Transfering threads from other lists
Heartland
> On a separate note, could you guys move this to the
> PersonalIdentity list Heartland set up? I guess the
> list sniper is asleep at the trigger, but that's no
> reason to take advantage.
I agree. Let's move these sl4 threads here. I suspect people are still not sure
whether to continue the discussions on this list since they are not certain whether
whoever they are talking to over on sl4 has also joined this list. Would making a
list of current subscribers public (at least for a while) help?
Slawek
P.S. Thanks Randall.
Stathis Papaioannou
Yes, it probably would, if it's OK with the subscribers.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
>> whether to continue the discussions on this list since they are not certain
>> whether
>> whoever they are talking to over on sl4 has also joined this list. Would making
>> a
>> list of current subscribers public (at least for a while) help?
Stathis:
> Yes, it probably would, if it's OK with the subscribers.
Current subscribers can now access the members list. Turns out the same option is
unavailable to non-subscribers anyway, but the archives will stay public unless
somebody objects.
Slawek
Lee
(BTW, Eliezer's ban is not so general as I feared. I vote to move
here only those threads *specifically* about personal identity.)
> Lee:
> > At the top of every post I say who said something. Later
> > on, when I think it's "obvious" I drop it. But mistakes can be made :-)
> > See how it says "Heartland writes" up there? I don't think that you'll
> > even find one post I wrote on this list where I don't do that---even
> > if I do issue a preamble of sorts first.
> Yes, you do that, but once you scroll down it's sometimes hard to
> figure out who said what, which is why I prefer attributing each group
> of paragraphs and make everything visually clean for crystal
> clarity. I think I'm the only one who bothers to do that.
Suit yourself. But I once worked out a deep mathematical formula
for helping out in such instances. The basic idea, without going into
great detail, is to regard even numbers of the angle bracket symbols
as text coming from the original poster, and odd numbers of these,
e.g., ">", or ">>>", as coming from his opponen--er, interlocutors.
> First, I asked you why memories were important to you. You answered
> it was because you wanted to remain like Lee Corbin. Then I asked why
> being "like something" was important, and you replied that people don't
> want to be like rodents, for example. Since I'm not much
> closer to getting the answer, I'm asking it again below.
I'll try to address it when I get there. But please be patient in
these
discussions. Especially people write as though their concepts are
almost 180 degrees apart, confusion and miscommunication is
unfortunately very common, even among the most careful and the
best-intentioned.
> Wait. You're making the exact same point as before, namely, that people
> don't want to be like rodents because rodents experience lower quality of
> life (small size, shorter lifespan, decreased intelligence, ugliness).
Sorry. I was working up towards a general feeling that people don't
like
losing the traits they have and acquiring others, and that I think
that this
includes both you and me, and so firstly, it's a very *common*
feeling.
(My theory---i.e. the one *in practice* accepted by approximately
6x10^9
people on Earth---explains this. They have an attachment to their own
selves which is lost upon radical change. But I concur that this is
not
a logical argument, merely the postulation of a theory.)
> Regarding the other paragraph I snipped (see, I'm doing my share :-)), I'm well
> aware that people don't want to be drastically different than they already are, and
> know what they mean when they say, "I want to be like Brad Pitt," but I still have
> not received an explanation for *why* it's so important to you not to be like
> someone/something else. Do you think this explanation exists?
No, at least I very much doubt it. Now there is an easy-to-come-by
*evolutionary* explanation for how organisms got this way, but you
are after something else, I sense---after answers to questions
I presume to be quite similar (when taken in isolation) to "why is
it better to exist than to not exist?", "what is the real reason you
prefer to be alive?, "why do you prefer a higher standard of
living?".
Now---do NOT react to those particular questions. I offer them only
as example of *similar* questions to which I believe that no reasons
(outside of evolutionary ones) exist.
> Lee:
>>>> ...is [it] that under anaesthesia, perhaps you believe your "instance
>>>> of mind process" is ended?
>> > It's an objective fact. Even all cryonicists should have no problem
>> > acknowledging this simple truth. An instance of any type of
>> > process ends when it stops. If you catch a ball, its flight ends.
>> > What can be less confusing than that?
>>
> Lee:
>> Just checking. Just confirming that you believe that what you value
>> really would be lost if you take anaesthesia. Right? I mean, you
>> would refuse general anaesthesia if you went to a hospital and the
>> doctors were going to perform an exceedingly, exceedingly
>> painful operation?
>
> It's complicated. My final decision would have to take into account
> potential size of area under the "pain over time" curve on a xy-plane--
> where x-axis denotes time and y-axis measures intensity of pain--
> for both cases. In the end, it's all about quality of life for me, so,
> if the size of area under "pain over time" curve reached a certain
> limit (not sure what it is right now, I don't think it's very high) in
> any case, I would accept general anesthesia as surviving with this
> limit exceeded would make no sense either. IOW, the quality of
> life would reach unacceptably low levels.
I think that you've wandered away from the main point, really.
Maybe I should have followed up with this question. Do you
or do you not believe that your instance comes to an end
under extremely deep anesthesia?
> Lee:
> > Would you like for someone you love to go under anesthesia?
>
> I wouldn't have liked it even if I had believed in new-age-inspired theories such
> as that "people are adjectives," to quote my inebriated persecutor. I wouldn't
> protest, though.
To ask the same thing about this example, do you think that upon
"coming out" of anesthesia, "someone" comes out who is the same
person you were acquainted with? We know that someone who comes
out of being frozen is to you not the same person---the original
person's
life ended when they were frozen. So I'm asking an exactly parallel
question.
Lee
Heartland
Lee Corbin wrote:
> (BTW, Eliezer's ban is not so general as I feared. I vote to move
> here only those threads *specifically* about personal identity.)
All these threads were about "personal identity," as far as I could tell, and I
thought Eliezer issued a blanket ban on all of them. It'll be interesting to see
how long he'll continue to tolerate them.
This list is about everything that directly or indirectly relates to personal
survival so topics such as functionalism, for example, definitely belong here and
will probably be discussed often.
>> Regarding the other paragraph I snipped (see, I'm doing my share
>> :-)), I'm well aware that people don't want to be drastically
>> different than they already are, and know what they mean when they
>> say, "I want to be like Brad Pitt," but I still have not received an
>> explanation for *why* it's so important to you not to be like
>> someone/something else. Do you think this explanation exists?
>
> No, at least I very much doubt it. Now there is an easy-to-come-by
> *evolutionary* explanation for how organisms got this way, but you
> are after something else, I sense---after answers to questions
> I presume to be quite similar (when taken in isolation) to "why is
> it better to exist than to not exist?", "what is the real reason you
> prefer to be alive?, "why do you prefer a higher standard of
> living?".
> Now---do NOT react to those particular questions. I offer them only
> as example of *similar* questions to which I believe that no reasons
> (outside of evolutionary ones) exist.
You are right, I'm after the answer that would be similar to the answers to the
type of questions you list, and not after the type of answer that reduces to
"because I'm programmed to spread my genes." I hope we're smart enough not to be
fooled by evolution or at least we should try.
What my line of questioning has been getting at is why we value the things we value
and, more importantly, who/what really benefits from seeing these values fulfilled.
I answered this question the first time you asked me. Yes.
> To ask the same thing about this example, do you think that upon
> "coming out" of anesthesia, "someone" comes out who is the same
> person you were acquainted with?
This person is the same only in the abstract, not physical sense. It's certainly
not the same instance of mind process so the person who wakes up is logically
equivalent to an exact, physically separate copy of you (or of somebody else) that
you might meet on the street. Different instances do not share the same thread of
subjective experience or else they should not be considered different. Even though
this instance of a person who wakes up is exactly *like* the previous instance, and
my relationship to that person remains the same, the previous instance is as dead
as though surgery ended tragically.
> We know that someone who comes
> out of being frozen is to you not the same person---the original
> person's
> life ended when they were frozen. So I'm asking an exactly parallel
> question.
It's the same type of person that wakes up, but it's only a new person. It's like a
conception/birth except the "newborn" already behaves like an adult someone used to
know. It's a birth, not resurrection.
Slawek
Lee
(and BTW, thanks for changing the subject line. I should have
started a new subject. It'll be a while before I get the hang of
this.)
> > I presume to be quite similar (when
> > taken in isolation) to "why is
> > it better to exist than to not exist?",
> > "what is the real reason you
> > prefer to be alive?, "why do you
> > prefer a higher standard of living?".
>
> to the answers to the type of questions you list, and not
> after the type of answer that reduces to "because I'm
> programmed to spread my genes." I hope we're smart
> enough not to be fooled by evolution or at least we should try.
kind of answers that exist.
> What my line of questioning has been getting at is why we
> value the things we value and, more importantly, who/what
> really benefits from seeing these values fulfilled.
> > I think that you've wandered away from the main point, really.
> > Maybe I should have followed up with this question. Do you
> > or do you not believe that your instance comes to an end
> > under extremely deep anesthesia?
>
> I answered this question the first time you asked me. Yes.
