Characterizing the sense of PI
Tim DeLaney
"Value of memories" thread, but for some reason
"Reply to author" is the only option available.
Why do some threads allow "Reply" while others
do not?
I gather that many of these discussions started
elsewhere, and I am no doubt way behind the
learning curve. That said, here are some of my
thoughts on the subject.
Evolution has programmed us for many activities.
We Seek food and drink; we seek procreation. We
seek a certain temperature range. We avoid pain.
We sleep on a diurnal schedule, and, we are
programmed to survive. Much of what we do is
governed by what is necessary the survival of the
species.
There are other activities that we engage in that
appear to have no connection to evolution; they
are mere accidents. I think religion is one of
these, although that is debatable. The capacity
to make and enjoy music is another, but again,
debatable. We dream during REM sleep. I don't
know of anybody who seriously holds that dreaming
has any survival value. Surely, the fact that we
dream is entirely accidental.
I would like to argue that one of the accidental
outcomes of evolution is our sense of Personal
Identity. PI did not arise as an adaptation; how
could it help the species to survive? It has, I
argue, no more significance than dreams have, at
least in evolutionary terms.
Some have expressed this view by saying that PI is
illusory. I don't think that this is a useful view.
PI is not an illusion, but neither is it an entity.
It is just a name we have given to a neural
phenomenon. The fact that we have a strong sense
of PI really doesn't mean very much. After all,
when we dream, we generally have that same sense.
When we wake up, we realize how naive that sense
was that we had in our dreaming state.
Under this view, the question of instance is not a
problem. If one undergoes deep anaesthesia, one is
still the same person upon awakening. This
sense arises from the interaction of the way the
brain is organized and of the memories it has
stored. (By stored memories, I mean the memories
of one's personal experiences, as distinct from,
say, remembering what is the capital of Delaware.)
If I could characterize my view of what I mean by
PI it would be this: The sense of PI is nothing
more than the sum total of all the neural impulses
that occur in the brain.
I admit that it's not clear how neural impulses
could lead to self awareness, conciousness, or a
sense of PI. Nor is it clear what the phrase "sum
total" might denote. Somehow it happens, just as a
photon can go through two slits at the same time.
The only alternative that occurs to me is to posit
a god that decrees it, and I'm not prepared to do
that. It solves the problem definitively to say
that God created me with a Soul and Free Will. But
it poses other problems that, to me, are insoluble.
Is there anything novel or interesting in the above?
Or am I just rehashing old ideas? (Or worse yet,
naive or discredited ideas?)
Tim
lco...@rawbw.com
> Evolution has programmed us for many activities.
> We Seek food and drink; we seek procreation. We
> seek a certain temperature range. We avoid pain.
> We sleep on a diurnal schedule, and, we are
> programmed to survive. Much of what we do is
> governed by what is necessary the survival of the
> species.
>
> There are other activities that we engage in that
> appear to have no connection to evolution; they
> are mere accidents.
avoid being chased in my dreams by the shade of
Stephen J. Gould, I will refrain from wondering
how much this is the "spandrels" he used to
talk about (and about which, I think, he got a lot of
heat from more knowledgeable researchers).
> I think religion is one of these, although that is
> debatable.
had (or have) a strong religious identity survived (or
survive) better. Another theory (described in a very
great book, "Before the Dawn" by Nicholas Wade)
is that "the sacred" was a means of countering lies,
establishing by providing an in-group of fellow believers
It also looks like it can cause individuals to make
personal sacrifices to have large families, which
definitely makes it easier for groups to perpetuate
themselves and be competitive against other groups.
> Surely, the fact that we dream is entirely accidental.
> I would like to argue that one of the accidental
> outcomes of evolution is our sense of Personal
> Identity. PI did not arise as an adaptation; how
> could it help the species to survive? It has, I
> argue, no more significance than dreams have, at
> least in evolutionary terms.
a strong sense of PI (e.g. ones who were particularly
proud of some personal accomplishment that they
would, for example, stop every single bystander at a
chess club and say "Have I shown you my game with
Weinberger yet?")?
