U.S.-Iran peace: Easier than peacebuilding
John Onyeukwu
U.S.-Iran peace: Easier than peacebuilding
The June 2026 agreement between the United States and Iran may have ended a dangerous conflict, but history suggests that peace agreements are beginnings, not endings. The real challenge lies in building institutions, trust, and political consensus strong enough to sustain peace long after the signing ceremony.
By John Onyeukwu | Policy and Reform Column, Business a.m. | Mon June 22 - Sun June 28, 2026 |
On 18 June 2026, United States President Donald J. Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian of the Islamic Republic of Iran signed what may ultimately be remembered as one of the most consequential diplomatic agreements of the twenty-first century. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), brokered through the combined efforts of Pakistan, Oman, Switzerland, Qatar, and other international actors, formally ended a period of direct military confrontation between Washington and Tehran that had raised fears of a wider Middle East war and a potentially devastating shock to the global economy.
The agreement attracted immediate global attention because it addressed issues extending far beyond the bilateral relationship between the United States and Iran. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, commitments relating to Iran's nuclear programme, phased sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, and provisions for future negotiations all carry implications for global energy markets, international security, regional stability, and the future of the international order. Yet the significance of the agreement lies not merely in what it contains, but in what it reveals about the changing nature of power, diplomacy, and conflict.
There is a tendency in international affairs to treat peace agreements as endings. History teaches a different lesson. Peace agreements are usually beginnings. The signing ceremony is often the easiest part. The greater challenge lies in transforming negotiated commitments into sustainable political realities.
The roots of the U.S.-Iran conflict stretch back nearly five decades. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, relations between the two countries have been defined by sanctions, proxy conflicts, military tensions, and profound mutual distrust. Successive American administrations viewed Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional influence as threats to regional stability and allied interests. Iranian leaders, in turn, regarded American policies as attempts to undermine Iranian sovereignty and shape the future of the Islamic Republic. Despite years of confrontation, neither side achieved a decisive strategic outcome. The Islamabad Memorandum represents an acknowledgment that military pressure alone could not resolve the issues dividing them.
The agreement reflects an enduring principle of international relations: conflicts often end not when one side achieves total victory but when the costs of continued confrontation become unsustainable. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Camp David Accords of 1978, and even the arrangements that ended the Cold War emerged from recognition that stability requires accommodation as well as strength. The Islamabad Memorandum belongs to this tradition of pragmatic diplomacy rooted not in trust, but in necessity.
One of the most significant aspects of the agreement concerns energy security. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most strategic maritime corridors, carrying a substantial share of globally traded oil and liquefied natural gas. Any disruption immediately affects energy prices, inflation, supply chains, and investor confidence. The agreement's provisions for reopening maritime traffic therefore represent far more than a regional achievement; they are a contribution to global economic stability.
For Nigeria and other oil-producing countries, this development offers an important lesson. Historically, instability in the Middle East has often translated into higher oil prices and temporary fiscal gains. Yet no nation can build sustainable prosperity on crises occurring elsewhere. Countries become prosperous because they build productive economies, strengthen institutions, and create environments that encourage investment and innovation. The lesson for Nigeria is that economic diversification remains a more reliable strategy than dependence on geopolitical disruptions.
The agreement is equally significant from the perspective of international law. Several provisions reaffirm principles embedded in the Charter of the United Nations, including sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Their reaffirmation by two states with a long history of hostility demonstrates a recurring reality of international politics: even powerful nations eventually return to legal and diplomatic frameworks when seeking durable peace. Military force may alter strategic calculations, but it cannot by itself create legitimacy or lasting stability.
Yet perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the agreement is that it is not fundamentally a bilateral arrangement. Although signed by Washington and Tehran, its success depends on a broader network of actors whose interests are directly affected by its implementation. Among these actors, none is more important than Israel.
For decades, successive Israeli governments have viewed Iran's nuclear programme as a direct threat to national security. From Ariel Sharon to Benjamin Netanyahu and beyond, Israeli strategic doctrine has remained largely consistent: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons capability. This position has shaped Israeli diplomacy, defence policy, intelligence operations, and its relationship with successive American administrations.