>
> > To ask the same thing about this example, do you think
> > that upon "coming out" of anesthesia, "someone" comes
> > out who is the same person you were acquainted with?
>
> This person is the same only in the abstract, not physical sense.
> It's certainly not the same instance of mind process so the
> person who wakes up is logically equivalent to an exact,
> physically separate copy of you (or of somebody else) that
> you might meet on the street.
was scheduled to go under deep anesthesia and become
someone else? Even if, say, she did not care (e.g. was
not philosophical about all this, but that her friends had seemed
okay afterwards was good enough for her)?
> Different instances do not share the same thread
> of subjective experience or else they should not be
> considered different.
I do say that they share the same subjective
experience, so long as it remains exactly identical.
> > We know that [to you] someone who comes
> > out of being frozen is...not the same person
> > were frozen. So I'm asking an exactly parallel
> > question.
>
> It's the same type of person that wakes up, but
> it's only a new person. It's like a conception/birth
> except the "newborn" already behaves like an
> adult someone used to know. It's a birth, not
> resurrection.
Lee
Heartland
>> > I presume to be quite similar (when
>> > taken in isolation) to "why is
>> > it better to exist than to not exist?",
>> > "what is the real reason you
>> > prefer to be alive?, "why do you
>> > prefer a higher standard of living?".
>>
>> You are right, I'm after the answer that would be similar
>> to the answers to the type of questions you list, and not
>> after the type of answer that reduces to "because I'm
>> programmed to spread my genes." I hope we're smart
>> enough not to be fooled by evolution or at least we should try.
>
> Sometimes those will turn out to be the only
> kind of answers that exist.
You're giving up too easily, Lee. Do you really see nothing wrong with being one of
evolution's slaves, blindly following its orders without giving second thought to
what's in it for you?
There's definitely some explanation to why people are attached to their memories.
I've been programmed by evolution also so I instinctively understand this
attachment, but, upon further examination, personal memories don't appear as
crucial to survival as people think. I want somebody, someday to tell me exactly
what's so indispensable about memories just to make sure the answer I rejected was
the
same. It's always possible I missed something. Maybe some others who disagree with
me just think about this more deeply.
My sense, though, is that most people are satisfied with their intuitive sense of
what it means to survive. Unfortunately, they are not willing to go beyond the
intuition so they don't give themselves a chance to examine the real reasons for
why they want to survive. This is why when they are presented with a scenario, they
can easily evaluate whether the scenario is acceptable or not to them, and yet,
when pressed, they won't be able to explain what motivated their preference. They
never gave themselves an opportunity to find out whether their intuitions about
what they want to happen have been logically consistent with what they actually
want.
>> What my line of questioning has been getting at is why we
>> value the things we value and, more importantly, who/what
>> really benefits from seeing these values fulfilled.
>
> I'll try to keep that in mind.
I still would like you to take a shot at answering these questions. Even failed
attempts to answer them could likely bring a lot of clarity to these issues.
> All right. So would you *care* if someone you deeply loved
> was scheduled to go under deep anesthesia and become
> someone else? Even if, say, she did not care (e.g. was
> not philosophical about all this, but that her friends had seemed
> okay afterwards was good enough for her)?
I would care, of course, but not enough to do anything to stop this person from
accepting anesthesia (for the reasons I outlined before). However, it's most
important to realize that any answer to this question wouldn't alter the truth of
whether the mind instance that wakes up after anesthesia survived any more than me
saying that Earth is a flat disk would change the fact that Earth is round.
>> Different instances do not share the same thread
>> of subjective experience or else they should not be
>> considered different.
> Hmm. On that choice of words, for what it's worth,
> I do say that they share the same subjective
> experience, so long as it remains exactly identical.
And this is at the heart of our disagreement. People who start thinking about
survival inevitably face this question and their answer ultimately determines if
their allegiance will be to a pattern or to a continuous mind instance.
For me the choice has always been clear and obvious. My neighbor and I don't share
the same subjective experience so there's absolutely no reason to think changing
the structure of my neighbor's brain into my type of brain structure would suddenly
make me see what he sees, hear what he sees, feel what he feels, etc. If I die and
my neighbor lives, my neighbor's continued thread of subjective experience won't,
in any way, extend my thread of subjective experience no matter what. When my mind
instance dies, it's just a return to pre-birth-like nothingness/nonexistence
forever.
>> > We know that [to you] someone who comes
>> > out of being frozen is...not the same person
>> > ---the original person's life ended when they
>> > were frozen. So I'm asking an exactly parallel
>> > question.
>>
>> It's the same type of person that wakes up, but
>> it's only a new person. It's like a conception/birth
>> except the "newborn" already behaves like an
>> adult someone used to know. It's a birth, not
>> resurrection.
>
> Reincarnation, perhaps? :-)
Resurrection, reincarnation, these are all religious concepts. I'll stick to
calling it a birth.
:-)
Slawek
Lee
> > Sometimes those will turn out to be the only
> > kind of answers that exist.
>
> You're giving up too easily, Lee. Do you really see nothing
> wrong with being one of evolution's slaves, blindly following
> its orders without giving second thought to
> what's in it for you?
rebel against my genes ever since 1976 when the last line of
Dawkin's book of that year reiterated the idea that we may come
to have values different from those that evolved in us. Moreover,
I had said nothing that would lead you to make such a preposterous
inference.
> There's definitely some explanation to why people are
> attached to their memories. I've been programmed by
> evolution also so I instinctively understand this
> attachment, but, upon further examination, personal
> memories don't appear as crucial to survival as people
> think. I want somebody, someday to tell me exactly
> what's so indispensable about memories just to make
> sure the answer I rejected was the same.
are thousands of extremely qualified philosophers
attending questions just like this, it may eventually
occur to you that there is something wrong with your
question. Don't ask me what, because if I did feel like
articulating it, I might not be able to.
> My sense, though, is that most people are satisfied
> with their intuitive sense of what it means to survive.
> Unfortunately, they are not willing to go beyond the
> intuition so they don't give themselves a chance to
> examine the real reasons for why they want to survive.
question except the EP one. Sorry.
> I still would like you to take a shot at answering these
> questions.
the end of each one, so I can tell them apart from your
point-making about them.
> > All right. So would you *care* if someone you deeply loved
> > was scheduled to go under deep anesthesia and become
> > someone else? Even if, say, she did not care (e.g. was
> > not philosophical about all this, but that her friends had seemed
> > okay afterwards was good enough for her)?
>
> I would care, of course, but not enough to do anything
> to stop this person from accepting anesthesia (for the
> reasons I outlined before). However, it's most important
> to realize that any answer to this question wouldn't alter
> the truth of whether the mind instance that wakes up
> after anesthesia survived any more than me saying that
> Earth is a flat disk would change the fact that Earth is round.
presume, suppose your actual wife to be dead, i.e.,
the actual mind instance you fell in love with, and
just consider this new person to be merely a very
satisfactory replacement?
> >> Different instances do not share the same thread
> >> of subjective experience or else they should not be
> >> considered different.
> > Hmm. On that choice of words, for what it's worth,
> > I do say that they share the same subjective
> > experience, so long as it remains exactly identical.
>
> And this is at the heart of our disagreement. People who start thinking about
> survival inevitably face this question and their answer ultimately determines if
> their allegiance will be to a pattern or to a continuous mind instance.
that on re-re-quotes, pretty horrible wrapping results.
I'm tired of halving your sentences. Perhaps we need
to write the way I'm writing this paragraph? Or do I
just not have enough experience yet in this, and am
wrong?
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
> There's definitely some explanation to why people are attached to their memories.
> I've been programmed by evolution also so I instinctively understand this
> attachment, but, upon further examination, personal memories don't appear as
> crucial to survival as people think. I want somebody, someday to tell me exactly
> what's so indispensable about memories just to make sure the answer I rejected was
> the
> same. It's always possible I missed something. Maybe some others who disagree with
> me just think about this more deeply.
>
> My sense, though, is that most people are satisfied with their intuitive sense of
> what it means to survive. Unfortunately, they are not willing to go beyond the
> intuition so they don't give themselves a chance to examine the real reasons for
> why they want to survive. This is why when they are presented with a scenario, they
> can easily evaluate whether the scenario is acceptable or not to them, and yet,
> when pressed, they won't be able to explain what motivated their preference. They
> never gave themselves an opportunity to find out whether their intuitions about
> what they want to happen have been logically consistent with what they actually
> want.
The "intuitive sense of what it means to survive" includes, in large
part, memories. A person enters a coma and, some days later, a person
comes out of the coma who has the same memories and behaves in the
same way. The person and everyone else around him considers that he
has survived the coma *by definition*. If scientific evidence is later
presented that during the coma all the atoms in his body were
replaced, or all his neural activity completely ceased, then that just
means *by definition* that people can survive these insults; or
equivalently that the definition of survival being used by the
scientists differs from the intuitive one.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Slawek P.
>> > Sometimes those will turn out to be the only
>> > kind of answers that exist.