Those who in any shape or form are more resigned to
loss of PI would, everything else being equal, have
lowered survival prospects, it seems to me. And the
brain does seem to actively fight to retain its integrity:
split brain patient's hemisphere's keep making up
excuses for each other, as though adamantly trying
to deny that they're now separate beings. We badly
want to believe in the integrity of our souls, at least
as reflected in most people's normal daily behavior.
> If I could characterize my view of what I mean by
> PI it would be this: The sense of PI is nothing
> more than the sum total of all the neural impulses
> that occur in the brain.
perfectly intelligent in every other regard, but
lacked any sense of PI. If pressed, it might
finally acknowledge "oh, you mean, *this* machine
here that is the one speaking to you...", but
otherwise be devoid of "I" or "me".
> Is there anything novel or interesting in the above?
> Or am I just rehashing old ideas? (Or worse yet,
> naive or discredited ideas?)
so large and our memories so poor (at least mine),
that such questions can seldom be answered,
I'm afraid. :-)
Lee
Tim DeLaney
game. If by chance you have one, let me know!
A strong sense of PI might favor survival, but if PI evolved as an
adaptation we must suppose there is a PI gene. This further supposes
that the synthesis of some protein or proteins somehow creats a sense
of PI.
This is why I'm skeptical that religion and music came about as
adaptations. Rarely, if ever, do adaptations spring up full-blown
from nothing. (I have in mind "Climbing Mount Improbable") Maybe these
three (religion, music and a sense of PI) are are exceptions, but most
adaptations are variations on existing structures. The three middle
ear bones are a classic example.
These traits might well have survival value, but until you can
demonstrate the existence of specific genes that bring about these
traits, and at a minimum, at least conjecture a mechanism for their
expression, then you must admit to the possibility that they are just
accidental.
>
> Those who in any shape or form are more resigned to
> loss of PI would, everything else being equal, have
> lowered survival prospects, it seems to me. And the
> brain does seem to actively fight to retain its integrity:
> split brain patient's hemisphere's keep making up
> excuses for each other, as though adamantly trying
> to deny that they're now separate beings. We badly
> want to believe in the integrity of our souls, at least
> as reflected in most people's normal daily behavior.
>
> > If I could characterize my view of what I mean by
> > PI it would be this: The sense of PI is nothing
> > more than the sum total of all the neural impulses
> > that occur in the brain.
>
> But I can easily imagine an AI, say, that was
> perfectly intelligent in every other regard, but
> lacked any sense of PI. If pressed, it might
> finally acknowledge "oh, you mean, *this* machine
> here that is the one speaking to you...", but
> otherwise be devoid of "I" or "me".
software combination imaginable today -- interact with one another.
Perhaps this interaction is necessary for a sense of PI to arise.
Picture yourself as the only biological entity you have ever
encountered. Somehow, food and drink appear when you get hungry or
thirsty. Your environment is always safe and comfortable. You can
amuse yourself with a variety of pursuits, but only those that don't
depend on other people.
In fact, there is no evidence that other people ever have -- or even
could in principle -- exist. How could the sense of PI arise in such
a world?
I argue that if AI and AI platforms became sufficiently complex, and
that if there were many of them -- all slightly different from one
another -- and if they routinely interacted with each other, each
would (or at least could) develop a sense of PI.
>
> > Is there anything novel or interesting in the above?
> > Or am I just rehashing old ideas? (Or worse yet,
> > naive or discredited ideas?)
>
> Alas, the space of ideas and different approaches is
> so large and our memories so poor (at least mine),
> that such questions can seldom be answered,
> I'm afraid. :-)
>
> Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
> I would like to argue that one of the accidental
> outcomes of evolution is our sense of Personal
> Identity. PI did not arise as an adaptation; how
> could it help the species to survive? It has, I
> argue, no more significance than dreams have, at
> least in evolutionary terms.
If I want to survive the next hour that means that I want two people
to be alive, one at time T=0 and another at T=1 hour, such that both
people are "me". How is it possible to rephrase this without
explicitly or implicitly referring to a sense of identity over time?
> Some have expressed this view by saying that PI is
> illusory. I don't think that this is a useful view.
> PI is not an illusion, but neither is it an entity.
