Belarus presidential campaign hots up
Peter Morley (Russia Profile Discussion Group)
What can or what should be done with Belarus? And if Lukashenko wins, as expected, then what happens next? From a Russian perspective, how are the country's interests affected by its current say-nothing stance with regards to its Western neighbour? And what about the prospects for the union state scheduled to come into being in the near future?
http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2006/3/1/3339.wbp
http://en.rian.ru/world/20060301/43855182.html
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-03-02T130244Z_01_L02110383_RTRUKOC_0_UK-BELARUS.xml&archived=False
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/3/D1FDF78F-98F1-4089-AAA3-256CBEA2B742.html
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,1721135,00.html
http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/02/28/lithuaniaradio.shtml
Peter Morley (Russia Profile Discussion Group)
The question is, what happens next? The EU and United States are talking about imposing sanctions, while the Russian establishment is having something of a field day sniping at the United States (especially) on the usual charge of "double standards" when it comes to democracy. Last night on Pervy Kanal's heavyweight Sunday night news wrap, Pyotr Tolstoi said that it seems for the Americans democracy is not how people vote, or who votes, or when they vote, but who they vote for "with regard to their loyalty to American foreign policy". Notwithstanding the usual caveats about states pursuing their own interests, which almost invariably leads to some dubious alliances and decisions, is it really in Russia's interest to be backing Lukashenko so heavily?
http://www.rferl.org/specials/belarus_votes/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4825708.stm
Peter Morley (Russia Profile Discussion Group)
http://www.russiaprofile.org/experts_panel/article.wbp?article-id=693477CC-F38E-4916-94E1-4D7D5E2447B0
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Presidential Elections in Belarus: No Denim Revolution
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Russia Profile
Contributors: Konstantin Eggert, Yury Fedorov, Andrei Segerin, Sergei Shishkarev, Andrei Zagorski, Andrei Lebedev
Voters in Belarus went to the polls on Sunday to vote in presidential election scheduled by President Alexander Lukashenko five months before his second term in office was set to expire. In October 2004, Lukashenko won a nationwide referendum to permit the removal of the constitutional limit of two presidential terms, thus making himself eligible for another five-year term. (Belarussian opposition and Western observers allege, however, that Lukashenko failed to garner the necessary 50% of the vote in that referendum.)
Four candidates were registered to run in the election – Alexander Lukashenko, the sitting president, Alexander Milinkevich, a professor of physics and the united opposition candidate, and two candidates with miniscule chances for success – Alexander Kozulin and Sergei Gaidukevich (who also ran in the 2001 presidential election). Scheduling an early election gives Lukashenko an immense organizational and media advantage and deprives the principal opposition candidate, Milinkevich, of enough time to mount an effective campaign.
Both the United States and the European Union openly call Lukashenko "Europe's last dictator" and make little secret of their desire to see the man go as a result of a "free and fair election." Russia, meanwhile, has been pointing to Lukashenko's genuine popularity with Belarussian voters and insisting that the Belarussian people have the right to decide whom they want to govern. Thus, as in Ukraine in 2004, the election in Belarus had the potential to become another source of tensions between Russia and the West over the results of a contested election.
However, even before the election, credible opinion polls by international groups were giving Lukashenko a convincing victory in the first round with somewhere between 52 and 70 percent of the vote. According to the latest Eurasian Monitor poll, which was conducted by a consortium of independent polling firms from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the first two weeks of March, a runoff election in Belarus was highly unlikely with Lukashenko set to win anywhere between 65 and 70 percent of the total vote and Milinkevich coming in second with 13-15 percent. According to the survey, 40 percent of voters believed the results of the elections could be trusted while only 15 percent thought they would be marred by voter fraud.
Early exit polling data indicated Lukashenko heading for a landslide victory with unseemly 82 percent of the vote, although the exit polls were conducted by an agency friendly to the Belarussian government. Later, official results gave Lukashenko over 90 percent of the vote.
With Lukashenko's power secure for another five years, it now falls to the governments of Russia and Western nations to figure out how to continue dealing with the man. The United States appears to be moving in the direction of tightening sanctions against the regime in Minsk by revealing information about his secret arms dealings with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Syria in violation of United Nations Security Council sanctions. The EU has a visa ban in effect for Lukashenko and his entourage.
For Russia, Lukashenko's regime continues to provide security benefits coupled with political embarrassments. With him in power, the idea of the proposed Russia-Belarus union is unlikely to go anywhere, unless he suddenly agrees to the prospect of becoming a Putin appointee in charge of a large region inside Russia, a very unlikely proposition.