>>
>> You're giving up too easily, Lee. Do you really see nothing
>> wrong with being one of evolution's slaves, blindly following
>> its orders without giving second thought to
>> what's in it for you?
> As usual, you have me pegged totally wrong. I've been a knowing
> rebel against my genes ever since 1976 when the last line of
> Dawkin's book of that year reiterated the idea that we may come
> to have values different from those that evolved in us. Moreover,
> I had said nothing that would lead you to make such a preposterous
> inference.
I read your statement that EP-inspired answers sometimes turn out to be the only
kind of answers that exist to mean that, in the context of this exchange, you
accept these answers as sufficient and are not willing to search for or consider
any other answers beyond the ones that were given. Sorry if that's not what you
meant, but I don't see how I could interpret this sentence differently especially
within the context of what was written before. Maybe if you elaborated a bit more
on what you actually meant beyond this short sentence, I would not have to guess
what your intended meaning was.
> Can you write shorter lines? I get the impression
> that on re-re-quotes, pretty horrible wrapping results.
> I'm tired of halving your sentences. Perhaps we need
> to write the way I'm writing this paragraph? Or do I
> just not have enough experience yet in this, and am
> wrong?
Sorry, but I have no idea what problem you are describing, Lee. Why would you halve
my sentences in the first place? What's wrong with them? In all my years of posting
I never had to deal with so many different meta complaints before, let alone inside
a single thread. Is my posting style really that incomprehensible and hideous?
Obviously, if I'm really making these horrible errors, anybody who points them out
and shows me the correct way of doing things would be doing me a big favor. Thanks.
Slawek
Heartland
Stathis:
> The "intuitive sense of what it means to survive" includes, in large
> part, memories. A person enters a coma and, some days later, a person
> comes out of the coma who has the same memories and behaves in the
> same way. The person and everyone else around him considers that he
> has survived the coma *by definition*. If scientific evidence is later
> presented that during the coma all the atoms in his body were
> replaced, or all his neural activity completely ceased, then that just
> means *by definition* that people can survive these insults; or
> equivalently that the definition of survival being used by the
> scientists differs from the intuitive one.
There's an illusion of survival and actual survival. An illusionist sometimes
performs a trick that seems to invalidate the laws of physics, yet, it's common
knowledge that the illusionist doesn't actually suspend or change the laws of
physics or logic during his performance. Being able to tell that laws of physics
and logic weren't changed by the illusionist is easy in the age of science and
education. However, in the age of uploading guided only by that part of philosophy
that hasn't become science yet, it will be much easier to reproduce illusions of
survival while at the same time much harder to tell if they are illusions. Once
philosophy of personal survival matures into science, it will be easier to tell the
difference and explain why illusions of survival violate people's volitions.
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
> There's an illusion of survival and actual survival. An illusionist sometimes
> performs a trick that seems to invalidate the laws of physics, yet, it's common
> knowledge that the illusionist doesn't actually suspend or change the laws of
> physics or logic during his performance. Being able to tell that laws of physics
> and logic weren't changed by the illusionist is easy in the age of science and
> education. However, in the age of uploading guided only by that part of philosophy
> that hasn't become science yet, it will be much easier to reproduce illusions of
> survival while at the same time much harder to tell if they are illusions. Once
> philosophy of personal survival matures into science, it will be easier to tell the
> difference and explain why illusions of survival violate people's volitions.
Suppose a scientist comes up with a theory of saltiness: which
compounds taste salty, and the underlying physiology. A new compound
is discovered which everyone agrees is indistinguishable in taste from
sodium chloride, but shouldn't be, according to the theory. Which of
these explanations is correct:
(a) The theory is correct. The new compound isn't salty, but only
produces the illusion of saltiness.
(b) The theory is incorrect, and a new theory should be sought that
explains why the new compound is salty.
When science is trying to explain something that is fundamentally
subjective to begin with, you have to be careful with the term
"illusion".
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
good job of organizing known views about PI plus it discusses pros and cons of each
approach.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
Slawek
(clearly a friend of the Somatic Approach)
Stathis Papaioannou
It's a good summary. Note that the article's author, Eric T. Olson, is
one of the main proponents of the somatic approach, or "animalism". By
this account, if your brain (and certainly if your memories and
personality but *not* your brain) were transferred to another body,
then you would stay behind in the original body, even if that original
body no longer had any psychological connection with the original
"you". This is fine: Olson does not say anything in the SEP article or
in another article of his I have read (in
http://www.amazon.com/Personal-Identity-Blackwell-Readings-Philosophy/dp/063123442X)
that is actually wrong. However, I would simply say that if personal
identity is defined in the way that Olson does, then personal identity
is not what matters to me in survival. What matters to me in survival
is psychological continuity.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> On 25/03/2008, Heartland <mindin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> This entry could serve as a nice introduction to problems involving PI. It does
>> a
>> good job of organizing known views about PI plus it discusses pros and cons of
>> each
>> approach.
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
>>
>> Slawek
>> (clearly a friend of the Somatic Approach)
>
> It's a good summary. Note that the article's author, Eric T. Olson, is
> one of the main proponents of the somatic approach, or "animalism". By
> this account, if your brain (and certainly if your memories and
> personality but *not* your brain) were transferred to another body,
> then you would stay behind in the original body, even if that original
> body no longer had any psychological connection with the original
> "you".
Yeah, I know Olson wrote it but even though he's animalist, like me, his
presentation of the field seems objective and balanced. He admits that animalism is
unpopular relative to psychological approach and, perhaps appropriately, spends
most of the time describing the latter.
> This is fine: Olson does not say anything in the SEP article or
> in another article of his I have read (in
> http://www.amazon.com/Personal-Identity-Blackwell-Readings-Philosophy/dp/063123442X)
> that is actually wrong. However, I would simply say that if personal
> identity is defined in the way that Olson does, then personal identity
> is not what matters to me in survival. What matters to me in survival
> is psychological continuity.
You have the right to vote for your path to survival. My point, though, is that, in
the end, it should matter to us which approach generates less or even no
contradictions. If there's any chance that this field becomes science, I think we
should discard intuition and passion and follow the logic wherever it might lead
us, then accept the conclusions no matter how unappealing they turn out to be. I'm
convinced that a vote for psychological continuity violates the voter's volition,
if I could borrow Yudkowsky's terms described in his CEV proposal, and, the way I
see it, there exists, more or less, medium Distance separating voter's decision and
his extrapolated volition in this specific case.
Slawek
P.S. I will respond to your saltiness analogy as soon as I'm done thinking about
it.
Stathis Papaioannou
> You have the right to vote for your path to survival. My point, though, is that, in
> the end, it should matter to us which approach generates less or even no
> contradictions. If there's any chance that this field becomes science, I think we
> should discard intuition and passion and follow the logic wherever it might lead
> us, then accept the conclusions no matter how unappealing they turn out to be. I'm
> convinced that a vote for psychological continuity violates the voter's volition,
> if I could borrow Yudkowsky's terms described in his CEV proposal, and, the way I
> see it, there exists, more or less, medium Distance separating voter's decision and
> his extrapolated volition in this specific case.
There is no absolute, fact-of-the-matter regarding personal identity,
that's the problem. We evolved in a world where there is only one
version of a person alive from birth to death, and in this simple case
most of the possible competing theories give the same answer. When we
discuss the various thought experiments we are all so fond of the
question becomes, How do I interpret PI in this unnatural situation,
given my evolved intuitions? Or at any rate, that's the question I'm
interested in when considering survival.
I have often said that the only consistent, objective theory of PI is
to consider that an entity is alive only momentarily, with all the
rest being subjective and contingent on evolved psychology. That would
mean that I only survive for a moment, and the feeling that I persist
over time is a sort of illusion. Assuming for the sake of argument
that this interpretation is correct (I know Lee, for one, vehemently
disagrees), should this worry us? Not in the slightest! If continuity
of identity is an illusion, then it's a very important illusion, and
we only need worry if the illusion is about to come to an end.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Lee
On Mar 26, 12:14 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> There is no absolute, fact-of-the-matter regarding personal identity,
> that's the problem. We evolved in a world where there is only one
> version of a person alive from birth to death, and in this simple case
> most of the possible competing theories give the same answer. When we
> discuss the various thought experiments we are all so fond of the
> question becomes, How do I interpret PI in this unnatural situation,
> given my evolved intuitions? Or at any rate, that's the question I'm
> interested in when considering survival.
> I have often said that the only consistent, objective theory of PI is
> to consider that an entity is alive only momentarily, with all the
> rest being subjective and contingent on evolved psychology.
be a bit analogous to saying that the only consistent theory
of the chair in my living room would be to consider that it
existed only momentarily and keep on becoming a different
thing from instant to instant, with "all the rest being subjective
(by us) and contingent on our evolved psychology. Please
consider that I'm not stressing the nature or accuracy of the
analogy here. I would simply like to hear how you would
rebut the idea that the chair in my living room is not a thing
that persists through time (even though, after decades of
wear, it may indeed start being used as a low bench or
something).
