Objective Test of Survival (was: Value of Memories)
Stathis Papaioannou
> I believe there can be only one universal definition of survival
> (persistence) for any thing, namely, Leibniz Law extrapolated to
> things that require time to exist. I described that extrapolation in
> the past but never actually had a chance to post it. This is all
> science and in science there can only be one correct answer so there's
> no need to guess which definition is more correct than others just
> like there's only one answer to 2+3. Finding an answer is just a
> matter of careful derivation.
Finding an objective test for something doesn't do any good if it's an
objective test for the wrong thing. I could say that under Leibniz'
law I definitely have *not* survived the year, since almost all the
atoms in my body are different, and in a different relative
configuration. This is objectively and unequivocally true, but so
what? All that means is that Leibniz' law isn't relevant to personal
survival, since I'm sure that I *have* survived the year.
The objective test you seek may be a test for survival in some sense,
but not in the sense that matters to people. Even if you convince
people that you have found the one legitimate definition of survival,
they can just turn around and say, "OK, so I don't really care about
true survival, what I care about is this feeling I have that I am the
same person from moment, and I'd like to maintain this feeling even if
it's illusory".
--
Stathis Papaioannou
Heartland
>
> > I believe there can be only one universal definition of survival
> > (persistence) for any thing, namely, Leibniz Law extrapolated to
> > things that require time to exist. I described that extrapolation in
> > the past but never actually had a chance to post it. This is all
> > science and in science there can only be one correct answer so there's
> > no need to guess which definition is more correct than others just
> > like there's only one answer to 2+3. Finding an answer is just a
> > matter of careful derivation.
>
> Finding an objective test for something doesn't do any good if it's an
> objective test for the wrong thing. I could say that under Leibniz'
> law I definitely have *not* survived the year, since almost all the
> atoms in my body are different, and in a different relative
> configuration. This is objectively and unequivocally true, but so
> what? All that means is that Leibniz' law isn't relevant to personal
> survival, since I'm sure that I *have* survived the year.
chose here to apply Leibniz law to. But since I don't agree with your
X, I can't accept your conclusion that you have not survived under
Leibniz law. You probably did survive. Basically, I agree with your
first sentence. Before we can *know* if something survived we must
investigate what that something is and whether it's the right thing.
Instead of X=snapshot of atom configuration, Leibniz law should be
applied to Y=mind process which, IMO, reflects true nature of life and
existence. After all, life, which is what we're trying to preserve, is
not merely a static configuration of atoms, but at least a dynamic
process that is undefined at snapshots (where deltaTime=0), but
necessarily defined over an interval (deltaTime>0).
> The objective test you seek may be a test for survival in some sense,
> but not in the sense that matters to people. Even if you convince
> people that you have found the one legitimate definition of survival,
> they can just turn around and say, "OK, so I don't really care about
> true survival, what I care about is this feeling I have that I am the
> same person from moment, and I'd like to maintain this feeling even if
> it's illusory".
subjective. If the test were objective and based on the correct
argument, then every rational person who understands it would
necessarily replace the obsolete and incorrect definition of survival
with the new one and would care deeply about its implications.
The statement, "I don't really care about true survival, what I care
about is this feeling I have" is somewhat irrational as caring about
maintaining any kind of feeling necessarily implies caring about true
survival. One cannot continue to feel anything if one ceases to exist.
Survival is a necessary prerequisite for continuing any kind of
experience so caring about continuing the experience means caring
about survival.
As I said before, I'm convinced that those who desire to preserve only
their psychological patterns inadvertently violate their own volitions
by trying to fulfill that desire.
Slawek
Stathis Papaioannou
> > The objective test you seek may be a test for survival in some sense,
> > but not in the sense that matters to people. Even if you convince
> > people that you have found the one legitimate definition of survival,
> > they can just turn around and say, "OK, so I don't really care about
> > true survival, what I care about is this feeling I have that I am the
> > same person from moment, and I'd like to maintain this feeling even if
> > it's illusory".
>
>
> That could be true only for an irrational person or if the test was
> subjective. If the test were objective and based on the correct
> argument, then every rational person who understands it would
> necessarily replace the obsolete and incorrect definition of survival
> with the new one and would care deeply about its implications.
>
> The statement, "I don't really care about true survival, what I care
> about is this feeling I have" is somewhat irrational as caring about
> maintaining any kind of feeling necessarily implies caring about true
> survival. One cannot continue to feel anything if one ceases to exist.
> Survival is a necessary prerequisite for continuing any kind of
> experience so caring about continuing the experience means caring
> about survival.
What I'm disputing is that you are discussing the right thing when you
are discussing an objective test for survival. If someone says that
survival involves having the same atoms you will argue that they're
wrong, life involves a process, and that process can continue despite
the atoms constantly changing. Fine so far. But then you say that a
person does not survive if that process is interrupted. Well, why is
that claim any better than the claim that having the same atoms is
essential to survival? In both cases the counterargument is, See here,
Fred has had his atoms changed / his processes stopped and restarted,
and clearly he has survived. In both cases the rebuttal to this
counterargument is, But the original Fred is dead, replaced by a copy
who mistakenly believes he is Fred. On what authority do you decide
that swapping atoms is OK but not interrupting processes?
--
Stathis Papaioannou