Congressional Snowden Report

[James M. Atkinson]

Please see the attached declassified document, as well as the text
snipping included as text in this message. It is wise for a TSCM,
CyberSecurity, CyberOperations, TEMPEST, or related
counter-intelligence, IC specialists to study this report, because it
will allow them to spot other spies in thier workplace, and to detect
behaviors and equipment usage patterns that will result in the capture
of the spy.

I took the PDF document, and performed a text recognition on it, and
then copy and pasted that text into this document (the document actually
is unclassifed and redacted, to please see the originl attached PDF file).

-jma


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(U) Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of
Former National Security Agency Contractor
Edward Snowden
September 15, 2016
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(U) Executive Summary
(U) In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
Edward Snowden
perpetrated the largest and most damaging public release of classified
information in U.S.
intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of
the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee
staff to carry out a
comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the
review was to allow the
Committee to explain to other Members of Congress-and, where possible,
the American
people-how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about
the man who
committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had
been remedied.
(U) Over the next two years, Committee staff requested hundreds of
documents from the
Intelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens of briefings and
meetings with IC
personnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with
knowledge of Snowden's
background and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden's
last two work locations.
The review focused on Snowden's background, how he was able to remove
more than 1.5
million classified documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5
million documents
contained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.
(U) The Committee's review was careful not to disturb any criminal
investigation or
future prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled
there on June 23, 2013.
Accordingly, the Committee did not interview individuals whom the
Department of Justice
identified as possible witnesses at Snowden's trial, including Snowden
himself, nor did the
Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand
jury. Instead, the IC
provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed
substantively similar
knowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview
Snowden's NSA coworkers
and supervisors directly, Committee staff interviewed IC personnel who
had reviewed
reports of interviews with Snowden's co-workers and supervisors. The
Committee remains
hopeful that Snowden will return to the United States to face justice.
(U) The bulk of the Committee's 37-page review, which includes 237
footnotes, must
remain classified to avoid causing further harm to national security;
however, the Committee has
made a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that
the public narrative
popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods,
exaggerations, and crucial
omissions, a pattern that began before he stole 1.5 million sensitive
documents.
(U) First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and
the vast
majority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs
impacting individual
privacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense, and
intelligence programs of
great interest to America's adversaries. A review of the materials
Snowden compromised
makes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops
overseas and secrets that
provide vital defenses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of
Snowden's disclosures
exacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC's
capabilities to collect
against legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted
in the loss of intelligence
streams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared
the full cache of 1.5
million classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the
deputy chairman of the
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Russian parliament's defense and security committee publicly conceded
that "Snowden did share
intelligence" with his government. Additionally, although Snowden's
professed objective may
have been to inform the general public, the information he released is
also available to Russian,
Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean government intelligence services; any
terrorist with Internet
access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.
(U) The full scope of the damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown.
Over the past
three years, the IC and the Department of Defense (DOD) have carried out
separate reviewswith
differing methodologies-of the damage Snowden caused. Out of an
abundance of caution,
DOD reviewed all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. The IC, by
contrast, has carried
out a damage assessment for only a small subset of the documents. The
Committee is concerned
that the IC does not plan to assess the damage of the vast majority of
documents Snowden
removed. Nevertheless, even by a conservative estimate, the U.S.
Government has spent
hundreds of millions of dollars, and will eventually spend billions, to
attempt to mitigate the
damage Snowden caused. These dollars would have been better spent on
combating America's
adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.
(U) Second, Snowden was not a whistleblower. Under the law, publicly
revealing
classified information does not qualify someone as a whistleblower.
However, disclosing
classified information that shows fraud, waste, abuse, or other illegal
activity to the appropriate
law enforcement or oversight personnel-including to Congress--does make
someone a
whistleblower and affords them with critical protections. Contrary to
his public claims that he
notified numerous NSA officials about what he believed to be illegal
intelligence collection, the
Committee found no evidence that Snowden took any official effort to
express concerns about
U.S. intelligence activities-legal, moral, or otherwise-to any oversight
officials within the
U.S. Government, despite numerous avenues for him to do so. Snowden was
aware of these
avenues. His only attempt to contact an NSA attorney revolved around a
question about the
legal precedence of executive orders, and his only contact to the
Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) Inspector General (IO) revolved around his disagreements with his
managers about
training and retention of information technology specialists.
(U) Despite Snowden's later public claim that he would have faced
retribution for
voicing concerns about intelligence activities, the Committee found that
laws and regulations in
effect at the time of Snowden's actions afforded him protection. The
Committee routinely
receives disclosures from IC contractors pursuant to the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1998 (IC WP A). If Snowden had been worried about
possible retaliation for
voicing concerns about NSA activities, he could have made a disclosure
to the Committee. He
did not. Nor did Snowden remain in the United States to face the legal
consequences of his
actions, contrary to the tradition of civil disobedience he professes to
embrace. Instead, he fled to
China and Russia, two countries whose governments place scant value on
their citizens' privacy
or civil liberties-and whose intelligence services aggressively collect
information on both the
United States and their own citizens.
(U) To gather the files he took with him when he left the country for
Hong Kong,
Snowden infringed on the privacy of thousands of government employees
and contractors. He
obtained his colleagues' security credentials through misleading means,
abused his access as a
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systems administrator to search his co-workers' personal drives, and
removed the personally
identifiable information of thousands ofIC employees and contractors.
From Hong Kong he
went to Russia, where he remains a guest of the Kremlin to this day.
(U) It is also not clear Snowden understood the numerous privacy
protections that govern
the activities of the IC. He failed basic annual training for NSA
employees on Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and complained the training
was rigged to be
overly difficult. This training included explanations of the privacy
protections related to the
PRISM program that Snowden would later disclose.
(U) Third, two weeks before Snowden began mass downloads of classified
documents, he was reprimanded after engaging in a workplace spat with
NSA managers.
Snowden was repeatedly counseled by his managers regarding his behavior
at work. For
example, in June 2012, Snowden became involved in a fiery e-mail
argument with a supervisor
about how computer updates should be managed. Snowden added an NSA
senior executive
several levels above the supervisor to the e-mail thread, an action that
earned him a swift
reprimand from his contracting officer for failing to follow the proper
protocol for raising
grievances through the chain of command. Two weeks later, Snowden began
his mass
downloads of classified information from NSA networks. Despite Snowden's
later claim that the
March 2013 congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper was a
"breaking point" for him, these mass downloads predated Director
Clapper's testimony by eight
months.
(U) Fourth, Snowden was, and remains, a serial exaggerator and
fabricator. A close
review of Snowden's official employment records and submissions reveals
a pattern of
intentional lying. He claimed to have left Army basic training because
of broken legs when in
fact he washed out because of shin splints. He claimed to have obtained
a high school degree
equivalent when in fact he never did. He claimed to have worked for the
CIA as a "senior
advisor," which was a gross exaggeration of his entry-level duties as a
computer technician. He
also doctored his performance evaluations and obtained new positions at
NSA by exaggerating
his resume and stealing the answers to an employment test. In May 2013,
Snowden informed his
supervisor that he would be out of the office to receive treatment for
worsening epilepsy. In
reality, he was on his way to Hong Kong with stolen secrets.
(U) Finally, the Committee remains concerned that more than three years
after the
start of the unauthorized disclosures, NSA, and the IC as a whole, have
not done enough to
minimize the risk of another massive unauthorized disclosure. Although
it is impossible to
reduce the chance of another Snowden to zero, more work can and should
be done to improve
the security of the people and computer networks that keep America's
most closely held secrets.
For instance, a recent DOD Inspector General report directed by the
Committee found that NSA
has yet to effectively implement its post-Snowden security improvements.
The Committee has
taken actions to improve IC information security in the Intelligence
Authorization Acts for Fiscal
Years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and looks forward to working with the
IC to continue to
improve security.
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Table of Contents
Executi.v e su mmary
.........................................................................................................................
1.
Scope and Methodology
.................................................................................................................
1
Early Life
........................................................................................................................................
1
CIA Employment
............................................................................................................................
3
Transition to NSA Contractor
.........................................................................................................
6
NSA Hawaii - Contract Systems Administrator
............................................................................
8
Snowden' s Downloading and Removal Process
..........................................................................
10
NSA Hawaii - Gaining More Access and Departing for China and Russia
................................. 14
Communications with Intelligence Oversight Personnel..
............................................................ 16
Was Snowden a Whistleblower?
..................................................................................................
18
Foreign Influence
..........................................................................................................................
19
What Did Snowden Take?
............................................................................................................
20
What Damage Did Snowden Cause?
............................................................................................
22
How Has the IC Recovered from Snowden?
................................................................................
28
Conclusion - Efforts to Improve Security
....................................................................................
30
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(U) Scope and Methodology
(U) Since June 2013, the unauthorized disclosures of former NSA
contractor Edward
Snowden and the impact of these disclosures on the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC) have been
a subject of continual Committee oversight. The Committee held an open
hearing on the
disclosures on June 18, 2013, and, over the next year, held eight
additional hearings and
briefings, followed by numerous staff-level briefings on Snowden's
disclosures.
(U) In August 2014, then-Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger
directed Committee staff to begin a review of the actions and
motivations of Edward Snowden
related to his removal of more than 1.5 million classified documents
from secure NSA networks.
