2010 check-up
Heartland
It's been a while since we chatted and I'm curious if anyone changed
any part of his philosophy of personal identity/personal survival
since we discussed it last time.
The only issue I've been willing to reconsider during these last 2
years is whether life could resume after complete cessation of mind
activity. Waking up from sleep is clearly not equivalent to having
your mind activated from a recently thawed brain because the original
mind instance doesn't expire when we go to sleep while it does expire
when the brain gets frozen; it's just that I'm open to the possibility
that the original instance of subjective experience might resume from
a completely frozen state. I don't see how yet, but perhaps it's
possible.
Stathis Papaioannou
What sort of evidence would you look for to support the theory that
you survive freezing?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
I'm looking for something that would seem equally obvious and true as
the fact that two identical objects are two different things, which is
the reason why distinction between an original and copy is valid. I'm
probably wishing for some counter-evidence to the idea that lives
irreversibly end when mind processes stop, because, emotionally, I don't
like my conclusions, even though, logically, the fact that two identical
objects are two different things, implies that two instances of the same
process cannot be the same either. It's a disturbing conclusion to think
that life can exist only "inside" a single instance, which is the reason
why I keep looking, so far unsuccessfully, for a loophole.
Stathis Papaioannou
You're happy with the fact that you can survive replacement of the
matter in your brain. Someone else might say that you do *not* survive
if the matter in your brain is replaced, not even if it is done
gradually and there is no disruption of cellular processes. They could
claim that this is a completely obvious fact: different matter,
different identity, even if the new matter is in the same
configuration. How would you argue against such an idea?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
That's a good question to answer. While two atoms are necessarily
different--or they'd be a single atom, not two--and new matter that
replaces old matter is indeed different in that sense, a gradual
replacement of atoms in the body doesn't really impact identity of the
mind because the substance of a mind isn't really matter, but a
spatiotemporal energy exchange process that happens between neurons and
synapses.
In other words, mind occurs at a much higher level of abstraction than
matter, which is why a change in identity of the brain matter
implementing the mind wouldn't affect the identity of that mind. To use
networking OSI model analogy, mind exists somewhere at the application
layer (software processes), atoms and molecules at the lowest physical
layer and neurons and synapses somewhere around network and transport
layers; even a change in identity of routers and switches doesn't affect
the function or identity of the browser, let alone a change in identity
of matter that makes up the cables.
Stathis Papaioannou
> That's a good question to answer. While two atoms are necessarily
> different--or they'd be a single atom, not two--and new matter that
> replaces old matter is indeed different in that sense, a gradual
> replacement of atoms in the body doesn't really impact identity of the
> mind because the substance of a mind isn't really matter, but a
> spatiotemporal energy exchange process that happens between neurons and
> synapses.
>
> In other words, mind occurs at a much higher level of abstraction than
> matter, which is why a change in identity of the brain matter
> implementing the mind wouldn't affect the identity of that mind. To use
> networking OSI model analogy, mind exists somewhere at the application
> layer (software processes), atoms and molecules at the lowest physical
> layer and neurons and synapses somewhere around network and transport
> layers; even a change in identity of routers and switches doesn't affect
> the function or identity of the browser, let alone a change in identity
> of matter that makes up the cables.
A response to this could be that although in a sense it is the same
process that continues despite a change in the matter, it is not the
same mind. The original mind is dead, and the new mind has the
memories of the dead mind and the delusional belief that it has
persisted through time. If you claim that mind occurs at a higher
level of abstraction and survives destruction of the substrate on
which it is being implemented, then you could as easily claim that the
mind is resurrected if a new brain in the appropriate configuration is
created years after the original has perished.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> On Sat, Oct 30, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Heartland <mindin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > That's a good question to answer. While two atoms are necessarily
> > different--or they'd be a single atom, not two--and new matter that
> > replaces old matter is indeed different in that sense, a gradual
> > replacement of atoms in the body doesn't really impact identity of the
> > mind because the substance of a mind isn't really matter, but a
> > spatiotemporal energy exchange process that happens between neurons and
> > synapses.
> >
> > In other words, mind occurs at a much higher level of abstraction than
> > matter, which is why a change in identity of the brain matter
> > implementing the mind wouldn't affect the identity of that mind. To use
> > networking OSI model analogy, mind exists somewhere at the application
> > layer (software processes), atoms and molecules at the lowest physical
> > layer and neurons and synapses somewhere around network and transport
> > layers; even a change in identity of routers and switches doesn't affect
> > the function or identity of the browser, let alone a change in identity
> > of matter that makes up the cables.
>
> A response to this could be that although in a sense it is the same
> process that continues despite a change in the matter, it is not the
> same mind. The original mind is dead, and the new mind has the
> memories of the dead mind and the delusional belief that it has
> persisted through time.
I don't think such a response would make much sense as the process we're
talking about here is the mind itself, so one can't separate one from
the other; they're the same continuous thing. It would be like pointing
to a ball and saying: "This object does exist, but this ball doesn't."
> If you claim that mind occurs at a higher
> level of abstraction and survives destruction of the substrate on
> which it is being implemented, then you could as easily claim that the
> mind is resurrected if a new brain in the appropriate configuration is
> created years after the original has perished.
I didn't say mind would survive destruction of the substrate; I said
mind would survive gradual replacement of the substrate. Obviously, mind
requires some form matter to exist--the function of matter, to be
precise--but matter itself isn't what mind is. Mind is a process that
requires time, space and energy as much as it requires matter; it is a
particular configuration of all these things; take away one, and mind
won't exist. This is why mind isn't a one-dimensional brain pattern, as
many would like to believe. One can't survive by preserving only a brain
pattern.
Stathis Papaioannou
>> A response to this could be that although in a sense it is the same
>> process that continues despite a change in the matter, it is not the
>> same mind. The original mind is dead, and the new mind has the
>> memories of the dead mind and the delusional belief that it has
>> persisted through time.
>
> I don't think such a response would make much sense as the process we're
> talking about here is the mind itself, so one can't separate one from
> the other; they're the same continuous thing. It would be like pointing
> to a ball and saying: "This object does exist, but this ball doesn't."