So what should be Russia's strategy when dealing with Belarus? Will the West continue isolating Minsk, or will there be a push to engage the regime economically and politically in order to be able to influence the internal dynamics in the country? How will Lukashenko's regime itself evolve during the third term? Will he be a president for life? Will he maintain his pro-Russian policies, or will his continued rule do more harm to relations with Moscow and the attitude toward Russia on the part of ordinary Belarussians?
Konstantin Eggert, Moscow Bureau Editor, BBC Russian Service:
Despite the predictable outcome of the presidential election itself, "the denim revolution" might have only just begun. Events in Minsk stand in stark contrast to the 2001 elections when the pressure from the authorities was weaker, but the opposition also much more dispirited. It is also quite clear that Lukashenko's cautious initial response to rallies in central Minsk points to his desire not to inflame the situation even more. His support in Belarus is strong, but by no means reaches the official 80 or 90 per cent.
Belarussian opposition has two things going for it:
1) It relies on the young people
2) It has a new leader who seems to have a certain appeal (though, by Russian standards, it's a bit provincial)
With demonstrations in central Minsk, Lukashenko's opponents have broken the mold of fear and silence. Three months ago the opposition would have been happy to mobilize 300 people, but it showed the movement's potential for growth by attracting 5,000-10,000 demonstrators.
Finally, it seems that Europe and the United States will not let the Belarussian issue fade away. Milinkevich proved to the West that the opposition is much more formidable than was initially thought, so it seems in the mid- to long term they have a chance, albeit it is by no means a guaranteed one.
Despite official congratulations, Russia will certainly analyze the situation carefully. Lukashenko is very popular in Russia, where – if circumstances were right – he would have had a bright political future, eclipsing the Communists and Rodina. It is interesting that Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reportedly hinted to NATO defense ministers in Sicily in February that Russia might change its attitude to the Lukashenko regime next year and jack up the price of gas. I suppose that Moscow could ask Minsk to pay for Russian silence with Beltransgaz and other things. If Lukashenko refuses, it would be surprising if the Kremlin declined to use its dominance over Belarus in its election strategy for 2007-2008. Notice that Milinkevich was much better received in Moscow than was initially expected.
Yury Fedorov, Senior Researcher, Chatham House, London:
To begin with a kind of triviality, Lukashenko's victory was absolutely predictable. Most probably, his lieutenants have added quite a number of ballots in favor of their chief; yet no one can ignore the fact that the majority of the Belarussian electorate likes their current president. Such is the political life in Belarus. And I have no hope at all that Belarussian democratic opposition has any chance to contest the results of the elections either by legal procedures, or by a "denim revolution." So, Belarus will remain under Lukashenko's rule for the next five years or perhaps even longer.
Of course, "Europe's last dictator" is a highly unpleasant gentleman; yet the principal question for Europe and the United States is whether he is dangerous or not; and, if he is, what particular danger does he represent? My guess is that there is, in principle, a red line that Lukashenko should not cross – helping rogue states to acquire nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. He should also show more moderation in his treatment of the regime's political opponents. Lukashenko is clever enough not to cross these lines, especially because he has no need to do that. The opposition is bothersome but weak, and he is able to export enough conventional weapons to gain billions of dollars for his private and political needs. Therefore, the West will use soft power against Lukashenko to clear its own conscience rather than to change the regime in Minsk: it will criticize and isolate the country's top echelons of power, support democratic opposition, and may even try to freeze bank accounts Lukashenko and his team have in Switzerland, the Bahamas or Cyprus. The latter could be the most painful for those in power in Minsk and thus the most effective instrument to influence their policy. Yet a prospect of any "military option," like the war against Milosevic's regime, is beyond imagination. The West simply does not need it.
Also, Lukashenko may try to make a deal with the West, but the price will be high. The West will treat him as unpleasant yet acceptable figure, like the rulers of Central Asian and African states – if Russia ends its military presence in Belarus. However, this will be a casus belli for Russia; and Moscow will do all it can to stop such a turnaround in Minsk's policy.
As for Russia, it is much easier to outline what it should not do than to propose concrete measures that should be done. If the Kremlin wishes to be a respectful partner for Europe, it should not remain too close to Lukashenko. And, of course, it should say goodbye to all hopes or integrating Belarus. Lukashenko capitalizes on pro-integrationist feelings in his own country and on naive hopes typical of some Moscow circles who believe that the formation of the so-called "union state" with Belarus would be a first step towards the restoration of something like the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. Lukashenko will never accept any form of integration with Russia – or with any other country - that limits his personal power. His aim, which he has never been able to achieve, is to be an autocratic ruler, not Moscow's deputy or governor-general in Minsk.
Andrei Seregin, Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Moscow:
Imposing sanctions on Belarus, a highly industrialized economy, will certainly fail politically and prove to be humiliating for Europe. The prospect for any instability in the Lukashenko regime is within the state establishment. Very soon we'll watch the West change its tactics toward Belarus to effectively "engage" the higher ranks of the Belarussian state and business elite.