The intent was not to duplicate the damage assessments already under way
in the executive
branch; rather, the report would help explain to other Members of
Congress-and, where
possible, the American people-how the "most massive and damaging theft
of intelligence
information in our history" occurred, 1 what the U.S. Government knows
about the man who
perpetrated it, and what damage his actions caused.
(U) Over the next two years, Committee staff requested hundreds of
documents from the
IC, participated in dozens of briefings and meetings with IC personnel,
and conducted several
interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden's background
and actions, and
traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden's last two work locations.
(U) The Committee's product is a review, not an investigation, largely
in deference to
any criminal investigation or future prosecution. Since he arrived in
Russia on June 23, 2013,
Snowden has not returned to the United States to face the criminal
charges against him.
Accordingly, the Committee did not interview or seek documents from
individuals whom the
Department of Justice identified as possible witnesses at Snowden's
trial, including Snowden
himself, nor did the Committee request any matters that may have
occurred before a grand jury.
Instead, the IC provided the Committee with access to other individuals
who possessed
substantively similar knowledge. Similarly, rather than interview
Snowden's NSA co-workers
and supervisors directly, Committee staff interviewed IC personnel who
had reviewed reports of
interviews with Snowden's co-workers and supervisors.
(U) The Committee's review has informed numerous congressionally
directed actions
and resource allocation decisions in the enacted Intelligence
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years
2014, 2015, and 2016, and in the House-passed Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year
2017.
(U) Early Life
(U) Edward Joseph Snowden was born on June 21, 1983, in Elizabeth City,
North
Carolina. His parents, Lon Snowde~, a Coast Guard chief petty officer,
and Elizabeth Snowden,
1 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, HPSCI
Worldwide Threats Hearing (Open
Session, Feb. 4, 2014).
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a federal court clerk, moved the family to Annapolis, Maryland, when
Edward was a child.2 In
2001, his parents divorced. 3
(U) By his own account, Snowden was a poor student.4 He dropped out of
high school in
his sophomore year and began taking classes at the local community
college. 5 Snowden hoped
that the classes would allow him to earn a General Education Diploma
(GED), but nothing the
Committee found indicates that he did so. To the contrary, on an
applicant resume submitted to
NSA in 2012, Snowden indicated that he graduated from "Maryland High
School" in 2001;6
earlier, in 2006, Snowden had posted on a public web forum that he did
not "have a degree of
ANY type. I don't even have a high school diploma." 7
(U) After leaving community college, Snowden eventually enlisted in the
Army Reserve
as a special forces recruit. He left after five months, receiving a
discharge in September 2004
without finishing training courses. 8 Snowden would later claim he had
to leave basic training
because "he broke both his legs in a training accident." 9 An NSA
security official the
Committee interviewed took a different view, telling Committee staff
that Snowden was
discharged after suffering from "shin splints," a common overuse injury. 10
(U) Unable to pursue his preferred military career, Snowden turned to
security guard
work. In February 2005, the University of Maryland's Center for the
Advanced Study of
2 "NSA Leaker Edward Snowden Has Ties to North Carolina," Raleigh News &
Observer (Aug. 1, 2013).
3 John M. Broder & Scott Shane, "For Snowden, A Life of Ambition,
Despite the Drifting," New York Times (June
15, 2013).
4 Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras, "Edward Snowden:
the Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations," The Guardian (June 11, 2013), available at
https:/ /www .theguardian.com/world/2013/j
un/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance ( accessed June
28, 2016).
5 Matthew Mosk, et al., "TIMELINE: Edward Snowden's Life As We Know It,"
ABC News, (June 13, 2013).
6 See, e.g., Edward Snowden Resume. Regarding "High School Education,"
the resume Snowden submitted to
NSA's Tailored Access Operations unit says as follows: For "Grad/Exit
dt," Snowden wrote "2001-06-21 ;" For his
"School," Snowden wrote "Maryland High School"; and for "Level
Achieved", Snowden wrote "High School
Graduate."
7 See supra, note 3. One of Snowden' s associates claims to have
reviewed official educational records that
demonstrate Snowden's passage ofa high school equivalency test and
receipt of high school equivalency diploma in
June 2004. Any receipt of such a diploma in 2004 stands in tension with
Snowden's 2006 claim to not have a
"degree of any type [or] ... even a high school diploma"; and with his
2012 resume, which stated that he either left or
graduated from "Maryland High School" in 2001.
8 "What We Know About NSA Leaker Edward Snowden," NBC News (June 10,
2013), available at
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/ _
news/2013/06/10/18882615-what-we-know-about-nsa-Jeaker-snowden?lite
(accessed
June 28, 2016); see also "Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces,
US Army Confirms," The Guardian
(June 10, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/edward-snowden-army-special
forces
(accessed September 15, 2016).
9 "Edward Snowden Did Enlist For Special Forces, US Army Confirms," The
Guardian (June 10, 2013), available
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/l
0/edward-snowden-army-special forces (accessed September 15,
2016).
10 See supra, note 6. If untreated, shin splints can progress into
stress fractures, but the Committee found no
evidence that Snowden was involved in a training accident.
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Language (CASL) sponsored Snowden for a Top Secret security clearance.
11 The investigation
for that clearance turned up only one piece of derogatory information: ~ of
Snowden's said she did not recommend him for access to classified
information. Snowden
sought counseling ~' and the counselor recommended him for a position
of trust with no reservations. The favorable investigation, combined
with a successful
polygraph test, enabled Snowden to work at CASL's lobby reception desk
as a "security
specialist." He worked there for four months, until he was hired by BAE
Systems to work on a
CIA Global Communications Services Contract.
(S//NF) Snowden's stint as a BAE Systems contractor was similarly
short-lived. For less
than a year, he worked as a systems administrator who "managed
installations and application
rollouts" in the Washington, DC, area.14 In August 2006, he converted
from a contractor to a
CIA employee. As part of that conversion, Snowden went through an
"entrance on duty"
s chological evaluation.
(U) CIA Employment
(U) Snowden was not, as he would later claim, a "senior advisor" at CIA.
16 Rather, his
only position as a CIA employee was as a Telecommunications Information
Systems Officer, or
TISO. The job description for a TISO makes clear that the position is an
entry-level IT support
function, not a senior executive. TISOs "operate, maintain, install, and
manage
telecommunications systems," and "provide project management and systems
integration for
voice and data communications systems," including "support to customers
after installation." 17
Even so, the position may have appealed to Snowden because TISOs
"typically spend 60-70% of
their career abroad." 18
(U) In November 2006--less than three months after starting with CIA-Snowden
contacted the Agency's Inspector General (IG) seeking "guidance" because
he felt he was "being
11 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document
classified Cl/NF; cited portion classified
U//FOUO.
12 NSA, FBI, and NCSC, "'Negative Information' Found in Edward Snowden's
Personnel Security File," (Sept. 30,
2014). Overall document classified U//FOUO.
13 Id.
14 CIA Office of Security, "Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting," (Nov.
18, 2014). Overall document classified
S//NF; cited portion classified S//NF.
is Id.
16 Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, "NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden:
'I Don't Want To Live in a Society
that Does These Sorts of Things," The Guardian (Jun. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-interview-video
(accessed May 2, 2016).
17 CIA, Careers and Internships, "Telecommunications Information Systems
Officer - Entry/Developmental,"
www.cia.gov (Oct. 2, 2015).
is Id.
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unfairly targeted" by his supervisor. 19 After entering on duty, Snowden
believed there were
"morale and retention issues" among his fellow TISOs.20 He raised those
concerns with his
training supervisor, the chief of the communications training unit, but
"felt they were left
unaddressed." 21 He next tried the chief and deputy chief of his
operational group, but was
similarly dissatisfied with their response. 22
(U) Undeterred, Snowden spent the next week surveying the other TISOs
who entered on
duty at the same time as him.23 He wrote up his findings and sent them
to the CIA's Strategic
Human Capital Office. Then, instead of attempting to raise his concerns
again with his
supervisor or work collaboratively with other TISOs to resolve the
concerns, Snowden sent his
concerns to the Deputy Director of CIA for Support-the head of the
entire Directorate of
Support and one of the ten most senior executives of CIA.24
(U) In his e-mail, Snowden complained about the process of assigning new
TISOs to
overseas locations, the pay of TIS Os compared to contractors who
performed similar work, and
the difficulty for TISOs to transfer laterally to other jobs. 25
~ Despite his lack of experience, the 23-year-old Snowden told the
Deputy Director he
felt "pretty disenfranchised" because his immediate supervisors did not
take his unsolicited
recommendations to heart. 26
(U) Snowden told the IG that, after he contacted the Deputy Director for
Support, his
supervisors pulled him in to their offices for unscheduled counseling.
In his view, they were
"extremely hostile" and "seem[ ed] to believe I have trouble bonding
with my classmates." 27
Those counseling sessions prompted Snowden to contact the IG to help
protect him from
"reprisal for speaking truth to power."
(U) One day after receiving his complaint, an IG employee responded to
Snowden and
,recommended he contact the CIA's Ombudsman, an official who could help
Snowden sort
through the options available to him and mediate disputes between
managers and employees. 28
The IG employee also directed Snowden to the relevant Agency regulation
regarding the factors
managers could consider when deciding to retain an employee beyond the
initial three-year trial
period.29 Whether that response satisfied Snowden is unclear; shortly
after receiving it, Snowden
sent another message to the IG employee instructing him to disregard the
initial request because
19 E-mail from Snowden to CIA Office of Inspector General (Nov. 2,
2006), Overall document classified S; cited
portion marked U//AIUO.