You say that "they're the same continuous thing" but so what? I'm not
interested in that, I'm interested in survival. You claim that I don't
survive if there is a disruption in a process giving rise to mind,
even though it may look and feel like it's the same process. So I can
as easily claim that I don't survive if there is a replacement of the
matter in my brain, even though it may look and feel like it's the
same process.
With the ball example, if the atoms are are replaced you could say
that the ball has survived under one definition, but under a different
definition it has not survived. Why should I accept one definition
rather than another, either for the ball or for myself?
>> If you claim that mind occurs at a higher
>> level of abstraction and survives destruction of the substrate on
>> which it is being implemented, then you could as easily claim that the
>> mind is resurrected if a new brain in the appropriate configuration is
>> created years after the original has perished.
>
> I didn't say mind would survive destruction of the substrate; I said
> mind would survive gradual replacement of the substrate. Obviously, mind
> requires some form matter to exist--the function of matter, to be
> precise--but matter itself isn't what mind is. Mind is a process that
> requires time, space and energy as much as it requires matter; it is a
> particular configuration of all these things; take away one, and mind
> won't exist. This is why mind isn't a one-dimensional brain pattern, as
> many would like to believe. One can't survive by preserving only a brain
> pattern.
By preserving a pattern the process can be preserved. If the brain is
destroyed then normally the pattern is destroyed and can never be
recovered, which is why it is a bad thing to destroy a living brain.
But that is just a technical problem; if the pattern and the
appropriate hardware to run it on could survive the destruction of the
brain, then destroying the brain would not be such a disaster.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 7:20 PM, Heartland <mindin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> A response to this could be that although in a sense it is the same
> >> process that continues despite a change in the matter, it is not the
> >> same mind. The original mind is dead, and the new mind has the
> >> memories of the dead mind and the delusional belief that it has
> >> persisted through time.
> >
> > I don't think such a response would make much sense as the process we're
> > talking about here is the mind itself, so one can't separate one from
> > the other; they're the same continuous thing. It would be like pointing
> > to a ball and saying: "This object does exist, but this ball doesn't."
>
> You say that "they're the same continuous thing" but so what? I'm not
> interested in that, I'm interested in survival.
Right, I'm interested in survival too except what you call "survival" is
different from what I believe is actually survival. You don't care about
my definition of survival, and I think your definition is just wrong.
It's a completely different debate from the one about identity of
something, which I think is settled, just like debate on whether 1+1=2
is settled; copy always has different identity than the original, end of
story.
What it means to survive is a question with not so obvious answers as
the question about identity. However, to survive still means to preserve
the identity of something. Now, the real difference between someone like
you and someone like me is the identity of *what* exactly we need to
track here. My answer is I want to track the identity of life, and since
what we call "life" is a process of subjective experience, which is a
mind process, therefore, "to survive" essentially means to preserve the
identity of the mind process.
Your answer--I'm assuming--is you also want to preserve life, except you
choose to reduce life--a multidimensional object--to a collection of
bits describing the brain pattern, except, at this stage, you've lost
life as bits can't live; you merely preserved a one-dimensional
projection of life. This reduction expires the instance of original
life. Sure, you can create another instance of this *kind* of life, but,
logically, this is equivalent to creating two objects; their identities
are necessarily different, or they would be a single object; two
instances of life are also necessarily different, or they would be a
single instance of life. Just because this is true for two 3-dimensional
objects, why wouldn't it be true for 4-dimensional ones?
> By preserving a pattern the process can be preserved. If the brain is
> destroyed then normally the pattern is destroyed and can never be
> recovered, which is why it is a bad thing to destroy a living brain.
> But that is just a technical problem; if the pattern and the
> appropriate hardware to run it on could survive the destruction of the
> brain, then destroying the brain would not be such a disaster.
As I try to explain above, preserving a brain pattern doesn't preserve
the original life; it is meaningless to your survival. You're merely
preserving conditions necessary to recreate copies of your life. Again,
we define "survival" differently.
Stathis Papaioannou
> On Tue, 2010-11-02 at 20:02 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 7:20 PM, Heartland <mindin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> A response to this could be that although in a sense it is the same
>> >> process that continues despite a change in the matter, it is not the
>> >> same mind. The original mind is dead, and the new mind has the
>> >> memories of the dead mind and the delusional belief that it has
>> >> persisted through time.
>> >
>> > I don't think such a response would make much sense as the process we're
>> > talking about here is the mind itself, so one can't separate one from
>> > the other; they're the same continuous thing. It would be like pointing
>> > to a ball and saying: "This object does exist, but this ball doesn't."
>>
>> You say that "they're the same continuous thing" but so what? I'm not
>> interested in that, I'm interested in survival.
>
> Right, I'm interested in survival too except what you call "survival" is
> different from what I believe is actually survival. You don't care about
> my definition of survival, and I think your definition is just wrong.
> It's a completely different debate from the one about identity of
> something, which I think is settled, just like debate on whether 1+1=2
> is settled; copy always has different identity than the original, end of
> story.
Identity is relevant to survival but it isn't synonymous with
survival. And the debate about identity is not settled. Is my car the
same car if the spark plugs are changed? If the engine is changed? If
every part is changed gradually over the course of a year? If it's
destroyed and I get a new car just like it? There is room for
discussion, but in the end it not a question of facts but a question
of definitions, the names we apply to the facts. I think you assume
that "identity" and "survival" are matters of fact, but they are not,
and evidence for this is that we disagree on these terms while readily
agreeing on the facts.
> What it means to survive is a question with not so obvious answers as
> the question about identity. However, to survive still means to preserve
> the identity of something. Now, the real difference between someone like
> you and someone like me is the identity of *what* exactly we need to
> track here. My answer is I want to track the identity of life, and since
> what we call "life" is a process of subjective experience, which is a
> mind process, therefore, "to survive" essentially means to preserve the
> identity of the mind process.
