Theory Lunch Speaker This Week (Thursday, 4/3 at 12:00, GCS 502C)

[Grayson York]

Hi all,

Please join us this week for theory lunch, where we are excited to have Professor Jens Witkowski from the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management speaking. Below is a brief bio and a title and abstract for the talk. I am looking forward to seeing everyone there!

Thanks,

Grayson

Bio: Jens Witkowski is an Associate Professor of Computer Science and Management at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. His research focuses on the intersection of data science and economics, with an emphasis on eliciting, aggregating, and evaluating crowd-sourced information. Before joining Frankfurt School in August 2018, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Institute for Machine Learning at ETH Zurich, working with Andreas Krause. From 2014-2015, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Good Judgment Project at the University of Pennsylvania, working with Lyle Ungar, Barb Mellers, and Phil Tetlock. From 2010–2014, he was a Fellow of the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at Harvard University, where he was working with David C. Parkes. Jens received his Ph.D. (2014) and Master’s (2009) degrees in Computer Science from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany.

Title: An Equivalence Between Fair Division and Wagering Mechanisms

Rupert Freeman*, Jens Witkowski*, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, and David Pennock
*equal contribution

Abstract: We draw a surprising and direct mathematical equivalence between the class of fair division mechanisms, designed to allocate divisible goods without money, and the class of weakly budget-balanced wagering mechanisms, designed to elicit probabilities. While this correspondence between fair division and wagering has applications in both settings, we focus on its implications for the design of incentive-compatible fair division mechanisms. In particular, we show that applying the correspondence to Competitive Scoring Rules, a prominent class of wagering mechanisms based on proper scoring rules, yields the first incentive-compatible fair division mechanism that is both fair (proportional and envy-free) and responsive to agent preferences. Moreover, for two agents, we show that Competitive Scoring Rules characterize the whole class of non-wasteful and incentive-compatible fair division mechanisms, subject to mild technical conditions. As one of several consequences, this allows us to resolve an open question about the best possible approximation to optimal utilitarian welfare that can be achieved by any incentive-compatible mechanism. Finally, since the equivalence greatly expands the set of known incentive-compatible fair division mechanisms, we conclude with an evaluation of this entire set, comparing the mechanisms’ axiomatic properties and examining their welfare performance in simulation.

[Grayson York]

Hi all, please join us at the following zoom link:

https://usc.zoom.us/j/8561565993?pwd=LzhDWnY2citubmtyQXR1NnVtK0ZaQT09