Modern Warfare 3 Part 1

[Егор Ульянов]

NoteThis is the first part of a major revision to my article on the American Civil War being the first modern war. Part two will follow tomorrow. This is actually the beginning of the first chapter of my Gettysburg text, much of which has been appearing in various forms on this site for the past year, much of this deals with the connection between policy and strategy and the relationship of political leaders to the military.

At the beginning of the war the leaders and populace of both sides still held a romantic idea of war. The belief that the war would be over in a few months and that would be settled by a few decisive battles was held by most, including many military officers on both sides, there were some naysayers like the venerable General Winfield Scott, but they were mocked by both politicians and the press.

However, like all wars many of its lessons were forgotten by military professionals in the United States as well as in Europe. Thus 50 years later during World War One, British, French, German, Austrian and Russian wasted vast amounts of manpower and destroyed the flower of a generation because they did not heed the lessons of the Civil War. Fuller noted:

What would a complete failure of the current race to field artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) systems across the U.S. military look like? The American military profession is equally blessed and cursed by technological determinism and the belief that new gadgets will solve old problems. This line of thinking pervades notions about offsets and the belief that precision can counter mass in modern war.

In the scenario below, the future is bleak. Old ideas about war combine with industrial-age bureaucracy to limit the extent to which any new technology can produce an enduring advantage. AI/ML becomes another false promise sacrificed on the altar of the clash of wills. The defense bureaucracy struggles to adapt and falls back on enduring ideas about war despite the availability of new technology. The man on horseback remains nostalgic and lost in dreams of past battles that leave him unable to adapt to the future of war.

In this alternative future, the U.S. military never escapes the gravity of old ideas about war and legacy bureaucracy. Despite the current wave of enthusiasm about AI/ML, there is a non-zero chance of this future. Yes, services are in a race to develop new battle networks, but the extent to which they become new doctrine and fighting formations is still uncertain.

He remembered during that iteration how a lance corporal snuck up on an automated sentry designed to detect enemy movement around secure patrol bases by placing a tortoise shell in front of his face. The machine assumed he was an endangered species and sent a message causing all sentries to stand down. It was always this way. In those days, the generals got briefed on magic, but grunts saw the truth.

The latest report signaled that despite increasing data and analytical optimization in the private sector due to years of 5G connectivity, new chip designs, and better algorithms, there remained real concerns about transforming the military. The report interviewed more than one hundred combat leaders from across the services. Even though it was anonymous, he knew them, or at least how they thought about war. The robots could go screw themselves.

Over the course of his career, the Chairman remembered being on the margins of this group. He watched as civilians, usually millennials with grand ideas and thin resumes, were appointed to new administrations and pressed for technological change. These civilians called the old ways outdated and a relic of twentieth-century warfare. He watched as the movement pushed back, using social media and whispers in the halls of Congress to limit the extent to which any new whiz kid could challenge age-old traditions and fundamental human truths about war. Networks of gray beards and retirees fostered the insurgency.

A cursory look at historical cases beyond a desire rooted in Whig history to see the past as progress to the present illustrates why U.S. policy-makers today need to prevent the scenario outlined above. From early experiments with radar to the development of a global network of unmanned aerial surveillance and strike capabilities, there are more failures than success stories. For every radar success story like the United Kingdom and the Chain Home early warning radar network, there was a wide range of half-baked ideas about death rays across major global powers in the interwar period. Despite the success the United States experienced in fielding a new generation of unmanned attack and reconnaissance aircraft after 2001, there was a rich, underreported prehistory of drones that failed to break the enduring image of battle as a human endeavor.

To realize sustained change, the heart of these initiatives will need reside in planning and how the military reimagines the proverbial man on horseback as part of a larger disaggregated decision network. Understanding the balance of human judgment, creativity, and model-generated perspectives will prove essential for operational art in the twenty-first century. To understand how best to fuse data and the mind for war, though, requires bold experimentations and wargames that test different combinations of systems. The future is still in the making. Every military professional, as well as concerned citizens, whether AI/ML enthusiast or skeptic, should become part of it.

Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., is a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting in the Marine Corps University and a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

In the wake of October 7, the State of Israel, its society, and all its institutions are at a critical crossroads. One path forward demands a thorough investigation and examination of everything that failed on that day so the necessary corrections can be made. The second path directs Israel towards a comprehensive inquiry across all dimensions and urges the formulation of a new and updated national narrative in the face of the existential challenge. The question is, which of the two paths is worth pursuing?

And yet, despite uncertainty regarding the continuation of the war, its outcomes, and the implications for the future security of the State of Israel, the moment the IDF launched a ground attack deep into the city of Gaza on Friday, October 27, it crossed a Rubicon of decades-old Israeli apprehension, thereby constituting a significant achievement in and of itself.

The anxiety of the Israeli leadership in recent decades regarding the deployment of ground forces into enemy territory represents a crisis in the Israeli security perception. It reflects a fear of the uncertainties associated with entering a war, which inherently involves a step into the unknown. At the crossroads where the decision to launch an offensive operation by ground forces is made, the political echelon has been hesitant about making such a potentially complicated move as it could mean a loss of control leading to a failure to achieve the desired end.

This problematic dynamic was evident in Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008. A dispute arose between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was pushing for a decisive move against Hamas, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who sought to conclude the operation before matters escalated into the unknown. In this conflict, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff prevailed.

It is true that in wars of the past century, especially WWII, cities became battlefields. However, urban warfare was just one part of the overall war effort. In the war waged by the IDF in the heart of Gaza, the city itself, with its rich cultural and religious institutions, serves as both the front and the focal point of the conflict. The ability of the IDF to operate successfully in the heart of the city should be regarded as a comprehensive achievement of the highest order.

The political and military leadership clearly understood that they were heading into a prolonged war, and they declared this to be the case from the outset. However, the public, including veterans of previous Israeli wars, is struggling to understand why this war needs to last longer than any other war the country has experienced since the War of Independence.

The enemy made major changes to its command and control methods. The organization for warfare in Hezbollah and Hamas tends to be decentralized, which allows each local combat core to fight independently even without orders. In past wars, IDF targeting of command and control centers had a direct impact on weakening the enemy, but that is no longer the case.

In this spirit, Abdullah Azzam, born in a village near Jenin, led the mujahideen struggle in Afghanistan. Inspired by this, the Hamas movement was established two days after the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987. When the IDF faces Hamas and Hezbollah, it encounters Islamic fighters who are believers, presenting a challenge not previously recognized.

Those who come to the forefront during a crisis gather great support and unite the ranks of the fighters. But off the battlefield, this spirit does not seem to influence leaders in the socio-political discourse. The commitment to war, with all its urgency, relies on conflicting Israeli dreams that continue to resist settlement. Advocates for a two-state solution, including Yossi Beilin and others, see the war against Hamas as a historic opportunity to advance their vision. In their view, the disappearance of Hamas rule will mean the removal of an obstacle preventing the implementation of the two-state plan. Their renewed push for the plan, which involves extensive Israeli withdrawals in the West Bank and even the uprooting of settlements, aligns with the expectations of the American administration.

That research outlined the foundations of a scenario like the sudden attack by Hamas on the morning of October 7. It referred to the doctrine of war intentionally developed by Hezbollah and Hamas under Iranian influence. My claims are based on an analysis of the characteristics of the new form of warfare that has emerged in the 21st century, emphasizing the critical need for territorial depth in defense. The changes in the phenomenon of warfare, particularly those adopted from the Russia-Ukraine war, present additional considerations indicating the need for Israeli control over vital territories in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley.

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