> That would mean that I only survive for a moment, and the
> feeling that I persist over time is a sort of illusion.
life is beyond me. Recall your nice salt analogy.
> (a) The theory is correct. The new compound isn't salty,
> but only produces the illusion of saltiness.
>
> (b) The theory is incorrect, and a new theory should be
> sought that explains why the new compound is salty.
(even if we get teleporters, can upload, and duplicate).
So you should say (b) about your theory.
> Assuming for the sake of argument that this interpretation
> illusion, and we only need worry if the illusion is about to
> come to an end.
about the illusion of God, or the illusion of special creation.
As soon as we know that something is an illusion, we need
to discard the idea, at least if we want to proceed rationally.
Therefore, you should reject the theory that leads to the
notion that there is nothing to the continuity of identity,
because it certainly appears (and can be made to coincide)
with the notion of survival.
Lee
Lee
> Lee wrote:
> >> > Sometimes those will turn out to be the only
> >> > kind of answers that exist.
>
> of this exchange, you accept these answers as
> sufficient and are not willing to search for or consider
> any other answers beyond the ones that were given.
> Sorry if that's not what you meant, but I don't see
> how I could interpret this sentence differently
> especially within the context of what was written
> before.
perhaps (probably) just a claim that there exist
some questions that don't have good answers.
I doubt that you believe that all questions can
have good answers.
I will go back and try to pick up where I was a
couple of weeks ago. Sorry for my absence.
Anyway, about formatting, you wrote
> > Can you write shorter lines? I get the impression
> > that on re-re-quotes, pretty horrible wrapping results.
> > I'm tired of halving your sentences. Perhaps we need
> > to write the way I'm writing this paragraph? Or do I
> > just not have enough experience yet in this, and am
> > wrong?
>
> Sorry, but I have no idea what problem you are describing, Lee. Why would you halve
> my sentences in the first place? What's wrong with them? In all my years of posting
> I never had to deal with so many different meta complaints before, let alone inside
> a single thread. Is my posting style really that incomprehensible and hideous?
> Obviously, if I'm really making these horrible errors, anybody who points them out
> and shows me the correct way of doing things would be doing me a big favor. Thanks.
Slawek wrote, without my doing any editing of his sentences but
just hitting "reply"
On Mar 24, 3:58 pm, "Heartland" <mindinsta...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> There's definitely some explanation to why people are attached to their
> >> memories.
> >> I've been programmed by evolution also so I instinctively understand this
> >> attachment, but, upon further examination, personal memories don't appear as
> >> crucial to survival as people think. I want somebody, someday to tell me
> >> exactly
> >> what's so indispensable about memories just to make sure the answer I rejected
> >> was
> >> the
> >> with
you to type shorter sentences, or find some way of making
it as readable as Stathis's and my posts are?
Lee
Heartland
>>>> their memories.
>>>> I've been programmed by evolution also so I instinctively
>>>> understand this attachment, but, upon further examination,
>>>> personal memories don't appear as crucial to survival as people
>>>> think. I want somebody, someday to tell me exactly
>>>> what's so indispensable about memories just to make sure the
>>>> answer I rejected was
>>>> the
>>>> same. It's always possible I missed something. Maybe some others
>>>> who disagree with
Lee:
> Look how chopped up that all is! Do you see why I want
> you to type shorter sentences, or find some way of making
> it as readable as Stathis's and my posts are?
Yes, that looks bad. I assure you that everything looks perfect when I send it.
It's probably OE's fault. What mail program are you using?
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
> > I have often said that the only consistent, objective theory of PI is
> > to consider that an entity is alive only momentarily, with all the
> > rest being subjective and contingent on evolved psychology.
>
>
> I hardly consider that any kind of useful theory at all. It would
> be a bit analogous to saying that the only consistent theory
> of the chair in my living room would be to consider that it
> existed only momentarily and keep on becoming a different
> thing from instant to instant, with "all the rest being subjective
> (by us) and contingent on our evolved psychology. Please
> consider that I'm not stressing the nature or accuracy of the
> analogy here. I would simply like to hear how you would
> rebut the idea that the chair in my living room is not a thing
> that persists through time (even though, after decades of
> wear, it may indeed start being used as a low bench or
> something).
Surely you will agree that under a certain, perhaps pedantic,
definition it is *not* the same chair from moment. Its structure
changes due to slow chemical decomposition, sagging under gravity, and
so on. Even if it retained the very same atoms in the very same
configuration, those atoms' spacetime coordinates are constantly
changing. And if some multiverse theory is correct and there are many
chairs where previously there was one, the term "one and the same"
obviously doesn't apply. So the term "same chair" has a meaning in
everyday discourse which conveniently ignores all these factors.
That's fine, and of course I understand and use this meaning along
with everyone else. But then what terminology are you going to use if
for some reason you want to emphasise the differences in the chair
from moment, as described? You will then have to say it's not
*exactly* the same chair, but it's the same chair FAPP; since it
wouldn't do to say that it is exactly the same chair, only different.
Now, that "FAPP" is what the disagreement between us is all about. We
can ignore it in the case of ordinary everyday life, but not when
considering strange and unnatural situations involving duplication. If
you travel five minutes into the past to meet your slightly younger
self, it is obvious that the two of you are neither exactly the same
nor one and the same, and that the only reason you would say without
qualification that you are is that - FAPP - such situations just
aren't going to arise. You might yet argue that you are in an
important sense the same person, but there is no logically binding
reason why two near copies coming to blows over property have to agree
with you; and there is no logically binding reason simply because, in
a precise and unequivocal sense, they are *not* the same person.
> > That would mean that I only survive for a moment, and the
> > feeling that I persist over time is a sort of illusion.
>
>
> How you can embrace a theory so at odds with your daily
> life is beyond me. Recall your nice salt analogy.
>
> > (a) The theory is correct. The new compound isn't salty,
> > but only produces the illusion of saltiness.
> >
> > (b) The theory is incorrect, and a new theory should be
> > sought that explains why the new compound is salty.
>
> Your theory has no satisfactory application to daily life
> (even if we get teleporters, can upload, and duplicate).
> So you should say (b) about your theory.
I can see that it might look as if I am contradicting myself, but I
was trying to make a point about what happens when we try to define
something subjective in terms of something objective. You can do
experiments and come up with a precise scientific definition: only the
halides of group I metals are Salty. By this definition, magnesium
bromide is unequivocally, scientifically, not Salty. But if I taste
magnesium bromide and find that it tastes somewhat like sodium
chloride, then I can claim that if the purpose of the experiments was
to find a definition of Salty which corresponds with what I would find
salty, then the counterexample of magnesium bromide shows that the
Saltiness theory is wrong.
Similarly, I can come up with a definition of Identity according to
which nothing is Identical from moment to moment, or Slawek can come
up with a definition according to which no living thing is Identical
with a past version of itself if there has been an interruption in
biological processes, and it will be perfectly clear according to
either definition what is Identical and what isn't. But if the purpose
was to define Identical in such a way as to capture the subjective
feeling of remaining the same person from moment to moment, then these
definitions both fail: people do feel they are the same from moment to
moment despite not being *exactly* the same, and people have woken up
after hypothermia and felt they are the same person despite the fact
that their biological processes had temporarily stopped.
OK, so we want to define *subjective* saltiness and *subjective*
identity. In certain constrained cases this is not problematic, but
difficulties arise if we allow us to consider every possible case.
What if I find something salty but you don't? What if two copies meet
and insist that they are not the same person? There is no appeal to an
objective standard to settle the matter since the whole point is that
we are trying to define something subjective. Objectively, there are
many compounds which some people will call salty while others will
not. Objectively, there may be many distinct versions of a person
which under some circumstances will consider themselves selves and
under other circumstances will not.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Slawek
is not valid in my version of the world. Survival shouldn't be allowed
to be verified by an output of subjective experience just like laws of
physics shouldn't be allowed to be verified by whims. Survival could
only be verified by an objective measurement verifying a physical link
between a past physical process and a current physical process. Since
mind is one of the examples of such a process, mind and its survival
can be described and verified by measurable physical components
(matter, space, time, energy). Science can deal with survival because
survival of anything is something that is fundamentally *not*
subjective to begin with.
Slawek
PS. Sorry for the delayed response.
Stathis Papaioannou
> Except survival isn't like saltiness at all which is why this analogy
> is not valid in my version of the world. Survival shouldn't be allowed
> to be verified by an output of subjective experience just like laws of
> physics shouldn't be allowed to be verified by whims. Survival could
> only be verified by an objective measurement verifying a physical link
> between a past physical process and a current physical process. Since
> mind is one of the examples of such a process, mind and its survival
> can be described and verified by measurable physical components
> (matter, space, time, energy). Science can deal with survival because
> survival of anything is something that is fundamentally *not*
> subjective to begin with.
Survival is *necessarily* about the subjective. If you undergo a
procedure which you survive according to some objective test, but in
fact you are left a zombie, then the objective test of survival is
wrong. If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
according to some objective test, but are left feeling exactly the
same after the procedure, then again the objective test is by
definition wrong. If you disagree we could end up having a
conversation such as the following:
A: Procedure X causes death.
