This Thursday 2/6 Jason Liu will be giving the following talk at 12:00PM
in GCS 502C. Hope to see you all there!
In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that
proportionally
represents large cohesive groups of voters is an essential task. In
common, there are two definitions for ''cohesiveness'' and two
definitions for ''representation''. Three of the four combinations had
been studied, leading to axioms known as PJR, EJR, and FJR. We
investigated the fourth possibility, which we call Full Proportional
Justified Representation (FPJR). We compared FPJR with the known ones,
and showed that several proportionality axioms (priceability, perfect
representation, etc.) and efficient rules (Monroe, method of equal
shares, etc) satisfy FPJR. We also showed that verifying FPJR and
verifying FJR are coNP-complete, the latter of which was open for years.
Joint work with Yusuf Hakan Kalacyi and David Kempe.