>
> Your answer--I'm assuming--is you also want to preserve life, except you
> choose to reduce life--a multidimensional object--to a collection of
> bits describing the brain pattern, except, at this stage, you've lost
> life as bits can't live; you merely preserved a one-dimensional
> projection of life. This reduction expires the instance of original
> life. Sure, you can create another instance of this *kind* of life, but,
> logically, this is equivalent to creating two objects; their identities
> are necessarily different, or they would be a single object; two
> instances of life are also necessarily different, or they would be a
> single instance of life. Just because this is true for two 3-dimensional
> objects, why wouldn't it be true for 4-dimensional ones?
I would say that the life survives despite a discontinuity. You could
say that the two instances of life are similar but not identical, but
you could say that about two instances of anything. And there is no
logical necessity to link survival with identity, however identity is
defined. I along with most people would say that I have survived
despite a discontinuity provided only that I feel I have survived. If
you convince me that my identity has not been preserved then all that
means to me is that insofar as I believed that identity was what
matters in survival I was wrong.
>> By preserving a pattern the process can be preserved. If the brain is
>> destroyed then normally the pattern is destroyed and can never be
>> recovered, which is why it is a bad thing to destroy a living brain.
>> But that is just a technical problem; if the pattern and the
>> appropriate hardware to run it on could survive the destruction of the
>> brain, then destroying the brain would not be such a disaster.
>
> As I try to explain above, preserving a brain pattern doesn't preserve
> the original life; it is meaningless to your survival. You're merely
> preserving conditions necessary to recreate copies of your life. Again,
> we define "survival" differently.
Yes, we do. You think that discontinuity produces illusory survival,
but my response is that even if it makes sense to say this, this sort
of illusory survival is just as good as the real thing. That would
also be most peoples' response if I claimed that they don't survive
ordinary life because the atoms in their brain are replaced: I feel I
have survived, so this is as good as really having survived. It is
this feeling rather than any abstract considerations about whether a
mind has been preserved without disruption that determines how most
people view survival. At the very least, there is no internal
contradiction in this idea.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> survival. And the debate about identity is not settled. Is my car the
> same car if the spark plugs are changed? If the engine is changed? If
> every part is changed gradually over the course of a year? If it's
> destroyed and I get a new car just like it?
When I said that debate about identity was settled, I meant it was
settled for the case when we assign identity to two objects, not for the
case of a single object undergoing replacement of its parts. The latter
is a much more complicated topic that we aren't ready to discuss yet
because we don't agree on the basics.
The reason it might be wise to start with the simplest case--identity of
two objects--is because it's probably the only case where we can be
absolutely sure of what's going on and what is obviously true,
regardless of which definition of survival we believe in; two objects
are necessarily different or they'd be a single object. This is not a
statement based on faith or preference, but a solid fact all rational
people should agree on. In fact, my whole argument and conclusions are
extrapolated from this simple fact.
> I would say that the life survives despite a discontinuity. You could
> say that the two instances of life are similar but not identical, but
> you could say that about two instances of anything. And there is no
> logical necessity to link survival with identity, however identity is
> defined. I along with most people would say that I have survived
> despite a discontinuity provided only that I feel I have survived. If
> you convince me that my identity has not been preserved then all that
> means to me is that insofar as I believed that identity was what
> matters in survival I was wrong.
I think you're justifying conclusions that you currently feel
comfortable to accept instead of working from the basic facts and
working your way toward conclusions, however terrifying they might turn
out to be. This happens all the time. Usually people assume they will
survive just because, in some hypothetical scenarios, "it seems that
way," then introduce "facts" that nicely support the already assumed
conclusion. Typically, all these arguments always have happy endings,
meaning, unless the brain is nuked, everyone survives in the end and
lives happily ever after. The most outrageous example of this type of
argument is probably one where merely keeping a diary of personal values
is enough to ensure survival, even if the brain is nuked. Now, that's
what I call optimism--or just a coping mechanism. It seems like people
in general can't deal with how fragile life really is.
Anyway, just because it seems like someone survives, doesn't mean he
does. If it looks like duck and quacks like a duck, it might just be a
toy duck with a hidden tape player playing duck sounds. Just because
your copy feels like it's alive and shares your memories, doesn't mean
you survived at all. If I feel alive, does this prove anything about
whether my neighbor is alive too?
There absolutely is a logical necessity to link survival with identity,
but I do understand why your concept of survival doesn't require that
link. I would love it too if there was no such link, because my chance
of survival would be so much greater as a result; it's a pleasant
thought.
> >> By preserving a pattern the process can be preserved. If the brain is
> >> destroyed then normally the pattern is destroyed and can never be
> >> recovered, which is why it is a bad thing to destroy a living brain.
> >> But that is just a technical problem; if the pattern and the
> >> appropriate hardware to run it on could survive the destruction of the
> >> brain, then destroying the brain would not be such a disaster.
> >
> > As I try to explain above, preserving a brain pattern doesn't preserve
> > the original life; it is meaningless to your survival. You're merely
> > preserving conditions necessary to recreate copies of your life. Again,
> > we define "survival" differently.
>
> Yes, we do. You think that discontinuity produces illusory survival,
> but my response is that even if it makes sense to say this, this sort
> of illusory survival is just as good as the real thing.
From your copy's perspective, yes, but not from your perspective. See,
there's no such thing as illusory survival here. You keep assuming your
mind would still be there to experience some illusion - it wouldn't;
you'd feel precisely nothing because you wouldn't exist anymore.
> That would
> also be most peoples' response if I claimed that they don't survive
> ordinary life because the atoms in their brain are replaced: I feel I
> have survived, so this is as good as really having survived.
> It is this feeling rather than any abstract considerations about whether a
> mind has been preserved without disruption that determines how most
> people view survival. At the very least, there is no internal
> contradiction in this idea.
Yes, we really need to examine what it means to survive. I'm curious why
you keep equating life with your memory, and your survival with
preservation of your memory. Could you explain why you think this view
is accurate?
Stathis Papaioannou
> When I said that debate about identity was settled, I meant it was
> settled for the case when we assign identity to two objects, not for the
> case of a single object undergoing replacement of its parts. The latter
> is a much more complicated topic that we aren't ready to discuss yet
> because we don't agree on the basics.