20 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
21 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
22 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
23 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
24 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
25 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked.
26 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion classified C.
27 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion not portion-marked
28 E-mail from CIA Office oflnspector General to Edward Snowden (Nov. 3,
2006). Overall document classified S;
cited portion classified U//AIUO.
29 Id. Overall document classified S; cited portion classified U//AIUO.
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the issue had been "addressed." 30 During the rest of his time at CIA,
Snowden did not contact
the IG.
f8) After the completion of his training, Snowden was assigned to - in
March 2007
for his first TISO assignment. 31 Snowden was, in the words of his
supervisor, "an energetic
officer" with a "plethora" of experience on Microsoft operating systems,
but he "often does not
positively respond to advice from more senior officers, ... does not
recognize the chain of
command, often demonstrates a lack of maturity, and does not appear to
be embracing the CIA
culture. "32
f8) A few months after starting in_, Snowden asked to apply for a more
senior
position in - as a regional communications officer. His supervisor did
not endorse his
application. When he was not selected for the position, Snowden
responded by starting "a
controversial e-mail exchange with very senior officers" in which he
questioned the selection
board's professionaljudgment. 33 Years later, when characterizing his
experience as a CIA TISO,
Snowden would write that he was "specially selected by [CIA's] Executive
Leadership Team for
[a] high-visibility assignment" that "required exceptionally wide
responsibility." 34 The
description is in tension with his supervisor's account of a junior
officer who "needed more
experience before transitioning to such a demanding position. "35
f8) Snowden also modified CIA's performance review software in
connection with his
annual performance review, by manipulating the font. 36 This behavior
led to Snowden's recall
for "professional consultations" with the head of all CIA technical
officers in Europe. 37 This was
the first but not the only time more senior CIA officers attempted to
correct Snowden's behavior.
His supervisor in - cataloged six counseling sessions between October
2007 and April
2008, nearly one per month, regarding his behavior at work. 38 In
September 2008, Snowden
requested to leave - "short of tour," that is, before his scheduled
rotation date to a new
assignment. 39 The request was denied. Disobeying orders, Snowden
traveled back to the
Washington, D.C., area for his and his fiancee's medical appointments.
Because of his
disobedience, Snowden's supervisors recommended he not return to __ 40
30 E-mail from Snowden to CIA Office oflnspector General (Nov. 3, 2006).
Overall document classified S; cited
portion classified U//AIUO.
31 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014); overall document
classified C//NF; cited portion classified
Cl/NF.
32 Memorandum for the Record by Senior Telecommunications Officer -
Europe, "TISO --Edward
Snowden" (Sept. 4, 2008).
33 CIA Office of Security, "Response to HP SCI Staffer Meeting," (Nov.
18, 2014).
34 Edward Snowden Resume.
35 Memorandum for the Record by Senior Telecommunications Officer -
Europe, "TISO --Edward
Snowden" (Sept. 4, 2008). Overall document classified S//NF; cited
portion classified S.
36 Id. Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S.
37 Id. Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S.
38 Memorandum for the Record by Office in Charge, -· "TISO --Edward
Snowden" (Dec. 18, 2008).
Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S.
39 Id. Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S.
40 Id. Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S.
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(8//NF) In January 2009, CIA submitted a "fitness for duty" report for
Snowden, an
administrative tool to determine whether Snowden had any work-related
medical issues.41 The
Agency also assigned him to a ~osition in the Washington, D.C., area so
he could be available
for any medical appointments. 4
(8//NF) Several years later, Snowden claimed that, while in_, he had ethical
qualms about working for CIA.43 None of the memoranda for the record
detailing his numerous
counseling sessions mention Snowden expressing any concerns about
-· Neither the CIA IG nor any other CIA intelligence oversight official
or manager
has a record of Snowden expressing any concerns about the legality or
morality of CIA activities.
(U) Transition to NSA Contractor
(C,l/NF) Around the same time that Snowden returned to the D.C. area, he
applied for a
position with an NSA contractor, Perot Systems, as a systems
administrator. He was still a CIA
employee at the time and his clearance remained in good standing with no
derogatory
information.44 On March 25, 2009, Perot Systems sponsored Snowden for
employment; six days
later, on March 31, NSA Security checked the Intelligence Community-wide
security database,
"Scattered Castles," to verify Snowden's clearance.45
(U) Seeing no derogatory information in Scattered Castles, NSA Security
approved
Snowden for access eight days later, on April 7.46
(8//NF) On April 16, Snowden formally resigned as a CIA employee. 47
CIA's Security
Office u dated his Scattered Castles record on April 20,
. Because NSA had checked the
database three weeks earlier, NSA Security did not learn of the - in his
record at that
time.49 It is unclear ifNSA Security would have treated Snowden's
onboarding any differently
had NSA been aware of
41 CIA Office of Security, "Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting," (Nov.
18, 2014). Overall document classified
SI/NF; cited portion classified SI/NF.
42 Id. Overall document classified SI/NF; cited
43
NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document
classified Cl/NF; cited portion classified
Cl/NF.
45 Id. Overall document classified Cl/NF; cited portion classified UI/FOUO.
46 Id. Overall document classified Cl/NF; cited portion classified UI/FOUO.
47 Id. Overall document classified Cl/NF; cited portion classified Cl/NF.
48 CIA Office of Security, "Response to HPSCI Staffer Meeting," (Nov.
18, 2014). Overall document classified
SI/NF.
49 NSA, Edward Snowden Time Ii~ 30, 2014 ). Overall document classified
Cl INF; cited portion classified
Cl/NF. The alerting function for - in Scattered Castles has since been
fixed.
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(U) From May 2009 to February 2012, Snowden worked in a variety of roles
supporting
IC contracts for Dell, which had purchased Perot Systems in 2009. He
worked as an IT systems
administrator at NSA sites in .. for a little more than a year, where he
supported NSA's
Agency Extended Information Systems Services (AXISS) contracts. 50
(U) One co-worker recalled that while he was working in .. , Snowden
traveled to
Thailand to learn how to be a ship's captain, but never finished the
training course. According to
another co-worker, at some point before he was stationed in .. , Snowden
took a trip to China
and spoke about his admiration for the Chinese people and Chinese
martial arts. 51 The same coworker
remembered Snowden expressing his view that the U.S. government had
overreached on
surveillance and that it was illegitimate for the government to obtain
data on individuals'
personal computers. 52 There are no indications of how Snowden attempted
to square this belief
with his continued employment in support of the foreign signals
intelligence mission ofNSA.
(U) Other co-workers from Snowden's time in 1111rec alled him as someone
frustrated
with his lack of access to information. One remembered Snowden
complaining how he lacked
access at CIA;53 another recalled him attemptin~ to gain access to
information about the war in
Iraq that was outside of his job responsibilities. 4 Although Snowden
did not obtain the
information he was looking for, he later claimed it was "typical" of the
U.S. government to cover
up embarrassing information. 55
(C//NF) In September 2010, Snowden returned to the United States and
Dell attempted to
move him to a position where he would support IT systems at CIA. Because
of the ~ in
Scattered Castles, however, CIA refused to grant Snowden access to its
information. Dell put
Snowden on leave for three months while waiting for a position that did
not require a security
clearance to open up. Eventually, one did: In December 2010, Snowden
started work in an
uncleared "systems engineer/pre-sales technical role" for Dell
supporting a CIA contract. 57
(U) Snowden was also due for a periodic background reinvestigation in
the fall of 2010.
OPM contractor U.S. Information Services completed that review in May
2011, finding no
derogatory information. According to an after-the-fact review by the
National
Counterintelligence Executive, the reinvestigation was "incomplete" and
"did not present a
complete picture of Mr. Snowden." 58 Among its other flaws, the
investigation never attempted
to verify Snowden's CIA employment or speak to his CIA supervisors, nor
did it attempt to
independently verify Snowden's self-report of a past security
violation-areas where further
so Id. Overall document classified C//NF; cited portion classified U//FOUO.
51 Interview with NSA Atto~(Feb. 8, 2016) (report of interview with-·
52 Id. The same co-worker, -· also mentioned that Snowden considered
himself a privacy advocate.
" Interview with NSA Attom,b. 8, 2016) (report of interview with -·
54 Id. (report of interview with .
55 Id. (report of interview with .
56 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document
classified C//NF; cited portion classified
Cl/NF.
57 Id. Overall document classified C//NF; cited portion classified C//NF.
58 National Counterintelligence Executive, Technical and quality review
of the April 2011 Single Scope Background
Investigation- Periodic Reinvestigation on Mr. Snowden," (Aug. 23,
2013); overall document classified U//FOUO.
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information could have alerted NSA to CIA's concerns. 59 Contrary to
best practices, the
investigation also failed to develop any character references beyond the
two people Snowden
himself listed, his mother and his girlfriend. 60
(8) From August 31, 2011, to January 11, 2012, Snowden took a leave of
absence from
His Dell co-workers offered conflicting accounts of how he spent his
leave, 61
(U) NSA Hawaii - Contract Systems Administrator
(U) Snowden returned from leave in early 2012 and took a position as a
general systems
administrator supporting Dell's AXISS work at NSA's Hawaii Cryptologic
.Center.62 As part of
the change in station, he took a counterintelligence polygraph
examination. The first exam was
"inconclusive," but did not lead to NSA Security developing any further
information; the second
was successful. 63 At the end of March 2012, Snowden moved to Hawaii.