B: But I've undergone procedure X many times, and I'm obviously not dead.
A: You aren't the same person you were before the procedure; that
person is dead, and you just have the mistaken belief that you are
him.
B: What reason do you have for making such a claim?
A: Well, procedure X can be shown to change the alignment of all the
hydrogen atoms in your brain. This is a scientific fact, not doubted
by anyone who knows anything about the subject.
B: I believe you, but all that means is that changing the alignment of
all the hydrogen atoms in my brain obviously doesn't result in death.
A: But it does; tests on cadavers clearly shows this.
B: Then the tests on cadavers show that it is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for death.
A: I'm telling you, it is definitely a necessary *and* sufficient
condition for death.
B: It can't be a sufficient condition as I'm clearly not dead.
A: *You're* not dead, but as I explained, the person you think you were is dead.
B: I could as easily claim that drinking water is lethal.
A: No, that would be silly; it would mean that everyone in the world has died!
B: Maybe they have, and they just don't know it. How would they?
A: But water is necessary for life, as every child knows.
B: That's the tragedy of it. We die without water, but we also die
with water - we just don't realise it in the latter case. And there is
no reason for us to have evolved with such an insight, since evolution
only cares about passing genes from one generation to the next, not
about who actually does the passing.
And so on...
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> Survival is *necessarily* about the subjective.
universal and things capable of subjective experience survive
differently than things that lack subjective experience. Implication
here is that human survival is governed by "special rules" which are
different for survival of non-human things. The way I see it is that
people, computers and animals are essentially things made of matter,
energy in time and space so the same rules should apply to all these
physical objects.
> If you undergo a
> procedure which you survive according to some objective test, but in
> fact you are left a zombie, then the objective test of survival is
> wrong.
showed there has been a physical, causal link between a process in T1
interval and process in T2 interval and that the output of this
process was essentially the same, then it would be impossible for
process in T1 that was not a zombie to become a zombie later in T2. In
general, objective measurements would not return "different" after
measuring the same thing. Only subjective evaluations (he's a zombie
now because it seems that way to me) could which is why subjective
evaluations should not be admissible when trying to verify survival.
When the truth of objective results is being measured by subjective
feelings, this is what you get.
> If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
> according to some objective test, but are left feeling exactly the
> same after the procedure, then again the objective test is by
> definition wrong.
You can't just jump to a conclusion that you would survive some
procedure and claim that prediction (subjective, unverifiable by
definition) as evidence that the objective test is wrong. If the
objective test showed you didn't survive, then you really would not be
capable of feeling anything anymore. That's the sole purpose of the
test, to know when someone irreversibly loses the ability to
experience things.
Do you really think your current mind instance would be able to feel
something ever again if somebody shot you now and a copy similar to
you was instantiated a year later on a different planet?
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
> > Survival is *necessarily* about the subjective.
>
> But if so, then you're implying that the concept of survival is not
> universal and things capable of subjective experience survive
> differently than things that lack subjective experience. Implication
> here is that human survival is governed by "special rules" which are
> different for survival of non-human things. The way I see it is that
> people, computers and animals are essentially things made of matter,
> energy in time and space so the same rules should apply to all these
> physical objects.
Survival doesn't have an absolute, objective meaning even if we're
discussing non-sentient things, such as the Ship of Theseus. We can
come up with a definition such as "it's the same thing at T1 as at T2
if 99% of the atoms in it are the same", and applying this definition
will give an "objective" answer to the question of survival; but why
use that particular definition rather than another? Which definition
to use depends on what is important about survival in the particular
context.
In the case of personal identity I can certainly say that I have
survived the last five minutes, and therefore any objective criterion
for survival must be consistent with this fact. If it is shown that
10% of the matter in my body has changed configuration in the last
five minutes, then a theory of survival which insists that such a
change results in death is by definition wrong.
> > If you undergo a
> > procedure which you survive according to some objective test, but in
> > fact you are left a zombie, then the objective test of survival is
> > wrong.
>
> Assuming we're talking about a purely objective test and that test
> showed there has been a physical, causal link between a process in T1
> interval and process in T2 interval and that the output of this
> process was essentially the same, then it would be impossible for
> process in T1 that was not a zombie to become a zombie later in T2. In
> general, objective measurements would not return "different" after
> measuring the same thing. Only subjective evaluations (he's a zombie
> now because it seems that way to me) could which is why subjective
> evaluations should not be admissible when trying to verify survival.
> When the truth of objective results is being measured by subjective
> feelings, this is what you get.
The thing of primary importance is that my subjective experiences do
not change radically or disappear altogether as a result of a
procedure. I agree it is very unlikely that this would happen if the
procedure left my physical composition much the same, but this
objective criterion is only important to the extent that it can
guarantee the subjective criterion.
> > If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
> > according to some objective test, but are left feeling exactly the
> > same after the procedure, then again the objective test is by
> > definition wrong.
>
>
> Notice that you would not be feeling anything if you didn't survive.
> You can't just jump to a conclusion that you would survive some
> procedure and claim that prediction (subjective, unverifiable by
> definition) as evidence that the objective test is wrong. If the
> objective test showed you didn't survive, then you really would not be
> capable of feeling anything anymore. That's the sole purpose of the
> test, to know when someone irreversibly loses the ability to
> experience things.
But how would the objective test show that you haven't survived if you
are replaced with an exact copy that claims to have survived? I could
claim that you will die if you don't read the Bible for at least an
hour every day, and then present very convincing evidence that
yesterday you did not read the Bible at all. Therefore, objectively,
it is clear that the person going by your name died yesterday. You
claim otherwise today, but this fallible subjective evidence is
invalidated by the objective evidence.
> Do you really think your current mind instance would be able to feel
> something ever again if somebody shot you now and a copy similar to
> you was instantiated a year later on a different planet?
If not, then it could be just as correct to say that my current mind
instance won't be able to feel anything ever again if I travel to the
planet by spaceship. By the time I get there none of the atoms in my
body will be the same, nor will they be in the same configuration
relative to each other.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
lco...@rawbw.com
> > Look how chopped up that all is! Do you see why I want
> > you to type shorter sentences, or find some way of making
> > it as readable as Stathis's and my posts are?
>
> Yes, that looks bad. I assure you that everything looks perfect when I send it.
> It's probably OE's fault. What mail program are you using?
know how others solve it. What I started doing many, many
years ago was (1) setting my line lengths to the max, i.e.,
to 132 characters (there is a setting for that if you look hard
enough in Express or Outlook Express) and then (and this
is the hard part) just (2) forcing all my lines to be as short
as seems necessary by typing in a hard CR (Enter) at the
end of the appropriate line. Therefore, I get to adjust to what
my interlocutor seems to be able to do.
But then, it gets really tiresome if he or she sends really
garbled text. Take Stathis as a model. How does he do it?
It always works fine. There are a number of other people
(I remember Hal Finney many years ago) that seemed to
be able to just type in freeform with no hard breaks; I
suspect they were using a unix based emailer.
I hope that helps. Even more :-) I hope that I don't have
to re-edit your lines. But if I do, such is life.
Lee
lco...@rawbw.com
In the thread "PersonalIdentity" On Apr 11, 5:21 am, "Stathis
> > > I have often said that the only consistent, objective theory of PI is
> > > to consider that an entity is alive only momentarily, with all the
> > > rest being subjective and contingent on evolved psychology.
> >
> > I hardly consider that any kind of useful theory at all. It would
> > be a bit analogous to saying that the only consistent theory
> > of the chair in my living room would be to consider that it
> > existed only momentarily and keep on becoming a different
> > thing from instant to instant, with "all the rest being subjective
> > (by us) and contingent on our evolved psychology.
>
> definition it is *not* the same chair from moment. Its structure
> changes due to slow chemical decomposition, sagging under
> gravity, and so on.
> Even if it retained the very same atoms in the very same
> configuration, those atoms' spacetime coordinates are constantly
> changing. And if some multiverse theory is correct and there are many
> chairs where previously there was one, the term "one and the same"
> obviously doesn't apply. So the term "same chair" has a meaning in
> everyday discourse which conveniently ignores all these factors.
> That's fine, and of course I understand and use this meaning along
> with everyone else. But then what terminology are you going to use if
> for some reason you want to emphasise the differences in the chair
> from moment, as described?
resorting to saying "It's not the same chair". For example:
a. "it changes slightly from instant to instant"
(But notice the assumed identity of it!)
b. "its atoms' spacetime coordinates constantly change
Hmm. Still talking about "it" as though it has an identity.
I tell you: this is no coincidence that it's difficult to avoid
referring to a "constant" sort of label or pointer or identity.
So we *should* just use the language sensibly, and on
those rare occasions when we need to refer to it not being
exactly the same from moment to moment, invent a
circumlocution to handle the case.
You yourself would readily agree that what we label it
during a discussion doesn't change, except when
the alterations become so pronounced that it would
be confusing to not recognize them with a change
of label.
