Prediction Markets in Foresight or Futures Studies
Walter Derzko
Dear PM colleagues
I’m looking for examples of prediction markets being used as tools for Foresight studies? Can you provide me with any names and links
Thanks in Advance
Walter Derzko
Smart Economy
Toronto
http://smarteconomy.typepad.com
Kristoffer Thomas Hartwig
Actually, part of my thesis -which basically researches the
theoretical and practical linkages between contemporary innovation
strategy and the use of PM's in corporations and between stakeholders
- is going to be on strategic forecasting.
I've found literature on strategic forecasting and scenarioplanning,
but cases on PM's and this seem hard to come by. There is of course
things such as Yahoo Buzz. One problem I can imagine is long term
betting, which is less involving for participants and that the
"winner" in an idea market might not necessarily turn out to be useful
in reality. Who knows? However, a solution may be to begin looking at
the acceleration of certain ideas (or even memes if you will ) within
the trading and discourse of the players/traders
Also, it might be something to have idea markets categorized by some
of the megatrends most futurologists seem to agree is coming. By this,
organizers (typically enterprises I would suppose) could be prepared
with an idea bank for each given scenario. I'm thinking this would fit
well with the need to be 'poised' in these times of discontinuities.
If you've found or heard anything regarding your inquiry, I'd love to
hear about it.
Kristoffer Hartwig
On Jun 7, 10:21 pm, "Walter Derzko" <wder...@pathcom.com> wrote:
> Dear PM colleagues
>
> I'm looking for examples of prediction markets being used as tools for
> Foresight studies? Can you provide me with any names and links
>
> Thanks in Advance
>
> Walter Derzko
>
>
> Smart Economy
>
> Toronto
>
> http://smarteconomy.typepad.com<http://smarteconomy.typepad.com/>
Bell, Tom W.
* * *
Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)'s recent request for comments about the regulation of prediction markets includes a number of specific questions. I am not sure whether I will manage to write up answers to all of them before the July 7 deadline, but question in particular—question 14—has attracted my attention. The CFTC there asks, "Should certain underlying events or measures--such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities—be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?"
"I answer the first part of question 14, "No," (and thus need not answer the second part). I doubt that the CFTC wants to hear that sort of reply, frankly; I instead suspect that it wants a legal excuse to avoid the sort of political firestorm that followed the Pentagon's proposal to create a Policy Analysis Market that included claims about assassinations and terrorist events. My draft answer to question 14 explains why I'm willing to risk disappointing the CFTC:<BLOCKQUOTE>The CFTC should not forbid trading in claims based on assassinations, terrorist activities, or other criminal acts. Because event markets would offer only relatively thin and traceable trading, they would not offer an attractive investment option to anybody planning to profit from wrongdoing. A would-be terrorist would risk revealing both his plans and his identity if, for instance, he invested in a contract predicting another 9/11. He would instead find it more safe and profitable to simply short certain publicly traded stocks.
"Furthermore, event markets in terrorist or criminal acts might benefit the public by revealing life-saving information. Suppose, for instance, that an anthropologist's study of corrido culture convinced her that narcoterrorists had begun planning military raids on border checkpoints in Arizona and California. If she had the opportunity to buy terrorist event claims, she might both profit from her research and tip us all off about looming trouble. Sound public policy suggests that we should encourage that sort of trading—not forbid it.
"To judge from their reactions to the Policy Analysis Market proposed by the Pentagon in 2003, politicians might need to learn more about the benefits of using trading to help predict assassinations or other terrorist events. That poses a public relations problem, however—not a legal one. The CFTC thus has no sound reason to presumptively forbid trading in contracts related to such events."
Notably, my answer to question 14 differs sharply from the answer offered by Jed Christiansen. He said, "There should never be any incentive to break a law, so there should never be any contracts that would pay someone if a law was broken." I disagree, of course, but I thank him for stimulating me to offer an alternative take.
* * *
---
Prof. Tom W. Bell
Chapman University School of Law
tb...@chapman.edu
http://ssrn.com/author=183716
www.tomwbell.com
Costakis, Alex
traceable will reveal a trader's identification, and by nature of their
trading, intent, that's exactly right. With that being said, why should
set a limitation on trading these type of events when we all know the
gathering of as much information (intelligence) is so critical to avoid
a possible future disaster.
It's yet another reason for having event markets regulated and audited
by a regulatory agency and its oversight bodies. By having the event
market adhere to compliance and audit requirements, the level of
scrutiny would likely be enough to dissuade a potential perpetrator from
risking exposure for limited gain.
-----Original Message-----
From: Predictio...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:Predictio...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bell, Tom W.
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 12:15 PM
To: Predictio...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism
The recent posting here of Jed Christiansen's draft answers to the
CFTC's request for comments inspired me to offer an alternative answer
to question 14. Please see
<http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2008/06/let-prediction-markets-fight-te
rrorism.html> or
<http://www.midasoracle.org/2008/06/23/let-prediction-markets-fight-terr
orism/> for the full blog posts, complete with working links. Here's
the text:
* * *
Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)'s recent request for
comments about the regulation of prediction markets includes a number of
specific questions. I am not sure whether I will manage to write up
answers to all of them before the July 7 deadline, but question in
particular-question 14-has attracted my attention. The CFTC there asks,
"Should certain underlying events or measures--such as those based on
assassinations or terrorist activities-be prohibited altogether due to
the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other
legal basis would support this treatment?"
"I answer the first part of question 14, "No," (and thus need not answer
the second part). I doubt that the CFTC wants to hear that sort of
reply, frankly; I instead suspect that it wants a legal excuse to avoid
the sort of political firestorm that followed the Pentagon's proposal to
create a Policy Analysis Market that included claims about
assassinations and terrorist events. My draft answer to question 14
explains why I'm willing to risk disappointing the CFTC:<BLOCKQUOTE>The
CFTC should not forbid trading in claims based on assassinations,
terrorist activities, or other criminal acts. Because event markets
would offer only relatively thin and traceable trading, they would not
offer an attractive investment option to anybody planning to profit from
wrongdoing. A would-be terrorist would risk revealing both his plans
and his identity if, for instance, he invested in a contract predicting
another 9/11. He would instead find it more safe and profitable to
simply short certain publicly traded stocks.
"Furthermore, event markets in terrorist or criminal acts might benefit
the public by revealing life-saving information. Suppose, for instance,
that an anthropologist's study of corrido culture convinced her that
narcoterrorists had begun planning military raids on border checkpoints
in Arizona and California. If she had the opportunity to buy terrorist
event claims, she might both profit from her research and tip us all off
about looming trouble. Sound public policy suggests that we should
encourage that sort of trading-not forbid it.
"To judge from their reactions to the Policy Analysis Market proposed by
the Pentagon in 2003, politicians might need to learn more about the
benefits of using trading to help predict assassinations or other
terrorist events. That poses a public relations problem, however-not a