(U) The job Snowden performed in Hawaii was similar to his duties during
the previous
three years with Dell. He was a field systems administrator, working in
technical support office
ofNSA Hawaii. Some of his work involved moving large numbers of files
between different
internal Microsoft SharePoint servers for use by other NSA Hawaii
employees. Although most
NSA Hawaii staff had moved to a new building at the start of 2012,
Snowden and other technical
support workers remained in the Kunia "tunnel," an underground facility
originally built for
aircraft assembly during World War Two.
(U) Snowden had few friends among his co-workers at NSA Hawaii. 64 Those
co-workers
described him as "smart" and "nerdy," but also someone who was
"arrogant," "introverted," and
"squirrelly"; an "introvert" who frequently 'jumped to conclusions. "65
His supervisors found his
work product to be "adequate," but he was chronically late for work,
frequently not showing up
until the afternoon. 66 Snowden claimed he had trouble waking up on time
because he stayed up
late playing video games. 67
(U) Few of Snowden's Hawaii co-workers recall him expressing political
opinions. One
remembered a conversation in which Snowden claimed the Stop Online
Piracy Act and the
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Interview with NSA Attorney (Feb. 8, 2016).
62 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Dell Federal was a
subcontractor to CACI International for
NSA's AXISS Field IT support contracts. E-mail from NSA Legislative
Affairs to HPSCI Staff, "Responses to
Your Questions on Read and Return Documents for HPSCI Media Leaks
Review," (Dec. 2, 2014, at 3:47 PM).
Overall document cited U//FOUO; cited portion classified U//FOUO. ·
63 Id.
64 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
65 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016).
66 Id.
61 Id.
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Protect Intellectual Property Act would lead to online censorship. 68 In
the same conversation,
Snowden told his colleague that he had not read either bill.69 The same
co-worker recalled
Snowden once claiming that, based on his meetings with Chinese hackers
at a conference, the
United States caused problems for China but China never caused problems
for the United
States.70 Although no other co-worker in Hawaii recalled Snowden
expressing any sympathy for
foreign governments, a different co-worker from the Kunia tunnel
remembered that Snowden
defended the actions of Private Bradley Manning. 71
(U) One incident early in Snowden's time at NSA Hawaii merits further
description. In
June 2012, Snowden installed a patch to a group of servers on classified
networks that supported
NSA field sites, including NSA Hawaii. Although the patch was intended
to fix a vulnerability
to the classified servers, the patch caused the servers to crash,
resulting in a loss of network
access for several NSA sites.72 One ofNSA's senior technical support
managers, a government
employee, fired off an e-mail to a number of systems administrators,
asking who had installed
the troublesome patch and sarcastically chiding that individual for
failing to test the patch before
loading it. 73
(U) Snowden replied to all the recipients and added the deputy head
ofNSA's technical
services directorate to the e-mail thread. This individual was several
levels above the immediate
government supervisors whom Snowden could have contacted first. Calling
the initial e-mail
"not appropriate and ... not helpful," Snowden accused the middle
manager of focusing on
"evasion and finger-pointing rather than problem resolution." 74
(U) Snowden received a quick rebuke. The NSA civilian employee in Washington
responsible for managing field AXISS contracts sent Snowden an e-mail
telling him his response
was "totally UNACCEPTABLE" because "[u]nder no circumstances will any
contractor call out
or point fingers at any government manager whether you agree with their
handling of an issue or
not."75 She further instructed Snowden that ifhe "felt the need to
discuss with any management
it should have been done with the site management you are working with
and no one else." 76
~ That weekend, Snowden came in to work
77
68 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing co-worker 111111).
69 Id. (citing co-worker
70 Id. (citing co-worker
71 Id.; Interview with N ttomey (Feb. 8, 2016) ( citing co-worker.).
72 Interview with (Oct. 28, 2015).
73 E-mail from , "RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956," (Jun. 21,
2012, at 1:20AM). Overall
document classified U//FOUO.
74 E-mail from Edward Snowden, "RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956,"
(Jun. 21, 2012, at 1 :OOPM). Overall
document classified U//FOUO.
75 E-mail from_, "(U) E-mail you sent in response to ICA-tcp issues with
a patch," (Jun. 22, 2012, at
3:26AM). Overall document classified U//FOUO.
76 Id.
77 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
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(U) The following Monday, he sent an e-mail to the NSA middle manager
saying he
"understood how bad this e-mail looked for what was intended to be a
relatively benign
message" and acknowledging that the e-mail "never should have happened
in the first place." 78
The manager accepted the apology, explaining that his problem with the
message "had nothing
to do with the content but with distribution" because he did not
understand "the elevation of the
issue to such a high management level"; that is, to the deputy head
ofNSA's technical services
directorate. 79
(U) Snowden would later publicly claim that his "breaking point"-the
final impetus for
his unauthorized downloads and disclosures of troves of classified
material-was March 2013
congressional testimony by Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper. 80
(SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) But only a few weeks after his conflict with NSA
managers,
on July 12, 2012-eight months before Director Clapper's
testimony-Snowden began the
unauthorized, mass downloading of information from NSA networks. 81
(U) Snowden 's Downloading and Removal Process
(U) Snowden used several methods to gather information on NSA networks,
none of
which required advanced computer skills.
(U) At first, Snowden used blunt tools to download files en masse from
NSA networks.
Two non-interactive downloading tools, commonly known as "scraping"
tools, called "wget"
and DownThemAll! were available on NSA classified networks for
legitimate system
administrator purposes. 84 Both tools were designed to allow users to
download large numbers of
files over slow or unstable network connections. 85 Snowden used the two
tools with a list of
website addresses, sometimes writing simple programming scripts to
generate the lists. For
78 E-mail from Edward Snowden, "RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956"
(Jun. 25, 2012, at 2:31AM). Overall
document classified U//FOUO.
79 E-mail from_, "RE: (U) ICA-tcp issues with KB2653956" (Jun. 25, 2012,
at 1:51AM). Overall
document classified U//FOUO.
80 "Transcript: ARD Interview with Edward Snowden," (Jan. 26, 2014),
available at
https://edwardsnowden.com/20 14/01/27
/video-and-interview-with-edward-snowden.
81 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014). Overall document
classified C//NF; cited portion classified
C//REL TO USA, FVEY.
82 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited ortion classified
S//REL.
83
NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified U//FOUO
85 Id. Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified U//FOUO
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instance, ifNSA webpages were set up in numerical order (i.e., page 1,
page 2, page 3, and so
on), Snowden programmed a script to automatically collect the pages. 86
Neither scraping tool
targeted areas of potential privacy or civil liberties concerns; rather,
Snowden downloaded all
information from internal NSA networks and classified webpages of other
IC elements. 87
(U) Exceeding the access required to do his job, Snowden next began
using his systems
administrator privileges to search across other NSA employees' personal
network drives and
copy what he found on their drives.91 Snowden also enlisted his
unwitting colleagues to help
him, asking several of his co-workers for their securit1 credentials so
he could obtain
information that they could access, but he could not.9 One of these
co-workers subsequently
lost his security clearance and resigned from NSA employment. 93
(8//REL) Snowden infringed the privacy of at least • NSA personnel by
searching
their network drives without their permission, removing a co y of any
documents he found to be
of interest. 94 5 •
86 Id. Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified U//FOUO
87 Id. Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified U//FOUO
88 NSA, "HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper," (Jan. 26, 2015). Overall
document classified S//NF; cited portion
classified S//NF. See infra for a more detailed description of the files
Snowden removed.
89 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited ortion classified
S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
90 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
91 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified U//FOUO.
92 HPSCI Memorandum for the Record, NSA Briefing to HPSCI Staff(July 22,
2013).
93 NSA Legislative Affairs Memorandum to Staff Director and Minority
Staff Director (Feb. 10, 2014). Overall
document classified U; document not portion-marked.
94 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016); NSA, "Number of
Personal Network Drives Searched,"
(Mar. 14, 2016). Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited
portion classified S//REL TO USA,
FVEY.
95 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
96 Id.
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(U) Snowden's searches quickly expanded beyond surveillance programs.
Some of the
personal network drives Snowden searched belonged to individuals
involved in the hiring
decision for a job for which Snowden had applied. On these individuals'
network drives,
Snowden searched for human resources files and files related to the
promotion and hiring
decisions.97
(S//REL) Snowden first saved the information he gathered on his personal
network
drive.98 At some point in 2012, a fellow systems administrator noticed
that Snowden's personal
drive used a significantly larger amount of memory than most other
employees and asked him
what he was doing. 99 Snowden responded that he was downloading system
atches for NSA
networks, a task that was consistent with his job responsibilities. 100
(U) In late August 2012, Snowden requested a ''thin-on-thick" machine
for his desk. 102
At the time, NSA Hawaii was in the middle of a transition from "thick
clients,"-physical
desktop computers at each worker's desk, to "thin clients,"-virtual
desktops hosted on servers.