>
> The reason it might be wise to start with the simplest case--identity of
> two objects--is because it's probably the only case where we can be
> absolutely sure of what's going on and what is obviously true,
> regardless of which definition of survival we believe in; two objects
> are necessarily different or they'd be a single object. This is not a
> statement based on faith or preference, but a solid fact all rational
> people should agree on. In fact, my whole argument and conclusions are
> extrapolated from this simple fact.
Two objects next to each other are not the same object because they
don't occupy the same space. If they did, they would be one object,
not two. But it could be equally well said that two instances of an
object at different points in time are not the same, since they don't
occupy the same spacetime coordinates. It's just the fact that we
don't have time time travel that allows us to conveniently ignore this
latter point.
I could say that just because you feel you have survived the last six
months does not mean that you have survived. Your brain has changed,
so your belief that you have survived is an illusion; you are a copy,
and the original is dead. Your claim that you have survived because
your brain processes have continued is an ad hoc rationalisation,
because you don't want to acknowledge that you are a copy and will
soon be dead yourself.
> There absolutely is a logical necessity to link survival with identity,
> but I do understand why your concept of survival doesn't require that
> link. I would love it too if there was no such link, because my chance
> of survival would be so much greater as a result; it's a pleasant
> thought.
There is *no* logical necessity to link survival with identity. You
have acknowledged this yourself by allowing that a person can survive
despite brain replacement. It is not the same brain, it is a different
but similar brain. It is not the same mind either: it is a different
mind with some characteristics in common with an earlier mind. There
is a causal connection between the earlier and the later mind but
there is also a causal connection between any original and copy. It's
just that you have arbitrarily decided that one type of causal
connection preserves identity and the other does not. You have also
decided that if there is a discontinuity in the brain process, such as
through freezing, that also destroys identity, even though again there
is a clear causal connection between the earlier and the later mind.
This also seems quite arbitrary.
>> Yes, we do. You think that discontinuity produces illusory survival,
>> but my response is that even if it makes sense to say this, this sort
>> of illusory survival is just as good as the real thing.
>
> From your copy's perspective, yes, but not from your perspective. See,
> there's no such thing as illusory survival here. You keep assuming your
> mind would still be there to experience some illusion - it wouldn't;
> you'd feel precisely nothing because you wouldn't exist anymore.
The illusion is that the copy feels he is the original. But I am quite
happy to say that I only survive momentarily - that I am a series of
short-lived instances of myself each of which has the illusion of
persistence through time. What I would not be happy about is if the
copies were to stop coming, for that would disrupt the illusion and
would be equivalent to death.
>> That would
>> also be most peoples' response if I claimed that they don't survive
>> ordinary life because the atoms in their brain are replaced: I feel I
>> have survived, so this is as good as really having survived.
>> It is this feeling rather than any abstract considerations about whether a
>> mind has been preserved without disruption that determines how most
>> people view survival. At the very least, there is no internal
>> contradiction in this idea.
>
> Yes, we really need to examine what it means to survive. I'm curious why
> you keep equating life with your memory, and your survival with
> preservation of your memory. Could you explain why you think this view
> is accurate?
It's not accurate or inaccurate, it's just what is needed to create
the feeling that I am surviving through time. It is this feeling that
I want to preserve. There is no absolute reason why it is better to
survive rather than die, it is just the way evolution has programmed
us. Evolution doesn't care whether the individual atoms are preserved
or an uninterrupted brain process is preserved.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> Two objects next to each other are not the same object because they
> don't occupy the same space. If they did, they would be one object,
> not two. But it could be equally well said that two instances of an
> object at different points in time are not the same, since they don't
> occupy the same spacetime coordinates. It's just the fact that we
> don't have time time travel that allows us to conveniently ignore this
> latter point.
You got it! Two objects in space have different identities, but also,
two instances of a single object must have different identities if
they're separate in time. Let's keep this fact in mind when we later
discuss a logical necessity of the link between identity and survival.
> > There absolutely is a logical necessity to link survival with identity,
> > but I do understand why your concept of survival doesn't require that
> > link. I would love it too if there was no such link, because my chance
> > of survival would be so much greater as a result; it's a pleasant
> > thought.
>
> There is *no* logical necessity to link survival with identity. You
> have acknowledged this yourself by allowing that a person can survive
> despite brain replacement. It is not the same brain, it is a different
> but similar brain. It is not the same mind either: it is a different
> mind with some characteristics in common with an earlier mind.
It is a brain with different atoms, yes, but it's still the same
instance of mind because gradual replacement of the brain doesn't halt
the mind process at any time during the replacement, just like your
internet connection doesn't die when someone on the global network
replaces a router with a different one. Mind process is at the higher
level of abstraction than brain and, as long as the *function* (as
opposed to the identity) of the lower layers is preserved, the function
*and* identity of higher levels remain intact.
> There
> is a causal connection between the earlier and the later mind but
> there is also a causal connection between any original and copy. It's
> just that you have arbitrarily decided that one type of causal
> connection preserves identity and the other does not.
None of this is arbitrary. One is a real, physical causal connection,
and the other is a connection that exists as an idea. There exists
absolutely no physical causal connection between the original and a
copy. You merely *choose* to connect the two by the abstract
idea/knowledge that these two are similar. It's completely unreal and
bogus connection. The original and a copy are as causally connected to
each other as I'm connected to a neighbor, a rock, or a poem.
> You have also
> decided that if there is a discontinuity in the brain process, such as
> through freezing, that also destroys identity, even though again there
> is a clear causal connection between the earlier and the later mind.
> This also seems quite arbitrary.
Again, there's only an abstract connection between the earlier and
latter minds, but there's no physically causal connection between the
two. Living occurs only in the physical realm, not in the abstract one.
> >> Yes, we do. You think that discontinuity produces illusory survival,
> >> but my response is that even if it makes sense to say this, this sort
> >> of illusory survival is just as good as the real thing.
> >
> > From your copy's perspective, yes, but not from your perspective. See,
> > there's no such thing as illusory survival here. You keep assuming your
> > mind would still be there to experience some illusion - it wouldn't;
> > you'd feel precisely nothing because you wouldn't exist anymore.
