The Basics of Mesorah
Rabbi Kaganoff
The Basics of Mesorah
By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff
The Relationship between the Written and Oral Torah
I will begin our discussion by quoting the beautiful words of Rav Hirsch explaining the relationship between the words of our Written Torah and the Oral Torah:
The relationship between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah is like that between brief written notes taken on a scientific lecture, and the lecture itself. Students who attended the oral lecture require only their brief notes to recall at any time the entire lecture. They often find that a word, a question mark, an exclamation mark, a period, or the underscoring of a word is sufficient to bring to mind a whole series of ideas, observations, qualifications, and so forth. But for those who did not attend the instructor’s lecture, these notes are not of much use. If they try to reconstruct the lecture solely from these notes, they will of necessity make many errors. Words, marks, and so forth, that serve the students who listened to the lecture as most instructive guiding stars for the retention of the truths expounded by the lecturer appear completely meaningless to the uninitiated. The non-initiate who will attempt to use these same notes in order to construct (as opposed to reconstruct) for himself the lecture he did not attend will dismiss what seems unclear as baseless mental gymnastics and idle speculations leading nowhere.[1]
Thus, we see that the Oral Torah is indispensable for a proper understanding of the Written Torah.
The Rambam[2] divides all the myriad laws of the Torah into three basic categories:
1. Those laws that we know on the basis of mesorah -- that is, we have a direct tradition from each generation’s greatest Torah leaders to its teachers of the previous generation, and this tradition can be traced directly back to Moshe Rabbeinu, who, in turn, was taught these laws by Hashem during his sojourn on Har Sinai. For this reason, the Rambam, both in his Introduction to the Mishneh Torah and in his Introduction to his Commentary to the Mishnah lists the entire chain of the mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu until the completion of the Talmud. Every law included in this first category was transmitted by the leaders of each generation to the next, in an unbroken chain.
2. Those laws that are derived from the Written Torah on the basis of rules that we were given at Har Sinai. In this instance, we were provided with the Written Torah as the lecture notes described above by Rav Hirsch, and accompanied by a detailed explanation of how to apply logic to derive and understand more details of these mitzvos. Any laws derived this way qualify as min haTorah.
3. Those laws that were introduced by the sages of each generation in fulfilling their role as mandated by the Torah to safeguard the observing of its commandments. This category includes also completely new mitzvos that Chazal introduced, such as kindling the Chanukah menorah, the various observances of Purim, and washing our hands before partaking of bread.
The Rambam notes that there is a very sharp distinction between the first two categories, notwithstanding the fact that the laws of both are min haTorah. There cannot be a dispute about the veracity of any law that is in the first category, since all such laws are based on mesorah. To quote the Rambam, divrei kabbalah lo naflah bahem machlokes le’olam, there can never be a dispute regarding concepts that are based on our Oral Tradition.
On the other hand, as the second category is based on logic, there will, of necessity, be differing opinions as to how to interpret and understand halachic concepts. As our Sages teach, just as no two people look the same, no two people think the same.[3] Therefore, any time we discover a dispute between sages of the Mishnah or Gemara, the law being debated must fall under either the second category or the third, but it can never belong to the first.
A related difference between the two categories is that a Beis Din Hagadol of a later generation has the right and ability to overturn a ruling that is of the second category, but it cannot overturn a law that is a mesorah from Har Sinai.
In the Introduction to his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam divides the first category into two different subcategories, both of which include exclusively laws that we were taught by mesorah. The Rambam calls the first subcategory peirushim hamekubalim, explanations of the verse that are accepted on the basis of our mesorah. The second subcategory includes all laws that we know exclusively from mesorah without any allusion at all in the “lecture notes” – that is, the Written Torah.
Esrogim, Hadasim, Mechitzos
Allow me to explain, with an example, the difference between these two subcategories: The Torah instructs us to take on Sukkos the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of date palms, twigs of a plaited tree and willows of a stream. In the cases of the fruit of a beautiful tree and the twigs of a plaited tree, the notes provided by the Torah are insufficient on their own to identify which items are intended. However, those who attended the original “lecture” were told that the fruit of a beautiful tree means an esrog, and that the twigs of a plaited tree refers to hadasim. The mesorah explaining these oral lecture notes was transmitted by Moshe to Yeshoshua and the other great leaders of his era, and from them to the leaders of the next generation, and so on, until they were codified in the Mishnah and later in the Gemara. This subcategory is called peirushim hamekubalim.
On the other hand, the Gemara mentions that many of the concepts related to the contruction of halachic walls, called mechitzos, are categorized as halacha leMoshe miSinai, meaning laws that are known only because of the mesorah of what Moshe was taught at Har Sinai. These laws were taught completely via mesorah. Since there is no mention of these laws in the “lecture notes,” the Written Torah, they comprise the second subcategory.
Again, both of these two subcategories are laws that we know on the basis of mesorah and whose veracity is never disputed. The difference between the two subcategories is that something included under peirushim hamekubalim is something that we may have understood without mesorah on the basis of logic and the Written Torah, whereas we would never have known about a halacha leMoshe miSinai without our mesorah. Thus, the Gemara[4] demonstrates several ways that one may derive that the “fruit of a beautiful tree” is indeed an esrog, even had we not been provided this information in our mesorah. However, we would never have known the laws of mechitzos without a mesorah.
Nisuch Hamayim
The mitzvah to pour water on the altar on Sukkos provides insight into another curiosity. The Gemara[5] cites approaches that derive this mitzvah by means of “lecture notes” in the Written Torah. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah derives the mitzvah from the otherwise unnecessary letters mem, yud and mem (spelling mayim, water) in the words describing the wine libations on the second, sixth and seventh days of Sukkos.[6] A different opinion, that of Rabbi Nechunya, says that this mitzvah is completely halacha leMoshe miSinai.