On a ''thin client," there is no traditional desktop computer at
workers' desks, rather, each user
has a client that provides a display and input, with computing
processors, memory, and storage
on network servers. Snowden's "thin-on-thick" setup meant that he had a
physical desktop
computer at his desk, but he only used its computing power and hard
drive to operate a virtual
computer. This "thin-on-thick" setup allowed NSA Hawaii to reap some of
the benefits of thin
clients, such as uniform security policies and improved information
sharing, without the cost of
buying new thin client devices. NSA Hawaii could also make use of a
large quantity of "thick
client" desktop computers it had recently purchased. 103 Yet the
thin-on-thick setup opened up a
loophole for Snowden to exploit.
(S//NF) Snowden knew NSA's networks recorded and logged every action by
users on
thick client workstations while connected to the network. 104 He also
knew that auditing controls
97 NSA, "Number of Personal Network Drives Searched," (Mar. 14, 2016).
Overall document classified S//REL TO
USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
98 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
99 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016).
100 Id.
101 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
102 NSA Response to HPSCI Question on Thin-on-Thick Computer at
Snowden's Workstation (Mar. 2, 2016).
Overall document classified S//NF; cited portion classified S//NF.
Because thin-on-thick workstations were
prevalent at NSA Hawaii at the time, Snowden did not have to go through
any special approval process to obtain a
thin-on-thick workstation.
103 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
104 NSA, "Response to HPSCI Document Re uest - Question # IO" (Ma
S//NF; cited ortion classified S//NF.
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would send an alert to network security ersonnel if he tried to remove
data from the network.
106
(SI/REL) There is no evidence that NSA was aware of this specific
vulnerability to its
networks. Because Snowden's legitimate work responsibilities involved
transferring large
amounts of data between different SharePoint servers, the large
quantities of data he copied as
Step I of the exfiltration process did not trigger any NSA alerts for
abnormal network traffic. 109
105 NSA, "Purpose of Functioning CD-ROM and USB Drive," (Mar. 14, 2016).
Overall document classified S//REL
USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S//REL USA, FVEY.
106 NSA, "Methods Used by Edward Snowden To Remove Documents from NSA
Networks," (Oct. 29, 2014).
Overall document classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY; cited portion
classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY. See also id
for additional details on the NSA forensics rocess that allowed for the
reconstruction of Snowden' s methods.
107
Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
109 NSA, "Response to HPSCI Document Request - Question# 1 O" (May 1,
2015). Overall document classified
S//REL USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S//REL USA, FVEY. Although
Snowden, as a systems administrator,
was authorized to transfer large quantities of data on the NSA network,
he was not authorized to remove data from
the network for his intended purpose of later transferring it to
removable media so he could disclose it.
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(U) NSA Hawaii - Gaining More Access and Departing for China and Russia
(U) After he began removing documents in the summer of 2012, Snowden
spent several
months applying for employment as a NSA civilian. In September 2012, he
took a test to obtain
a position in the Tailored Access Operations office, or TAO, the group
within NSA responsible
for computer network exploitation operations. After finding the test and
its answers among the
documents he had taken off of NSA networks, he passed the test. 111
Based on the test result and
his exaggerated resume, 112 TAO offered him a position. The pay grade
TAO offered, howevera
GS-12 position that would have paid around $70,000 per year-was not
sufficient for
Snowden. He instead believed he should have been offered a GS-15
position that would have
paid nearly $120,000 per year. 113
(U) In early December 2012, Snowden attempted to contact journalist
Glenn Greenwald.
To hide his identity, Snowden used the pseudonym "Cincinnatus" and asked
Greenwald for his
public encryption key so Snowden could send him documents securely. 115
In January 2013, he
contacted filmmaker Laura Poitras. 116
(U) In late March 2013, Snowden finally obtained a new position, not
with NSA as a
civilian but with Booz Allen Hamilton as a contractor. 117 He would be a
SIGINT Development
Analyst, meaning he analyzed foreign networks and cyber operators to
help NSA's National
Threat Operation Center (NTOC) in its cyber defense efforts. NTOC's
operations helped defend
U.S. military networks from attacks by foreign cyber actors, including
Russia and China.
110 NSA, "Purpose of Functioning CD-ROM and USB Drive," (Mar. 14, 2016).
111 Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison, and Suzanna Andrews, "The Snowden
Saga: A Shadow land of Secrets and
Light," Vanity Fair (May 2014), available at
www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/05/edward-snowden-politicsinterview
(quoting NSA Deputy Director Rick Ledgett).
112 Edward Snowden Resume (June 28, 2012). Snowden described himself as
a "Senior Advisor" at
"Dell/NSNCIA/DIA" rather than as a systems administrator. Resume
inflation was a habit for Snowden-in the
files he sent to Glenn Oreenwald, he described himself as an NSA Special
Advisor "under corporate cover" and as a
former CIA "field officer." See Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide at 32.
113 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
114 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
115 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide at 7 (2014).
116 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
117 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
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(C//NF) In his new position, Snowden had access to more documents on NSA
networks,
many of which he later removed. 118 Because there was not a
thin-on-thick workstation at
Snowden's new desk, he had to return after hours to his old desk-located
at a different NSA
facility a twenty-minute drive away-to exfiltrate documents 119
His NTOC job did not require him to visit his old building, so he had no
reason other than
document removal to return. 120
(U) On May 15, 2013, Snowden told his Booz Allen Hamilton supervisor
that he needed
to take two weeks of leave without pay to return to the continental
United States for medical
reasons. 121 According to his supervisor, Snowden had previously claimed
he suffered from
epilepsy, 122 although he never presented evidence of a diagnosis from
any doctor. 123 Four days
later, Snowden flew to Hong Kong without telling either his girlfriend
or his mother (who was in
Hawaii at the time visiting him) where he was going. 124 The Committee
found no conclusive
evidence indicating why Snowden chose Hong Kong as his destination, but,
according to later
accounts, Snowden believed he would be safe in the city based on its
tradition of free speech. 125
(U) On Friday May 31, Snowden's leave without pay ended. The following
Monday,
June 3, Booz Allen Hamilton started looking for him. 126 Two days later,
on June 5, Booz Allen
reported Snowden to NSA's Office of Security and Greenwald published the
first ofSnowden's
disclosures. 127
(U) Four days after the first Greenwald articles were published, Snowden
revealed
himself as the source of the disclosures. 128 According to press
reports, between June 10 and June
23, Snowden hid in the apartments of refugees in Hong Kong while his
lawyer worked to arrange
transit for him out of the city. 129 On June 23, 2013, he flew from Hong
Konf< to Moscow's
Sheremetyvevo airport, accompanied by Wikileaks activist Sarah Harrison.
1 0 The next day, he
failed to appear on a flight to Havana and disappeared from public view
until August 1, 2013,
when Russia granted him asylum and he left the airport. 131 As of
September 15, 2016, Snowden
remains in Russia.
118 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
119 NSA, "Response to HPSCI Document Request - Question #2" (June 24,
2015). Overall document classified
S//NF; cited portion classified C//REL.
120 Id. Cited portion classified C//REL.
121 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
122 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing BAH supervisor).
123 Interview with NSA Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
124 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014); Interview with NSA
Security Official (Jan. 28, 2016).
125 See Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 108.
126 NSA, Edward Snowden Timeline (Sept. 30, 2014).
127 Glenn Greenwald, "Verizon Order: NSA Collecting Phone Records of
Millions of Americans Daily," The
Guardian (June 5, 2013).
128 See Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 146-52.
129 Theresa Tedesco, "How Snowden Escaped," National Post (Sept. 6,
2016), available at
http://news.nationalpost.com/features/how-edward-snowden-escaped-hong-kong/
130 Luke Harding, The Snowden Files (2014) at 224.
131 Id. at 229-30, 250.
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Additionally, although
Snowden's objective may have been to inform the public, the information
he released is also
available to Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean intelligence
services; any terrorist with
Internet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.
(S//NF) When he fled Hong Kong, Snowden left a number of encrypted com
uter hard
drives behind.
-133
(U) Communications with Intelligence Oversight Personnel
(U) In March 2014 public testimony to the European Parliament, Snowden
claimed that
he reported his concerns about "clearly problematic programs to more
than ten distinct officials"
at NSA. 134 Snowden also publicly stated that he "specifically expressed
concern about [NSA' s]
suspect interpretation of the law," inviting "members of Congress to
request a written answer to
this question [from the NSA]." 135 The Committee requested such an
answer from NSA, 136 and
found no evidence to support these claims. The Committee further found
no evidence that
Snowden attempted to communicate concerns about the legality or morality
of intelligence
activities to any officials, senior or otherwise, during his time at
either CIA or NSA.
(U) As already described, one of Snowden's Hawaii co-workers recalls him
defending
Bradley Manning's actions, 137 another remembered him criticizing bills
under consideration in
Congress that he regarded as harmful to online privacy 138 and
criticizing U.S. foreign policy
toward China. 139 None of his co-workers or his supervisors, however,
recall Snowden raising
concerns about the legality or morality of U.S. intelligence activities. 140
132 DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Initial Assessment" (Dec. 26,
2013), at 3. Overall document classified
TS//Sl//RSEN/OC/NF; cited portion classified S//NF.
133 HPSCI Memorandum for the Record, Insider Threat/Counterintelligence
Monthly Briefing (Feb. 4, 2014).
