RUSSIA PROFILE WEEKLY EXPERTS PANEL13Chechnya

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RUSSIA PROFILE WEEKLY EXPERTS PANEL

 

COULD CHECHNYA BE A MODEL FOR IRAQ?

 

Introduced by Vladimir Frolov

 

 

 

The United States and its allies are getting increasingly bogged down in Iraq. Religious and ethnic violence continues unabated. Repeated guerrilla and terrorist attacks exert a heavy toll on American and Iraqi forces. More than three thousand Americans have died in the war.

 

Iraq now has a constitutionally elected government, but its control of the country remains tenuous at best. Iraqi police are still not up to the job and criminal gangs roam the country.  Key resistance and Al-Quaida leaders remain at large.

 

Iraq’s economy has not rebounded to prewar levels and indeed is barely functioning with basic communal services like water and electricity still not restored in many areas. Iraq’s oil production is below the pre-war levels contributing to the high oil prices on the international markets.

 

President Bush’s and British Prime-Minister Blair’s political standing has taken a serious hit with both leaders losing most of their pre-war popularity. Opinion polls show majority of voters in the US and in Great Britain think the war of 2003 was a mistake.

 

Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction turned out to be a bad joke while North Korea and Iran are marching full speed to a nuclear weapon aware that the US is bogged down in Iraq and can ill afford another major military conflict.

 

Contrast that with President Putin’s situation in Chechnya.

 

The war is essentially over with no major military operations taking place for the last two and a half years. The Russian Army in Chechnya is doing military training at the base. Russian military casualties in Chechnya are a very rare occurrence now. Mop-up operations against scattered and disorganized rebels are conducted by highly capable Chechen security forces run by former rebel leaders who voluntarily switched over to the government side.

 

Chechnya has a constitutionally elected President and a multi-party Parliament. The Chechen government headed by Ramzan Kadyrov are in almost full command of the country. The guerilla resistance is no longer a viable force and is incapable of staging large-scale military or terrorist operations against the government forces. Some resistance leaders, like former President Aslan Maskhadov have been killed, but most others, like Maskhadov’s former defense Minister Hazbiev, have chosen to join Kadyrov’s security service and the new Chechen government and are now sitting in the new Chechen parliament.

 

Chechnya is engaged in serious talks with Moscow on broad autonomy powers. Russia is pumping significant financial resources to reconstruct the Chechen economy.

 

Chechnya has ceased to be a major domestic political problem for Vladimir Putin and even has largely ceased to be an issue in Russia’s relations with the US and the EU.

 

In terms of security, Russian military draw-down and cooptation of rebel forces into the pro-government security structures, as well as economic reconstruction efforts, Chechnya could in some ways be a model for Iraq. Compared to the case of Iraq, an invasion of a foreign country and ensuing chaos due to dismal preparation for the post-war reconstruction, Chechnya seems to be model case for post-war management and local empowerment.

 

So why are not Russia and President Putin given international credit for a masterful transformation of the festering Chechen insurgency into manageable political problem with viable local institutions that take responsibility for the country’s future?

 

Will President Bush take any friendly advice from President Putin at the G8 summit in July on how to handle the reconstruction of Iraq based on Russia’s experience in Chechnya?

 

For this we ask Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel.

 

 

 

Anthony T. Salvia – former Director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Moscow Programming Center

 

It is far-fetched to think Russia would get any international credit for her relatively successful handling of the Chechen war.  For one thing, Russia, in the view of the US foreign policy elite, can only be satellite or adversary, never partner, and therefore never deserving of credit.  For another, those who were most enthusiastic for the Iraq war have also tended to oppose Russia’s role in Chechnya. 

 

It may sound strange that those who support a war in one locale whose ostensible purpose is to deal a blow to radical Islam, would oppose a different war in another locale being prosecuted for the same purpose.  But then again, President Putin’s objective has been the pragmatic one of short-circuiting the establishment of a radical Islamic caliphate in south and central Asia, whereas the Americans have other, grander, and more complex priorities, including nothing less than advancing the interests of all of progressive humanity.  Russia got over her end-of-history moment when the USSR collapsed, whereas the US is still in the throes of hers.  Now Russia is absorbed in such mundane tasks as maintaining internal political coherence, assuring the physical and moral health of the nation, and securing her borders.    

 

With America increasingly concerned about the security of her own southern border and at something of a loss as to how extract herself from a war gone badly awry, the US elite may have to resume the practice of traditional diplomacy and give Russia a new and friendlier hearing.  They may yet discover that it makes good sense to work with Russia and others to meet the challenge of radical Islam and a rising China. 

 

No, Russia should expect no credit for her achievement in Chechnya.  But it is an achievement and it should at least receive publicity.  Unfortunately, as has been noted in the Experts’ Panel before, there is no effective, organized pro-Russian lobby in Washington – although Russia does have friends there.  This state of affairs must be rectified.

 

 

Nikolas Gvozdev, editor, The National Interest

 

There are many lessons for the U.S. - led coalition in Iraq based on the Russian experiences in Chechnya, notably the extreme difficulties in recruiting and maintaining effective security forces from the local population, as well as the ongoing challenges of simultaneously fighting a local insurgency while trying to engage in economic and political reconstruction.

 

There are also lessons to be avoided—especially what happens when outside military forces, in dealing with the local population, turn to brutalizing treatment. Politically, however, it is impossible for any Western policymaker to claim that there is anything that can be learned from Chechnya, because the dichotomy is one of Russian repression of freedom in Chechnya versus the liberation and democratization of Iraq.