According to both opinions, the law is the same, and it was taught via a mesorah from Sinai. The dispute between the two opinions is under which subcategory this mitzvah should be included. Is it similar to esrog and hadas, in that a careful reading of Written Torah will teach the existence of this mitzvah, or is it likemechitzos, that even the most careful reading of the Written Torah would not teach this law without our oral mesorah?
What if we forget a mesorah?
The Gemara[7] states that thousands of laws were forgotten during the days that the Jewish people mourned Moshe Rabbeinu’s passing. However, the majority were restored through the brilliant analysis of Asniel ben Kenaz. Are these now mesorah, or are they based on logic? The answer is that although they were originally mesorah, they are now based on logic, notwithstanding the fact that there is no dispute about them.
None of us is as brilliant as Asniel; we would be unable to resolve these issues on the basis of our own analysis. We accept the rulings that Asniel restored because the Beis Din Hagadol accepted Asniel’s logic. This concept will become important to the rest of our discussion.
So far, we have explained the two subcategories, both of which are aspects of the first category – laws that are part of the mesorah that we were taught at Har Sinai. As I mentioned above, the second category of the Torah’s laws are laws that are derived from the written Torah, the “lecture notes” to the Oral Torah, on the basis of the principles that the Torah taught. Since these laws are interpreted through logic, disputes may occur. According to the Rambam, whenever we find a dispute recorded, it may only be regarding a law that falls under either the second or third of the Rambam’s three categories. If a dispute regards a Torah law, it will be a law of the second category, and the dispute is either two differing interpretations of a verse, two differing interpretations of a halacha leMoshe miSinai,[8] or a dispute as to how to apply one of the rules that the Torah provided for interpreting the Written Torah.
It occasionally happened that a great Torah leader received the mesorah of a halacha and a different leader was aware of the halacha but had not received the mesorah upon which it is based. In such an instance, the opinion that cites a mesorah as the source becomes the halachic basis for the law.[9]
Who Decides?
When there is a dispute among gedolei Yisrael concerning how to interpret the words or concepts of the Torah, it is the duty of the Beis Din Hagadol, also known as the Sanhedrin, to decide which approach is the final halacha that klal Yisrael will follow. In the times that the Beis Din Hagadol functioned, all disputed matters were brought to its attention for a ruling. Unfortunately, the Beis Din Hagadol has not functioned for many hundreds of years, and that is why, today, we are often left with unresolved disputes.[10]
The Torah teaches that a great scholar who refuses to follow the ruling of the Sanhedrin and persists in ruling differently from their decision is guilty of a capital offense and called a zakein mamrei.[11] The reason why the Torah treats this offense so seriously is that, otherwise, Klal Yisrael would become divided into many divergent groups, and we would lose our unified Torah.[12]
The Story of Akavya
Let us digress to explain an often-misunderstood Mishnah. The Mishnah[13] teaches that Akavya ben Mahalallel, perhaps the greatest Torah scholar of his generation, disagreed with the other Torah leaders of his generation regarding four different disputes. The other sages recognized Akavya's tremendous scholarship and offered to make him the Av Beis Din, the head of the Sanhedrin, on the condition that he simply recant his position in these four areas. He rejected this because he considered it falsifying the Torah.[14] Yet, when Akavya lay dying, he instructed his son not to follow his positions on any of the four issues. When his son asked him why Akavya himself would not withdraw his opinion, yet instructed his son to do so, Akavya answered: The opinion that I hold is because I heard this from the majority of sages of an earlier generation, and therefore I am bound by what I heard. However, you heard this position only from me, and I am now a minority. You are bound by what you heard to be the majority position, which disagrees with me, and you should therefore follow the position of the majority.[15]
It is apparent that the dispute between Akavya and the other sages was not over a question of mesorah, for then there could have been no dispute. The dispute between them was based on a position that had been arrived at originally through logic. Akavya and the other sages disputed the conclusion of the earlier generation. Since this was a position based on logic, they were freely able to do so.[16]
Was Akavyah a zakein mamrei?
Since Akavyah refused to accept the authority of the rest of the Sanhedrin, why did he not qualify as a zakein mamrei? The Gemara[17] asks this question and cites a dispute on the subject. The approach that is accepted is that, notwithstanding the fact that Akavyah opposed the decision of the Sanhedrin, he refrained from ruling for people. Although he would explain that he disagreed with the ruling of the members of the Sanhedrin, he would never tell someone to follow his position against theirs.
We will continue this topic next week.
[1] Hirsch Commentary to Shemos 21:2, Haberman translation
[2] There are several places where the Rambam discusses these ideas, the most extensive of which is in the Introduction to his Commentary to the Mishnah. He also discusses these ideas in Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Mamrim, Chapter 4; and in Sefer Hamitzvos, his second rule.
[3] Berachos 58a
[4] Sukkah 35a
[5] Taanis 2b, 3a
[6] There is also a third opinion, Rabbi Nosson, who has a different scriptural source for this mitzvah.
[7] Temurah 15b and 16a
[8] See Kol Kisvei Maharatz Chayes, Volume 1, pg 115
[9] Shiurim Lezeicher Aba Mari, Volume 1, page 230
[10] Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 1:4
[11] Devarim 17:12
[12] Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah 495
[13] Eduyos 5:6
[14] The Yam shel Shlomoh, Bava Kama 4:9, explains the seriousness of this prohibition.
[15] Eduyos 5:7
[16] See Margaliyos Hayam, Sanhedrin 88a, who cites this explanation in the name of the Sanhedri Ketanah, for reasons independent of the Rambam’s position.
[17] Sanhedrin 88a