134 Edward Snowden, Testimony to the European Parliament (Mar. 7, 2014)
at 6.
135 Bryan Burrough, Sarah Ellison, and Suzanna Andrews, "The Snowden
Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and
Light," Vanity Fair (May 2014), available at
www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/20l4/05/edward-snowden-politicsinterview.
136 Letter from HPSCI Chairman Mike Rogers to Director James Clapper
(Aug. 5, 2014) (requesting, among other
things, "[a]ll communications between Edward Snowden and any IC or
Department of Defense compliance, legal, or
Inspector General personnel").
137 See supra, note 71.
138 See supra, note 68.
139 See supra, note 70.
140 Interview with NSA Attorney (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing supervisors,
co-workers). The co-worker who recalled
Snowden defending Manning expressly mentioned that Snowden did not
believe Americans' privacy rights were
being violated and that Snowden had no qualms about the legality of the
NSA mission. See Interview with NSA
Attorney (Feb. 8, 2016) ( citing co-worker •.
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(U) Neither did Snowden raise any concerns with IC oversight personnel.
As previously
discussed, Snowden contacted the CIA IG within a few months of his start
at the Agency to
complain about training issues and management style, but he later
dropped the complaint. 141 He
did not contact the NSA IG, the Department of Defense (DOD) IG, or the
Intelligence
Community (IC) IG, all of whom could have responded to a complaint
regarding unlawful
intelligence activities. Nor did Snowden attempt to contact the
Committee or the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence through the procedures available to him under
the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act (IC WP A). He could have done
this anonymously if
he feared retribution.
(U) Snowden did, however, contact NSA personnel who worked in an
internal oversight
office about his personal difficulty understanding the safeguards
against unlawful intelligence
activities. While on a trip to NSA headquarters at Ft. Meade in June
2012, Snowden visited a
training officer in the internal oversight and compliance office of the
Signals Intelligence
Directorate. The training officer remembered that Snowden was upset
because he had failed
NSA's internal training course on how to handle information collected
under FISA Section 702,
the legal authority by which the government can target the
communications of non-U.S. persons
outside the United States. 142
(U) The internal training is a rigorous computer-based course that walks
NSA employees
and contractors through the laws and regulations that govern the proper
handling of information
collected under the authority of FISA Section 702, including information
collected under the
programs Snowden would later disclose, PRISM and "upstream" collection.
At the end of the
course, NSA personnel take a scenario-based test to gauge their
comprehension of the material;
if they do not receive a minimum score on the test, they must retake the
computer-based training
course. All of the answers to the test questions can be found within the
training material. After
three failures of the computer-based course, the individual must attend
an in-person training
course to ensure they are able to understand the rules governing Section
702, including privacy
protections.
(U) According to the training officer, Snowden had failed the
computer-based training
course and was afraid of the consequences. 143 He was also upset because
he believed the course
was rigged. 144 After the training officer explained to Snowden that he
could take the course
again-and that careful reading would allow him to find all of the
answers to the test-Snowden
became calm and left the oversight and compliance office. 145 At no
point during his visit to the
compliance office did Snowden raise any concerns about how NSA used
Section 702, PRISM, or
"upstream" collection. 146
141 See supra, notes 19 through 30.
142 NSA, "OVSC1203 Issue Regarding Course Content and Trick Questions,"
overall document classified TS/INF;
cited portion classified U//FOUO.
143 Interview with - (Oct. 28, 2015).
144 Id
14s Id.
146 Id.
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(U) In April 2013-after he had removed documents multiple times from NSA
systemsSnowden
contacted the NSA Office of General Counsel with a question about a
different training
course. 147 He was curious about the mandatory training on United States
Signals Intelligence
Directive 18, which is the foundational authority for NSA's collection
activities overseas
targeting foreigners. 148 Specifically, he believed the training
erroneously accorded the same
precedence to statutes and executive orders. A few days later, an NSA
attorney clarified that
while executive orders have the force of law, they cannot trump a
statute. 149 Snowden did not
respond to that e-mail; he also did not raise any concerns about the
legality or morality of U.S.
intelligence activities. 150
(U) Was Snowden a Whistlehlower?
(U) As a legal matter, during his time with NSA, Edward Snowden did not use
whistleblower procedures under either law or regulation to raise his
objections to U.S.
intelligence activities, and thus, is not considered a whistleblower
under current law. He did not
file a complaint with the DOD or IC IG's office, for example, or contact
the intelligence
committees with concerns about fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, or
violations of law.
Instead, Snowden disclosed classified information to the press.
(U) Snowden, however, has argued that even a lawful disclosure would
have resulted in
retaliation against him.
(U) Among other things, Snowden has argued that he was unable to raise
concerns about
NSA programs because he was not entitled to protection as an IC
whistleblower given his status
as a contractor. (He was with Booz Allen at the time of his leaks to the
press.) But the 1998 IC
WP A applies to IC employees as well as contractors. Although the
statute does not explicitly
prohibit reprisals, the IC WPA channel nevertheless enables
confidential, classified disclosures
and oversight, as well as a measure of informal source protection by
Congress. The statute
specifically authorizes IC contractors to inform the intelligence
committees of adverse actions
taken as a consequence of IC WPA-covered disclosures.
(U) Moreover, explicit protection against such actions was conferred on
Snowden by
DoD regulation 5240 1-R. Snowden's unauthorized disclosures involved
Executive Order (EO)
12333 activities as well as activities conducted under FISA. At least
with respect to intelligence
activities authorized under E.O. 12333-and, according to the DoD Senior
Intelligence
Oversight Official, activities conducted under other authorities-5240
1-R requires employees
and contractors of a DoD intelligence element to report "questionable
activities," or "conduct
that constitutes, or is related to, [an] intelligence activity that may
violate the law, any Executive
147 E-mail from Edward Snowden to NSA Office of General Counsel (Apr. 5,
2013, at 4:11PM), overall document
classified U//FOUO; cited portion classified U//FOUO.
148 Id., cited portion classified U//FOUO.
149 E-mail from NSA Office of General Counsel Attorney to Edward Snowden
(Apr. 8, 2013, at 1 :37PM), overall
document classified U//FOUO; cited portion classified U//FOUO.
150 IC on the Record, "Edward J. Snowden email inquiry to the NSA Office
of General Counsel," (May 29, 2014)
("There was not additional follow-up noted.").
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Order or Presidential directive ... or applicable DoD policy[.]" 151
5240 1-R also says that DoD
senior leaders shall "ensure that no adverse action is taken against any
employee [ or contractor]
because the employee reports [questionable activities]" pursuant to the
regulation. 152 The IC
IG's Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing &
Source Protection
(ICW&SP), a former employee of the DoD IG's staff, has advised HPSCI
staff that these
procedures applied to Snowden during his employment as an NSA contractor
and would have
helped to shield him from retaliation for voicing his objections internally.
(U) Finally, Snowden also likely was covered by 10 U.S.C. § 2409
(Section 2409). As
written at the time of Snowden's leaks, 153 Section 2409 was primarily
focused on protecting
DoD contractors from reprisals if they properly disclosed a "violation
of law related" to a DoD
contract. However, Snowden has not advanced any contract-related claims
about NSA
surveillance. Rather, he generally disagreed with NSA surveillance
programs on policy and
constitutional grounds.
(U) If Snowden did have concerns with programs related to a DoD
contract, then the
prior version of Section 2409 authorized him to raise those concerns
without fear of retaliation
with a "Member of Congress, a representative of a Committee of Congress,
an Inspector
General, the Government Accountability Office, a Department of Defense
employee responsible
for contract oversight or management, or an authorized official of an
agency or the Department
of Justice[.]"
(U) Foreign Influence
151 Department of Defense Regulation 5240 1-R, Procedures Governing the
Activities of DoD Intelligence
Components that Affect U.S. Persons, C.15.2.1, 3.1.1 (Dec. 7, 1982)
(emphasis added).
152 Id at C.14.2.3.2.
153 Important amendments to Section 2409, which took effect in July
2013, substantially altered the statute. Among
other things, the updates extended reprisal protections to DoD
subcontractors as well as contractors, and widened the
list of persons to whom contractors and subcontractors could make
disclosures. At the same time, the amendments
also narrowed Section 2409's coverage by explicitly excluding employees
and contractors ofIC elements. However,
that limitation, like other alterations to Section 2409, did not take
effect until July 2013-after Snowden had
unlawfully disclosed NSA material to journalists.
154 See, e.g., Testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander at 30, HPSCI Hearing
(Jun. 13, 2013) ("It is not clear to us if there
is a foreign nexus. There [are] some things; it does look odd that
someone would go to Hon Kong to do this.")
155
15
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(TS//HCS/OC/NF) Since Snowden's arrival in Moscow, he has had, and
continues to
have, contact with Russian intelligence services.
and in June 2016,
the deputy chairman of the Russian parliament's defense and security
committee asserted that
"Snowden did share intelligence" with his government. 161
(U) What Did Snowden Take?
In light of the volume at stake, it is likely that even
Snowden does not know the full contents of all 1.5 million documents he
removed.
(U) One thing that is clear, however, is that the IC documents disclosed
in public are
merely the tip of the iceberg.