>
> The illusion is that the copy feels he is the original.
What if your neighbor suddenly felt he was you? Would you say you'd
survive through him?
> But I am quite
> happy to say that I only survive momentarily - that I am a series of
> short-lived instances of myself
That's the problem right here. You think your life is a series of
short-lived instances so, as I wrote in a previous post, you have no
choice but to assume the highly-optimistic conclusion that you must
survive through cycles of short-lived instances, therefore, creating a
copy of yourself obviously seems OK because you'd argue that a copy is
just like one of those instances. And all I can say to this is, how did
you ever come up with the idea that life consisted of short-lived
instances?
> each of which has the illusion of
> persistence through time. What I would not be happy about is if the
> copies were to stop coming, for that would disrupt the illusion and
> would be equivalent to death.
The moment the original dies, it's as if the copies stop coming, to use
your language. Life isn't a series of different short-lived instances.
> > Yes, we really need to examine what it means to survive. I'm curious why
> > you keep equating life with your memory, and your survival with
> > preservation of your memory. Could you explain why you think this view
> > is accurate?
>
> It's not accurate or inaccurate, it's just what is needed to create
> the feeling that I am surviving through time. It is this feeling that
> I want to preserve. There is no absolute reason why it is better to
> survive rather than die, it is just the way evolution has programmed
> us. Evolution doesn't care whether the individual atoms are preserved
> or an uninterrupted brain process is preserved.
I don't think evolution has anything to do with this. Let's assume we
want to keep living regardless of the reasons why. I'm far more
interested in what you think it is exactly that causes you to live right
now. Out of all the things in the world, let's eliminate all the things
that a person can't live without, literally. What's left at the end of
this process of elimination is the only thing we'll need to track and
preserve the identity of in order to survive.
So, for example, if we examined, say, a particular content of personal
memories and whether it'd be something a person could live
without--again, literally--how would you answer?
Stathis Papaioannou
>> There is *no* logical necessity to link survival with identity. You
>> have acknowledged this yourself by allowing that a person can survive
>> despite brain replacement. It is not the same brain, it is a different
>> but similar brain. It is not the same mind either: it is a different
>> mind with some characteristics in common with an earlier mind.
>
> It is a brain with different atoms, yes, but it's still the same
> instance of mind because gradual replacement of the brain doesn't halt
> the mind process at any time during the replacement, just like your
> internet connection doesn't die when someone on the global network
> replaces a router with a different one. Mind process is at the higher
> level of abstraction than brain and, as long as the *function* (as
> opposed to the identity) of the lower layers is preserved, the function
> *and* identity of higher levels remain intact.
Your definition of what constitutes "death" is arbitrary both for mind
and the Internet connection. It would be quite feasible to have a
computer network connection that is switched off for a millisecond
every second, for example, if the hardware is configured to deal with
such an interruption. You could say, not without reason, that the
connection "dies" every second and a "new" connection is made. But
this is just a matter of semantics. Functionally, it is the same as
one continuous connection, and that is what the end user cares about.
Similarly, if a mind undergoes a discontinuity for a millisecond every
second, provided that this is handled properly and doesn't cause the
person to eg. go blank in a conversation or have a car accident, the
end user will not care. You can explain to them that they have
actually died and been replaced by a copy and they will either (a)
tell you you are wrong, or (b) tell you that that is interesting but
not really relevant to their lives. The issue is not about
definitions, it is about how we feel about the physical facts we all
agree on.
>> There
>> is a causal connection between the earlier and the later mind but
>> there is also a causal connection between any original and copy. It's
>> just that you have arbitrarily decided that one type of causal
>> connection preserves identity and the other does not.
>
> None of this is arbitrary. One is a real, physical causal connection,
> and the other is a connection that exists as an idea. There exists
> absolutely no physical causal connection between the original and a
> copy. You merely *choose* to connect the two by the abstract
> idea/knowledge that these two are similar. It's completely unreal and
> bogus connection. The original and a copy are as causally connected to
> each other as I'm connected to a neighbor, a rock, or a poem.
There is a clear causal connection between an original and a copy in
that the original must be analysed in some way and the information
used to make the copy. That is not the same connection as exists
between two instances of an object that just sits there, but it is
still a causal connection. However, the causal connection is just a
means to an end. I would be just as happy if an exact copy of me arose
randomly after my death as if that copy were created from stored
information about me. It's just that the copy is much less likely to
arise randomly: that is the only reason why the causal connection is
important.
>> You have also
>> decided that if there is a discontinuity in the brain process, such as
>> through freezing, that also destroys identity, even though again there
>> is a clear causal connection between the earlier and the later mind.
>> This also seems quite arbitrary.
>
> Again, there's only an abstract connection between the earlier and
> latter minds, but there's no physically causal connection between the
> two. Living occurs only in the physical realm, not in the abstract one.
There must be a physical connection, otherwise how does the
information to make the copy get transferred? However, as above, the
physical connection is only a technical necessity to ensure that the
copy is made. The important thing is that the copy is made and that it
is the right sort of copy, not how it is made.
>> > From your copy's perspective, yes, but not from your perspective. See,
>> > there's no such thing as illusory survival here. You keep assuming your
>> > mind would still be there to experience some illusion - it wouldn't;
>> > you'd feel precisely nothing because you wouldn't exist anymore.
>>
>> The illusion is that the copy feels he is the original.
>
> What if your neighbor suddenly felt he was you? Would you say you'd
> survive through him?
No, unless he had my memories, personality etc. Conversely, if I
suddenly lost all my memories and personality and gained those of my
neighbour, that would be terrible, because I would be dead. You could
argue that under a technical definition I would not be dead but I
don't care: I would be as good as dead from my point of view. We both
agree on the facts, but we disagree on how we feel about the facts.
The definitions make no substantive difference.