> You will then have to say it's not *exactly* the same
> chair, but it's the same chair FAPP; since it wouldn't
> do to say that it is exactly the same chair, only different.
that two things are *exactly* the same or *exactly* equal?
I say no, not really. Therefore everyone should *assume*
that OF COURSE, by default, we never mean that. Any
child above about age 4 realizes that one car is not
exactly the same as another, and so on (though some
three- year olds, I think, have not quite mastered the idea).
> Now, that "FAPP" is what the disagreement between us is all about.
> We can ignore it in the case of ordinary everyday life, but not when
> considering strange and unnatural situations involving duplication.
duplication too---and, more importantly, that we would get
used to doing exactly that, I predict. (But sorry, this is not
an argument right here, only a claim.)
> If you travel five minutes into the past to meet your slightly younger
> self, it is obvious that the two of you are neither exactly the same
> nor one and the same, and that the only reason you would say without
> qualification that you are is that - FAPP - such situations just
> aren't going to arise. You might yet argue that you are in an
> important sense the same person, but there is no logically binding
> reason why two near copies coming to blows over property have to agree
> with you; and there is no logically binding reason simply because, in
> a precise and unequivocal sense, they are *not* the same person.
are the same person. So in the basic case (if one of the instances
has to die and it's given the choice of it dying without the $10M
or the other living with the $10M, and) the copies have no problem
with getting the money, then it makes sense to say they're the
same person.
I will agree that if they---as you propose---(rather ridiculously)
come
to blows or do not choose to get the money, then they're acting
like they're different people. That viewpoint has many, many problems
IMO. What if the time difference is less than a second, and they're
repeatedly put into the situation? What if we throw in memory erasure?
Then it can become manifestly clear that they ought to act as though
they're the same person (because memory erasure + teleportation
can be made to *exactly* coincide with a close duplicate frozen a
few minutes ago), and so on and on.
> to find a definition of Salty which corresponds with what I would find
> salty, then the counterexample of magnesium bromide shows that the
> Saltiness theory is wrong.
given it, though, is adequate. You may have to dredge it up
again if it seems I need to re-examine it.
> Similarly, I can come up with a definition of Identity according
> to which nothing is Identical from moment to moment, or
> Slawek can come up with a definition according to which no
> living thing is Identical with a past version of itself if there has
> been an interruption in biological processes, and it will be
> perfectly clear according to either definition what is Identical
> and what isn't. But if the purpose was to define Identical in
> such a way as to capture the subjective feeling of remaining
> the same person from moment to moment, then these
> definitions both fail: people do feel they are the same from
> moment to moment despite not being *exactly* the same,
> and people have woken up after hypothermia and felt they
> are the same person despite the fact that their biological
> processes had temporarily stopped.
(I hate definitions) that captures the subjective feeling
of remaining the same person, while I might emphasize
preferring a theory or usage that accounts best for how
they act. (Just a loose idea, that---just thought I'd
throw it out.)
More importantly, Slawek and I (and Slawek and you)
would take starkly different actions in choice A vs.
choice B scenarios. How about you and me? What
do you recall about what choices we would make
differently? (Sorry, I just don't remember.) For example,
would one instance of Stathis choose destruction so that
a frozen instance from one minute ago wakes up
tomorrow in Stathis' bed with $10M in his account?
(Like memory erasure.)
If we happen to agree on actions, then that puts a different
slant on the project here. Anyway, I'd like to know.
> OK, so we want to define *subjective* saltiness and
> *subjective* identity.
advocate a *usage* that is to be taken as *objective*
and not *subjective*. In other words, I want very recent
duplicates to be regarded as the same person because
that will fit better with most semantic links.
A note on semantic links: I oppose anti-abortionists
calling abortion "murder" because it links to so many
things everyone disapproves of. In that sense, they're
being unfair. When people I agree with call an
inheritance tax a "death tax", I'm not bothered---maybe
(hopefully) because it has fewer syllables? :-) But
surely the semantic links for "death tax" are not as
odious as they are for calling abortion "murder".
> In certain constrained cases this is not problematic, but
> difficulties arise if we allow us to consider every possible case.
> What if I find something salty but you don't?
about. We see that different usages are appropriate under
different circumstances.
> What if two copies meet and insist that they are not the
> same person?
the terms just as strangely as if they say they're not the
same person from day to day or nanosecond to nanosecond.
> There is no appeal to an objective standard to settle the
> matter since the whole point is that we are trying to define
> something subjective.
"that is not the car that hit me" just because it's the next
day. Same with chairs. Same with people. But you make
a good case about "salty" after all:
> Objectively, there are many compounds which some people
> will call salty while others will not.
term ought to try to capture the subjectivities. Who knows
what some weird person may say about table salt? So I
guess I'd slide towards your nice chemical criterion. And
if someone said "I tell you, *this* is not salty", then I could
reply as is my wont and say "You are wrong :-)".
> Objectively, there may be many distinct versions of a
> person which under some circumstances will consider
> themselves selves and under other circumstances
> will not.
in two hospital beds, enough familiarity with Nurse Ratchet's
needle would make me say "do it to him!", and later he'd
say "I got the needle today---not you!". But I rationalize
those usages as aberrant due to our animal natures coming
to the forefront. On any important thing---if I can think clearly
(which, for example, I really can't do in the Clock/Torture
Experiment), I'll do what is best for my future instances in
toto.
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
> But then, it gets really tiresome if he or she sends really
> garbled text. Take Stathis as a model. How does he do it?
> It always works fine.
I just use Gmail.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> Survival doesn't have an absolute, objective meaning even if we're
> discussing non-sentient things, such as the Ship of Theseus. We can
> come up with a definition such as "it's the same thing at T1 as at T2
> if 99% of the atoms in it are the same", and applying this definition
> will give an "objective" answer to the question of survival; but why
> use that particular definition rather than another? Which definition
> to use depends on what is important about survival in the particular
> context.
(persistence) for any thing, namely, Leibniz Law extrapolated to
things that require time to exist. I described that extrapolation in
the past but never actually had a chance to post it. This is all
science and in science there can only be one correct answer so there's
no need to guess which definition is more correct than others just
like there's only one answer to 2+3. Finding an answer is just a
matter of careful derivation.
"Which definition [of survival] to use?" is not really a question
about definition, as there can be only one correct definition of
survival/persistence, but a question about which thing we should apply
this definition to. So when somebody asks, "What's the definition of
survival?" what they really mean is, "Which thing should I apply this
definition of survival to?" which pretty much reduces to, "What are
the necessary and sufficient conditions/things for life to persist?"
Some say you have to maintain personal memories, some say atoms (not
me :-)), while others say "agency." But when they say, "survival of
personal memories", "survival of atoms" or "survival of agency" they
must refer to the same definition of survival.
So any debate about survival is really about trying to find those
things without which you cease to remain alive. This is why in a
recent discussion with Lee on sl4 I kept asking him about the "value
of memories," as personal memories, in his view, were precisely those
things without which he thinks he ceases to remain alive. Now, you
might say, "See, this is all subjective after all, just as I tried to
tell you. There's no objective way to determine that personal memories
are more crucial to life than agency or atoms." Well, no, IMO, we're
not free to make that choice either.
> In the case of personal identity I can certainly say that I have
> survived the last five minutes, and therefore any objective criterion
> for survival must be consistent with this fact. If it is shown that
> 10% of the matter in my body has changed configuration in the last
> five minutes, then a theory of survival which insists that such a
> change results in death is by definition wrong.
about what it means to survive. Definition of survival is being
arbitrarily molded into one that fits a desired subjective evaluation.
Basically, we start with assumption that nobody died and then discard
all the objectively recorded changes and deem them "irrelevant to
survival" because nobody died. This seems fine until somebody notices
that nobody who ever uses that logic starts with assumption that they
have not survived. And why should they? Every person who ever attempts
to think about survival is necessarily alive and anyone who is alive
will always (with no exceptions!) claim he's survived. In other words,
this whole derivation can return only one answer because it's
impossible for the dead to provide a counterexample such as, "Hey
there, I'm dead. These objectively observed changes you living folks
thought were irrelevant to survival are *really, really* relevant to
survival after all. Just look at me, I'm dead now." Subjective
verifications are worthless or at least unreliable because they don't
always reflect what actually happens.
> The thing of primary importance is that my subjective experiences do
> not change radically or disappear altogether as a result of a
> procedure.
actually disappears.
> > > If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
> > > according to some objective test, but are left feeling exactly the
> > > same after the procedure, then again the objective test is by
> > > definition wrong.
>
> > Notice that you would not be feeling anything if you didn't survive.
> > You can't just jump to a conclusion that you would survive some
> > procedure and claim that prediction (subjective, unverifiable by
> > definition) as evidence that the objective test is wrong. If the
> > objective test showed you didn't survive, then you really would not be
> > capable of feeling anything anymore. That's the sole purpose of the
> > test, to know when someone irreversibly loses the ability to
> > experience things.
