Rabbi Yishmael’s Principles
Rabbi Kaganoff
Because several of these principles are applied to cases of metzora…
Four of Rabbi Yishmael’s Principles
Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza
By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff
Question #1: Lelameid al haklal kulo yatza -- to teach about the entire category
Aside from being a major mouthful, what does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, “That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category.”
Question #2: Melachos of Shabbos
Are the 39 melachos treated like 39 different mitzvos?
Question #3: Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza
In Rabbi Yishmael’s passage, he mentions four middos (numbers 8-11) that begin with: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza, followed by distinctions that are difficult to understand for most readers. What do these middos mean?
Introduction
Prior to the kaddish derabbanan closing the korbanos section, we enumerate the thirteen middos of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah (see also Sanhedrin 86a). Without these rules of interpretation, there would be a greater chance that the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh might be forgotten, and it would also be more difficult to apply halacha to new situations and questions that develop. These are some of the advantages of the system of these thirteen rules that we were taught via mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai.
Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza
At this point, I will address my opening question: “What does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, ‘That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category?’” In other words, a case that was included in a category and is then singled out for a new teaching, it is not singled out to teach the new law only regarding itself. Rather, the new law applies to everything in its original category.
Notwithstanding the rather cumbersome title, this eighth rule of Rabbi Yishmael is actually fairly straightforward. In one place in the Torah, a group of similar mitzvos or items used for a mitzvah are listed. In a different place in the Torah, a new law is taught and only one example from the first list is mentioned. The rule teaches that the halacha applies to all cases in the first list.
The Toras Kohanim itself provides the following example to explain this rule. After teaching us concerning the various offerings brought in the Beis Hamikdash, the Torah concludes by saying: “This is the law for olah (offerings burnt on the altar in their entirety except for the hide), for mincha (grain offerings), for chatas and asham (both offerings brought as atonement for different types of sins), for miluim (offered when the Mishkan was dedicated) and for shelamim offerings (offerings from which the owner and the kohanim eat most of the meat) [Vayikra 7:37].” In a different place (Vayikra 7:20), the Torah teaches that someone who is tamei when he eats meat from the korban shelamim will receive the punishment of kareis. Thus, the Torah mentions only shelamim when it introduces this new law. Because of rule #8, we understand that the punishment of kareis applies to a person who is tamei and eats from any of the other korbanos included in the listing of Vayikra 7:37, but not if he eats something else (see also Yevamos 7a; Kerisus 2b). An example of something excluded from the new law is kodashei bedek habayis, something declared to be property of the Beis Hamikdash, which is sold and its received value is used to pay for repairs and upkeep of the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Although it is prohibited min haTorah to eat from an item that was declared property of the Beis Hamikdash, someone who eats it when he is tamei is not culpable of kareis.
There are numerous applications of this rule in all sorts of types of laws. For example, the halacha that we are not required to eat matzah after the first night of Pesach is derived via this rule (Pesachim 120a). Also, the requirement to bring nesachim (wine offerings) alongside korbanos olah and shelamim, but not alongside asham and chatas, is derived by an application of this rule (Sifrei, Bamidbar 15:3). The fact that the lo saaseh prohibiting making parts of grain korbanos into chometz applies to all stages of the korban’s production is similarly derived from an application of this rule (Menachos 55b).
Here is another example: The Torah states in several places that we are not to perform any melacha on Shabbos. As we derive from several sources, the definition of a melacha is one of the 39 categories of work that were performed in the construction of the Mishkan. Yet, the Torah specifically states independently, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, “Do not kindle fire anywhere that you reside on the Shabbos day” (Shemos 35:3). Kindling fire is one of the 39 melachos; therefore, it is included under the general prohibition not to do melacha on Shabbos. If so, why does the Torah need to mention it separately as its own prohibition? This is to teach us that this melacha, on its own, is treated with all the stringencies of melacha. But this answer only begs the question; what is being added to the prohibition of violating Shabbos by having hav’arah, kindling, mentioned specifically?
The halachic conclusion is that this pasuk teaches that hav’arah should be treated as if it was one of the 613 mitzvos and not simply as a category of melachos Shabbos. But since hav’arah is one of the many other melachos that are all included under the heading of melacha, applying rule #8 teaches that each of the 39 melachos is treated as if it is an independent mitzvah of the 613.
What difference does this make? A vast difference. Someone who performs melacha on Shabbos negligently is obligated to offer a korban chatas as atonement for his sin.
Unfortunately, we do not have a Beis Hamikdash today, but when the Beis Hamikdash is iy”H rebuilt, very soon, he will be required to bring a korban chatas. This law is true regarding negligent violation of almost any prohibition for which violating it intentionally brings the punishment of kareis. Whoever violates negligently a potential kareis prohibition must offer a korban chatas.
However, someone who violates the same prohibition many times because he was unaware that what he was doing was against the Torah does not require repeated korbanos chatas, but only one korban chatas.
Now, what is the law concerning someone who violated negligently several different melachos on Shabbos? Since the Torah states, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, we derive that all 39 melachos are treated as if they are separate Torah prohibitions. The ramification of this ruling is that someone who violated negligently several different melachos will be obligated to bring a korban chatas for each melacha that he has violated (Shabbos 70a)! We have now explained the second of our opening questions: Are the 39 melachos treated as 39 different mitzvos?