>> But I am quite
>> happy to say that I only survive momentarily - that I am a series of
>> short-lived instances of myself
>
> That's the problem right here. You think your life is a series of
> short-lived instances so, as I wrote in a previous post, you have no
> choice but to assume the highly-optimistic conclusion that you must
> survive through cycles of short-lived instances, therefore, creating a
> copy of yourself obviously seems OK because you'd argue that a copy is
> just like one of those instances. And all I can say to this is, how did
> you ever come up with the idea that life consisted of short-lived
> instances?
Under certain physical theories everything exists transiently, eg.
so-called block universe theories of time. Under other physical
theories everything is being duplicated continuously, such that it is
impossible to distinguish even in theory between copy and original,
eg. the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Physicists
argue about whether these theories are true, but the point is they
*could* be true - they are entirely consistent with the world we
experience. If some experiment is done tomorrow confirming one of
these theories it will be interesting but people will just go about
their everyday lives the same as they always have. A few, such as
perhaps you, will be dismayed but most people won't care. What does
that tell you?
>> each of which has the illusion of
>> persistence through time. What I would not be happy about is if the
>> copies were to stop coming, for that would disrupt the illusion and
>> would be equivalent to death.
>
> The moment the original dies, it's as if the copies stop coming, to use
> your language. Life isn't a series of different short-lived instances.
But it may as well be.
>> > Yes, we really need to examine what it means to survive. I'm curious why
>> > you keep equating life with your memory, and your survival with
>> > preservation of your memory. Could you explain why you think this view
>> > is accurate?
>>
>> It's not accurate or inaccurate, it's just what is needed to create
>> the feeling that I am surviving through time. It is this feeling that
>> I want to preserve. There is no absolute reason why it is better to
>> survive rather than die, it is just the way evolution has programmed
>> us. Evolution doesn't care whether the individual atoms are preserved
>> or an uninterrupted brain process is preserved.
>
> I don't think evolution has anything to do with this. Let's assume we
> want to keep living regardless of the reasons why. I'm far more
> interested in what you think it is exactly that causes you to live right
> now. Out of all the things in the world, let's eliminate all the things
> that a person can't live without, literally. What's left at the end of
> this process of elimination is the only thing we'll need to track and
> preserve the identity of in order to survive.
Evolution has not only programmed us to want to keep living, it has
also programmed with an idea of what it means to continue living. I
refer to the assertion above that almost everyone would consider that
they have survived even if given the information that they in fact
live only transiently to be replaced by a copy. The information is not
enough to counteract evolutionary programming.
> So, for example, if we examined, say, a particular content of personal
> memories and whether it'd be something a person could live
> without--again, literally--how would you answer?
There's no absolute answer because it is obviously possible to lose
some memories without any problem - we all do. However, if all
memories and sense of self were suddenly lost that would be equivalent
to death.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
> You can explain to them that they have
> actually died and been replaced by a copy and they will either (a)
> tell you you are wrong, or (b) tell you that that is interesting but
> not really relevant to their lives. The issue is not about
> definitions, it is about how we feel about the physical facts we all
> agree on.
I have to disagree. What we're trying to do is to find truth which can
only be based on facts and logical extrapolations of these facts.
Feelings should have absolutely no influence on what we consider true.
Centuries ago people "felt" it was true that Sun revolved around Earth,
and, yes, they probably didn't care about claims of those who tried to
find out what was really going on based on facts.
Whether you know it or not, you have no choice about what death is and
are not allowed to choose a different definition you're emotionally
attached to. There is room for only one logically and physically correct
definition of death, just like there's only one correct answer for 1+1,
at least in this Universe.
> >> There
> >> is a causal connection between the earlier and the later mind but
> >> there is also a causal connection between any original and copy. It's
> >> just that you have arbitrarily decided that one type of causal
> >> connection preserves identity and the other does not.
> >
> > None of this is arbitrary. One is a real, physical causal connection,
> > and the other is a connection that exists as an idea. There exists
> > absolutely no physical causal connection between the original and a
> > copy. You merely *choose* to connect the two by the abstract
> > idea/knowledge that these two are similar. It's completely unreal and
> > bogus connection. The original and a copy are as causally connected to
> > each other as I'm connected to a neighbor, a rock, or a poem.
>
> There is a clear causal connection between an original and a copy in
> that the original must be analysed in some way and the information
> used to make the copy.
I think we'd both agree that it's a tenuous connection, at best. IMO,
it's completely abstract, therefore, irrelevant.
> That is not the same connection as exists
> between two instances of an object that just sits there, but it is
> still a causal connection. However, the causal connection is just a
> means to an end. I would be just as happy if an exact copy of me arose
> randomly after my death as if that copy were created from stored
> information about me. It's just that the copy is much less likely to
> arise randomly: that is the only reason why the causal connection is
> important.
Clearly, the most important thing to you is your memory so survival
equals preservation of that memory. Why did you choose memory and not
something else? What's so special about these memories? After all, some
people have even more pleasant, more meaningful memories; why wouldn't
you want to replace your memories with theirs, if that were possible? I
would.
> >> The illusion is that the copy feels he is the original.
> >
> > What if your neighbor suddenly felt he was you? Would you say you'd
> > survive through him?
>
> No, unless he had my memories, personality etc. Conversely, if I
> suddenly lost all my memories and personality and gained those of my
> neighbour, that would be terrible, because I would be dead. You could
> argue that under a technical definition I would not be dead but I
> don't care: I would be as good as dead from my point of view. We both
> agree on the facts, but we disagree on how we feel about the facts.
> The definitions make no substantive difference.
I suspect you are confusing the concept of "life extension" with
"preservation of what's important to you"--these things are not
necessarily the same. Clearly, preservation of your memories is very
important to you for some reason, but, just because this is so important
to you, doesn't mean you necessarily "survive" as long as your memories
exist. Survival is something different. Why not just say that your copy
merely preserves something that was important to you back when you were
among the living?
Consider that some parents care deeply about welfare of their children,
which, for some parents, is even more important than continuation of
their own lives. It would be incorrect to say that cremated parents
"survived" simply because the kids lived happily ever after. Instead,
it'd be correct to say that, what was most important to parents, was
preserved well into the future, but their lives weren't extended. This
is analogous to your beloved memories. Sure, your copy preserves them,
and this is very important to you, but this doesn't extend your life, so
it doesn't deserve to be called "survival."