> It is just a name we have given to a neural
> phenomenon. The fact that we have a strong sense
> of PI really doesn't mean very much. After all,
> when we dream, we generally have that same sense.
> When we wake up, we realize how naive that sense
> was that we had in our dreaming state.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this. If I have a sense
that I am myself in a dream why is that naive or invalid?
> Under this view, the question of instance is not a
> problem. If one undergoes deep anaesthesia, one is
> still the same person upon awakening. This
> sense arises from the interaction of the way the
> brain is organized and of the memories it has
> stored. (By stored memories, I mean the memories
> of one's personal experiences, as distinct from,
> say, remembering what is the capital of Delaware.)
>
> If I could characterize my view of what I mean by
> PI it would be this: The sense of PI is nothing
> more than the sum total of all the neural impulses
> that occur in the brain.
>
> I admit that it's not clear how neural impulses
> could lead to self awareness, conciousness, or a
> sense of PI. Nor is it clear what the phrase "sum
> total" might denote. Somehow it happens, just as a
> photon can go through two slits at the same time.
Yes, but this seems to me almost too obvious to be worth stating.
> The only alternative that occurs to me is to posit
> a god that decrees it, and I'm not prepared to do
> that. It solves the problem definitively to say
> that God created me with a Soul and Free Will. But
> it poses other problems that, to me, are insoluble.
I could be ignorant about how a computer works but still be certain
that it is completely explained by electrical activity in its
components. I don't see why anyone would consider supernatural
explanations for brains but not computers.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Tim DeLaney
On Jul 12, 5:32 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2008/7/11 Tim DeLaney <delaney.timo...@comcast.net>:
> > I would like to argue that one of the accidental
> > outcomes of evolution is our sense of Personal
> > Identity. PI did not arise as an adaptation; how
> > could it help the species to survive? It has, I
> > argue, no more significance than dreams have, at
> > least in evolutionary terms.
>
> If I want to survive the next hour that means that I want two people
> to be alive, one at time T=0 and another at T=1 hour, such that both
> people are "me". How is it possible to rephrase this without
> explicitly or implicitly referring to a sense of identity over time?
This view is an opinion that our sense of PI cannot be
explained as an evolutionary adaptation. If it were, then
we could, at least in principal, study PI by determining
which genes are responsible for it, and which proteins
those genes synthesize.
>
> > Some have expressed this view by saying that PI is
> > illusory. I don't think that this is a useful view.
> > PI is not an illusion, but neither is it an entity.
> > It is just a name we have given to a neural
> > phenomenon. The fact that we have a strong sense
> > of PI really doesn't mean very much. After all,
> > when we dream, we generally have that same sense.
> > When we wake up, we realize how naive that sense
> > was that we had in our dreaming state.
>
> I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this. If I have a sense
> that I am myself in a dream why is that naive or invalid?
dream, I don't have access to the memories that I have access
to in the waking state. My parents, for example, are still alive.
I am still a smoker, although I quit that habit some 15 years ago.
In my dreams, I am sometimes capable of flight.
The point is that the sense of PI that I experience in my dreams
has no objective significance. ("Naive" was a lousy choice of
words, and just muddled my thoughts.)
do exactly that. They have a pat solution to the PI problem.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Tim
Jared Goldman
the "shared experience" of dreaming point to a "shared identity"? Does
the coincidental evolutionary parallels that we share as a species
also not point to this? Both the genetic and psychological identities
which we share, as a species in our experience?
- Jared Goldman
Stathis Papaioannou
>> > I would like to argue that one of the accidental
>> > outcomes of evolution is our sense of Personal
>> > Identity. PI did not arise as an adaptation; how
>> > could it help the species to survive? It has, I
>> > argue, no more significance than dreams have, at
>> > least in evolutionary terms.
>>
>> If I want to survive the next hour that means that I want two people
>> to be alive, one at time T=0 and another at T=1 hour, such that both
>> people are "me". How is it possible to rephrase this without
>> explicitly or implicitly referring to a sense of identity over time?
>
> I'm not sure how this bears on the view I expressed above.
What I meant was that if the will to survive evolves then necessarily
a sense of personal identity also evolves, since personal survival
can't be defined without at least implicitly defining personal
identity.