Principles 9-11
At this point, I will explain the next three principles together, since doing so will make it easier. In each of these cases, the interpretation of how the principle is applied depends on how the law that was part of a category and was specified outside that category is different from the laws with which we are already familiar from the category.
Principle #9: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an echad shehu che’inyano, yatza lehakeil velo lechachmir.
The new case is not noticeably different from an already known case, yet rules that would make this case completely similar to the already known case are omitted.
When nothing new is mentioned, but some halachos are simply omitted, we derive only lenient rulings.
Principle #10: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an acheir shelo che’inyano, yatza lehakeil ulehachmir.
The halachic difference in the new case appears to be the opposite of what we would have expected based on the already known case. When the new case includes a ruling that contradicts what we knew previously, we derive both strict and lenient rulings.
Principle #11: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza bedavar heh’chodosh, iy atah yochol lehachziro lichlalo ad she’yachazeerena hakosuv lichlalo befeirush.
The new case introduces a completely new innovation that was unheard of in any previous application. We do not apply rulings from the original category unless and until the Torah tells us that the new case is still part of that category.
I will now demonstrate applications of each of these three rules:
Principle #9 applied:
All types of tzara’as are divided into two general categories: musgar, a tumah that is temporary, and muchlat, a tumah that remains until the symptoms of tzara’as disappear or the tamei item is destroyed. Usually, musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person or garment undergoes immersion in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (In the case of a house, it undergoes a different procedure.) A muchlat could remain tamei forever, and the procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat is far more expensive, more complicated and is considerably longer to perform than becoming tahor after being musgar. In the case of nega’im on clothing and houses, the status of muchlat will eventually require burning the clothing or razing the house.
For most types of nega’im on a person, there are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:
(1) The tzara’as spreads.
(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs within the nega turn white.
(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.
The Torah presents the case of nega’im on healthy skin and its rules and then teaches of nega’im on injured skin, which seem to be the same as the laws of regular nega’im, except:
(A) Whereas regarding other nega’im, the Torah refers to two consecutive weeks of when someone can potentially be a musgar, regarding a nega on injured skin it mentions only being musgar for one week.
(B) There is no mention of healthy skin inside the nega being a sign of muchlat.
Now we can understand how the 9th Principle applies: “Something that became an exception with a detail that fits its general topic teaches lenience but not strictness.” No striking new rules were taught regarding the nega’im on injured skin; simply some details that apply to other nega’im are missing. Therefore, no strict rules that apply to other nega’im apply here unless the Torah specifically mentions them, but lenient rules do apply. As a result of the 9th Principle, a nega on injured skin will never require a second week of musgar; if the signs of the nega are unchanged after seven days, the nega is ruled tahor and requires only immersion. Similarly, healthy-looking skin within a white nega on injured skin is not a sign that it is tamei.
Principle #10 applied:
This is where a case seems to be part of a general rule, but a halachic detail is dissimilar from the laws that apply to the cases of the general rule. In this situation, the new case may have some laws that are stricter and others that are more lenient than the previous known general rule.
As an example, the Toras Kohanim picks another case from the laws of tzara’as. A blond hair has no halachic significance to a regular nega or to any other rules of tzara’as on the body. Yet the Torah gave it much significance regarding a nega on the scalp or face. As mentioned above, a nega that develops two white hairs renders the afflicted person muchlat. Later, when discussing tzara’as found on the scalp or face, the Torah teaches that a blond hair is a sign of tumah (Vayikra 13:30). This example is virtually the opposite from the general rule of negaim on the body, in which white hair, not blond hair, renders it tamei. The Toras Kohanim explains that the 10th principle of Rabbi Yishmael teaches that this case has both lenient and stringent ramifications: a white hair on the scalp or face does not make him muchlat, but a blond hair does.
Principle #11 applied
Something that is part of a general rule but that has a novel detail is no longer considered part of the original category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category. What does this mean and how is it different from the previous principle (Ra’avad; Halichos Olam; Shlah)? Principle #11 discusses a case which has laws completely dissimilar from the typical experience with these laws.
Here is an example: Every korban, including the asham, must have its blood received into a vessel. However, the law of the korban asham of a metzora includes a ruling that is very different from any other korban. Some of the blood of the korban asham of the metzora is caught by a kohein in his right hand! This striking difference implies that we should not derive any halachos concerning this asham from the laws of other korbanos asham unless the Torah teaches us to do so (see also Zevachim 49a; Sifrei, Bamidbar 6:20, end of piska 37; Malbim #134).
Another example: When teaching what parts of a korban shelamim sheep are burnt on the mizbei’ach, the Torah (Vayikra 3:9) adds the alyah, a fattail unique to Mid-Eastern sheep. (You won’t find it on American sheep – they have scrawny tails.) Once this detail has been taught regarding this variety of korban shelamim, the Torah needs to teach that the other laws of shelamim are identical, whether it is a sheep, cattle or a goat.
A third example of this rule is that the shelamim offering of the nazir has a special law that its right forearm is cooked before the rest of the korban is offered (Bamidbar 6:19). Once this distinction has been made, we would not apply the other laws of shelamim to this korban until we have a halachic source to do so (Pesikta Zutrasa, Vayikra 3:10).
Conclusion
When the Gemara tells us that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen middos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).