Introduction
Tim DeLaney
upon this group while trying to trace down an old friend -- Lee
Corbin. Lee and I logged many hours of discussion of this group's
topic back in the early 1960's. We conversed briefly by e-mail at
about the time of this group's inception, but I lost his e-mail
address when my hard drive crashed. (I have sent an e-mail to him
via the group. I hope he gets it.)
I spent some time reading his messages on Cryonet:
http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/findmsgs.cgi?author=lee%20corbin
And yes, it's the same Lee Corbin of the 1960's. [ I use the word
"same" with tongue firmly in cheek.]
Our views have diverged, but only slightly. One thing I noticed in
the above collection is that there is not much mention of
consciousness. Yet I have come to view this phenomenon as central to
the topic of personal identity. Without consciousness, the topic
could not exist.
Two authors have shaped my views on consciousness: Douglas Hofstadter
_Godel, Escher, Bach ..._ and Daniel Dennett _Consciousness
explained_.
Hofstadter suggests that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the
brain. That is, (if I understand him correctly) it has little to do
with how the organism functions, and is not necessary for survival.
It's just an interesting quirk. We are only conscious because we
think we are. (Please don't challenge me to parse that!)
Dennett's view seems to bear that out. We learn from Dennett that
there is no central screening room where all the current sensory
inputs are all reviewed. Instead, input A might be processed before
input B by one part of the brain, while B might be processed before A
by another part. Dennett cites some interesting experiments that
demonstrate this.
So, my views on personal identity, while not differing from Lee's in
any material way, are that PI and consciousness are ephemeral and
essentially unimportant. The paradox is that these are of overriding
importance to those who are conscious, and those who have a sense of
PI.
Oh, and by the way, I have, I believe, a plus score against Lee at
chess.
Tim DeLaney
Heartland
Tim DeLaney wrote:
> Hofstadter suggests that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the
> brain. That is, (if I understand him correctly) it has little to do
> with how the organism functions, and is not necessary for survival.
> It's just an interesting quirk. We are only conscious because we
> think we are. (Please don't challenge me to parse that!)
Whether consciousness is necessary for survival depends on what is meant by
"consciousness". Because consciousness is vaguely defined, different people
ascribe different meanings to the term so very often people discuss
consciousness yet they mean two different things and, unsurprisingly, their
debate goes nowhere.
The statement that consciousness is not necessary for survival makes sense
to me as I usually separate consciousness from awareness. In my view,
awareness is much more important to survival then consciousness. One could
describe consciousness as "awareness of self" while awareness might refer to
awareness of anything at all. Animals seem to lack consciousness yet nobody
would claim they don't survive from second to second, minute to minute. It
seems they survive because they maintain a certain level of awareness of
what's happening around them. It's the one requirement that needs to be
preserved in order for a living thing to survive. Humans are animals too
and, while they have additional capacity for consciousness which is worthy
of preservation too, it is maintenance of awareness that seems crucial and
absolutely necessary for their survival.
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I would not normally clutter a group with personal trivia, but I came
> upon this group while trying to trace down an old friend -- Lee
> Corbin. Lee and I logged many hours of discussion of this group's
> topic back in the early 1960's. We conversed briefly by e-mail at
> about the time of this group's inception, but I lost his e-mail
> address when my hard drive crashed. (I have sent an e-mail to him
> via the group. I hope he gets it.)
Yes, Lee's a fine fellow.
> Two authors have shaped my views on consciousness: Douglas Hofstadter
> _Godel, Escher, Bach ..._ and Daniel Dennett _Consciousness
> explained_.
>
> Hofstadter suggests that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the
> brain. That is, (if I understand him correctly) it has little to do
> with how the organism functions, and is not necessary for survival.
> It's just an interesting quirk. We are only conscious because we
> think we are. (Please don't challenge me to parse that!)
>
> Dennett's view seems to bear that out. We learn from Dennett that
> there is no central screening room where all the current sensory
> inputs are all reviewed. Instead, input A might be processed before
> input B by one part of the brain, while B might be processed before A
> by another part. Dennett cites some interesting experiments that
> demonstrate this.
It has always struck me as perhaps *the* most absurd notion in the
world to claim that consciousness does not exist, which is how the
ideas of the likes of Hofstadter and Dennett are sometimes
characterised. In general, should we say that A does not exist if A
reduces completely to its parts?
> So, my views on personal identity, while not differing from Lee's in
> any material way, are that PI and consciousness are ephemeral and
> essentially unimportant. The paradox is that these are of overriding
> importance to those who are conscious, and those who have a sense of
> PI.