> This view is an opinion that our sense of PI cannot be
> explained as an evolutionary adaptation. If it were, then
> we could, at least in principal, study PI by determining
> which genes are responsible for it, and which proteins
> those genes synthesize.
The genes which are responsible for our brains must be responsible for
>> > Some have expressed this view by saying that PI is
>> > illusory. I don't think that this is a useful view.
>> > PI is not an illusion, but neither is it an entity.
>> > It is just a name we have given to a neural
>> > phenomenon. The fact that we have a strong sense
>> > of PI really doesn't mean very much. After all,
>> > when we dream, we generally have that same sense.
>> > When we wake up, we realize how naive that sense
>> > was that we had in our dreaming state.
>>
>> I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this. If I have a sense
>> that I am myself in a dream why is that naive or invalid?
>
> Perhaps your dreams are very different from mine. When I
> dream, I don't have access to the memories that I have access
> to in the waking state. My parents, for example, are still alive.
> I am still a smoker, although I quit that habit some 15 years ago.
> In my dreams, I am sometimes capable of flight.
>
> The point is that the sense of PI that I experience in my dreams
> has no objective significance. ("Naive" was a lousy choice of
> words, and just muddled my thoughts.)
If we are dreaming, hallucinating or deluded our experiences might not
correlate with external reality, but they are still just as valid as
experiences. I'd consider swapping my present reality for a simulated
one if it were attractive enough.
>> I could be ignorant about how a computer works but still be certain
>> that it is completely explained by electrical activity in its
>> components. I don't see why anyone would consider supernatural
>> explanations for brains but not computers.
>
> Billions of people on this planet, and in fact a clear majority,
> do exactly that. They have a pat solution to the PI problem.
My problem is that I don't see how a supernatural explanation could be
any better in principle than a natural one. All the so-called
paradoxes of PI still occur if we have souls; for example, if God
duplicates your soul in two separate locations, where do you find
yourself ending up?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
lco...@rawbw.com
> Tim wrote:
>
> > This view is an opinion that our sense of PI cannot be
> > explained as an evolutionary adaptation. If it were, then
> > we could, at least in principal, study PI by determining
> > which genes are responsible for it, and which proteins
> > those genes synthesize.
to say that all animals and birds that act like they're
discrete entities are discrete, and have a sense of personal
identity (if by those four words you all think what I think you
do).
> The genes which are responsible for our brains must be
> ...
> could be any better in principle than a natural one.
> All the so-called paradoxes of PI still occur if we have souls;
> for example, if God duplicates your soul in two separate locations,
> where do you find yourself ending up?
sure the theologians would argue that a new soul is created
instanter (to use a medieval word). God also cannot make
arguments so unfathomable that He cannot see through them.
Jared wrote
> Hmm, I fly as well in my dreams sometimes, as do many others... Does
not become one man" -- Baizhang, Master of Zen (720–814 AD)
> Does the coincidental evolutionary parallels that we share as
> a species also not point to this?
and yet they are not one" --- ibid (720-814 AD)
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
> Not even God can duplicate a soul, or so I understand. I'm
> sure the theologians would argue that a new soul is created
> instanter (to use a medieval word). God also cannot make
> arguments so unfathomable that He cannot see through them.
But it is at least logically possible that God could duplicate a soul;
it does not present a contradiction in the way the unfathomable
argument does.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Tim DeLaney
On Jul 12, 11:40 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2008/7/13 Tim DeLaney <delaney.timo...@comcast.net>:
>
> What I meant was that if the will to survive evolves then necessarily
> a sense of personal identity also evolves, since personal survival
> can't be defined without at least implicitly defining personal
> identity.
me from jumping off cliffs or swimming with crocodiles
that has nothing to do with PI. We pull our hand from a
hot stove automatically. The adaptation to avoid pain
has nothing to do with PI.
...
> If we are dreaming, hallucinating or deluded our experiences might not
> correlate with external reality, but they are still just as valid as
> experiences.
of PI during such experiences suggests to me that a sense
of PI is not important to our survival. It's just a quirk that
pops up now and then.
>I'd consider swapping my present reality for a simulated
> one if it were attractive enough.