(S//NF) As of August 19, 2016, press outlets had published or referenced_
taken by Snowden. 164 This represents less than one-tenth of one percent
of the nearly 1.5 million
documents the IC assesses Snowden removed. 165
160 Id. Cited material classified S//OC//NF.
161 Mary Louise Kelly, "During Tenure in Russia, Edward Snowden Has Kept
A Low Profile," National Public
Radio (June 29, 2016), available at
http://www.npr.org/2016/06/29/483890378/during-tenure-in-russia-edwardsnowden-
has-ke t-a-low- rofile.
16
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(U) The 1.5 million documents came from two classified networks, an
internal NSA
network called NSANet and an IC-wide Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented
Information
network called the Joint Warfighter Information Computer System (JWICS).
If printed out and
stacked, these documents would create a pile more than three miles high. 166
165 NSA, "HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper," (Jan. 26, 2015) Overall
document classified S//NF; cited portion
classified S//NF.
166 Testimony of Mr. Scott Liard, Deputy Director for
Counterintelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, HPSCI
Hearing (Jan. 27, 2014), at 7-8. The 1.5 million document count does not
include 374,000 blank documents
Snowden downloaded from the Department of the Army Intelligence
Information Service (DAIIS) Message
Processing System. See DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Fourth
Quarter Report, 2014" (Dec. 31, 2014), at
xvii.
167 NSA, "HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper," (Jan. 26, 2015). Overall
document classified S//NF; cited portion
classified S//NF.
168 NSA, "Timing of Recollection and Security Flags," (Mar. 14, 2016).
Overall document classified S//REL TO
USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S//REL.
169 Id.
110 Id.
171 NSA, "HPSCI Recollection Summary Paper," (Jan. 26, 2015).
172 Id.; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Fourth Quarter
Report, 2014" (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
173 Id; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Fourth Quarter
Report, 2014" (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
174 Id; see also DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Fourth Quarter
Report, 2014" (Dec. 31, 2014), at xvii.
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(8) The vast majority of the documents Snowden removed were unrelated to
electronic
surveillance or any issues associated with privacy and civil liberties.
(U) What Damage Did Snowden Cause?
(S/INF) Over the past three years, the Intelligence Community and the
Department of
Defense (DoD) have carried out separate reviews-with differing
methodologies-of the
contents of all 1.5 million documents Snowden removed. It is not clear
which of the documents
Snowden removed are in the hands of a foreign government. All of the
documents that have
been publicly disclosed 176--can be accessed b foreign militaries
and intelligence services as well as the public.
(U) Out of an abundance of caution, DoD therefore reviewed all 1.5
million documents to
determine the maximum extent of the possible damage.
(TS/INF) As of June 2016, the most recent DoD review identified 13
high-risk issues,
which are identified in the following table. 179 Eight of the 13 relate to
capabilities ofDoD; if the Russian or Chinese
governments have access to this information, American troops will be at
greater risk in any
future conflict. 180
E-mail from NSA Legislative Affairs (Aug. 22, 2016, at 4:48PM). Overall
document classified S//REL TO
USA, FVY; cited portion classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
177 DIA, Information Review Task Force-2, "Initial Assessment" (Dec. 26,
2013), at 3. Overall document classified
TS//SV/RSEN/OC/NF; cited portion classified S//NF.
178 Mary Louise Kelly, "During Tenure in Russia, Edward Snowden Has Kept
A Low Profile," National Public
Radio (June 29, 2016), available at
http://www.npr.org/2016/06/29/483890378/during-tenure-in-russia-edwardsnowden-
has-kept-a-low-profile.
179 DoD, Mitigation Oversight Task Force, "Quarterly Report" (Oct.
2015), at 8. Overall document classified
TS//Sl/TK//ORCON/NF; cited portion classified TS/INF
180 Id.
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-
-
(U) The Intelligence Community, by contrast, has carried out a damage
assessment for
only a small subset of the documents Snowden removed. And unlike IC
damage assessments for
previous unauthorized disclosures , 181 the IC assessment on Snowden
does not contain an
assessment of Snowden 's background and motive, an assessment of whether
he was the agent of
a foreign intelligence service, or recommendations for how to improve
security in the IC. In its
review, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) , a
component of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, divided the documents Snowden
removed into three
"tiers." 182
181 See, e.g., Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,
"Ana Belen Montes : A Damage Assessment ,"
(July ! , 2004) . Overall document classified S//NF.
182 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden , 1 January 20 I 5 through 31 August 20 I
5," (Apr. 8, 2016) , at 5. Overall document
classified TS//HCS-P/Sl-G /TK//OC/NF; cited portion classified U//FOUO.
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(8//REL) Tier One: Documents that have been disclosed in the media,
either in whole
or in part. As of August 19, 2016, press outlets had published or
referenced 1111fil es taken by
Snowden.183
(TS/181/lOC/NF) Tier Two: Documents that, based on forensic analysis,
Snowden
would have collected in the course of collecting Tier One, but have not
yet been disclosed to the
ublic. The IC assesses these documents are likel in the hands of the media.
(8//NF) The IC damage assessment of Tier One documents is still ongoing,
but, as oflate
May 2016, the IC had no plans to c out a damage assessment of the
documents in Tier Two
or Tier Three. 186
As a result, the IC's
damage assessment cannot be considered a complete accounting of the
damage Snowden caused
to U.S. intelligence.
(U) However, even the IC's limited damage assessment of documents in
Tier One
indicates that Snowden's disclosures caused massive damage to national
security. A few
examples, listed below, illustrate the scale of the damage .
•
183 E-mail from NSA Legislative Affairs (Aug. 22, 2016, at 4:48PM).
Overall document classified S//REL TO
USA, FVEY; cited portion classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY.
184 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,"
(Apr. 8, 2016), at 5. Overall document
classified TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//OC/NF, cited portion classified TS//SI/OC/NF.
185 Id., cited portion classified TS//SI/OC/NF.
186 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC (May 25, 2016).
187 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,"
(Apr. 8, 2016), at I. Overall document
classified TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//OC/NF; cited portion classified S//NF.
188 HPSCI Staff Memorandum for the Record, "NSA Notification of Resulting
from Recent Media Disclosures," (July 8, 2014). Overall document
classified TS//SI//NF.
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24
1s9 Id.
190 Id.
•
•
TOP SECRET//HCS O P/SI G/TKJ/ORCON/NOFOR1'J
0
0
0
191 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Inform ation
Attributed to Edward Snowden , I August 2014 through 31 December 2014,"
(Dec . 22, 2015) , at 25. Overall
document classified TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//OC/NF; cited portion classified
S//Sl//NF .
192 Presidential Policy Directive 28, "Signals Intelligence Activities"
(Jan . 17, 20 I 4) .
193 Letter from Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper to
Chairman Devin Nunes and Ranking Member
Adam Schiff (Jun. 23, 2015). Overall document classified TS//SI//NF,
cited portion classified TS//SI//NF .
194 NSA, "Response to Congressionally Directed Action:
_ ," (Nov . 17, 2014), at 2-4. Overall document classified TS//Sl//NF ;
cited portion classified
TS//Sl//NF .
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•
0
•
•
195 HPSCI Staff Briefing with ODNI (Sept. 6, 2016).
196 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC, NSA, CIA, and FBI (Jun. 17, 2016).
197 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden, 1 August 2014 through 31 December 2014 -
HCS-0 Annex" (Dec. 22, 2015), .
Overall document classified TS//HCS-0/SI//OC//NF; cited portion
classified S//HCS-0//0C/NF.
198 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden, 1 January 2015 through 31 August 2015,"
(Apr. 8, 2016), at 11. Overall document
classified TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//OC/NF; cited portion classified TS//SI//NF.
199 HPSCI Staff Briefing with NCSC, NSA, CIA, and FBI (Jun. 17, 2016).
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0
0
•
•
200 NCSC, "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment: Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information
Attributed to Edward Snowden, I January 2015 through 31 August 2015,"
(Apr. 8, 2016), at 11. Overall document
classified TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//OC/NF; cited portion classified
S//HCS-P/SI//OC/NF.
201 Id., cited portion classified S//HCS-P/SI//OC/NF.
202 NSA, "Response to Request for Information Re: ," (Dec. 16, 2014).
Overall document classified TS//SI//NF; cited portion classified TS//SI//NF.
203 CIA, Memorandum for Congress, "In Response to Questions on Decreased
Collection Possibly Caused by
Unauthorized Disclosures since June 2013," (July 20, 2016), at 2.
Overall document classified TS//HCS-0-P
CRD/SI//OC/NF; cited portion classified TS//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY).
204 ODNI, Recouping Intelligence Capabilities Brief (Jun. 7, 2016), at
8. Overall document classified TS//SI//NF;
cited portion classified TS//SI//NF; ODNI Briefing to HPSCI Staff on
Recouping Intelligence Capabilities Brief
(July 13, 2016).
20S Id.
206 ODNI, "Remediation of Unauthorized Disclosures" (June 2015), at 3.
Overall document classified
TS//SI//OC/NF; cited portion classified TS//SI/OC/NF.
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•
•
(U) How Has the IC Recovered from Snowden?