With Lukashenko certain to hold on to power in Belarus for another five years, it's obvious that the West (at least for the time being) will go on pressuring Minsk. Still, the policy of isolating Minsk politically – and to a conspicuously lesser extent economically – can hardly be seen as a major threat to Lukashenko, as the country's economy is largely self-sufficient with the exception of energy imports from Russia. Nowadays, the basic demands of people in Belarus are met in a far better way, and state social benefits are higher than in neighboring Russia and Ukraine.
Behind the biased media coverage of Lukashenko's regime, it's almost impossible to notice the obvious fact – despite the lack of mineral resources, the country's economy has effectively been export-oriented. Under Soviet rule the republic could boast modern industrial facilities that produced a lot more than it was able to consume. Thus, Belarus was popularly called "the all-Union assembly line." Almost all large industrial facilities were under federal, rather than regional, control in the Soviet period. Not surprisingly, Belarus was the first of all the post-Soviet states to recover to Soviet era GDP levels.
The much-discussed prospect of raising Russian gas prices for Belarus can easily be offset by higher oil transit fees. The domestic demand for oil in Belarus is relatively low – some 10 million metric tons, and the production capacity of its two main refineries is three times higher – around 30 million. Lukashenko is a survivor and the West will have to deal with him for a long time to come.
Sergei Shishkarev, Member of the Russian State Duma (United Russia):
It is doubtful that the Belarussian opposition will pull off anything even approaching the Maidan in Kiev. The government in Minsk is not likely to fold and disintegrate. Security services remain deeply loyal to Lukashenko and, if necessary, would be in a position to break up any street demonstration. The number of protesters is diminishing with every passing day, the opposition seems to have failed to plan for the eventuality of a prolonged crisis and appears to have no plan or resources to bus additional numbers of supporters from other regions.
While Lukashenko's official election numbers look somewhat high, they are in line with the majority of the forecasts by reputable Russian and international polling companies. No one, including the opposition, is challenging the fact that he has won the election.
It is unrealistic to expect Lukashenko to yield to Western pressure and schedule another vote. Why should he? Russia was right to recognize Lukashenko's victory because not doing so would have deprived Moscow of the little precious leverage it has with Minsk. The West will have to find a way to deal with Lukashenko and gradually engage him in political and economic cooperation. Isolation and sanctions almost never work as intended and sometimes the collateral damage from the cure might be much worse that the disease. It was pointless to isolate Hamas after it won a convincing victory in Palestine. Democracy works in mysterious ways, and sometimes its results are genuinely hard to swallow. Lukashenko is not Hitler or Saddam Hussein, he is not even the late Slobodan Milosevic, He is not prone to suicidal follies and is quite capable of fashioning a rational foreign policy which takes into account various Western interests. He is here to stay. It is time to learn how to use him to benefit Europe and the world at large.
Andrei Zagorski, Associate Professor, MGIMO-University:
The Belarussian election did not come as a surprise. No reasonable observer had expected any significant shift in attitudes. Although Lukashenko certainly does not enjoy the 80 percent support, he was clearly leading in the polls ahead of the election. Everybody rightly claiming that the election was fraudulent has no other choice but to live with the result. This proves that "color revolutions" are neither triggered by external forces or by the verdict of the OSCE monitors. They only occur when the electorate wants changes.
The confirmation of the status quo in the Belarussian election implies that business as usual is most likely to prevail in the policy towards Belarus.
The European Union and the United States do not recognize the legitimacy of Lukashenko's reelection and will continue the policy of isolating the regime while, at the same time, keeping their doors open for the civil society. This was their policy over the past 10 years, occasionally complemented with attempts to engage Belarusian authorities. This policy has proven impotent, and there is unlikely to be any change over the next few years.
Moscow is happy that, this time, it did not have to "give up" Belarus to the West, and is unlikely to be confronted with that dilemma until the Russian presidential elections in 2008. There is little chance that Moscow would stop heavily subsidizing the Belarussian economy in exchange for keeping this "closest ally" within its orbit. The economic argument and the commercial interests of Gazprom, widely used in the most recent gas dispute with Ukraine, are clearly outweighed in the Belarussian case by political considerations.
Russia has also consistently rejected any anti-Lukashenko coalition with either the EU or the United States. The isolation of Minsk in the West plays into the hands of Moscow as it prevents Lukashenko from diversifying external ties and escaping from the overwhelming dependence on Russia.
In these circumstances, neither Moscow nor Minsk see any incentives to accelerate the project of the Union State. This is especially true with regard to Lukashenko who, in any case, would want to wait until the new Russian president comes in. Meanwhile, he would seek further to diversify at least the economic facet of his country's foreign relations, using exports to Europe to compensate for a dependence on imports from Russia. Over the past years, he was successful in doing so by buying Russian oil at low prices and selling secondary petroleum products to Europe at full prices.