Let's say they're ephemeral, let's say they aren't separate ontic
entities, let's say they're illusions: then the *very important* thing
- what we mean by survival - is that these illusions continue.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Tim DeLaney
On Jul 4, 7:41 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2008/7/4 Tim DeLaney <delaney.timo...@comcast.net>:
seem curiously unable to characterize it.
>
> > So, my views on personal identity, while not differing from Lee's in
> > any material way, are that PI and consciousness are ephemeral and
> > essentially unimportant. The paradox is that these are of overriding
> > importance to those who are conscious, and those who have a sense of
> > PI.
>
> Let's say they're ephemeral, let's say they aren't separate ontic
> entities, let's say they're illusions: then the *very important* thing
> - what we mean by survival - is that these illusions continue.
illusion, any more than I would say that the enjoyment of music is an
illusion.
Tim
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Tim DeLaney
On Jul 4, 5:22 am, "Heartland" <mindinsta...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Whether consciousness is necessary for survival depends on what is meant by
> "consciousness". Because consciousness is vaguely defined, different people
> ascribe different meanings to the term so very often people discuss
> consciousness yet they mean two different things and, unsurprisingly, their
> debate goes nowhere.
difficult to define with any precision. I like to define it as a brain
state in which I can direct the brain's activity, but obviously,
that's circular. Who is this "I", this "director"?
Still, the ability of a brain to somehow control its own activities
is, I think, a hallmark of conciousness.
> The statement that consciousness is not necessary for survival makes sense
> to me as I usually separate consciousness from awareness. In my view,
> awareness is much more important to survival then consciousness. One could
> describe consciousness as "awareness of self" while awareness might refer to
> awareness of anything at all. Animals seem to lack consciousness yet nobody
> would claim they don't survive from second to second, minute to minute. It
> seems they survive because they maintain a certain level of awareness of
> what's happening around them. It's the one requirement that needs to be
> preserved in order for a living thing to survive. Humans are animals too
> and, while they have additional capacity for consciousness which is worthy
> of preservation too, it is maintenance of awareness that seems crucial and
> absolutely necessary for their survival.
frequently behave as if they are concious so I don't think
conciousness is unique to humans. But I accept your distinction
between awareness of surroundings and self awareness as being central
to conciousness.
Also central to the idea is the ability to control the brain's
activities. Why am I here on PI instead of playing on-line poker or
weeding my garden? The evolution of the brain has enabled me to take
an interest (whatever that means) in these activities, even though
they have no survival value.
The brain has become so extraordinarily complex that it performs
activities that have nothing to do with its evolutionary purpose.
(Consider dreaming, for example.) We tend to look for some survival
purpose in our inclination for religion or music, for example, but I
don't think there is any.
Like Lee, I see the human as a process. But unlike him, I don't don't
view that process as intrinsically important. When my identity is in
abeyance, as in sleep, there is no cause for dismay. Someday it will
be permanently extinguished. Why should that concern me any more than
the diurnal cycle? Of course, I continue to avoid death because I'm
wired to do so.
So my view is that our sense of PI arises accidentally from the
complexity of the brain. We ought to enjoy it as best we can.
Tim
lco...@rawbw.com
> The brain has become so extraordinarily complex that it performs
> activities that have nothing to do with its evolutionary purpose.
> (Consider dreaming, for example.)
an evolutionary purpose. Various experiments, as you probably
know, that interfere with certain aspects of sleep, degrade
subsequent human performance (and can even lead to death).
As I understand it, the dreaming stages are vital, and it's possible
that even the subjective aspects are necessary.
> We tend to look for some survival purpose in our inclination
> for religion or music, for example, but I don't think there is any.
guy who stayed behind and beat on the drum was favored by
evolution.
> Like Lee, I see the human as a process. But unlike him, I don't don't
> view that process as intrinsically important. When my identity is in
> abeyance, as in sleep, there is no cause for dismay. Someday it will
> be permanently extinguished. Why should that concern me any more than
> the diurnal cycle? Of course, I continue to avoid death because I'm
> wired to do so.
death are just more *consistently* wired? Frankly, I am sick
of being dead in Florida. And Massachusetts, and practically
every place in the universe except northern California (and I'm
just hanging on by a thread in one small city even there). The
years before 1948, when I was born, were no fun at all.
> So my view is that our sense of PI arises accidentally from the
> complexity of the brain. We ought to enjoy it as best we can.
as very unfortunate, and as something to be put off if possible?
Lee