a vyavaharika term. Do you wish to conflate Absolute and relative and thereby produce a third category of existence? 🙏🙏🙏

[Vikram Jagannathan]

Namaskaram Michael ji,

Inline responses first, followed by a discussion recap for clarity.

--

<< Do you find a difference between jnani and brahman? What is that difference? Can you show where that kind of distinction appears in Prasthanatraya bhasya? >>

Yes, jnani here refers to the antahkarana-avacchinna-chaitanya which antahkarana has gained the akhandakara-vritti jnana. Brahman is Chaitanya or pure Jnana. All references to a tattva-darshi or stithaprajna or a guru or an acharya in PTB refers to the jnani. Therefore, pretty much every single Upanishad teacher is the jnani. Brahman as Chaitanya is distinct from a jnani, but a jnani is non-distinct from Brahman.

<< You might find a couple of places where Sankara speaks of videha mukti or the continuation of prarabdha but that is a kind of gauna mukti as it contradicts so many other descriptions of mukta as bodiless, non-dual, free of pramata, pramana, prameya etc. >>

No, I am not bringing videha mukti into picture here. Jnani is a perceived to be embodied. Based on the PSA sampradhaya there is no contradiction with the other descriptions of a mukta. They are all easily explained even from within the context of videha mukti / jivan mukti / krama mukti / sadyo mukti.

<< OR, are you claiming paroksha jnana leads to aparoksa jnana? In which case, either that's prasamkhyana vada or misguided to think the relative has access to the infinite. >>

No, I am not claiming paroksha jnana leads to aparoksha jnana.

<< Sorry, I don't follow. Of course, there's satya and asatya in vyavahara. Why not? >>

Agreed; looks like we are aligning here. There is vyavaharika-satya and vyavaharika-asatya. And there is the underlying paramarthika-satya. Hence 3 categorization from our perspective.

<< The law of excluded middle is a vyavaharika term. Do you wish to conflate Absolute and relative and thereby produce a third category of existence? >>

True; but this doesn't mean that the law of excluded middle should be force-fit into every scenario.

-- 

This has been a long discussion; just to recap my understanding of this thread (lest I am not completely off-track!)

Contention: Between satya and asatya, mithya doesn't need to be a third ontological category. Mithya (relative reality) as a third ontological category is misleading and oxymoronic as it contradicts the "law of excluded middle".

Response: Mithya is a valid third ontological category as its definition is distinct from the definition of satya and asatya. The "law of excluded middle" is inapplicable here, to begin with, as the definitions of satya and asatya do not form a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set. Therefore the contradiction with the "law of excluded middle" is not a ground for rejecting mithya as a third ontological category.

dhanyosmi

prostrations,

Vikram