Hi John, let me offer a few scattered thoughts in response..
Aside from letting things take care of themselves, position limits are
both the easiest and most powerful way of combating price
manipulation. Beyond that the CFTC maintains a large trader reporting
infrastructure:
http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/marketsurveillance/ltrp.html
If Intrade wishes to come under CFTC jurisdiction, some of your
questions are basically answered for you.
But as the exchange currently operates, there may be more liberal ways
to address manipulation concerns. I am sure that Intrade maintains a
measure of market balance for margined contracts. That is, a market
is most off-balance if it consists of a single trader on one side of
the open interest and many traders on the other side. This end of the
spectrum is indicative of market power and possibly manipulation, but
rather than disallowing or scrutinizing large positions, Intrade could
instead publish or make available upon request some metric indicating
the "entropy" of positions such as the variance of position sizes. A
low balance metric would warn traders and price interpreters that
something may be fishy. Of course it could just indicate a well-
funded trader or an insider. We can begin to test the usefulness of
this metric though. Take all closed markets and for each day
calculate the balance metric, e.g. variance of position sizes. Then
for each market, sort all days by the metric. Did the closing prices
for the top 50% most off-balance days have more error than the prices
in the lower 50% based on the outcome of the contract? (This might
not work if markets tend to display a trend in balance as they
approach maturity.) How do some specific contracts that have elicited
manipulation speculation look according to this analysis? Gore
Nomination? Clinton Presidency? Giuliani nomination? (Let's just
assume they have already settled at zero.) I don't know if this is
going to work, but if it does, you have a very cheap, gentle way to
address potential manipulation. It's basically a warning label for
traders, and at the same time large traders are more likely to become
paranoid and resist exercising market power unless they really have
information, as they are more vulnerable to a "run" by other traders.
(The metric will not indicate what side of the market the large
traders are on, but this can be inferred by the price action.)
The CFTC generally does not regulate against insider trading, although
with event markets, they will regulate against outcome manipulation
which happens to be a type of insider trading. Outside of CFTC
jurisdiction, outcome manipulation may be desirable because it can act
as a prize mechanism for research questions, although such markets may
suffer from low volume.
Note that the familiar argument for not regulating against (price)
manipulation suggests that one *should* regulate against insider
trading. The argument roughly goes that manipulation ultimately
increases market accuracy because traders are attracted to markets
“subsidized” by manipulators, and this liquidity eventually leads to
greater accuracy. Therefore traders would be less likely to
participate in markets where insider trading, a negative subsidy by
this logic, is allowed, and this would ultimately decrease liquidity
and accuracy. You could argue that the decreased long-term information
due to discouraged liquidity is less significant than the initial
short-term information gains due to insider trading, but then wouldn’t
the increased long-term information due to encouraged liquidity be
less important than the initial short-term information loss due to
manipulation? I am not making a claim one way or the other.
Different assumptions will
lead to different answers, but there does seem to be some tension
here.
Thomas brings up a very important aspect of this question. In what
ways might (detection of) manipulation differ between traditional
futures and binary prediction markets? In one way, binary options are
less vulnerable to manipulation since they settle according to an
objective event at a specific time, whereas futures prices are open-
ended in one direction and their "meaning" is always open to
interpretation. In another way, manipulation may be more difficult to
detect in prediction markets, and some indicia that are available to
the CFTC for detecting corner-type manipulations do not have clear
analogs for all market power manipulations. It is highly suggestive
if someone is willing to buy december silver at 50 while march silver
sits at 30, or is willing to buy bullion at levels far above coin and
refining prices, or willing to bid silver up when gold has not moved,
etc. Prediction markets have similar checks but are still illiquid
enough that a
well-funded trader could overwhelm all related contracts. More
significantly, even with deep markets, it might be impossible to tell
whether a binary price is being manipulated within 10% or more,
especially if insiders are permitted. While this may not satisfy the
CFTC, letting these situations take care of themselves is probably the
best option for Intrade, perhaps alongside published metrics as
mentioned above.
Finally, the CFTC also disallows "wash" trades, which are trades
designed to give the impression of high volume at certain prices. For
instance, two friends could conspire to not only move the price of the
Iran Strike contract, but also trade back-and-forth with minimal
profit/loss implications to create the impression of extraordinary
volume in order to lend credence to their manipulation. I mention
this, because I'm sure we realize that if something like this happened
and CNBC picked-up on it leading to a temporary move in oil prices,
that would be very negative for the industry.
Hope this helps,
Jason Ruspini