He also would seek further investment from the West that has been crucial for his economic policies despites its modest volume. Still, 80 percent of the accumulated foreign investment in Belarus is coming from the West, with only 20 percent arriving from Russia.
Anthony T. Salvia, Director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Moscow Programming Center:
In deciding what course to undertake in Belarus, Russia could do worse than to take into account the amazing bellicosity of The Washington Post editorial on Lukashenko's disputed victory: Lukashenko stole the election, but Vladimir Putin and his chairmanship of the G8 is the problem.
Any assessment of the situation in Belarus must begin with the consideration that Russia has a serious problem in its relations with the United States. "Conservative" circles in the Bush administration are said to be hatching new moves against Moscow, while "liberals" at The Washington Post continue with their harsh anti-Putin drumbeat. Meanwhile, the impeccably bipartisan Council on Foreign Relations has issued an anti-Russian fatwa in which the creme de la creme of the U.S. foreign policy establishment decries Russia's tendency to take interest in political developments on its own borders, attributing this impertinence to its democratic shortcomings, including… the manner in which she chooses her leaders. Washington, it seems, has lost none of its taste for regime change.
Both the Russians and the Americans face a dicey situation in Belarus with a great deal at stake. Any American move to overthrow Lukashenko in the name of global democratic revolution could well play into Moscow's hands, as Russia will have an easier time incorporating Belarus into the Russian Federation with Lukashenko out of the picture. Moreover, Lukashenko could choose to bow out, which, under normal circumstances he would be loathe to do, if he felt he could thereby pave the way for a union treaty with Russia, thus dealing a black eye to the Americans.
The United States must proceed with caution. The Russians have been lying low in Belarus, quite the opposite of their posture during the last Ukrainian elections. Then, Russia bore the brunt of world criticism for interference in Ukrainian affairs although the Americans were at least as guilty of the charge. An American-orchestrated campaign against Lukashenko would have U.S. fingerprints all over it, not that world media would much object – anything for the forward march of democracy, human rights and free enterprise – but this could easily backfire on the United States in Russia, which, as everyone understands, is the real name of the game. A U.S.-engineered coup in Minsk could play into Putin's hands in the run-up to legislative elections in 2007 and the presidential election in 2008.
The Kremlin may think the passage of restrictive NGO legislation has obviated the prospect of an Orange Revolution in Red Square. It should think again. The Russian authorities can expect a full court press for their overthrow.
Andrei Lebedev, former political editor for the Izvestia newspaper:
One more question is, why all the fuss about Alexander Lukashenko while paying almost no attention to other former Soviet republics which are not an inch closer to Western-style democracy? American and NATO officials maintain close contacts with Baku and Ashgabat, for example. This is a matter of double standards, no doubt, although it is euphemistically called a "different approach to the concept of democracy." Still, the majority of Belarussian people, though not nearly as large as officially proclaimed, supported Lukashenko, voting mostly not for him personally but for stability, preferring a chicken in every pot to freedom of speech. Comparatively consistent economic growth, combined with a rather elaborate social security net, is a powerful argument. Even Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis had to admit as much – without accepting the outcome of the polls, of course.
Still, the question stands. Why Belarus? The West prefers to make one step at a time and they view Belarus as the easiest step at that. The reason for thinking this way in Washington and Brussels is simple: if we could do it in Ukraine, Belarus would be a piece of cake.
This prospect does not seem realistic at the moment, though. Military-wise, Belarus is too important a partner for Russia. Hopes that Moscow will strip Lukashenko of its support are futile. One of the small signs was that President Vladimir Putin offered his congratulations without waiting for the official results of the elections. Evidently, the Kremlin was not afraid of repeating its blunder in Ukraine, when premature congratulations had been sent to Leonid Kuchma.
The U.S. position on Minsk is clear enough. Belarus has been ranked alongside Iran and North Korea, and prospects of military action are openly being discussed about the latter two. Hints that Lukashenko's regime is supporting Iran with dual technology equipment and supplying arms to Sudan and Syria could develop into heavy pressure. But unless Washington can convince Moscow that infringement on international law has taken place, or that the president of Belarus makes a major blunder, no effective sanctions against Lukashenko could be put forward by the West. But, Lukashenko is not someone to cave in under threats.
So, the lukewarm friendship of Moscow and Minsk will continue. Will this make Lukashenko president for life? Hardly. One should not forget that the forthcoming personal changes in Russian leadership will probably involve Belarus as part of a virtual union between the two countries. No doubt some ways of stepping down have already been scripted in the Kremlin for Lukashenko. It`s only a matter of time for one of them to be put into effect.