> >> But I am quite
> >> happy to say that I only survive momentarily - that I am a series of
> >> short-lived instances of myself
> >
> > That's the problem right here. You think your life is a series of
> > short-lived instances so, as I wrote in a previous post, you have no
> > choice but to assume the highly-optimistic conclusion that you must
> > survive through cycles of short-lived instances, therefore, creating a
> > copy of yourself obviously seems OK because you'd argue that a copy is
> > just like one of those instances. And all I can say to this is, how did
> > you ever come up with the idea that life consisted of short-lived
> > instances?
>
> Under certain physical theories everything exists transiently, eg.
> so-called block universe theories of time. Under other physical
> theories everything is being duplicated continuously, such that it is
> impossible to distinguish even in theory between copy and original,
> eg. the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Physicists
> argue about whether these theories are true, but the point is they
> *could* be true - they are entirely consistent with the world we
> experience. If some experiment is done tomorrow confirming one of
> these theories it will be interesting but people will just go about
> their everyday lives the same as they always have. A few, such as
> perhaps you, will be dismayed but most people won't care. What does
> that tell you?
That people don't understand what it means to survive and will make
wrong choices that will guarantee their deaths?
> >> each of which has the illusion of
> >> persistence through time. What I would not be happy about is if the
> >> copies were to stop coming, for that would disrupt the illusion and
> >> would be equivalent to death.
> >
> > The moment the original dies, it's as if the copies stop coming, to use
> > your language. Life isn't a series of different short-lived instances.
>
> But it may as well be.
No, it may not, because any mind process consists of a vast collection
of mental sub-processes with overlapping execution times, which
guarantee impossibility of delineation between potential "blocks" of
instances belonging to your theoretical series of short-lived instances.
This basically means that life is a single instance.
> > I don't think evolution has anything to do with this. Let's assume we
> > want to keep living regardless of the reasons why. I'm far more
> > interested in what you think it is exactly that causes you to live right
> > now. Out of all the things in the world, let's eliminate all the things
> > that a person can't live without, literally. What's left at the end of
> > this process of elimination is the only thing we'll need to track and
> > preserve the identity of in order to survive.
>
> Evolution has not only programmed us to want to keep living, it has
> also programmed with an idea of what it means to continue living. I
> refer to the assertion above that almost everyone would consider that
> they have survived even if given the information that they in fact
> live only transiently to be replaced by a copy. The information is not
> enough to counteract evolutionary programming.
Why is this relevant? Yes, evolution brainwashes people into believing
objectively verifiable untruths. Perhaps you are making a point that we
should adopt definitions programed into us by evolution instead of
definitions based on facts and logic? If so, then I strongly disagree.
> > So, for example, if we examined, say, a particular content of personal
> > memories and whether it'd be something a person could live
> > without--again, literally--how would you answer?
>
> There's no absolute answer because it is obviously possible to lose
> some memories without any problem - we all do. However, if all
> memories and sense of self were suddenly lost that would be equivalent
> to death.
And yet the mind would continue to operate and generate an undiminished
stream of subjective experience allowing this person to see, feel, hear,
smell, taste and think. It doesn't look like death to me. Do you really
think it makes any sense to say that a life ended here? Or would it
makes vastly more sense to say that life continues even though personal
memories were forgotten?
As I mentioned earlier, concepts of "life extension" and "preservation
of what's important to you" are not necessarily the same. They can be
the same, but, in your case of memory, they are not because your mind
would still work perfectly even with your personal memories erased.
Another example illustrating the difference between life extension and
preservation of what's important to you might be a soldier who
sacrifices his life for his country. Clearly, such a person values
welfare of his country more than his life; if his brain explodes, and
the country is saved from disaster as a result, then the soldier
succeeds at preserving something that was important to him, but his life
doesn't extend into that happy future, no matter how much he loved and
cared about his country. So, when you enter that destructive uploading
chamber and a copy of your mind is created, then your brain turns to
mush, you're just like that soldier with exploded brain; you only
succeed at preserving what was important to you--memories--but fail at
extending your life.
Stathis Papaioannou
> I have to disagree. What we're trying to do is to find truth which can
> only be based on facts and logical extrapolations of these facts.
> Feelings should have absolutely no influence on what we consider true.
> Centuries ago people "felt" it was true that Sun revolved around Earth,
> and, yes, they probably didn't care about claims of those who tried to
> find out what was really going on based on facts.
>
> Whether you know it or not, you have no choice about what death is and
> are not allowed to choose a different definition you're emotionally
> attached to. There is room for only one logically and physically correct
> definition of death, just like there's only one correct answer for 1+1,
> at least in this Universe.
A feeling that the Sun orbits the Earth is not the right analogy. The
analogy is whether the Sun feels warm. The Sun does feel warm, and if
you don't know any better, it also feels as if it orbits the Earth and
as if it is at most a few hundred kilometres away. In fact, the Earth
orbits the Sun it is 150 million kilometres away. This is interesting
and surprising if it comes to you as news, but it does not change the
fact that the Sun feels warm. The Sun would still feel warm even if it
turned out there was no star there at all but it was a projection.
Similarly with your definition of death: you might convince people
that you die to be replaced by a copy if your brain processes are
interrupted, but the response will be that it still feels as if you
survive. Call it an illusion, but like the warmth of the Sun (wherever
and whatever it is) it is the illusion that people are interested in
preserving. Conversely, if I fall into a dreamless sleep from which I
will never wake, then I am as good as dead, even if you convince me
that it is correct to say that I am technically still alive because my
brain processes continue. We all agree on what is actually going on in
these cases, but our appraisal of the facts is different. I can't do
anything about it if you would be upset by the knowledge that your
stream of consciousness was interrupted. It is as if someone who
previously enjoyed sunbaking suddenly lost their taste for it on
learning that the Sun is so far away.
>> There is a clear causal connection between an original and a copy in
>> that the original must be analysed in some way and the information
>> used to make the copy.
>
> I think we'd both agree that it's a tenuous connection, at best. IMO,
> it's completely abstract, therefore, irrelevant.