...
Tim
Tim DeLaney
On Jul 13, 12:58 am, lcor...@rawbw.com wrote:
> Stathis writes
> > Tim wrote:
> > ...
> > My problem is that I don't see how a supernatural explanation
> > could be any better in principle than a natural one.
>
> Surely no one here is daring to *advocate* one! :-)
emulate. The use of the word "daring" here is exquisite.
I brought it up to suggest obliquely that religion was invented
to resolve "the so-called PI paradoxes." (to use Stathis' term)
I have never been an advocate of the "god gene".
Tim
Lee Corbin
> Stathis wrote:
>>
>> What I meant was that if the will to survive evolves
>> then necessarily a sense of personal identity also
>> evolves, since personal survival can't be defined
>> without at least implicitly defining personal identity.
>
> I think it can. I can imagine an adaptation that prevents
> me from jumping off cliffs or swimming with crocodiles
> that has nothing to do with PI. We pull our hand from a
> hot stove automatically. The adaptation to avoid pain
> has nothing to do with PI.
If there is a large enough collection of such sets of
behavior, wherein an organism appears to be
continually on the lookout for threats to it, then
objectively, it certainly looks like it has a sense
of self. Yet on the other hand, some friends of
mine made a nice computer game where a little
twisting, dancing, very peculiar shape would "try"
very hard to avoid having you trap it by one play
or another at your disposal. Though it strongly
conveyed this, I have to admit that it'd be a stretch
to say that it really had going on in its "mind" what
we'd call a sense of identity.
> [Stathis wrote]
>> If we are dreaming, hallucinating or deluded our
>> experiences might not correlate with external reality,
>> but they are still just as valid as experiences.
>
> Yes, I agree. But the fact that we can have a strong sense
> of PI during such experiences suggests to me that a sense
> of PI is not important to our survival. It's just a quirk that
> pops up now and then.
Would you guys say that most birds and mammals we
frequently observe have a sense of personal identity?
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
> I think it can. I can imagine an adaptation that prevents
> me from jumping off cliffs or swimming with crocodiles
> that has nothing to do with PI. We pull our hand from a
> hot stove automatically. The adaptation to avoid pain
> has nothing to do with PI.
There is still an implicit sense of PI: I pull my hand from the hot
stove, not your hand. The intellectual understanding of PI comes when
we reflect on this, anticipating that we remain the same person over
time and planning to avoid the stove next time.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Tim DeLaney
regard to some of the higher mammals (E.G.
chimpanzee, dolphin), it seems obvious that
they are conscious, self-aware, and have a
sense of PI. (To what extent is the above
statement redundant?)
Tim
Tim
Lee Corbin
> Sent: Saturday, July 12
>
>> Stathis wrote:
>> If I have a sense that I am myself in a dream why is that naive or invalid?
>
> Perhaps your dreams are very different from mine. When I
> dream, I don't have access to the memories that I have access
> to in the waking state.
Certainly, not to *all* those memories.
> My parents, for example, are still alive. I am still a smoker, although
> quit that habit some 15 years ago.
Yes, but those are your parents, and smoking was something
you did for many years.
> In my dreams, I am sometimes capable of flight.
>
> The point is that the sense of PI that I experience in my dreams
> has no objective significance. ("Naive" was a lousy choice of
> words, and just muddled my thoughts.)
I guess I still don't understand what is meant by
"an objective sense of Personal Identity", or
whether its significance would be objective.
I would say that Tim Delaney does have experiences
while asleep, but they're pretty weird, often weirder
than when he takes powerful drugs.
If we had a device that would suddenly remove from
your brain all your present memories, and impose
instead all the memories Tim Delaney had in 1967,
then I'd say that Tim D. is still alive, and the person
we would interrogate would be sure of it, though if
he had a resume of all your activities since, he might
(rightly in my view) suggest that the Tim Model-2008
is only 50% or something of the Tim 1967, and vice-
versa.
I think that that is all mostly objective, just as it's
objectively true that a Studebaker resembles
a Ford more than it does a locomotive. (What
a coincidence: I check the spelling of "Studebaker"
and they're from South Bend Indiana, just like you.)
Lee