>
> But how would the objective test show that you haven't survived if you
> are replaced with an exact copy that claims to have survived?
causal link between earlier version of me and later version me. If so,
then later version of me would not really be a continuation of me (if
it was, then I would still feel something, but I'm not) and it should
be declared a copy.
> > Do you really think your current mind instance would be able to feel
> > something ever again if somebody shot you now and a copy similar to
> > you was instantiated a year later on a different planet?
>
> If not, then it could be just as correct to say that my current mind
> instance won't be able to feel anything ever again if I travel to the
> planet by spaceship. By the time I get there none of the atoms in my
> body will be the same, nor will they be in the same configuration
> relative to each other.
instantiating X1 there is absolutely nothing like moving X from here
to there. If these things were equivalent, I might as well claim that
if I put a gun in my mouth and shoot that would be like "eating."
Slawek
Heartland
On Apr 12, 8:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > But then, it gets really tiresome if he or she sends really
> > garbled text. Take Stathis as a model. How does he do it?
> > It always works fine.
>
> I just use Gmail.
the OE's UI that's causing problems. You are probably using Gmail's
UI, right?
Anyway, my last few messages were all sent through GoogleGroups' UI. I
hope the "choppy" look is gone now.
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
> It's interesting that you emphasize a certain *usage*
> (I hate definitions) that captures the subjective feeling
> of remaining the same person, while I might emphasize
> preferring a theory or usage that accounts best for how
> they act. (Just a loose idea, that---just thought I'd
> throw it out.)
If copies come to blows even if they agree intellectually that they
are the same person, then obviously they are not acting as if they are
the same person.
> More importantly, Slawek and I (and Slawek and you)
> would take starkly different actions in choice A vs.
> choice B scenarios. How about you and me? What
> do you recall about what choices we would make
> differently? (Sorry, I just don't remember.) For example,
> would one instance of Stathis choose destruction so that
> a frozen instance from one minute ago wakes up
> tomorrow in Stathis' bed with $10M in his account?
> (Like memory erasure.)
My position would be not to choose destruction unless the copy is made
at the instant of destruction, since that is equivalent to ordinary
life. However, I would not be so worried about a procedure that
involved memory loss of short duration, and this is inconsistent. Your
position of treating copies as selves is consistent, but it devalues
what I consider the most important thing about survival, anticipating
future experiences. So to be consistent, I have to either accept that
anticipating future experiences is not important, or accept that
memory loss is equivalent to death, and neither seems satisfactory.
There is no consistent way to reconcile all our natural notions about
what it means to survive with the scenarios discussed in duplication
thought experiments. This is because there is no objective
fact-of-the-matter regarding personal identity, but just behavioural
patterns which are contingent on our evolutionary history. If we had
evolved differently, for example in a world where copying is routine,
our notions of survival might also have been different.
> > What if two copies meet and insist that they are not the
> > same person?
>
> If they're very recent duplicates, then I think they're using
> the terms just as strangely as if they say they're not the
> same person from day to day or nanosecond to nanosecond.
It's interesting that you take this last statement and conclude that
since they obviously are the same person from moment to moment, they
must also be the same person standing next to each other, whereas I
conclude that since they obviously aren't the same person standing
next to each other, they must also not be the same person from moment
to moment. I think most people would prefer to say that they obviously
are the same person from moment to moment but *not* the same person
standing next to each other, which is inconsistent.
> > There is no appeal to an objective standard to settle the
> > matter since the whole point is that we are trying to define
> > something subjective.
>
> Hmm. For me, it's simply objectively false if someone says
> "that is not the car that hit me" just because it's the next
> day. Same with chairs. Same with people.
It is objectively false if we agree on an objective definition of
"same". This is not always easy to do, even in everyday situations. If
a close replica of the car that hit you is made would you say that the
replica hit you?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou
> Hey, I also use gmail *accounts* except I access them through OE. It's
> the OE's UI that's causing problems. You are probably using Gmail's
> UI, right?
I use the Gmail UI with a web browser. It's simple, I can use it on
any computer at all, and it does everything I want including neatly
organise threads in an email discussion.
> Anyway, my last few messages were all sent through GoogleGroups' UI. I
> hope the "choppy" look is gone now.
Yes, it's cleaner. I'm impressed with all of Google's products that
I've used so far.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
lco...@rawbw.com
> Survival is *necessarily* about the subjective. If you undergo a
> procedure which you survive according to some objective test,
> but in fact you are left a zombie, then the objective test of survival
> is wrong.
whether an object is conscious. In my analogy, some shivering
people gathered around a campfire a thousand years ago
might have said the same about "warmth", having recalled
some of its very subjective aspects.
> If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
> according to some objective test, but are left feeling
> exactly the same after the procedure, then again the
> objective test is by definition wrong.
How could you possibly know for sure that you are
"feeling the same"? On my reading, I could be presented
with objective evidence that I did not exist yesterday, but
that a bunch of memories had just been created, and so
forth.
> A: Procedure X causes death.
> B: But I've undergone procedure X many times,
> and I'm obviously not dead.
> A: You aren't the same person you were before the
> procedure; that person is dead, and you just have
> the mistaken belief that you are him.
where we have someone who really is mistaken
about who he is. Someone with a very great knowledge
of Napoleon's life and who (contrary to evidence)
believes he's Napoleon, must have his claims stand
or fall on objective evidence. Conceivably, he could
be vindicated if we find out some time travel had
happened, or if we find out that a Universalist-
Immortalist type resurrection (with valid memories
restored) had occurred, or perhaps other possibilities.
So your reasons that "survival is necessarily subjective"
don't seem right to me.
Lee
lco...@rawbw.com
> I believe there can be only one universal definition of survival
> (persistence) for any thing, namely, Leibniz Law extrapolated
> to things that require time to exist.
usage of the term "survival", as we gain more experience,
especially in the far future.
> Basically, we start with assumption that nobody died
> and then discard all the objectively recorded changes
> and deem them "irrelevant to survival" because nobody
> died.
*not* start with that assumption. Suppose that someone
who looks like someone I once knew claims to be that
other person. It could easily happen that as I learn all
the facts I conclude that the old person died, and the
new one is either an imposter, or fails to fulfill some
other objective criteria (which for me, as you know,
is having enough of the right kind of memories).
> This seems fine until somebody notices that nobody
> who ever uses that logic starts with assumption that
> they have not survived.
began with the main character concluding that he had
not survived. I.e., he weighed the whole thing up, and
figured that it was too improbable that the memories of
the person he thought he was were legitimate, or---or
some other reason I don't really recall now.
> And why should they? Every person who ever attempts
> to think about survival is necessarily alive and anyone
> who is alive will always (with no exceptions!) claim he's
> survived.
bit different. Yes, obviously, no one will say "the person
I am now is dead". So we have to charitably attribute
more meaning, such as in the Stross case, or when
a nut-case is finally persuaded that all his memories
of leading armies across Europe only came about
from having read about Napoleon.
> An objective test would simply have to verify the absence
> of physical, causal link between earlier version of me and
> later version me.
going into deep freeze and coming out again is enough of
a causal link, or whether the causal transfer of memories
from one body to another (with some time later the original
body and brain being destroyed) is a good enough causal
link.
> [Stathis wrote]
> > instance won't be able to feel anything ever again if I travel to the
> > planet by spaceship. By the time I get there none of the atoms in my
> > body will be the same, nor will they be in the same configuration
> > relative to each other.
>
> Two completely different things, Stathis. Destroying X here and then
> instantiating X1 there is absolutely nothing like moving X from here
> to there.
much like to the extent of what others might think (though
not know), and causal continuity itself.
I've been wanting to ask you, and I apologize if I've already
asked and have forgotten your answer.
Suppose that in the city where you live an exact duplicate
of the dwelling where you live has been created, and during
alternate weeks, you live your life normally when you enter
your dwelling. But during the other week, a near instantaneous
copy of the person of Slawek is created in the fake dwelling,
and the original destroyed, all in the space of a microsecond.
Then after a leisurely millisecond, the reverse is done: a copy
of the copy is created in Slawek's original dwelling, and the
first copy erased. This goes on all week long so long as you
are inside your house not looking outside.
Do you affirm that *this* cannot possibly be one of those
weeks, because of the way you feel. (I am not entirely
unsympathetic to your answer---I basically just want to
know so that I know how to proceed.)
Lee
lco...@rawbw.com
> On 13/04/2008, lcor...@rawbw.com <lcor...@rawbw.com> wrote:
>
> > (Like memory erasure.)
>
> My position would be not to choose destruction unless the copy is made
> at the instant of destruction, since that is equivalent to ordinary
> life. However, I would not be so worried about a procedure that
> involved memory loss of short duration, and this is inconsistent.
> Your position of treating copies as selves is consistent, but it
> devalues what I consider the most important thing about survival,
> anticipating future experiences.
through trying to anticipate what will happen (short term) to
my duplicate. Even though Nurse Ratchet is approaching
him with the needle, one duplicate says to itself "That is
happening to myself over there. Even though no memories
will be formed over here, it's happening to me just the same."
