Was Putin right to go it alone, breaking ranks with other parties to
the Israel-Palestinian settlement, including the EU and the United
States? The initiative has not been received well on many fronts
(including in Israel), so what does Russia hope to achieve by this? Can
Russia realistically hope for a role as a peace-maker, as "the largest
European and Muslim country simultaneously" (Pervy Kanal's
description)? Discuss the issues here.
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2006/2/8/3225.wbp
http://www.1tv.ru/owa/win/ort6_main.main?p_news_razdel_id=1&p_news_title_id=86013
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2006/2/13/3247.wbp
What Does Moscow Want With Hamas?
Comment by Marianna Belenkaya
Special to Russia Profile
A New Direction for Peace in the Middle East
President Vladimir Putin's plans to invite the leaders of Hamas to
Moscow have divided world opinion. Some think that talks with the
winners of the recent Palestinian elections will make it possible to
draw the movement into the political process and eventually make it
less radical, while others think that inviting the Hamas leadership to
Moscow is the first step towards legitimizing terrorism.
Russia is the only nation actively involved in mediating peace in the
Middle East to openly state its readiness for high-level dialogue with
Hamas, and this turn of events has caused many nations to question
where Russia's loyalty lies.
Russia's position seemed to strike a blow at Israel, the United
States and the EU, - which have all considered Russia an ally in the
fight against terrorism and whose leaders have declared Hamas a
terrorist organization. Israel, which has always had doubts about
Russia's commitment to the war on terror, is particularly outraged at
Putin's invitation to Hamas. Many in the Arab world, in contrast, saw
Putin's invitation as a challenge to the United States and a swipe at
Israel's long-standing policy against the group.
However, Putin's invitation should not be seen as inconsistent with
Russia's previous actions. Russia has two motivations for entering
into talks with Hamas. First, Moscow wants to show that it is still an
influential player in the Middle East and on the international stage in
general. The very fact that Hamas emerged victorious in the Palestinian
election represents a miscalculation in the United States' "Greater
Middle East" policy, which has focused on trying to democratize the
region extending from North Africa to Central Asia. When Washington
first began talking about this project a few years ago, it thought that
democracy could become an alternative to radical Islam. But the radical
Islamists proved to be the best students of the American system, and
instead used democracy to come to power. This situation is clearest in
the territories controlled by the Palestinian National Authority. It is
also visible in Iraq and Egypt. Add to this the complex security
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the tension with Iran and Syria and
the "caricature affair" that has gripped the world, it seems clear
that the West, and above all the United States, is in a very difficult
position at the moment, and Russia is simply making use of the
opportunity that has opened up.
The second reason for Russia to establish contact with Hamas is
security. Russia has recently been taking calculated steps toward to
the Islamic world, including obtaining observer status in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Russia realizes that a
"conflict of civilizations" would undermine stability - above all
within its own borders. Russia has personal interests in mediating
between East and West, and for now, that involves negotiating with
Hamas.
[Article continues. Full text at
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2006/2/13/3247.wbp]
A Question of Double Standards Editorial President Vladimir Putin's decision to invite the leaders of Hamas for talks in Moscow has angered Israel and raised many eyebrows in the international community. Such a reaction should come as no surprise to Moscow, given that Hamas has carried out nearly 60 suicide bombings in Israel since 2000, killing hundreds of people. Israel and the United States have classified Hamas as a terrorist organization, refusing to make a distinction between its political and militant wings. Just as the Kremlin has refused to make a distinction between Chechens such as Shamil Basayev, who has ordered the most horrendous terrorist attacks in Russia's history, and separatist envoys like Akhmed Zakayev, who has been granted political asylum in Britain. Both are terrorists in Putin's eyes. Even Aslan Maskhadov, who won a popular election to become president of Chechnya in 1997, was branded a terrorist following the Dubrovka hostage-taking in 2002. Notably, Maskhadov denied any involvement in the seizure of the Moscow theater. He condemned terrorism and more than once suggested he would seek the prosecution of Basayev over the attack. Yes, Maskhadov said his willingness to bring terrorists to justice was conditional upon the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and restoration of his presidential rule. But even if his words were only empty rhetoric, Maskhadov, who was killed last March, did say these things. The Hamas leadership, on the other hand, has shown no willingness to condemn its militants for their suicide bombings. Moscow has called for a united international front against terrorism, arguing that there should be no double standards and that one man's terrorist should not be another man's freedom fighter. The invitation to Hamas has weakened Russia's argument, and the Kremlin is playing a risky game if it is betting on its capacity to influence Hamas in spite of having lost its clout as a global superpower. But Putin -- who met Wednesday with an envoy of the Quartet of Middle East peace mediators, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn -- will still come out ahead if he unequivocally demands that Hamas renounce terrorism and acknowledge Israel's right to exist. He will then have to be ready to cut all ties with the Palestinian organization if it refuses to meet these demands. Otherwise, Moscow will no longer be able to complain about double standards. Its only hope will be that the United States and other members of the international community turn their backs on whatever is left of the moderate wing of Chechen separatism. | |
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The question therefore is not whether this bold Russia's initiative
may upset few other countries. The real question is whether courting
Hamas is in Russia's best interests. Hamas will undoubtedly welcome
upcoming talks with Russia as a means of breaking a "recognition
blockade" the United States and Israel are trying to impose on it.
But more than any international recognition, Hamas needs money. Is
Russia ready to follow up with cash infusion into remarkably
inefficient and corrupted Palestinian Authority? Is it ready to stand
in line with - or perhaps even replace -- major donors such as United
States and European Union?
The danger is that Hamas, having "national" interest of its own,
will soon forget Russia's high-flying political overtures in favor of
a down-to-earth financial package. Should this to happen, "picking
up chestnuts out of the fire" may become the best way of describing
Russia's future role in the Middle East conflict resolution.
Let's give double standards a break. They make foreign policy more
flexible and rid it from the always unnecessary and often inflammatory
ideological zeal. The top Bush administration officials have spoken
volumes about Russia using gas prices to punish "pro-Western"
Ukraine. They now openly consider withdrawing funds from the
Palestinian Authority should Hamas form the government, as expected.
If from the very beginning the Bush administration had adhered to the
time-honored double standards in its Middle East approaches - instead
of chasing the chimera of "spreading democracy" -- it would have
never found itself in the Hamas mess.