The Islamabad Memorandum therefore creates both opportunities and concerns for Israel. On one hand, reduced tensions between the United States and Iran lower the risk of a broader regional war and may contribute to greater stability. On the other hand, provisions involving sanctions relief, economic normalization, and phased negotiations inevitably raise questions within Israeli political and security circles regarding whether sufficient safeguards exist against future nuclear escalation.
This concern exposes one of the agreement's central challenges. Peace between the United States and Iran does not automatically translate into peace across the Middle East. The region's security architecture is shaped by state and non-state actors, competing alliances, ideological rivalries, and historical grievances that cannot be resolved through a single document.
The renewed tensions involving Hezbollah in southern Lebanon shortly after the signing of the agreement illustrate this reality. Hezbollah's relationship with Iran, Israel's security calculations, and Lebanon's political fragility create circumstances that extend beyond the direct control of negotiators in Washington and Tehran. Modern conflicts are increasingly networked rather than isolated. Consequently, peace agreements must contend with actors whose interests do not always align with those of the principal signatories.
This raises a broader strategic question: Is the Islamabad Memorandum merely a ceasefire between two adversaries, or does it represent the beginning of a new Middle Eastern security order?
The answer remains uncertain. Since the end of the Second World War, the region has witnessed multiple geopolitical transformations, from Arab nationalism and Cold War rivalries to the post-Arab Spring fragmentation. The current agreement may signal another transition—one in which Iran gradually moves from relative isolation toward greater integration in regional diplomacy and economic engagement.
If that transition succeeds, countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel will need to adapt to a strategic environment in which economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement assume greater prominence than military competition. If it fails, it may reinforce long-standing arguments that deterrence remains more effective than negotiation in managing regional threats.
Another challenge lies within Iran itself. President Masoud Pezeshkian has presented the agreement as a pathway toward economic recovery and greater international engagement. Yet conservative factions and elements of the security establishment remain skeptical of deeper engagement with the United States. Every major peace process must ultimately survive domestic politics. Agreements endure not because leaders sign them, but because institutions, political actors, and citizens accept their legitimacy.
The same principle applies to the United States. The fate of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action demonstrated how changes in political leadership can alter diplomatic commitments. The durability of the Islamabad Memorandum will therefore depend not only on current leaders but also on the willingness of future administrations and institutions to sustain its framework.
One of the most encouraging aspects of the agreement is what it reveals about diplomacy itself. At a time when international affairs are increasingly framed through great-power competition involving the United States, China, and Russia, the Islamabad process highlights the continued relevance of middle powers and diplomatic intermediaries. Pakistan, Oman, Switzerland, and Qatar played critical roles in facilitating dialogue and building confidence between adversaries. Their involvement demonstrates that influence is not determined solely by military strength or economic size. Credibility, trust, and strategic positioning remain valuable forms of power.
For African countries, including Nigeria, this lesson is particularly relevant. Nations that invest in diplomacy, institution-building, and regional leadership can exercise influence far beyond what conventional measures of power might suggest.
Ultimately, the future of the U.S.-Iran agreement will not be determined solely in Washington or Tehran. It will also be shaped in Jerusalem, Beirut, Riyadh, Muscat, Doha, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing. Modern conflicts are rarely bilateral, and modern peace is rarely achieved through a single document. Durable peace emerges when institutions become stronger than personalities, when interests begin to outweigh fears, and when former adversaries discover that coexistence serves them better than confrontation.
The agreement signed on 18 June 2026 may eventually be remembered as one of the defining diplomatic achievements of this decade. Equally, it may become another reminder that peace agreements are easier to sign than to implement. The real test begins now. The challenge is no longer ending war between the United States and Iran. The challenge is building a regional order capable of sustaining peace among all those who must live with its consequences.
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Augustine Togonu-Bickersteth
There is a tendency in international affairs to treat peace agreements as endings. History teaches a different lesson. Peace agreements are usually beginnings. The signing ceremony is often the easiest part. The greater challenge lies in transforming negotiated commitments into sustainable political realities.
thank you. The more we read. The more we discover our ignorance
So it's said
Augustine Togonu Bickersteth London England 🇬🇧 June 23 2026
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