I guess I "devalue" anticipating because I think it internally
non-rational or inconsistent. An easy example, is "when
you're in deep on Midazolam, do you anticipate a future?".
So I force myself to look forward to the experiences of
duplicates, and as I remember pleasant experiences, I
think of it as a form of anticipation also.
> So to be consistent, I have to either accept that
> anticipating future experiences is not important,
> or accept that memory loss is equivalent to death,
> and neither seems satisfactory.
allow that *anticipation* isn't entirely logical or
rational, or whatever?
> > > What if two copies meet and insist that they are not the
> > > same person?
>
> > If they're very recent duplicates, then I think they're using
> > the terms just as strangely as if they say they're not the
> > same person from day to day or nanosecond to nanosecond.
>
> It's interesting that you take this last statement and conclude that
> since they obviously are the same person from moment to moment,
> they must also be the same person standing next to each other,
> whereas I conclude that since they obviously aren't the same person
> standing next to each other, they must also not be the same person
> from moment to moment.
person from day to day that we have in our imaginings
about duplicates. Besides, if memory merging was ever
perfected, a duplicate couldn't but help to anticipate
some things about to happen to another duplicate
(that is, if you were very, very accustomed to picking
up the memories later).
> > Hmm. For me, it's simply objectively false if someone says
> > "that is not the car that hit me" just because it's the next
> > day. Same with chairs. Same with people.
>
> It is objectively false if we agree on an objective definition of
> "same". This is not always easy to do, even in everyday situations.
> If a close replica of the car that hit you is made would you say
> that the replica hit you?
that hit me. I guess if I do know all the facts, then I'll make a
more convoluted answer. Perhaps in this case, "the same"
may refer to a physical object most often (rather than, as with
books "have you read that book?" a pattern). But for sure, the
context always determines the answer as to what information
your interlocutor is after.
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> On Apr 11, 9:49 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Survival is *necessarily* about the subjective. If you undergo a
> > procedure which you survive according to some objective test,
> > but in fact you are left a zombie, then the objective test of survival
> > is wrong.
>
>
> You are implying that we shall forever be unable to determine
> whether an object is conscious. In my analogy, some shivering
> people gathered around a campfire a thousand years ago
> might have said the same about "warmth", having recalled
> some of its very subjective aspects.
I think we could have a very good idea that something is conscious by
examining its behaviour and structure. However, the point I was making
is that the "objective test of survival" is only of interest to the
extent that it is a reliable marker of ongoing conscious experience of
a particular kind.
In other words, what we really want is an objective test indicating
that a person has the right subjective qualities to make him the same
person as an earlier version of himself. Let's suppose there is an
absolutely reliable test of this, test G: God peers into the mind of
of the person at issue and reports that he does (G+) or does not (G-)
have the subjective qualities which we would normally expect to have
in order to be the future version of a person in the course of
everyday life. We don't have access to G so we use a different test,
H, such that we believe that the H status is strongly correlated with
the G status. H might involve observing behaviour and structure, for
example. Now, what I think Slawek is doing is taking some test H and
declaring that it *trumps* G; that if someone is G+ but H- then he
hasn't survived, or if he is G- but H+ then he has survived. But this
is wrong: G is what we're really interested in, and H is only useful
because we can measure it directly while we can't measure G.
> > If you undergo a procedure which you you don't survive
> > according to some objective test, but are left feeling
> > exactly the same after the procedure, then again the
> > objective test is by definition wrong.
>
>
> It seems to me that there is flaw in what you are saying.
> How could you possibly know for sure that you are
> "feeling the same"? On my reading, I could be presented
> with objective evidence that I did not exist yesterday, but
> that a bunch of memories had just been created, and so
> forth.
I can't know *for sure*, but I am reasonably certain that I am the
same person after my cup of coffee this morning as I was before since
I feel I am the same person and no-one I know is telling me otherwise.
Therefore, I conclude that I survived drinking the coffee. If a
scientific study is published tomorrow showing that coffee is
invariably lethal, acknowledging that people seem to survive in just
the way I have described but don't really survive, then the authors of
the study are using a different definition of survival to the one
people normally use. That's OK, as long as everyone is clear about it.
> > A: Procedure X causes death.
> > B: But I've undergone procedure X many times,
> > and I'm obviously not dead.
> > A: You aren't the same person you were before the
> > procedure; that person is dead, and you just have
> > the mistaken belief that you are him.
>
> But surely we could find many (hypothetical) cases
> where we have someone who really is mistaken
> about who he is. Someone with a very great knowledge
> of Napoleon's life and who (contrary to evidence)
> believes he's Napoleon, must have his claims stand
> or fall on objective evidence. Conceivably, he could
> be vindicated if we find out some time travel had
> happened, or if we find out that a Universalist-
> Immortalist type resurrection (with valid memories
> restored) had occurred, or perhaps other possibilities.
>
> So your reasons that "survival is necessarily subjective"
> don't seem right to me.
What you're saying is, he thinks he's Napoleon, but he doesn't have
all the subjective qualities he would have if he were Napoleon, and
therefore he isn't really be Napoleon. You're basing this on certain
observations: even if he behaves like Napoleon, Napoleon died a long
time ago and it doesn't seem possible that his mind could somehow have
been preserved and resurrected. However, if through some miracle he
*does* have all the subjective properties of Napoleon, then he *is*
Napoleon. The objective criteria are just an indicator of the
subjective criteria, which we can't directly measure.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou
> I guess I "devalue" anticipating because I think it internally
> non-rational or inconsistent. An easy example, is "when
> you're in deep on Midazolam, do you anticipate a future?".
> So I force myself to look forward to the experiences of
> duplicates, and as I remember pleasant experiences, I
> think of it as a form of anticipation also.
Yes, I agree that anticipation is an irrational and inconsistent. This
is clear if we acknowledge that there is no absolute sense in which I
can be said to be the same person from moment, but only a contingent
sense, depending on context and psychology. Your response to this is
that normal usage and behaviour *does* define "same person". But
normal usage and behaviour also has it that I am not the same person
as my copy in the next room precisely because I can't anticipate his
future experiences. If I could convince myself emotionally that
anticipation didn't matter, then I have no reason to be concerned
about the survival of any of my copies.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> > Basically, we start with assumption that nobody died
> > and then discard all the objectively recorded changes
> > and deem them "irrelevant to survival" because nobody
> > died.
>
> You're being overly harsh on us (or me). I definitely do
> *not* start with that assumption. Suppose that someone
> who looks like someone I once knew claims to be that
> other person. It could easily happen that as I learn all
> the facts I conclude that the old person died, and the
> new one is either an imposter, or fails to fulfill some
> other objective criteria (which for me, as you know,
> is having enough of the right kind of memories).
always precede the conclusion. As you know, some people are willing
to assign identity X to anyone who thinks he is X. You often bring up
a nice example of a person who thinks he's Napoleon that deals with
this.
The difference between us lies in the answer to question, "What should
survive?" I don't think preservation of personal memories is worth
much if the original instance of mind process expires and can never
access these personal memories again. How much benefit could a blind
person derive from a pretty picture?
> > An objective test would simply have to verify the absence
> > of physical, causal link between earlier version of me and
> > later version me.
>
> Basically, I agree. Where you and I disagree is over whether
> going into deep freeze and coming out again is enough of
> a causal link, or whether the causal transfer of memories
> from one body to another (with some time later the original
> body and brain being destroyed) is a good enough causal
> link.
example, a shattering of a window and my foot transferring energy to a
soccer ball would have a physically causal link between them.
I don't see how transferring memories from one body to another
preserves that link. Freezing also seems to destroy that link.
> > Two completely different things, Stathis. Destroying X here and then
> > instantiating X1 there is absolutely nothing like moving X from here
> > to there.
>
> "Absolutely nothing like"?? Come now.
and birth there.
> I've been wanting to ask you, and I apologize if I've already
> asked and have forgotten your answer.
>
> Suppose that in the city where you live an exact duplicate
> of the dwelling where you live has been created, and during
> alternate weeks, you live your life normally when you enter
> your dwelling. But during the other week, a near instantaneous
> copy of the person of Slawek is created in the fake dwelling,
> and the original destroyed, all in the space of a microsecond.
> Then after a leisurely millisecond, the reverse is done: a copy
> of the copy is created in Slawek's original dwelling, and the
> first copy erased. This goes on all week long so long as you
> are inside your house not looking outside.
>
> Do you affirm that *this* cannot possibly be one of those
> weeks, because of the way you feel. (I am not entirely
> unsympathetic to your answer---I basically just want to
> know so that I know how to proceed.)
>
> Lee
this sentence thinks because without access to objective evidence the
person who typed this sentence might have been a copy or the original.
If I rely only on my subjective experience, I can never be sure. Any
exclusively subjective evaluation is an unreliable reflection of the
truth and should be discarded.
Now, assuming the copying and erasing process has started, the answer
cannot even be given because the person you ask (or assume you're
asking) is dead.
Slawek