Re: [singularity] Consciousness
Heartland
> I sometimes try to point out to people who think that teleportation is
> death that, if they are to be consistent, walking should also be
> considered death: you disappear *here* and a few moments later a copy
> of you appears *there*. What are we to make of this? Some possible
> responses are:
Teleportation is clearly (to me, at least) not equivalent to walking even
though I think I understand why somebody would think so. Teleportation, as I
understand it, consists of 3 phases: 1) Transformation of a mind snapshot
into bits followed by destruction of the brain, 2) Transmission of the bits
to another location, 3) Installing the mind file in a new hardware at the
new location. During 2) there's no mind anywhere, only electromagnetic waves
traveling through space that are incapable of thinking or perceiving. This
never happens during walking.
Stathis Papaioannou
Then rather than walking, consider being wheeled around on a hospital
trolley while deeply anaesthetised. You're at liberty to say that this
would also constitute death, which means we don't differ in our
beliefs about the empirical facts, just in what terminology we use to
refer to the facts. So that there's no confusion, let's call temporary
cessation of brain activity A-death and permanent cessation B-death. I
say that I want to avoid B-death at all costs, but A-death doesn't
seem to me such a big deal. How will you convince me to think
differently?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
I admit that's a nearly impossible task. A convincing argument would show
that A-death reduces to B-death. I believe that our subjective experience is
tied to a single instance of mind process and any disruption to that mind
process causes that instance to expire. It cannot be resumed as that would
mean going back in time. In other words, it's time's fault. So subjectively,
when our current instance expires, that instance can never perceive, think
or feel again as it is "stuck" in the past while, objectively, the same
*type* of that instance resumes in a new instance with its own expiration
date and your family thinks you're back alive.
When people talk about survival, what they really mean by it is being able
to continue to experience the world. Any "experiencing" is done
subjectively, not objectively, so what's true from subjective perspective is
more relevant to our survival than what's true from objective perspective.
From subjective perspective, A-death results in the total and permanent loss
of ability to perceive and think while, objectively, to your family, A-death
seems like a temporary break from living. Choose which perspective is more
important to you.
Stathis Papaioannou
> I admit that's a nearly impossible task. A convincing argument would show
> that A-death reduces to B-death. I believe that our subjective experience is
> tied to a single instance of mind process and any disruption to that mind
> process causes that instance to expire. It cannot be resumed as that would
> mean going back in time. In other words, it's time's fault. So subjectively,
> when our current instance expires, that instance can never perceive, think
> or feel again as it is "stuck" in the past while, objectively, the same
> *type* of that instance resumes in a new instance with its own expiration
> date and your family thinks you're back alive.
>
> When people talk about survival, what they really mean by it is being able
> to continue to experience the world. Any "experiencing" is done
> subjectively, not objectively, so what's true from subjective perspective is
> more relevant to our survival than what's true from objective perspective.
> From subjective perspective, A-death results in the total and permanent loss
> of ability to perceive and think while, objectively, to your family, A-death
> seems like a temporary break from living. Choose which perspective is more
> important to you.
A similar situation arises if you argue with someone who thinks
replacement of all the matter in your brain constitutes death, let's
call it C-death. You don't think C-death matters provided that the
replacement does not disrupt brain function, but someone who fears
C-death might argue that of course it disrupts brain function, since
the old brain has disintegrated and can't possibly do any more
thinking.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> A similar situation arises if you argue with someone who thinks
> replacement of all the matter in your brain constitutes death, let's
> call it C-death. You don't think C-death matters provided that the
> replacement does not disrupt brain function, but someone who fears
> C-death might argue that of course it disrupts brain function, since
> the old brain has disintegrated and can't possibly do any more
> thinking.
And then I would point out to that person that his brain would retain the
same matter if, say, his heart failed, and then, in light of this, I would
ask if it is less acceptable to have a brain still active despite
replacement of atoms than to have a brain permanently disabled but
consisting of the same atoms. That would hopefully convince that person that
C-death is less likely the correct definition of death than A-death and
B-death.
I think part of the problem is confusion between goals and means. If I think
making a copy will ensure my survival, then it's easy for me to make a
mistake to assume that making a copy is my goal. Most of the convincing,
then, has to start with a discussion of what survival actually means, what
do we want and what causes us to exist. Only after establishing the goal, we
can then move on to implementation.
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stat...@gmail.com>
>>
>> A similar situation arises if you argue with someone who thinks
>> replacement of all the matter in your brain constitutes death, let's
>> call it C-death. You don't think C-death matters provided that the
>> replacement does not disrupt brain function, but someone who fears
>> C-death might argue that of course it disrupts brain function, since
>> the old brain has disintegrated and can't possibly do any more
>> thinking.
>
> And then I would point out to that person that his brain would retain the
> same matter if, say, his heart failed, and then, in light of this, I would
> ask if it is less acceptable to have a brain still active despite
> replacement of atoms than to have a brain permanently disabled but
> consisting of the same atoms. That would hopefully convince that person that
> C-death is less likely the correct definition of death than A-death and
> B-death.
He would say that you have to have the same matter functioning in the
same way. Cutting off the blood supply to the brain does not change
the matter, but it does change its function.
> I think part of the problem is confusion between goals and means. If I think
> making a copy will ensure my survival, then it's easy for me to make a
> mistake to assume that making a copy is my goal. Most of the convincing,
> then, has to start with a discussion of what survival actually means, what
> do we want and what causes us to exist. Only after establishing the goal, we
> can then move on to implementation.
Exactly so, there's no point in making a backup copy if it means
you're still dead. You have to be sure that the backup really will
ensure your survival.
--
Stathis Papaioannou