Hi all,
Please join us for my quals exam on Monday 3/23 at 3:00 PM in GCS 402c.
In this presentation I will be discussing some work that I did with David Kempe on delegated voting. A description of the talk is as follows:
In this presentation, we will discuss the power of vote delegation to improve election outcomes. We will discuss a novel model in which voters may be adversarially misinformed about the alternatives in an election in a modification of the classic metric distortion model. We will show that self interested delegation can significantly decrease the harm caused by this adversarial misinformation.
We will explore this problem through the story of a student who joins a computer science theory group, and is immediately asked to vote on which professor will decide the group's research direction in the coming years. Because the student is unfamiliar with the research interests of the faculty members of the group, he may seek advice from a peer in order to vote more effectively. We will demonstrate that by giving students the option to seek such advice, the decided research direction of the group will align much more closely with the interests of its members.
Thanks,
Grayson