It's not abstract, there must be actual physical contact in order for
the information transfer to occur. It is impossible for an object to
affect something outside its light cone for this reason.
>> That is not the same connection as exists
>> between two instances of an object that just sits there, but it is
>> still a causal connection. However, the causal connection is just a
>> means to an end. I would be just as happy if an exact copy of me arose
>> randomly after my death as if that copy were created from stored
>> information about me. It's just that the copy is much less likely to
>> arise randomly: that is the only reason why the causal connection is
>> important.
>
> Clearly, the most important thing to you is your memory so survival
> equals preservation of that memory. Why did you choose memory and not
> something else? What's so special about these memories? After all, some
> people have even more pleasant, more meaningful memories; why wouldn't
> you want to replace your memories with theirs, if that were possible? I
> would.
Sometimes I want to forget unpleasant things, or at least not to be so
bothered by them. But if I forget all my past, who I am, who I know
etc. then that is equivalent to death. I guess some people would not
mind, but I would, and so would everyone I know.
> I suspect you are confusing the concept of "life extension" with
> "preservation of what's important to you"--these things are not
> necessarily the same. Clearly, preservation of your memories is very
> important to you for some reason, but, just because this is so important
> to you, doesn't mean you necessarily "survive" as long as your memories
> exist. Survival is something different. Why not just say that your copy
> merely preserves something that was important to you back when you were
> among the living?
>
> Consider that some parents care deeply about welfare of their children,
> which, for some parents, is even more important than continuation of
> their own lives. It would be incorrect to say that cremated parents
> "survived" simply because the kids lived happily ever after. Instead,
> it'd be correct to say that, what was most important to parents, was
> preserved well into the future, but their lives weren't extended. This
> is analogous to your beloved memories. Sure, your copy preserves them,
> and this is very important to you, but this doesn't extend your life, so
> it doesn't deserve to be called "survival."
Preservation of my mind constitutes survival for me, even if you claim
it is only an illusion of survival; I am happy with the illusion.
Preservation of the products of my life would be nice but it does not
even create the illusion of survival.
>> Under certain physical theories everything exists transiently, eg.
>> so-called block universe theories of time. Under other physical
>> theories everything is being duplicated continuously, such that it is
>> impossible to distinguish even in theory between copy and original,
>> eg. the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Physicists
>> argue about whether these theories are true, but the point is they
>> *could* be true - they are entirely consistent with the world we
>> experience. If some experiment is done tomorrow confirming one of
>> these theories it will be interesting but people will just go about
>> their everyday lives the same as they always have. A few, such as
>> perhaps you, will be dismayed but most people won't care. What does
>> that tell you?
>
> That people don't understand what it means to survive and will make
> wrong choices that will guarantee their deaths?
So you say, but it could be under the theories I have mentioned that
you are guaranteed to die multiple times a second. That could have
been the case your whole life (or rather, your "whole life") and you
would not know it. What would you do with the knowledge? Most people
would simply redefine survival to encompass the illusion of survival,
provided that this illusion is as good as the one they have been
accustomed to.
>> > The moment the original dies, it's as if the copies stop coming, to use
>> > your language. Life isn't a series of different short-lived instances.
>>
>> But it may as well be.
>
> No, it may not, because any mind process consists of a vast collection
> of mental sub-processes with overlapping execution times, which
> guarantee impossibility of delineation between potential "blocks" of
> instances belonging to your theoretical series of short-lived instances.
> This basically means that life is a single instance.
But mental processes can be interrupted in the case of sleep, coma or
general anaesthesia. Under your definition (or someone else's) this
could mean that you die and are replaced by a copy. But it doesn't
matter if this claim is right or wrong; what matters is that everyone
who undergoes one of these processes is satisfied that they have
survived, and no definition of survival is going to make any
difference to them, just as no astronomical discovery is going to
change the fact that the object that looks like the Sun feels warm.
>> Evolution has not only programmed us to want to keep living, it has
>> also programmed with an idea of what it means to continue living. I
>> refer to the assertion above that almost everyone would consider that
>> they have survived even if given the information that they in fact
>> live only transiently to be replaced by a copy. The information is not
>> enough to counteract evolutionary programming.
>
> Why is this relevant? Yes, evolution brainwashes people into believing
> objectively verifiable untruths. Perhaps you are making a point that we
> should adopt definitions programed into us by evolution instead of
> definitions based on facts and logic? If so, then I strongly disagree.
Evolution makes us enjoy sweets. As a matter of fact, this may be bad
for us; but this does not alter the fact that we enjoy sweets.
>> There's no absolute answer because it is obviously possible to lose
>> some memories without any problem - we all do. However, if all
>> memories and sense of self were suddenly lost that would be equivalent
>> to death.
>
> And yet the mind would continue to operate and generate an undiminished
> stream of subjective experience allowing this person to see, feel, hear,
> smell, taste and think. It doesn't look like death to me. Do you really
> think it makes any sense to say that a life ended here? Or would it
> makes vastly more sense to say that life continues even though personal
> memories were forgotten?
Life may continue but life also continues in a coma - it just isn't the same.
> As I mentioned earlier, concepts of "life extension" and "preservation
> of what's important to you" are not necessarily the same. They can be
> the same, but, in your case of memory, they are not because your mind
> would still work perfectly even with your personal memories erased.
>
> Another example illustrating the difference between life extension and
> preservation of what's important to you might be a soldier who
> sacrifices his life for his country. Clearly, such a person values
> welfare of his country more than his life; if his brain explodes, and
> the country is saved from disaster as a result, then the soldier
> succeeds at preserving something that was important to him, but his life
> doesn't extend into that happy future, no matter how much he loved and
> cared about his country. So, when you enter that destructive uploading
> chamber and a copy of your mind is created, then your brain turns to
> mush, you're just like that soldier with exploded brain; you only
> succeed at preserving what was important to you--memories--but fail at
> extending your life.
It isn't the same as valuing something important. The illusion of
survival (if that is the term you want to use) is the important part
of survival.
--
Stathis Papaioannou