(TS//SI//NF) There is no IC-wide estimate for the total cost to the
government of
remediating Snowden's disclosures. However, a mid-2015 study by ODNI's
Systems and
Resources Analysis Group estimated that NSA and CIA will spend over Fiscal
Years 2016 and 2017 to recover from the damage Snowden's disclosures
caused to SIGINT
capabilities. 211
(TS/1-SI//NFA) s a whole, the IC will undoubtedly spend even more. The
estimate represents a conservative assessment of the amount CIA and NSA
will spend to rebuild
SIGINT capabilities that were damaged by Snowden's disclosures. The
estimate captures only
two years of spending and does not reflect investments made before
Fiscal Year 2016 or planned
investments for Fiscal Year 2018 and beyond. Moreover, it does not
capture the costs associated
HPSCI Staff Memorandum for the Record, "Upcoming Unauthorized Disclosures of
~ Overall document classified TS//SI//NF. ·
ODNI SRA, "FYl7 Major Issue Studies- Recouping Intelligence
Capabilities," (June 7, 2016), at 9. Overall
document classified TS//SI//NF; cited portion classified TS//SI//NF.
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with the IC's damaged relationships with foreign and corporate partners,
the opportunity cost of
the time and resources the IC and DOD have spent mitigating the damage
of the disclosures, or
the costs of improved security measures across the federal government.
(U) Snowden's actions also exposed significant vulnerabilities in the
IC's information
security. Although it is impossible to reduce the risk of an insider
threat like Snowden to zero,
relatively simple changes such as automatically detecting the malicious
use of scraping tools like
"wget," physically disabling removable media from the workstations ofNSA
personnel who lack
a work reason to use removable media, and implementing two-person
controls to transfer data by
removable media would have dramatically reduced the quantity of files
Snowden could have
removed or stopped him altoge~er.
(U) The Committee remains concerned that NSA, and the IC as a whole,
have not done
enough to reduce the chances of future insider threats like Snowden.
(Cl/REL TO USA, FVEY) In the aftermath ofSnowden's disclosures, NSA
compiled a
list ofllll security improvements for its networks. These improvements,
called the "Secure the
Net" initiatives, contained many steps that would have stopped Snowden,
such as two-person
control for transfer of data by removable media, and many broader
security improvements, such
as reducing the number of privileged users and authorized data transfer
agents, and moving
toward a continuous evaluation model for background investigations. 212
In July 2014, more than
a year after Snowden's first disclosures, many of these "Secure the Net"
initiatives-including
some relatively simple initiatives, such as two-stage controls for
systems administrators-had
not been completed. 213 In August 2016, more than three years after
Snowden's first disclosures,
four of the 111i1ni1tia tives remained outstanding. 214
(U) In the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016, the
Committee directed the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IO)
to carry out an
assessment of information security at NSA, including whether NSA had
successfully remediated
the vulnerabilities exposed by Snowden.
(U) In August 2016, DOD IO issued its report, finding that NSA needed to
take
additional steps to effectively implement the privileged access-related
"Secure the Net"
initiatives.215
· (U) In particular, DOD IO found that NSA had not: fully implemented
technology to
oversee privileged user activities; effectively reduced the number of
privileged access users; or
effectively reduced the number of authorized data transfer agents. In
addition, contrary to the
212 NSA, "Secure the Net Initiatives," (Aug. 22, 2016). Overall document
classified C//REL TO USA, FVEY.
213 NSA, "Secure the Net Initiatives," (July 2014). Overall document
classified C//REL TO USA, FVEY.
214 NSA, "Secure the Net Initiatives," (Aug. 22, 2016). Overall document
classified C//REL TO USA, FVEY.
215 Department of Defense Inspector General, Report 2016-129, "The
National Security Agency Should Take
Additional Steps in Its Privileged Access-Related Secure the Net
Initiatives" (Aug. 29, 2016). Overall document
classified S//NF, cited portion classified U//FOUO.
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"Secure the Net" initiatives, NSA did not consistently secure server
racks and other sensitive
equipment in data centers, and did not extend two-stage authentication
controls to all high-risk
users.216 Recent security breaches at NSA underscore the necessity for
the agency to improve its
security posture.
(U) And even though NSA has been the victim ofrecent breaches, it is not
the only IC
agency where information security needs to be improved. For instance, a
recent CIA Inspector
General report found that CIA has not yet implemented multi-factor
authentication controls such
as a physical token for general or privileged users of the Agency's
enterprise or mission
systems.217
(U) As a recent Committee report concluded, the introduction of the
Intelligence
Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) should produce an
improved security
environment in the IC.218 And as that report noted, although IC data
will be more secure and
better protected under IC ITE than it is today, from both internal and
external threats, IC ITE will
also increase risks in different areas.219 These risks will require
dedicated attention to ensure IC
ITE reaches its full potential for an improved security environment.
(U) Conclusion - Efforts to Improve Security
(U) Although it is impossible to reduce the chance of another Snowden to
zero, more
work can and should be done to improve the security of the people and
computer networks that
keep America's most closely held secrets.
(U) Since the beginning of Snowden's disclosures, the Committee has
directed the IC to
carry out a number of studies and security improvements to reduce the
risk of another insider
threat. Among its other oversight efforts, the Committee has:
• (U) Authorized an additional for insider threat detection efforts in
Fiscal
Year 2014. Consistent with a spend plan and updated insider threat
strategy provided to
Congress, 60 percent of these funds were to be used for insider threat
detection and the
remaining 40 percent toward continuous evaluation; 220 .
• (U) Directed the DNI to ensure that the President's National Insider
Threat Policy and
Minimum Standards were fully implemented on TS/SCI networks and all
NIP-funded
216 Id., cited portion classified C//REL TO USA, FVEY.
217 CIA Office oflnspector General, "Review of National Security Systems
Required by the Cybersecurity Act of
2015," Report No. 2016-0022-AS (Aug. 2016). Overall report classified
S//NF, cited portion classified S//NF.
218 HPSCI Report, "Assessing IC ITE's Security Posture," (Feb. 4, 2016).
Overall report classified S//NF, cited
portion classified U.
219 Id. at 25, cited portion classified U//FOUO.
22° Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-
126, pp. 15-16.
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networks at CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, FBI, and DOE by October 1, 2014; 221
• (U) Directed the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, to establish a
structure for a
comprehensive continuous evaluation system for holders of TS/SCI within
270 days of
the enactment; 222
• (U) Directed the DNI, in coordination with the USD(I) to review
whether the continuous
evaluation process, insider threat auditing tools, and background
investigation processes
should consider different kinds of information to detect potential
leakers than the current
process collects to detect traditional security threats; 223
• (U) Directed the DNI to review the management controls on privileged
access, to include
Systems Administrators; 224
• (U) Directed the NSA to implement a "two person rule" for Tier 3 Systems
Administrators and select Tier 2 Systems Administrators and directed the
DNI to report
to the Intelligence Committees on actions he is undertaking to lead the
other IC elements
in enacting a similar two person rule, or similar safeguards; 225
• (U) Directed the DNI to attempt to reduce the number of Tier 3 System
Administrators
and ensure consistency in tier ratings across the IC;226
• (U) Directed the DNI to expand Scattered Castles to contain all TS/SCI
clearance holders
and list any pertinent exceptions or "flags" as close to real-time as
possible; 227
• (U) Directed the DNI to ensure that insider threat security measures
were fully applied to
contractors and contractor facilities; 228
221 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed
Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 pp. 32.
222 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed
Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 pp. 32-33.
223 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed
Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 p. 33.
224 Id.
22s Id.
226 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. I 13-
126, p. 16; Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the House-passed
Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 p. 34.
221 Id.
22s Id.
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• (U) Required the IC to continuously evaluate the eligibility of
personnel to access
classified information, to develop procedures for automatically sharing
derogatory
information between agencies, and other improvements to the
reinvestigation process; 229
• (U) Encouraged the DNI to make a determination of how periodic
reinvestigations will
be handled in concert with a continuous evaluation program; 230
• (U) Directed an IC analysis of private sector policies to reduce
insider threats; 231
• (U) Directed a DNI-led review once every three years of all U.S.
government positions
with access to classified information; 232
• (U) Directed the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of
Defense, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, to
develop and
implement procedures that govern whether and how publicly available
information may
be used in the security clearance process; 233
• (U) Required each IC element to implement a program to enhance
security reviews of
individuals applying for access to classified information; 234
• (U) Required the Inspector General of each federal agency that
operates national security
systems to report on, among other things, information security practices
to detect data
exfiltration and other threats; 235
• (U) Directed NSA to produce a plan for completing security
improvements to its
networks by the end of Calendar Year 2018, including enclaves and
systems used outside
ofNSA-controlled facilities; and236
229 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-126,
Title V.
23° Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-
126, p. 16
231 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-293, §
308.
232 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-
293, p.11.
233 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-
293, pp. 11-12.
234 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Division M,
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 2016, P.L. 114-113, § 306.
235 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Division N, Consolidated Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 2016, P.L. 114-113,
§ 406
236 Classified Annex to Accompany the Joint Explanatory Statement to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016, Division M, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2016, P.L. 114-113, p. 19.
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• (U) Directed the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) to
carry out an
assessment of post-Snowden information security improvements at CIA,
DIA, FBI,
NGA, NRO, and ODNI.237
(U) As the Fiscal Year 2017 Intelligence Authorization Act moves toward
enactment and
Congress begins its consideration of the President's Fiscal Year 2018
budget request, the
Committee looks forward to working with the IC to ensure our nation's
secrets receive the
security they deserve.
237 Classified Annex to Accompany the Report to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R.
5077, p. 93.
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