 

 

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Energy, Transport and Communications, the Russian State Duma (United Russia)

 

 

It is no longer a matter of dispte between Russia and the US and the EU that the situation in Chechnya has markedly improved over the last two years. Violence is down, kidnappings and terrorist attacks are a rare occurrence compared to what it used to be. The Russian military are in the barracks and the security forces that still conduct some limited anti-insurgency operations are composed mostly of local police many of whom are former rebel fighters who switched to the pro-Moscow side.

 

A meaningful political process has begun. For years the West has been insisting that Moscow launch a dialogue with moderate rebel leaders. Today most of those rebel leaders, including former “Defense Minister” in Aslan Maskhadov government Magomed Hambiev, are sitting in the new Chechen Parliament or command pro-Moscow security forces. This would be an equivalent to Saddam Hussein’s top military commanders switching over to the new government in Iraq and leading the new Iraqi security forces to defeat the Sunni insurgency.

 

The new Chechen government is in talks with Moscow over broad autonomy powers that would  grant Chechnya self-rule in anything but defense and foreign affairs. Econokic reconstruction has begun and the war devastated Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, is being gradually restored.

 

And internationally Chechnya has ceased to be an issue that Moscow, Washington and Brussels regard as a sore point in their relationship that adversely affect other areas of cooperation.

 

It is true that there continue to be serious political and security issues that still need to be resolved in Chechnya. But they pale in comparison to what Russia had to surmount just two years ago and what the United States and NATO still need to address in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Of course Russia will not seek any official international credit for its success in Chechnya. But at least some objective comparative analysis on Chechny in Western media and among Western policy makers and political pundits is long overdue and would not hurt Russia’s feelings.

 

 

Andrei Seregin, Senior Political Analyst, The National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, Moscow

 

The key difference between the two cases - Russia in Chechnya and America in Iraq - seems to be within the core attitude towards the stabilization process. Iraq is one of the elements of broader American policy in the Great Middle East (just consider its prospective oil output lowering war-premium in the price of a barrel of oil). The  US seeks to make Iraq another stronghold in the whole region, and foil attempts of Islamic regimes to isolate Israel.

 

Chechnya is surely quite a different case. With the current Russian stability in the North Caucases and in Russia at large dependant upon the success of post-war management and local empowerment, the main interest of the Kremlin here is not the former break-away republic in itself, but rather the set of example of establishing relatively loyal and generally secular Islamic rule. So, it’s more «oil vs. stability» conflict that makes the great difference between Russian and American ways.

 

The West is largely reluctant to give the Kremlin international credit for a peaceful transformation in Chechnya due to basically two main reasons. The first is purely political – until the very last day of Chechen insurgency Chechnya will and should remain on Western democracy vigilantes «watch-lists». You won’t expect the West to throw away all diplomatic aces, just because life in Chechnya gradually improves. Whatever success Putin may have in stabilizing the republic, there still will be at least some of those, opposing him. If there is no protest, it should be made up artificially. That’s quite an obvious tactic of «managed instability»  practiced by the White House.

 

The second reason is more profound – the Russian «success story» in Chechnya is still far from being over. Bearing in mind the notorious example of «vietnamisation» which had a limited and temporary effect, Western observers sense big trouble ahead for the Kremlin. The viability of local institutions being created by the Kremlin in Chechnya is virtually based on independence. The sole fact that Chechen leader Kadyrov never speaks of independence and liberty in terms, Dudaev and Maskhadov did, won’t make any difference for Western analysts.

 

 

Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow

 

Putting aside the evident difference between the two cases (Chechnya’s being an integral part of Russia and independence of Iraq), one has to agree that they certainly may be compared in terms of political and military settlement. The degree of success is strikingly different, though.

 

The reasons for that are evident enough. Rehabilitation of Chechnya was entrusted to local feudal barons-come-politicians, who widely employed and still employ former rebels. This did not end the inter-clans feud, however making them less visible by mostly excluding federal forces from them. As the outcome of the feuds in favor of the Kadyrov clan was becoming clear, it left less ground for involvement from abroad in the situation. As far as Kadyrov people (rumor has it that Kadyrov Jr. is the one and only candidate for Chechnya presidency) rule in the republic, they have no reason to let someone from Amman, Tbilisi or Istanbul stir the situation, and all the reasons to go on milking the federal center.

 

In Iraq the coalition forces failed to find the winning combination of leaders and/or forces. Potent religious and political groups violently oppose pro-American government, making reconstruction of the country impossible. If there was a moment fit to switch gears and change horses, it was missed. The US is in desperate situation, its alternatives being getting further bogged down in a hopeless anti-guerilla war or withdrawing from the country claiming “victory” but losing face over inevitable defeat. No joy either way.

 

So there is hardly is any realistic advice President Putin can give to President Bush on his  colleague’s sad situation. More than that, peace in Chechnya achieved by Kadyrov’s clan may happen to become a Pyrrhic victory for the federal center, after all. Milking Russian treasury is an important element (the battle over the autonomy powers has been going on for several years). Still more important is the possibility of sudden political changes in Chechnya, should its current clan leaders receive an enticing enough proposal. This is perfectly well known in Kremlin, which is why Vladimir Putin will offer George Bush, Jr. no Chechnya-based advice on Iraq. Still, the current development of events in Chechnya, however deficient, is the best of the worse from the Kremlin’s point of view. The trick is not to overplay one’s hand. Over time, something better that Kadyrov and his clan may come along. No one in the Kremlin will guarantee Kadyrov a rule for life. Other powerful Chechen clans will be supported by Moscow to provide a check on Kadyrov’s rule.